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ABSTRACT: 
 
Uphill All the Way: The Fortunes of Progressivism, 1919-1928 
 
Kevin C. Murphy 
 
 
With very few exceptions, the conventional narrative of American history dates the end 
of the Progressive Era to the postwar turmoil of 1919 and 1920, culminating with the election of 
Warren G. Harding and a mandate for Normalcy. And yet, as this dissertation explores, 
progressives, while knocked back on their heels by these experiences, nonetheless continued to 
fight for change even during the unfavorable political climate of the Twenties.  The Era of 
Normalcy itself was a much more chaotic and contested political period – marked by strikes, race 
riots, agrarian unrest, cultural conflict, government scandals, and economic depression – than the 
popular imagination often recalls. 
 
While examining the trajectory of progressives during the Harding and Coolidge years, 
this study also inquires into how civic progressivism - a philosophy rooted in preserving the 
public interest and producing change through elevated citizenship and educated public opinion – 
was tempered and transformed by the events of the post-war period and the New Era.  
 
With an eye to the many fruitful and flourishing fields that have come to enhance the 
study of political ideology in recent decades, this dissertation revisits the question of progressive 
persistence, and examines the rhetorical and ideological transformations it was forced to make to 
remain relevant in an age of consumerism, technological change, and cultural conflict. In so 
doing, this study aims to reevaluate progressivism's contributions to the New Era and help to 
define the ideological transformations that occurred between early twentieth century reform and 
the liberalism of the New Deal.
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“Perhaps you may ask, ‘Does the road lead uphill all the way?’ And I must answer, ‘Yes, 
to the very end.’ But if I offer you a long, hard struggle, I can also promise you great rewards.”  
 
These are the words of Grace Abbott, the second head of the Children’s Bureau, 
summing up her lifelong experience as a progressive social worker and children’s advocate in a 
1934 commencement address. This quote is also the epigram of Clarke Chambers’ 1963 book, 
Seedtime of Reform, one of the first book-length examinations of the fate of progressivism in the 
Twenties.  It is certainly a very reasonable approximation of the experience of many of the 
progressives in this study during the decade in question. And, as anyone who has ever trod along 
the long, lonely road of academe can tell you, “Uphill All the Way” is also an apt summary of 
the often-Sisyphean task of researching and writing a history dissertation. This particular boulder 
rolled back to the starting point many times over in the seven years since I first embarked on this 
project. It would never have made it over that final crest without the support and encouragement 
of the many listed below. 
 
I would first like to thank my advisor, Alan Brinkley, the other members of my 
dissertation committee, Elizabeth Blackmar, Eric Foner, David Greenberg, and Ira Katznelson, 
and the American history faculty of Columbia University for their advice, their teachings, and 
most of all their patience. Thank you also to the hardworking and friendly archivists at the 
Library of Congress, where I conducted the bulk of my offline research. 
 
I also want to thank my colleagues at the Office of Rosa DeLauro, where I began full-
time work as a speechwriter in the midst of this project, and who were kind enough to offer their 
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support and tolerance when I decided to complete in my off hours what I had started years prior. 
Special thanks go to Liz Albertine, Eric Anthony, Kevin Brennan, Melinda Cep, Sarah Dash, 
Kelly Dittmar, Matt Doyle, Sara Lonardo, Asa Lopatin, Letty Mederos, Beverly Pheto, Kaelan 
Richards, Brian Ronholm, Elyse Schoenfeld, Lona Watts, Megan Whealan, Jasmine Zamani, 
Dan Zeitlin, and Congresswoman DeLauro herself, who, ninety years later, continues the same 
fight for a more progressive America that is chronicled in these pages. 
 
This dissertation, like most other works of research, could never have come together 
without the hard work of the dozens of scholars who gleaned these archives and pulled on these 
same threads before. So I would like to thank the many historians whose work I have cited here, 
and whose body of research was indispensable to me – particularly Leroy Ashby, Wesley M. 
Bagby, Dorothy Brown, Clarke Chambers, Nancy Cott, Alan Dawley, Robert David Johnson, 
David Kennedy, Thomas Knock, William Leuchtenburg, Laton McCartney, Ronald K. Murray, 
Donn Neal, Burl Noggle, David Pietrusza, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Howard Zinn. I also want 
to acknowledge and thank Dr. Carlanna Hendrick, my high school American history teacher 
who, two decades ago, helped set me on the path that culminated in this project today. 
 
Along with my debt to the past, I want to acknowledge my debt to the future. I could 
never have completed this project without the gigantic and growing archive of resources 
available to all via the Internet. From the Google Books and UNZ.org portals, which make 
available thousands of useful primary and secondary sources to anyone who goes looking, to 
magazines like TIME, The New Republic, and The Nation, who now have all of their back-
catalog online for subscribers’ use, the practice of historical research is changing for the better, 
and I and this study have been clear beneficiaries.  
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Thanks also to my friends and fellow boulder-pushers in the Columbia History program, 
who helped to enrich my days as a graduate student and keep my spirits up in the early days of 
this project – especially Sarah Bridger, Ben and Vivian Coates, Alex Cummings, Jason 
Governale, Susan Jean, Ryan Jones, Emily Lieb, Liam Moore, Amy Offner, Giovanni Ruffini, 
Ted Wilkinson, and Josh Wolff. Thank you all.  
 
I also want to thank my other friends in and around New York who helped sustain me 
through the graduate school years, particularly Olaf Bertram-Nothnagel, Lauren Brown, Mike 
Fernandez, Moses Gates, Maria Gambale and Zachary Taylor, Arkadi Gerney and Nancy 
Meakem, Lisa Halliday, Jennifer Martinez, Mark Noferi, Amanda Rawls, Alex Travelli, Joyce 
Wu, and Daniel Yohannes. Thank you also to my friends in DC: John Anderson, Steve Bogart 
and Lynette Millett, Tim Cullen, Lotta Danielsson, Mike Darner, Tony Eason, Alex Lawson and 
Laila Leigh, Marisa McNee, Dave Meyer, Matt Stoller, and Shaunna Thomas. A special thank 
you to Erin Mastrangelo, who helped give me the strength and confidence, when I found myself 
back at square one once again, to make one final, sustained push up the hill.  And thank you to 
all the friends and readers who have sustained me at Ghost in the Machine over the years. 
 
And the deepest of thanks to my closest and dearest friends, who have provided much 
support and encouragement over the long course of this project – David Demian, Jeremy 
Derfner, Marcus Hirschberg and Bea Wikander, Kofi Kankam, Randolph Pelzer, Danny 
Sanchez, David Weaver, and Jonathan Wolff. And many thanks to my family – my sisters 
Gillian and Tessa, my brother and brother-in-law Thad and Ethan, and especially my parents 




Finally, I want to acknowledge my faithful sheltie hound Berkeley, who came with me as 
a young pup to graduate school in the fall of 2001, and who saw this project through with me 
until its end in the fall of 2012. It has seemed like a lifetime for the both of us. And yes, now we 
can go to the dog park. 
 























“THEM was the days! When the muckrakers were best sellers, when trust busters were 
swinging their lariats over every state capitol, when ‘priviledge’ shook in its shoes, when 
God was behind the initiative, the referendum, and the recall – and the devil shrieked 
when he saw the short ballot, when the Masses was at the height of its glory, and Utopia 
was just around the corner. 
 
…Now look at the damned thing. You could put the avowed Socialists into a roomy new 
house, the muckrakers have joined the breadlines, Mr. Coolidge is compared favorably to 
Lincoln, the short ballot is as defunct as Mah Jong, Mr. Eastman writes triolets in 
France, Mr. Steffens has bought him a castle in Italy, and Mr. Howe digs turnips in 
Nantucket. 
 
Shall we lay a wreath on the Uplift Movement in America? I suppose we might as well.” 
 
-- Stuart Chase, 19261 
 
“I thought of Gatsby’s wonder when he first picked out the green light at the end of 
Daisy’s dock. He had come a long way to this blue lawn and his dream must have seemed 
so close that he could hardly fail to grasp it. He did not know that it was already behind 
him, somewhere back in that vast obscurity beyond the city, where the dark fields of the 
republic rolled on under the night. 
 
Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgastic future that year by year recedes before us. 
It eluded us then, but that’s no matter – tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our 
arms farther…And one fine morning --- 
So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.”  
                             -- F. Scott Fitzgerald, 1925.2
                                                          
1
 Stuart Chase, “Where are the Pre-War Radicals?” The Survey, February 1, 1926, 563 
2






The “Twenties were really the formative years of modern American society.” – George Mowry, 
intro to The Twenties: Fords, Flappers, and Fanatics3 
 
“The decade sits solidly at the base of our culture…This was the first serious attempt of 
Americans to make their peace with the twentieth century.” – Paul M. Carter4 
 
“Many difficulties come from the simple failure of our ideas and conventions, not to mention our 
prejudices, to keep up with the pace of material change. Our environment moves much faster 




The Bourne Legacy 
  
“One has a sense of having come to a sudden, short stop at the end of an intellectual era,” 
declared an appalled Randolph Bourne in 1917, as the American left lurched into World War 
One.
6
 While the nation’s progressive president bade his countrymen “make the world safe for 
democracy” and one of its foremost intellectuals waxed enthusiastic about “the social 
possibilities of war,” Bourne portended dire consequences ahead for the forces of reform in 
American life. “It must never be forgotten that in every community it was the least liberal and 
least democratic elements among whom the preparedness and later the war sentiment was 
found,” he argued. “The intellectuals, in other words, have identified themselves with the least 
democratic forces in American life. They have assumed the leadership for war of those very 
classes whom the American democracy had been immemorially fighting. Only in a world where 
irony was dead could an intellectual class enter war at the head of such illiberal cohorts in the 
                                                          
3
 Paul Carter, The Twenties in America (New York: Crowell, 1975), 28. 
4
 Dorothy Marie Brown, Setting a Course: American Women in the 1920s (Boston: G.K. Hall, 1987), 1. 
5
 Jane Addams, The Second Twenty Years at Hull House (New York: MacMillan Company, 1930), 392. 
6
 Randolph Silliman Bourne and Olaf Hansen, The Radical Will : Selected Writings, 1911-1918 (Berkeley: 




avowed cause of world-liberalism and world-democracy.” “The whole era,” concluded Bourne in 
disgust, “has been spiritually wasted.”7 
 
Nothing if not prescient, Randolph Bourne’s words have become an epitaph for the 
Progressive Era in the decades since his untimely death in 1918.
8
 Indeed, with very few 
exceptions, the standard, textbook interpretation of American history dates the end of the 
progressive movement to the postwar turmoil of 1919 and 1920, culminating in the election of 
Warren G. Harding and a mandate for Normalcy.
9
 Over the next decade, so the story goes, the 
nation entered a New Era marked by conservatism, consumerism, and cultural conflict, three C’s 
for which the progressive ideology of yore seemed wholly inadequate and obsolete.
10
 
Progressives, at the center of American political life prior to the Great War, became victims to 
the cruel disillusion of un-fulfillment – They were, as one historian framed the prevailing tale in 
                                                          
7
 Ibid, 308. 
8
 Indeed, one does not have to look very far to find Bourne playing the grim harbinger of progressive demise in 
several narratives of the period. “Bourne was right: the progressives needed the war effort, and the war effort needed 
them,” concludes Michael McGerr in his recent synthesis A Fierce Discontent. “What was canny intuition in 1917 
became obvious reality by 1919 and 1920.” In The Story of American Freedom, Eric Foner uses Randolph Bourne to 
similar purpose. “Bourne’s prescience soon became apparent…[the war] laid the foundation not for the triumph of 
Progressivism but for one of the most conservative decades in American history.” Michael E. McGerr, A Fierce 
Discontent : The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920 (New York: Free Press, 2003), 
283,310.. Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 177.. 
9
 “No concept,” argued historian Burl Noggle in 1966, “has endured longer or been more pervasive among historians 
than the one which views the 1920s as a time of reaction and isolation induced by the emotional experience of 
World War I.” Milton Plesur, The 1920's: Problems and Paradoxes; Selected Readings (Boston,: Allyn and Bacon, 
1969). p. 283. Similarly, Arthur Link remarked in 1959 that, “[w]riting without out much fear or much research (to 
paraphrase Carl Becker’s remark), we recent American historians have gone indefatiguably to perpetuate hypotheses 
that either reflected the disillusionment and despair of contemporaries, or once served their purpose in exposing the 
alleged hiatus in the great continuum of twentieth-century reform.” Arthur Link, “What happened to the Progressive 
Movement in the 1920s?” The American Historical Review,  Vol. 64, No. 4 (Jul. 1959), 833. 
10
 As LeRoy Ashby sums it up in his study of William Borah, “by the Twenties, [the] prewar progressive consensus 
was in shambles. As the unifying spirit and confidence of the earlier years dissolved, the internal weaknesses of 
progressivism became all too apparent. One agonizing problem – and one which Borah symbolized so vividly – was 
the need to square the basically rural and agrarian social vision of progressivism with the demands of an ethnically 
and racially diverse nation. Although many progressive leaders were urban residents, their roots and biases tended to 
be overwhelmingly rural. Their penchant for individualism, their hostility to special privilege, and their Protestant 
faith comprised the intellectual and cultural baggage which they carried with them from their village backgrounds.” 
LeRoy Ashby, The Spearless Leader; Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920's (Urbana,: 




1959, “stunned and everywhere in retreat along the entire political front, their forces 
disorganized and leaderless, their movement shattered, their dreams of a new America turned 
into agonizing nightmares.”11 And only after the earth-shattering tumult of the Great Depression, 
nine years hence, would a revived and rethought liberal creed rise again to national prominence, 
like a phoenix from out the ashes of progressive despair. 
 
It makes for a good story, and, like most neat narrative conventions of synthesis, there is 
indeed much truth to it. Clearly, many Progressive contemporaries saw events as such: In 1920, 
Senator Hiram Johnson lamented “the rottenest period of reaction that we have had in many 
years.” Harold Ickes reflected seven years later that 1927 still “isn’t the day for our kind of 
politics.” And Progressive luminary Jane Addams looked back at the entirety of the Twenties as 
“a period of political and social sag.”12 
 
And, yet, the progressive experience from 1919-1929, while perhaps primarily a 
declension narrative, deserves to be further explored.  In the words of Ellis Hawley, “[d]elving 
beneath the older stereotypes of ‘normalcy’ and ‘retrenchment,’ scholars have found unexpected 
survivals of progressivism.”13 Indeed, as historian Leroy Ashby notes of the first election cycle 
after Harding’s victory, “the 1922 campaigns seemed positive proof that the progressive 
movement was regaining some of its prewar vigor,” with a number of progressive candidates in 
Congress and gubernatorial races, such as Burton Wheeler, Gifford Pinchot, Al Smith, and 
Fiorello LaGuardia, defeating their more conservative opposition. (Indeed, after the election 
                                                          
11
 Link, 834. 
12
 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent : The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920, 313,15. 
Ashby, The Spearless Leader; Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920's, 284. 
13
 Ellis Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an Associative State, 1921-1928,” 




returns, The New Republic went so far as to declare “Progressivism Reborn.”)14 And, while the 
failed third party bid of Robert La Follette in 1924 saw progressivism “fragmented, leaderless, 
and far removed from the optimism that had followed the 1922 election,” America’s choice for 
President in 1928 nevertheless consisted of two candidates with some progressive credentials, 




Noting this discrepancy between narrative and evidence in 1959, historian Arthur Link 
suggested in his essay “What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s?” that 
“perhaps it is high time that we discard the sweeping generalizations, false hypotheses, and 
clichés that we have so often used in explaining and characterizing political developments from 
1918 to 1929…When we do this we will no longer ask whether the progressive movement was 
defunct in the 1920s. We will only ask what happened to it and why.”16  
 
With Link’s fifty-year-old challenge as a guide stone, and with an eye to all the broader 
and exciting new lines of inquiry that have opened in American history since, this study aims to 
reexamine the fortunes of progressivism in the decade from 1919 to 1929. How were prominent 
progressives impacted by the experiences of the immediate post-war era? How did they navigate 
their way through the 1920s? What causes did they take up and what contributions did they make 
to the politics of the period? And, perhaps most importantly, what sort of rhetorical and 
ideological transformations were progressives forced to make to keep their ideology practicable 
and relevant in an age of consumer culture and cultural conflict? 
                                                          
14
 Ashby, The Spearless Leader; Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920's, 56-57. 
15
 Ibid., 179. 
16




As this study explores, progressives were badly jarred by the failures of Wilsonism and 
the excesses that marked the annus horribilis of 1919, and many never recovered. But others 
persisted even during the unfavorable political climate of the Twenties.  
 
Shocked by the outright repression and virulent nationalism that had accompanied World 
War I and the subsequent Red Scare, some progressives began rethinking the appropriate role of 
state power and the importance of civil liberties, just as others crafted draconian immigration 
reforms that followed the letter, if not the spirit, of earlier attempts to "Americanize" citizens. 
Wary of the influx of private interests into government life that accompanied the return to 
normalcy, some progressives, particularly the Western mavericks in the Senate, battled 
corruption on both ends of Washington, and reaffirmed the centrality of the public interest in 
endeavors ranging from radio regulation to public power. Progressive peace activists and 
organizations emerged at the forefront of an international disarmament movement.  Newly 
empowered with the vote, many progressive women looked to fashion a stronger federal role 
over the realms of education, health care, and child welfare.   
 
The Progressive-headed "Committee of Forty-Eight" attempted to forge an independent 
political movement behind insurgent Senator Robert M. LaFollette, who captured approximately 
17% of the vote in 1924. The NAACP, under the leadership of W.E.B. Du Bois, worked to 
improve the lives of African-Americans in southern states and northern cities, and began crafting 
its legal strategy to dismantle segregation. And countless progressive reformers, in laboratories 




with ideas, ranging from social insurance to associationalism to regional development, which 
would later form the centerpiece of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal. 
 
But, as times changed, so too did progressivism, and not the least because many of its 
leading lights either grew tired and frail or passed beyond the veil. From World War I on, 
progressives continually found their foundational faith in individual improvement and the 
infallibility of an informed electorate tested. The “business bloc” that formed behind Harding 
and Coolidge, coupled with cultural conflicts of the period, as embodied most famously by the 
Scopes Trial and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, further strained the progressive belief in a 
crusading, dispassionate, and well-informed middle-class as a vehicle for change.  And as 
progressives grappled with the growing centrality of consumerism and consumerist thinking in 
all aspects of American life and governance, they had also to confront the abysmal failure of - 
and fallout from - Prohibition, the movement's most ambitious moral experiment, and a telling 
indicator of the limits of reform. 
 
Over the course of the decade, as progressives saw setback after setback and everything 
from advertising to Freudianism suggested that base instinct all too often prevailed over reason, 
many seemed to lose their abiding faith in the central touchstones of their ideology: the concept 
of the public interest, the transformative power of public opinion, and the capacity for individual 
improvement. Instead of conceiving themselves as the vanguard of the popular will, many now 
defined themselves as an oppositional elite. Chiding themselves for their earlier ambitions, and 
lamenting what they now thought of as hopeless naivete, they turned inward and apart. They 
began to dwell less on how to mold good citizens and more on questions of economic power and 




Deal, progressives tempered by the post-war experience also bequeathed a new language and 
disposition toward reform that would characterize the movement for decades to come. 
Progressives and Progressivism 
 
 But what is progressivism? And who were the progressives? These are two seemingly 
straightforward questions that have nevertheless haunted the efforts of many an enterprising 
historian over the years. Regarding the first of these queries, any satisfactory working definition 
of progressivism as a guiding political ideology must clearly be expansive and flexible enough to 
allow for considerable variation, encompassing New Nationalists, Wilsonians, prohibitionists, 
and suffragettes. As Robert Crunden writes in Ministers of Reform, progressives “shared no 
platform, nor were they members of a single movement,” but they “shared moral values.” It is 
tempting to utilize a Potter Stewart definition for progressivism and simply argue that one knows 




In broad terms, and for the purposes of this study, progressivism constituted what Samuel 
Hays famously referred to as a “response to industrialism,” and to the “fundamental 
redistributions of wealth, power, and status” that occurred in its wake. In others words, 
progressivism arose in reaction to the unmitigated corporate power that had defined the Gilded 
Age, and progressives usually defined themselves in opposition to that power, even as they 
embraced some of its methods. “Ultimately,” as historian John Buenker summarizes Hays’ 
thesis, “nearly everyone began to perceive that the only way to cope with his problems and to 
                                                          
17
 Robert Morss Crunden, Ministers of Reform: The Progressives’ Achievement in American Civilization, 1889-1920 
(Chicago: Illini Books, 1984), ix. Daniel Rodgers’ essay “In Search of Progressivism” ably summarizes the rise and 
fall of progressivism as a unifying construct up through 1982. More recently however, syntheses such as James 
Kloppenberg’s Uncertain Victory, Michael McGerr’s A Fierce Discontent (2003) and Rodgers’ own Atlantic 




advance or protect his interests was to organize, for the new environment put a premium on 
large-scale enterprise. For most people, as Hays so effectively put it, it was a case of ‘organize or 
perish.’”18  
 
However hotly contested other aspects of progressivism have been over the years, 
historians have also tended to agree that progressives generally hailed from the middle-class 
(Indeed, this is as often meant as an epithet as much as a descriptor.
19
) As Michael McGerr puts 
it, progressivism was “the creed of a crusading middle class,” a bold and brazen attempt “to 
transform other Americans, to remake the nation’s feuding, polyglot population in their own 
middle-class image” and “build what William James sneeringly but accurately labeled the 
‘middle-class paradise.’”20 
 
In addition, progressivism as a public philosophy hewed closely to what political scientist 
Michael Sandel has described as “civic republicanism.” Central to this theory of civic 
republicanism, writes Sandel, “is the idea that liberty depends on sharing in self-government: 
 
It means deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the 
destiny of the political community. But to deliberate well about the common good requires more 
than the capacity to choose one’s ends and to respect other’s rights to do the same. It requires a 
knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, a moral bond 
with the community whose fate is at stake. To share in self-rule, therefore requires that citizens 
possess, or come to acquire, certain qualities of character, or civic virtues. But this means that 
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republican politics cannot be neutral toward the values and ends its citizens espouse. The 
republican conception of freedom, unlike the liberal conception, requires a formative politics, a 
politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires.21 
  
In other words, whether they perceived the most dangerous threat to the nation to be 
unfettered capitalism, monopoly power, moral hygiene, ethnic political machines, or the demon 
rum, progressives aimed to preserve the forms and prerequisites of democratic citizenship from 
outside dangers and to inculcate some form of civic virtue into the electorate. In effect, the 
overarching goal of progressivism was to defend the American experiment against the 
vicissitudes of capitalism and vice, in part by transforming and “uplifting” American citizens. 
 
Progressives also all generally agreed on certain fundamental principles of change. First, 
that men and women could be molded. In the words of New Republic editor Herbert Croly, 
“democracy must stand or fall on a platform of possible human perfectibility. If human nature 
cannot be improved by institutions, democracy is at best a more than usually safe form of 
political organization.” Second, humans had the power to improve their communities and 
themselves by sheer force of applied reason. Following from this, the most powerful force for 
change in the world was enlightened public opinion. “[I]f the people knew the facts about 
inhuman working conditions and the neglect of children,” argued Frances Perkins in one of 
innumerable examples, “they would desire to act morally and responsibly.”22 
 
 In Reform, Labor, and Feminism, her 1988 study of Margaret Dreier Robins and the 
Women’s Trade Union League, Elizabeth Payne eloquently defines progressivism as “the last, 
                                                          
21
 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent : America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996). 
22
 David Danbom, The World of Hope: Progressives and the Struggle for an Ethical Public Life (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1987), 137. Clarke Chambers, Seedtime of Reform: American Social Service and Social 




full-blown articulation of that optimistic, republican, tolerant, and liberal Protestant view of the 
individual and society that had informed America for one hundred years and that found its most 
eloquent statement in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s call for the reformation of man. That tradition 
saw the individual as possessing enormous potential for good, which could only be realized by a 
properly structured society.”23 
 
In Payne’s casting, the agenda of progressivism was “to pass the laws and create the 
institutions that would release the individual’s potential both as a person and as a citizen. The 
Progressive’s task was to liberate the individual from enslaving ignorance, debasing labor, 
soulless pastimes, corrupt authority, and concentrated power. Once these multiple and 
interlocking tyrannies were destroyed, the hitherto ‘hidden treasures’ of the self would be freed 
for social expression; ‘every resource of body, mind, and heart’ would find vent in elevating 
fellowship and individual excellence.”24 
 
 “Born between 1854 and 1874,” notes Robert Crunden similarly in Ministers of Reform, 
“the first generation of creative progressives absorbed the severe, Protestant moral values of their 
parents and instinctively identified those values with Abraham Lincoln, the Union, and the 
Republican Party”:  
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But they grew up in a world where the ministry no longer seemed intellectually respectable and 
alternatives were few. Educated men and women demanded useful careers that satisfied 
demanding consciences. They groped toward new professions such as social work, journalism, 
academia, the law, and politics. In each of these careers, they could become preachers urging 
moral reform on institutions as well as individuals… Men and women found that settlement 
work, higher education, law, and journalism all offered possibilities for preaching without pulpits. 
Over the long term, their goal was an educated democracy that would create laws that would, in 
turn, produce a moral democracy.”25 
 
 
 David Danbom’s 1987 study The World of Hope: Progressives and the Struggle for an 
Ethical Public Life also argues that progressives “were products of the Victorian age in which 
they grew up. They reflected the Victorian faith in the individual and confidence in the 
inevitability of human progress. They reflected also the crisis of authority in Victorian society 
between religious and secular modes of understanding human affairs, and the value crisis raised 
by the realities of a modernizing, industrializing society. These crises stimulated them to action, 
leading them to attempt to infuse the values of private life into public life.” 26   
 
As products of a Victorian mindset, Danbom argues, progressives “looked backward 
rather than forward….their purpose was to hold a reluctant society to its basic values, not to pull 
it into the modern age.” They also “embraced a religious and secular faith in individual self-
determination that infused every area of human behavior.” In the words of progressive Frederic 
C. Howe, former Commissioner of Ellis Island and author of the much-discussed memoir 
Confessions of a Reformer, “early assumptions as to virtue and vice, goodness and evil remained 
in my mind long after I had tried to discard them. That is, I think, the most characteristic 
influence of my generation. It explains the nature of our reforms, the regulatory legislation in 
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morals and economics, our belief in men rather than in institutions and our messages to other 
peoples.”27  
 
Of course, by the late teens and especially by the Twenties, the world was a rather 
different place than it had been only thirty years before. And especially by World War I, a 
younger generation of progressives was emerging alongside that of Howe – a generation who, 
while embracing the basic tenets of progressivism outlined above, were also more accustomed to 
twentieth-century ferment. They would eventually comprise the vanguard of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, and the passing of the baton to them is one of the foci of this tale. 
Cast of Characters 
 
 As noted above, progressives were a diverse lot, involved in a myriad of social and 
political reforms. As such, this study focuses on distinct groups of reformers at various times. 
Foremost among these are the progressive Senate bloc of the Mid-West and West, which 
included William Borah, Robert La Follette, Hiram Johnson, George Norris, and Burton 
Wheeler. As Leroy Ashby argues, these men of the West constituted the “main source of 
progressive strength on Capitol Hill” during the Twenties.28  
 
Also covered in this study are the writers and intellectuals of The New Republic, The 
Nation, and The Survey, among them Herbert Croly, Walter Lippmann, Bruce Bliven, Paul 
Kellogg, Oswald Villard, Freda Kirchwey, and Ernest Gruening. These journalists and scholars, 
“middle class in background and deeply committed to the progressive movement,” argued 
Charles Forcey in 1961, “were leaders among the men who sought to move liberalism in [a] new 
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direction,” both during and after the Progressive Era.29 “Journals like The New Republic and The 
Nation,” argues Lynn Dumenil, “continued at the center of liberal thought” in the 1920’s. Also 
part of this tale is H.L. Mencken, the acerbic and venerable columnist for the Baltimore Sun. 
While Mencken fits in no easy box, his voice would be both one of the more prescient and most 




Leaders of the women’s suffrage movement, as well as other prominent progressives 
concerned with combating gender inequality, such as Florence Kelley, Alice Paul, Margaret 
Dreier Robins, Carrie Chapman Catt, and Jane Addams, all play a role in this story, with Addams 
in particular something of the patron saint of progressivism during the decade. As Robert 
Johnston noted in his survey of recent Progressive literature, “the overwhelming sense from 
recent scholarship is not only that women as a general collectivity were indeed empowered by 
and through Progressivism, but that women were chiefly responsible for some of the most 
important democratic reforms of the age.”31  
 
The old, capital-P progressives that had congregated around Teddy Roosevelt – Harold 
Ickes, Raymond Robins, Amos and Gifford Pinchot, William Allen White – have a part to play 
as well, with Ickes’ falling away from Bull Moose Republican to FDR Democrat throughout the 
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period a particularly useful window into the progressive politics of the decade. We will also see 
urban reformers such as Al Smith and Fiorello LaGuardia of New York. Historians such as John 
Buenker have argued that such urban reformers constituted a “vital part of the Progressive Era” 
and have often been overlooked, to the detriment of our understanding of the period.
32
 
Obviously, Smith and his ilk are particularly important in understanding the political events of 
1924 and 1928.  
 
Smith’s 1928 opponent, Herbert Hoover, has been deemed by historians such as Ellis 
Hawley and Joan Hoff-Wilson as the “Forgotten Progressive.” As Hawley notes, Hoover was at 
the center of “the most rapidly expanding sector of New Era governmental activity…[the] 
transformation and expansion of the commerce secretariat.”33 African-American progressives 
such as W.E.B. DuBois, James Weldon Johnson, and Walter White prove particularly valuable in 
examining how the ideology and rhetoric of progressivism was transformed by the exigencies of 
racial and cultural conflict. Socialists and former radicals – Eugene Debs, Victor Berger, Crystal 
Eastman, Margaret Sanger, Roger Baldwin – are also present in this story, as they made common 
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While these reformers do not all impact equally on every subject of discussion, taken 
together I believe they form a wide-ranging palette with which to examine the questions that 
drive this study. 
Review of the Literature 
 
The question of progressivism in the twenties – while once very much in favor – has not 
been scrutinized in depth for awhile. Arthur Link’s 1959 essay “What Happened to the 
Progressive Movement in the 1920’s?” remains the foundation for studies of this sort – In it, 
Link hypothesized that the various members of the progressive coalition, although unable to 
reunite or to capture a major party, were still very much alive and well in the New Era. In a 1966 
article for the Journal of American History, which declared the Twenties a “New 
Historiographical Frontier,” Burl Noggle ably surveyed the findings of then-recent monographs 
on New Era progressivism: 
 
An intriguing but most debatable theme that political historians lately have enlarged upon is that 
of reform in the 1920s. Studies have begun to reveal survivals of Progressivism and preludes to 
the New Deal in the decade. Clarke Chambers has found a strong social welfare movement at 
work in the period, one concerned with child labor, slums, poor housing, and other problems that 
Progressives before the 1920s and New Dealers afterward also sought to alleviate. Preston J. 
Hubbard has studied the Muscle Shoals controversy of the 1920s and has demonstrated the 
essential role that Progressives in the decade played in laying the basis for the New Deal’s TVA 
system. Donald C. Swain has shown that much of the conservation program of the New Deal 
originated in the 1920s. Howard Zinn has shown that Fiorello La Guardia, as congressman from 
New York in the 1920s, provided a ‘vital link between the Progressive and New Deal eras. La 
Guardia entered Congress as the Bull Moose uproar was quieting and left with the arrival of the 
New Deal; in the intervening years no man in national office waged the Progressive battle so 
long.’ La Guardia in the 1920s was ‘the herald of a new kind of progressivism, borne into 
American politics by the urban-immigrant sections of the population.’ Not only his background 
and his ideology, but also his specific legislative program, writes Zinn, were ‘an astonishingly 
accurate preview of the New Deal.’” 35 
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All of these works mentioned by Noggle, along with his own work on Teapot Dome and 
the immediate post-war years, have informed this study. So too has perhaps the best book-length 
treatment of New Era progressivism since Noggle’s writing, Leroy Ashby’s 1972 tome The 
Spearless Leader: Senator Borah and the Progressive Movement in the 1920s. In this work, as 
noted previously, Ashby attributes the demise of progressivism in the Twenties not only to a 
failure of leadership (i.e., Borah’s mercurial predisposition to always return to the Republican 
fold at the last moment
36
), but to the aforementioned cultural clashes which irreparably 
fragmented the progressive concept of the public interest. 
 
Reflecting the general movement away from political history and towards cultural history 
since Ashby’s day, most recent work on the Twenties – with some exceptions – has taken the end 
of progressivism in 1919 as a given and tended to focus instead on the contentious cultural 
clashes that marked the period, such as the rise of the second Ku Klux Klan, the Scopes trial, and 
the emergence of the “New Woman.”37  
 
However, there are some notable exceptions. David Goldberg’s 1999 synthesis 
Discontented America devotes a chapter to the demise of progressivism in the Twenties. 
Goldberg attributes the “Indian Summer of Progressivism” in the early 1920s to “widespread 
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agricultural discontent,” yet ultimately concludes that “progressivism as a movement never 
recovered from the 1924 defeat” of Robert La Follette and the Progressive Party.38  
 
And in his 2003 book Changing the World: American Progressives in War and 
Revolution, the late Alan Dawley argues in his final chapter that, “as progressivism died out in 
the higher circles of power, it was reborn in social movements down below. It came to life in the 
vital postwar peace movement, in the hard-fought struggles of organized labor, in the protests of 
small farmers, and in the spirited defense of civil liberties.” Instead, Dawley argues, “keepers of 
the faith took a turn toward economics, threw in their lot with the producing classes, and set out 
to win economic justice for farmers and workers. In taking the economic turn, postwar reformers 




With the exception of a brief prologue and epilogue, this study is broken down into three 
main parts:  Part One, “Crack-Up: From Versailles to Normalcy,” covers the plight of 
progressives from the signing of the Armistice to the election of Warren Harding in 1920. While 
this first section is told mostly in narrative form, Parts Two and Three, “Confronting Normalcy” 
and “A New Era” – which culminate in the elections of 1924 and 1928 respectively – cover the 
experiences of progressives across the decade by subject. 
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“I am honestly sorry,” Jane Addams would write in the introduction of her 1930 book 
The Second Twenty Years at Hull House, “to write so much in this book of the effects of the 
world war.” This was a common refrain throughout the period of study – F. Scott Fitzgerald 
attributed the entire character of the decade to “all the nervous energy stored up and unexpended 
in the war.” “I have no doubt,” said Clarence Darrow, “but what the war is largely responsible 
for the reactionary tendency of the day.” The war and its aftermath “all but destroyed my picture 
of America,” said Frederic Howe. “It does not come to life again.” To John Haynes Holmes, it 
proved the “America we loved was gone, and in its place was just one more cruel imperialism. 
The discovery ended a movement which had for its purpose the protection and vindication of an 
ideal America.”40  
 
In sum, the period from 1918 to 1920 would set the stage for most of the decade to come. 
Chapter One and Two of this section cover progressive reaction to the demoralizing failures of 
Woodrow Wilson at Versailles and the battle over the League of Nations respectively. Chapter 
Three surveys the long, dark night of the soul that was 1919, when a steady diet of strikes, race 
riots, and repression conspired to bury the progressive post-war dream. Chapter Four takes up the 
tale with the election of 1920, when, as a result of all the calamities covered in the first three 
chapters, amiable mediocrity Warren Harding won the most decisive presidential victory in a 
century. 
 
With the stage thus set, Part Two – “Confronting Normalcy” – covers much of the 
experience of 1920-1924, a time that – contrary to the Gatsbyesque view of the Twenties in the 
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popular imagination – was in many ways as hard-fought and full of conflict as the immediate 
post-war period. The time usually thought of as the Roaring Twenties – a boom era when 
progress stagnated and business values reigned triumphant – did not really come to pass until 
Calvin Coolidge ascended to the presidency. In the years of Harding Normalcy, the country 
remained in the grip of a post-war recession, and, even as progressives passed the Sheppard-
Towner Act, rolled back the legal excesses of the Red Scare, moved the country toward a 
disarmament footing, and exposed systemic corruption in the administration, the nation as a 
whole saw labor violence erupt in West Virginia and Herrin, Illinois, race wars flare up in Tulsa 
and Rosewood, and a strike wave redound across the nation in 1922. 
 
Chapter Five, “The Politics of Normalcy,” begins the examination of this period by 
chronicling the tenor, conduct, and achievements of the Harding administration, attempts by 
congressional progressives to organize in opposition over the course of the decade, and efforts to 
establish and maintain the virtue of good government in American life, by decrying lobbies, 





Chapter Six, “Legacies of the Scare,” focuses on the newfound attention paid by many 
progressives in the Twenties to issues of civil liberties, including the right to organize, during the 
Twenties, and covers such as issues as the struggles of the ACLU, the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, the 
                                                          
41
 It was “persistent investigative work by Montana senators Burton K. Wheeler and Thomas Walsh,” writes David 
Goldberg in his recent survey of the Twenties, which “began to uncover the full scope of the Teapot Dome scandal, 
and progressives remained convinced that the ‘radical swing’ would be carried into the election year.” Similarly, 
Burl Noggle’s 1962 work on Teapot Dome argued that it was progressive conservationists, namely friends of 
Gifford Pinchot, who set the Teapot Dome scandal in motion. Goldberg, Discontented America, 60. Burl Noggle, 




NAACP’s fight for anti-lynching legislation, and the labor conflicts of the period.42 Chapter 
Seven, “America and the World,” examines the nationalistic and anti-imperialistic foreign policy 
of “peace progressives,” honed during the battle over the League of Nations, and covers such 
issues as the continued question of American involvement in the League and World Court, the 
disarmament and outlawry movements, and immigration restriction. Closing out Part Two, 
Chapter Eight covers the story of the election of 1924, when disaffected groups propelled Robert 
La Follette and the Progressive Party to one of the more impressive third-party candidacies of the 
century. 
 
Part Three, “A New Era,” takes up the story after Coolidge’s impressive victory in 1924. 
It begins with Chapter Nine, “The Business of America,” highlighting the ascendancy of the 
business culture in government and American life, and covering Harding’s budget reforms, the 
Coolidge administration, the work of Herbert Hoover and Andrew Mellon, the rise of welfare 
capitalism, and the enthronement – particularly among a younger generation – of professionalism 
and expertise as progressive virtues.  Chapter Ten, “Culture and Consumption,” examines the 
rocky shoals progressives faced in trying to navigate between consumerism and cultural conflict 
during the New Era. On one side, even as emerging technologies like radio and the cinema 
suggested intriguing new possibilities for enlightening public opinion, conspicuous consumption 
and advertising threatened to overwhelm the basic philosophical underpinnings of progressive 
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ideology. On the other hand, traditionalist reactions to the pace of change, like the Ku Klux Klan, 
anti-Scopes fundamentalism, and the apparent failure of prohibition seemed a mocking shadow 




Chapters Eleven, “New Deal Coming,” surveys the policy foundations of the New Deal 
laid down in the immediate postwar era and Twenties, including former suffragists’ defense of a 
more robust federal welfare state, the innovations of the Al Smith administration in Albany, 
attempts to rein in the power of the Supreme Court, and George Norris’ lonely fight for public 
power. Finally, Chapter Twelve concludes the tale with an examination of the election of 1928 
and its aftermath, including the personal attempts by progressives, over the course of the decade, 
to stave off defeatism and despair.  
 
Writing in The Survey on New Year’s Day 1921 in answer to the question “What Else 
Must Be Done To Make This a More Livable World,” Felix Adler, founder of the Society for 
Ethical Culture, argued that “the best satisfaction we can hope for is the consciousness of 
creative activity in the effort to make it better.” In a decade that often saw reaction in the driver’s 
seat and the ideals that had sustained the progressive experiment for decades under assault, that 
consciousness of a fight hard-waged – and the companionship of those also engaged in the 
struggle – would often be the only consolation for progressives. In the ten years between the 
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PROLOGUE: INAUGURATION DAY, 1921 
 
“When one surveys the world about him after the great storm, noting the marks of 
destruction and yet rejoicing in the ruggedness of the things which withstood it, if he is an 
American he breathes the clarified atmosphere with a strange mingling of regret and new 
hope.”45 So began Warren G. Harding on the crisp, cold morning of March 4, 1921, soon after 
taking the oath of office to become the 29th president of the United States. A return to 
“normalcy” had been Harding’s solemn vow as a presidential candidate, of course, and 
everything from the stripped-down spectacle of the day’s events – at the president-elect’s 
request, the customary ball had been abandoned and the usual parade had been scaled back – to 
the content of the inaugural address worked to convey the impression that this “great storm” had 
passed, that the long national nightmare of the Wilson years was ended, and that the new steward 




“Our supreme task is the resumption of our onward, normal way,” argued the new 
president. “Reconstruction, readjustment, restoration, all these must follow.” In their 
overreaching, Harding suggested, the policies of Woodrow Wilson had disrupted the natural 
order of things. “[N]o statute enacted by man can repeal the inexorable laws of nature. Our most 
dangerous tendency is to expect too much of government,” he warned.  Surveying the American 
economy after eight years of Democratic rule, Harding thought “[t]he normal balances have been 
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impaired, the channels of distribution have been clogged, the relations of labor and management 
have been strained.” And, as the world had “witnessed again and again the futility and the 
mischief of ill-considered remedies for social and economic disorders,” the new President 
promised a simpler and humbler approach to governance on his watch.  “I speak for 
administrative efficiency, for lightened tax burdens, for sound commercial practices, for 
adequate credit facilities, for sympathetic concern for all agricultural problems, for the omission 
of unnecessary interference of Government with business, for an end to Government's 
experiment in business, and for more efficient business in Government administration.”47 
 
In short, as per his decisive electoral mandate – Harding had defeated Democratic 
nominee and Ohio Governor James A. Cox the previous November with 60.3% of the popular 
vote (as opposed to only 34.1% for Cox, the largest popular vote differential in modern 
American history) – Harding promised an end to Wilsonian hubris, a light government touch and 
the type of sturdy, well-practiced, and business-minded leadership that had marked Republican 
administrations since the days of Williams McKinley and Taft. As the New York Tribune 
summed up Harding’s remarks, “he looks at our political and economic life with no innovating 
eye. He is a conserver, and would stick to the time tested. The old America is good enough for 
him.”48 
 
And yet, however much Harding’s words conveyed a safe and salutary return to the way 
things ought to be, signs of change were in the air, as perhaps exemplified by the “startlingly 
modern jazz number” played as America’s new First Lady, Florence Harding, whom her 
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husband and his confidants referred to as “the Duchess,” took her seat.49 For Harding’s inaugural 
that morning was not only the first to employ an automobile rather than the conventional 
carriage, it was also the first to be amplified by loudspeakers and the first broadcast across the 
nation – as well as to army posts and battleships around the world – via a “special wireless 
telephone apparatus.”50  
 
Another sign of the times was the increased police presence at the event, who, along with 
1000 Boy Scouts and 400 members of the Home Defense League, spied for troublemakers and 
ne’er-do-wells among the crowd – including attendees who might try to sneak a drink. (A earlier 




And, perhaps most indicative of changing times was the attention paid by Harding – the 
first president elected after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment – to America’s new women 
voters. “With the nation-wide induction of womanhood into our political life,” Harding 
proclaimed, “we may count upon her intuitions, her refinements, her intelligence, and her 
influence to exalt the social order. We count upon her exercise of the full privileges and the 
performance of the duties of citizenship to speed the attainment of the highest state.”52 
  
His tip of the hat to America’s newest voters notwithstanding, the meat of Harding’s 
inaugural message was geared toward the nation’s business and financial sectors.  “President 
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Harding has touched admirably upon many matters that are of great moment to the whole world 
today,” Thomas W. Lamont of J.P. Morgan told the NY Times. For his part, Elbert Gary, 
Chairman of U.S. Steel, found the speech “able, comprehensive, clear, and convincing…it will 
have a reassuring and decided effect upon the general commercial, financial and industrial affairs 
of the country.”53 And, while financial markets “failed to display the animation expected” after 
Harding’s inaugural, the Wall Street Journal did attest that “the contents were favorably 
commented upon by interests in the Financial District,” with “the withdrawal of the Government 
from business and the readjustment of tax problems” proving “of exceptional interest.”54 
 
Political conservatives also rejoiced. No doubt finding validation in its thorough 
renunciation of the League of Nations, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge 
deemed the speech “a splendid address…all must be gratified with the patriotic spirit that it 
breathed.” Enthused Republican Senator James Watson of Indiana, “It was magnificent…It was 
thoroughly American from beginning to end…it bore a spirit of loyalty to American institutions 
and against internationalism and all weakening of the spirit of true patriotism.”55 
 
And even to many press observers, the “great storm” seemed at long last over as well. 
“Under blue skies serene and cloudless a multitude listened with deep approval,” wrote George 
Rothwell Brown of the Washington Post, as Harding “reconsecrated the nation to the ideals of its 
inspired founders…No president ever more quickly found his way into the hearts and minds of 
the people.”56  
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Also writing in the Post, actress and inaugural attendee Lillian Russell Moore similarly 
conveyed her enthusiasm for the new president as the dawning of a new day: “America is full of 
sunshine once more,” she exclaimed. “It was all uplifting. There is a hope and a feeling of good 
fellowship in the hearts of the people in Washington. The mystery, the silence, the aloofness that 
has been the condition here in and about the White House for the last few years, so depressing 
and menacing, is dispelled…I thanked God that I was an American and that a true American 
through whose veins coursed real American blood was our president.”57 
 
Still, the acclaim was not unanimous – There were those who found Harding’s inaugural 
less sanguine. The policies in the speech aside, Baltimore Sun columnist H.L. Mencken thought 
its form alone, which he famously dubbed “Gamalielese,” prophesied dark days ahead for the 
country. “On the question of the logical content of Dr. Harding’s harangue of last Friday, I do 
not presume to have views,” he wrote. “But when it comes to the style of the great man’s 
discourse, I can speak with…somewhat more competence…[H]e writes the worst English I have 
ever encountered. It reminds me of a string of wet sponges; it reminds me of tattered washing on 
the line; it reminds me of stale bean soup, of college yells, of dogs barking idiotically through 
endless nights. It is so bad that a sort of grandeur creeps into it. It drags itself out of the dark 
abysm…of pish, and crawls insanely up to the topmost pinnacle of posh. It is rumble and 
bumble. It is flap and doodle. It is balder and dash.”58  
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Mencken’s memorable diatribe can in part be explained away as the usual nattering of an 
interminable cynic. But he was not alone in his contempt for the new president. However they 
felt about the deeply polarizing Woodrow Wilson, many progressives saw grim tidings for 
reform in Harding’s ascendance to the Oval Office.  
 
James Cox, his Democratic opponent in the 1920 election, had ably summed up 
progressive concerns about the Harding agenda the previous August, while on the campaign trail. 
“The normalcy voiced by their candidate as visioned by his masters is the bayonet at the factory 
door, profiteering at the gates of the farm, the burden of government on shoulders other than 
their own and the Federal Reserve System an annex to big business.”59 With normalcy now 
decisively enthroned, many progressives lamented the political landscape that lay before them. 
“Reaction is on,” Senator Hiram Johnson wrote to William Jennings Bryan when Harding’s 
victory became inevitable. “Whether the old spirit of progressivism can be aroused, in either of 
the parties, during our generation, seems to me doubtful.”60  “What a God damned world!” 
exclaimed the progressive publisher William Allen White. “Starvation on the one hand, and 
indifference on the other, pessimism rampant, faith quiescent, murder met with indifference; the 
lowered standard of civilization faced with universal complaisance, and the whole story so sad 
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that nobody can tell it. If anyone had told me ten years ago that our country would be what it is 
today, and that the world would be what it is today, I should have questioned his reason.”61 
 
Indeed, if progressives needed a visual reminder of the dire straits in which reform 
seemed to have fallen on inauguration day, they need only look over at the outgoing president, 
the feeble, emaciated Woodrow Wilson. Once viewed as the man who would lead the world into 
a new age of peace, Wilson was now frail and exhausted, the sick man of progressivism. “There 
was something tragic about the broken frame of the man who limped from the White House to 
accompany his successor to the Capitol,” observed the New York Times, who called his final 
moments in the White House “dramatic and touchingly pathetic.”62 As it turns out, Wilson was 
too weak even to attend all of the inaugural services. After riding to the Capitol with the 
president-elect, during which he ignored the crowds, looked straight ahead, and, during one quiet 
moment between the two presidents, broke down in tears, Wilson declined to attend the official 
inauguration in the Senate Chamber, on the grounds that he was likely too weak to make it up the 
required steps.
63
 “The Senate has thrown me down,” Wilson quipped to Pennsylvania Senator 
Philander Knox, obliquely referring to the League of Nations fight that had so sapped his 
strength, “but I am not going to fall down.”64  
 
And so, as Harding ushered in the era of normalcy from the Capitol portico, Wilson 
limped to a waiting car and retired to his new home on S Street, where he was greeted by a 
crowd of well-wishers, eager to give their fallen president one final round of applause. Even 
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when the gathering struck up “Onward, Christian Soldiers,” Wilson was either too weak or too 




How had it come to this? Only two and a half years earlier, Wilson had been the 
victorious leader in a war to make the world safe for democracy, and was adored by millions the 
nation and world over. And, while many thought the Great War a setback to reform, and had 
endured personal calumny and ridicule in the nationalist fervor that had followed in its wake, 
even “peace progressives” had still looked to a reconstructed post-war world with a good deal of 
hope for the future. “We need no longer work for the right of self-determination for the peoples 
of the earth,” editorialized the Survey in November 1918. “Militarism is dead, unless we are so 
incredibly stupid as to revive it…The Atlantic Ocean is the new Mediterranean, and while trade 
winds blow its waves shall be consecrated to freedom…The war is won. Under what device can 
we consolidate its gains, eliminate its evils, capitalize for the programs appropriate to peace the 
social enthusiasms which it has generated?”66   
  
 That device remained elusive, for the Survey as for the progressives. In the months and 
years that followed, the millennial post-war dream of November 1918 would founder amid a sea 
of diplomatic realpolitik, social upheaval and unfortunate coincidences, finally culminating in 
Harding’s impressive mandate in November 1920. Novelist Willa Cather once famously 
remarked that “the world broke in two in 1922 or thereabouts.”67 For the progressive movement, 
that break happened a few years earlier, between the end of the war and the election of 1920. 
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PART ONE:  CRACK-UP: 
FROM VERSAILLES TO 
NORMALCY 
 
“The old world has crumbled into dust at our feet, and it can never be restored. The war 
has broken for good and all the bands which held the pre-war world together. For the 
moment we are adrift and have no idea of our bearings.” 
 
– Richard Roberts, The Survey, 1919.68 
 
 
“The final war for democracy will begin after the war.” 
 
--  Walter Weyl, 1918.69 
 
 
“Europe was devastated by the war, we by the aftermath.” 
 
- Louis Brandeis, 192170 
 
 
“Between the idea 
And the reality 
Between the motion 
And the act 
Falls the Shadow.” 
 
- T.S. Eliot, 192571 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE “TRAGEDY OF THE PEACE MESSIAH”  
PROGRESSIVES AND THE VERSAILLES TREATY 
 
“Doesn’t the whole trouble in Europe today go back to the Versailles Treaty, that instrument of 
perfidy and dishonor?...It seems to me that practically all our ills are directly chargeable to the 
Versailles Treaty.” – Harold Ickes, 1923.72 
 
“The reforming spirit of the pre-war brand led most of its paladins to Versailles. After that 
debacle of superficial moral zeal, destitute of adequate social intelligence, why should we ask 
‘where are the pre-war reformers or their successors?’– Norman Thomas, 192673 
 
“Paris was like a session of Congress…The effort at negotiation and settlement sort of became a 
rout, any old thing to close up shop. One came to Paris when hope was riding high, and day by 
day you could see these hopes just – well, you soon detected that it was a great enormous balloon 
and gradually all the air was coming out of it. It soon settled into a kind of sordid play of selfish 




Prominent progressives had split on the issue of America’s entry into the Great War. 
Many, such as officials in the Wilson administration, the editors of The New Republic 
and, perhaps most memorably, philosopher John Dewey, saw vast opportunities for 
progressivism both home and abroad in the president’s call to arms in 1917. But others, 
such as Jane Addams, Robert La Follette, and Oswald Villard of The Nation, believed 
entering the war represented both a betrayal of and a great step backward for the 
progressive impulse. 
 
If progressives had been divided on the question of entry into the conflict, however, they 
were virtually unanimous in their dismay over the Great War’s conclusion at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Progressives of all stripes –pragmatists and pacifists alike – came 
to see the Versailles conference and President Wilson’s role therein as a disastrous turn 
of events for the nation and for progressivism. Although disenchantment with both 
idealism and the Wilson government had already been set in motion by the experience 
of the war itself, the seemingly complete failure of the peace only exacerbated the 
widespread sense of disillusionment. And, while many progressives laid the blame for 
Versailles solely on Wilson, others extrapolated from the experience to detect inherent 
problems with progressivism as then constituted. 
 
*** 
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An American in Paris 
 
After four unimaginably destructive, soul-crushing years, the Great War at last ended in 
armistice in November 1918, and an exhausted world rejoiced as best it could. But President 
Woodrow Wilson, believing his most crucial task had only just begun, spent little time resting on 
the laurels of Allied victory. Rather, he committed himself immediately to securing the world 
“made safe for democracy” that he had promised would result from the conflict.  
 
Wilson believed that only a peace that followed his Fourteen Points could legitimate the 
bloody sacrifice and horrible devastation endured by the world, and he told America he would 
settle for nothing less. “We are about to give order and organization to this peace not only for 
ourselves but for the other peoples of the world as well, so far as they will suffer us to serve 
them,” he told Congress in December of 1918. “It is international justice that we seek, not 
domestic safety merely… The gallant men of our armed forces on land and sea have consciously 
fought for the ideals which they knew to be the ideals of their country; I have sought to express 
those ideals; they have accepted my statements of them as the substance of their own thought and 
purpose, as the associated governments have accepted them; I owe it to them to see to it, so far as 
in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them, and no possible effort 
omitted to realize them.” 75  
 
As such, Wilson explained, he must now go to Paris himself, the first time in American 
history that a president had ventured across the Atlantic while in office, to ensure that the peace 
was won. “It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what they offered their life's 
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blood to obtain. I can think of no call to service which could transcend this...I am the servant of 
the nation. I can have no private thought or purpose of my own in performing such an errand. I 
go to give the best that is in me[.]”76 
 
For Wilson, this planned trip to Versailles was a culmination not only of the war but of 
his entire public life, for he had envisioned such a role in his destiny from a very early age. “If 
God will give me the grace I will try to serve him to perfection,” he had written in his journal as a 
young man, just before graduating from Princeton in 1879. On his thirty-third birthday, he asked 
himself, “Why may not the present generation write, through me, its political autobiography?” 
And, while courting his fiancée in 1885, Wilson had written to her of his most noble dream. “I 
have a passion for interpreting great thoughts to the world,” he told her. “I should be complete if 
I could inspire a great movement of opinion, if I could read the experiences of the past into the 
practical life of the men of to-day and so communicate the thought to the minds of the great mass 
of the people as to impel them to great political achievements.”77  
 
During the Presidential campaign of 1912, it seemed to Wilson that destiny had finally 
called. “Remember that God ordained that I should be the next president of the United States,” 
he told a staffer. “Neither you nor any mortal could have prevented that.” And now, with the 
Great War over and the world looking to Wilson to bring forth a new era of peace, it seemed his 
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But even by his exacting standards, Wilson had set himself a high bar. And, indeed, as he 
sailed across the Atlantic aboard the George Washington in early December of 1918 with a small 
army of aides and diplomats in tow, he confided as much to his head of the Committee of Public 
Information, journalist George Creel.
79
 “I am wondering whether you have not unconsciously 
spun a net from which there is no escape,” Wilson mused, passing the buck of his lofty promises 
for a moment onto his minister of propaganda. “What I seem to see – with all my heart I hope 
that I am wrong – is a tragedy of disappointment.”80  
 
In this early moment, Wilson was prescient, for “a tragedy of disappointment” 
encapsulated what the Paris Peace Conference, and Wilson’s involvement in it, would come to 
mean for onlookers the world over. “Mr. Wilson left for Paris with the best wares ever brought to 
market,” The New Republic’s Walter Weyl would write afterward, “with economic power, 
military power, and the prestige of disinterestedness; he comes back with empty pockets and a 
gross of green spectacles.” As English economist John Maynard Keynes put it, “When President 
Wilson left Washington, he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world 
unequalled in history…With what curiosity, anxiety, and hope we sought a glimpse of the 
features and bearing of the man of destiny, who, coming from the West, was to bring healing to 
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the wounds of the ancient parent of his civilization and lay for us the foundations of the future. 
The disillusion was so complete that some of those who had trusted most hardly dared speak of 
it.”81 
 
Admittedly, a just and lasting world peace may be considered beyond the powers of any 
one man to fashion out of whole cloth. But Wilson must nonetheless bear the brunt of much of 
the ensuing disillusionment among American progressives concerning Versailles. In 1916, he 
had been re-elected with the enthusiastic support of progressives and even many socialists.
82
 And 
in that campaign, Wilson had offered not only a platform of Peace and Preparedness, but 
tantalizing visions of a new world order to come. “[W]hen the great present war is over,” he told 
an Indianapolis audience in October of 1916, “it will be the duty of America to join with the 
other nations in some kind of league for the maintenance of peace.”83 
 
If he had perhaps promised the world too much, he had also promised to bring the best of 
him to Paris. But Wilson – perhaps in part due to medical reasons, be it a bout of his recurring 
cerebral vascular disease or a case of the same virulent flu epidemic that had felled millions the 
world over – brought the worst in him as well: his stern, unbending rectitude and ensuing 
                                                          
81
 Walter Weyl, Tired Radicals and Other Papers (New York: B.W. Huebsch, 1921), 86. John Maynard Keynes. 
“When the Big Four Met,” The New Republic, December 24, 1919, 105. 
82
 According to estimates, Wilson picked up 20 percent of the 1912 Progressive vote for Roosevelt and 33 percent of 
the 1912 Socialist vote for Debs. [In 1916] “Walter Weyl…Amos Pinchot and Rabbi Wise of the American Union 
of Militarism presented the President with a resolution (signed also by John Dewey, Ray Stannard Baker, and Walter 
Lippmann) expressing their regret for having earlier opposed him…Paul Kellogg and Lillian Wald organized ‘Social 
Workers for Wilson’…the Democratic National Committee proudly announced that Jane Addams planned to vote 
for Wilson.” Herbert Croly also officially brought TNR along to Wilson. Among the Socialists who voted Wilson in 
1916 were John Reed, Jack London, Charles Edward Russell, Helen Keller, Upton Sinclair, John Spargo, William 
English Walling, Florence Kelley, Algie M. Simons, Gus Myers, and Max Eastman.  Knock, 94, 100. 
83
 Knock, 96. According to Knock, the “point has never been established either in biographies or in more specialized 
studies of Wilson’s foreign policy. But Wilson made American membership in a league of nations one of the themes 




disinterest for the niceties of diplomacy, his supreme confidence in his own sense of the right, 




Whatever the reasons, Wilson had already begun the process of sabotaging any possible 
diplomatic achievements at home by neglecting to name any prominent Republicans to the 
Versailles delegation. (His unfortunate decision was characterized by humorist Will Rogers as 
follows: “I’ll tell you what, we’ll split 50-50 – I will go and you fellows can stay.”) Given that 
the Republican party had recently retaken both the House and Senate in the midterm elections of 
1918 – an election Wilson had told the public beforehand should be taken as a referendum on his 
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But, in naming his delegation, Wilson looked over such GOP luminaries as Senate 
Foreign Relations Chair Henry Cabot Lodge, ex-President and head of the League to Enforce 
Peace (LEP) William Howard Taft, and Wilson’s opponent in 1916, Charles Evans Hughes. (Of 
the latter, Wilson argued that “there is no room big enough for Hughes & me to stay in.”)86  
 
Perhaps most notably, Wilson also looked over longtime internationalist and venerable 
Republican lawyer Elihu Root, a former Secretary of State and Nobel Peace Prize winner, who 
could have given Wilson’s diplomatic efforts an imprimatur of bipartisanship that many 
conservatives in the GOP would have been bound to respect. But, with no Republican cover, the 
president ensured his efforts would be construed as solely a Wilsonian peace. And while many 
Republicans had already suggested during the midterm contests that they would not back 
Wilson’s “socialistic” peace proposals regardless, Wilson’s diplomatic snub no doubt poured 
unnecessary salt into the wound. As former president (and perennial Wilson critic) Theodore 
Roosevelt, who had lost his son Quentin in the war, angrily put it to a Carnegie Hall crowd in 
October 1919, “We can pay with the blood of our hearts’ dearest, but that is all we are to be 
allowed.”87 
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 Worse, to many observers Wilson seemed to arrive in Paris wholly unprepared for the 
delicate negotiations that awaited him, and was outflanked in any case by the wily old diplomatic 
veterans of Europe. For, although he was welcomed in city after city in Europe with remarkable 
outpourings of adulation, Wilson was a considerably less-beloved figure among the European 
heads of state, and each had their own axes to grind with the peace as outlined in the Fourteen 
Points.  
 
With the British Navy still the scourge of the oceans and the cornerstone of the Empire’s 
defense, English Prime Minister David Lloyd George and had little use for freedom of the seas. 
Nor did Vittorio Orlando of Italy have any real desire for a League of Nations. Rather than a 
“world made safe for democracy,” Orlando was more inclined at Versailles to establish Italian 
territorial control over former Central Power territories, such as parts of Turkey and the Croat 
state of Fiume.  
 
For his part, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau – a man with vivid memories of the 
Siege of Paris during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 – was most concerned with 
preserving the security of his homeland. With the threat of nearby Germany a centuries-old thorn 
in the side of France, the man known as “the Tiger” had more faith in the long-standing system 
of alliances that had prevailed in Europe for centuries than he did Wilson’s seemingly naïve 
Fourteen Points. And, after the millions of lives lost – forty-seven times more than the casualties 
suffered by the United States – and the untold destruction experienced in the Great War, no 




realization of “self-determination” for the former territorial holdings of the German empire. To 
the contrary, it was time for payback.
88
 
 And so, bit by bit, Wilson’s grand millennial vision died the death of a thousand cuts in 
Paris, until it was almost completely subsumed by the vagaries of Old World realpolitik. 
Beginning with a heated discussion over the mandate system, it became clear to all that the 
powers of Europe aimed to -- and would quickly succeed in -- divvying up the territories of the 
former German empire among them. “At this and subsequent critical junctures,” observed 
historian Thomas Knock, Wilson “found himself in an absolute minority of one.” From this fight 
over mandates, which for all intent and purposes papered over the Allied powers’ land grabs with 
the lofty rhetoric of the League, the wily masters of Europe soon discovered they could extract 
virtually any concession from Wilson they desired, so long as they paid lip service to his 
professed ideals and promised to grant him his beloved League of Nations.
89
  
And after the Republicans, left behind in Washington, illustrated to the world over that 
Wilson’s League faced some not-inconsiderable opposition at home, the other leaders at 
Versailles saw their chance to strike. As William Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia had 
already figured out, the League of Nations was to Wilson “what a toy was to a child – he would 
not be happy till he got it.” And so, in exchange for concessions on the League aimed solely at 
keeping the United States Senate happy (such as a clause recognizing the primacy of the Monroe 
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Doctrine), Wilson gave away the store.
90
 France obtained military control over the Rhineland, 
England received promises of a future US naval conference, Italy (after a walkout) got the 
territory they were looking for in Eastern Europe, and – in a move that would particularly startle 
progressives – even the delegation from Japan saw their control over the historic and 
strategically vital Chinese province of Shantung reaffirmed.
91
 (When told that the world would 
not look kindly on this last concession, Wilson voiced frustration about his diplomatic 
predicament. “I know that too,” he told press secretary Ray Stannard Baker, “but if Italy remains 
away & Japan goes home, what becomes of the League of Nations?”) Soon thereafter, the 
European powers were able to convince the increasingly exhausted Wilson to open the door for 
the large and punitive reparations that are most often associated with the Versailles treaty.
 92
 
A Human Failure 
As the peace Wilson had long promised slowly evaporated, the early optimism of 
progressive-minded observers ripened into contempt and disgust, much of it directed at Wilson 
himself. “The President’s programme for the world, as set forth in his speeches and his notes,” 
wrote John Maynard Keynes, in a series of articles printed in The New Republic, “had displayed 
a spirit and a purpose so admirable that the last desire of his sympathizers was to criticise details 
– the details, they felt, were quite rightly not filled in at present, but would be in due course”:  
“It was commonly believed at the commencement of the Paris Conference that the President had 
thought out, with the aid of a large body of advisers, a comprehensive scheme not only for the 
League of Nations but for the embodiment of the Fourteen Points in an actual Treaty of Peace. 
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But in fact the President had thought out nothing; when it came to practice, his ideas were 
nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing 
with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He 
could have preached a sermon on any of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty 
for their fulfillment; but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of 
Europe.”93 
 
“He not only had no proposals in detail,” continued Keynes in exasperation, “but he was 
in many respects, perhaps inevitably, ill informed as to European conditions. And not only was 
he ill informed…but his mind was slow and inadaptable.” Indeed, Keynes concluded of Wilson, 
“[t]here can seldom have been a statesman of the first rank more incompetent than the President 
in the agilities of the Council Chambers…His mind was too slow and unresourceful to be ready 
with any alternatives. The President was capable of digging his toes in and refusing to 
budge…But he had no other mode of defense.”94  
 
The reason for this fundamental defect, thought Keynes, lay in the cast of Wilson’s mind. 
“The President was a nonconformist minister, perhaps a Presbyterian. His thought and his 
temperament were essentially theological not intellectual, with all the strength and the weakness 
of that manner of thought, feeling, and expression.” The president’s rivals at Versailles evidently 
concurred with this assessment of Wilson as evangelistic dupe. “I’ve never knew anyone to talk 
more like Jesus Christ, and act more like Lloyd George,” quipped Clemenceau of Wilson. “God 
gave us the Ten Commandments, and we broke them,” the Tiger remarked early in the 
negotiations. “Wilson gives us the Fourteen Points. We shall see.” And Wilson himself added 
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fuel to this fire, purportedly telling one aide that “If I didn’t feel that I was the personal 
instrument of God, I couldn’t carry on.”95 
 
In the months and years that followed, several progressive writers, many of whom had 
originally deeply admired the President, would also try to make sense of Wilson’s baffling 
performance at the Paris Peace Conference. To Walter Weyl, who wrote on the catastrophe at 
Versailles just before his untimely death from throat cancer in November 1919, Wilson’s failure 
was also rooted in his nature. “Mr. Wilson’s failure was a poignant moral failure involving 
everything in the man that held our respect: 
 
[Wilson was] overconfident – too sure of his ability to match his mind against the best minds of 
Europe. He was ill-prepared and ill-informed. He grew confused and lost perception of what 
could, and could not be done. He was stubborn when he should have been open-minded, 
vacillating when he should have been decisive...Mr. Wilson went to Paris like some medieval 
Doctor of Theology, with his theses written down on stiff parchment, ready to meet the other 
good doctors in fair and leisurely argument. Instead of Doctors of Divinity it was hand-to-mouth 
diplomats whom he met – men no worse than their calling – who greeted him kindly and then 
reverently laid his neat theses under the map of Europe which was being sliced up. These 
diplomats, though smaller, were cleverer than the President, and they were playing their own 
game with their own cards.”96 
  
As a former political science professor happiest in the realm of abstraction, Wilson, 
thought Weyl, had no talent for the gritty realpolitik inherent to Old World diplomacy, perhaps 
best typified by English Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s rumored quip to a Conference 
aide, “Please refresh my memory. Is it Upper or Lower Silesia we’re giving away?” In a 
damning summation of the inherent flaws in Wilsonism (and, by extension, a certain cast of 
progressive mind), Weyl argued:  
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The simple faith of Mr. Wilson in his Fourteen Points, unexplained and unelaborated, was due, I 
believe, to the invincible abstractedness of his mind. He seems to see the world in abstractions. 
To him railroad cars are not railroad cars but a gray, general thing called Transportation; people 
are not men and women, corporeal, gross, very human beings, but Humanity – Humanity very 
much in the abstract. In his political thinking and propaganda Mr. Wilson cuts away all the 
complex qualities which things possess in real life in order to fasten upon one single 
characteristic and thus he creates a clear but over-simple and unreal formula. As a consequence 
he is tempted to fall into inelastic categories; to see things black and white; to believe that similar 
things are identical and dissimilar things opposite… 
 
[T]his abstractness of Mr. Wilson is part of a curiously a priori metaphysical idealism. His world 
stands firmly on its head. Ideas do not rest upon facts but facts on ideas. Morals and laws are not 
created out of the rub and wear of men and societies but are things innate, uncreated, immutable, 




In sum, Weyl concluded, Wilson ventured into the diplomatic thicket of Versailles “with 
a map of the world but without a compass.” And yet, perhaps recognizing the implications such a 
critique would have on the larger progressive project, Weyl ultimately rejected his own 
argument, and backed away from blaming Wilson’s idealism for the failure at Versailles. “Those 
who despise all idealism in politics will exult over this new Don Quixote overthrown and 
bespattered, this new saint seduced,” he wrote. “They will wish to revert to the old time 
diplomatist, the dollar and steel and sausage diplomatist, who has as few ideals as may be but has 
his broad feet flat on the ground. They will call for an end of prophets and idealists.” Having 
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sensed the danger, Weyl honed his critique. “It was not Woodrow Wilson, the prophet and 
idealist, who was overturned at Paris,” he concluded: 
 
for whatever his defects, his abstractness, his metaphysical idealism, his over-confidence, his 
vanity, he might always have retrieved himself and gained at least a moral victory by a final 
refusal. The man who was discomfited was Woodrow Wilson the politician, the man who thought 
he could play the European game, who was not afraid of the dark, who at times seemed to bargain 
for his own hand, for his personal prestige and his political party, instead of fighting always and 





Writing several years later, in his much-discussed (at the time) 1925 autobiography 
Confessions of a Reformer, disillusioned progressive Frederic C. Howe concurred with the 
general contours of Weyl’s assessment. “For the first time in his political life,” he wrote, 
“Woodrow Wilson was compelled to do battle with equals, who knew every detail of what was 
being discussed, but of which he had only the superficial information provided on a sheet of 
paper. He had expected an afternoon tea; he found a duel. He expected to dictate; he descended 
to barter.” On one hand, thought Howe, Wilson suffered from grievous personal failings, rooted 
in idealistic “reveries,” that undermined his ability to succeed in Paris. “Mr. Wilson could not 
bear criticism. Criticism brought his reveries of himself under inspection, and he cherished those 
reveries. He shielded them, nursed them, lived with them. His dreams had to be kept intact. They 
had to be respected by others.”  
 
On the other, Howe believed that Wilson ultimately forsook this cherished idealism at the 
bargaining table, to disastrous results. “Had the President remained a Messiah, content with 
approval from himself alone, he might possibly have won. He might have failed, but his failure 
would have been a Messianic failure in keeping with his vision of himself”:  
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But he chose to barter. When he began to barter, he lost all; he lost his own vision of himself, and 
he had to keep this vision of himself intact. It and his principles were all that he had brought to 
Paris. A man less idealistic would have been betrayed as he was betrayed, but he would have 
been a better bargainer. He would have used America’s financial power. He would have brought 
pressure to bear. He might have threatened. He would have descended more frankly into the 
world in which he found himself. But the evangelist could do none of these things frankly, and 





In sum, Howe concluded, “President Wilson’s sense of insecurity, when outside of his 
study, made him vulnerable. He was unwilling to face defeat. He would not face failure. To 
escape failure he sacrificed principles…His constant struggle was to preserve the semblance 
even when the substance was lost.” And, when Wilson returned from Versailles to pitch the 
League of Nations to his countrymen, “the people were ready to accept his failures and 
understand the cause. It was his assertion that he had brought back the peace he had promised 
that had turned the tide. The people did not believe what he said. They heckled him in his 
meetings. They forced him to see himself. It was then that his strength gave way, his health 
broke. He lost his vision of himself when he discovered that it was no longer held by others. The 
pinnacle from which he fell was within himself. That was the tragedy of the Peace Messiah.”100 
 
The experience at Versailles also disillusioned many of the progressives on Wilson’s 
diplomatic team. “‘I took up the work at Paris full of the warmest anticipations of some 
settlement that would realize liberal ideals,” wrote former progressive journalist and then Wilson 
Press Secretary Ray Stannard Baker. “I saw the reaction…from the War and I realized…the 
enormous strength of the old imperialistic and military systems.” During the peace conference, 
Baker confided in his journal of Wilson: “He will probably be beaten. He can escape no 
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responsibility & must go to his punishment not only for his own mistakes and weaknesses of 
temperament but for the greed and selfishness of the world.”101  
 
Upon first reading the final version of the treaty, which had been delivered to his hotel 
room at four in the morning, economic advisor and former head of the food administration 
Herbert Hoover was so shaken that he went for a walk about Paris to collect his thoughts. He 
soon happened upon Keynes and Jan Christiaan Smuts of South Africa (one of the main 
architects of the League), who had disappeared into the night for similar reasons. “It all flashed 
into our minds why each was walking about at that time of the morning,” wrote Hoover. “We 
agreed that the consequences of many parts of the proposed Treaty would ultimately bring 
destruction.” Nevertheless, Hoover ultimately decided to grit his teeth and back the final product. 
“With all my forebodings about the Treaty, I decided for myself to support its ratification…as a 
lesser evil.”102  
 
Not all of Wilson’s diplomats in Paris followed Hoover in toeing the line. William 
Bullitt, a recent Yale graduate who had been sent to broker a cease-fire with the Bolshevik 
government in Russia (a cease-fire which was ultimately ignored by Wilson in Paris), was beside 
himself about the final treaty. “I am sorry that you did not fight our fight to the finish,” Bullitt 
angrily wrote to Wilson, “and that you had so little faith in the millions of men, like myself, in 
every nation who had faith in you…Our government has consented now to deliver the suffering 
peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and dismemberments – a new century of 
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war.” He led a group of young diplomats in tendering their resignations from Wilson’s staff, 
telling the press, “I am going to lie in the sands of the French Riviera, and watch the world go to 
hell.” (Bullitt would later take a break from his self-imposed vacation to testify against the 




Diplomat Adolf A. Berle shared Bullitt’s disgust and was among those who tendered his 
resignation upon completion of the treaty. Writing in The Nation a few months later, he deemed 
the treaty a perversion of the principles – self-determination, open covenants, disarmament, and 
the like – for which the war had been fought. Worse, Berle and his fellow progressives “were 
faced with the ghastly truth that we had refused to recognize with the tenacious hope borne of 
faith: the master was himself the traitor. The power and splendor of Mr. Wilson’s thought, the 
faith reposed in him by the plain people, the burning hopes and the new vision which he aroused 
deepen the tragedy.” As a result of Wilson’s performance, Berle thought “the idealists 
throughout the world” were now “bewildered, defeated, betrayed.”104 
 
A Failure of Idealism? 
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Journalist Walter Lippmann, who had earlier played a substantial role in creating eight of 
the Fourteen Points as a member of “The Inquiry,” a group set up by Wilson to determine how 
rationally to resolve the boundary disputes of the Great War, also vehemently turned against 
Wilson and the treaty. “I don’t need to tell you how disappointed I am at the outcome at Paris,” 
he wrote to Colonel House in the summer of 1919. “[I]t is just such events which make a whole 
people cynical and the worst result of the Conference is that it has shaken the faith of millions of 
men in the integrity of those who now rule the world.” Lippmann strongly encouraged Wilson to 
disavow the results of the conference completely. “The world can endure honest disappointment 
…But I see nothing but pain and disorder and confusion if this first act of honesty is not 
performed.” (Wilson, of course, did not take Lippmann’s advice, instead deeming the Versailles 
treaty upon his return “one of the great charters of human liberty.”105) 
 
In a December 1919 review of Harold Stearn’s Liberalism in America, Lippmann 
expanded his critique of the failure at Versailles. Arguing that a satisfactory peace could have 
emerged from the war effort, Lippmann rested the blame for the treaty on a “defect of the liberal 
mind” exemplified by “its apathy about administration [and] its boredom at the problem of 
organization.” In short, he concluded, “Mr. Wilson attempted to achieve a diplomatic miracle 
without a diplomatic service.”106  
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Meanwhile, “the conservatives had a better grip on their case” than did Wilson’s band of 
peacemakers at Paris. “They had worked harder. They had planned more thoroughly. They had 
manipulated better. They were infinitely more resourceful. They dealt with situations from the 
inside and not eternally by hearsay inspiration and guess from the outside. They knew how to 
negotiate. They knew how to go past the fragile reason of men to their passions. They made 
liberalism in the person of its official representatives seem incredibly naïve. They knew how to 




Stressing the critical importance of the Anglo-American bond across the Atlantic (an 
emphasis that would define his foreign policy writings for the remainder of his long career), 
Lippmann argued that “a working partnership with [British] sea power was the indispensable 
basis of a liberal peace. We should have played with Britain, instead of letting Mr. George bob 
back and forth between M. Clemenceau and the President.” But, “in rejecting a working 
partnership with Britain, Mr. Wilson had cut himself off from the nation in which liberalism is 
mature and powerful. The only forces left were the revolutionists and to them he dared not 
appeal.” In sum, to Lippmann, the failure at Versailles was borne of hubris and misplaced 
idealism. Wilson’s mistake, and that of progressives in general, was in believing that they would 
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 The New Republic, the flagship progressive journal for whom Lippmann wrote, shared 
his condemnation of the results at Versailles.  In a May 17, 1919 cover editorial entitled “Is it 
Peace?” the magazine – formerly a strong advocate of entry into the war and Wilson’s peace 
proposals – answered its own question. “Looked at from the purely American point of view, on a 
cold calculation of probabilities, we do not see how the treaty is anything but the prelude to 
quarrels in a deeply divided and a hideously embittered Europe.” Just in case anyone had missed 
the journal’s remarkable renunciation of Wilsonism, the next issue declared emphatically across 
its front, “This Is Not Peace.” “America promised to underwrite a stable peace,” the lead 
editorial by Herbert Croly argued. “Mr. Wilson has failed. The peace cannot last.”109 
 
 Writing in TNR in October of 1919, philosopher John Dewey – who had memorably cast 
the war as a progressive opportunity in its early days (earning the derision of critics such as 
Randolph Bourne) – gave his own assessment of what happened at Versailles, and attempted to 
explain why his position on the war remained the correct one. The implications of Wilson’s 
failure, he wrote, “come home to everyone who favored the participation of the United States in 
the war on what are termed idealistic grounds. It comes with especial force to those who, 
strongly opposed to war in general, broke with the pacifists because they saw in this war a means 
of realizing pacific ideals – the practical reduction of armaments, the abolition of secret and 
oligarchic diplomacy, and of special alliances, the substitution of inquiry and discussion for 
intrigue and threats, the founding through the destruction of the most powerful autocracy of a 
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democratically ordered international government, and the consequent beginning of the end of 
war.” 110 
 
 Dewey did not try to sidestep the magnitude of Wilson’s failure. “The defeat of idealistic 
aims has been, without exaggeration, enormous.” But, Dewey argued, what failed at Versailles 
was not idealism but sentimentalism. “The defeat…is the defeat which will always come to 
idealism that is not backed up by intelligence and by force – or, better, by an intelligent use of 
force… The ideals of the United States have been defeated in the settlement because we took 
into the war our sentimentalism, our attachment to moral sentiments as efficacious powers, our 
pious optimism as to the inevitable victory of the ‘right’, our childish belief that physical energy 
can do the work that only intelligence can do, our evangelical hypocrisy that morals and ‘ideals’ 
have a self-propelling and self-executing capacity.”111 
 
 This failing of idealism aside, for Dewey as with Lippmann and many other progressives, 
Woodrow Wilson’s mistake was mainly one of hubris. The president, Dewey argued, “seems to 
have thought that, contrary to all experience of representative government, he could ‘represent’ 
the unrepresented interests of the common people whose main concern is with peace, not war.” 
But, while “it is easy to blame…Mr. Wilson’s personal desire to play the part of Atlas supporting 
alone the universe of free ideals,” Dewey thought the president ultimately “a scape-goat 
convenient to save our vanity.”  Rather, Dewey believed, it was the hubris of the American 
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people as a whole that was to blame. It was not idealism per se, “but our idealism discredited, an 
idealism of vague sentiments and good intentions, isolated from judgment as to the effective use 
of the force in our hands…We are so generous, so disinterested, that we do not bargain or 
impose conditions. In short we are so childishly immature, so careless of our professed ideals, 
that we prefer a reputation for doing the grand seigneur act to the realization of our national 
aims. This is the acme of our sentimentalism. Can we blame the European statesmen if to put it 
with blank vulgarity they play us for suckers?” 
 
 As the title of his essay, “The Discrediting of Idealism,” makes plain, Dewey, like Weyl, 
realized that his distinction would be lost on many, and that the failure of Versailles would be 
left on the doorstep of idealism. “It may be that the words Idealism and Ideals will have to go,” 
he concluded, “that they are hopelessly discredited. It may be that they will become synonyms 
for romanticism, for blind sentimentalism, for faith in mere good intentions, or that they will 
come to be regarded as decorative verbal screens behind which to conduct sinister plans.” 
Nevertheless, he counseled his fellow progressives to learn from the disastrous mistake of 
Versailles. “Our idealism will never prosper until it rests upon the organization and resolute use 
of the greater forces of modern life: industry, commerce, finance, scientific inquiry and 
discussion and the actualities of human companionship.”112 
 
The Peace Progressives 
 
Having been a reliable voice for pacifism and antiwar sentiment throughout the recent 
conflict, The Nation saw Versailles not as a failure to achieve an “intelligent use of force” at all, 






but rather a prime example of the chickens coming home to roost once force was invoked. “What 
has confronted us at Paris and what confronts us at Washington is the failure of moral 
leadership,” the journal argued. “We are paying the price for the falsities and hypocrisies which 
are the inevitable accompaniment of any war.”113  
 
Flush in its sense of vindication, The Nation was particularly cruel to Wilson. “No 
amount of official welcoming,” it editorialized in July of 1919, “no array of battleships however 
imposing, no amount of enthusiasm however stimulated can hide in the long run the fact that 
Woodrow Wilson returns from Paris an utterly defeated man. That he is prepared to deny this is 
obvious…He will plume himself upon having compromised as much as he did.” 114   
 
Deeming Wilson’s failure “a fall as profound as it is pathetic and tragic,” The Nation 
claimed to take “only pity for the weak, compromising, morally-defeated man who returned from 
Paris on Tuesday. Never was there such an opportunity vouchsafed to anyone in modern times to 
make over the world…Every trump card was Mr. Wilson’s.” But, it concluded, despite the many 
progressives who “warmly welcomed his Fourteen Points and fought for them tooth and nail” 
and were now “disillusioned, disheartened, [and] discouraged,” Wilson “lost in Paris because he 
went there mentally prepared to lose, because he was neither saturated with conviction nor 
steeped in principle.”115   
 
This was mainly because, according to The Nation, Wilson was at heart just a base 
politician. “The United States has gone backward, not forward, under the leadership of Mr. 
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Wilson, with its hopeless contradictions and never-ending insincerities,” argued an editorial. 
“Never, so far as we are aware,” the journal opined of the president a week later, “has he put his 
back to the wall and declared that sink or swim, survive or perish, he would not abandon a given 
principle if it cost him his career.” (Ironically, Wilson was about to take just such a stand – for 
his League of Nations – that would cost him a good deal more than just his career.)116  
 
 Looking back on Versailles in January of 1922, Jane Addams, perhaps the most 
venerable and well-respected progressive critic of the war during the conflict, drew a more 
expansive lesson from the conference, and in so doing eloquently articulated the pacifist 
interpretation of Versailles.  
 
Looking past Wilson’s potential flaws of character, Addams was more charitable to the 
then-former president than Villard and The Nation had been in 1919. “Certainly international 
affairs have been profoundly modified by President Wilson’s magnificent contribution,” she 
wrote, speaking of the League of Nations and his emphasis on open covenants.  And, she argued, 
too much may have been asked of Wilson in any event. “Did the world expect two roles from 
one man, when experience should have clearly indicated that ability to play the two are seldom 
combined in the same person? The power to make the statement, to idealize a given situation, to 
formulate the principle, is a gift of the highest sort, but it assumes with intellectual power a 
certain ability of philosophic detachment; in one sense it implies the spectator rather than the 
doer…To require the same man later on to carry out his dictum in a complicated, contradictory 
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situation demands such a strain upon his temperament that it may be expecting him to do what 
only another man of quite another temperament could do.”117 
 
Nevertheless, regardless of the daunting task before him, Addams argued, Wilson’s 
failure was inevitable as soon as he made the disastrous decision to buck the peace movement 
that had helped him win re-election and involve the United States in the Great War. “We were in 
despair,” she wrote of herself and her fellow pacifists, when “the President himself led the 
preparedness parade and thus publicly seized the leadership of the movement which had started 
and pushed by his opponents.” Nodding to Randolph Bourne’s prescient argument in “War and 
the Intellectuals,” Addams recalled her confusion at the war-fervor among progressives that 
seemed to accompany Wilson’s change of heart in 1917. “It seemed as if certain intellectuals, 
editors, professors, clergymen, were energetically pushing forward the war against the hesitation 
and dim perception of the mass of the people. 
 
They seemed actually to believe that ‘a war free from any taint of self-seeking could secure the 
triumph of democracy and internationalize the world.’ They extolled the President as a great 
moral leader because he was irrevocably leading the country into war. The long-established peace 
societies and their orthodox organs quickly fell into line, expounding the doctrine that the world’s 
greatest war was to make an end to all wars. It was hard for some of us to understand upon what 
experience this pathetic belief in the regenerative results of the war could be founded: but the 
world had become filled with fine phrases and this one, which afforded comfort to many a young 
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In any case, as a result of Wilson’s decision to enter the war, Addams argued, the 
president’s ability to negotiate the peace he had long desired was fatally compromised. “The 
President had a seat at the Peace Table as one among other victors,” she wrote, “not as the 
impartial adjudicator. He had to drive a bargain for his League of Nations; he could not insist 
upon it as the inevitable basis for negotiations between two sides, the foundation of a ‘peace 
among equals.’” By involving himself in the machinery of war, Wilson had become tainted to 
the world – He was now one of the conquerors rather than a bringer of peace.  
 
“What,” Addams asked, “might have happened if President Wilson could have said in 
January 1919, what he had said in January 1917: ‘A victor’s terms imposed upon the 
vanquished…would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace 
would rest not permanently but only as upon quicksand,’…Europe distrusted any compromise 
with a monster which had already devoured her young men and all but destroyed her civilization: 
A man who had stood firmly against participation in war could have had his way with the 
common people in every country.”119 
 
 In arguing that the failure of the Versailles peace was irrevocably rooted in the decision 
to enter World War I in the first place, the progressive pacifists at least had the virtue of logical 
consistency. As such, they were not forced to resort to the same feats of intellectual contortion as 
Dewey, TNR, and other progressive supporters of the war, who attempted to pin the blame on 
Wilson personally, while trying to salvage what they could of the idealism and ideology he stood 
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for. But progressives such as Addams and Villard’s Nation had been publicly marginalized for 
their pacifism during the war, and their voices no longer carried the same weight in the general 
public as they had previously.  
 
Whether they were for the war or against the war, progressives around the world wrestled 
with their disappointment and confusion in the wake of Versailles. The disastrous fate of that 
grand project embittered many of them through the ensuing decade. “What really irritates me,” 
historian Carl Becker wrote to his colleague William Dodd in June 1920, “is that I could have 
been naïve enough to suppose, during the war, that Wilson could ever accomplish those ideal 
objects…It was futile from the beginning to suppose that a new international order could be 
founded on the old national order.” “We are at the dead season of our fortunes,” John Maynard 
Keynes similarly proclaimed in the fall of 1919. “Never in the lifetime of men now living has the 
universal element in the soul of man burnt so dimly.”  And so it fell to another group -- the 
Republican progressives in the Senate, who had never held much truck with Wilson and his 




                                                          
120
 Carl Becker to William Dodd, June 17, 1920. Wolfgang J. Helbich, “American Liberals in the League of Nations 
Controversy.” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 1967-1968), pp. 572-573. Schlesinger, Crisis 




CHAPTER TWO: THE “LEAGUE OF DAM-NATIONS”  
PROGRESSIVES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
 “I have conscientiously opposed the League because of one fundamental reason, and that is…it 
would not be a league of peace but a league of war.” – William Borah, 1921121 
*** 
 
With the promised new world order at Versailles in shambles, the League of Nations 
became at once the last, best hope for peace to some on the left and a symbol of all 
that had gone wrong in Paris to others. The League had enjoyed the support of both 
progressive internationalists and conservatives before WWI, but it would face its most 
strident opposition from progressive nationalists in the Senate, most notably Senators 
William Borah, Hiram Johnson, and Robert La Follette. The outcome of the ensuing 
debate would not only destroy a president, but determine much of the course of foreign 
policy in the decade to come. 
 
*** 
Collapse at Pueblo 
Despite the near-universal condemnation in progressive corners for Woodrow Wilson’s 
performance at Versailles, the president returned to the United States with absolutely no 
intention of admitting defeat on the treaty issue.  Having staked so much on the creation of a 
League of Nations during the negotiations, Wilson was irrevocably committed to seeing at least 
this one facet of his vision become manifest.  
It was owed to “the mothers of America and the mothers of France and England and Italy 
and Belgium and all the other suffering nations,” Wilson told a Memorial Day crowd at the 
American Army graveyard in Suresnes, west of Paris, that they “never be called upon for this 
sacrifice again. This can be done. It must be done, and it will be done. The great thing that these 
men left us,” speaking of the deceased soldiers before him, “is the great instrument of the League 
of Nations.” Then, in a feat of presidential séance, Wilson spoke for the fallen: “’We command 
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you [the living] in the names of those who, like ourselves have died to bring the counsels of men 
together, and we remind you what America said she was born for.’” If the League does not pass, 
in other words, the dead had died in vain.
122
 
Framing the League in such stark Gettysburgian terms suggested much about the 
president’s mindset on the issue. For one, with the sacrifices made so great, there could be no 
compromise. And thus Wilson became that much more unyielding on the League in the face of 
criticism. The Treaty “has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God, 
who led us into this way,” Wilson told the Senate upon submitting the document for ratification. 




For another, it now befell Wilson, like the soldiers before him, to give his last full 
measure of devotion to the cause. Despite his obviously deteriorating health, Wilson’s sense of 
divine mission – and the sacrifices of the fallen – propelled him onward. “I do not want to do 
anything foolhardy but the League of Nations is now in crisis,” Wilson told his private physician 
upon embarking on the grueling pro-League speaking tour that would ruin him, “and if it fails I 
hate to think what will happen to the world. You must remember that I, as Commander in Chief, 
was responsible for sending our soldiers to Europe. In the crucial test in the trenches they did not 
turn back – and I cannot turn back now. I cannot put my personal safety, my health in the 
balance against my duty – I must go.”124 
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The outcome of this ill-fated decision is well-known. During a month-long train tour 
around the country, Wilson exhorted crowds several times a day to back the treaty, growing 
weaker with each stop. As the trip wore on, the exhausted president began suffering severe 
headaches and even bouts of blindness. After a speech in Pueblo, Colorado on September 25, 
1919 – one in which he once again invoked the memory of those dead in Suresnes – Wilson 
suffered a minor stroke. His physician ordered an immediate return to Washington, but the 
damage had been done. A week later, on October 2
nd
, Wilson collapsed on the bathroom floor of 
the White House, suffering another, more powerful stroke, one that nearly killed him. Instead, 




With the president having sacrificed his health, no one, not even the ghosts of Suresnes, 
could doubt his commitment to the League. And yet, however much he gave for the cause in the 
end, Wilson had actually been a relative latecomer to the idea of an international League. (And 
while Wilson had remained adamant about the League’s importance throughout the Versailles 
negotiations, its actual creation had been spearheaded mainly by British diplomats, most notably 
Lord Robert Cecil, Lord James Bryce, and South Africa’s Jan Smuts.) Rather, the idea of a 
League had instead been nurtured along in America by several different groups across the 
political spectrum – progressives, socialists, and conservatives – and each had held different 
views of how the League should be organized.
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The Origins of the League 
 
The idea of a “concert of nations” working together to resolve diplomatic disputes and 
keep the peace had been envisioned by advocates of the emerging field of international law for 
several decades before Wilson’s presidency. But its earliest formulation by a leading political 
figure in America was by Theodore Roosevelt in 1910, when the former president formally 
accepted the Nobel Peace Prize he had won for negotiating the Treaty of Portsmouth between 
Russia and Japan four years earlier. Arguing that the “power to command peace throughout the 
world could best be assured by some combination between those great nations which sincerely 
desire peace and have no thought themselves of committing aggressions,” Roosevelt argued that 
“it would be a masterstroke if those great powers honestly bent on peace would form a League of 
Peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its 
being broken by others.”127  
After the Great War broke out in Europe in 1914, Roosevelt made the case anew in the 
pages of The Outlook. “Surely the time ought to be ripe for the nations to consider a great world 
agreement among all the civilized military powers to back righteousness by force. Such an 
agreement would establish an efficient world league for the peace of righteousness.” As the war 
progressed, however, Roosevelt became increasingly pro-Allied (and militaristic) in his rhetoric, 
and – though he thoroughly condemned Wilson for his attempt at neutrality and his lack of 
“preparedness” at every opportunity – the former President spoke less of the League idea he had 
floated in 1910. Thus, it befell others to take up the standard. 
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 In To End All Wars, his study of the League of Nations fight, historian Thomas Knock 
lists many “feminists, liberals, pacifists, socialists, and social reformers” in the ranks of the 
“progressive internationalists” during World War II, among them Wellesley professor Emily 
Greene Balch, radical siblings Max and Crystal Eastman, Stanford president David Starr Jordan, 
progressive editors Oswald Garrison Villard and Paul Kellogg of The Nation and Survey 
respectively, and settlement house reformer Lillian Wald. It was Jane Addams, however, who, 
according to Knock, “played a pivotal role in this wing of the internationalist movement” and 
“personified its purposes and values perhaps better than anyone else.” With Wald, Kellogg, 
Carrie Chapman Catt, and Crystal Eastman, Addams founded the Women’s Peace party (WPP) 
in January 1915. Its platform committee, according to Knock, “produced the earliest, and what 
must be acknowledged as the most comprehensive, manifesto on internationalism advanced by 
any American organization throughout the entire war.”128  
This “program for constructive peace,” writes Knock, “called for an immediate armistice, 
international agreements to limit armaments…removal of the economic causes of the war (that 
is, a reduction of trade barriers), democratic control of foreign policy, self-determination, 
machinery for arbitration, freedom of the seas, and, finally, a ‘Concert of Nations’ to supersede 
the balance-of-power system and rival armies and navies.” With this peace statement in hand 
(which was also sent on to President Wilson), Addams attended the International Congress of 
Women at The Hague three months later, and succeeded in having them endorse the WPP 
proposal as well. Upon her return, Addams, Balch, and others personally pitched the peace plan 
to the Wilson administration. While the president, Colonel House, and Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing did not adopt the proposals right away, Wilson told Addams he thought the “program 
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for constructive peace” the “the best formulation which up to the moment has been put forward 
by anybody,” and it was one he clearly returned to when later crafting his Fourteen Points.129  
  Writing in Peace and Bread in 1922, Addams elaborated on what the WPP had meant by 
a “Concert of Nations” seven years earlier. “What we insisted upon was that the world could be 
organized politically by its statesmen as it had been already organized into an international fiscal 
system by its bankers,” she wrote. “We asked why the problem of building a railroad to 
Baghdad, of securing corridors to the sea for a land-locked nation, or warm water harbors for 
Russia, should result in war.” The obstacle, thought Addams and her contemporaries in the 
women’s peace movement, was nationalism. “Was it not obvious that such situations 
transcended national boundaries and must be approached in a spirit of world adjustment, that 
they could not be peacefully adjusted while men’s minds were still held apart by national 
suspicions and rivalries?” The progressive League envisioned by Addams would be a truly 
international institution, one where the peoples of the world could come together and transcend 
the petty disputes engendered by virulent nationalism.
130
  
That being said, American patriotism still had a part to play. In guiding the world beyond 
the heretofore confining limits of nineteenth century nation-states, America must lead by 
example. The United States, according to Addams, should show the way “by demonstrating that 
the same principles of federation and of an interstate tribunal might be extended among widely 
separated nations, as they had already been established between our own contiguous states. 
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Founded upon the great historical experiment of the United States, it seemed to us that American 
patriotism might rise to a supreme effort because her own experience for more than a century had 
so thoroughly committed her to federation and to peaceful adjudication as matters of every-day 
government.”131 
 Of course, Addams and the progressives were by no means the first Americans to 
advocate the cultivation of an international consciousness that transcended the vagaries of nation. 
Such a call for international solidarity among the world’s workers had been the province of the 
Socialist Party for decades, and – given the very permeable barrier between socialism and 
progressivism in the pre-war years – it’s safe to say Addams and her ilk were at least partially 
influenced by the party of Debs.  
Indeed, soon after the WPP’s peace platform – and despite being blindsided by the 
decision of their European counterparts to back their respective governments in war – the 
Socialists followed up with their own proposal. Penned primarily by moderate Morris Hillquit, 
the Socialist peace “manifesto,” like the WPP plan, advocated self-determination for all peoples, 
open diplomacy, disarmament, “political and industrial democracy,” and a “congress of neutral 
nations” to mediate the end of the conflict. As Knock notes, other than a call for a ban on 
indemnities (reparations), the Socialist proposal “presented few stark contrasts with that of 
America’s foremost ‘bourgeois pacifist’ organizations (in which, it should be mentioned, many 
individual Socialist party members held leadership positions.)” Nevertheless, it too was 
presented to Wilson in person, and once again the president seemed to review it favorably. 






(Hillquit later reported to the Socialist newspaper Appeal to Reason of Wilson that “his 
sympathies were entirely with us.”132)  
Yet, if Wilson seemed generally inclined toward the internationalist bent of the 
progressives and socialists, he also took heed of the suggestions of the “conservative 
internationalists,” who came to advocate a very different type of League than their rivals on the 
left. The conservatives, who included among their number former Secretary of State Elihu Root, 
college presidents Nicholas Murray Butler (Columbia) and Abbot Lawrence Lowell (Harvard), 
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and former president William Howard Taft, 
rested their faith not in international movements but in international law and arbitration.  
To the conservatives who formed the League to Enforce Peace (LEP), with Taft at its 
head, in June 1915, what was needed was not a federated world government that transcended 
nation-states, but a world court that adjudicated issues between them, and a collective security 
pact of some kind that could prevent any one nation from threatening the rest. The conservatives 
had no truck with what they considered to be the wooly-headed internationalist reforms of the 
women’s peace movement, nor did they share their ambitious vision of a federated super-
government. Rather, the conservatives believed in free and independent nations, guided by self-
interest and realpolitik, interacting with one another as nations, through the twin mediums of law 
and diplomacy. As Elihu Root had written to this effect in his 1912 Nobel Peace Prize address, 
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“The independence of nations lies at the basis of the present social organization of the civilized 
world.”133 
Put simply, when considering a possible “League of Nations,” the progressive 
internationalists emphasized the “League” and the conservatives emphasized the “Nations.” This 
was arguably the most central and striking difference between the WPP/Socialist and 
LEP/conservative visions of the League, and the question of nationalism versus internationalism 
would redound through almost all of the foreign policy debates in the decade after the war.  
But it was not the only bone of contention. Where the progressives emphasized neutrality 
in the present conflict and in their rhetoric, seeking a negotiated settlement to end the war, the 
conservatives were much more inclined to back an Allied victory, arguing Germany was at fault 
for the conflict and should be punished for it. Where the progressives emphasized the importance 
of self-determination and thought the League a potential alternative to the imperial system, 
almost all the conservatives “had been ardent imperialists and champions of Anglo-American 
entente since the 1890s.” Where the WPP and Socialists emphasized the structural reasons for 
the coming of the Great War and posited ways in which the League could remedy them 
(removing economic barriers, for example), the LEP gave not a whit for cause and effect. In 
short, while the progressives envisioned the League as a means toward transcending nationalism 
and achieving reform and social justice on an international scale, the conservatives thought the 
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League an end in itself – once the rights of nations were recognized and protected by the 
growing canon of international law, little other tinkering would be required.
134
 
Supported across the political spectrum like this, the idea of the League was often made 
to carry diverse and even contradictory ideas. Writing in The Crisis, W.E.B. Du Bois argued that 
the “League of Nations is absolutely necessary to the salvation of the Negro race”: 
Unless we have some super-national power to curb the anti-Negro policy of the United States and 
South Africa, we are doomed eventually to fight for our rights…What we cannot accomplish 
before the choked conscience of America, we have an infinitely better chance to accomplish 
before the organized Public Opinion of the World. Peace for us is not simply Peace from wars 
like the past, but relief from the spectre of the Great War of Races [which] will be absolutely 
inevitable unless the selfish nations of white civilization are curbed by a Great World Congress in 
which black and white and yellow sit and speak and act.”135 
At the same time, the New York Times could argue, in its review of Lothrop Stoddard’s 
The Rising Tide of Color, that it “throws new light upon the need of a league or association 
which will unite the nations in defense of what is precious in the Nordic inheritance.”136  
So, while progressives and conservatives could agree on the formation of a League of 
Nations at the end of the war, they held very distinct visions for what form that League would 
take. This was reflected anew in November 1918, when both sides took the opportunity of the 
armistice to restate their goals. 
The League after Armistice 
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Within two weeks of the cessation of hostilities, the League to Enforce Peace – Taft and 
the conservatives’ organization – announced its “Victory Program.” As per both their earlier 
peace plan and Wilson’s Fourteen Points, it included a “League of Free Nations with judicial, 
administrative, and executive powers and functions.” 137  
While remaining purposefully vague about the details so as to encourage “discussion and 
criticism by all organizations and persons seeking international cooperation,” the LEP 
recommended that the League include “an administrative organization for the conduct of affairs 
of common interest [and] the protection and care of backward regions and internationalized 
places” and “a representative Congress to formulate and codify rules of international law, to 
inspect the work of administrative bodies and to consider any matter affecting the tranquility of 
the world or betterment of human relations.” Most importantly, “a resort to force by any nation 
should be prevented by a solemn agreement that any aggression will be met immediately by such 
an overwhelming economic and military force that it will not be attempted.” The “initiating 
nucleus” of this League would be solely “the nations associated as belligerents in winning the 
war.” In the “Victory Program,” all the major tenets of conservative internationalism – 
imperialism over “backwards regions,” independent nations interacting through international 
law, collective security, and a peace determined by the Allied victors – were reaffirmed.138 
A few days later, the progressives weighed in, vis a vis the Statement of Principles 
penned by the League of Free Nations Association (LFNA). Formed in April 1918 by the 
Survey’s Paul Kellogg as a private study group on the war aims suggested by the Fourteen 
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Points, the “Committee on Nothing at All,” as it was originally known, ended up being “the only 
expressly liberal organization in the League fight, and it represented the only effort of liberals to 
organize on either side of the controversy.” The statement was printed in six major progressive 
journals (the Dial, the Independent, the Nation, the New Republic, the Public, and the Survey) 
simultaneously, and the signers of the League statement, according to historian Wolfgang 
Helbich, “read like a Who's Who of American liberalism.”139 
 As with the LEP’s “Victory Project,” the LFNA’s statement of principles restated the 
basic intentions of the progressive internationalists. “The fundamental principle underlying the 
League of Nations,” it argued, “is that the security and rights of each member shall rest upon the 
strength of the whole League, pledged to uphold by their combined power international 
arrangements ensuring fair treatment for all.” To accomplish thus, the LFNA advocated a rolling 
back of national power, as “any plan ensuring nationals security and equality of economic 
opportunity will involve a limitation of national sovereignty.”  
 
In keeping with arguably the central tenet of progressive ideology, the LFNA emphasized 
the importance of the League as a vehicle of and for enlightened international public opinion: “If 
the League of Nations is not to develop into an immense bureaucratic union of governments 
instead of a democratic union of peoples, the elements of (a) complete publicity and (b) effective 
popular representation must be insisted upon.” And, drawing upon the federal example and 
history of the United States, the LFNA argued for the League as a first step in molding a new 
international order, one which would allow for “the greatest measure of autonomy, and for 
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absolute freedom of religion, of civil liberty, of cultural development of the weaker peoples 
within the stronger nations, and of the native peoples of the undeveloped regions of the earth.” 
More than just the collective security pact suggested by the Victory Program, the progressive 





To some, the League of the progressive internationalists seemed dangerously naïve, if not 
downright un-American. “We are not internationalists. We are American nationalists,” thundered 
Theodore Roosevelt in Chicago in the summer of 1918. “To substitute internationalism for 
nationalism means to do away with patriotism,” he declared in New York soon thereafter. “The 
professional pacifist and the professional internationalist are equally undesirable citizens.” 
Desiring a League that would serve “only as an addition to, and in no sense as a substitute for the 
preparedness of our own strength for our own defense,” Roosevelt later scoffed at the global 
order articulated by Wilson and the progressives, saying it would force America into war “every 
time a Jugoslav wishes to slap a Czechoslav in the face.” In very Rooseveltian language, TR’s 
old friend, Senator Albert Beveridge of Indiana, also deplored the “amiable old male grannies 
who, over their afternoon tea, are planning to denationalize America and denationalize the 
Nation’s manhood.”141 
 
But even as conservatives and progressive internationalists wrangled over the character 
and make-up of a possible post-war League, another set of observers rejected the idea of an 
international organization outright. Disgusted by what they thought to be imperialistic forays by 
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Wilson into Mexico, the Caribbean, and Russia, and deeply fearful of the obligations which they 
believed League membership would place on the United States, a group of progressives in the 
Senate worked feverishly – and hand-in-glove with conservatives – to kill the treaty and the 
League, believing nothing less than the fate of the republic was at stake. These, to use a term 
coined by historian Robert David Johnson, were the Senate “peace progressives.”142 
 
The Third Way: Progressive Nationalists 
 
 
In the oft-told tale of the League’s demise in the Senate, much has been made of the 
enmity between President Wilson and Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Henry Cabot Lodge. 
As Lodge told Theodore Roosevelt in 1915, “I never expected to hate anyone in politics with the 
hatred I feel toward Wilson.” And the feeling was mutual. When Republican Senator James 
Watson of Indiana fretted that Lodge might be giving Wilson what he wanted by offering 
reservations to the Treaty, Lodge replied: “[M]y dear James, you do not take into consideration 
the hatred that Woodrow Wilson has for me personally. Never under any set of circumstances in 
this world could he be induced to accept a treaty with Lodge reservations appended to it.”143 
 
However, as historian Robert Crunden has noted, “Wilson’s true enemies were the group 
of senators called the Irreconcilables, or the Battalion of Death”: 
 
Fourteen Republicans and two Democrats, they fought Wilson and his schemes to the end and 
successfully prevented Lodge from making compromises to ratify any treaty. The most visible 
leaders of the group were two of the most progressive men in Washington. In fact, the fight over 
the Treaty of Versailles was also the last great battle within progressivism. Each side continued to 
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These two progressive leaders Crunden mentions were Senators William Borah of Idaho 
and Hiram Johnson of California, both of whom were against the League from the start.
145
 In 
fact, both men, against the professed wishes of Lodge, would eventually follow Wilson around 
the country on a counter-speaking tour.
146
 A close third at the head of the left-leaning 
Irreconcilables was Robert La Follette of Wisconsin. All three were progressive nationalists who 
believed, in the words of Borah, that Americans were “‘perfectly willing to do all they can for 
the pacification and for the uplifting of the world except to imperil the independence or surrender 
the sovereignty of their own Republic. They do not believe that to be either in the interest of 
peace in America or peace in the world.” Rather, the nation should stay “true to the old Republic 
as we have enjoyed it for nearly a century and a half.”147 
 
As Westerners who came to public life at a time and place where populism and 
progressivism intermingled – and unlike both conservatives and the international-minded 
progressives – they were both intensely anti-imperialist and intensely nationalistic in their 
outlook. They were, in a word, Jeffersonians, and from the start they were dedicated foes of 
Wilson’s league. Along with other Senate progressives like George Norris of Nebraska and Asle 
Gronna of North Dakota, they were the balance of power who helped to determine the treaty’s 
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ultimate fate. And they – particularly Borah, who led the crusade against the Treaty (and it was 
very much a crusade) and would later serve as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in the Twenties – would become a central locus in the foreign policy debates of the 
ensuing decade. 
 
Like Teddy Roosevelt, William Borah often heaped scorn on the cosmopolitan mindset. 
He abhorred “this weakening, simpering, sentimental internationalism which would destroy 
national character and undermine nationalism.” “Internationalism absolutely defeats the national 
spirit and patriotic fervor,’ he argued another time, deeming it a “disloyal doctrine that the 
American Constitution can be subordinated to a pact with foreign powers.” In fact, disloyalty 
was a theme for Borah.  To him, an advocate of the League was “a man who ‘no longer wants an 
American Republic, no longer believes in nationalism and no longer desires to see the American 
flag a little higher in the heavens than that of any other nation.”  He occasionally took to 
comparing internationalists to Benedict Arnold – “the most worthy exemplar I know of for those 
who feel America alone is not quite sufficient – that we must be broader and more pliable – not 
so pronounced in our Americanism.”148 
 
At the same time, however, Borah had no truck with the conservative approach either. In 
1915, he argued that Taft’s League to Enforce Peace “ought to be entitled a League to 
Undermine and Destroy Republican Institutions,” and that it was a scheme put forward by 
wealthy plutocrats to protect their overseas investments. “Let no one be misled,” he argued. “The 
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real force behind this traitorous scheme is not peace but plunder. There are those who have their 
investments in Europe who see tremendous opportunity for the exploitations of the people of 
those countries and the natural resources of the countries but who will not enter upon the 
doubtful investment until our own government gets behind the securities and underwrites their 
exploitations. There has never been so bold an attempt to literally sell a free government, to 
auction it off, since they auctioned off the emperorship from the parapets of Rome.”149 
 
The reference to “the parapets of Rome” was not unusual in Borah’s rhetoric. On any 
given issue, the former Idaho lawyer’s writing and speeches had a tendency towards the 
grandiloquent.  But the battle of the League – or the “League of Dam-nations,” as one of his 
constituents dubbed it – moved Borah to, even for him, increasing feats of grandiosity. “Nothing 
could be more imperialistic, more calculated to work injustice and to produce misery than the 
Versailles Treaty,” he declared, calling it “the most important issue since the civil war.” To 
Borah, the League it contained was “the evil thing with the holy name,” “the most consummate 
organization for autocracy which has yet been attempted,” and “at war with every principle of 
the Magna Charta, the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the 
United States, and with the fundamental principles of justice, liberty, and freedom.” It was a 
“conspiracy against justice, against peace, against humanity, and against civilization.”150 
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If America joined the League, he wrote a few years later, “this old Republic will have 
started upon its downward career. We may keep a Republic in name, but we will cease to be a 
Republic in fact. If we adopt the European system and become a part of European affairs and a 
copartner in European turmoils and broils, we will not long remain the government which the 
Fathers gave us. I entertain no more doubt about that than that my Redeemer liveth.” Speaking of 
said Redeemer, Borah also asserted that “[i]f the Savior of man would revisit the Earth and 
declare for a League of Nations, I would be opposed to it.”151 
 
And Borah was not alone in this strong sentiment against the League. In a letter to his 
son, Borah’s fellow Irreconcilable, Hiram Johnson, called the League “the most iniquitous thing 
at least during my life time…How any man of liberal views can support it passes my 
comprehension.” Considering Wilson’s Peace “a travesty on his fourteen points” and “a mockery 
of every idealistic utterance,” the former California governor railed against the diplomats who 
“have played the same old game of grab and gouge…The League of Nations is the product of 
this cupidity and intrigue, the instrument for their maintenance and preservation.”152  
 
On the Senate floor, Johnson argued that the peace forces “the chains of tyranny upon 
millions of people and cements for all times unjust and wicked annexations.” It would mean the 
“halting and betrayal of New World liberalism, the triumph of cynical Old World diplomacy, the 
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humiliation and end of American idealism.” For Johnson, as for Borah, it all came down to 
preserving the national independence of the United States. “The issue is the Republic that 
Washington gave us, that Lincoln saved for us, whose traditions have been so gloriously upheld 
by our valiant sons abroad. The issue is America. And I am an American.”153  
 
Writing to his own sons, the formidable Wisconsin progressive Robert La Follette 
deemed the Versailles Treaty “an agreement to bind us to fight in every future world-
war…without a parallel in all history as a spoils-grabbing compact of greed and hate.” Following 
a path of argument that would become heavily trodden in the coming decade, he lamented what 
the relative quiet about the botched Peace suggested about American democracy:   
 
One would think that sense of national honor, that a pride in keeping faith would make 
Americans with one voice insist that we make our word good. But you don’t hear a peep. Outside 
a few radical papers like the Nation…there isn’t a word being said. Even if everybody is still 
afraid of being called pro-German…still one would think that an intelligent citizenship would 
demand that the peace to ‘end war’ should not be permitted to become a mere scramble for spoils 
that must inevitably sow all Europe with a hatred that makes wars in the near future an absolute 
certainty.”154 
 
Instead, La Follette surmised, “the people are thinking with their fears. They never want 
war again and because this is called a ‘Covenant of Peace,’ they think it must make for peace – 
when it binds us into a fight in every war upon the orders of foreign governments. Not one in a 
thousand has ever read the League. Not one in ten thousand has ever analyzed it. They are just 
for a ‘League to stop war.’”155  And why had public opinion failed in this regard? Wilson. In a 
January 1920 op-ed entitled “Wilson’s Broken Pledges,” La Follette exclaimed: “We have been 
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lied to so much and for so long that we hardly know the face of the truth….I challenge any man 
to name one new privilege, one added new right which the common people of this or any other 
allied countries are to gain as a result of this war.” 156  
 
In short, to La Follette, the League “[f]rom the first sentence to the last” was a “sham and 
a fraud.” If ever it or the Versailles Treaty were adopted, he argued in a May 1920 speech, “we 
would stand convicted before the world, as a Nation without honor.” Someday, La Follette 
argued, “Woodrow Wilson may emerge from himself and face that judgment” of the American 
people for putting such a plan forward. “God pity him when that time comes. He will find that 
judgment as harsh as Truth, as unrelenting as Justice.”157  
 
Summing up the Irreconcilable position in March 1919, progressive Senator Asle Gronna 
exclaimed, “I will die before I will vote for the League of Nations.” (This turned out to be true – 
Gronna died in 1922, two years after losing a Republican primary to fellow progressive Edwin 
Ladd.) The intransigence of the Senate progressives early in the process gave Henry Cabot 
Lodge, who opposed the League for both philosophical and partisan reasons, the opening he 
needed.   Late in the evening of March 3
rd
, just before Wilson was to return to Paris to continue 
negotiations on the treaty, he introduced his “Round Robin” resolution. Signed by thirty-seven 
Republicans – including the Irreconcilables – it argued that “in the form now proposed,” a 
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With that one stroke, Lodge broke the coalition of progressive internationalists, socialists, 
and conservatives that was emerging behind the League. Earlier, The New Republic had deemed 
the League covenant “the Constitution of 1919,” arguing “if such an organization had been in 
existence in 1914 there would have been no war.” Speaking for the Socialists, the Appeal to 
Reason had said the proposed League would end “belligerent and wholly selfish nationalism” 
and lead to “the internationalism of balanced justice and cooperation.” Meanwhile, Taft and the 
League to Enforce Peace were also outspoken proponents of Wilson’s League. The very next day 
after the Round Robin, March 4
th, Wilson and Taft would appear together at New York’s 




But, with the Round Robin, Lodge had opened the door to alterations to the League, 
leaving the question open of which direction these alterations would go. Almost immediately, 
doubts began to surface. In its current form, editor of The Dial Robert Morss Lovett wrote on 
March 8
th, the League was “a blank check – a form which may be signed but will then require 
filling out with the figures which alone can give it meaning.” He argued the League’s Covenant 
needed more substance with regard to disarmament, direct representation of the people, and the 
economic causes of the war.
 
The New Republic, while warning that too many reservations would 
“threaten to upset the whole applecart,” and that progressives “should prepare to support any 
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agreement which will set up a promising even though inadequate measure of international 
government,” offered its own suggestions the following week, including guarantees of protection 




On one hand, Wilson – trying to steer a course between the progressives and the 
conservatives – clearly recognized the danger that Lodge’s Round Robin posed. Two days before 
it was introduced, the President had urged the progressive members of LFNA in a private 
meeting to get on board with the League now. “[T]he important thing to do is to get behind the 
covenant as it is,’” he noted, promising that any future changes would be “in a liberal direction 
[and] not in the direction of the opposition.” On the other, the president fell right into Lodge’s 
trap. Responding to the Round Robin on the day of his departure, Wilson told his audience at 
Metropolitan Hall: “[W]hen that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant 
not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the 
Covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure.” By tying the fate of the 
League to the entire Versailles treaty – a treaty whose outcome was still very much in 




The Treaty Arrives in the Senate 
 
 
By the time the treaty came back for Senate consideration, four harrowing months later, 
word had leaked of the diplomatic shenanigans at Versailles, and of the resignations of William 
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Bullitt and other members of the Peace Commission, and progressive opinion had begun to sour 
on Wilson. As La Follette wrote to his sons, “my impression is that Wilson & the League & 
Treaty are losing ground every day – at least it looks so from this angle.” Similarly, Hiram 
Johnson wrote his son in May that “[o]ne of the notable things of the East is that every liberal 
paper has turned against Wilson and his League.” 162 
 
Compounding matters, official Senate consideration of the Treaty began with what 
looked to be another petty Wilson snub: The Treaty had leaked to the public before it had been 
transmitted to the Senate. Wilson refrained from publicizing the text, insisting that the treaty was 
not final until the Germans agreed to it and it was signed. And so Hiram Johnson introduced a 
resolution demanding that Secretary of State Lansing send a copy of the full treaty to the Senate, 





During this contentious debate, William Borah poured gasoline on the fire twice -- first 
by declaring that copies of the text were already circulating, not just across Europe, but in New 
York’s financial sector. Lodge confirmed, noting the existence of four copies in New York. 
Apparently, Lodge quipped, “the only place where it is not allowed to come is the Senate of the 
United States.”  Soon thereafter, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began an inquiry into 
exactly how the House of Morgan received the Treaty before the Senate, and whether they had 
any financial interests involved in its writing.  
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This investigation was actually an idea put forward by Wilson Democrats to embarrass 
the Republicans, but true-to-form, Borah intended to run with it. When hearing that Borah 
intended to call up “J.P. Morgan et al” before the committee, Robert La Follette mused: “Of 
course they will tell all about it – NOT,” but he nonetheless offered to help Borah “in any way I 
can. If Borah will do it I am going to get him to examine them as to the extent of their private 
loans prior to the time we went into the war. That will be useful information to have later on – if 
we can get it.” But, exercising his considerable leverage with Republicans, Elihu Root – one of 
the recipients of the treaty in New York – stepped in to quash an extended investigation. 164    
 
Then, three days after passage of the Johnson resolution (and after Wilson had again 
demurred to send the treaty along), Borah brought his own bootleg copy of the text into the 
Senate. When unanimous consent to print it as a Senate document was refused, he began reading 
it into the Record.
 Thus, remarked La Follette to his sons, “making Good Wilson’s pledge of 
open Covenants openly arrived at.” 165 
 
Borah’s decision to circumvent the normal process drove Wilson Democrats into 
apoplexy -- particularly Gilbert Hitchcock of Nebraska, the Ranking Member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, and so by extension the unofficial leader of Wilson forces on the 
Treaty (although progressive Thomas Walsh of Montana also aspired to that role.) Hitchcock 
cried treason, arguing that “the majority of the United States Senate is deliberately cooperating 
with the German government” in order to throw “a monkey wrench into the negotiations.” 
Covering all the bases, the Senator also invoked the B-word. “The Senate of the United States is 
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putting itself in the attitude of a Bolshevik organization, running amuck here in the treaty 
negotiations.” His argument was carried on by another Democrat, John Sharp Williams of 
Georgia. Wilson, he said, “represents the American people and his opponents represent all the 
hyphenates in America – all of the enemy hyphenates in America.” 166 
 
In that Senate melee, Hitchcock also announced the fateful Democratic decision that 
would ultimately spell doom for the Treaty: “The issue is this league or none…if this league is 
defeated, there will be no league at all.” In other words, the Democrats wanted a “clean” treaty -- 
There would be no reservations agreed upon. (However angry at the time, Hitchcock was 
following orders here: “It is manifestly too late now to effect changes in the Covenant,” Wilson 
had told Lansing. “I hope…Hitchcock and all his friends [will] take a most militant and 
aggressive course, such as I mean to the minute I get back.”)167 
 
The Articles of Contention 
 
With the Versailles Treaty published in the Senate at last – and deemed unalterable by 
Wilson and the Democratic opposition – the battle lines for and against the League were drawn. 
For Borah and the Irreconcilables – as with much of the wider opposition to the League, 
progressive or otherwise – the prime locus of dispute was Article X of the League Covenant, 
which argued that all League signatories “undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members.” 
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As progressive irreconcilable Asle Gronna told the Senate in October 1919, “I doubt if 
any two members of this body or any two citizens anywhere would agree upon the construction 
and the meaning of this article.” And yet, for both its supporters and detractors, it was the crux of 
the Covenant.  Wilson called it the “king pin” of his League, “the very backbone of the whole 
covenant.” Its absence, he told audiences during his speaking tour, would mean “we have 
guaranteed that any imperialistic enterprise may revive, we have guaranteed that there is no 
barrier to the ambition of nations that have the power to dominate, we have abdicated the whole 
position of right and substituted the principle of might.” Removing or revising it, he continued, 
would mean a “rejection of the covenant” – It would “change the entire meaning of the Treaty 
and exempt the United States from all responsibility for the preservation of peace.” As he said to 
his future successor, Warren Harding, in August 1919, “Without it the league would be hardly 
more than an influential debating society.” 168 
 
At a February 1919 dinner with members of Congress, before the Irreconcilable 
opposition in the Senate had truly begun to coalesce, Wilson had been asked about what Article 
X might mean for American sovereignty. The president fundamentally misread his audience. 
“[S]ome of our sovereignty would be surrendered,” he told them, since a League could not work 
“without some sacrifice…each nation yielding something to accomplish such an end.” Wilson 
went on to argue that America “would willingly relinquish some of its sovereignty for the good 
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of the world,” and that the League “would never be carried out successfully if the objection of 
sovereignty was insisted upon by the Senate.”169 
 
Unfortunately for Wilson and the League, this objection was vociferously insisted upon 
by progressives and conservative nationalists alike. Citing the historic examples of Washington’s 
Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine time and again, Borah deemed himself “a thorough 
believer in the proposition that America should not politically and governmentally entangle 
herself in European affairs. I entertain no possible doubt that any such program would be the end 
of the Republic.”170  
 
Asle Gronna argued much the same. “Let us protect our own people first – the people of 
the United States – with confidence and full assurance and belief that we shall in the future as we 
have in the past, to the utmost of our ability, assist the helpless, defend the defenseless, assist and 
protect the oppressed, and to the best of our ability aid and support the people of the nations 
which may suffer injustice.” If America signed aboard a League with Article X, he argued, “the 
people of the United States will resent the idea, and will take it as an insult, to be told by a 
council composed mostly of aliens that we must do thus and so.”171 
 
As Gronna’s oration reflects, closely connected to the question of endangered American 
sovereignty is what entrance to the League would mean for the Constitution. Would the United 
States Congress still have the right to declare war, or would that power now be ceded to the 
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League? For the peace progressives, even the creation of the League was constitutionally 
suspect, since, rather than asking for their advice and consent during the treaty-making process, 
Wilson had delivered a fait accompli to the Senate. “[It is] too late for the advice to be effective 
after the treaty is made and signed and passes out of hands and into the possession of the 
Senate,” argued La Follette.”172 
 
While always foremost, the threat to American sovereignty and the Constitution was not 
the only objection to Article X in the progressive irreconcilable’s arsenal. They also believed that 
respecting the “territorial integrity” of current members would mean a global and irrevocable 
locking-in of the status quo. In the words of Hiram Johnson, it would mean “a war against 
revolution in all countries, whether enemy or ally,” and that the United States would have to send 
her troops overseas to police the borders of European empires. It would “freeze the world into 
immutability and put it in a straightjacket,” making “subject peoples…subject until the crack of 
doom.”173  
 
Similarly, Robert La Follette argued this stipulation was included to “build an iron ring of 
conservative governments…and wall in the dangerous doctrines of the Soviet government.” To 
the readers of his magazine, he declared: “We don’t need to restrain the peoples of different 
countries from making war upon each other. We do need to restrain the ruling classes of every 
country, from inciting or compelling its people to war upon those of some other country.”174 
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William Borah was also put off by the geopolitical stasis Article X seemingly endorsed, 
calling it tantamount to “maintaining the status quo by force.” Writing after the dust had cleared, 
he told a constituent: “I think it was the most unconscionable scheme to reduce the world to 
military control and to place all peoples under the dominancy of the military power of the few 
Nations that has ever been conceived. It has always been one of marvels to me how people, who 
really love peace and who believe in a Government founded upon reason and upon the maxims 
of liberty, could be in favor of a scheme to place the military power of four or five Nations over 
the destiny of the entire human race.”175 
 
Writing in his memoirs years later, Herbert Hoover – who knew more than most about 
the origins of the Treaty – made a similar argument against Article X. “It was a practical freezing 
of the world into a mold of Versailles cast in the heats of war – and was a stifling of progress and 
all righting of wrongs. Moreover, I knew this article had been forced into the League by the 
French as a part of their demand for an indirect military alliance of the principal Allies.”176  
 
Two and a half weeks after Lodge’s Round Robin had opened the door to Senate 
adjustments to the final treaty, progressive journalist William Hard argued in the New Republic 
for the removal of Article X from the League on similar grounds. It “lays an individual 
obligation to maintain the world’s present boundaries upon every individual nation in the world,” 
he argued. By its decree, “the United States, by itself if necessary, must defend the territorial 
integrity of Italy against the Jugo-Slavs.” While conceding that “a League is essential to a 
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peace,” he argued that Article X was a “manifest mistake” which the Senate should eliminate “no 
matter what the President may do or say.” 
 
I submit that the first sentence of Article Ten is a surrender to the Tories. I submit that it binds the 
United States to use all its resources of men and money to ‘preserve’ forever every territorial 
iniquity which the present peace conference may establish…I submit that if the rule of Article 
Ten had been adopted in the days of Marcus Aurelius we should still have a Roman Empire from 
the Euphrates to the Tiber. I submit that the world has not yet arrived at the end of its possible 
growth. I submit that the first sentence of Article Ten is a sentence of death on much of the 
possible liberal growth of the future.177 
 
A week later, TNR officially agreed with Hard in an editorial entitled “Defeat Article 
Ten.” While noting that “the Covenant as a whole is necessary to prevent every power from 
acting as Austria acted” in 1914, “Article Ten should be eliminated for the following reasons: 
first, because the hasty settlement now being made in Paris cannot do final justice, second 
because America should not be pledged to uphold injustices, third because Article Ten is 
destructive of the League’s main purpose, in that it excludes from discussion a large class of 
questions” – namely the justice of current borders. And after striking Article X, the essay argued, 
“Article Eleven…[still] fully protects every nation against aggression.”178 
 
But, as it happens, the progressive irreconcilables in the Senate had very similar 
objections about Article XI, which stated that “any war, or threat of war, whether immediately 
affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the 
League.” Wilson had called this article, which he considered “in conjunction with Article X,” his 
“favorite article in the treaty” – because it allowed America to “mind other peoples’ business 
and…force a nation on the other side of the globe to bring to that bar of mankind any wrong that 
is afoot in this world.” To the Senate progressives, this was, as Borah put it, “the acme of 
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tyranny.” “If any war or threat of war shall be a matter of consideration for the league,” Borah 
asked, “what is the necessity of Article X?...Is there anything in Article X that is not completely 
covered by Article XI?” In Gronna’s words, Article XI “undertakes to dictate and regulate the 
affairs of every nation on the face of the globe,” resulting in “limitless autocracy and oligarchy 
complete, self-determination…a thing of the past.” Gronna continued:  
This proposed treaty provides for the enforcement of peace by force, by the sword, by waging 
war, and it takes from the peoples of every nation on the face of the globe the right to have a 
voice in the matter. So in this matter, so important to the welfare of the human family, you are 
setting up a supergovernment ruled by what we hope may be a few benevolent despots; but, if we 
miss our guess, so that instead of directing their energies in the interest of benevolence, justice, 
and peace, if they desire to become autocrats, there is absolutely nothing to prevent them from 
becoming the greatest tyrants the world has ever known. And yet you call this a league to 
establish peace.179 
 
The progressives did not feel they were speaking hypothetically about the imperialist 
dangers of Articles X and XI – They believed they had already seen the same dynamic at work in 
Russia, when Wilson sent 5000 troops to the port of Arkhangelsk in September 1918 to serve 
under British officers as part of the “Polar Bear Expedition.” In fact, one of the reasons Johnson 
turned against the League early is that he saw in it the seeds of Wilson’s military intervention 
there. “In the Russia situation, we have exactly the League of Nations,” he wrote a friend. “The 
League decreed the Russia expedition against our vote. Congress never declared war, a war has 
been carried on by United States troops under the direction and command of the foreign 
nations…it is exactly what will be done under a League of Nations.”180  
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If Russia was not example enough of budding imperialism in the League, the fates of 
Shantung and Korea in the Versailles Treaty proved another damning exhibit for the prosecution. 
Progressive George Norris of Nebraska, otherwise inclined towards a League, fell into the 
Irreconcilable camp mainly on the basis of these provisions in the Treaty. They demonstrated 
beyond a doubt “the germs of wickedness and injustice” in the compact, as well as “the greed 
and avarice shown by the nations…that are to control the League.” “When you start to build the 
temple of justice upon a foundation of sand, of crime, of dishonor, of disgrace,” he warned, 
“your temple will crumble and decay just as surely as history repeats itself.”181 
 
 And the imperialist dangers of the League were not lost on the wider progressive 
community either.  As Oswald Villard editorialized in The Nation, the American people will 
soon “realize that the League of Nations as drawn commits us to a policy of imperialistic 
interference in the affairs of all the world, and threatens to fill the future with constant warring in 
behalf of men and causes alien to our entire historic spirit and purpose.” Similarly, Thorstein 
Veblen wrote in The Dial that the League was “an instrument of realpolitik, created in the image 
of nineteenth century imperialism.”182 
 
Columnist H.L. Mencken – never a progressive so much as a bitterly cynical moralist – 
made a similar satiric argument about the League, while taking time to skewer the fickle “war is 
the health of the state” progressivism of Dewey and The New Republic: 
 
“Personally, I am in favor of the League – not that I am under any delusion about its intents and 
purposes, but precisely because I regard it as thumpingly dishonest. Like democracy, it deserves 
to be tried. Five years of it will see all the principal members engaged in trying to slaughter one 
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another. In other words, it will make for wars – and I have acquired an evil taste for wars. Don’t 
blame it on any intrinsic depravity. There was a time when I cooed for peace with the best of 
them, but all the present whoopers for peace insisted upon war, and after viewing war for six 
years I found it was better than a revival or a leg-show – nay, even better than a hanging.”183 
 
While much more concerned about threats to American sovereignty than incipient 
imperialism, the Republican foreign policy intelligentsia – Lodge, Charles Evans Hughes, 
William Howard Taft, Elihu Root – all agreed Article X was at best a weak point and more often 
a dealbreaker for the League as well.
 And, despite Wilson’s warning to the contrary back in 




Sensing the danger, Wilson tried to rephrase his arguments for Article X in another 
meeting with Senators – this time in August 1919. There, he insisted that Article X was “a moral, 
not a legal, obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon 
it in all cases that call for action. It is binding in conscience only, not in law.” He then confused 
the issue further, by telling Warren Harding that a moral obligation “is of course superior to a 
legal obligation, and, if I may say so, has a greater binding force.”185  
 
In this distinction between legal and moral obligations, Wilson was trying to square the 
logical paradox that Article X presented for its defenders. If Article X was not binding, it was 
powerless, and could therefore be removed without issue. The only reason it needed to exist was 
if it in fact bound members to certain obligations (which, in a simpler time only a few months 
earlier, Wilson had already conceded.)  As historian Robert Crunden put it, “either Article X 
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meant nothing and should go, or it meant that Americans could be involved in war without 
specific congressional sanction.” As conservative Irreconcilable James Reed of Missouri 
articulated the Democrats’ dilemma in Senate debate, “All you have argued thus far is that your 
League is a powerless thing, and yet it is to save the world!”186  
 
While Articles X and XI were almost always the center of debate, other issues also 
rankled the progressive irreconcilables. Believing that enlightened public opinion was the only 
real fulcrum that could move the world, they believed another fundamental defect was the 
manner of the League’s creation: The whole process lacked suitable transparency. As Borah put 
it, the “treaty and the league were written behind hermetically sealed doors and all the material 
facts were studiously and persistently kept away from the people.” 
 
We are creating a supergovernment with its capital in Europe which will deal with the destinies of 
millions behind closed doors. It will take but little time if we judge the future by the past for such 
a secret council to fall to the lowest standard of venality and corruption. Yet to such a body we 
are about to delegate tremendous powers for evil…It was thoroughly understood from the 
beginning that unless this treaty was written in secret and the facts concerning it kept secret and it 




Nonetheless, Borah took heart that, “ [despite] the highly capitalized and thoroughly 
organized propaganda carried on by the sinister interests with large investments and securities in 
Europe[,] the people at large are coming more and more to understand and be against the League 
and the treaty. Just in proportion as they learn the facts they are turning against it.” Public 
opinion – the great engine of progressivism – was running smoothly.188 
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Robert La Follette also abhorred the secrecy in which the Treaty had come about, in 
defiance of Wilson’s promise of “open covenants openly arrived at.” One would think that 
Article 23 of the League’s covenant, which argued that members “will endeavour to secure and 
maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in their own 
countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend,” should 
have been music to the ears of a La Follette. More than a few conservatives opposed the League 
for exactly this inclusion. But the Wisconsin Senator saw an inherent flaw in the mold. “The vice 
which goes to the very root of all the labor provisions of this proposed treaty,” he argued, “is that 
they provide for the enactment of labor legislation by the secret and undemocratic method by 
which treaties are made.” Due to both this secrecy and the seeming enshrinement of the status-
quo laid down by Article X, La Follette argued the League would only serve to “crystallize the 
present industrial conditions and to perpetuate the wrong and injustice in the present relations 
existing between labor and capital.”189  
 
 Like the legal and moral obligations of Article X, the question of secrecy also came up at 
Wilson’s August 1919 meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  When asked 
about secret treaties made among the Allies before the war, Wilson claimed to have no 
knowledge of them entering the Paris talks, even though they had been widely publicized. The 
lie struck many as an act of desperation. “If he was ignorant,” La Follette concluded, “he was the 
only man connected in any way with public life in the United States who was ignorant of the 
terms and purposes of the secret treaties.” Sensing an “almost universal conspiracy to lie and 
smother the truth,” an increasingly irate Walter Lippmann agreed. This “initial lie has taken the 
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decency out of him, he wrote to his friend Bernard Berenson. “He is as unscrupulous today as 
LG [Lloyd George] and a great deal less attractive.”190 (In fact, Lippmann had helped prepare 
Borah and the Irreconcilables for this White House meeting, by giving them questions based on 
his inside knowledge of the Inquiry. It was a decision he would come to regret later in life.)
191 
 
Sovereignty, constitutionality, imperialism, secrecy – To the Senate progressives, all of 
these objections to the League were intermingled, and not just with each other. As historian 
Thomas Knock notes, progressive “disappointment with Wilson and the Covenant were 
multiplied a hundredfold by the treaty itself…the progressives [simply] believed that the 
President had helped to make a bad peace.”  In the words of La Follette: 
 
“The little group of men who sat in secret conclave for months at Versailles were not 
peacemakers. They were war makers. They cut and slashed the map of the Old World in violation 
of the terms of the armistice…They betrayed China. They locked the chains on the subject 
peoples of Ireland, Egypt, and India. They partitioned territory and traded off peoples in mockery 
of that sanctified formula of 14 points, and made it our Nation’s shame. Then, fearing the wrath 
of outraged peoples, knowing that their new map would be torn to rags and tatters by the 
conflicting warring elements which they had bound together in wanton disregard of racial 
animosities, they made a league of nations to stand guard over the swag!...Mister President, 
whatever course other Senators take, I shall never vote to bind my country to the monstrous 
undertaking which this covenant would impose.”192 
 
 
He was, in a word, irreconcilable. Unfortunately for those who wanted to see America in 
a League of Nations, so too was the President of the United States. 
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Things Fall Apart 
 
Writing Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas in August 1919, Republican editor, Roosevelt 
Progressive, and League supporter William Allen White – whose homespun wisdom and 
espousal of common-sense Midwestern values earned him the moniker “the Sage of Emporia” – 
urged his former Governor to be careful about crossing Wilson on the League of Nations.  “I 
would vote for the League with certain restrictions and reservations,” he told Capper, “but I 
would never vote for an amendment to the League which would be unacceptable to the President. 
He is too smart. He is a singed cat. You think you can play politics all around him, but he fools 
you.”  Indeed, White thought the League issue could very well decide the election of 1920. 
“[Wilson] can be pretty nearly elected to a third term in this country…[I]f we defeat the League 
of Nations, we are in the Devil’s own box for next year. You can discredit the old man this year, 
but he will turn up smiling next year, and Heaven knows that the country has had so much 
Democratic incompetency that another term of it would swamp us.”193 
 
William Allen White was right about the League of Nations being an election issue, but 
not much else. For, however canny his political instincts might have been in the past, when 
Woodrow Wilson arrived back in America in early July, he returned to a very different political 
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For one, the rude facts of the Versailles Treaty had arrived before he did, and soured 
many on the peace process. As early as May 1919, the Women’s International Conference for 
Permanent Peace at Zurich weighed in with a damning statement against the treaty, expressing 
“deep regret that the terms of peace proposed at Versailles should so seriously violate the 
principles upon which alone a just and lasting peace can be secured and which the democrats of 
the world had come to expect.” They argued the Treaty “tacitly sanctioned secret diplomacy, 
denied the principle of self-determination, recognized the rights of the victors to the spoils, and 
created all over Europe discords and animosities which can only lead to future wars.” Seconded 
by Jeanette Rankin, the former Member of Congress who had opposed entry into World War I, 
the statement was approved unanimously – meaning it also enjoyed the support of former Wilson 




For another, Wilson’s erstwhile allies among both the progressive and conservative 
internationalists were, after Lodge’s Round Robin, now pushing for alterations in their respective 
directions. Even as the progressive League of Free Nations Associations (LFNA) and 
conservative League to Enforce Peace (LEP) officially joined forces in the summer of 1919, they 
began to pull Wilson’s League apart. 
 
While arguing that a “League of Nations is essential to the world’s future peace, progress, 
and prosperity” and that a “failure to ratify a League Covenant that seems a promising beginning 
would be a crime against the whole world,” Paul Kellogg’s progressive League of Free Nations 
Association (LFNA) also now declared that “it would be little less criminal to regard as final and 
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unalterable what has been wrought in haste out of the pressing exigencies of a world crisis.” 
Stanford President David Starr Jordan, one of the early founders of the LFNA, now argued to 
Borah that “the ratification of the present Treaty, bad as it is, with certain reservations can be 
made to give better results than would follow rejection.”196 
 
By December, the LFNA was arguing that, while the Senate’s reservations to the League 
were “vicious and petty,” “the concessions made at Paris to European and Japanese nationalistic 
self-interests have made it impossible for President Wilson to underwrite unqualifiedly the 
Treaty of Versailles, with its territorial and other compromises.” These compromises, “some of 
them violating the principles upon which the armistice was based,” gave opponents of the 
League “their most effective argument against the treaty – that the covenant would, in effect, 
make the United States the chief guarantor of the perpetuation of some of the worst features of 
the old diplomacy and imperialistic policies of the great powers.” And so they offered their own 
amendments to the Covenant, among them issuing a clarification that Article X would not be 
used to authorize “interference by the League in internal revolutions…[or in] preventing genuine 
redress and readjustment of boundaries.”197 
 
Caught in the grip of repression at home, other left-leaning Americans were even more 
vocal in their desire to see Wilson and the League fail. Writing Robert La Follette in September, 
Amos Pinchot urged the Irreconcilables to “shout the truth…that [Wilson] spent his time at Paris 
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standing in the corner with a dunce cap and that he came home so thoroughly spanked that he 
had to run around the country because he could not sit down.”198  
 
At The Crisis, W.E.B. Du Bois remained a stalwart defender of the League, warts and all. 
“The proposed League is not the best conceivable – indeed, in some respects, it is the worst,” he 
told his readers in November 1919. “But the worst Internation is better than the present anarchy 
in international relations.” However “oligarchic, reactionary, restricted, and conservative…it has 
a democratic Assembly, it recognizes no color line, and it can enforce peace.” Thus, The Crisis 
argued: “Let us have the League with all its autocracy and then in the League let us work for 
Democracy of all races and men.”199  
 
But Du Bois and The Crisis would be increasingly lonely in this view as the League fight 
dragged on. More often heard in progressive circles was the view of The New Republic: “With 
the publication of the Treaty,” the magazine recalled in November of 1920, “the New Republic 
was forced to conclude that the character of the peace was such that it would disturb the world it 
enforced. From May of 1919 the New Republic has therefore stood irreconcilably against the 
ratification of the Treaty which contains the Covenant of the League of Nations on the ground 
that the whole value of American participation in the League would be engulfed by American 
obligation under the Treaty.”200 
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Meanwhile, Wilson’s conservative support was badly buckling as well. The conservative 
internationalists who originally comprised the League to Enforce Peace (LEP) had always 
envisioned a League grounded in international law – where nations could arbitrate and appeal, as 
nations, under commonly accepted rules – rather than one subject to the whims and vagaries of 
political councils. But as Wilson’s August distinction between legal and moral obligations makes 
clear, the president did not envision the law as the cement of his new League. In the words of 
Elihu Root, Wilson’s League would see “all questions of right…relegated to the investigation 
and recommendation of a political body to be determined as matters of expediency.” As such, it 
“practically abandons all effort to promote or maintain anything like a system of international 
law,” and “puts the whole subject of arbitration back where it was twenty-five years ago.”  
Similarly, Charles Evans Hughes lamented that “suitable steps have not been taken for the 
formation of international legal principles and to secure judicial determinations of disputes by 
impartial tribunals.” Instead, decisions would rest “largely upon the decision of bodies likely to 
be controlled by considerations of expediency.” 201 
 
Even in the face of this conservative disappointment, LEP president William Howard 
Taft had put on a good face – appearing with Wilson at events and publicly supporting the 
League. But, in July of 1919, the façade of presidential bipartisanship was broken by the leaking 
of a confidential letter Taft had written to Republican Party chairman Will Hays.  In it, Taft 
criticized Wilson’s work in Paris, arguing that “some of the defects of the League of Nations are 
due to him. I am confident that he prevented the adoption of the plan of the League to Enforce 
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Peace in respect to an international court and the settlement of justiciable questions…His 
prejudice against courts is well known.”202  
 
In this private letter, Taft did argue that “the attempt of such men as Senator Borah, 
Senator Johnson…and others to defeat the treaty…do not, I think, indicate the attitude of the 
majority of the Republican Party,” and that he was “strongly in favor of ratifying the treaty as it 
is” and “would not hesitate to vote for it.” But he also went on to outline several reservations he 
would offer to make the League more palatable – including limiting America’s obligation under 
Article X to five years and making other concessions to American sovereignty, such as 




Taft offered to resign as head of the LEP after his letters had been made public – likely 
by Hays or one of Wilson’s opponents in the Senate, with whom Taft and Hays shared the 
correspondence – but the damage had been done. On both the left and right, the consensus 
behind the current League had fallen apart. There was no longer any debate that the League 
should be modified in the Senate – only what form these changes should take. If Wilson would 




As is well known, Wilson was not so moved. “My clear conviction,” he wrote before 
returning from Paris, “is that the adoption by the Treaty by the Senate with reservations would 
put the United States as clearly out of concert of nations as a rejection. We ought either to go in 
or stay out.” He was assuredly not going to let the Senate make the League a tool of lawyers and 
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imperialists. And so, already exhausted from the interminable Paris negotiations, Wilson 




The rest of the story of the League is a death of a thousand cuts. On July 10
th
, two days 
after returning from Paris, Wilson address a joint session of Congress where he implored them to 
follow the will of the world and pass the Treaty as written. “The stage is set, the destiny 
disclosed,” he thundered: 
It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God who led us into this way. 
We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirit, to follow the 
vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light 
streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else.206 
  
According to the New York Times, the “President’s address was heard with the keenest 
interest by his splendid audience, but it was heard in silence.” Belle La Follette – present in the 
gallery above during the President’s speech – later wrote her children: “[T]here was not one 
handclap throughout his address and when he finished there was not nearly the warmth in the 
applause that there was in reception. From the few comments Daddy got from the floor, there 
was evident disappointment and not much pretense at satisfaction.” 207 
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 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee then took up the treaty, with Lodge deliberately 
slow-walking the debate to let public opinion continue to turn against it. After two weeks of 
reading the treaty aloud, as well as the August 19
th
 White House question-and answer session 
with Wilson, hostile witnesses came to testify throughout August and early September – the most 
damning being that of William Bullitt, the young diplomat who would resign in disgust, on 
September 12
th
, 1919. After three hours of testimony, Bullitt read from a memo that quoted 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing as an opponent of the League. According to Bullitt, Lansing 
“considered many parts of the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung 
and the League of Nations. 
[Lansing] said: “I consider that the League of Nations at present is entirely useless. The great 
powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France in 
particular have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted, and the league of nations can 
do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of the 
members of the league, and the great powers will never give their consent to changes in the 




In case anyone had missed the point, Bullitt concluded, “Mr Lansing said: ‘I believe that 
if the Senate could only understand what this treaty means, and if the American people could 
really understand, it would unquestionably be defeated.”209 
 
For Wilson, the defection of his own Secretary of State into the opposition was the 
unkindest cut of all, and it was not helped by Lansing’s terse response to the ensuing media 
firestorm, delivered just before a fishing trip to Lake Ontario: “I have no comment to make.” 
(This did not stop The Nation from running a “Resignation Not Yet Written by Robert Lansing,” 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
uncharacteristically shaky self-confidence and questionable judgment in his test audience.” Cooper, Breaking the 
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which had the Secretary of State calling the treaty “a grave breach of faith…which the historians 
of the future will inevitably take note to condemn.”) The real Lansing was slightly more 
circumspect to the president, telling him via wire that “I recognized that certain features of the 
Treaty were bad, as I presumed most everyone did, but that was probably unavoidable in view of 
conflicting claims and that nothing ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace 
by signing the Treaty.”210 
 
Wilson was livid, and more than a little paranoid. Bullitt’s testimony, he told Joseph 
Tumulty, “is a confirmation of the suspicions I have had” about Lansing, whose “trail” he saw 
“on the other side…everywhere [he] went.” “[H]ere in his own statement is a verification at last 
of everything I had suspected. Think of it! This from a man who I had raised from the level of a 
subordinate to the great office of Secretary of State of the United States! My God!” The day after 
receiving Lansing’s cable, September 17th, Wilson was plagued with worse headaches than ever 




The same day Lansing had wired Wilson, Senator Lodge – his work complete – finally 
brought the treaty out of committee for full Senate consideration. Two months later, after 
invoking cloture for the first time in its history, it was time to vote. Visiting the White House to 
encourage Wilson to support mild, Democratic-penned reservations that could counteract 
Lodge’s list, Senator Gilbert Hitchcock confronted an “emaciated old man with a thin white 
beard which had been permitted to grow.” But, however sick, Wilson remained steadfast against 
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even the slightest alteration to the Treaty “I could not stand for those changes for a moment,” 
Wilson told him, “because it would humiliate the United States before all of the Allied 
countries…the United States would suffer the contempt of the world.” In fact, he went on: 
 
“I want the vote of each, Republican and Democrat, recorded…because they will have to answer 
to the country. They must answer to the people. I am a sick man, lying in this bed, but I am going 
to debate this issue with these gentlemen in their respective states whenever they come up for re-
election if I have breath enough in my body to carry the fight. I shall do this even if I have to give 
my life to it. And I will get their political scalps when the truth is known to the people…I have no 
doubt as to what the verdict will be when they know the facts.” 212 
 
Wilson was less emphatic in his message to Congress on the subject, but the meaning was 
still clear. “I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the 
Lodge resolution of ratification,” Wilson told Congress. “I understand that the door will probably 
then be open for a genuine resolution of ratification.”213 
 
And so, on November 19
th
, 1919, the last day of session and one year, one week, and one 
day after the armistice had been signed, the day of the vote came. Even if the outcome seemed 
decided by the president’s missive to brook no compromise, Irreconcilable William Borah took 
no chances – Instead, he delivered a three-hour oration against the Treaty on the floor that moved 
Senators, among them Henry Cabot Lodge, to tears.  
 
Threatening to replace rule of the people by rule of force, Borah argued, the League was 
an existential threat to the last best hope of the world, the American republic. Should it pass, 
America would be inextricably entangled with the affairs of Europe, contrary to the wisdom of 
Washington and Monroe, and the “maxim of liberty will soon give way to the rule of blood and 
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iron…Autocracy which has bathed the world in blood for century reigns supreme, Democracy is 
everywhere excluded. This, you say, means peace.” Instead, Borah urged Wilson to “turn from 
this scheme based on force to another scheme, planned one hundred and forty-three years ago in 
old Independence Hall, in the city of Philadelphia, based on liberty. I like it better.” 214  
 
Borah also made an eloquent case for the progressive vision of America. “[D]emocracy,” 
he intoned, “is something more vastly more, than a mere form of government by which society is 
restrained into free and orderly life: 
 
It is a moral entity, a spiritual force as well. And these are things which live only and alone in the 
atmosphere of liberty. The foundation upon which democracy rests is faith in the moral instincts 
of the people. Its ballot boxes, the franchise, its laws, and constitutions are but the outward 
manifestations of the deeper and more essential thing – a continuing trust in the moral purposes of 
the average man and woman. When this is lost or forfeited your outward forms, however 
democratic in terms, are a mockery…These distinguishing virtues of a real republic you cannot 
commingle with the discordant and destructive forces of the Old World and still preserve them. 
You cannot yoke a government whose fundamental maxim is that of liberty to a government 
whose first law is that of force and hope to preserve the former…We may become one of the four 
dictators of the world, but we shall no longer be master of our own spirit. And what shall it profit 
us as a nation if we shall go forth to the dominion of the earth and share with others the glory of 




If the Irreconcilables had offended, Borah argued, it was only because they had too much 
faith in America – “because we have placed too high an emphasis upon the wisdom of 
Washington and Jefferson, too exalted an opinion upon the patriotism of the sainted 
Lincoln…[I]f we have, in our limited vision, seemed sometimes bitter and at all times 
uncompromising,” Borah explained, “the things which we have endeavored to defend have been 
the things for which your fathers and our fathers were willing to die.”216 
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 Ibid. Borah was such a believer in the American system of democracy that, two years later, he (perhaps 
presciently) prescribed it for Europe: “There is another subject,” he told an editor of the New York Times, “if I could 





In the final vote, those fathers were not dishonored. The Senate rejected the Treaty of 
Versailles with the Lodge reservations attached by a vote of 59 to 33 – seven short of the needed 
two-thirds majority –  and then rejected it again, without reservations 53-38. In the first vote, the 
Irreconcilables had joined with the Democratic stalwarts to defeat the Lodge reservations. In the 
second, they sided with the Republicans against the Wilsonians.
217
   
 
Either way, the treaty was defeated. But even then, there was still one more chance to 
save the treaty. The Senate, after being bombarded with requests from both conservatives and 
Wilsonian progressives, agreed to hold one more vote on the League in the following session. 
But the deeply ill president remained recalcitrant – and increasingly desperate.  
 
Early in January, Wilson contemplated “challeng[ing] the following named gentlemen, 
members of the Senate of the United States, to resign their seats in that body and take immediate 
steps to seek re-election to it on the basis of their several records with regards to the ratification 
of the treaty. For myself, I promise if all of them or even a majority of them are re-elected, I will 
resign.” After much discussion was his advisors, Wilson was talked out of this high-stakes 
gambit. Instead, at a January 8, 1920 Jackson Day Dinner, Wilson threw down a slightly more 
subtle gauntlet:  “The clear and single way out is to submit it for determination at the next 
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election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn 
referendum.”218  
 
The following month, on Sunday, February 1
st
, 1920, ambassadors from England and 
France told Wilson they would accept the Lodge reservations in order to preserve the 
participation of the United States in the League, Wilson replied: “No, Ambassador, I shall 
consent to nothing. The Senate must take its medicine.” When Bernard Baruch, head of Wilson’s 
War Industries Board, implored the president to agree to the Lodge reservations, Wilson 
answered simply, “Et tu, Brute.”  To Senate Democrats who were thinking of embracing the 
reservations in March, Wilson wrote: “I hear of reservationists and mild reservations, but I 
cannot understand the difference between a nullifier and a mild nullifier.” 219 
 
For their part, the Senate followed to form. Even with some Wilson Democrats joining 
the reservationists in an attempt to save the League, they again rejected the treaty in March. 
Irreconcilable James Reed called the League “as dead as Hector” – To Lodge, it was “as dead as 
Marley’s ghost.” Wilson began envisioning for himself a martyr’s death. “It probably would 
have been better if I had died last fall,” he told his doctor after the vote. Visiting the president  a 
few days later, George Creel was aghast at what he saw. Wilson’s “bloodless lips,” Creel 
reported, “moved continuously, as if framing arguments and forming new appeals.” His eyes 
were “filled with an anguish such as I trust never to see again. ‘If only I were not helpless,’ he 
whispered.” The final nail of the coffin came that November, when, even worse than two years 
before, Wilson and his party were decisively repudiated at the polls. “So far as the United States 
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is concerned,” said Lodge in the flush of victory, “that League is dead.” Similarly, in his first 
speech after being elected in a landslide, Harding pronounced Wilson’s League “now deceased.” 
Whatever form a League under Harding might take, the president-elect promised, “it will be an 





 However unhappy an ending it made for Wilson, the League of Nations battle would set 
the stage for much of the foreign policy fights in the decade to come. Disillusioned by defeat, he 
progressive internationalists would look for new avenues to pursue the goals of promoting 
democracy and fellowship around the world. Meanwhile, the progressive Irreconcilables who 
had banded together and defeated the president now sat in the catbird seat, with Borah in 
particular soon to take a prominent role in guiding American foreign policy. 
 
Looking back in 1923, William Allen White would articulate the sentiments of many of 
the progressive internationalists about the experience of the League fight. “The golden moment 
has passed,” he wrote. “Sometimes I persuade myself that the world had reached a height of 
aspiration between November 1918 and January or February 1919 when it might possibly have 
been wise to unite the nations of the world in an altruistic enterprise. But alas, that day is a 
memory and the memory of it is only an illusion. Perhaps there was no reality to that day, but 
only an emotional fizz.”221 
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The irreconcilables were not much more sanguine. Despite their victory in the Senate, 
William Borah felt uneasy about the League, and would spend much of the Twenties re-litigating 
the same fight he had won in 1919. “Having failed to enter the front door and having received 
the open condemnation of the people,” Borah wrote a constituent in early 1921, “the plan [for the 
League] seems to be now to enter the back door.” Senator Borah believed he and his allies would 
have to remain vigilant guardians of that backdoor. “We must realize that the conflict is not 
over,” he wrote. “Those who propose to be in on the exploiting of the subject peoples of the Old 
World, the filching of their natural resources, and oil, and all kinds of mineral wealth, do not 
propose that the United States shall stay out of this gigantic scale of militarism and 
imperialism.”222  
 
Borah was not alone in this fear of the League being agreed to by other means. “I grow 
more apprehensive all the time that, in spite of our historic victory, we shall find ourselves drawn 
in to the European vortex which swirls more madly all the time,” wrote Albert Beveridge after 
the election. And Hiram Johnson thought similarly, and he too pledged to keep up the fight. 
“You have done such a wonderful job in this matter – more than any other living, human being,” 
he wrote Borah after the election, “and I want to continue with you and I want to aid in 
preventing all the effort from going to naught.” Johnson was particularly perturbed by a missive 
from Elihu Root arguing that “a new deal here from the beginning by abandoning the Versailles 
Treaty is impossible…The only possible course is to keep the treaty, modifying it to meet the 
requirements of the Senate reservations[.]” Hearing of this, Borah replied to Johnson: “The fight, 
from now on…is coming inside of our own party”: 
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Of course, there were thousands of people in this fight who were in good faith in favoring the 
League, who honestly believed that it would bring peace. But that class of people we can easily 
deal with. They are honest and sincere, and after they see the developments in Europe and more 
fully examine the League, they change their minds. But with those who are actuated by selfish 
and sinister purposes, there is nothing for them except a club. They belong to the same 
profiteering class who robbed our home people while the Great War was raging and now they 
propose to rob the people of the Old World and deprive them of their natural resources and make 





If the victors remained uneasy, the loser of the great battle for the League seemed 
irredeemably broken. Reflecting on this last chapter of Wilson’s story after the election, The New 
Republic sought “to state, and then if possible, to understand what it is that makes Woodrow 
Wilson one of the really strange figures of history. What makes the scene so tremendous,” it 
determined, “is not the spectacle of a Lodge triumphant…It is the interior tragedy played 
between the Wilson of the armistice and the Wilson returned from Versailles.” To TNR, “the 
Wilson who acquiesced in the disastrous peace was a man who at the worst had made mistakes, 
as all human beings do. But the Wilson who returned from Versailles denying those mistakes, 
the Wilson who attempted to exploit the sacred confidence of common men to make those 
mistakes seem a triumph, that is the lonely Wilson. That is the Wilson who will interest his real 
biographer, for it is here that the paradox of his life culminates.”224 
 
Visiting the former president a few weeks before his death in early 1924, League of 
Nations official Raymond Fosdick found Wilson still writhing upon this paradox to the very last. 
“Our conversation wandered over many topics,” Fosdick wrote in TNR, “but his chief thought 
was of the League of Nations, and its promise for the future.” Breaking into tears at one point, 
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Wilson insisted the League would be “America’s contribution to the race…It might come soon, 
it might come late, but come it would. America would not stand in the way of human progress, 
America would not long thwart the hope of the race.” But, however certain his vision of the 
future, Wilson could not hide his bitterness about all that had happened in that final conversation. 
As Fosdick recalled, “[h]is voice rose in indignation as he recalled the charge of ‘idealism’ so 
often levied against the League. ‘The world is run by its ideals,’ he exclaimed. ‘Only the fool 
thinks otherwise.’” 225 
 
The world is run by its ideals. It is a maxim that, until Wilson at Versailles, many 
progressives had shared. But even as the president fought for his new world order in Paris, 
distressing events at home further turned progressives against Wilsonian ideals. “America could 
not aid the world toward permanent peace,” Frederic Howe concluded in 1925, looking back at 
the failure of Versailles and the League. “Our alleged ideals did not operate at home, they could 
not operate abroad.”226  
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CHAPTER THREE: CHAOS AT HOME 
PROGRESSIVES IN THE CRUCIBLE OF 1919. 
 
“The inevitable letdown in idealism after the war, deepened by Wilson’s surrender to such 
reactionaries in his cabinet as Attorney-General Mitchell Palmer and Postmaster-General 
Burleson and, of course, the ending of the democratic dream at Versailles, left the country in an 
ugly mood.” – Arthur Garfield Hays, 1942227 
  
“From our recent experience, it is clear that the traditional liberties of speech and opinion rest on 
no solid foundation.” – Walter Lippmann, November 1919228 
 
“I regard it one of the most serious results of the War – the manner in which we utterly came to 




You believe in votes for women? Yah! 
The Bolsheviki do. 
And shorter hours? And land reforms? 
They’re Bolshevistic, too. 
“The Recall” and other things like that, 
Are dangerous to seek; 
Don’t tell me you believe ‘em or I’ll 
Call you Bolshevik! 
Bolshevik! Veek! Veek! 
A reformer is a freak! 
But here’s a name to stop him, for it’s 
Like a lightning streak! 
 
 – Edmund Vance Cooke, 1919230 
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The failures at Versailles and the rejection of the League of Nations would have been 
enough to send a generation of progressives into a slough of despond. But these 
foreign policy events, disillusioning as they were, did not happen in a vacuum. They 
took place during what was, aside from the Civil War and arguably the late 1960’s, the 
most tumultuous two-year period in American history. From strikes and bombings to 
raids, race riots, and repression, America erupted into confusion and hysteria in 1919 
and 1920. Those hoping for a progressive post-war reconstruction saw their plans, and 




Terror Comes to R Street. 
 
On Monday, June 2
nd
, 1919, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt and his 
wife Eleanor returned to their Washington home at 2131 R. St NW rather late in the evening. 
Their home lay in the sleepy, ritzy Dupont neighborhood known as the West End – home to past 
president William Howard Taft and future presidents Warren Harding and Dwight Eisenhower – 
and far from the hustle and bustle of other parts of the capital. Franklin parked the car in the 
garage a few blocks away and the two began walking home. Three minutes later, at around 
11:15pm, a loud explosion thundered outside the house, blowing in all of the Roosevelt home’s 




After rushing up the stairs to check on his eleven-year-old son James, Franklin Roosevelt 
ran outside, past the fragments of bone and body on his doorstep, to the center of the blast– the 
home across the street. “The front door of the house was blown in and the façade is a wreck,” 
Roosevelt told journalists later that night. “The front sitting room, or library, was badly 
shattered.” Standing amidst the wreckage, deeply shaken to his core, was the intended target of 
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the attack: Woodrow Wilson’s Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer. In a state of shock, Palmer 
– who had avoided certain death by only minutes by leaving that shattered first floor library and 
heading upstairs for bed – had taken on the cadences of his Quaker youth. “He was ‘theeing’ and 
‘thouing’ me all over the place,” FDR recalled, ‘thank thee, Franklin, and all that.’”232 
 
Eleanor Roosevelt’s cousin, and the daughter of Franklin’s fifth cousin Theodore 
Roosevelt, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, returned home not much later and witnessed the same 
carnage. “As we walked across R Street,” she said, “it was difficult to avoid stepping on bloody 
hunks of human being. The man had been torn apart, fairly blown to butcher’s meat. It was 
curiously without horror…a large number of pieces had been assembled on a piece of 
newspaper, and seemed no more than so much carrion.”233 
 
And it seemed everywhere. A scalp was later found on the Roosevelts’ roof. Body 
fragments and broken glass littered the nearby homes of Senator Claude Swanson and 
Representative Ira Copley. Down the block, at 2137 R St, a body fragment sailed through the 
window of the Minister Plenipoteniary of Norway and landed next to a sleeping child’s cot. 
There were so many dismembered parts scattered about the neighborhood that police could not at 
first tell how many bombers – or even passers-by – had perished in the blast, although Franklin 
Roosevelt noticed that at least one of the deceased was a poorly dressed ne’er-do-well from the 
quality of his socks. No head was found – it was presumably eviscerated in the blast – but 
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authorities did find a size fifteen collar with a Chinese laundry mark, tattered scraps of a black 




And then there were the papers. “Blackhand literature and dodgers [6x10 inch placards] 
were found among the wreckage of the neighborhood,” Roosevelt told the press. Signed by “The 
Anarchist Fighters,” they sounded the tocsin of class war: “The powers that be make no secret of 
their will to stop here in America the worldwide spread of revolution. The powers that be must 
reckon that they will have to accept the fight they have provoked: 
 
The challenge is an old one, O ‘democratic lords of the autocratic republic. We have been 
dreaming of freedom, we have talked of liberty, we have aspired to a better world, and you jailed 
us, you clubbed us, you deported us, you murdered us whenever you could. Now that the great 
war, waged to replenish your purses and build a pedestal to your saints, is over, nothing better can 
you do to protect your stolen millions, and your usurped fame, than to direct all the power of the 
murderous institutions you created for your exclusive defense, against the working multitudes 
rising to a more human conception of life. The jails, the dungeons you reared to bury all 
protesting voices, are now replenished with languishing conscientious workers, and never 
satisfied, you increase their number every day… 
 
Do not say we are acting cowardly because we keep in hiding; do not say it is abominable; It is 
war, class war, and  you were the first to wage it under cover of the powerful institutions you call 
order, in the darkness of your laws, behind the guns of your bone-headed slaves… 
 
Our mutual position is pretty clear. What has been done by us so far is only a warning that there 
are friends of popular liberties still living. Only now are we getting into the fight; and you will 
have a chance to see what liberty-loving people can do. Do not seek to believe that we are the 
Germans or the devil’s paid agents; you know well we are class-conscious men, with strong 
determination and no vulgar liability. And never hope that your cops and your hounds will ever 
succeed in ridding the country of the anarchistic germ that pulses in our veins.235 
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“We know how we stand with you and know how to take care of ourselves,” the dead 
man’s missive concluded. “Besides, you will never get all of us, and we multiply nowadays.” 236 
 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer was ready and willing to try regardless.  “We could 
not take a step without seeing or feeling the grinding of a piece of flesh,’ he told a Senate 
Committee in 1920, remembering the abattoir that had been made of his front porch. In fact, this 
was the second attempt on Palmer’s life in 1919. Along with eight other bombs that went off 
June 2
nd
 around the country, one of which killed night watchman William Boehner in New York 
City, someone had dispatched mail bombs to Palmer and thirty-five other financial and political 
luminaries in late April. After one of the first bombs to arrive, intended for Senator Thomas 
Hardwick of Georgia, blew off the hands of his maid, almost all of the rest were identified before 




Before tragedy had struck, Palmer had been considered a left-leaning, well-meant fellow 
who supported progressive initiatives like women’s suffrage, the child labor law, and the eight-
hour day during the war, and who advocated leniency for political dissidents like Eugene Debs 
after it. Indeed, Palmer had been the point man for organized labor during Wilson’s 1916 
presidential campaign, and was considered both a friend to labor and to newly-arrived 
immigrants at the time of his ascension to the Attorney General’s office three months earlier.238 
 
                                                          
236
 NYT, 6/3/19. 
237
 Stephen Puleo, Dark Tide: The Great Boston Molasses Flood of 1919 (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 147. While 
they would become deeply antagonistic to Palmer in the year to come, TNR editorialized at the time of the incident 
that eight bombs in eight different cities “are conclusive evidence of a really serious criminal conspiracy, and the 
quicker the men are caught, tried, and punished the better.” “Terrorism,” The New Republic, June 14, 1919, 201-202.  
238




But with this explosive attempt on the lives of him and his family, something snapped, 
and Palmer was transformed. “I remember…the morning after my house was blown up, I stood 
in the middle of the wreckage of my library with Congressmen and Senators, and without a 
dissenting voice they called upon me in strong terms to exercise all the power that was 
possible…to run to earth the criminals who were behind that kind of outrage.”239  
 
While few progressives would be as viscerally transformed by the harrowing experiences 
of 1919 as A. Mitchell Palmer, hardly any would leave the year unscarred. Writing the President, 
who at the time was beginning the last, dismal, grinding month of Versailles negotiations in 
Paris, Joseph Tumulty told Wilson that “[w]hat happened in Washington last night in the attempt 
upon the Attorney General’s life is but a symptom of the terrible unrest that is stalking about this 
country…growing steadily, from day to day, under our very eyes, a movement that, if it is not 
checked, is bound to express itself in attack upon everything we hold dear.” Tumulty was both 
right and wrong. There was indeed a terrible unrest that threatened everything Wilson and 
Tumulty held dear – but its seeds had been sown several years earlier, and by the hand of the 
president himself.
240
   
 
The Storm before the Storm. 
 
 
Just as Wilson had foreseen a “tragedy of disappointment” emerging from Versailles 
before he left for Paris, the president had anticipated the chaos and dissension that would wreak 
havoc across America. In an April 1, 1917 interview with Frank Cobb, editor of the New York 
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World, on the eve of entry into the Great War, he predicted that war would “mean that we shall 
lose our heads, along with the rest, and stop weighing right and wrong.” 241  
 
“It will be too much for us,” the president presciently lamented. “Once lead this people 
into war and they’ll forget there ever was such a thing as tolerance. To fight, you must be 
brutal…and the spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into the very fiber of our national life, 
infecting Congress, the courts, the policeman on the beat, the man in the street. Conformity will 
be the only virtue. And every man who refuses to conform will have to pay the penalty.”242 
 
But while Wilson played the part of aggrieved statesman to Cobb, he himself had spent 
years stoking the fires of discord that would consume America during the war and after. In 1915, 
two full years before his second thoughts to Cobb, Wilson had delivered an address to Congress 
that served as a virtual litany of intolerance, as intemperate in its own way as any anarchist’s 
dodger.  “I am sorry to say,” he intoned, “that the gravest threats against our national peace and 
safety have been uttered within our own borders.” In other words, the Enemy that threatened to 
bring America into the war (as Wilson would himself do two years later) was among us. These 
were the dreaded Hyphenates: 
There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed 
under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have 
poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to 
bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries 
wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase 
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our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue. Their number is not great as compared with the whole 
number of those sturdy hosts by which our nation has been enriched in recent generations out of 
virile foreign stock; but it is great enough to have brought deep disgrace upon us and to have 
made it necessary that we should promptly make use of processes of law by which we may be 
purged of their corrupt distempers.243  
“Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy,” he continued, “must be crushed out. 
They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close 
over them at once.” And so, while conceding that “no laws, I suppose, can reach corruptions of 
the mind and heart,” Wilson urged the Congress before him to enact “adequate federal laws…at 
the earliest possible moment,” in order to preserve “the honor and self-respect of the nation.”244 
The intemperance at the heart of Wilson’s Third Annual Address was not a one-time 
lapse. In 1917, Wilson warned that the German enemy “has filled our unsuspecting communities 
and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigue everywhere afoot against 
our national unity of council, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce.” 
And it was echoed by other prominent political leaders and elites. Teddy Roosevelt railed against 
the “whole raft of sexless creatures,” from the I.W.W. to the Socialists, which undermined 
America by desiring peace. “If you turn hell upside down,” declared the popular evangelist Billy 
Sunday, “you will find ‘Made in Germany’ stamped on the bottom.” Elihu Root was more direct: 
“There are men walking about the streets of this city tonight,” he announced, “who ought to be 
taken out at sunrise tomorrow and shot for treason.”245 
And so, particularly after war became a reality, Congress worked to provide the 
“adequate federal laws” Wilson had requested. In June of 1917, two months after entry into 
WWI, it passed the Espionage Act, which set a punishment of up to 20 years and $10,000 for 
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“false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the 
military or naval forces of the United States,” including “willfully obstruct[ing] the recruiting or 
enlistment service.” It also gave the Postmaster General the power to ban any mailings that 
violated this Act or otherwise advocated “treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to the law 
of the United States.” Robert La Follette would call the Act “the greatest crime of this war.”246  
A year later, Congress strengthened the Espionage Act with a series of amendments that 
came to be known as the Sedition Act. It made it criminal to “utter, print, write, or publish any 
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United 
States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United 
States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, 
or any language intended to bring [any of the above] into contempt, scorn, contumely, or 
disrepute.”247  
To Senator Hiram Johnson, the Sedition Act was a “villainous measure.” Such laws, he 
argued, “do not unite a people. They cause suspicion to stalk all through the land…they take a 
great, virile, brave people and make that people timid and fearful.” Senator George Norris 
wondered what was the point of fighting a war for Democracy abroad if Congress was going to 
interfere “with the very fundamental principles of human liberty and human freedom on which 
our great Commonwealth is founded…What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and 
lose his own soul?” In quoting Matthew 16:26, Norris potentially put himself on shaky ground 
with the authorities. Speaking to a crowd about the Espionage Act in July 1917, Socialist Max 
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Eastman memorably quipped: “You can’t even collect your thoughts without getting arrested for 
unlawful assemblage…They give you ninety days for quoting the Declaration of Independence, 
six months for quoting the Bible, and pretty soon somebody is going to get a life sentence for 
quoting Woodrow Wilson in the wrong connection.” The experience of the next four years 
would make a sad reality of Eastman’s witticism. Between 1917 and the repeal of the Sedition 




Among those who found themselves a target for prosecution was one Charles Schenck, 
then the Secretary of the Socialist Party, who had printed and mailed 15,000 leaflets opposing 
the draft as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude. 
After an appeal, Schenck’s conviction under the Espionage Act was unanimously upheld by the 
highest court in the land. “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man 
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously argued in Schenck v. United States. “The question in every case is whether the words 
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”249 
The Court also weighed in support of the Espionage Acts in another case, this time 
involving the beloved Socialist candidate for president Eugene Victor Debs. In a June 16, 1918 
speech in Canton, Ohio, Debs had railed against the wartime oppression of Socialists. “I realize 
that, in speaking to you this afternoon,” he argued, “there are certain limitations placed upon the 
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right of free speech. I must be exceedingly careful, prudent, as to what I say, and even more 
careful and prudent as to how I say it.” To the authorities in Canton, he was not careful enough, 
particularly when Debs told his audience: 
They have always taught and trained you to believe it to be your patriotic duty to go to war and to 
have yourselves slaughtered at their command…[L]et me emphasize the fact—and it cannot be 
repeated too often—that the working class who fight all the battles, the working class who make 
the supreme sacrifices, the working class who freely shed their blood and furnish the corpses, 
have never yet had a voice in either declaring war or making peace. It is the ruling class that 
invariably does both. They alone declare war and they alone make peace.  
Yours not to reason why; Yours but to do and die. That is their motto and we object on the part of 
the awakening workers of this nation. 250 
  
Arrested after the speech, Debs – after a colorful trial where the great orator eloquently 
railed against the powers-that-be – was ultimately convicted to ten years and a lifetime of 
disenfranchisement. Once again the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, and Debs entered a 
state penitentiary in West Virginia in April of 1919. (The federal pen, it was determined, held too 
many kindred spirits.) “Tell my comrades that I entered the prison doors a flaming revolutionist, 
my head erect, my spirit untamed and my soul unconquered,” he said as he publicly accepted his 
fate. In private, Debs was deeply discouraged, “I don’t know why but I feel dreadfully 
depressed,” he wrote a confidant. “I want to get away from everybody. The comrades are kind as 
they can be and I am trying hard not to let them know what is in my heart. There’s an awful 
loneliness that has gripped me.”251  
To Ernst Freud in The New Republic, Debs’ detention set an exceedingly bad precedent, 
especially in peacetime. “A country can ill-spare the men who when the waves of militant 
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nationalism run high do not lose the courage of their convictions,” he wrote. Supporters of Debs 
petitioned the administration for clemency, which Wilson, while busy at Versailles, was willing 
to contemplate, at least in private. “[I’d be] willing to grant a respite in the case of Eugene V. 
Debs and the others,” he wrote Tumulty from Paris, “but I doubt the wisdom and public effect of 
such an action.” Instead, he asked Tumulty to talk to Palmer and ‘let me know the result of the 
conference before I act.” Palmer, now fully embracing the avenging angel role circumstances 
had thrust him in, hated the idea: Debs’ “attitude of challenging and defying the administration 
of law,’ he told the president, “makes it imperative that no respite of clemency be shown at the 
present time.” 252 
After passions had receded a few years later, A. Mitchell Palmer would actually suggest 
to Wilson that he pardon Debs before leaving office, on Lincoln’s birthday: February 12, 1921.  
But by then, bad health and grim circumstances had calcified the president’s views. “Denied,” 
Wilson told Tumulty then. “While the flower of American youth was pouring out its blood to 
vindicate the cause of civilization, this man, Debs, stood behind the lines sniping, attacking, and 
denouncing them…This man was a traitor to his country and he will never be pardoned during 
my administration.” The New Republic was disgusted by Wilson’s stubbornness. “It taxes 
credulity and taxes vocabulary. If there are Gods who enjoy human irony they staged this 
ironical scene – Woodrow Wilson denying pardon to a man who stood by his convictions.”253  
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While not reaching the level of the Supreme Court, another case upholding the repression 
of the Espionage Act was the ironically named U.S. v. Spirit of ’76. Inspired by the rousing 
success of D.W. Griffith’s 1915 Civil War epic Birth of a Nation, filmmaker Robert Goldstein – 
the son of a German immigrant – decided to make a similarly impassioned (and emotionally 
manipulative) film about the American Revolution. The final result reached theaters in May 
1917, and while now lost to history, The Spirit of ’76 included scenes, according to one film 
historian, of “Paul Revere's Ride, the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Valley Forge, 
and, most conspicuously as far as later events were concerned, the British atrocities committed 
against the American settlers during the 1778 Cherry Valley Massacre.” Among the atrocities 
lain at the foot of Englishmen were an infant slaughtered by British bayonet and the suggested 
rape of a colonial woman. 
But one month after entry into the war was not an opportune time for such Patriot-style 
muckraking, and Goldstein was prevailed upon by Chicago’s Censorship Board, headed by one 
Metallus Lucullus Cicero Funkhouser, to trim the offending scenes down. Goldstein did as 
requested, until he got to Los Angeles, where he showed the film uncut and in its original form. 
For this offense, he was quickly arrested. In the ensuing case – US v. Spirit of ’76 – the judge 
accused Goldstein of “a sedulous effort” to “question the good faith of our ally” and “to insert 
those things which would tend to ‘excite’ and to create a prejudice against Great Britain.” 
Goldstein was convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison (of which he served three.)
254
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
most pathetic figure in the world. No man in public life in American history ever retired so thoroughly discredited, 
so scathingly rebuked, so overwhelmingly impeached and repudiated as Woodrow Wilson.” Paul Sann, The Lawless 
Decade: A Pictorial History of the Roaring Twenties. Excerpted at http://www.lawlessdecade.net/21-31.htm.  
254
 The end of Goldstein’s story is not a happy one. While Wilson did commute his sentence in 1921, he was 
effectively disbarred from making movies in America. After several fruitless attempts to clear his name, Goldstein 
tried to start over as a filmmaker in other countries. He ultimately ended up in Germany, where he may well have 




Thousands such cases were prosecuted by the federal government during the war, many 
receiving great notoriety. Socialist speaker Rose Pastor Stokes was arrested in March 1918 for 
writing to the local paper: “No government which is for the profiteers can also be for the people, 
and I am for the people, while the government is for the profiteers.” She was sentenced to ten 
years. Socialist Kate Richards O’Hare got five years for giving an anti-war speech in North 
Dakota – one she had already delivered several times over without repercussions.255 
A particular wartime target was the International Workers of the World, a.k.a. the 
Wobblies. As encapsulated by historian Howard Zinn: “In early September 1917, Department of 
Justice agents made simultaneous raids on forty-eight IWW meeting halls across the country, 
seizing correspondence and literature that would become courtroom evidence. Later that month, 
165 IWW leaders were arrested for conspiring to hinder the draft, encourage desertion, and 
intimidate others in connection with labor disputes. One hundred and one went on trial in April 
1918; it lasted five months, the longest criminal trial in American history up to that time.” In 
fact, almost half of Espionage and Sedition Act prosecutions occurred in thirteen (of eighty-
seven) federal districts – the thirteen Western districts where IWW activity was centralized.256  
Another prime target, of course, was Germans themselves. Soon after entry into the war, 
Wilson had decreed that all German males in America (and later German females) would have to 
register with the government, and keep their registration on them at all times. Over the course of 
the war, thousands of German nationals would be harassed or arrested by government officials 
and local authorities. Over 2000 – among them the famed conductor of the Boston Symphony 
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Orchestra, Karl Muck, who was rumored to have refused to play “The Star-Spangled Banner” (it 
wasn’t true) – would be shipped to military bases: Fort Douglas, Utah, in the West and 
“Orglesdorf,” a.k.a. Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, in the East. There – until they were all freed by 
incoming Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in early 1919 – they would become the 
responsibility of the ambitious 22-year-old running the Enemy Alien Registration Section at DOJ 
– John E. Hoover (later and better known as J. Edgar.)257 
Meanwhile, in September 1918, a five-member committee in the Senate, chaired by 
Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina, was created to look into charges that the United States 
Brewers’ Association had become a haven of pro-German activity within America. Senator 
Overman took his mandate broadly, and steered the committee to delve more widely and deeply 
into the subject of possible pro-German sentiment in America. Even though the Overman 
Committee only took shape within weeks of the end of the war, as one historian has noted, this 
was “the first congressional investigation of political activities and opinions of American 
citizens.”258 
If these wartime abuses of the Constitution were unnerving to progressives, more 
unnerving still was the extra-legal furor that accompanied them. Not content with leaving the 
policing of anti-American sentiment to the judicial system, the Wilson administration also 
worked to marshal the forces of public opinion to their cause.  
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And so, on April 13
th
, 1917, Wilson signed Executive Order 2594, creating a Committee 
of Public Information (CPI), to be headed by Denver journalist and muckraker George Creel. 
During the war, notes historian David Kennedy, the CPI "distributed 75 million copies in several 
languages of more than thirty pamphlets explaining America's reaction to the war...sponsored 
war expositions in nearly two dozen cities [and] issued 6000 press releases to assist (and to 
influence) the nation's newspapers in their reporting on the war.” “Government,” New York 
World editor Frank Cobb said, describing the work of the CPI, “conscripted public opinion as 
they conscripted men and women and materials…They mobilized it. They put it in the charge of 
drill sergeants. They goose-stepped it. They taught it to stand attention and salute.”259  
From the beginning, Creel had envisioned his task mainly as progressive muckraking writ 
large. Imbued with “faith in democracy…faith in the fact,” in the words of Newton Baker, the 
CPI was intended by Creel to be a grand experiment in mobilizing public opinion through, as one 
historian put it, “information and disclosure, pure and simple.” Chief among Creel’s initiatives 
were the rollout of 75,000 volunteers – the “Four Minute Men,” so named after their assessment 
of the average person’s attention span – who traveled the country drumming up support for the 
war in four minute bursts. They were instructed by Creel and the CPI head office to rely on the 
facts and the facts only. “A statement only of patent facts will convince those who require 
argument more than doubtful disputations,” Creel told them. “No hymn of hate accompanies our 
message.”260  
Similarly, Creel – looking back in his 1920 memoir, How We Advertised America, as the 
Red Scare was beginning to burn itself out -- defended the work of the CPI during the war. “In 
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no degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machinery of concealment or 
repression,” he wrote: 
At no point did it seek or exercise authorities under those war laws that limited the freedom of 
speech and press. In all things, from first to last, without halt or change, it was a plain publicity 
proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventures in advertising...We 
did not call it propaganda, for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with deceit 
and corruption. Our effort was educational and informative throughout, for we had such 
confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, 




But, however well-intentioned at first, Creel and the CPI fell away from its just-the-facts 
approach during the war and began to appeal to baser instincts. For one, by a year into the 
conflict, Four Minute Men -- which, by Creel’s estimate, delivered over 7.5 million speeches to 
314 million people -- were being actively encouraged by management to weave tales of German 
atrocities into their speeches. For another, even though each had been endorsed by local pillars of 
their respective communities, the 75,000 men of Creel’s four-minute army could and did not 
always follow the company line.  
According to a poem in the Four Minute Men News, these hardy speakers were called 
upon to “build morale and confidence in the right” and “defeat fear, mistrust and ignorance. Lies 
are cut down and fall naked before my sword. False rumor flies before the searchlight of my 
truth as does the mist at sunrise. I make clear the issues so that all may know and understand.” 
But, in practice, many four-minuters would traffic in mistrust and innuendo all the same. “Ladies 
and gentlemen,” one representative speaker began, “I have just received the information that 
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there is a German spy among us – a German spy watching us. He is around, here somewhere, 
reporting upon you and me – sending reports about us to Berlin.”262 
Compounding the problem, it was often hard to tell the official four-minute men from the 
off-message vigilantes. For example, the man who told a Pennsylvania crowd he was 
“determined to wipe out seditious talk among pro-Germans here even if it requires tar and 
feathers and a stout rope in the hands of a necktie party.” He then went on to name names of 
those locals he thought to have been “slackers in the purchase of war stamps and also disloyal to 
their adopted country in uttering seditious remarks.” A CPI investigation set the record straight 
that this was not a Four Minute Man delivering the officially-sanctioned war message of Uncle 
Sam – but only after the story was reported in the local papers as Four Minute canon.263   
Later, Creel would blame overzealous patriots and presspersons like these for the 
vigilantism and chaos that would ensue during the war and after. “People generally, and the press 
particularly,” he wrote, “were keyed up to a high pitch, an excited distrust of our foreign 
population, and a percentage of editors and politicians were eager for a campaign of ‘hate’ at 
home.” And clearly, many papers of record furthered the hysteria. The New York Times, for 
example, reminded its readers that “the duty of every good citizen [is] to communicate to proper 
authorities any evidence of sedition that comes to his notice.”  But, in truth, Creel’s organization, 
even at higher levels than the Four Minuters on the ground, was not as blameless as he 
suggested. At one point, CPI put large ads in newspapers and magazines like the Saturday 
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Evening Post requesting that good Americans “report the man who spreads pessimistic 
stories…cries for peace, or belittles our efforts to win the war.”264   
Also buttressing CPI and the press’s efforts were the many patriotic organizations that 
had sprung up in recent years as part of the Preparedness movement – most notably the National 
Security League (established in December 1914) and its Republicans-only offshoot, the 
American Defense Society (born August 1915). Backed by some of the wealthiest and most 
powerful men in America – Elihu Root, John D. Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, T. Coleman Du Pont 
– the NSL could boast 100,000 members and 250 chapters in 42 states by the end of 1916. Two 
years after that, in April of 1918, Princeton professor Robert McNutt McElroy -- the head of 
NSL’s propaganda arm, the “Committee on Patriotism through Education” – would publicly 




The ADS, meanwhile, was by February 1918 urging Congress to take even stronger 
action against any potential German fifth column in American life. “The appalling and complete 
moral breakdown of German ‘Kultur’ compels a sweeping revision of the attitude of civilized 
nations and individuals toward the German language, literature, and science,” ADS argued in an 
official statement, for “the close scrutiny of German thought induced by Hun frightfulness in this 
war has revealed abhorrent inherent qualities hitherto unknown.” Along with increasing 
internment efforts, ADS advocated expunging the study of German from public schools.
266
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Alongside these two organizations grew a panoply of homegrown spy organizations, 
among them the Liberty League, the American Defense Society, the Home Defense League, the 
All-Allied Anti-German League, the Boy Spies of America, the Knights of Liberty, the Sedition 
Slammers, and the American Anti-Anarchy Organization. The largest and most powerful of 
these, numbering 250,000 dues-paying members in 600 cities at its zenith, was the American 
Protective League, founded in April 1917.
267
   
Over the course of the war, the members of the APL, as historian David Kennedy writes, 
“constituted a rambunctious, unruly posse comitatus on an unprecedented national scale”: 
Its ‘agents’ bugged, burglarized, slandered, and illegally arrested other Americans. They opened 
mail, intercepted telegrams, served as agents provocateurs, and were the chief commandos in a 
series of extralegal and often violent ‘slacker raids’ against supposed draft evaders in 1918. They 
always operated behind a cloak of stealth and deception, frequently promoting reactionary social 
and economic views under the guise of patriotism. The League sometimes counseled its members 
to commit outright physical assault on dissenters. It was, in one authority’s view, ‘a force for 




Indeed, Attorney General Thomas Gregory applauded the “several hundred thousand 
private citizens…assisting the heavily overworked Federal authorities in keeping an eye on 
disloyal individuals.” He even allowed the APL to state it was "Organized with the Approval and 
Operating under the Direction of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of 
Investigation” on its letterhead. APL members often wore badges and cultivated the air of 
officiality that Gregory had bestowed upon them. After a three-day APL“slacker raid” of New 
York City that culminated in tens of thousands of arrests (for not carrying draft cards) and netted 
thousands of “slackers” – people shirking draft duty – a Justice Department official argued that 
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everything “done in connection with this roundup has been done under the direction of the 
Attorney General.”269 
For his part, Wilson felt very uneasy about this public-private intelligence partnership. 
[I]t would be very dangerous,” he told Gregory, “to have such an organization operating in the 
United States, and I wonder if there was any way in which we could stop it?” But, during his 
tenure, Gregory made no such attempt.  In fact, dissolution of the partnership would not occur 
until A. Mitchell Palmer succeeded Gregory in early 1919. Arguing that “espionage conducted 
by private individuals or organizations is entirely at variance with our theories of government, 
and its operation in any community constitutes a grave menace to that feeling of public 
confidence which is the chief force making for the maintenance of good order,” Palmer made 
severing the APL from government one of his first official acts as Attorney General.
270
 
Nonetheless, when it came to harassment and repression of German-Americans and 
sundry other suspect individuals during World War I, it became hard to draw the line between 
what was government-sponsored activity and what was just citizen enthusiasm. Across the 
country, sauerkraut became “liberty cabbage,” dashschunds “liberty pups,” hamburgers “liberty 
sandwiches.” In the House, a Michigan congressman introduced a bill mandating that “all cities, 
villages, counties, townships, boroughs…streets, highways, and avenues in the United States” 
named “Berlin or Germany” be re-named “Liberty, Victory, or [an]other patriot designation.”  In 
Iowa, Governor William Harding issued “the Babel Proclamation,” which made English the 
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In Butte, Montana, the government’s war against the Wobblies would be taken up by 
private citizens (and, likely, Pinkertons): Two weeks after telling a crowd that he “don’t give a 
damn what your country is fighting for” and that army enlistees were “Uncle Sam’s scabs in 
uniform,” IWW Executive Board member Frank Little was grabbed by six masked men and 
hung from a railroad trestle. Pinned to his corpse was a placard in red crayon reading: “Others 
Take Notice: first and Last Warning.”272 
Similarly, one of the darkest incidents of anti-German fervor on the homefront was the 
fate of Robert Prager, a German-born man in Collinsville, Indiana. When the war started, Prager 
had registered as ordered and even tried to enlist, but was unable to for health reasons. He had 
also previously attended Socialist meetings, and run afoul of local UMW members, some of 
whom apparently believed him to be a spy for local mine operators. In any case, in April of 
1918, Prager was swept up by a drunken mob, draped with an American flag (which he was 
repeatedly forced to kiss), dragged through the streets, and ultimately lynched.  Since the mob 
had forgotten to tie his hands the first time, and Prager had been able to grab the rope that was 
strangling him, Prager was lowered down and allowed to pen a brief letter. It read: “Dear Parents 
- I must this day, the 5th of April, 1918, die. Please pray for me, my dear parents. This is my last 
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The mayor of Collinsville blamed this incident on Congress’s failure to pass stronger 
anti-sedition laws. In the ensuing trial, the defense claimed Prager’s execution was “patriotic 
murder” and the jury, after twenty-five minutes agreed. Said one jury member, “nobody can say 
we aren’t loyal now!”274 
Enemies in Office, Friends in Jail. 
 
In this intense wartime climate, those progressives who had stayed true to their pacifist 
beliefs were at best marginalized by society at large, and more often than not became open 
targets of rage and ridicule. For her tenacious pacifism, Jane Addams was confronted with 
booing crowds and death threats. She would be denounced as a traitor to America by 
newspapers, editorialists, and no less an authority than the president of the University of 
Chicago, who called her “so-called peace activities” a form of “giving aid and comfort to the 
enemy.” As she would describe in her 1922 book, Peace and Bread, it was an experience that 
would force her to question many of her prevailing assumptions about the infallibility of public 
opinion.
275
   
Similarly, Robert La Follette found himself an increasingly lonely and embattled anti-war 
voice in the Senate. One of six Senators (and 55 Congressmen) who voted against entry, La 
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Follette delivered a memorable three-hour speech in October of 1917 on the vital importance of 
“Free Speech in Wartime.” “American citizens may hold all shades of opinion as to the war,” 
argued, “one citizen may glory in it, another may deplore it, each has the same right to voice his 
judgment… If the American people are to carry on this great war, if public opinion is to be 
enlightened and intelligent, there must be free discussion.”276 
This view was considered somewhat suspect at the time, and especially so after the 
Associated Press misquoted La Follette as declaring “we had no grievances against Germany.” 
(His actual phrase was: “I don’t mean to say that we hadn’t suffered grievances; we had.”) AP 
later regretted the error, but the genie was out of the bottle. “[Y]ou might just as well put poison 
in the food of every American boy that goes to his transport as to permit La Follette to talk as he 
does,” Columbia’s Nicholas Murray Butler effused to the American Bankers Association. 
Another paper called La Follette, “[f]ar more capable…than any I.W.W…The poison of morbid 
unrest has fed the maggots of disorder and revolt. It is a shame to America, shame to Wisconsin, 
that the Senate…must harbor a defender of the child-murderers who sank the Lusitania.” 
William Howard Taft wished “some way could be found to punish men like Senator La Follette 
on the ground that their activities are traitorous.” For his part, Theodore Roosevelt referred to La 
Follette a “Hun at the gates” who “is at this moment loyally and efficiently serving one country – 
Germany. He is acting in such fashion as to make him one of the most potent enemies of this 
country and a most sinister enemy of democracy.” If he were a Senator, TR fumed, “I would be 
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ashamed to sit in that body until I found out some method of depriving Senator La Follette of his 
seat in that chamber.”277 
As Roosevelt’s musings suggest, the Senator had more than harsh words to contend with. 
Wisconsin newspapers like the State Journal turned roundly against him.  421 faculty members 
at the University of Wisconsin signed a petition castigating his lack of patriotism, and students 
on that same campus burned him in effigy. And La Follette’s colleagues in the Senate began to 
investigate him for un-American activities. In December 1918, after the war ended, the 
committee in question finally voted 9-2 to dismiss the charges. That same month, La Follette 
apologized to his family for the strain his ordeal had put on him and them both. “One of the 
hardest things about the last two years is the feeling of repression we have to carry around with 
us,” he wrote. “I know it has made me a very different person to live with.”278  
Time and again, former progressive and socialist allies of Wilson entreatied the president 
to take a firmer stance against this sort of repression and on behalf of tolerance. Only ten days 
after the war began, twenty-two prominent peace progressives, including Jane Addams, Paul 
Kellogg, Norman Thomas, Oswald Garrison Villard, Amos Pinchot, Herbert Croly, and Lillian 
Wald, wrote to Wilson describing the war fervor that was already taking hold. “We have seen 
evidence of the breaking down of immemorial rights and privileges,” they began.  
Halls have been refused for public discussion; meetings have been broken up;—speakers have 
been arrested and censorship exercised not to prevent the transmission of information to enemy 
countries, but to prevent the free discussion by American citizens of our own problems and 
policies. As we go on, the inevitable psychology of war will manifest itself with increasing 
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danger, not only to individuals but to our cherished institutions. It is possible that the moral 
damage to our democracy in this war may become more serious than the physical or national 
losses incurred.  
What we ask of you, Mr. President, whose utterances at this time must command the earnest 
attention of the country, is to make an impressive statement that will reach, not only the officials 
of the Federal Government scattered through the Union, but the officials of the several States and 
of the cities, towns and villages of the country, reminding them of the peculiar obligation 
devolving upon all Americans in his war to uphold in every way our constitutional rights and 
liberties. This will give assurance that in attempting to administer wartime laws, the spirit of 
democracy will not be broken. Such a statement sent throughout the country would reenforce 
your declaration that this is a war for democracy and liberty. We are sure that you will believe 
that only because this matter seems of paramount public importance that we venture to bring it to 




Suffice to say, Wilson made no such statement. Similarly, Wald – one of the letter’s 
signatories -- begged the president in a personal message to “find a way for us to pull together. 
You will not drive your natural allies from you. You will not banish us from the Democratic 
party which you promised to make the home of all liberal spirits.” 280 
Socialists John Reed, Amos Pinchot, and Max Eastman also prevailed upon the 
president’s sense of justice and the right. In asking him to stop the ban on Socialist newspapers 
being ruthlessly enforced by Wilson’s postmaster general, Albert Sidney Burleson – a man 
Edward House deemed “the most belligerent member of the Cabinet” – they wrote: “Can it be 
necessary, even in war time, for the majority of a republic to throttle the voice of a sincere 
minority? As friends of yours, and knowing how dear to you is the Anglo-Saxon tradition of 
intellectual freedom, we would like to feel that you do not sanction the exercise.” Wilson was 
warm but firm in response: “I can only say that a line must be drawn and that we are trying, it 
may be clumsily, but genuinely, to draw it without fear or favor or prejudice.”281 
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Wilson did say he’d “go to the bottom of the matter” and wrote Burleson about the 
situation, telling him “these are very sincere men and I should like to please them.” Again, just as 
in his discussion with Thomas Gregory about the APL, nothing changed. This would become a 
pattern. Time and again, noted progressives like Herbert Croly and Upton Sinclair would beg the 
president to rein in Burleson, a man Norman Thomas argued “couldn’t tell socialism from 
rheumatism.” Each time, Wilson would try to straddle the line. “I am sure you will agree with me 
that we must act with the utmost caution and liberality in our censorship,” Wilson would chide 
Burleson as he half-heartedly appealed for socialist papers like the Milwaukee Leader and the 
Masses. But the man Wilson had deemed “the Cardinal” would either ignore the president or, 
eventually, threaten to resign. (To which Wilson jovially responded, “Well, go ahead and do 
your duty.”) Only just before the end of the war, when Burleson banned the September 1918 
issue of The Nation for being critical of Wilson ally Samuel Gompers, did the president actively 
overrule his hyper-zealous underling.
282
 
Wilson’s decision to “put his enemies in office and his friends in jail,” as Amos Pinchot 
wryly put it, would have serious ramifications for his administration – perhaps most notably in 
the election of 1918. Even as the National Security League, operating as arguably the first 
political action committee of the twentieth century, was spending $100,000 in a direct mail 
campaign to defeat Democrats they believed were insufficiently patriotic, Wilson’s former 
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electoral allies – the voters who had carried him over the top in 1916 -- were not particularly 
inclined to vote enthusiastically for the president.
283
   
“At the very moment of [Wilson’s] extremest trial,” editorialized Oswald Villard in The 
Nation before the results were known, “our liberal forces are by his own act, scattered, silenced, 
disorganized, some in prison. If he loses his great fight for humanity, it will be because he was 
deliberately silent when freedom of speech and the right of conscience were struck down in 
America.” In more guarded terms, the New Republic lamented “the unwholesome condition of 
American public opinion which results from the suppression during the war of living political 
discussion,” a suppression for which “the administration shared responsibility.”284 
When the election returns came in – the loss of both the House and Senate to the 
Republicans -- the suspicions of the progressive publications were confirmed. “In allowing the 
mind of the country to stagnate,” opined TNR, “he had played into the hands of the incorrigible 
enemy of his own policy.” To Villard and the Nation, Wilson lost because he did “not built up a 
liberal party and…permitted Burleson and Gregory to scatter and intimidate such liberal forces 
as have existed.” 285 
The midterm defeats in 1918 should have been a chance for reflection for the Wilson 
administration. This became especially true when, one week after that poor election 
performance, the armistice was announced. “Can we now look forward to something like normal 
conditions of freedom of speech and opinion,” asked The Dial. “Will radicals and dissenters now 
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be permitted to have their say, or must we expect more orgies of suppression?” The fate of 
Wilson’s League, and indeed his presidency, would hinge on that question.286 
Mobilizing the Nation 
 
Of course, it was not just public opinion that was mobilized behind the war effort – So 
too was the public itself. To win the war to end all wars, the President argued, it would take “a 
mobilization of all the productive and active forces of the nation and their development to the 




 “Three months ago,” Senator Hiram Johnson wrote in June 1917, “if any man in our 
state had advocated the conscription of our youth to have them fight in Europe in this war, he 
would have been hooted from the platform. Today, our men are landed in France and our 
transports are upon the water. As I look back, the changes seem to me almost incredible.” And 
what Johnson was witnessing was only the beginning. By the following summer, almost ten 
thousand newly christened doughboys a day would be sailing Over There, and by the end of the 
war, close to four million would wear the uniform – half of those in the field. 288  
To muster such a force, the Wilson administration had originally wanted to rely on 
volunteers. But, for reasons of low turnout, efficiency – and to stave off a corps of virile, mostly 
Republican crusaders being assembled by Teddy Roosevelt and Leonard Wood – Wilson soon 
moved toward the idea of a draft once the war began: It would, he argued, only pick the men 
who were not engaged in jobs needed at home, and thus “disturb the industrial and social 
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structure of the country just as little as possible.” And so, on May 18th, the Selective Service Act 




So as to avoid the type of memorable unpleasantness that afflicted New York City during 
the Civil War, the WWI draft disallowed substitutes and was run by local boards – leading to 
significant regional disparities in exemptions and enforcement: Some religions saw the pacifism 
of conscientious objectors honored; others did not. Some communities exempted men with wives 
or children, others did not; others still used party, ethnicity, and race as determining factors. “The 
draft law,” argued Hiram Johnson (whose son-in-law did not escape the net), “was being 
administered in such fashion as to make it unfair, unequal, partial, and discriminatory.” 
Nonetheless, through this fashion, 2.8 million troops were added to Uncle Sam’s ranks over the 
course of the war.
290
 
But not without some protest. “Make no mistake about it,” Amos Pinchot – sensing a 
broader game afoot -- wrote Samuel Gompers in March 1917: 
Conscription is a great commercial policy; a carefully devised weapon that the exploiters are 
forging for their own protection at home, and in the interest of American financial imperialism 
abroad…[B]ack of the cry that America must have compulsory service or perish, is a clearly 
thought-out and heavily backed project to mould the United States into an efficient, orderly 
nation, economically and politically controlled by those who know what is good for the people. In 
this country so ordered and so governed, there will be no strikes, no surly revolt against authority, 
and no popular discontent. In it, the lamb will lie down in peace with the lion, and he will lie 
down right where the lion tells him to….This, if we cut through the patriotic pretext and flag-
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 Before the Selective Service Act passed into law, officers of the American Union against 
Militarism (AUAM), of which Pinchot was a guiding member – most notably former 
Presbyterian minister Norman Thomas and former St. Louis social worker Roger Baldwin – 
urged Congress to stand up for America’s “glorious heritage” and include provisions in the bill 
for conscientious objection. “[A]utocracies may coerce conscience in this vital matter,” they 
argued, “democracies do so at their peril.” When this was not forthcoming, Baldwin and Crystal 
Eastman established in July, under the auspices of the AUAM, “a bureau for advice and help to 
conscientious objectors throughout the United States” -- the Civil Liberties Bureau. In October of 
1917, due to the politically sensitive nature of their charge, this Bureau was split off into its own 




 Particularly while still under the auspices of the AUAM, the Civil Liberties Bureau 
believed it was possible to work with the Wilson administration and help conscientious objectors 
at the same time. Arguing in their literature that liberty of conscience was “essentially an Anglo-
American tradition for which our ancestors fought and died, and for which thousands emigrated 
to America,” members of the Bureau such as Baldwin, Thomas, Oswald Villard, and John 
Haynes Holmes encouraged objectors to “register – and when you register, state your protest 
against participation in war.” This inside game was in keeping with Baldwin’s general approach 
to reform, which was “we want to look patriots in everything we do. We want to get a good lot of 
flags, talk a good deal about the Constitution and what our forefathers wanted to make of this 
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country, and to show that we are really the folks that really stand for the spirit of our 
institutions.”293 
But, once unshackled from AUAM (where progressive pacifists like Lillian Wald and 
Paul Kellogg were deeply uncomfortable with Baldwin and Eastman’s more radical approach) – 
and as the Wilson government found their work increasingly distasteful, the NCLB moved into a 
more independent role. In April of 1918, they published The Truth about the I.W.W., a 56-page 
work – promptly banned from the mails by Postmaster Burleson – arguing that the Chicago 
conspiracy trial against the Wobblies was groundless. The following month, an official 
communiqué from the War Department informed Baldwin “it would not be in the public interest 
for us to continue to supply information pursuant to your request, or otherwise to cooperate in 
any way with the NCLB.” (Unofficially, Baldwin was by now considered a “seditious pacifist,” 
and under investigation.) Three months after that, in August 1918, NCLB offices were raided by 
federal agents and members of the American Protective League.
294
  
And a month after that, Baldwin wrote his local draft board explaining why he himself 
should now be considered a conscientious objector. “I am opposed to the use of force to 
accomplish any end, however good,” he argued. “I am therefore opposed to participation in this 
or any other war…[thus] I will decline to perform any service under compulsion regardless of its 
character.” Arrested and tried soon thereafter, Baldwin was found in violation of the Selective 
Service Act and sentenced to the full penalty of one year in prison for his continued recalcitrance 
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– He would serve nine months, during which the national need for committed defenders of civil 
liberties would only grow more pronounced.
295
 
Moving millions of men behind the war effort would be jarring enough, but it was only 
part of the mobilization process. The Wilson administration also set forward to take control of 
the entire economy. In August of 1917, Wilson allies moved the Lever Food and Fuel Control 
through the Congress, creating both the United States Food Administration, soon to be headed by 
Herbert Hoover, and the Fuel Administration, led by John Wheeler, president of Williams 
College. It authorized the Wilson government to set food and fuel prices and supply as deemed 
fit, and to  “cooperate with any person or persons in relation to the processes, methods, activities 
of and for the production, manufacture, procurement, storage, distribution, sale, marketing, 
pledging, financing, and consumption of necessaries which are declared to be affected with a 
public interest.” In the words of Lever act opponent Henry Cabot Lodge, the bill amounted to 
granting Wilson “despotic power” over America’s food supply.296 
For vital materials outside of food and fuel, Wilson turned to what historian David 
Kennedy calls “without doubt the most ambitious of the war agencies,” the War Industries 
Board.  In the words of its most successful director, financier Bernard Baruch, after the fact, the 
WIB was an attempt to invest “some Government agency…with…powers…to encourage, under 
strict Government supervision, such cooperation and coordination in industry as should tend to 
increase production, eliminate waste, conserve natural resources, improve the quality of 
products, [and] promote efficiency in operation.” In other words, overlaying and complementing 
the “cooperative committees” of businessmen and government purchasers already working 
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together, at the urging of the Council of National Defense, to supply the war effort, the WIB 
helped determine industrial priorities and manage prices and production in an organized, 
coherent fashion. It was, in effect, an attempt to bring rationality to the American economy, and 
similarly to “assist in cultivating the public taste for rational types of commodities.”297  
Without the explicit price-fixing power of the Lever Act at its disposal, Bernard Baruch 
and the WIB mainly had to coax and cajole industries to do things their way.  All Baruch had, 
according to one biographer, “was an old piece of paper” naming him chairman of the Board. “If 
he had to, he showed it to people. That was the way he settled disputes. That was practically the 
only power he had except a personality and the sense other people had of his leadership.” 
Nonetheless, the WIB managed to increase industrial production by 20% over the course of the 
war, and it proved the first of many federal experiments in the years to come of a political 
economy based on organized public-private cooperation.
298
 
Part of the reason the WIB and Food and Fuel Administrations managed to accomplish 
these feats of mobilization during the war is by adopting a “high production level over low price” 
philosophy. “Cheap prices,” argued Baruch, “could not in wisdom have been the single or even 
primary aim of Government control.” Instead “[p]roduction in many industries had to be 
stimulated by every conceivable device; and the business man of America is so imbued with the 
habit of reaping where he sows, that even admitting for him the highest and most unselfish 
quality of patriotism, no device is more stimulating to his latent energy than a vision of a fair 
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reward.” Put more bluntly by one beneficiary in the steel industry: “We are all making more 
money out of this war than the average being ought to.” 299  
These sorts of sweetheart deals drove progressives like Robert La Follette into apoplexy. 
Arguing that the war effort “openly enthroned Big Business in mastery of government,” he 
deemed these agreements ‘the greatest plan ever devised for looting the treasury.’” And yet, for 
the sake of comity and continued production, labor was not left out of such wartime generosity. 
Under the auspices of the War Labor Board, a joint business and labor committee headed by 
William Howard Taft to mediate labor disputes, the right to organize and bargain collectively 
was tentatively recognized (although so too was the open shop and the company shop, union-
busting tools that would come into fashion in the decade to come.) And federal largesse, through 
the tool of cost-plus contracts, helped ensure that workers were paid adequately for their wartime 
service. One fall 1918 incident in Bridgeport, Connecticut notwithstanding, when Wilson 
threatened to bring the draft down hard upon striking machinists, labor troubles were relatively 
non-existent during the war. In fact, the ranks of labor unions swelled during the conflict.
300
 
In short, by the fall of 1918, the Wilson administration had made of the United States a 
thriving and fully operational war machine. Men and materials flowed into the war effort, prices 
and production boomed, patriotism and service were both lauded and rigidly enforced. 
And then the war ended. 
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The Wheels Come Off 
 
  “The past is behind us, the future is ahead,” proclaimed a 1918 Department of Labor 
poster, depicting a doughboy shaking hands with a workingman. “Let us all strive to make the 
future better and brighter than the past ever was.” Unfortunately – and, as we shall see later in 
the chapter, despite the best efforts of many progressive organizations at the time – that was 
about the extent of the administration’s post-war planning on the domestic policy front.  And if 
so much of the confusion that reigned after the war is attributable to the wartime actions of the 
Wilson administration, equally at fault in the end is what Wilson did not do – namely, prepare in 
any way for the peace in post-war America.
301
 
Even as Wilson carried to Paris a vision of a new international postwar order, he 
seemingly held no similar blueprint for the national life. Even in his administration, thinkers like 
Robert Brookings of the War Industries Board and Felix Frankfurter at the War Labor Policies 
Committee had assembled plans to ensure a soft landing for the post-war economy. Instead -- 
and perhaps, one historian has speculated, for fear of “conservative businessmen…gain[ing] 
control of the machinery, if not in the immediate future, certainly after he went out of office,” his 
administration set about dismantling their wartime apparatus as rapidly as possible. As Wilson 
told Congress in December of 1918, “Our people do not want to be coached and led: 
They know their own business, and are quick and resourceful at every readjustment, definite in 
purpose and self-reliant in action…I have heard much counsel as to the plans that should be 
formed…but from no quarter have I seen any general scheme of ‘reconstruction’ emerge which I 
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thought it likely we could force our spirited businessmen and self-reliancy to accept with due 




And so, on November 12
th
, even as the ink dried on the Armistice treaty, war contracts 
were cancelled en masse – More than half of the $6 billion in outstanding contracts were 
canceled within four weeks, and these only allowed for up to 30 day’s further operation at the 
current production rate. The day after that, the WIB began dismantling its price control systems. 
In December, the United States Housing Corporation was told by Congress to stop work on all 
buildings that were not 70 percent finished. Meanwhile, 600,000 men returned home from 
France right away, and the entire 4,000,000 man American Expeditionary Force would return to 
civilian life within the year.
303
 
In other words, the labor markets were being flooded with returning soldiers at exactly 
the same moment that industries were scaling back their production and laying off workers.  
Within six months, production had dropped by 10%, and unemployment surged to 12% All of 
this occurred after eighteen months of heady, patriotic promises made to laborers for their 
amiability and their output.
304
 
And even as men lost jobs – or returned home without one -- the cost of living remained 
stratospheric.  Food costs leaped 84%, clothing 114.5%, furniture 125%. For the average 
American family, the cost of living was 77% higher in 1919 than before the war, and 105% 
higher in 1920. In total, inflation averaged 14.6% for 1919 and just under 9% for the first six 
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months of 1920. “[W]e have now almost reached the breaking point…I do not see how we can 
very long continue under present conditions of living costs,” fretted Senator George Norris, who 
thought the issue posed “very great danger to the stability of the Government itself.”305 
Then as ever, the cost of living was a hugely impactful political issue, and politicians 
begged Wilson to do something about it. “Where there is one man in a thousand who cares a rap 
about the League of Nations,” wrote one Midwestern Congressman, “there are nine hundred and 
ninety-nine who are vitally and distressingly concerned about the high cost of living.” Similarly, 
twenty-six Massachusetts Democrats implored Wilson to take action against high prices, “which 
we consider far more important than the League of Nations.”306 
As we have seen, for Wilson, nothing was as important as the League, and these pleas to 
do something, anything, about the economy fell on deaf ears. Even his secretary, Joe Tumulty, 
could not get through to him: “You cannot understand,” he cabled the president in desperation in 
May 1919, “how acute situation is brought about by rising prices of every necessity of life.” 
Eventually a humor magazine called Life began to badger Wilson with a fake series of cables to 
“Wilson, Paris” from “The American People”: “Please hurry home and look after the labor 
situation.” “Please hurry home and look after the railroads.” “Please hurry home and fire 
Burleson.” “Please hurry home. Let someone else do it.” Wilson, of course, did not – and, within 
two months of his ultimate return, he was felled by the stroke that would incapacitate him for the 
remainder of his presidency.
307
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Nor could Wilson’s wartime machinery work to ease the landing for the American 
economy. For his part, Bernard Baruch announced in December 1918, a month after the 
Armistice, that the War Industries Board would be disbanding effective January 1
st
, 1919. Not 
only would Baruch resign on that day (and head to Paris, compounding the leadership vacuum 
stateside), but “all the rules, regulations and directions of every nature whatsoever issued…are 
hereby canceled and all pledges heretofore made…are hereby revoked.” By the first day of 1919, 
the WIB experiment was at an end.
308
 
So too, for all intent and purposes, was the Committee on Public Information. While the 
CPI continued work overseas through the middle of June, and officially disbanded in August, it 
ended all operations within the United States on Armistice Day. As New York World editor Frank 
Cobb put it a December 1919 address to the Women’s City Club, “When the Armistice was 
signed…public opinion was demobilized too. It was turned loose to shift for itself and, naturally, 
it felt a little awkward in civilian clothes. It had been trained to think only in terms of war and 
had almost forgotten how to think in terms of peace…It was in the habit of being told what to 
think and what to feel, and when it was left to its own resources it was bewildered.” 309 
Before the Committee disappeared in the mists of history, however, one of its final works 
would set the stage for the hysteria to come. In October of 1918, only weeks before the end of 
the war (and a month after 5000 American troops had landed in Archangel, Russia as part of the 
Polar Bear expedition), the CPI published The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy, a report which 
declared that “the present heads of the Bolshevik Government — Lenin and Trotsky and their 
associates — are German agents” and that “the Bolshevik revolution was arranged for by the 
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German Great General Staff, and financed by the German Imperial Bank and other German 
financial institutions.”  
These charges were buttressed by a number of papers in the report purportedly smuggled 
from the Soviet Union by CPI agent Edgar Sisson. Debate over the Sisson papers’ authenticity 
began almost immediately after their publication and would rage for decades, with Russia expert 
George Kennan declaring them forgeries in 1956. But by suggesting a conspiracy between 
Germans and Bolsheviks, the CPI laid the groundwork for the shift in collective emphasis that 
would soon become the Red Scare. “At this point,” Frank Cobb noted grimly to the women of 
New York, “private propaganda stepped in to take up the work that Government had 
abandoned.” 310 
On a Pale Horse 
 
 
 While the United States mostly escaped the wholesale slaughter that the Great War 
visited upon Europe, death had never been a stranger during the conflict. In total, the American 
Expeditionary Force suffered 117,000 fatalities, 53,000 of those in battle, compared to a million 
dead in England, 1.2 million in Italy, 1.7 million in France, 2.5 million in Germany, 2.9 million 
in the Ottoman Empire, and 3.3 million in Russia. But, even as the war raged overseas, the worst 
disease outbreak in human history, the Great Influenza, scoured the planet, and to that America 
was not immune. Between 1918 and 1920, somewhere between 50 and 100 million people, by 
contemporary estimates, would perish from the disease.  Half of those deaths were young men 
and women under the age of 40 – they never received the partial immunity that came with earlier 
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influenza outbreaks – and more than half of those deaths occurred within the span of 13 weeks, 
between mid-September and early December 1918. In America, one out of every four would 
contract the disease, with the coastal cities of the United States particularly hard hit, and 675,000 
– five times the actual fatality rate from the War – would die from it.311 
 
 In short, the Great Influenza had a profound and often overlooked impact on the 
American experience of the war and immediate post-war periods. In late 1918, it quickly 
scourged a generation. In 1919 and 1920, it continued to linger in the shadows. And even amid 
all the other crises of the time, it added another note of tragedy to an already grim year.  
 
Influenza, it seems likely, worked to destabilize Wilson at Versailles in April 1919, and 
may well have created the conditions for his later stroke. His closest aide-to-camp, Colonel 
House, contracted it three times – The last time, in Paris, he read his own obituaries in the paper. 
Others were not so fortunate. Randolph Bourne, one of the keenest critics of his young 
generation, who had correctly surmised beforehand the mockery that war would make of 
progressive hopes, succumbed to the disease in December, 1918 at the age of 32. “Those who are 
not in some sense of the younger generation will hardly realize what poignancy there is for us in 
the news of the death of Randolph Bourne,” wrote Floyd Dell in TNR. “We have become in these 
days more than a little familiar with the tragic incidence of death…[but] Randolph Bourne 
belonged to us, and stood for us, in a way which he perhaps did not fully know, but which we 
now very keenly feel.”  His loss was a tragedy “to a country which is starved for thought.” A 
year later, when reaction had set in in earnest, Florence Kelley told a friend she was “haunted by 
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sorrow that he [Bourne] is not now interpreting the incomprehensible darkening of the mind and 
spirit of this whole nation.” Now, adding to the “loss we have suffered in Randolph Bourne’s 
going,” Kelley lamented, “Walter Lippmann will be taken seriously as spokesperson for the new 
generation.”312 
 
Another casualty of the epidemic was Willard Straight, the co-founder and financial 
backer behind The New Republic – He died in Paris a major in the United States Army. “There 
was warmth in his heart; there was light in his eyes; there was direction and stability in his 
underlying purposes,” eulogized Herbert Croly, who would edit Straight’s memoirs for 
publication in 1922. The TNR community would suffer another grievous blow half a year later, 
when editor Walter Weyl – arguably its most insightful and far-seeing voice – died of throat 
cancer in August. “[H]is mind was incorruptible,” remembered fellow editor Francis Hackett in 
1921. “He never ceased in his struggle to see, to hear, to understand. He remained, up to the day 
that the shadow of death fell across his road, a human being who allied himself in love with other 
human beings[.]”313  
 
For every American who perished, several more had to stare death in the face. Returning 
home after two months in Europe in September 1919, Franklin Roosevelt had to be disembarked 
in a stretcher and carried to his mother’s house on Sixty-Fifth and Fifth. The papers said “it 
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would be several days” before the Assistant Secretary of the Navy could return to Washington. 
He didn’t get out of bed for weeks. Even those who did not contract the disease themselves were 
affected by it. The much-vilified Robert La Follette had to add consistent gall bladder pain to his 
list of burdens in 1918 and 1919. His doctors, Will and Charles Mayo of the Mayo Clinic, 
refused to operate on him so long as the epidemic continued. 314  
 
On the Great Influenza, despite eventually being stricken himself, here again the 
president was a no-show. Wilson made not a single public statement about the great plague. Nor, 
other than asking his generals about the efficacy of continuing to send men to France when 
transport ships had become influenza-riddled deathtraps, did he ever query anyone in his 
administration about their public health response efforts. To Wilson, the influenza was not an 
issue – until it consumed him.315 
 
And yet, despite the ubiquity of influenza at the time, it was not responsible for arguably 
the most publicly significant death of 1919. For many Americans, and particularly progressives 
of a certain generation and disposition, the annus horribilis that year would become began in 
earnest only six days after the New Year.   
 
On the evening of January 6
th
, Theodore Roosevelt – a man who had once symbolized 
youth, strength, and virility to the nation; a man who had delivered a speech in 1912 with blood 
on his shirt and a bullet in his chest; a man who had survived malaria and tropical fever, the 
presidency and the rigors of the Amazon; the man who, in 1912, had stood at Armageddon and 
battled for the Lord – that man went to sleep at the relatively youthful age of 60 and never woke 
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up, the victim of a coronary embolism (and, many thought, heartbreak over his son Quentin’s 
death in World War I.)  
 
“Roosevelt was so active a person…he so occupied the centre of every stage,” wrote 
Henry Augustin Beers in his book Four Americans, out in November of 1919, “that, when he 
died, it was as though a wind had fallen, a light a gone out, a military band had stopped playing. 
It was not so much the death of individual as a general lowering in the vitality of the nation. 
America was less America, because he was no longer there.” Beers was not the only one who 
thought as much. “[T]he flag lost its bravest defender when Theodore Roosevelt passed from life 
to the eternal,” Senator Warren Harding told an audience soon after the fact, remembering the 
flag draped over Roosevelt’s coffin at his funeral. “A flaming spirit of American patriotism was 
gone. A great void had come, and there was none to fill it.”316 
 
The entire nation mourned, but those progressives who had known him, fought alongside 
him, and loved him were especially bereft. To the former head of his Forest Service, Gifford 
Pinchot, Roosevelt represented “life at its warmest, and fullest and freest, at its utmost in 
vigor…life tremendous in volume, unbounded in scope, yet controlled and guided with a 
disciplined power that made him, as few men have ever been, the captain of his soul.”317 “I was 
weak with fever,” remembered lawyer Donald Richberg, then suffering from his own bout with 
influenza. “I could only press my face into the pillow and cry like a child.”318  
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Writing on TR’s death in 1930, Richberg argued that this was the moment when 
something finally, irrevocably broke: The ideals that “inspired my generation,” he wrote, “ceased 
at the end of the World War when the first of its four great leaders [along with Wilson, Bryan, 
and La Follette] died.” “Something went out of my life that has never been replaced,” 
remembered Harold Ickes, twenty-five years later, on the moment he heard Roosevelt had 
fallen.
319
   
 
It was not just the loss of the man that hurt, but of the opportunities he embodied. Pinchot 
lamented to his brother Amos at the time: “[TR’s death] may result in such control by the 
reactionaries as to put the policies you and I are interested in back many years.” (And, indeed, on 
the day of Roosevelt’s funeral, Ohio political handler Harry Daugherty wrote his protégé, 
Senator Warren Harding: “I have some ideas about this thing now which I will talk over with 
you.”)  “A great man has died and the whole world stands shocked and mourning,” editorialized 
W.E.B. Du Bois in The Crisis. “We mourn with the rest of the world as is fitting, but there is too 
in our sorrow a quality peculiar and apart. We have lost a friend. That he was our friend proves 
the justice of our cause, for Roosevelt never championed a cause which was not in its essence 
right.”320  
 
Even years later, progressive Republican editor William Allen White saw in Roosevelt’s 
death a fateful turning point for the nation “I am satisfied that, if the Colonel had lived,” he 
wrote, “he would have been the Republican nominee and the country would have had, in 
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workable terms, from a Republican administration, much of the social program that came a 
dozen years later under the second Roosevelt. It would have been adopted in normal times…It 
would not have disturbed economic and industrial traffic, and a great cataclysm might have been 
avoided.” 321  
 
The second Roosevelt himself, now no longer bedridden and returning to Europe with 
Eleanor, was more sanguine about his uncle-in-law’s passing. “I cannot help think that he 
himself would have had it this way, and that he had been spared a lingering illness of perhaps 
years.’” And a few believed TR was not the only one spared by his demise. Agreeing with 
William Howard Taft’s observation of the ex-president that he “believe[d] in war and wishe[d] to 
be a Napoleon and die in the battlefield,” pacifist Oswald Garrison Villard considered the 
Colonel’s death an act “of divine mercy for the country and another piece of Woodrow Wilson’s 
extraordinary luck.” But Villard’s cynicism was something of an outlier. At the very end of his 
life, when Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. interviewed 85-year-old Walter Lippmann about his thoughts 
on Richard Nixon and Watergate, Lippmann replied: "Presidents in general are not lovable. 
They've had to do too much to get where they are. But there was one President who was lovable 
-- Teddy Roosevelt -- and I loved him.”322 
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In 1919, Theodore Roosevelt passed on, and, in the words of journalist John Chamberlain 
in his 1932 book, Farewell to Reform, “is it too much to say that the ‘moral’ age in American 
politics died with him?” And it was only the first week of the year. 323 
Battle in Seattle 
 
 
The next shock to the system, and the first of many similar to come in 1919, began two 
weeks later in the Pacific Northwest. On January 21
st
, 35,000 shipyard workers in Seattle went 
out on strike against the Emergency Fleet Corporation, demanding higher wages. That evening, 
their cause was taken up by the Seattle Central Labor Council, which represented all the labor 
unions in the city. After some deliberation, the Council, which was more a bastion of staid AFL 







The day before Strike Day, the Union Record – the Council’s newspaper – told its readers 
what to expect. “On Thursday at 10 A.M.,” it declared in bold, “[t]here will be many cheering, 
and there will be some who fear. Both these emotions will be useful, but not too much of either: 
We are undertaking the most tremendous move ever made by LABOR in this country, a move 
which will lead – NO ONE KNOWS WHERE! We do not need hysteria. We need the iron march 
of labor. 
 
LABOR WILL FEED THE PEOPLE. Twelve great kitchens have been offered, and from them 
food will be distributed by the provision trades at low cost to all.  
 
LABOR WILL CARE FOR THE BABIES AND THE SICK. The milk-wagon drivers and the 
laundry drivers are arranging plans for supplying milk to babies, invalids, and hospitals, and 
taking care of the cleaning of linen for hospitals. 
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LABOR WILL PRESERVE ORDER. The strike committee is arranging for guards, and it is 
expected that the stopping of the cars will keep people at home… 
 
The closing down of Seattle’s industries as a MERE SHUTDOWN will not affect…eastern 
gentlemen much. They could let the whole northwest go to pieces as far as money alone is 
concerned. 
 
BUT, the closing down of the capitalistically controlled industries of Seattle, while the 
WORKERS ORGANIZE to feed the people, to care for the babies and the sick, to preserve order 
– THIS will move them, for the looks too much like the taking over of POWER by the 






The next morning, 100,000 Seattle workers – 60,000 union members and 40,000 
sympathetic workers – were off the job. And for five days that shook the media and ground 
normal life in Seattle to a halt, the Council was true to their word. Labor fed the people – 30,000 
meals were delivered to strikers at the cost of a quarter each (35 cents for non-workers). Labor 
cared for the babies and the sick – Milk stations were set up all around town, and laundries 
continued service for hospital laundry only. And labor preserved order – Firefighters and garbage 
trucks stayed on the job, and there were no strike-related arrests, “not even a fist-fight.”326 
 
But, for many news outlets, success was provocation enough, as more than one journalist 
sounded the tocsin of revolution. The Seattle Star screamed “STOP BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE” 
to its readers before the strike began, reminding them “This is America – not Russia.” On the 
morning of, readers of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer were greeted with a front-page cartoon of a 
Red banner flying above the American flag. The caption: “Not in a Thousand Years.”  Not for 
the last time that year, the national press was no less hysterical – “It is only a middling step from 
Petrograd to Seattle,” cried the Chicago Tribune. “The beast comes into the open,” prophesied 
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the Cleveland Plain Dealer.  To the Washington Post, this was the “stepping stone to a 
bolshevized America.” With an eye to the bad press, national unions, many of whom never 
cottoned to the notion of general strikes anyway, began leaning on their Seattle locals to end the 




With a career politician’s sense of the zeitgeist, Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson decided to put 
himself at the forefront of this burgeoning backlash. A State Senator for ten years, Hanson had 
been elected to his position the previous March and, while an avowed foe of the Wobblies, he 
had been known as both a solid progressive and friend to labor. He had followed Roosevelt out 
of the Republicans in 1912, pulled the lever for Wilson in 1916, and even named three of his 
eight children Theodore Roosevelt Hanson, William Taft Hanson, and Bob LaFollette Hanson. 




And so, even as the general strike began in earnest, Mayor Hanson quite literally draped 
he and his car with the American flag, and made sure he was seen directing the federal troops he 
had requested all over the city. “The time has come,” he declared, “for the people in Seattle to 
show their Americanism.” When the strikers opted to cancel their action after five days – more 
due to AFL pressure from the head office than any of Hanson’s ministrations – the mayor 
exulted: “The rebellion is quelled, the test came and was met by Seattle unflinchingly.” 
Newspapers local and national rallied around the conquering hero.  Hanson – a man blessed with 
“courage and that essential, unyielding Americanism,” not to mention “a backbone that would 
                                                          
327
 Murray, Red Scare, 64-65. Barry, Rising Tide, 139. 
328




serve as a girder in a railroad bridge” – was, said the New York Times, “living proof that 
Americanism, that respect for law, was not dead.”329  
 
Milking his moment for all it was worth, Hanson soon resigned the mayorship of Seattle 
to travel around the country and decry the Red Menace – a task for which he was well-
compensated. Later that year, he published a book entitled Americanism vs. Bolshevism, which 
he dedicated to “to all Americans who love their country, revere its ideals, understand and 
support its institutions, and are willing to give their all in order that ‘our Government shall not 
perish from the earth.’” In that tome – mainly a screed against his old enemies, the IWW – 
Hanson described the Seattle general strike as “an attempted revolution”: 330   
 
That there was no violence does not alter the fact…The intent, openly and covertly announced, 
was for the overthrow of the industrial system; here, first, then everywhere…True, there were no 
flashing guns, no bombs, no killings. Revolution, I repeat, doesn’t need violence. The general 
strike, as practiced in Seattle, is of itself the weapon of revolution, all the more dangerous 
because quiet. To succeed, it must suspend everything; stop the entire life stream of a 
community…That is to say, it puts the government out of operation. And that is all there is to 
revolt – no matter how achieved.” 
331
   
 
Even if “the overthrow of the industrial system” is not an unfair description of why, in 
their own words, the Council had called the strike into being, the notion that non-violent civil 
disobedience was a sign of the rankest Bolshevism merited some unpacking. Nonetheless, the 
end of the Seattle strike saw authorities strike back hard, and mainly against the usual suspects: 
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Socialist party headquarters were raided, and thirty-nine Wobblies were arrested for being 
“ringleaders of anarchy” – despite never having much to do with the planning of the strike.332 
 
In their coverage of the Seattle strike, The New Republic rightfully saw less of the specter 
of bolshevism at work than the consequences of wartime policy, a reaction to the high cost of 
living, and what one of its writers, Walter Lippmann, had earlier deemed “drift.” “The war 
period gave the workers a taste of economic comfort,” they argued. “It gave them a new sense of 
power; it convinced them that the resources of the country are adequate when intelligently 
administered to provide every man with a job at more than a bare subsistence wage.” And so the 
Seattle Strike “was not as the papers alleged, a Bolshevist uprising, but a mass protest on the part 




The worst part of it, TNR continued, was that all of this was readily foreseeable. “Months 
before the end of the war,” they continued, Wilson and Congress were forewarned “of the 
dangers that must attend planless military and industrial demobilization:
 
 
They knew that the rate of production in the country's basic industries, such as steel, copper and 
lumber had been keyed up to an abnormal pitch and that any sudden interruption of war contracts 
would upset the market, depress prices and throw great numbers of men out of work; they knew 
that the evils of unemployment among the men who had been gathered into the war industries 
would be greatly aggravated by the planless release of the millions in the army; they knew that 
the end of the war would give rise to problems requiring as careful preparation and as devoted 
patriotism for their solution as the problems of military mobilization…But all these suggestions 
were classified under the head of reconstruction, and reconstruction was taboo. To discuss post-
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As a result, America “had been thrown back into the chaos of laissez faire... 
unemployment is rapidly increasing, industrial unrest is growing steadily more acute, strikes are 
multiplying,” and it was all being lain “at the door of a mysterious and vaguely pervasive 
Bolshevist propaganda. In these troubled times, melodrama is very poor ballast for the ship of 
state.”  Rather than try to foist the Seattle strike on “alleged evils in Russia,” they concluded, 
Congress should “take its responsibilities for the welfare of American industry and American 
labor seriously.” From the corridors of the Senate, an exasperated George Norris concurred. 
“Wrongs, profiteering, and inefficiency are overlooked,” he said, because “when criticism is 
made, the critic is condemned as being a bolshevist.”335 
The Great Strike Wave 
 
Nonetheless, the state of play had been determined. From March to November 1919, each 
month saw hundreds of strikes all over the country, from New England (telephone workers) to 
Dallas (construction workers) to Chicago (railroad operators) to New York City (harbor workers, 
tailors, tobacco workers, painters, streetcar operators). In total, and over the course of 2665 
strikes, 20% of the workforce would strike in 1919 – over 4.1 million workers. But as Wilson 
and Congress grappled over the League, there would usually be little-to-no redress or relief from 
high places. And, more often than not, management could merely wave the flag of creeping 
bolshevism to break the strike – a charge often abetted breathlessly by newspapers, media 
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In point of fact, and as TNR had written of the Seattle strike, the massive labor unrest of 
1919 had less to do with any intellectual debt to Soviet Russia than with laborers working to 
consolidate the gains the war had ostensibly been fought for. Reams of propaganda had promised 
workers a post-war America where their efforts were as central and patriotic as those of the 
industrialist and the doughboy. But, with the peace, the old habits of business returned, and 
laborers were among the first left out in the cold. 
  
“It is a mess,” William Allen White – who saw the problem as clearly as TNR – confided 
to former Kansas Congressman Charles F. Scott in October 1919. “The world, and particularly 
the American part of the world, is adopting a brand-new scale of living and a brand-new scale of 
prices all at the same time. It has given us the worst case of social bellyache that it has been my 
misfortune ever to see or hear about. By a prodigal wave of the hand, somewhere along during 
the war, we have raised the laboring men into middle-class standards of living and he is not 
going back. But he cannot stay where he is unless we cut down profits in some way, to pay him 
his increased wages.” In short, White concluded, the problem was that America had “jumped 
about a hundred years in less than ten months in our economic growth.”337 
 
Writing to The Survey’s Paul Kellogg two months later, White offered his prescription for 
the labor dilemma: massive federal intervention to secure a living wage to all. “It seems to me, 
he wrote, “that our practical objective should be to keep every man who wants work in a job 
three hundred days in a year, and that he should be kept at work at a living wage, that is to say a 
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wage upon which he can maintain a family of six in the enjoyment of all the comforts of our 
civilization…That should be the first practical objective of society.” 338   
 
How to accomplish such a thing “without overturning the present economic and industrial 
order,” he asked? Through a constitutional amendment “giving Congress unlimited powers over 
commerce and industry…[U]nder that amendment I should establish a national minimum wage 
commission with full powers, and provide for federal employment agents who would take up the 
slack in our labor situation, thus securing so far as possible regular employment for people in the 
seasonal industries.” In short, he argued, America “should not fight Bolshevism with guns, but 
with steady employment.” (Of course, granting the government “unlimited powers over 
commerce and industry” to secure a living wage was not altogether different from what actual, 




White was not alone among progressives in desiring to see the federal government 
intervene on behalf of workers. Looking ahead to 1920, Chicagoan Harold Ickes, for example, 
argued in June that the chief election issue of the coming year would either be the League of 
Nations or “the relationship between labor and capital.” “If we are really wise,” he argued, “we 
will insist upon such measures of social and economic justice as will give the people what they 
are entitled to.” But while White and Ickes saw more to labor unrest than simple bolshevist 
intrigues, he and similarly-minded progressives were in the minority at the time. And while they 
could dream of a powerful federal response to the situation, in reality the president was more 
often than not distracted by the League and, eventually, bedridden and incapacitated.
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This pattern held in the three of the most prominent worker actions of 1919 – the Boston 
police strike, the Great Steel Strike, and the coal strike. The first of these began on the evening of 
September 9
th
, when, after months of back-and-forth with the city’s police commissioner, Edwin 
Curtis, 1100 of Boston’s 1544-member police force walked off the job. For months, Boston 
police had been trying to unionize under the decidedly un-revolutionary American Federation of 
Labor, who had shown reciprocating interest.  But even though police forces in other major cities 
had unionized without incident, Curtis – previously a lawyer, banker, and mayor of Boston by 
trade – believed public safety officials “cannot consistently belong to a union and perform his 
sworn duty.” And, so one day after Curtis fired nineteen officers for the crime of leading pro-




The police strike lasted only three days, but those 72 hours struck terror in the hearts of 
Bostonians and sympathetic onlookers nationwide, inadvertently launched a presidency, and set 
back the unionization of law enforcement workers by decades. Once the police left the streets on 
the evening of September 9
th
, hooliganism and mild looting abounded, prompting officials to 
cobble together a volunteer force made up of concerned citizens, Harvard students, and members 
of patriotic organizations – They were eventually relieved by the Provost Guard, stationed at the 
Boston Navy Yard.  
 
The next night, increased violence resulted in several deaths – due more often than not to 
excessive force by untrained volunteers. By September 11
th
, the 5000-man Massachusetts State 
Guard called onto the scene by Governor Calvin Coolidge had control of the city. And on 
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, at the urging of Samuel Gompers, the strikers unanimously agreed to go back to 
work – but were rebuffed by the Commissioner, who refused to re-hire them and made an 
entirely new police force of unemployed World War veterans instead. (These new recruits also 




In total, the damages to Boston for these three nights of terror came to $34,000, a paltry 
sum even by 1919 standards. While onlookers had feared another general strike like what had 
occurred in Seattle (and again in Winnipeg, Canada in May), none ever materialized. But that did 
not stop newspapers and opportunistic politicians from blowing up the strike into yet another 
arrival of the Red Menace onto American shores. “For the first time in the history of the United 
States,” wrote The New Outlook the week after the dust had settled, “an American community 
was called upon to accept or resist the beginnings of Soviet government.” The question on the 
table was whether “Americans wish to preserve their traditional democratic form of government, 
or is the United States ready for Bolshevism.” “Lenin and Trotsky are on their way,” lamented 
the Wall Street Journal. “Bolshevism in the United States is no longer a specter,” opined the 
Philadelphia Public-Ledger. “Boston in chaos reveals its sinister substance.” Others screamed 
lurid headlines like “TERROR REIGNS IN CITY.” In the Senate, Henry Myers of Montana 
warned darkly of a Bolshevist domino theory, whereby police unions would lead to army and 
navy unions and then Soviet government. For the hometown papers’ part, the Boston Herald 
decried the “Bolshevist nightmare” and Boston Globe told of “lawlessness, disorder, looting…as 
never was known in this city.”343 
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And just as Ole Hansen had climbed the ramparts of law and order in Seattle to become a 
national phenomenon, another political star was born in similar fashion in Governor Coolidge. 
Upon being asked by Samuel Gompers to allow for the reinstating of the striking police, 
Coolidge begged off. His letter of response included the curt and instantly famous rebuke: 
“There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time.” With 
those words, Coolidge became a national hero. Speaking from Montana in the midst of his ill-
fated Western swing, Wilson concurred with Coolidge’s hard stance, calling the Boston police 
strike “a crime against civilization”: 
In my judgment the obligation of a policeman is as sacred and direct as the obligation of a soldier. 
He is a public servant, not a private employee, and the whole honor of the community is in his 
hands. He has no right to prefer any private advantage to the public safety. I hope that that lesson 
will be burned in so that it will never again be forgotten, because the pride of America is that it 
can exercise self-control.”344 
 
 After Coolidge handily beat back a challenge from the fired policemen and won re-
election in November 1919 by the largest margin ever, a now-bedridden Wilson was among the 
applauders. “I congratulate you upon your election as a victory for law and order,” the president 
wrote Coolidge. “When that is the issue, all Americans must stand together.”345 
 
 The police strike was also a bridge too far for the normally pro-labor New Republic. 
Using language similar to Wilson’s, it argued that while “policemen were underpaid and have a 
very real human grievance” and “[t]o deny any body of free men the right to strike is a serious 
thing…the denial must be made.” The police, like members of the armed forces, “exercises the 
ultimate force of the government as an agent of the government, and the right to exercise that 
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force cannot be permitted to drift into the hands of any men other than the legal representatives 
of the community.” To do otherwise, thought the editors of TNR, put the entire progressive 
project at risk: 
Believing as we do in the evolution of the present state towards more complete democracy, we 
cannot believe in the surrender of any part of its ultimate force to a special interest, no matter how 
much we sympathize with that interest.  To the assertion of the fact that the police are now often 
affiliated with special interests, only that they happen to be the employers’ interests, they reply is 
that this is recognized as a form of corruption to be remedied as fast as labor and liberalism are 
adequately represented politically. In spite of the way the police are used in strikes, the tradition 
persists in American life that the state is not to be the instrument of a class. This tradition may in 
innumerable cases be a mere fiction, but even as a fiction it preserves an idea of social polity 




A week later, once the strike had ended, TNR lamented the wreckage: “Rarely in the 
history of labor conflicts has a body of highly organized labor, occupying as strong an economic 
position as the Boston unions, suffered so decisive a defeat.” And they excoriated the “vindictive 
spirit” of “state officials of Massachusetts,” arguing it was “harsh, inexpedient, and wrong-
headed” and “will infuse additional bitterness and fanaticism in the conduct of other labor 
controversies in other parts of the country.” At the same time, they were glad to have seen the 
strike fail, as the “Boston police…did not deserve to win.” Nonetheless, Coolidge and others 
should recognize that “labor is immensely more powerful than it was before the war”, and that 
“the warfare between capital and labor which has smoldered for so long in American industry is 
on the point of becoming a dangerous conflagration,” if not an “irreconcilable class war.347 
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 For The Nation, that class war had already erupted – and ordinary workers like the 
Boston police force were losing it. “One takes leave of the Boston police strike,” Arthur Warner 
wrote in its pages in December, “feeling not so much that injustice was done the men as that the 
city was the victim of a miscarriage of the normal processes of democracy, and that the public 
interest was flouted by three personally insignificant men – a Police Commissioner, a lawyer, 
and a Governor of Massachusetts.” The lawyer joining Curtis and Coolidge in this casting was 
“Herbert Parker, a corporation lawyer, whom [Curtis] had retained as his personal counsel,” and 
whom, according to The Nation, was “spoken of in Massachusetts as counsel for the Beef Trust 
and the Standard Oil interests…[and] alluded to as representing indirectly the United States Steel 
Corporation.” Parker, Warner argued, convinced Commissioner Curtis to throw out the 
potentially strike-averting agreement fashioned by the mayor of Boston and a mediating 
committee, and to let the chips fall where they may.”348  
 
In short, the Boston police strike was, in Warner’s eyes, a premeditated rope-a-dope by 
the established interests to goad organized labor into an ill-advised battle on unfavorable terrain. 
Arguing the strike “was forced upon the policemen against the wishes,” Warner noted that 
“[c]ertain persons in Boston…see the hand of Big Business, grasping at a chance to discredit 
organized labor with the public and so make it easier to defeat union demands looming up 
elsewhere in the country”: 
 
“A police strike would be the most unpopular of any that union workmen could support. If we can 
force them to defend such an issue, we can give them a black eye that will weaken them all over 
the United States. Why not fight the steel strike in Massachusetts instead of Pennsylvania? Why 
not make Boston the Belgium of our struggle?” In some such words as these one can imagine 
certain national captains of industry discussing the tactical possibilities of the Boston police 
situation in the latter part of August and the early days of September. Indeed there is a man in a 
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confidential business position in Boston who says that ‘letters conveying such ideas were 




“It may be,” Warned concluded, “that the explanation of ‘this otherwise almost 
inexplicable sequence of events is that, consciously or unconsciously, Messrs. Curtis, Parker, and 
Coolidge were serving the purpose, of Big Business – led by Mr. Gary and the Steel Trust – in its 
effort to perpetuate a decadent and despotic industrialism by discrediting the rising of organized 
labor.”350 
 
Steel and Coal 
 
By the time of Warner’s writing, two months after the police strike, it was easier to 
imagine an organized conspiracy of capital against labor. For, by then, two other major fronts 
had broken out in what began to seem more and more like a burgeoning class war. And these 
times, the hand of management in stoking anti-Red hysteria to break the actions was even more 
pronounced. 
 
The first among these was the Great Steel Strike, which began two weeks after the 
Boston cops walked out and only three days before Wilson’s collapse at Pueblo – itself an 
affected steel town.  At its height, the strike saw 365,000 workers all across the country leave the 
factories and furnaces. But this too was another failure for organized labor. By January 8th, 
1920, when the strike was finally officially called off, fewer than 100,000 remained out, and the 














Here again, the demands of the strikers were not particularly revolutionary. At the time, 
the average work week in the industry was sixty-nine hours, with twelve-hour shifts seven days a 
week the norm for over half of the unskilled jobs. For this back-breaking time commitment, 
unskilled steel workers netted an average of $1466 a year – $1100 less than what was considered 
the minimum level of subsistence for a family of five. Given this situation, and aided by the 
normally craft-oriented AFL’s push to organize unskilled steel laborers in 1919, steelworkers led 
by John Fitzpatrick and William Z. Foster – acting chairman and secretary-treasurer of the 
newly-formed National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers – asked Judge Elbert 
Gary, Chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel, for a conference to discuss the situation in June 1919. 
They were not even dignified with a response. Two months later, with the threat of a strike 
looming, Fitzpatrick and Foster again asked Gary to set up negotiations. “The officers of the 
corporation,” Gary replied, “respectfully decline to discuss with you, as representatives of a labor 
union, any matters relating to employees.”352 
 
With no other recourse, Fitzgerald and Foster announced a steel strike on September 11
th
 
– while eyes were transfixed on the situation in Boston. Eleven days later, the Great Steel Strike 
began, with workers demanding the right of collective bargaining, the eight-hour day and one 
day off in seven, no more 24-hour shifts, a pay raise and double-pay for overtime, and an end to 
company unions. The press, who had watched this slow-motion collision between Gary and 
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If Judge Gary had not deigned to heed labor’s request for a conference, he assuredly 
wasn’t going to back down in the face of a strike. And so U.S. Steel’s strike-breaking counter-
offensive was two-fold: win the public relations battle in the press and take advantage of ethnic 
and racial strife among the workers. 
 
The first of these initiatives, given the climate, was not a particularly heavy lift. Already, 
newspapers were calling the strike “another experiment in the way of Bolshevizing American 
industry” and a potential “revolution,” a theory that was buttressed by recently-organized 
Communist papers urging steelworkers to “crush the capitalists.” Nonetheless, the powers-that-
be in the steel industry deliberately fanned the flames this time. Once again, the question before 
America, argued the Gary Works Circle, was “Americanism vs. Bolshevism,” and so the open-
shop began to be called “the American system.” Soon, dozens of full-page advertisements 
appeared in the press, emphasizing the “United States” in U.S. Steel and urging workers to 
“stand by America,” “show up the Red agitator for what he is,” and “beware the agitator who 
makes labor a catspaw for Bolshevism.” On this front, the early syndicalist and Wobbly 
background of William Z. Foster was particularly useful – Soon, he was targeted by the press as 
an “uncompromising enemy of the existing political order” and a “revolutionist.” As for the 
striking workers themselves, management and their allies circulated the ludicrous notions that 





Meanwhile, employers also looked to expose and inflame the ethnic fault lines in the 
burgeoning worker’s movement. “We want you to stir up as much bad feeling as you possibly 
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can between the Serbians and the Italians,” ordered the Sherman Service – hired by U.S. Steel to 
help break the strike – to its employees. “Spread data among the Serbians that the Italians are 
going back to work….Urge them to go back to work or the Italians will get their jobs.” Handbills 
were circulated to native-born workers imploring them to “WAKE UP AMERICANS!! 
ITALIAN LABORERS…have been told by labor agitators that if they would join the union they 
would get Americans’ jobs.” Instead, true, loyal, and full-blooded Americans should work to 
break the “hunky” strike. Steelworkers also hired tens of thousands of African-Americans – who 
had been routinely ignored and discriminated against by the AFL – as strikebreakers.355 
 
Judge Gary’s attempt to paint the steel strike as yet another Bolshevik uprising drew 
further credence from events in the town U.S. Steel had built, Gary, Indiana, on October 4
th
, 
1919. Almost everywhere else, the steel strike had remained peaceful, but in Gary workers rioted 
at the introduction of African-American strikebreakers, who had been paraded through town by 
U.S. Steel to scare the workers into submission. Governor James Goodrich ordered in the state 
militia to restore order, but the next day, workers again stormed U.S. Steel, killing and injuring 
many before a fall rainstorm helped to break things up. The next day, General Leonard Wood 
came to town with regular army soldiers, declared martial law, and began an inquiry into what 
                                                          
355
 Howard Zinn, The Twentieth Century (New York: Perennial, 2003), 104. Cohen, 144.  As the NAACP’s Walter 
White noted when reviewing the reasons behind the Chicago Race Riot, “The Negro in Chicago yet remembers the 
waiters' strike some years ago, when colored union workers walked out at the command of the unions and when the 
strike was settled, the unions did not insist that Negro waiters be given their jobs back along with whites, and, as a 
result, colored men have never been able to get back into some of the hotels even to the present day. The Negro is 
between ‘the devil and the deep blue sea.’ He feels that if he goes into the unions, he will lose the friendship of the 
employers. He knows that if he does not, he is going to be met with the bitter antagonism of the unions.” 
Nonetheless, in the fall of 1919 the NAACP urged its readers “whenever possible to join the labor unions…The 
Labor Union is no panacea, but it has proved and proving a force that in the end diminishes racial prejudice.” Walter 
White, "The Causes of the Chicago Race Riot," The Crisis, October, 1919, 25. “The Negro and the Labor Union,” 




had set off the rioting – resulting in a sweep of Gary’s usual radical troublemakers, almost all of 
whom were unaffiliated with the steel strike on October 15th.
356
   
 
Not surprisingly, newspapers and the usual suspects saw “an attempted revolution” and 
the workings of a “Red Guard” in the events at Gary, pointing to statements like Mother Jones’ 
promise in Gary to “take over the steel mills and run them for Uncle Sam.” To the Boston 
Evening Transcript, it showed “the extraordinary hold which ‘Red’ principles have upon the 
foreign born population in the steel districts.” To conservative Senator Miles Poindexter, it 
showed “there is a real danger that the Government will fall.” Presumably harboring similar 
sentiments, police officers in the steel town of Weirton, West Virginia forced 118 immigrants 
and Wobblies who were striking to kiss the American flag. But, when a special Senate 
Committee later delved into the causes of the steel strike, the workers they spoke to usually 




“We work 13 hours at night and 11 hours at day, and we get 42 cents an hour,” one 
naturalized Serbian steelworker told the Committee. “Why did we strike? We did not have 
enough money so that we could have a standard American living.” Frank Smith, a Hungarian 
immigrant before the committee, concurred. “My conditions are all right; and I would gladly 
keep the work if I could make a living,” he told them. “I had never been kicked or abused, or 
anything like that whatever. The only thing that I am complaining against is that we are not 
getting enough money” and that “[t]his is the United States and we ought to have the right to 
belong to the union.” (Smith also made sure to inform the committee that he and his co-workers 
had bought Liberty Bonds and donated to the Red Cross and Y.M.C.A.) Andrew Pido, a Slavic 
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steelworker also working to become an American, testified he struck for “eight hours a day and 
better conditions…I think that a man ought to work eight hours to-day and have eight hours sleep 
and eight hours that he can go to school and learn something, and I think that an education is 
much better than money.”358 
 
On the steel issue, The New Republic felt much more comfortable siding against the 
depredations of management. “Had Mr. Fitzpatrick declined to confer with Mr. Gary he would 
have been denounced from one end of the country to the other as a firebrand,” they argued: 
 
But Mr. Gary can decline to confer with the representative of a very large section of his men; he 
can refuse to arbitrate, to consult, to mediate, even to discuss: he can bluntly repudiate all the 
known methods of peaceful adjustment, and so far as one can judge by the press, few voices are 
raised to brand him for what he is: an inciter of violence, a provoker of industrial war, an 
industrial barbarian. Mr. Gary by his action has made himself responsible for an enormous 
calamity. Whole communities will be disorganized, industries paralyzed, production halted, there 
will be waste and misery and untold bitterness, because he has willed it. Calculating that the 
unions may not be strong enough to win this time, relying on enormous war profits to tide him 
over, knowing that the organization is immature, trusting to his autocratic control over public 
authority in the steel districts, exploiting the fevered and panicky condition of the public mind, he 





It is impossible to escape the conclusion,” TNR summed up, “that a group of exceedingly 
dangerous men, with Mr. Gary as their leader, have chosen war because they think they can win 
it...[T]he only result of this attempt to poison public opinion will be to destroy that remnant of 
confidence between social classes which it is indispensable to the orderly transition of industry.”  
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Arguing that this “naked autocracy in industry” was enabled only by a “hideous cloud of 
misrepresentation and prejudice,” TNR saw in “Garyism” a “prelude to wider and deeper 
convulsions” and that the government must step in to settle it. “No government that dares to call 
itself American,” they argued, “can support Mr. Gary in his refusal to meet the representatives of 
his men. On this issue there can be no neutrality.”360 
 
The Wilson government could not react right away to the steel strike on account of the 
president’s collapse. But in early October – at the same time as Gary, Indiana erupted -- a 
National Industrial Conference, chaired by Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane (with 
Secretary of Labor William Wilson attending), was called to bring representatives of labor and 
management together to allay the steel strike and other labor unrest convulsing the country. It 
was, in sum, a non-starter. With the administration distracted and captains of industry more 
amenable to letting fears of Bolshevism win their battles for them, there was no real hearing for 
labor to be had. After a resolution by Samuel Gompers to affirm the right to collective 
bargaining was voted down on October 22
nd





The editors of The Survey gamely hosted symposia in December and January 1920 to 
discuss the final conference report, but most the responses were underwhelmed. “I find nothing 
new and little of interest,” argued Gompers. “The failure of the conference to recognize 
definitely the organizations of workers – trade unions – as the basis for representation is a fatal 
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omission.” William Z. Foster argued similarly. “They fail to recognize the workers’ right to 
organize. No hocus-pocus of fancy industrial machinery can overcome this fatal defect.” Without 
a recognition of organized labor, thought George Soule, “the essentials of a sound and hopeful 
industrial policy are lacking.”362  
 
“The industrial conference has collapsed,” opined The Nation. “Nothing else was to be 
expected. The President summoned a group of capital Bourbons and labor Bourbons…and bade 
them make peace for the public good. They assembled, wrangled for two weeks, [and] showed 
conclusively what we knew in advance, namely, they cared primarily for their own interest rather 
than the public welfare, and departed leaving the labor situation far worse.” By the third major 
labor action of the fall of 1919 – the coal strike – the Wilson government had moved from 




In its origins, the coal strike followed much the same pattern as the steel strike. Wages in 
the industry had not moved since September 1917, even as profits had surged and the cost of 
living doubled, on account of a deal made for the duration of the war. So once again, labor – this 
time under the leadership of the United Mine Workers’ John Lewis – looked to see their fair 
share of postwar profits. Almost a year after the signing of the Armistice, the UMW requested a 
new agreement that would raise wages, shorten hours, and set a five-day week for miners. But 
coal operators balked at signing or negotiating anything before April 1920, and attempts by 
Secretary of Labor Wilson to mediate fell through – Management saw no reason for cutting a 
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deal.  And so, on November 1
st
 – and even as the steel strike showed signs of dying – close to 




John Lewis was no fool. He knew the miners faced an extraordinarily adverse climate for 
this type of action, and so he reiterated going in that “the United Mine Workers have but one 
object in view, and that is to obtain just recognition of their right to a fair wage and proper 
working conditions. No other issue is involved and there must be no attempt on the part of 
anyone to inject into the strike any extraneous purposes.” It didn’t matter. Naturally, coal 
operator propaganda directly tied the strike to Soviet leaders in Russia, and newspapers 
bemoaned the strikers, “red-soaked in the doctrines of Bolshevism,” attempting to foment “a 
general revolution in America.”365 
 
This time, the strikers also incurred the wrath of the administration. Now several weeks 
into his sickbed period, Wilson deemed the action “unjustifiable,” “unlawful,” “the most far-
reaching plan ever presented,” and “a grave moral and legal wrong.” With the president ill, 
however, the point of the administration’s spear fell to Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer – 
now fully at war against the Enemy who had tried to kill him. At a meeting three days before the 
strike, Palmer apparently sold Wilson on breaking a pledge he had made to labor during the war 
and reviving the powers of the Fuel Administration to call down an injunction to stop the strike. 
This injunction was handed down the following day, to the shock of progressive observers and 
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the labor community – including Secretary of Labor William Wilson, who would file away this 
slight for the year to come.
366
   
 
But, while the UMW leadership technically complied, the strike happened anyway. Ten 
days later, when the injunction was made permanent, John L. Lewis again tried to cancel the 
action, arguing “We are Americans, we cannot fight our government.” The strike continued 
regardless, and as coal supplies dwindled, schools closed, factories cut back, and power was 
rationed. Eventually, in early December, the Fuel Administration offered a 14 cent wage increase 
and a promise to bring all sides together to negotiate a deal in the near future. This time, the 
strike did end, and in March 1920, a new two-year agreement was signed between operators and 




While the coal strike had a slightly happier ending than the police or steel strikes did for 
the workers involved, the decision to attempt an injunction served to further drive a wedge 
between the administration and its former progressive allies. “The war is on,” proclaimed The 
Nation of “the weasel words of the Attorney General” in invoking an injunction – “the war of the 
United States Government upon the forces of work at the basis of human society.” The 
injunction threatened America “with incalculable disaster; for it serves to confirm the 
unfortunate suspicion of workingmen that in the real test the Government is the organ of the 
propertied classes. Let that conviction become widespread, and violent revolution stands at the 
door…Do not our Washington officials understand that the plain people of the United States are 
coming thoroughly to distrust them? It is lamentable, but it is a fact, and Washington has itself to 
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blame.” In sum, The Nation argued, “Mr. Palmer’s action opens the way to violence, then the 
machine gun.”368  
 
For its part, TNR was slightly more temperate but no less contemptuous of the “broken 
pledge.” Wilson, it argued, “has rewarded the loyal service of the unions during the war 
by…placing at the disposal of their adversaries the vast prestige and so far as possible the 
physical power of the American government.” “[B]efore depriving coal miners, so far as it can, 
of their only safeguard against injustice and their most effective weapon with which to obtain a 
higher standard of living,” they concluded, “the government should guarantee a full and fair 
consideration of the miners' claims. This is precisely what the Wilson administration failed to 
do.” As it was, TNR argued, Wilson and Palmer’s injunction “constitute[s] an act of class 
violence under the forms of law” that “would undermine the moral unity of American society.” 
While conceding that a strike was a “dangerous and disorderly weapon which should in the long 
run disappear from the institutions of an industrial democracy…at present American industry is 
not democratically organized. It rests on the fears, the necessities, and the ignorant docilities of 
the majority of the workers, not on their free, self-conscious consent.”369  
 
Looking across the spectrum of labor conflicts in a piece entitled “Americanism in the 
Present Crisis,” the editors of TNR pleaded with the powers-that-be to cast off anti-Red hysteria 
and taken a more open-minded approach to the struggles of labor. Conceding that “[t]he 
American nation confronts one of the most serious crises in its history,” TNR noted the 
omnipresent and “general disposition among the employers, the politicians, and the press to treat 
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the labor unrest as a culpable and sinister rebellion – as an autocratic, anti-social demonstration 
of power which the American nation in the interest of its own future prosperity and security must 
suppress at any cost”: 
They cherish this bellicose and irreconcilable attitude of mind as patriotic and public spirited and 
as the veracious expression under the circumstances of the American national spirit.  We hope the 
opponents of labor will, while there is yet time and before they have done irretrievable damage, 
reconsider the pugnacity and the irreconcilability of the present attitude. They constitute the 
dominant, the more educated, and the most articulate element in American public opinion. It is 
their privilege and their function to renew the American spirit in its application to one of the great 
transitional and critical periods in our national history…The danger which the employers and 
their supporters in the press and among the politicians are now incurring is that of imitating the 
spirit of the abolitionists and the slave-owners and sowing the seeds of a calamitous and perhaps 
an irremediable class conflict on American soil… 
 
The most conspicuous, active and responsible elements in American public opinion are violating 
the spirit of free play; they are rendering free, patient, and considerate discussion of public 
questions almost impossible. They are using violently and unscrupulously the control possessed 
by the majority over the organized authority of the nation for the purpose of overriding and 
subjugating a protesting minority. If they continue in their headstrong course, they will destroy 




In short, the editors argued, people who should know better were “trying to prevent labor 
from enjoying its day in the court of American public opinion.” They were using “innuendo and 
invective to identify the discontent of labor with a revolutionary conspiracy against public order” 
and attempting “to stigmatize as “Bolshevism” all agitation for a redistribution of industrial 
power.” As a result, “[i]t is as profitable to argue with the great majority of American 
newspapers on a contemporary labor controversy as it is to argue with a brass band….they are 
ingenious and indefatigable in their effort to interpret the conflict as a fight to the finish, as a war 
of mutual extermination.” This was not the American way – Rather, so-called patriots should 
maintain “the traditional American reluctance to coerce an aggrieved minority and…the 
traditional American faith in the ability of the people to work through the most difficult and 






embittered conflicts to an ultimately liberating truth – provided all parties, all classes and all 
minorities obtain a full and fair hearing.”371 
 
Making a similar point in his own editorial in the same issue, Walter Lippmann warned 
that, at this “pregnant moment in American history,” the bad-faith shenanigans of the anti-labor 
crowd were pushing working people away from the conservative AFL approach and into the 
arms of the IWW.  As labor and capital seemed increasingly “irreconcilable dogmas,” he argued, 
“the easy thing to do is to let one’s sympathy decide between them, to throw in our lot with 
Gomperism or Garyism…But we dare not do that. We dare not allow the leaders of a class to 
present the American people with a dilemma, and we dare not allow ourselves to regard a 
conflict as fatally determined”: 
 
The idea that there is a Public Group, that it is the guardian of the Public Thing, that somehow it 
manages to represent the disinterested thought of the community – this idea persists in the 
American tradition. The skeptics jeer at it as a pure fiction, and the sinister often use it as a 
masquerade. But if it did not exist we should have to invent it. No class of people enumerated in 
the census are the ‘Public.’ But all individuals at some time or other are part of it. They are part of 
it whenever they are individuals and not mere conscious or unconscious members of a class. The 
Public is the name of those who in any crisis are seeking the truth and not advocating their 
dogma…The idea of a Public is simply a short way of expressing the great faith that a group of 
men and women will always disentangle themselves from their prejudices and will be sufficiently 
powerful to summon the partisans before that bar of reason; and that evidence, not mere jaw, will 
then decide. 372 
 
“Without a disentangled Public,” Lippmann warned, “the unending clash of Ins and Outs, 
Haves and Have Nots, Reds and Whites is likely to be a sheer commotion. No doubt there is 
much that is insincere and much that is maudlin said about the Public. The news system of the 
world being what it is, and education being where it is, it is possible to fool most of the Public a 
good part of the time. The Public is one of those ideals, if you like, which we miss oftener than 








we attain. But it is a precious ideal. It is the only way of formulating our belief that reason is the 
final test of action, that mere push and pull are not by themselves to set the issues and to render 
the decision.”373 
 
While Lippmann tried to rally progressives to the public interest, his colleague Walter 
Weyl instead saw a potential opportunity in “this strange significant phenomenon, the rise of 
class consciousness. It is a new weapon in the hands of a great but depressed class,” he argued in 
his essay, “The Only Truly Revolutionary Class.” “The rise of the modern wage-earning class is 
one of the big facts of history,” Weyl insisted. “We have lost the idea of a divinely ordered 
servile class. We have unchained innumerable ambitions and opened the door to astounding 
successes, disappointments, vanities and hatreds…All this means a complete revolution in our 
attitude towards all our social problems.” The world was becoming driven less by thoughts of the 
afterlife and more by the material pleasures of this realm, Weyl argued. “[A]ll of us – the 
financier floating a corporation, the farmer selling his crops, the grocer laying in his canned 
goods, the laborer drawing his pay of a Saturday – increasingly want the things of this world, and 
are willing to take the cash and let the credit go.” As such, “the labor problem is not a problem of 
class renunciation, but of group and individual expression. It is the problem of securing for 
wage-earners, primarily through their own efforts, the material and moral conditions of life, 
health, leisure, recreation, independence.”374 
 
Weyl’s insight that the labor problem was fundamentally one of purchasing power, and 
his notion that consumption and consumerism could be the glue to heal ancient enmities between 
farmers, laborers, and other producing classes, illustrated the foresight with which he was gifted.  








As he put it elsewhere, “[i]n America today the unifying force, about which a majority, hostile to 
the plutocracy is forming, is the common interest of the consumer.” But Weyl, who perished 
over the summer, was ahead of his time. Meanwhile, the fact that Lippmann and TNR felt they 
had to articulate robust defenses for public opinion and the idea of a disinterested public suggests 
how badly the cumulative effect of labor strife rattled the basic tenets of progressivism in 1919. 
And, like the League fight, the emerging class war was only one of many destabilizing issues 
playing out in America that year.
375
 
The Red Summer 
 
As the October incident in Gary, Indiana made plain, the line between labor and capital 
was only one of the seams along which America in 1919 began to tear. Indeed, even before the 
autumn of labor conflict began in earnest, the nation had experienced what the NAACP’s James 
Weldon Johnson deemed the “Red Summer” and what historian John Hope Franklin has argued 
was “the greatest period of interracial strife America has ever witnessed.” In Chicago, in 
Washington DC and San Francisco, in Charleston, Omaha, Knoxville, and Longview – all over 
the country, tensions flared between black and white Americans. In total, twenty-six major cities 
saw racial violence erupt in the summer and fall of 1919, with African-Americans almost always 
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As with so much else that went wrong in 1919, the racial turbulence had its origins in 
both the experience of the war and the expectations it had aroused. Those African-Americans 
who fought in the American Expeditionary Force returned home from the war to end all wars 
with pride in their service and a renewed commitment to defeating autocracy at home. The 
World War also helped to fuel what later became known as the Great Migration, as millions of 
African Americans moved out of the former Confederacy north and west, taking jobs in industry 
that were now open to support the war effort. 
 
“[We] fought gladly and to the last drop of blood for America, a nation that represents 
and gloats in lynching, disfranchisement, caste, brutality, and devilish insult,” wrote W.E.B. 
DuBois of the “Returning Soldiers” in The Crisis of May 1919.  “By the God of Heaven, we are 
cowards and jackasses if now that war is over, we do not marshal every ounce of our brain and 
brawn to fight a sterner, longer, more unbending battle against the forces of hell in our own 
land.” Similarly, NAACP boardmember and journalist Herbert Seligmann attributed the new 
militancy among African-Americans in 1919 to the fact that “the United States government 
called upon the Negro to die for democracy” and “spent enormous effort in making that concept 
a reality.” This experience was “most distinctively educative”:377 
 
The war has meant a vital change in the position of the Negro and in his own feeling about the 
position. In the Southern states he contributed almost as many men as did the whites. He bought 
Liberty Bonds, subscribed to Red Cross and other funds, and played his part in the crisis 
voluntarily and involuntarily as did the white man. Now he feels the opportunity for life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness which is accorded him as in some sense a supreme test of his 
country’s professions. If the white man tries to “show the nigger his place” by flogging and 
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Or, as poet Claude McKay put it more succinctly in his 1919 poem “If We Must Die”: “If 
we must die, let it not be like hogs/Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot...Like men we'll face 
the murderous, cowardly pack/ Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back!”379 
 
Another indication of new black militancy in the face of oppression was the meteoric rise 
of Marcus Garvey’s United Negro Improvement Association. Garvey, a Jamaican, founded the 
UNIA in July 1914 to “embrace the purpose of all black humanity.” By 1917, Garvey had come 
to the United States and begun to gather a following in Harlem, mostly among, according to 
historian David Levering Lewis, African-Americans and Afro-Caribbean immigrants that were 
“younger, angrier, poorer, and darker than the typical card-carrying members of the NAACP or 
the National Urban League.” Stressing economic self-sufficiency, racial pride, and the re-
colonization of Africa, Garvey envisioned a world where “the black man would not continue to 
be kicked about by all the other races and nations of the world…a new world of black men, not 
peons, serfs, dogs, and slaves, but a nation of study men making their impress upon civilization 
and causing a new light to dawn upon the human race.” By the early 1920’s – much to the 
consternation of DuBois, who looked warily upon this new rival – the UNIA boasted two million 
members around the world, as well a chain of grocery stores, a publishing house, the most 
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Further adding to African-Americans’ new resolve was the sheer fact that many cities of 
the North and West had seen burgeoning black communities arise virtually overnight. Reduced 
foreign immigration, a boll weevil infestation in southern cotton just before the war, the wartime 
ramp-up of northern industry, higher wages in the north, the persistence of Jim Crow – All 
conspired to encourage over four hundred thousand African-Americans to move north between 
the onset of war and 1920. “Brothers, come North,” argued The Crisis in January 1920. “The 
North is no paradise…but the South is at best a system of caste and insult and at worst a 
Hell…We can vote in the North. We can hold office in the North.” Detroit, home to the nascent 
automobile industry, had less than 1000 African-American residents in 1914. By 1919, it was 
estimated to have between 12,000 and 15,000. Pittsburgh saw the number of African American 
steelworkers double at many plants. Chicago’s African-American population jumped from 





Whatever the impact of the World War and the Great Migration, conservative forces and 
national newspapers were all too happy to ascribe postwar racial tensions to their favorite new 
bugaboo, the Red Menace, as well as to concomitant mischief by black leaders. “Reds Try to Stir 
Negroes to Revolt,” and “Radicals Inciting Negro to Violence,” warned the New York Times in 
July 1919. A month later, it was “Negroes of World Prey to Agitators,” and, from the New York 
Tribune, “Plot to Stir Race Antagonism in United States Charged to Soviets.” “[N]o element in 
this country is so susceptible to organized propaganda…as the least informed class of Negroes,” 
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opined the Times in October, reporting that “Bolshevist[s]…are winning many recruits among 
the colored races.” For its part, the Wall Street Journal ascribed the usual origins of race riots to 
“a Bolshevist, a Negro, and a gun.” 382  
 
Along with the standard-issue Bolshevists, newspapers also faulted black leaders for 
turning away from the congenial acquiescence toward racial slight that had defined the 
philosophy of Booker T. Washington. When W.E.B. Du Bois argued in The Crisis that “when 
the armed lynchers gather, we too must gather armed,” the Times saw only a failure of black 
leadership, for in the olden days “there was still active among the negro leaders a sense of 
appreciation tracing back to the civil war period” of “the great benefits granted the negro race in 
this country.” Or, as the Times put it elsewhere, before the Great War, the “majority of the 
Negroes in Washington…were well behaved…most of them admitted the superiority of the 
white race and troubles between the two races were undreamed of.” 383 
 
While the actual flashpoints instigating the riots differed, they tended to follow a general 
pattern. In most cases, African-Americans had usually either asserted a right that white people 
considered privileged to them only, or subsequently refused to back down once attacked. For 
example, the most infamous riot of the year, in Chicago, began on July 27, 1919 when Eugene 
Williams, an African-American boy, accidentally swam across an invisible barrier and into the 
white zone of the 29
th
 Street Beach. For this transgression, he was pelted with rocks until he 
drowned. When Chicago police tried to arrest a black man for the crime, fighting broke out that 
would rage across the Second City for almost a fortnight.  After the dust had settled, 38 were 
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dead – 23 blacks and 15 whites – 537 were injured, and 1000 African-American families had lost 
their homes. Reviewing the Chicago riot in The Crisis, Walter White noted that “[o]ne of the 
greatest surprises to many of those who came down to ‘clean out the niggers’ is that these same 
‘niggers’ fought back. Colored man saw their own kind being killed, heard of many more, and 
believed that their lives and liberty were at stake. In such a spirit most of the fighting was 
done.”384  
 
Similarly in Charleston, South Carolina, violence erupted in May 1919 when a white 
sailor named Roscoe Coleman and his friends chased down a black man who had bumped into 
him on the street. A fight broke out and eventually an African-American fired shots into the air. 
This led to rumors of a sailor shot dead by a black man, resulting in two days of rioting, the 




The Charleston riot was one of the earliest of the summer, and one of many to involve 
conflicts involving military men. In June, tensions between black and white soldiers at the naval 
base in New London, Connecticut degenerated into a fight that the police and fire department 
could not stop – The marines had to be called in. In July, local police tried to disarm African-
American troops stationed at Fort Huachuca in Bisbee, Arizona. The troops refused, and in the 
ensuing gunfight, five people ended up shot. Later that month, two were shot and many more 
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Other large-scale riots of the year began as attempted lynchings that turned into city-wide 
conflagrations.  Four days in late July saw nine dead, thirty fatally wounded, and 180 more 
wounded in the nation’s capital, where a white mob had gone on a spree of violence after the 
questioning and release of a presumed suspect in a sexual assault case. After reviewing the 
scene, James Weldon Johnson felt “disquieted, but not depressed…[It might have been worse. It 
might have been a riot in which the Negroes, unprotected by the law, would not have the spirit to 
protect themselves.” As it is, “[t]he Negroes saved themselves and saved Washington by their 
determination not to run, but to fight.”387 
 
The following month, a white mob in Knoxville seeking to lynch a black murder suspect 
broke into the local jail, freed sixteen white prisoners from jail, and then marched against black 
neighborhoods, leaving seven dead and twenty wounded. Similar stories played out in Longview, 
Texas in July and Wilmington, Delaware four months later. And in Omaha that September, yet 
another white mob of vigilantes lynched Will Brown, another sexual assault suspect, burned his 
body, attempted to lynch the mayor when he tried to intervene, and then went on a rampage 
through the black part of town. By the time Leonard Wood arrived with federal troops to put 





Speaking of Gary, it was not the only site of racial unrest with roots in labor disputes. In 
July, white ethnic laborers clubbed and beat black strikebreakers in Syracuse. And, in the 
bloodiest riot of the year, attempts by African-American sharecroppers and tenant farmers to 
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start their own union in Elaine, Arkansas turned into an outright massacre. When two white men 
– one a police officer, the other a railroad worker – tried to break up the organizational meeting 
at a local church on September 30
th
, the railroad man was shot at and killed. In retaliation, hordes 
of white vigilantes went on a quasi-sanctioned murdering spree in order to put down what they 
later argued was a Bolshevist-inspired race uprising.
389
   
 
The final official tally was five whites and 25 African-Americans dead, although blacks – 
and later historians – have argued the latter number easily ranged into the hundreds. “Negro 
uprising,’ ‘Negro insurrection,’ etc. was sent broadcast,” noted The Crisis in their examination of 
the riot. “The white planters called their gangs together and a big ‘nigger hunt’ began…Train 
loads and auto loads of white men, armed to the teeth, came from Marianna and Forest City, 
Ark., Memphis, Tenn., and Clarksdale, Miss. Rifles and ammunition were rushed in. The woods 
were scoured, Negro homes shot into. Negroes who did not know any trouble was brewing were 
shot and killed on the highways.” One local white leader, planter E.M. Allen, told a newspaper 
after all the shooting was done that their vigilantism was a necessity: “The present trouble with 
the Negroes in Phillips County,” he argued, “is not a race riot. It is a deliberately planned 
insurrection of the Negroes against the whites directed by an organization known as the 
‘Progressive Farmers and Household Union of America,’ established for the purpose of banding 
Negroes together for the killing of white people.” 390 
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As ridiculous as that sounds, official Justice Department inquiries into “sedition” among 
African-Americans were scarcely less extreme. “[T]he more radical Negro publications,” read a 
DOJ report on the subject in January 1920, “have been quick to avail themselves of the situation 
as cause for the utterance of inflammatory sentiment, utterances which in some cases have 
reached the limit of open-defiance and a counsel of retaliation.” As such, it concluded that 
“[t]here can no longer be any question of a well-concerted movement among a certain class of 
Negro leaders of thought and action to constitute themselves a determined and persistent source 
of a radical opposition to the government, and to the established rule of law and order.” This 
report on threats to “the established rule of law and order,” noted James Weldon Johnson, 
refrained from mentioning lynching in any way. In fact, the administration – which had 
reintroduced segregation in federal buildings once Wilson took office – took no real action 
against white-on-black violence at all. In August 1919, The NAACP sent Wilson a telegram 
"respectfully enquir[ing] how long the Federal Government under your administration intends to 




Surveying the race riots as a whole, Herbert Seligmann saw less sedition and more simple 
self-respect at work in the new militancy in the African-American community. Writing in TNR, 
he argued that the race riots “are symptomatic of the changing temper of Negroes as well as of 
white men toward race relations:  
Scratch the surface of public opinion…and you found beneath the talk of assaults upon women 
and of ‘crime waves,’ a determination to put the Negro back to where he was before the war. 
White workmen would tell you that Negroes were getting too high wages and were becoming 
‘independent,’ i.e. were no longer as servile as the southern white man wished… 
 
‘Crime waves’ are becoming a thin and transparent pretext for assault upon Negroes. The 
question which the American people will have to face is that of the economic and social status 
which will be accorded the Negro as a citizen…The war has meant a vital change in the position 
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of the Negro and in his own feeling about the position. In the Southern states he contributed 
almost as many men as did the whites. He bought Liberty Bonds, subscribed to Red Cross and 
other funds, and played his part in the crisis voluntarily and involuntarily as did the white man. 
Now he feels the opportunity for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness which is accorded him 
as in some sense a supreme test of his country’s professions. If the white man tries to ‘show the 
nigger his place’ by flogging and lynching him, the Negro, when the government does not defend 





“[T]he fundamental basis of proper relations between the races,” Seligmann concluded, 
“must be a recognition of the Negro’s prerogatives as a human being and as a citizen.” Without 
that foundation, America ran the risk of seeing “a hopeless condition of race war in the United 
States.” 393 
 
Writing about the Red Summer in 1919, W.E.B. Du Bois warned his readers not to let 
“justifiable self-defense against individuals become blind and lawless offense against all white 
folk.” Nonetheless, there was no turning back now. “Brothers we are on the Great Deep,” he 
wrote: 
We have cast off on the vast voyage which will lead to Freedom or Death. For three centuries we 
have suffered and cowered. No race ever gave Passive Resistance and Submission to Evil longer, 
more piteous trial. Today we raise the terrible weapon of Self-Defense. When the murderer 
comes, he shall no longer strike us in the back. When the armed lynchers gather, we too must 




“Honor, endless and undying Honor, to every man, black or white, who in Houston, East 
St. Louis, Washington and Chicago gave his life for Civilization and Order,” he concluded. “If 
the United States is to be a Land of Law, we would live humbly and peaceably in it….if it is to 
be a Land of Mobs and Lynchers, we might as well die today as tomorrow.”395 
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The Forces of Order 
 
African-Americans were not alone in finding themselves the target of federal inquiries in 
1919. On January 25
th
 of that year, and without any kind of advance warning, Jane Addams, 
Oswald Garrison Villard, Amos Pinchot, Frederic Howe, Charles Beard, David Starr Jordan, 
Roger Baldwin, Lillian Wald, and 54 other prominent progressives, socialists, and professors 
woke up to find themselves named “enemies of their country” in the newspapers, according to a 
“Who’s Who of pacifist and radical intellectuals” distributed by the Overman Committee in the 
Senate. Instead of winding down its now-mostly-irrelevant inquiry into pro-German propaganda, 
the Committee had, with the help of an enterprising New York lawyer and propagandist named 
Archibald Stevenson, instead decided to compile an enemies list for the United States. “In these 
universities there has been a festering mass of pure atheism and the grossest kind of 
materialism,” Committee member Senator William King of Utah argued in the New York 
Tribune, “and of teachings destructive of our form of government and the civilization which a 
Christian government recognizes. We ought to weed out and drive out of the universities these 
pernicious teachers.” At the very least, he argued, “the American people ought to know these 
professors.”396 
 
Some took the calumny in stride: Pacifist Jessie Wallace Hughan told interlocutors she 
was “glad to appear on any list that begins with Jane Addams’ name,” while Robert Benchley 
regaled readers of The Nation with a satirical tale of a Mr. Horace Peters, a perfectly normal 
God-fearing American who awoke to find his name on the list, right below Emma Goldman’s. 
(“[H]e went out to look up some of his friends, to explain that there had been a terrible mistake 
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somewhere. But he was coolly received. No one could afford to be seen talking with him after 
what had happened. His partner merely said ‘Bad business, Horace. Bad business!’”) Writing a 
decade later, Jane Addams was philosophical about her experience. “The United States was in a 
curious state of mind during those first years after the war,” she wrote. “Perhaps, because 
nothing save love stirs the imagination like hatred, there was a necessity for some object upon 
which the hatred stirred up during the war could vent itself. What so near at hand as the pacifists 
whom the newspapers had systematically identified with the enemy.”397  
 
But others were not so composed about this attempt at public shaming. “I am not and 
never have been” a pacifist, fumed Charles Beard to the committee (He had, in fact, resigned 
from Columbia to protest the dismissal of two pacifist professors.) New York lawyer Gilbert 
Roe, deemed an enemy of the state for his work with the Civil Liberties Bureau, argued he and 
the other named names were being punished not for pacifism but for calling out how “the homes 
of citizens had been unlawfully invaded and their persons and property seized without warrant or 
pretext” during the war – especially by self-appointed patriots like Archibald Stevenson. And 
Secretary of War Newton Baker, embarrassed and irate by the actions of one of his subordinates 
– Stevenson worked for the Military Intelligence Division (MID) in New York – told the press 
that the Overman Who’s Who included “names of people of great distinction, exalted purity of 
purpose, and lifelong devotion to the highest interest of America and of mankind.” He 
immediately initiated attempts to rein in the MID and end the federal sanction of civilian 
espionage outfits like the American Protective League.
398
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Unfortunately for Baker’s best efforts, the fortnight after the publication of the Who’s 
Who saw not only the beginning of the general strike in Seattle, but a breathlessly reported 
meeting in Washington DC where one speaker, Congregationalist minister Albert Rhys 
Williams, had argued that “America sooner or later is going to accept the Soviet Government, 
and when America discards some of the ideas current in the papers it will find it not so difficult 
to swallow.” All of a sudden the Overman Committee had a new raison d’etre: Bolshevism.399 
 
That same week, Senator Frank Walsh of Montana introduced a resolution in the Senate 
to expand the purview of the Overman Committee to include “efforts being made to propagate in 
this country the principles of any party exercising or claiming to exercise any authority in 
Russia,” as well as “any effort to incite the overthrow of the Government…by force, or by the 
destruction of life and property, or the general cessation of industry.” It passed unanimously.400  
 
For some, this additional inquiry was just usual good progressive government at work: 
Enlightening public opinion as to the true views and character of Bolshevism, argued Thomas 
Weeks of Massachusetts, would discourage Americans from embracing it. Other progressives 
who should have known better were just distracted. Senator William Borah already supported 
Robert La Follette’s bill to repeal the Espionage Act, because, he argued, “there never was a 
more vicious or insidious doctrine announced for the consideration of a free people than the 
doctrine that our constitution or any part of it is suspended during a time of war.” (It would 
ultimately fail 39-25, with 31 of 33 Democrats voting against repeal.) But here, he seemed to 
sense little danger in a simple informational inquiry. While arguing that the rally in Washington 
which had set the press aflame had only been a defense of the Soviet Union, not a call for 
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forcible overthrow of the United States, Borah nonetheless conceded that “if the propaganda 
which seems to have been fathered at that meeting be the beginning of a movement in this 
country, we may well consider how we are to meet such a serious situation.” 401  
 
Still, he argued, “I am opposed to Bolshevism whether it is in tatters and rags or whether 
it is clothed in broadcloth”: 
It is wholly immaterial to me from what source the attack comes upon the American Republic. 
These men may be hammering and battering away with a pick-axe and dynamite at one pillar of 
the republic, while other men are hammering and battering away at other pillars of the republic. 
The Soviet Government has its enthusiasts throughout the land…They held a meeting at the Poli 
Theatre. The League to Enforce Peace will began its campaign in Boston on the sixth day of 
February, and if they succeed, they will land us precisely where the Bolshevists would land us, 
and that is under the control of internationalism. They would tear down the fundamental 
principles of this republic just as successfully in the end and just as efficiently as the men who 
met in the Poli Theatre.402 
 
 
 And so, as Borah and the majority of the Senate turned its attention back to the League of 
Nations, the Overman Committee began its inquiry into Bolshevism. In an open letter to the 
Committee, Amos Pinchot – one of the Who’s Who targets – suggested to the Senators they 
would find far more “social dynamite in the statistics of child mortality in our slums and steel 
towns, in jails full of men convicted for their opinions, or in the gouging of the public by 
profiteering trusts and monopolies…than in the total propaganda of all the revolutionary minded 
persons in the country.” The Committee of five demurred, opting instead for a month of hearings 
depicting the Bolshevik regime in Russia as, in the words of the final report published in June, “a 
reign of terror unparalleled in the history of modern civilization, in many of its aspects rivaling 
even the inhuman savagery of the Turk and the terrors of the French Revolution.”403 
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The Bolshevik regime in Russia, the Overman Committee averred, was a threat to free 
speech, freedom of the press, and the family. Its “apparent purpose” was “to make the Russian 
Citizen, and especially the women and children, the wards and dependents of that Government… 
[I]t has destroyed the moral obligation of the father to provide, care for, and adequately protect 
the child of his blood and the mother of that child against the misfortunes of widowhood and 
orphanhood.” Its establishment in the United States would mean “the application of force and 
violence, the shedding of blood and the destruction of life and property,” as well as the 
disfranchisement of millions, confiscation of lands and printing presses, rampant atheism, 
“complete control of all banking institutions and their assets,” and, in, “one of the most appalling 
and far-reaching consequences,” the liquidation of life insurance companies.404 
 
For all that, however, the Overman Committee admitted that “only a portion of the so-
called radical revolutionary groups and organizations accept in its entirety the doctrine of the 
Bolsheviki.” However these groups were using Bolshevism as a “rallying cry” by which to 
topple American government, then to “muster sufficient strength to maintain a supremacy in the 
new social order and invoke the policies of its particular creed.” And so it befell the Senate, in 
order to combat this potential menace, to pass even more stringent anti-sedition laws to facilitate 
the incarceration of troublemakers and the deportation of foreign nationals. The Committee 




Despite its attempt to pass an Espionage Act-Plus, the Overman Committee’s main 
contribution in 1919 was to keep the newspapers in Red ink and the anti-Bolshevik hysteria 
brimming over in the first half of the year. In New York State, however – and again with the help 








of Archibald Stevenson – the Lusk Committee, a state-level inquiry into creeping Bolshevism, 
would go a step farther, and actually kick down doors and make arrests. Headed by freshman 
Senator Clayton Lusk, this Committee was formed on March 26, following a several-month 
investigation by Archibald Stevenson under the auspices of the Union League Club, “to 
investigate the scope, tendencies, and ramifications of…seditious activities and report the result 
of its investigations to the Legislature.” To cover all their bases, Lusk argued the current 
Bolshevik radicalism was likely “started here and elsewhere by paid agents of the Junker class in 
Germany as part of their programme of industrial and military world conquest.”406  
 
Now with an official imprimatur, police and DOJ officials, at the recommendation of the 
Committee, raided the Russian Soviet Bureau in downtown New York City. There, “the 
Committee found nothing,” scoffed Walter Lippmann. “[O]nly an absolute booby would have 
expected to find anything. Russians are pretty good conspirators, for all of them went to school 
under the Tsar. Now if you are conducting a conspiracy you do not carry it on from an office 
building after you have advertised the address in all the newspapers and invited everybody to 
come and call and do business. That would not be the ideal headquarters for a secret 
conspiracy…A schoolboy with no more detective skill than can be acquired from reading 
detective novels could have told Mr. Lusk and Mr. Stevenson that.”407 
 
Undiscomfited, Lusk-directed authorities moved again nine days later. They went after 
the local Socialist and IWW offices as well as the Rand School, a left-wing college offering 
classes in Socialism (and whose president, Algernon Lee, had called Stevenson “the greatest 
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maker of Bolsheviki in America”.) The reason for these seizures, Representative Lusk argued, 
was “Names! – Names of all parlor Bolsheviki, IWW, and Socialists.” But they found little of 





While the Lusk Committee followed the form of Senator Overman’s federal committee, 
states all around their country also followed their suggestions, passing ever more stringent anti-
sedition laws. Criminal anarchy laws, originally passed in some states as a response to the 1901 
assassination of William McKinley by Leon Czolgosz, were now ruthlessly enforced in New 
York (against radical leaders like Communist Benjamin Gitlow) and in the West (against the 
IWW).  Thirty-two states (24 in 1919, 8 in 1920) enacted laws banning the public display of Red 
flags. Thirty-five states, as well as then-territories Alaska and Hawaii, would have peacetime 
anti-sedition laws or new “criminal syndicalist” laws – defined as advocating “crime, 
sabotage…violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or 
political reform” – on the books by 1921.409  
 
After New York State passed some particularly virulent anti-radical legislation in April 
1920, calling for a banning of the Socialist party and a loyalty oath in the teaching professions, 
Governor Al Smith vetoed them as a threat of “the fundamental right of the people to enjoy full 
liberty in the domain of idea and speech.” In The Survey, Edward Devine applauded Smith’s 
actions. “You have killed all these vicious bills” and more, he wrote in an open letter to the 
Governor. “You have punctured an absurdity. You have restored a sense of proportion. You have 
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spoken truth and soberness at a time when untruth and insanity are still abroad. You have 
stripped the mantle of patriotism from the charlatan; you have made the patrioteer appear the 
ridiculous creature that he is.” Thanks to the Governor’s actions, Devine argued, “the New 
Yorker who travels when shamed by the names of Lusk and Sweet and Stevenson will be able to 
point to your vetoes and hold up his head.” Similarly, TNR thought Smith’s vetoes won him “the 
gratitude of everyone save the professional hunters of heresy.” Now, “those citizens of the state 
who cherish democratic principle must work now to attempt the defeat of every legislator who 
took a hand in the coup d’etat.” In the end, quite the opposite happened. Smith was ousted from 
Albany that November in the anti-Wilson wave, and his Republican successor, Nathan Miller, 




Just as government efforts to suppress sedition had been buttressed by volunteers during 
the Great War, so too did patriotic organizations old and new flock to the standard of enforcing 
conformity in the Red Scare. The National Security League and American Defense Society kept 
up their wartime efforts against the new enemy. “[W]hen you hear a man tryin’ to discredit 
Uncle Sam, that’s Bolshevism,” remarked one NSL pamphlet among many decrying “Parlor 
Bolshevists” and the “Enemy within Our Gates.” For their part, the ADS urged good Americans 
to boycott publications like TNR, The Nation, and The Dial and declared quintessentially 
progressive innovations like the referendum, recall, and initiative (as well as the Sixteenth 
Amendment creating an income tax)  to be tools of Bolshevism. Joining these two organizations 
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in defending the homeland was the National Civic Federation, whose official organ published 
super-patriotic screeds by its editor, Ralph Easley, with names like “My Days Under the 
Bolshevist Reign of Terror.”411 
 
The most notable of the new patriotic organizations to emerge in 1919 was the American 
Legion, officially established by veterans of World War I in March “to uphold and defend the 
Constitution of the United States of America; to maintain law and order; [and] to foster and 
perpetuate a one hundred per cent Americanism.” In fact, the Legion was something of a public-
private partnership. Its origins lay in Paris, where Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., 
after consultation with General Pershing’s staff and 19 other AEF officers, first discussed the 
potential for a veterans organization “to preserve the memories and incidents of our association 
in the great war…to consecrate and sanctify our comradeship.” More than that, it was thought 
the American Legion could work to counteract the influence of Bolshevistic ideas on the millions 
of returning – and now idle – troops. 412  
 
To patriotism and the patriotic endeavor of ferreting out subversive ideas, the Legion 
would dedicate itself for the first decade of its existence. Perhaps the best example of how thin 
the line could be between these two goals occurred on Armistice Day, 1919, in Centralia, 
Washington. There, an Armistice Day parade of American Legion members became a march on 
the local IWW office – who were forewarned such an attack might occur and had established 
covering fire. Shots rang out, and by the end of the fracas, four Legion members had been killed. 
In retaliation, veterans tracked down Wobbly -- and veteran – Wesley Everest, beat and castrated 
him, and hung him three times. (The first two times, the rope had not been long enough. The 
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third time, they had to step on his fingers as the broken man held on to the side of the bridge.) 
Everest had begged to be shot during his torture, and so after his death, the Legionnaires 
complied: They used his corpse for target practice, and then returned it to the local jail. 
According to the local coroner, Everest was a suicide. “He jumped off with a rope around his 
neck and then shot himself full of holes.”413 
 
The Centralia Massacre, as it became known, was only atypical in the ferocity of violence 
done to Everest’s body (and even then, African Americans might well disagree.) Similar mob 
actions against suspected radicals occurred all across the country, especially on May Day 1919. 
That ostensible pro-labor holiday saw 400 servicemen bear down on the headquarters of the 
Socialist newspaper The Call in New York City and smash everything in sight. The crowd also 
attacked the Russian People’s House, and forced those they found there to sing the national 
anthem. In Detroit and Chicago, police would break up May Day parades, and in Boston – only a 
few short months before they would be considered the Enemy themselves – policemen turned a 
peaceful parade of 1500 marchers into a full-fledged fracas. (One officer was fatally stabbed in 
the melee; afterwards, the crowd looted the local Socialist headquarters.) Cleveland saw the 
worst of it that day – After yet another riot of veterans, patriots, and police against suspected 




In Cleveland and after all of the May Day cases above, arrests and convictions were 
overwhelmingly, if not solely made of suspected socialists and Bolshevik ne’er-do-wells. But, 
even if pro-patriotic troublemakers were sometimes incarcerated as well, that did not necessarily 
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augur justice. In Indiana, a jury deliberating over the murder of Frank Petrich, an Austrian 
immigrant who had yelled “To Hell with the United States!” over the course of an argument, 
took all of two minutes to decide the gunman, Frank Petroni, was innocent. His defense had been 
“not guilty by reason of patriotism.” 415 
 
Can the men and women of Hammond, Indiana be faulted? Even God, it seemed, 
despised the unpatriotic, for joining the government and patriotic organizations in this crusade 
against Bolshevism were America’s leading evangelicals. “If I had my way with these ornery, 
wild-eyed Socialists and I.W.W’s,” stated Billy Sunday, the most popular preacher of his day, “I 
would stand them up before a firing squad and save space on our ships.” Another minister told 
General Leonard Wood he wanted to see Bolshevists deported “in ships of stone with sails of 
lead, with the wrath of God for a breeze and with hell for their first port.”416  
 
Progressives were for the most part disgusted with the waves of hysteria coursing through 
the public mind.  “Just how the public is to protect itself against this thing,” Robert La Follette 
remarked in April 1919, “I am not able to see at present.” “Our generation has evolved many 
new words as occasion demanded them; for scientific discoveries words like electrons, for new 
inventions words like radio, and dozens more for new groceries and automobile parts,” wrote 
Jane Addams of this moment. “We evidently need new words for this new panic which then 
seized the public mind. To apply the word patriotism to it is certainly a misuse of the word which 
has long connoted courage and candid loyalty to the highest achievement of which one’s country 
is capable.”417  
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The Nation argued similarly. “It seems nowadays that when an American legislator has 
nothing on his hands worth doing – which happens pretty regularly…he bestirs himself toward 
the seditious alien with the alacrity of the hart toward the waterbrooks.” Walter Lippmann also 
concurred in sardonic fashion. “It offends most patriots when a chorus girl appears in red and 
white tights and a star-spangled corsage and vociferates about the land of liberty,” he argued in 
November 1919. “It as just vulgar and offensive for men to dress up luridly when they are urging 
their views of public policy.” The chief problem facing America was that the same people who 
“saw a spy in every nurse girl and sedition in every brogue” during the war were now “daily in 
the presence of imaginary soviets, dictatorships, confiscation decrees, and above all 
extraordinary tribunals.” “Life today is grim and difficult enough without complicating it further 
by behaving as if it were half melodrama, half nightmare,” he concluded. “If everything that is 
suggested in America is to be viewed in the light of what Lenin thinks and does or is supposed to 
think and do, we shall never recover our self-possession.”418  
 
It probably did not help matters that the Attorney General of the United States had lost 
his own self-possession, one dark summer night on R Street. 
 
Mr. Palmer’s War 
 
Amid this whirlwind – and after the attempt on his life in early June – Attorney General 
A. Mitchell Palmer would move to the head of the anti-Bolshevik bandwagon with a convert’s 
zeal. “It is safe to say,” Palmer had said in 1918, “that never in its history has this country been 
so thoroughly policed.” Under his watch the following year, it soon would be, much to the 
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consternation of progressives. Indeed, Palmer would become the defining symbol of the new 
government repression and the domestic failures of the Wilson government. As historian Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. later wrote of the Attorney General’s efforts, “As Clemenceau slew the liberal 
dream in Paris, so Palmer slew it in America.”419  
 
Within a week of the blast that had destroyed his front porch, the Attorney General was 
setting up his retaliatory response. His goal now, he told Secretary of War Newton Baker on June 
9
th, was “putting an end forever to those lawless attempts to intimidate and injure, if not destroy 
organized government in this country.” To the Congress, he argued he was as “interested in the 
prevention of…crimes, if not more so, than the punishment of the perpetrators after they have 
been committed.” To accomplish these feats, he would need men, organization, and money. 420  
 
Regarding the first two, he made several new hires to his team over the summer. The two 
most notable of these were “the great anarchist chaser” (and the most recognized detective in 
America) William Flynn, who was named head of the Bureau of Investigation, and the 
promotion of 24-year-old John Edgar Hoover to the directorship of a brand new Radical 
Division, later the General Intelligence Division (GID). Along with being considered an expert 
on domestic anarchists, Flynn was an avowed publicity hound, and he would be extremely useful 
in drumming up attention for the Department. Hoover, meanwhile – relying on skills he acquired 
in an earlier job at the Library of Congress – developed an intricate card system that, by his 
count, included detailed information on over 60,000 suspected radicals within only a few 
months. For money, Palmer went before the House appropriations subcommittee on June 13
th 
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and asked for a $500,000 raise to the Justice Department budget of $1.5 million. When Congress 
only approved a $100,000 increase, Palmer went back to the Hill again in August, after a 




 While setting up shop, and after an initial, Flynn-orchestrated sweep of several major 
cities soon after the June bombings, Palmer and his revitalized organization remained mostly 
quiet over the summer of 1919. Flynn and other Justice Department officials intimated to the 
press, as well as state and local authorities, that there would be a spasm of Bolshevist activity on 
Independence Day. But, if this “chatter” ever in fact existed, it was incorrect. Despite an 
increased police presence in many American cities, including 11,000 police on 24-hour-duty in 
New York City, the only untoward incident that July 4
th
 was, as historian Stanley Coben noted, 
“a bloody case of mayhem in Toledo, Ohio, where Jack Dempsey beat Jess Willard to a pulp to 
win the heavyweight boxing championship.”422 
 
 As things remained quiet at the Justice Department, politicians and the press grew 
restless, particularly as the Red Summer faded into the fall of the Great Strikes. On October 19
th
, 
the Senate unanimously passed a resolution by conservative Miles Poindexter, asking the 
Attorney General to explain what actions he had taken against the Bolshevik threat in terms of 
arrests and deportations, “and if not, why not.” Those clamoring for action were also left 
scratching their heads by a speech Attorney General Palmer delivered at Lafayette College, his 
alma mater, that month while receiving an honorary degree. In it, he affirmed America – in the 
past, present, and future – as a nation of immigrants. “We cannot be less willing now than we 
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have always been,” he argued, “that the oppressed of every clime shall find here a refuge from 
trouble, disorder, and distress.” And while new arrivals must renounce force and follow the 
American way of intelligence, Palmer averred he “will not halt for a single moment any 
movement designed by its promoters to bring better conditions to any portion of our people.”423  
 
While The Survey published the entire text of Palmer’s speech the following month (after 
it had become more ironic in nature), more conservative outlets were put off by the progressive 
claptrap. Palmer has “expressed ancient and outworn views on immigration,” argued the New 
York Times. “The resolve of Americans to defend the American policy against Bolshevism is 
growing sterner every day. And here is the Attorney General of the United States, whose official 
duty it is to have these alien seditionaries, anarchists, plotters against the Government of the 
United States arrested, punished, deported, talking this pre-Adamite sentimentality.” In other 




In fact, Palmer was only laying the groundwork for his new division’s first decisive 
action. The Division had had a hard enough time conducting surveillance without congressional 
approval and building cases against crimes for which there was no body of law. To square that 
circle, Palmer authorized the GID to secure evidence for crimes to be defined, in laws “which 
may hereafter be enacted.” Even by that dubious standard, it would be hard, the GID’s top brass 
surmised, to bring a federal case against US citizens for sedition without a declared war going on 
any longer. And so, word was handed down that activities “should be particularly directed to 
persons, not citizens of the United States, with a view of obtaining deportation cases.” “The 
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deportation statute,” Palmer had told Congress at his appropriations hearings, “ought to be used 
liberally against these alien anarchists, these alien troublemakers, and that is one thing we 
propose to do.”425  
 
But that line of attack posed another problem – deportation was the purview of the 
Department of Labor, not the Department of Justice, and Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson 
and his top staff did not appreciate the attempted intrusion.”I have observed from several recent 
newspaper reports,” Secretary Wilson wrote Palmer, “that apparently it is the intention of the 
Department of Justice to undertake considerable special work in connection…with members of 
anarchistic and similar classes…[O]f course, the enforcement of the only laws which authorize 
deportation…is vested in this department.” 426  
 
To sort out the matter, Palmer had met with several of Wilson’s top deputies in June. The 
meeting went badly. Most of the Labor men were aghast at Palmer’s apparent ignorance of basic 
constitutional principles like probable cause and evidentiary requirements. “Do you mean to tell 
me that there is no law under which you can issue a warrant for the arrest of an alien when I 
certify that he is subject to deportation?” asked Palmer, only to be explained to that such a law 
would be unconstitutional if no evidence had been brought forth against the alien in question. 
After the meeting, the Labor attendees reported to Assistant Secretary Louis Post, who was 
handling much of the day-to-day responsibilities of the department on account of the illness of 
Secretary Wilson’s wife, and chuckled over Palmer’s naiveté. 427   
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All but Anthony Caminetti, Labor’s Immigration Chief and a man who already used his 
powers to strike against suspected radicals whenever he could. Caminetti thought Assistant 
Secretary Post a soft progressive ill-suited to the urgency of the times, and he held an especially 
intense loathing for Emma Goldman, the famed anarchist who was currently nearing the end of a 
two-year sentence in a Missouri penitentiary for interfering with conscription. Goldman’s 
deportation status had been a sticky wicket for months, since she had once been married to an 
American citizen, Jacob Kersner, for a year in 1894. So, after the ill-fated interdepartmental 
meeting, Caminetti reached out to Palmer’s staff, and, working alongside young Edgar Hoover, 
forged an agreement at the staff level which could be given to the respective higher-ups as a fait 
accompli: So long as Palmer’s office would back the deportation of Goldman, Caminetti would 
be more than happy to accede to anyone else the GID chose to deport. And so it was, early in the 
fall, a conference was held between the Departments of Justice and Labor providing for the GID 




With politicians and the press chomping at the bit for action, with a strategy of 
deportations agreed upon, and with all the bureaucratic niceties finally sorted out, all Palmer and 
Hoover’s GID needed was a target, which they readily found in the Union of Russian Workers 
(URW). The URW dated back to 1907, when it was created by immigrants fleeing Russia after 
the abortive 1905 revolution. (Its chief founder had since returned to the Motherland to become 
the new Bolshevik chief of police.) And it served as part-social club and settlement house for 
new Russian émigrés to learn English, part-political society devoted to the principles of class 
struggle and social revolution. Due to its 12-year history in America, the URW made for a juicier 
target than the recently created Communist and Communist Labor Parties, which had opened 
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shop in September. And, in fact, the New York Times had begun making the case in the press for 
a move on the URW over the summer, when they had published excerpts from its manifesto 
under the blaring headline “RUSSIAN REDS ARE BUSY HERE: Workers’ Union Has 500 
Agents Spreading Bolshevism in the United States – Constitution Proclaims War on 
Government”429   
 
With a target acquired, Palmer was at last ready for the show of force the papers wanted. 
At 9pm (in each respective time zone) on November 7
th
, 1919 – a date chosen to coincide with 
the second anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia – the GID struck in fifteen cities 
simultaneously. In New York and Hartford, Cleveland and Newark, Boston, Detroit, and San 
Francisco, hundreds of URW members were clubbed, beaten, and summarily arrested. Telling 
the story of the assault on the Russian People’s House in New York, where roughly 200 men and 
women were rounded up, the Socialist paper The Call told of “one of the most brutal raids ever 
witnessed in the city,” with police officers “clubbing and blackjacking” everyone in sight. (The 
editors of The Call were in a position to know: Along with being ransacked and raided 





One Russian laborer and veteran, Jacob Uden, told The Call of how he and 50 others had 
been waiting for a class when “[s]ome detectives came in, and they pushed us up against the end 
of the room. I asked one why he was pushing me, and he lifted up his leg and  kicked me in the 
stomach. Then another one hit me in the head with a club. Others were hit. Everybody was hit. 
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There was blood. I saw it, and when they pushed us together close, like in the subway, I got 
some on my face.” Another student told of how he “was struck on my head…by one detective, 
who knocked me down again, sat on my back, pressing me down to the floor with his knee and 
bending my body until blood flowed out of my mouth and nose.” Almost every retelling of the 
raid followed a similar pattern. Meanwhile, outside, bystanders “chuckled with delight.” When a 
Call reporter asked them about the scene, members of the crowd “used the words ‘seditious,’ 
‘Bolsheviki,’ ‘anarchist’ as if that was sufficient explanation for the merciless beating of men 
and women.”431 
 
As an anti-radical operation, the November 7
th
 raids left much to be desired. Ultimately, 
thirty-nine of the hundreds arrested were determined to be worth holding. Most of the rest were 
just Russian workmen who had been trying to learn some English or socialize with their fellow 
emigrés, and even those were held for absurd lengths of time in some areas – five months 
without a hearing in Hartford, Connecticut. The Palmer raids were followed the next day by even 
more anti-radical actions by local and state authorities, all looking to be a part of this great swipe 
against Bolshevism. In New York City, seven hundred police raided seventy buildings and 
arrested five hundred. But, across the nation, only 246 alien radicals were found worthy of 
deportation. 
 
 But, as a press event, the raids were a major coup, with A. Mitchell Palmer (to whom all 
the credit and blame redounded – Edgar Hoover had consciously tried to downplay his role) 
outdoing even Ole Hanson and Calvin Coolidge before him as the man of the hour. (This was 
particularly true given that Palmer had brought down the injunction against the coal strike the 






week before.) Here was “A Strong Man of Peace,” “a tower of strength to his countrymen,” “a 





 Six weeks later, on December 21
st
, 1919 – and after Frederic C. Howe, the former 
Commissioner of Ellis Island, had been forced to resign for being insufficiently amenable to 
deportations – A. Mitchell Palmer made his first down payment on his promise to expunge all 
the troublemakers threatening the United States. That day, the Buford sailed from New York 
City, carrying 249 deportees – 199 of whom had been picked up in the November raids, and one 
of whom was Emma Goldman, making good on Hoover’s promise to Caminetti. Once again, 
much of the popular press was effusive.  “Just as the sailing of the Ark that Noah built was a 
pledge for the preservation of the human race,” editorialized the New York Evening Mail, “so the 
sailing of the Ark of the Soviet is a pledge for the preservation of America.” Others deemed the 
“Soviet Ark” as “epoch-making as the immortal voyage of Columbus” and as important to 
American history as the Mayflower, except instead of bringing “the first of the builders to this 
country; the Buford has taken away the first destroyers.”433 
 
Progressives and left-leaning observers were less sanguine about the introduction of 
Palmerism into their midst.  For over a year, they had asked Woodrow Wilson time and time 
again to scale down the war footing and take a stand on behalf of civil liberties. “The President,” 
                                                          
432
 Ackerman, 90. Murray, Red Scare, 198. Hagedorn, 382-383 
433
 Murray, Red Scare, 208. In his widely-read 1925 book Confessions of a Reformer, Frederic Howe would rail 
against the Palmerism he had tried to stand against at Ellis Island. “I hated the Department of Justice, the ignorant 
secret-service men who had been intrusted with man-hunting powers; I hated the new state that had arisen, hated its 
brutalities, its ignorance, its unpatriotic patriotism, that made profit from our sacrifices and used its power to 
suppress criticism of its acts. I hated the suggestion of disloyalty of myself and my friends; suggestions that were 
directed against liberals, never against profiteers. I wanted to protest against the destruction of my government, my 
democracy, my America. I hated the new manifestation of power far more than I hated the spoilsmen, the ward 
heeler, the politician, or even the corruptionists who had destroyed my hope of democracy in Cleveland. I had 




Oswald Villard had warned Colonel House as early as February 1918, “will be completely 
unable to put through his peace program in America unless he can rally behind him the liberal 
and radical opinion of the country.” A year later, The Dial informed Wilson his beloved League 
would be “met by a storm of reactionary opposition. Where in America can you turn for aid and 
comfort save the American people – to American liberals?...They cannot accept your leadership 
in the League of Nations movement so long as…you persist in ignoring their single demand.” 
John Palmer Gavit, editor of the New York Evening Post, told the president that the civil liberties 
crackdown in America was “the very reason that you are not having now the liberal backing that 
is your right,” and that he should “uplift and electrify the country” by declaring “immediate and 
unconditional amnesty for all those persons convicted for expression of opinion.” Like Gavit, 
Charles Beard argued that “the time has come…[t]o release political prisoners whose offense 
was to retain Mr. Wilson’s pacifist views after he abandoned them.” 434 
 
But the administration, AWOL on so many other key issues in 1919, mostly ignored 
these pleas and instead seemed to have chosen Palmerism as its approach to Bolshevist hysteria. 
This choice would have consequences. Since Wilson and Palmer had “made it a penal offense to 
defend the policy which the President was enunciating,” argued The Dial, the battle for the 
League of Nations could not be won. Or, at former CPI head George Creel told the president 
himself: “All the radical, or liberal friends of your anti-imperialist war policy were either 
silenced or intimidated. The Department of Justice and the Post Office were allowed to silence 
and intimidate them. There was no voice left to argue for your sort of peace.”435  
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Writing to Newton Baker in January of 1920, Walter Lippmann also read the Wilson 
administration the riot act for its embrace of repression under A. Mitchell Palmer. “‘The events 
of the last few months, he wrote, “are too disturbing and the behavior of this administration too 
revolutionary not to put a severe strain upon men’s patience”: 
  
‘You know what hopes were put in this administration, how loudly and insistently it proclaimed 
its loyalty to the cause of freedom. Well, it was possible to fail in those hopes. It was credible that 
the wisdom and the strength to realize them would be lacking. But it is forever incredible that an 
administration announcing the most spacious ideals in our history should have done more to 
endanger fundamental American liberties than any group of men for a hundred years. 436 
 
  
Wilson’s administration, Lippmann argued, had ‘done everything humanly possible to 
add fresh excitement to an overexcited community.” They made the most “determined and 
dangerous…attack” on the constitution since the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, and fostered a 
“reign of terror in which honest thought is impossible, in which moderation is discountenanced, 





The Sage of Baltimore was inclined to agree. “[T]he issue of Americanism is being 
murdered by idiots,” Mencken sighed. “Day by day its exponents pile up proofs that to be an 
American, as they conceive it, is to be a poltroon and an ass…Between Wilson and his brigades 
of informers, spits, volunteer detectives, perjurers, and complaisant judges, and the 
Prohibitionists and their messianic delusion, the liberty of the citizen has pretty well vanished in 
America.” But Mencken also felt a change coming. “I begin to see signs that, deep down in their 
hearts, the American people are growing tired of government by fiat and denunciation. Once they 
reach the limit of endurance, there will be a chance again for the sort of Americanism that 
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civilized men can be proud of, and that sort of Americanism will make an issue a thousand times 
as vital as the imitations put forward by the Prohibitionists, the Palmer White Guard, the Wilson 
mail openers, and the press agents of the American Legion.”438 
 
That reaction was not here yet, but it was indeed coming.  “So far as I am presently 
concerned,” former Roosevelt Progressive Raymond Robins would write a friend the following 
year. “I shall give up my entire time to battling against Wilson’s administration, Wilson’s 
League and the witch-hunting of Postmaster General Burleson and Attorney General Palmer. I 
hope to make the infamy and betrayal of Wilson’s pseudo-liberalism and secure its 
overwhelming repudiation at the polls, which is to me the first obligation of our progressive 
citizenship.”439 
 
 Along with this reaction, among progressives, was a renewed sense that an American 
civil liberties tradition would have to be better established in the future battles to come. Speaking 
to the Women’s Club in 1919, New York World editor Frank Cobb took a preliminary stab at it 
by invoking the Bill of Rights and the writings of Jefferson. “The Bill of Rights is a born rebel,” 
he argued. “It reeks of sedition. In every clause it shakes its fist in the face of constituted 
authority and thunders “Thou shalt not.” Because of this, “it is the one guaranty of human 
freedom to the American people unless they themselves destroy their safeguard. We are in 
danger of forgetting this under the terrorism of mass thought, but we can forget it only at our 
imminent peril. There is revolution in reaction as well as in radicalism, and Toryism, speaking a 
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jargon of law and order, may often be a graver menace to liberty than radicalism bellowing the 
empty phrases of the soap-box demagogue.”440 
Quoting Jefferson’s dictum that “the spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on 
certain occasions that I wish it always to be kept alive,” Cobb also noted that “[i]f the author of 
the Declaration of Independence were to utter such a sentiment today, the Post Office 
Department could exclude him from the mail, grand juries could indict him for sedition and 
criminal syndicalism, legislative committee could seize his private papers and search them for 
evidence of bolshevism, and United States Senators would be clamoring for his deportation on 
the ground that he had been tainted with the ribald doctrines of the French Revolution and should 
be sent back to live with the rest of the terrorists. Thus the political philosophy of one generation 
becomes the political anathema of another.”441 
In sum, Cobb concluded, “[t]he policy of repression…to meet this propaganda of 
radicalism is fatal. Two thousand years of history bear witness to this folly. Nobody ever 
succeeded in bettering the weather by putting the thermometer in jail, and nobody will ever 
remove the causes of unrest and discontent by trying to suppress its manifestations.”442 
Senator William Borah, always a ready audience for progressive arguments which 
invoked the Founders, applauded Cobb for his “splendid editorial upon the strange lunacy which 
is now prevalent -- this idea that you must destroy all guarantees of the Constitution in order to 
preserve the rights of the American people.” As the Senator lamented to a constituent, “[i]t is my 
judgment that we have traveled backward upon this question a hundred years at least. We are 
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now seeking to invoke just such principles as the autocratic forces were seeking to invoke a 
hundred years ago…In fact, second to the cowardly policy to sell our country to foreign powers 
is this apparent determination to break down the fundamental principles upon which it is 
built.”443  
This, to Borah, was the chickens of the Espionage and Sedition Acts coming home to 
roost. “During the war,” he wrote, “the perfectly vicious doctrine was announced and practiced 
that the constitution is suspended during a state of war. This doctrine was both unnecessary and 
untrue…But this insidious and demoralizing doctrine was nevertheless announced and practiced. 
Now that peace is here we are gathering its fruits. Men are yet perfectly willing to deny the right 
of free speech, a free press, and peaceable assemblage and a free representation in utter disregard 
of the plainest provisions of our constitution… Three thousand years have demonstrated beyond 
controversy that arbitrary laws and persecution however persistent and drastic cannot control 
men’s thoughts.” Instead of raids and deportations, Borah argued, “[t]he only way to save the 
Constitution and to continue to enjoy our orderly and regulated liberty is to respect and preserve 
its terms and to enforce them as they are written.”444 
In fact, Borah was particularly contemptuous of the newfound regard for deportations. “I 
am opposed to deportation as a matter of policy,” he argued, “first, because it will prove wholly 
ineffective, secondly, because it is a cowardly way to meet this great question which we have 
before us. We cannot deal with the situation effectively which now confronts us by deporting a 
few people. Besides, why should we deport people into Russia and then go to the great expense 
of sending troops over there to shoot them. We now assume it to be our business to compose the 
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troubles of Russia. As a mere matter of business would it not be better to compose those we have 
here.”445 
Stanford president David Starr Jordan concurred with Borah’s basic assessment of 
Palmer’s policies. “Permit me to express my belief,” he told him, “that you are wholly right in 
your opposition to ‘Alien and Sedition Laws,’ promiscuous round-ups of unpleasant people, and 
irresponsible control of the press. Such lines of action more or less outside of law and in 
violation of the principle of fair trial spread sedition and aggravate the distemper.”446  
And he was not alone. “The idea that discontent in America in the twentieth century,” 
wrote Edward T. Devine in an open letter “To the President” for The Survey, “is to be 
overwhelmed by force of arms…is fantastic. The idea that radical agitation is to be ‘stamped out’ 
by imprisonments, deportations, raids, and the denial of the constitutional rights of assembly and 
discussion, is ridiculous. The idea that public officials are not to be criticized for official acts or 
strenuously opposed when they exceed their authority and abuse their powers is un-American… 
The only possible danger to American institutions lies in a policy of suppression.”447 Elsewhere 
in The Survey, Richard Roberts made the case that “in the interest of public safety and a quiet life 
we cannot allow erroneous opinion to be driven underground by suppression (for that is what 
always happens), there to grow in the dark and to become explosive.” In TNR, Walter Lippmann 
pointed out that “the very essence of any sincere belief in the liberty promised by the First 
Amendment is a willingness to defend the liberty of opinions with which you disagree. That 
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means protecting some pretty poor opinions, ignorant, wild and mean opinions, occasionally 
even sinister ones…There are pleasanter occupations.”448 
Across the board, progressives disgusted with the Palmer raids were moved to begin 
articulating a more robust defense of civil liberties. It is a project that would continue throughout 
the remainder of the coming decade, with a significant step forward occurring in the first month 
of 1920. Then, in a building on W. 13
th
 St. shared by Max Eastman’s Liberator and The Dial, the 
National Civil Liberties Bureau was reborn the American Civil Liberties Union, with Roger 
Baldwin – out of jail since October – as director.  “[A]ll thought on matters of public concern,” 
argued its Statement of Purpose, “should be freely expressed, without interference. Orderly 
social progress is promoted by unrestricted freedom of opinion.” Baldwin was particularly 
desirous to have the ACLU become involved in “the industrial struggle…clearly the essential 
challenge to the cause of civil liberty today.” Within a month, the organization was running ads 
in journals like The Survey asking for subscribers and boots on the ground. “Help in the Fight for 
Civil Liberty,” it pleaded, and join an organization that “ties together labor, liberal, and radical 
groups” to carry the fight “directly into the areas of industrial conflict.”449  
The newly-christened ACLU would have to hit the ground running, because, as 1919 
faded in 1920 at long last, A. Mitchell Palmer and Edgar Hoover unveiled their next encore. 
The Fever Breaks 
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1920. “It will not be an easy year,” remarked the cover of The New Republic’s first issue 
of the twenties. “[T]he world over schism and distrust, at Washington a deadlock of office 
holders, no single measure of Reconstruction achieved, a Presidential year…It will not be a 
possible year if thought is suppressed and terrorized, if the censors, the propagandists and bigots 
have their way. 1920 will leave the world better than it found it only if free men insist upon their 
freedom.”450  
 
They would have to. On January 2
nd
, Palmer and Hoover, dreaming of a fleet of Soviet 
Arks to follow the Buford into the Red sunset, initiated their second wave of raids. This time, the 
target was ostensibly the new Communist and Communist Labor parties, which the GID 
essentially attempted to liquidate. Law enforcement officials around the country were urged by 
the Justice Department that “every effort should be made by you to definitely establish the fact 
that the persons arrested” were members of one or the other party, since “the grounds for 
deportation will be based solely upon membership.” The warning did not count for much. 
Nationwide, the day saw as many as ten thousand arrests across 23 states and 33 cities -- Among 
those rounded up in the wide net were thirty-nine bakers in Lynn, Massachusetts attempting to 
organize a bakery, 800 men and women in Detroit who were then forced to sleep in a 
windowless hallway for five days and share one toilet, and a New Jersey man who “looked like a 
radical.” But in this huge haul, only three pistols were confiscated, two of them .22 caliber, and 





                                                          
450
 The New Republic, January 7, 1920, Vol. XXI, No. 266. 
451




Even allowing for Palmer’s previous excesses, progressives were shocked by the flagrant 
illegality of the January raids. “Deporting a political party,” TNR argued, was thought to be 
“abhorrent to that ‘fierce spirit of liberty’ which Burke once proclaimed as America’s chief 
characteristic.” Palmer had not only violated that creed, he had given the platform of the 
Communist party an enormous PR boost. “Fortunately the new sedition law has not yet been 
enacted by Congress, or Mr. Palmer might find himself, together with some very respectable 
newspapers, liable to prosecution for circulating seditious matter.” In The Nation, Frederick 
Barkley covered in detail the dismal confinement of the 800 in Detroit, 400 of whom were 
“confined for one to two weeks under conditions of horror, confined because of their peaceful 
assemblage, guaranteed by the Constitution, led the Department of Justice to suspect that their 
beliefs, also protected under the Constitution, were inimical to the peace and safety of 
110,000,000 people. Nearly 400 men are free after a taste of ‘Americanization’…that bodes ill 
for any future Americanizers who do not come backed by the clubs of the police and the 
constabulatory. Nearly 400 men, and hundreds more women and children, have had the seeds of 
hatred sown in their breasts.”452 
 
And while the Washington Post argued that ‘[t]here is no time to waste on hairsplitting 
over infringement of liberty,” this time legal officials also balked at the scale and scope of 
Palmer’s attack. Feeling “out of sympathy with the anti-radical policies of Mr. Palmer and his 
method of carrying them out,” Francis Fisher Kane, a US Attorney in Philadelphia, resigned. “As 
I read the manifestoes of the Communist Party,” Kane wrote in his resignation letter, “the party 
does not expressly stand for the overthrow of this government by force, and it was surely a 
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question of policy – not one of law” that prompted the raids. Moreover, Palmer’s tactics, Kane 
averred, are “generally unwise and very apt to result in injustice…Are we really in danger in this 
country from the presence of a handful of foreign ‘radicals’?” Kane doubted it.453  
 
Naturally, the Attorney General was incensed. In a public letter of reply, he laid out a 
case for why he believed the Communist parties were “pledged to the sole purpose of obtaining 
the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence.” He also rather 
dubiously declared that he had “carefully studied the procedure followed by the Department of 
Labor in the deportation cases and fail to find any single instance where any injustice has been 
done to an alien.” “In view of your misunderstanding of the real facts,” Palmer concluded, “I am 
bound to say that your resignation seems to me to be quite the proper step for you to take.” 454 
 
But Kane wasn’t the only lawyer to take umbrage at Palmer’s January actions. In Boston 
a few months later, a federal judge decried the raids as the work of a mob. “I refrain from any 
extended comment on the lawlessness of these proceedings by our supposedly law-enforcing 
officials,” declared Judge Anderson in the case of Colyer et al v. Skeffington. “The documents 
and acts speak for themselves. It may, however, fitly be observed that a mob is a mob, whether 
made up of government officials acting under instructions from the Department of Justice, or of 
criminals, loafers, and the vicious classes.” He also excoriated the “pains [that] were taken to 
give spectacular publicity to the raid[s], and to make it appear that there was great and imminent 
                                                          
453
 Capozzola, 204. Hagedorn, 422. Murray, Red Scare, 218. “The Documents in the Case,” The Survey, January 31. 
1920, 501. 
454




public danger.” To Sidney Howard in The Survey, Judge Anderson had “hit directly at the fallacy 
of the panic.”455 
 
Also concurring with Judge Anderson’s assessment of the situation was Acting Secretary 
of Labor Louis Post, who, upon review of the January arrests, re-imposed the attention to 
constitutional detail that Caminetti and Hoover had earlier sidestepped and began voiding almost 
half of the arrests. A livid Palmer urged Post be reprimanded for his “‘tender solicitude for social 
revolution,” and for this seeming coddling of the radical element, impeachment hearings were 
initiated against Louis Post in the House of Representatives in April. These backfired massively. 
Post proved an able and personable witness, and, in early May of 1920, he eloquently dissected 
the many illegalities at the heart of Palmer’s approach in official House testimony. TNR exulted 
to see Post run circles around the “hearing-hearers of Washington,” “lineal descendants” to the 
“witch-burners.” Post “anticipated attack, he welcomed it, he ran to meet it with every weapon of 
fact, of humor, of legitimate pride.” As such, the Committee “had very much the aspect of a 
group of gentlemen who had picked up a very hot poker and were looking for some place to cool 
it.” 456 
 
It helped Post’s case that Attorney General Palmer’s star was dimming of its own accord 
in the same week. As with Independence Day 1919, Palmer – now with a definite eye at the 
coming presidential election – had prophesied a wave of Bolshevik terror to occur on May Day 
1920. When nothing of note happened that day despite another ramp-up of police and law 
enforcement in major American cities, Palmer the “Fighting Quaker” began to seem more a 
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The second wave of Palmer Raids was not the only grievous overreach for anti-radical 
forces in America that January of 1920. Five days later, on January 7
th
, the New York State 
Assembly voted to expel five of its members– Samuel DeWitt, Samuel Orr, Louis Waldman, 
Charles Solomon, and August Claessens – for being representatives of the Socialist party and 
thus, in the words of Speaker of the House Thomas Sweet, “elected on a platform that is 
absolutely inimical to the best interests of the state of New York and the United States.” The 
resolution which determined their fate, which accused all five members of being “pledged to the 
forcible and violent overthrow of all governments now existing,” passed 140-6.458  
 
This was not the first time Socialists had been fired or expelled by virtue of their 
ideology. Earlier in the year, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt had to 
admonish Rear Admiral S.S. Robinson for attempting to fire three Socialists at Newport Naval 
Yard. “Now, my dear Admiral,” Roosevelt wrote, “neither you nor I can fire a man because he 
happens to be a Socialist. It so happens that the Socialist party has a place on the official ballot in 
almost every state in the union.” And, earlier in 1919, Congress had refused to seat Socialist 
Victor Berger of Milwaukee on account of his conviction under the Espionage Act. An 
unrepentant Berger, who had told his constituents “[y]ou got nothing out of the war except the 
flu and prohibition,” was re-elected in a special election in November 1919. Three days after the 
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incident in Albany, January 10
th
, 1920, Congress refused to seat him again, and the seat stayed 




In that case, however, Congress at least had the fig leaf of Berger’s conviction. The New 
York Assembly had no such cover for their vote. Speaker Sweet had argued that the Socialist 
Party was “not truly a political party…[but] a membership organization admitting within its 
ranks aliens, enemy aliens, and minors.” But to many onlookers, it seemed like a political hit by 
a majority against an unprotected minority. Progressives, as usual, voiced their displeasure at this 
turn of events. “Socialists,” argued Senator Hiram Johnson, “acting within the Constitution, have 
the right to preach their doctrine. When they are elected by their constituents they must be 
protected.” TNR spoke of “The Mob in High Places” and argued “Sweet, Lusk, and Stephenson” 
had made New York “the first democratic commonwealth in history to proscribe a political party 
which was seeking by orderly constitutional agitation to bring about changes in its political and 
economic institutions.” Quoting Jefferson and Hamilton, The Survey honored  the “Keepers of 
the Faith” who “Recently Broke Silence and Revealed a Great Body of Public Opinion Ready to 
Uphold the Liberties of the Founders” Among them were Hiram Johnson, Frank Cobb, Jane 




This time, however, progressives were joined by figures on the right, including Senator 
Warren Harding of Ohio, American Legion founder Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (also a member of 
the assembly), and, most notably, former Republican presidential candidate Charles Evans 
Hughes.  Disgusted with the turn of events, Hughes argued the vote was “a serious blow to the 
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standards of true Americanism and nothing short of a calamity.” He pushed the New York Bar to 
advocate re-admission, and even offered the five expelled Socialists legal counsel. “It was like a 
breath of fresh air,” wrote Harold Ickes to Hughes in gratitude for his stance. “Your petition must 
commend itself to every sober-minded citizen who has not allowed himself to be swept off his 
feet by the present wave of hysteria which, in the name of ‘law and order’ and the ‘preservation 
of our institutions,’ is doing more to encourage lawlessness and undermine our institutions than 
all of the Socialists, Communists, and so-called ‘Reds’ could do.” A few months later, in April 
1920, the Assembly voted to make the expulsion of the five Socialists permanent, but minds and 
the national mood were changing.  This time, the votes were 116-28 (against three of the 
members) and 104-40 (against the other two.) When all five accused were overwhelmingly re-
elected that September, the Assembly voted again to expel three of the members, but seated the 




At long last, the tensions of the war and post-war periods were beginning to slacken. As 
The Survey argued in February 1920, “the sedition bills, the dragnet raids, and plans for 
wholesale deportation have seemed to indicate that public intemperance is at its height. That is 
misreading the situation. These things are but the reflex of a public trepidation that has 
perceptibly waned.” The labor strikes had been broken, and, while the economy had not 
improved, production had, in the fall of 1919, suddenly increased past its wartime high. Perhaps 
most importantly, the prophesied revolution had not seemed to come. For this relative calm, 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer was happy to take credit. “Like a prairie fire, the blaze of 
revolution was sweeping over every American institution of law and order a year ago,” he 
reminded the nation in 1920, “It was eating its way into the homes of the American workman, its 
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sharp tongues of revolutionary heat were licking the altars of the churches, leaping into the belfry 
of the school bell, crawling into the sacred corners of American homes, seeking to replace 
marriage vows with libertine laws, burning up the foundations of society.”462  
 
But, at this point, the nation had begun to tune Palmer out – much to the delight of H.L. 
Mencken.  “The American people, as a general thing, enjoy the public pursuit of criminals,” he 
wrote. “They esteem and respect a prosecuting officer who entertains them with gaudy 
raids…But Palmer went a bit too far. He carried the farce to such lengths that the plain people 
began to sympathize with his victims, nine-tenths of whom were palpably innocent of any worse 
crime than folly. Today he faces a public conviction that he is a silly fellow, despotic and 
without sense. That conviction does little violence to the truth.” To Mencken as to many others, 
it was good riddance to bad rubbish, for Palmer “has probably done more than any other one 
man, save only Mr. Wilson himself, to break down democratic self-government in America and 
substitute a Cossack despotism, unintelligent and dishonest…In brief, the fellow is a hollow 
charlatan.”463 
 
As Palmer himself could testify, there had been real dangers in 1919: Galleanists had 
tried to murder him twice. But, not for the first or last time in American history, the government 
response to the acts of terror in April and June 1919 had been wildly disproportionate to the 
actual threat. And so it was ironic, that, when this small band of foreign-born anarchists actually 
launched their most violent and successful attack on September, 16
th
, 1920 – a bomb in 
downtown Wall Street that killed 39 and wounded hundreds – America, after the initial shock, 
mostly reacted with an exhausted shrug. “Attorney General Palmer is convinced the Wall Street 
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explosion was the result of a bomb plot,” deadpanned The New York World after the tragedy. “In 
spite of the Attorney General's opinion, it probably was the result of a bomb plot.” 464 
 
The Best Laid Plans 
 
“Any spring is a time of overturn,” wrote John Dos Passos, looking back years later at 
1919, “but then Lenin was alive, the Seattle general strike had seemed the beginning of the flood 
instead of the beginning of the ebb, Americans in Paris were groggy with theatre and painting 
and music; Picasso was to rebuild the eye, Stravinsky was cramming the Russian steppes into our 
ears, currents of energy seemed breaking out everywhere as young guys climbed out of their 
uniforms, imperial America was all shiny with the new idea of the Ritz, in every direction the 
countries of the world stretched out starving and angry, ready for anything turbulent and new, 
when you went to the movies you saw Charlie Chaplin.”465  
 
Dos Passos was not alone in this retrospective assessment of the time. “I suppose that 
from 1919 to 1921,” remarked journalist and economist George Soule, “the world seemed more 
in flux, more ready for fundamental changes, than it has ever since.” From the modern 
perspective, it is hard to overstate how epoch-changing and, to some, traumatic, the experiences 
of that year would be. Even notwithstanding all of the other shocks to the system already 
described, 1919 and 1920 saw all manner of calamity and transformation.
466
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On midday January 15
th
, 1919, before anyone in Seattle had breathed a word of a general 
strike, a tank holding 2.3 million tons of molasses in the North End of Boston, Massachusetts 
suddenly exploded, sending a 25-foot-tall, 160-foot-wide wave of brown, suffocating liquid 
charging through the streets at 35 miles an hour. When all was said and done, the Great Boston 
Molasses Flood would leave 21 dead and 150 hospitalized. (The owner of the defective tank, 
Purity Distilling Company, naturally tried to shunt blame for the disaster on anarchists. Not until 
the mid-twenties, after a lawsuit, would it come to rest on the company’s lack of oversight.)467 
 
A biblical and deadly tsunami of molasses was only one of the seeming indignities 
committed upon the basic laws of nature in 1919. In June, British aviators John Alcock and 
Arthur Brown would fly from Newfoundland to Ireland, thus making the first non-stop 
transatlantic flight in history.
468
 In December, the Smithsonian would publish Robert Goddard’s 
A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes, which outlined Goddard’s early experiments in solid-
fuel rocketry and explained how such a rocket could reach outer space.
469
 And in late May 1919, 
a team of astronomers led by Arthur Stanley Eddington took simultaneous photographs of a total 
solar eclipse from Brazil and the island of Principe off the coast of West Africa. These findings, 
published the following year, showed a predicted displacement of stars due to light bending 
nearing the sun, thus confirming Albert Einstein’s theory of general relativity.470  
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Even time and space itself, it seemed, were now in flux, and nothing was safe from 
transformation – not even America’s favorite leisure activities. For one, October of 1919 saw not 
only great strikes in the workplace, but dubious strikes in the ballpark – The Chicago White Sox 
lost the World Series to the Cincinnati Reds in eight games and, to many observers, ten iffy plays 
by White Sox players like Lefty Williams, Eddie Cicotte, and “Shoeless Joe” Jackson. That 
series was soon eclipsed by the offseason acquisition of star hitter Babe Ruth by the New York 
Yankees from the Boston Red Sox (an event which would rankle Bostonians for almost nine 
decades.) But, to the horror of baseball fans, it would come out the following year that the Series 
had likely been fixed by mobsters, with the aid of eight White Sox players. “The revelations,” 
argued a writer in The New Republic, “shocked the entire nation and wrecked the faith of 
millions of boys.”471 
 
As baseball was besmirched, boozing was outright banned. During the War, advocates of 
Prohibition had taken the opportunity to tie alcohol reform to the war effort. “German brewers in 
this country,’ argued the powerful Anti-Saloon League, “have rendered thousands of men 
inefficient and are thus crippling the Republic in its war on Prussian militarism.” In December 
1917, Congress approved the Eighteenth Amendment, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, 
transportation, or export of alcohol, and sent it to the states. By January 1919, a little over a year 
later – the fastest turnaround in history, even if Connecticut and Rhode Island refused to have 
any part of it – thirty-six states had approved the amendment. At so at the stroke of midnight on 
January 17
th
, 1920, Prohibition went into effect, beginning America’s thirteen-year long “Noble 
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Experiment.” “Slums will soon only be a memory,” proclaimed Billy Sunday, “We will turn our 
prisons into factories and our jails into storehouses and corncribs. Men will walk upright now, 
women will smile, and the children will laugh. Hell will be forever for rent!” William Jennings 
Bryan was no less enthusiastic, quoting Matthew 20:2: “For they are dead which sought the 
young child’s life.” “King Alcohol has slain more children than Herod ever did,” the Great 
Commoner told a Washington DC rally. Now “the revolution that rocked the foundation of the 
Republic will be felt all over the earth.” For his part, Franklin Roosevelt set up a secret stash of 
“Old Reserve” in his New York home before the midnight hour struck. “47 East Sixty-Fifth 
Street is for the time being on the ‘wet’ list,” he proclaimed, much to the consternation of his 





Of course, prohibition was not the only major constitutional change in 1920. Another 
came to a climax in Knoxville in mid-August. There, the state legislature set about determining 
whether or not Tennessee should be the thirty-sixth and decisive state to support women’s 
suffrage.  Anti-suffrage forces had been fighting a rearguard action tooth and nail throughout the 
past year. Mary Kilbreth, head of the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage – an 
organization that stood for “HOME and NATIONAL DEFENSE against Woman Suffrage, 
Feminism, and Socialism…MAN-POWER in Government, because Democracy must be 
STRONG to be SAFE,” and for the “FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of 
Morality…Patriotism…and World Progress” – believed earnestly that “the interests of 
Womanhood, Childhood, and Civilization [should] be advanced FREE from the strife and 
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division of politics, factions, and parties.” In January, she had begged Senator William Borah to 
block “the ratification stampede” so NAOWS could “kill the amendment in the courts.” “I am 
convinced,” Kilbreth wrote, “you are the only one in the United States who can do this and it will 
be nothing less than a second Declaration of Independence.” 473 
 
Now, in August, Carrie Chapman Catt and pro-suffrage forces, amassed in Knoxville for 
the last battle, watched in “helpless despair” as well-funded anti-suffragists appealed to racism 
“and every other cave man’s prejudice” to stop the amendment in Tennessee. In the end, the 
difference came down to one vote. The youngest member of the legislature, 22-year-old first-
term Republican Harry T. Burn of McMinn County, was thought to be a staunch anti-suffragist, 
and he had earlier voted to table the amendment. But, when the moment of decision arrived, 
Representative Burn looked to a note in his pocket from his widowed mother. It read: “Hurrah, 
and vote for suffrage!  Don’t keep them in doubt.  I notice some of the speeches against.  They 
were bitter.  I have been watching to see how you stood, but have not noticed anything yet. Don’t 
forget to be a good boy and help Mrs. Catt put the ‘rat’ in ratification.” So he did, and the 
Tennessee legislature ratified the Amendment, 50-49. Explaining his vote, Burns said, “I know a 
mother’s advice is always safest for her boy to follow, and my mother wanted me to vote for 
ratification.” 474 
 
And so, after a century of struggle and just in time for the presidential election of 1920, 
the Nineteenth Amendment was enacted, granting all twenty-six million women in America the 
right to vote. “At last the work of Susan B. Anthony and Frederick Douglass is crowned,” 
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editorialized The Crisis, noting “how slowly the world moves in the commonest matters of 
elementary righteousness...[And yet] A civilization that required nineteen centuries to recognize 
the Rights of Women can confidently be expected some day to abolish the Color Line.” In this 
one instance, unlike the hopes of labor, African-Americans, and many others, the promise of the 
war was realized. And, as a result, the former suffragists were some of the only progressives to 
emerge from the post-war years with a spring in the step. Now that women were full participants 




It was meant to be like this on so many other fronts. In 1940, Lewis Mumford recalled 
how he and his fellow progressives had expected “that at the end of that fierce and rancorous 
conflict, in which other men had been engaged for four searing years, the beat of angels’ wings 
would at once be heard in the sky and concord and brotherly love would immediately settle over 
the earth.” In the words of Mary White Ovington in the February 1919 Crisis, “[e]very oppressed 
group, workingmen, carving out other’s fortunes while they themselves remain in poverty; 
women, deprived of their rights as citizens; small nationalities, disrupted by the ambitions of 
aggressive empires; so-called ‘inferior races,’ persecuted by the race at the moment in power; 
each and every one of these groups is [now] engaged in a separate struggle to secure something 
of value for itself in the chaos that comes at the close of a great war.”476 
 
Spurred by the promises of a war to end all wars and a new world order to come, many 
progressive organizations had assembled grand plans for what postwar America should look like. 
For the NAACP, the future lay in universal suffrage, better educational facilities in the South, the 
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abolition of Jim Crow, peonage, and lynching; penal reform, and a living wage. At a 1918 
convention chaired by Secretary of War Newton Baker, the National Consumer League 
announced a Ten-Year Program of reform, which included expanded government powers over 
consumer goods, fact-finding boards to help settle labor disputes amicably, a living wage, health 




Others also looked to the principles of wartime cooperation as a guide for future action. 
“Why not continue on into the year of peace,” asked Robert A. Wood at the 1918 National 
Conference of Social Work, “this close, vast wholesome organism of service, of fellowship, of 
creative power?” Donald Richberg concurred. “No man of any political intelligence and 
economic vision,” he argued, “has been able to defend the existing economic order since the 
World War laid bare its utter inadequacy and its insane consequences.” Bernard Baruch, 
meanwhile – noting that the business world had tasted “the tremendous advantages, both to 
themselves and to the general public, of combination, cooperation, and common action, with 
their natural competitiors” – argued for a continuation of the public-private partnership of 
government and trade associations that had defined the WIB. The war, argued the American 
Federationist, “has opened the door of opportunity through which the more sound and 
progressive policies may enter.”  “What we have learned in war,” Walter Weyl concluded, “we 
shall hardly forget in peace…The new economic solidarity, once gained, can never be 
surrendered.”478 
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Along with the war experience, the postwar agenda of the British Labour party, which 
advocated “the Universal Enforcement of a National Minimum,” “the Democratic Control of 
Industry,” “A Revolution in Finance,” and “the Surplus for the Common Good” – in other words, 
full-employment public works programs, progressive taxation, a minimum wage, public 
ownership of utilities like mines, railroads, and electricity, and universal education – also 
inspired progressives’ agenda for change. This, argued The New Republic, in a special February 
1918 issue on the subject, was “probably the most mature and carefully formulated programme 
ever put forth by a responsible political party” and was “worthy of patient and painstaking 
examination” – “[I]t will go ill with us unless a party is formed in America which will formulate 
and fight for a programme of American reconstruction which, however different from the 
following document, will at least not fall below it in courageous, scientific, and thorough-going 
radicalism.”479 
 
A year later, just as the postwar trials of 1919 were starting to pick up momentum, the 
National Catholic War Council published its “Bishop’s Program of Social Reconstruction,” 
written by Father John Ryan and based heavily on the Labour model. It pushed, in TNR’s words, 
for “permanent retention of the National War Labor Board and the National Employment 
Service…equal pay for equal work for women and men, insurance against old age, sickness, 
unemployment, heavy taxes on incomes and excess profits.” It also upheld the right to collective 
bargaining, argued for cooperation between management and labor, and urged a ban on child 
labor and redresses to the problem of income inequality. “If this sort of thing goes on 
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unchecked,” said TNR, “we shall soon arrive at a pass where the real standpatter will be quite 
unable to find a spiritual fold.”480 
 
 It did not go on unchecked. By the middle of 1919, progressives found themselves 
knocked back on their heels by the forces of reaction. By the year’s end, many would be 
scrambling just to make sense of the across-the-board retrenchment. “It was as though a hard 
frost overnight had killed the rank growth of emotions and ideals,” lamented Donald Richberg. 
For some, this experience was just too much. “The world was never in such a state of 
disorganization and demoralization,” wrote Ray Stannard Baker in October 1919. “It seems only 
possible to get prohibition, oppositions, negative actions, out of our leaders. They abolish liquor, 
they legislate against and enjoin workmen, they hold endless futile inquiries, they [fight] the 
treaty and President to no good purpose whatever.” 481  
 
Meanwhile Palmer and his kind were “raiding, beating up, and arresting alleged radicals 
– and thus spreading the fires of radicalism.” “It looks black in America these days,” he 
concluded. Almost a year later, Baker remained in the doldrums. “I have a hard time getting over 
this war,” he wrote July 1920. “My old world died; I have had trouble [creating] my new one.” 
Eventually, he decided the best solution was to give up the progressive dream. I was “terribly 
serious, borne down by the Problems of the world,” he wrote, until he registered the “absurdity” 
that he and “most other people” had been “trying to regulate the lives of other people and had 
stopped trying to regulate our own lives.”482 
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Similarly, in January 1920, a month after leaving Wilson’s cabinet, Secretary of the 
Interior (and close friend to Franklin Roosevelt) Franklin Lane lamented how “the whole world” 
had become “skew-jee, awry, distorted and altogether perverse. The President is broken in body, 
and obstinate in spirit…Einstein has declared the law of gravitation outgrown and decadent. 
Drink, consoling friend of a Perturbed World, is shut off; and all goes merry as a dance in hell!” 
Two months after Harding’s inauguration, as he lay in a Mayo Clinic sickbed with fatal heart 
disease (and after a heart operation without anesthesia), Lane imagined his life after death. “I 
think I’d rather loaf with Lincoln along a river bank,” he mused, “Yes, we would sit down where 
the bank sloped gently to the quiet stream and glance at the picture of our people, the negroes 
being lynched, the miners’ civil war, labor’s hold ups, employers’ ruthlessness, the subordination 




 Walter Lippmann and The New Republic agreed with Ray Baker that the world suffered 
from a vacuum of political leadership, but, to them, the problem resided squarely with Wilson. 
“For one year we have tried to drift somehow back to a peace footing. Instead we have drifted 
into a severe internal conflict,” Lippmann wrote in November 1919. “In these last months, it has 
directed itself to the edge of disaster”: 
 
This was not accomplished by the comparatively insignificant people who wish to overthrow the 
government. It was accomplished by the office-holders who have been too absent-minded to 
behave like a government. They have refused to look ahead, refused to think, refused to plan, 
refused to prepare for any of the normal consequences of a war. The attack on the government is 
nothing as compared with the paralysis of the government. Can anyone name a single piece of 
constructive legislation carried through since the armistice?... 
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Compared to those of any other nation our difficulties were small. But they were difficulties, and 
they required action and policy and leadership. There has been none. For the government of the 
United States resides in the mind of Mr. Wilson. There are no other centers of decision. Whatever 
thinking is done he does. If he is always away the thinking apparatus is away. Because for the last 
year he found himself more than occupied with the treaty of peace, there has been no government 
at home able or willing to deal with those things that we have neglected at our peril. For this 
neglect a most fantastic excuse has been put forward. It is that nothing could be done until the 
treaty of peace was ratified.  
 
It is pointed out that labor’s productivity is low. It remains to be pointed out that the productivity 
of the government in respect to leadership is lower still. There has been no example from 
Washington to inspire handiwork, prevision or prudence…There has been no program on which 
men could loyally unite, no line of policy defined which they could follow, no purposes set before 






As The New Republic, in keeping with Lippmann’s fascination with “drift”, bemoaned 
the lack of top-down leadership in America, Oswald Villard and The Nation looked to the 
grassroots for sustenance. “The most extraordinary phenomenon of the present time,” he argued 
in October 1919, “the most incalculable in its after effects, the most menacing in its threat of 
immediate consequences, and the most alluring in its possibilities of ultimate good, is the 
unprecedented revolt of the rank and file.” The “common man,” he continued, was “losing faith 
in the old leadership” and experiencing “a new access of self-confidence, or at least a new 
recklessness, a readiness to take chances on his own account.” As a result, “authority cannot any 
longer be imposed from above; it comes automatically from below.” 485 
 
To Villard, writing a month earlier, the “old restraints…breaking down” was a extremely 
promising development, because most of the terrible events of the past year were, in his mind, 
top-down creations. “Who has made war on Russia…? Not the plain people of the United 
States”: 
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Who has shaped at Paris a League of Nations deftly fashioned to ‘insure peace’ among all the 
questioning peoples gathered about the throne of the great god of things as they are? Not the plain 
people…Who is demanding huge armies and unmatchable navies and eighteen-inch guns and 
shrapnel and poison gas? Not the plain people….Who is insisting on repressive laws, on jailings 
and deportations? Not the plain people. Who has taken the initiative in the systematic campaign 
of hatred that for years has filled our press and pulpits and universities, turning its poisoned darts 
first against the Germans, then against the Bolsheviks, the Nonpartisans, and finally against 
everyone whose ideas hold aught of menace for the privileges embalmed in the existing order? 




 “If we look more keenly,” he argued, “we shall see, not an old society crumbling but a 
new society coming into being.” Villard would argue much the same in 1920: “[W]e have not 
witnessed the beginning of a new era of liberal domestic reform of which Woodrow Wilson 
seemed to be the prophet,” he wrote. “We have witnessed the end of the old system and have no 
exact light as to just what shape the new will take.” In other words, all the sordid follies of the 
leaders no longer mattered. The plain people of the United States would decide the future. 487 
 
 Unfortunately for Villard and other progressives, it would soon become abundantly clear 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE TRIUMPH OF REACTION 
PROGRESSIVES AND THE ELECTION OF 1920. 
 
“The chief distinguishing aspect of the Presidential campaign of 1920 is the eclipse of liberalism 
or progressivism as an effective force in American politics.” – Herbert Croly, 1920488 
 
“Harding’s main appeal was to get back to ‘normalcy.’ It was just what the people wanted to do 
after all the emotional and other strains of the war. It was a sort of ‘leave-me-alone’ feeling after a 
fever.” – Herbert Hoover, 1952489 
 
“The Gamalian plurality in the late plebiscite was so huge that contemplation of it has distracted 
the public attention from all subsidiary phenomena. One gapes at it as a yokel gapes at a blood-
sweating hippopotamus; its astounding vastness makes it seem somehow indecent, as a very fat 




With the president incapacitated and the nation in the throes of chaos, 1920 looked to 
be a Republican year from the start. But which Republican? The death of Theodore 
Roosevelt opened the door to several different challengers, all of whom hoped to 
assume the mantle of the fallen Colonel. The Democrats, meanwhile, found that their 
fallen standard-bearer was not quite ready to leave the stage just yet. And some 
progressives thought the time may finally be ripe for a third party challenge to the 
established order. By the end of the year, progressives would witness what appeared to 




A Rematch Not to Be 
 
 
As a United States Senator, and eventual Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, a 6’4”, 
350-pound, Harvard-educated scion of a powerful Pennsylvania family, and, in the words of one 
historian, a “successor to Hanna, Quay, and Aldrich” as a behind-the-scenes mover and shaker in 
the Republican Party, Boies Penrose was a man with no small amount of standing in the world of 
                                                          
488
 Herbert Croly, “The Eclipse of Progressivism,” The New Republic, Oct. 27th, 1920. Reprinted at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/78969/the-eclipse-progressivism  
489
 Hoover, 35.  
490




Republican politics. Eleven years after his 1921 death, he was described in the New York Times 
as “the Last of the Great Political Bosses.” “He put men in high and low places and pulled the 
wires which moved their joints and tongues,” wrote the NYT’s Henry Hart in 1932. “More than 
any other great national political boss…he may accurately be represented as the instrument 
which, from 1900 until 1920, transformed the democratic intentions of American government 
into the agencies that would yield the country and its fruits into the hands of a plutocracy.” 
Similarly, William Allen White deemed him the “incarnation and epitome of plutocratic power 
in a democratic society.”491   
 
In short, Boies Penrose was the Old Guard’s kingmaker, and for decades, rumor would 
have it that he was the Machiavel who orchestrated the ascent of Warren Harding to the 
Republican nomination in the famous “Smoke-Filled Room” of Chicago’s Blackstone Hotel.492  
 
But two years earlier, in the fall of 1918, Senator Penrose had expected quite a different 
candidate to wrest the White House away from the Democrats. “There is only one candidate for 
president,” Penrose told Republicans gathered at the Hotel Willard. “He is the only candidate. I 
mean Theodore Roosevelt…I don’t like him. I once despised him. But that doesn’t alter the fact 
that Theodore Roosevelt is now the one and only possible Republican candidate in 1920. He will 
surely receive the nomination.”493 
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In late 1918, a grief-stricken and bed-ridden TR told his biographer he was “indifferent to 
the subject. I would not lift a finger to get the nomination. Since Quentin’s death, the world 
seems to have shut down on me.” Still, Penrose was not alone in thinking thus in 1918. Many 
political observers then believed that the next presidential election would be a rematch of the two 
titans who had battled in 1912, Wilson and Roosevelt. “The most piquant forecast for 1920,” 
editorialized The Nation in January of that year, “is that of two Presidents running against each 
other for a third term.” Of course, it was not to be. By mid-January 1919, one of the two great 
combatants would be deceased. By the following September, the other would be stricken. The 





Even as he came to terms with his grief over Roosevelt’s death, Harold Ickes, always a 
savvy political observer, began to game out what the election now meant for Republicans and 
Progressives – those Republicans who had followed TR out of the party in 1912. “The death of 
Colonel Roosevelt,” he wrote Raymond Robins in January, “creates a very difficult situation…” 
 
Of course, if Colonel Roosevelt had lived and had been nominated for president on the 
Republican ticket in 1920, as everyone seemed to think he would be, there would then have been 
no doubt as to what former Progressives would have done…[But now]Colonel Roosevelt has 
gone and there is no single man who can guarantee to former Progressives either the 






“The Progressive voters cannot be ‘delivered’ in the old political sense,” Ickes warned. 
“They think for themselves and will vote according to their convictions…If the Republican Party 
ignores this situation and goes ahead taking it for granted that the progressives will fall into line 
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and support the ticket in 1920, regardless of who the candidates may be and of what the platform 
will be, they will be committing suicide…A misstep now will be very likely to prove fatal in 
1920.
 496   
 
Of course, writing in January 1919, Ickes had no sense of the year that was to come, or 
how much the spirit of progressivism would recede by 1920. Nonetheless, his letter spoke to two 
questions that the death of Colonel Roosevelt now posed. Who could possibly replace such a 
larger-than-life character and unite all the factions of the disparate Republican Party in 1920? 
And where could progressive-minded Republicans, and progressives in general, now put their 




Regarding the first of these – who could replace Roosevelt – Republicans would not find 
the answer to their dilemma in their last presidential candidate, Charles Evan Hughes. The 
former New York Governor’s oldest daughter, Helen, would die of tuberculosis in April of 1920, 
an event Hughes would call in his memoirs “the greatest sorrow of my life.” After that, his heart 
was just not in the fight. “Since our daughter died,” he told the lawyer sent to ascertain his 
intentions, “Mrs. Hughes and I are heartbroken. I don’t want to be President of the United States. 
I request that my name not even be mentioned in the convention,” adding presciently that 
“whoever is nominated will be elected, but in my opinion he will not fill out the term.”497 
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And so, Republicans would instead have to choose a new candidate to assume the 
Colonel’s mantle. But Theodore Roosevelt was a bundle of contradictions. What aspect of the 
ex-president did they want their candidate to embody? Or, as Walter Lippmann put it, “[t]here 
were no end of Caesars after Julius as there are Roosevelts after T.R. is dead. The name is a 
magnet of affection and of votes, and whoever can carry the name can carry some of the 
affection and some of the votes. There is consequently a tussle for the name.”498 
 
The Man on Horseback 
 
 
If Theodore Roosevelt had chosen an heir apparent, it was probably his former 
commanding officer, General Leonard Wood.  A career military man who headed the Rough 
Riders during the Spanish-American War and served as governor of Cuba in the years thereafter, 
Wood had been passed over by Wilson (in favor of John J. Pershing) to lead the American 
Expeditionary Force into the Great War. Nonetheless, he was a longtime friend and confidant of 
the former president, and held impeccable military credentials. To Roosevelt, Wood “combined 
in a very high degree the qualities of entire manliness with entire uprightness and cleanliness of 
character. It was a pleasure to deal with a man of high ideals, who scorned everything mean and 
base, and who also possessed those robust and hardy qualities of mind and body for the lack of 
which no merely negative virtue can ever atone.” 499 
  
As a result of TR’s fondness for the man, “it was taken for granted,” said the president’s 
daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, after his death, “that Father’s family would be for General 
Wood. It was quite natural we should be.” Or, as one of Roosevelt’s former heirs apparent, 
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William Howard Taft, put it, “it would seem as if the funeral bake meats had furnished forth the 
feast for the heir.” Taft’s former Cabinet, along with many of the esteemed conservatives in 
Roosevelt’s orbit, such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root, also flocked to General Wood’s 
standard. So too did Wall Street money – J.P. Morgan’s son-in-law ran the Wood campaign in 
New York City – in the hopes, as one savvy political observer wrote, that “he would use the 
military arm of the government to break up strikes and destroy the unions.”500 
 
In that regard, Wood talked a good game. On his speaking tours throughout 1919 and 
1920 – interrupted every so often by military trips to keep the peace in Omaha and Gary – Wood 
was consistently loud and vociferous in his embrace of Americanism and his denunciations of 
the Red menace. “Kill it as you would a rattlesnake,” he said of Communism, “and smash those 
who follow it, speak for it, or support it.” In 1919, this was relatively run-of-the-mill stuff, but 
Republican editor William Allen White still encouraged the general to tone it down for the sake 
of the progressive half of the party. “This crazy notion to hunt ‘em down and shoot ‘em and see 
Red, and all that sort of thing,” White warned Wood, “is going to pass during the Spring, and 
leave you high and dry unless you definitely appeal to the Progressives. They are militant and 
they aren’t going to be satisfied with the kind of speeches you are making.”501 
 
Harold Ickes, for one, agreed. “When I called upon [Wood] at his Army headquarters…to 
size him up for myself,” Ickes would later write in his autobiography, “I found a big, well-set-up 
man, approachable and with a fine presence. The thing that impressed me at once was that he 
talked so much…He seemed to have no reticences at all. And the more he talked, the less 
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inclined I was to commit myself to his candidacy.” When Ickes brought fellow progressive 
Raymond Robins to meet the general, Wood had the same effect on him. (“It seemed impossible 
to stem his flow of language.”)502  
 
And sure enough, it did not take long for other progressive observers to turn against  
General Wood also. According to Oswald Villard, Wood embraced “no philosophy but the 
soldier’s one of force and the rigid and violent upholding of authority.” The New Republic 
scoffed “that anyone can consider for the most powerful office in the world a mind so vacant…It 
contains not a single guide to action; it begs completely every question it touches; it is a insult to 
the poorest intelligence in the land…[His] phrases are strung along like beads on string.” 
Lippmann deemed the Wood boomlet a sect of “radical jingo with the prejudices of the junker 
rather than the great industrialists. It is really incapable of distinguishing between the military 
government of an occupied country like Cuba and the civil government of the United 
States…They have the mood, if not the courage of the coup d’état.”503  
 
For his part, H.L. Mencken saw in Wood “the simple-minded dragoon, viewing all 
human phenomena from the standpoint of the barrack-room. His remedy for all ills and evil is 
force. Turn out the guard , and let them have a whiff of grape!” Still, the Sage of Baltimore 
conceded, “one somehow warms to the old boy. He is archaic, but transparent. He indulges 
himself in no pishposh about ideals…He is the cavalryman incarnate, all heart and no brains. I 
haven’t the slightest doubt that he believes his backers to be unselfish patriots, and that a glimpse 
of their private account book would shock him to death. He also believed in Roosevelt.”504 
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Mencken wasn’t the only one looking askance at the big money behind General Wood. 
Senator William Borah was not fond of Wood’s man on horseback routine in any event. 
Deeming Wood’s militarism “completely at war with everything in which I believe,” Borah 
though it would be “sheer absurdity to nominate a military man to take care of the intricate 
economic and industrial problems with which we have to deal.” But in millionaires’ embrace of 
the general’s candidacy, Borah saw even more sinister evils afoot. “Whatever General Wood 
may be individually, “Borah wrote one constituent, “he has surrendered his candidacy to a 
coterie of multi-millionaires who believe that you can corrupt the American electorate and 
dominate politics by the sheer use of money.”505 
 
Even though “it has obtained a deep, strong hold upon the political system of our 
country” and “thousands and thousands of good people think it must be and therefore let it go, 
this problem” of money in elections, Borah argued to another correspondent, “is coming to be 
the most sinister, subtle and universal evil with which we have to deal. All good men regardless 
of party and the people should be aroused to the fact that only by the utmost vigilance can the 
effect of money in elections be counteracted.”506 
 
This being Borah, the Senator also saw in Wood’s campaign finance largesse the 
handiwork of pro-League forces. “As is always true after every war,” Borah wrote to another 
constituent, “a military man seeks to dominate the situation and that is again true… 
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It is the most brutal and shameless exhibition of the use of money in elections that has ever taken 
place in any country…The men who spent their millions to propagandize this country and to 
pawn our independence to Europe are the same men who are spending their millions now to 
control the United States through its elections. It is the same fight precisely. It is simply a 
question of whether the people will still retain the government of this country or whether 
international bankers and those under their control will directly or indirectly, openly or covertly 
yoke it to the European powers and utilize it for their own selfish interests.507 
 
And yet, if Wood made a critical error in the 1920 election season, it was likely that the 
general did not listen to the Old Guard forces that originally backed his candidacy. At first, as 
befitting the Roosevelt imprimatur, Wood’s candidacy was being run by TR’s former campaign 
manager, John T. King of Connecticut – a close ally of Boies Penrose and a consummate 
political handler. “I like John King,” Teddy Roosevelt has said of him, “We have a perfect 
working arrangement. John supplies the efficiency, and I supply the morals.” Under King’s 
direction – which mainly entailed an inside game of brokering deals with state party officials – 




But, acting on the advice of members of Roosevelt’s former inner circle, like Elihu Root, 
Alice Roosevelt Longworth, and Henry Stimson – all of whom thought King’s loyalties lay first 
and foremost with the Penroses of the Party – Wood eventually replaced King with Colonel 
William Cooper Proctor, heir to the Proctor & Gamble fortune and acting Chair of the national 
“Leonard Wood League,” a 60,000 member-strong volunteer association of Wood enthusiasts. 
While more malleable, perhaps, Colonel Proctor unfortunately turned out to have no talent for 
the type of backroom politics at which King had excelled. Instead, Proctor allied with his fellow 
true believers, and attempted to run insurgent Wood campaigns in 47 states using the same 
techniques with which his family sold soap. In so doing, Proctor managed to deeply antagonize 
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not just favorite sons like Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Frank Lowden, but also the 
political bosses, state and local machines, and professional party men who had considerable 
sway over who would be the final nominee.
509 
 
The Men in the Middle 
 
 
With General Wood thus off the reservation, Old Guard Republicans began to search for 
a more pliant horse for their 1920 election hopes. They soon found a sturdy, if unremarkable one 
in one of the favorite son candidates General Wood had managed to antagonize – Governor 
Frank Lowden of Illinois. Although he hailed from a Republican state not generally considered 
in competition, and while he was neither a popular nor a well-known figure nationally, Lowden 
nevertheless enjoyed the benefit of a sterling resume for Party purposes: A log cabin boyhood, 
marriage to a Pullman heiress, experience in both the US Congress and the State House, and 




More than anything, Lowden was a safe and conventional compromise choice in a year 
when such men were exceedingly hard to find.  “There is a logic to Lowden,” wrote Walter 
Lippmann, “once you grant the premises. He comes from the middle of the country, he stands in 
the middle of a road, in the middle of his party, about midway between [Leonard] Wood of New 
Hampshire and [Hiram] Johnson of California.” During four years as Governor, Lowden had 
managed to remain agreeable to both Republicans and Democrats in the State House, as well as 
to both corporate and labor interests in the state (notwithstanding some issues with his Pullman 
family ties.) He was for women’s suffrage, for Prohibition, and against the League as envisioned 
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by Wilson, although he endorsed the court-oriented approach of conservatives like Elihu Root 
and supported the Lodge reservations. He was anti-Red, of course, but still distinguished himself 
from Wood as “the goose step vs. the forward step.” And thus he could remain an amenable 
choice to Old Guard figures like Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia and Senator Warren 
Harding, who thought of Lowden as his second choice for president behind himself, as well as to 
Chicago progressives like Harold Ickes, who thought the Governor “fair and open-minded” and a 
“first-rate governor.”511   
 
And, with the exception of some competitive fights against General Wood in the South 
Dakota primary and in his home state of Illinois, Governor Lowden played nicely with Old 
Guard figures and state and local party officials alike, and mostly seemed content just to keep his 
name afloat until the Republicans gathered in his home state that summer.  In other words, he 




Nonetheless, conservatives in the party did not want to put all their eggs in one basket 
again. And, so to assure a full field that would prevent one of the non-Old-Guard-sanctioned 
candidates from breaking too far ahead, Boies Penrose also urged his fellow Senator, Warren 
Harding of Ohio, to make a run for the presidency. A handsome, amiable Ohio newspaperman 
who had risen through the State Senate to become a Republican regular in the US Congress, 
Harding was not much inclined to take the offer.  
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For one, the Senator from Ohio had a keen sense of his own limitations, and did not think 
himself fit for the highest office in the land. “I must assert the conviction,” he wrote one 
supporter early in the campaign season, “that I do not possess the elements of leadership… 
essential to the ideal leadership of our Party in 1920…I know better than some who overestimate 
both my ability and availability.” To another, he wrote, while “I would almost be willing to make 
a bet that I would be a more ‘commonsensible’ President than the man who now occupies the 
White House…I have such a sure understanding of my own inefficiency that I should really be 
ashamed to presume myself fitted to reach out for a place of such responsibility.” In short, as he 
told yet another well-wisher, “I harbor no delusions or designs. I should like to be kindly 
esteemed, but the pretense that seems to be necessary to popularity is not agreeable to my 
nature.”513  
 
Which wasn’t quite true – Harding was actually an exceedingly popular figure in the 
Senate. In Washington, he often golfed, played poker, entertained guests at his Wyoming 
Avenue residence, and ran up a liquor bill that got into the hundreds per month. As such, 
Harding felt he already held what he believed to be “the most desirable office in the world.” As a 
result, Harding declared he would prefer “he not be forced into…becoming an aspirant for the 
nomination.” “I should be unhappy every hour from the time I entered the race until the thing 
were settled,” he said. “I had much rather retain my place in the Senate and enjoy the association 
of friends and some of the joys of living.”514 
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Harry Daugherty, Harding’s former campaign manager and head of the Ohio Republican 
Party, thought differently. Daugherty had risen through the ranks of Ohio politics as a protégé of 
the estimable kingmaker Mark Hanna, and he harbored ambitions his friend did not. “When I 
met him,” Daugherty said of Harding, “he was like a turtle sitting on a log. I pushed him in the 
water.” Assuaging the Senator’s insecurities by telling him that “the days of giants in the 
Presidential chair is passed” and that “the truest greatness was in being kind,” Daugherty 
prevailed upon Harding to enter his name as a candidate, if nothing else than to push back 
against the challenge that Wood insurgents now clearly posed for control of the Ohio party 
apparatus. This Harding did, retaining Daugherty as campaign manager out of loyalty and 
friendship, even though the latter’s reputation for double-dealing, extortion, and bribery in Ohio 




As with Governor Lowden, Harding’s campaign mostly involved keeping his name in 
contention while not unduly irritating the other candidates – an easy fit for a jocular fellow like 
Harding. At first, he was considered to be one of the leading contenders for the nomination by 
both the press and political observers like party chairman Will Hays, who thought him “strong in 
the Middle West and eminently satisfactory to Wall Street.” But his star dimmed when General 
Wood’s forces launched a well-funded foray into the heart of Harding country, and managed to 
take nine of forty-eight delegates in the Ohio primary. (Harding had run a half-hearted race in his 
home state, believing it undignified.)  And when the Ohio Senator ran fourth in nearby Indiana 
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Harry Daugherty was not one of those people. However sinister his reputation, the Ohio 
bagman was nonetheless as savvy a political operator as they come. And, in February 1920, he 
famously prophesied to The New York Times that Harding could still have his day as a dark 
horse. “I don’t expect Senator Harding to be nominated on the first, second, or third ballots,” he 
said: 
[B]ut I think we can afford to take chances that about eleven minutes after two, Friday morning of 
the convention, when fifteen or twenty weary men are sitting around a table, someone will say, 
‘Who will we nominate?’ At that decisive time, the friends of Harding will suggest him and can 
well afford to abide by the result.”517 
 
I’m for Hiram 
 
 
While Leonard Wood had the support of Roosevelt’s former inner circle, he was not the 
only claimant to the Colonel’s throne in 1920. Also making a run in the former president’s name 
was Roosevelt’s running mate in 1912: Senator Hiram Johnson of California.  
 
Unlike General Wood, Johnson was an unabashed progressive, a man who as both 
Governor and Senator of his state had amassed a pro-labor, pro-civil liberties record. (That is, for 
white Americans. Johnson was also the champion and signer of the Alien Land Law of 1913, 
which barred Japanese farmers and other “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from holding land.) 
This made him, according to The New Republic, “a vote-winner in a country now reacting 
against the Elbert H. Garys and the coal operators and their little brothers, the A. Mitchell 
Palmers.” To Oswald Villard of The Nation, Johnson – who “alone has stood up bravely and 
                                                          
517




fearlessly for the right of free speech” (Debs notwithstanding) -- “more nearly voices, in certain 
respects, the aspirations of many liberals than any other candidate.” 518  
 
And unlike Frank Lowden, Johnson was assuredly a national figure, and one who aroused 
some degree of controversy in Republican circles. Wildly popular in California, Johnson had 
made a career of continually thumbing his nose at the Penroses of his party – while remaining 
reasonably satisfactory to conservative interests in his own state – and his irreconcilable 
opposition to the League was well-known. This made him, TNR thought, a “perplexing… 
problem for the Old Guard leaders.” Only eight years after Roosevelt split the party, “[w]hat will 
happen if the Republican leaders stick to tradition and refuse to nominate a man who can get the 
votes of labor and the liberal and the radical and the progressive?” Johnson aimed to make the 




Naturally, Johnson enjoyed the support of his Irreconcilable comrades-in-arms, George 
Norris and William Borah, as well as innovative adman Albert Lasker -- a man Colonel 
Roosevelt had thought “the greatest advertiser in America” – and progressives like Felix 
Frankfurter, Dean Acheson, and Harold Ickes. “I know Senator Johnson pretty well,” Borah 
wrote to one constituent. “I am supporting him in this campaign because I entertain no doubt, 
first, of his Americanism, and second, because I feel that he truly represents nationally what he 
unquestionably represented in California, that is clean, wholesome just government.” In short, 
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Borah, concluded, Senator Johnson’s record demonstrated “beyond question that he is his own 
master and that he stands for wise and just administration of public affairs.”520 
 
It was on this question – of clean government – that Johnson managed to draw the 
deepest blood during the 1920 campaign. In his typical fashion, Johnson ran rhetorically as an 
insurgent against his own party – the fearless progressive speaking truth to power – and so by 
necessity, he relied on a semi-successful strategy of relying on presidential primaries rather than 
appealing to party regulars (although, unlike Wood, he also worked to ensure that he did not 
unnecessarily antagonize favorite sons like Lowden and Harding.)  As part of that strategy, 
during the North Dakota primary, Senator Johnson lashed out at the many millionaires 
supporting Wood’s candidacy – a charge of corruption quickly echoed by both Democratic 
newspapers eager to score points against the presumptive Republican nominee and Johnson’s 




Upon Borah’s urging, the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections created a 
subcommittee to conduct a survey of campaign expenditures, which became known as the 
Kenyon Committee after its chairman, Senator William Kenyon of Iowa. It ultimately found 
General Wood’s campaign had spent the then-unprecedented sum of over $2.1 million during the 
primary season. “The public at large,” argued The Nation, “cannot but distrust a President or a 
party that is placed in power...by multi-millionaire soap and oil producers.” By contrast, the next 
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closest amount spent was Lowden’s $415,000, then Johnson’s $194,000. But, despite his less 
appalling spending levels, Lowden too was found wanting: His campaign in Missouri had cut 
$2500 checks for two men in St. Louis that went on to become Lowden delegates, “for nothing 
in particular but to create sentiment for Governor Lowden.” 522  
 
The mind reeled at Wood’s two million in campaign spending, but here in Lowden’s 
camp was a seemingly simple, easy-to-understand case of quid-pro-quo corruption. And even as 
it later came to light that the Illinois governor had nothing to do with the bribes, the revelation 
effectively ended Lowden’s chances at the presidency -- and further infuriated party bosses 
against Hiram Johnson, as did Senator Johnson’s continued rhetorical attacks against Lowden 
and Wood on the eve of the Chicago convention. And with Lowden now compromised, the Old 
Guard would have to look elsewhere for a candidate in Chicago. Harry Daugherty’s prediction 
was one step closer to reality.
523
 
Visions of a Third Term 
 
If Republicans were having trouble agreeing upon a candidate to fill the shoes of the 
fallen Roosevelt, Democrats faced a similar problem in choosing an heir to their own standard 
bearer, Woodrow Wilson. If anything, Democrats’ political situation in 1920 was even more 
intractable. For one, unlike the now deceased Colonel Roosevelt, Wilson had not yet been 
sainted. Rather, in the nadir of 1919 and 1920, the incapacitated president was controversial and 
deeply unpopular across the nation, and any Democrat who took up his standard was in danger of 
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assuming all of his considerable negatives. For another, unlike the Bull Moose, this fallen leader 
refused to stay fallen. 
 
Before Wilson’s stroke in September 1919, and before the Versailles Treaty and the 
failure of the League became millstones around the Democrats’ neck, political observers and the 
press both believed the president would run for a third term. If anything, it was thought that 
Wilson would likely coast to victory as a reward for successfully prosecuting the Great War and 
forging a League that America could be a part of, and his Fall 1919 whirlwind tour across the 
West assuredly seemed like the incipient stages of a third term campaign. Four days before 
Wilson’s collapse, papers reported that Republicans and Democrats alike thought the president 




But, the stroke, coupled with the failure of the League in the Senate – in no small part due 
to Wilson’s increasing intractability on this issue – quelled talk of a third term among party 
officials, and Democratic friends and colleagues began to request the president instead step 
aside. In March of 1920, Joseph Tumulty suggested to Mrs. Wilson that “a dignified statement of 
withdrawal [would] strengthen every move the President wishes to make during the remainder of 
his term,” while on the Senate floor and in the newspapers other Democrats began to suggest that 




The president was unmoved. While Wilson did not directly say he was running for 
another term, he also refused to say he wasn’t. In March 1920, the president’s closest advisors 
and members of his Cabinet, among them Bernard Baruch, A. Mitchell Palmer, Josephus 
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Daniels, Senator Carter Glass of Virginia, and Joe Tumulty, were gathered together and each 
given a card, on which Wilson asked them: “What part should the writer play in politics in the 
immediate future?” With the exception of Postmaster Albert Sidney Burleson, everyone thought 
the president should step aside, and to a man they believed Wilson should accept the League 
with the Lodge reservations. Unfortunately, nobody wanted to be the person to convey these 




And so the dance continued into the spring and summer of 1920, with Wilson never 
explicitly announcing a run for a third term, but also never contradicting anyone who said he was 
in the hunt, and never choosing to endorse anyone else for the position. Instead, right up until the 
Democratic convention, Wilson continued meeting with members of the press for interviews that 
stressed the hale and hearty president’s fitness for office.  More often than not, these interviews 
also included cryptic statements such as the one offered to New York World reporter Louis 
Seibold ten days before the convention, in which Wilson confessed his desire to “make a 
personal call to the people directly. Perhaps that will come later on. I am eager that it shall.” Said 
the World of this exchange: “The views set forth by the President were plainly designed to 
announce to the country he is in every way still fitted to be a leader of his party and Chief 
Executive.” For TNR, Wilson’s interview made “perfectly clear that there is to be no quiet 
substitution of a new management and new policies in the Democratic party, if he can prevent 
it.”  The Tribune was more concise: “Wilson May Seek Third Term.”527 
 
What Wilson seemed to be envisioning, in keeping with his lifelong desire to “inspire a 
great movement of opinion” and be the “political autobiography” of a generation, was that, if he 
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just left the door open, he would be publicly acclaimed by the Democratic Party to run again and 
save the League from extinction. Should the convention deadlock, Wilson told his private 
physician, “there may be practically a universal demand for the selection of someone to lead 
them out of the wilderness.” And if that happened, “[t]he members of the convention may feel 
that I am the logical one to lead – perhaps the only one to champion this cause. In such 
circumstances I would feel obliged to accept the nomination even if I thought it would cost me 
my life.” For his part, Dr. Cary Grayson was not in accord with Wilson’s desire for martyrdom. 
“He just must not be nominated,” the doctor wrote. “I tell you that he is permanently ill, 
physically, is gradually weakening mentally, and can’t recover. He couldn’t possibly survive the 
campaign.”528 
 
Ambition in the Cabinet 
 
No Democrat was as impacted by Wilson’s waffling as his son-in-law, and the “Crown 
Prince” of the president’s cabinet: former Wilson campaign manager, Secretary of the Treasury, 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, and director general of the United States Railroad Association 
William Gibbs McAdoo. A former Tennessee lawyer generally considered to be “next in line” 
for the Democrats, McAdoo remained a reasonably popular figure from the administration, 
particularly with the labor and Dry communities. He was not unloved by progressives either – 
Walter Lippmann deemed him “an administrator of the first order” and “a truly distinguished 
public servant” in The New Republic, albeit one too “sensitive to the stimulus of popular 
feeling.” But because of Wilson’s refusal to close the door on a third term – a refusal endorsed 
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by McAdoo’s wife, the daughter of the president – McAdoo spent much of the election season 




“Of course, the President’s silence makes it very awkward for me,” McAdoo pleaded 
with Dr. Grayson on the eve of the February 1920 Georgia primary, as he attempted to figure out 
if he had the go-ahead to make a run for the nomination. “[E]ven if I had an inclination to stand 
for the Presidency – which, as you know, I have not, but it is not possible to resist the demands 
of one’s friends to state either that they may proceed or that they may not…Any suggestions you 
may have to offer I shall appreciate. I am really very much perplexed.” In the end, McAdoo 
removed his name from consideration in Georgia, as he did not want to “do anything that would 
create the appearance of a candidacy.” Nonetheless, McAdoo made sure to add he would “regard 
it as the imperative duty of any man to accept a nomination if it should come to him 
unsolicited.”530 
 
So, like his father-in-law, McAdoo engaged in a delicate dance through the remainder of 
the primary season. Whenever he was asked, McAdoo argued he was not officially putting his 
name in contention, but if the Democratic Party saw fit to anoint him their leader, he would not 
shrink from the call of duty. Instead of campaigning outright, McAdoo took every opportunity to 
appear the statesman, usually of the progressive variety. “[I]n recent interviews,” wrote 
Lippmann in TNR, McAdoo “has been courageous and straightforward on contentious questions 
affecting civil liberty, Russia, the Palmer injunctions, and the whole paraphernalia of the Red 
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hysteria. He has talked the way free men are supposed to talk about such things.” Meanwhile, 
behind the scenes, McAdoo’s allies worked to secure delegates all across the country.531  
 
This strategy worked so well that Woodrow Wilson saw fit to step in and smother it, by 
giving his potential third term interview with the New York World ten days before the 
Democratic Convention in San Francisco. The afternoon after that article appeared, McAdoo told 
reporters he would not allow his name to be put into nomination, and that his decision was 
“irrevocable.” Evidence suggests that McAdoo was in fact trying to maintain the same delicate 
position he had held all along, and that if his name was brought forth by acclamation, he would 
still go along with the cries of the crowd. But this time many of his lieutenants thought he was 




While McAdoo spent the election season tortured about the right thing to do, A. Mitchell 
Palmer suffered from no such quandary. In fact, Palmer became the first Democrat to officially 
throw his name into the ring, arguing that “[i]f the President wanted a third term he would have 
stated so before this time.” And, because of this boldness, the Attorney General actually entered 
the San Francisco convention with more delegates than anyone else – albeit only 76 from his 
home state of Pennsylvania and 28 from Georgia, where he – and all other contenders – had been 
trounced by favorite son Tom Watson. (Using Palmer as an administration foil, Watson had 
declared on the campaign trail that “‘Woodrow Wilson should be in prison and Eugene Debs in 
the White House!”)533 
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Despite the delegate lead, however, Palmer was already a man whose moment had 
passed. Like Ole Hanson of Seattle, the Attorney General had devolved into a single-issue 
candidate over the course of 1919, and it was an issue he aspired to carry him all the way to the 
White House.  “I myself am an American, Palmer said on the stump, “and I love to preach my 
doctrine before 100% Americans because my platform is undiluted Americanism…Each and 
every [radical] is a potential murderer or a potential thief…Out of the sly and crafty eyes of 
many of them leap cupidity, cruelty, insanity, and crime; from their lopsided faces, sloping 
brows, and misshapen features may be recognized the unmistakable criminal type.”534 
 
A fine message for 1919, perhaps. But by 1920 – especially after the false alarm of May 
Day – the public had grown sick of Palmerism, as it had of Wilsonism in general. The Attorney 
General’s “mediaeval attempts to get into the White House by pumping up the Bolshevik issue,” 
wrote H.L. Mencken, “have had the actual effect of greatly diminishing his chances…Aside from 
his efforts to scare the boobery with Bolshevist bugaboos, Palmer seems to put most reliance in 
his fidelity to Dr. Wilson’s so-called ideals. Here he simply straps himself to a cadaver. These 
ideals, for two years the marvel of Christendom, are now seen to have been mere buncombe.” 
This would be a problem for more Democrats than just Palmer.
535
 
The Democrats’ Lowden 
 
 
While administration backers split between McAdoo and Palmer (not to mention the 
ghost of the president himself), other Democrats – with an eye to Wilson’s growing unpopularity 
in a time of chaos and high costs – began to look elsewhere for a 1920 nominee. One solid, if 
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uninspiring such candidate was Governor James M. Cox of Ohio, a self-made newspaperman 
who had the political savvy to be a progressive reformer from 1912-1914 (elected in 1912, Cox 
emphasized public infrastructure like schools and roads and passed workman’s compensation 
and pension laws), a pacifist from 1916-1917 (when Wilson worked to keep America out of 
war), and a pro-war nationalist from 1917 on. (Among other things, Governor Cox created an 
Americanization committee -- chaired by later New Deal brains truster Raymond Moley -- and 




In other words, like Governor Frank Lowden across the aisle, Cox was for the most part 
an unoffensive figure to all sides. “[W]ithout having irreconcilably antagonized those who regard 
the Democratic party as a staunch defender of the status quo,” Charles Merz wrote of him in 
TNR, “he has caught the eye of those who look upon it as the country’s most successful 
instrument of progress.” Perhaps even more intriguing, Cox had the added benefit of being 
“outside the shadow of the White House, no part of the official family, a man who has neither 
fought the President nor bled for him.” The governor was similarly agnostic on the League 
question – Cox had “made a number of orthodox statements” for the League, and his “campaign 
managers declare him a loyal supporter of the president.” But Governor Cox also supported 
reservations, and thought the League a question unsuited to partisan politics regardless. As Merz 
put it, “the one most heartfelt thing that Cox has said about discussion of the League was…‘The 
public is sick and tired of it.’”537   
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To progressives like Merz, Cox – despite his anti-German stance during the war – also 
seemed to have kept a reasonable distance from the repression that had marked the Wilson 
administration.  Noting with approval that Cox, as Governor, had never called out the militia to 
end a strike in Ohio, Merz lauded Cox’s “considerable courage and a good deal of self-
possession…[W]hen representatives of an ostensibly Jeffersonian administration like Palmer and 
Burleson have bludgeoned public opinion, and other representatives, like Wilson and Baker, 
have stood by in silence, Cox was willing to hold out against the alarmist press and the 
persuasive push of the steel companies.” Within the party, foreshadowing a schism that would 
lay Democrats bare four years later, the governor was also a popular choice with urban Wets 
looking to offset the rural Dryness of William McAdoo and back a wet candidate who would 
bring in northern ethnic voters to the polls. In short, Cox seemed to be the antithesis of 
everything people didn’t like about Wilsonism.538 
 
The governor further helped his case, for the most part, by laying low: After announcing 
his intentions to run in February 1920 , Cox – aside from a minor foray into the nearby Kentucky 
primary – kept his powder dry until San Francisco. “My friends are urging me to open up a 
vigorous campaign,” Cox explained, “[b]ut I prefer to wait. If, when the convention opens, they 
finally turn to Ohio, all right. We either have an ace in the hole, or we haven’t. If we have an ace 
concealed, we win; if we haven’t, no amount of bluffing and advertising can do much good.”539  
 
The Great Engineer 
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As Republicans and Democrats weighed their options, there was one particular candidate 
that caught both parties’ eyes in 1920, as well as those of many a disgruntled progressive: Head 
of the Food Administration Herbert Hoover -- the only man, as John Maynard Keynes had 
written, “who emerged from the ordeal of Paris with an enhanced reputation.” To Keynes, 
Hoover, “with his habitual air of weary Titan,” had remained “steadily fixed on the true and 
essential facts of the European situation” while at Versailles. As a result, he 
“imported…precisely that atmosphere of reality, knowledge, magnanimity, and disinterestedness 
which, if they had been found in other quarters, also, would have given us the Good Peace.”540 
 
And that was but one of the many encomiums to the Great Engineer in 1919 and 1920. “I 
am 100 percent for him,” argued Justice Louis Brandeis, a man whose words carried in the 
progressive community. “High public spirit, extraordinary intelligence, knowledge, sympathy, 
youth, and a rare perception of what is really worth-while for the country, would, with his 
organizing ability and power of inspiring loyalty, do wonderful things in the Presidency.” Walter 
Lippmann declared he had “never met a more interesting man, anyone who knew so much of the 
world and could expound so clearly…the inscrutable mysteries of European politics.” Secretary 
of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt was another Wilson man firmly in the Hoover camp. “He is 
certainly a wonder,” he declared, “and I wish we could make him President of the United States. 
There could not be a better one.”541 
 
The New Republic editors agreed. Having been pro-war themselves at the start of the 
great conflagration, they seemed to envision a possible redemption in a Hoover candidacy: “The 
dominant temper of politics at this moment,” they argued,  “is a product of the fatigue of the war, 
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the frustration at Versailles, and the panic of inexperience.” But as the hero who fed Europe, 
Hoover could be the “vehicle of that same idealism which ennobled the war and was thwarted in 
the peace.” If a “vast disinterested call for Hoover by men and women who were willing to 
waive differences of opinion, of party, and of personal preference” were to rise up, then the 
Great Engineer could “restore sanity to American politics, and…prepare an administration led by 
hope rather than one dictated by fear.”542 
 
And so – much to the consternation of Hiram Johnson supporters in particular – TNR 
began attempting to manufacture that vast, disinterested call by loudly touting Hoover’s 
presidential timbre in its pages. “There is one man, not an active candidate,” TNR opined in 
January 1920, “who in comparison with all the other candidates, qualifies so readily that his 
election would be a foregone conclusion in reasonable conditions. That man is Herbert Hoover”: 
 
[W]ill any supporter of Leonard Wood or Mitchell Palmer pretend that either of their candidates 
knows a fragment of what Herbert Hoover knows about the necessities of the modern world? 
Would either of them, or any of the others, risk comparison with Hoover, either on knowledge of 
social conditions, knowledge of American industry, knowledge of world trade, knowledge of 
European politics, knowledge of diplomacy? Is there one of them who can show a record as 
administrator which will stand against the record of the organizer of the Belgian Relief, Food 





Hoover, TNR continued to effuse, was “no dark horse, no straw man manufactured by 
political boomers, but admittedly the most competent and successful American revealed by the 
war…every trial enhanced his stature.” As such, he was the candidate of all Americans who had 
their “eyes on the facts, not on labels and doctrines.” 544  
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Doubling down a few weeks later, TNR deemed Hoover “the spokesman and the 
embodiment of the profound discontent and the utter disgust which Americans who understand 
what is happening to the world and to their own country, feel at the gross obscurantism and 
incompetence of the existing leadership of both political parties.” His candidacy made evident 
“the unreality of the competing candidates and the political bankruptcy of the two party 
machines. It is the expression of the manifest need of a new agency of party agitation and action 
in American politics…[It forces] the two old parties to come out from behind the protection of 
patriotic phrases and tell the American people how they propose to act to mend the gaping breaks 
in our national life and in the life of the modern civilized world.” In The Nation, Robert Herrick 
argued similarly. “Whether’s one sympathies are radical or reactionary,” he wrote “what we 
must have as a leader today is someone who knows. And the only man in the United States who 
thoroughly understands this moloch of a machine to which we are all inextricably hitched is 
Hoover.” Only The Great Engineer, Herrick concluded, “understands the infinitely intricate 
machine that modern capitalistic society has become.545 
 
In deeming Hoover an avatar of efficiency, both Herrick and TNR’s editors were not far 
off from the candidate’s own view of himself and what he would bring to the presidency. 
“During my whole European experience,” Hoover would later write in his memoirs, “I had been 
trying to formulate some orderly definition of the American System… Along with these ideas, I 
elaborated a basis of economic recovery and progress: 
 
It involved increasing national efficiency through certain fundamental principles. They 
were (a) that reconstruction and economic progress and therefore most social progress 
required, as a first step, lowering the costs of production and distribution by scientific 
research and transformation of its discoveries into labor-saving devices and new articles 
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of use; (b) that we must constantly eliminate industrial waste; (c) that we must increase 
the skill of our workers and managers; (d) that we must assure that these reductions in 
cost were passed on to consumers in lower prices; (e) that to do this we must maintain a 
competitive system; (f) that with lower prices the people could buy more goods, and 
thereby create more jobs at higher real wages, more new enterprises, and constantly 
higher standards of living. I insisted that we must push machines and not men and 
provide every safeguard of health and proper leisure. 
 
I listed the great wastes; failure to conserve properly our national resources; strikes and 
lockouts; failure to keep machines up to date; the undue intermittent employment in 
seasonal trades; the trade-union limitation on effort by workers under the illusion that it 
would provide more jobs; waste in transportation; waste in unnecessary variety of articles 
used in manufacture; lack of standard in commodities; lack of cooperation between 
employers and labor; failure to develop our water resources; and a dozen other factors. I 
insisted that these improvements could not be effected without government control, but 
that the government should cooperate by research, intellectual leadership, and 
prohibitions upon the abuse of power.”546 
 
Hoover’s vision of the American System, and of forward progress defined as a battle 
between efficiency and waste, is something he would continue to develop in the decade to come. 
But to some of TNR’s readers in 1920, this conception was already off the mark. In fact, some 
thought TNR had gone overboard for Hoover at the expense of real progressive virtues. Citing 
concerns about civil liberties and the Versailles Treaty, editor Charles Merz wrote a bylined 
piece to “disassociate myself from the policy these editorials have defined,” since “we owe it to 
our readers to underwrite no man’s candidacy until he comes more completely into agreement 
with us than Mr. Hoover has come.” Similarly, reader A.C. Freeman wrote in to critique the 
editors’ emphasis on efficiency. “I fail to see any proof of genuine liberalism in Mr. Hoover’s 
recent statement of his position on domestic issues,” he wrote. “True he comes out in favor of 
our traditional rights of free speech, etc. But so does Mr. Nicholas Murray Butler”: 
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The sole valid argument in favor of Mr. Hoover is his unquestionably efficient record as an 
administrator during the war. But efficiency is a quality shared by Judge Gary, Clemenceau, and 
the Prussian General Staff. There is no reason to suppose that General Wood and Governor 
Lowden are lacking in efficiency. Nine-tenths of the suffering in the world at the present time is 
due to efficiency, selfish efficiency, devoid of moral purpose or rational direction. In choosing a 
liberal candidate for President let us have an efficient man by all means; but let us first have a 
man who is courageous, and humane, and forward-looking, who will not be afraid to condemn the 
Peace Treaty and the blockade of Prussia, for the crimes that they are, who will not instinctively 




Other readers argued that, by going whole hog for Hoover, TNR had given the proven 
progressive in the race, Senator Hiram Johnson, short shrift. “Mr. Hoover’s great capacity as an 
administrator is willingly recognized,” wrote in another correspondent, “but as President of the 
United States we need at this time one who is something more than an administrator – a 
statesman with imagination and insight, a statesman who stands for constructive political 
principles both in the domestic and the international field. Such a statesman the country 
possesses in Senator Hiram Johnson – and I know of no one else.” (The writer, Aksel Josephson, 
did concede that Hoover’s vaunted efficiency would make him a great Postmaster-General.) For 
his part, Gifford Pinchot thought Hoover’s emphases reflected a “natural aristocrat” who favored 
“big business and the middleman as against both the producer and the consumer.”548 
 
Similarly, William Hard, while conceding “the merits of your Presidential candidate,” 
argued to TNR’s readers that Hiram Johnson was much closer on the issues of note than Herbert 
Hoover. On “the preservation of civil liberties,” “coercive foreign adventures – such as our 
invasion of Russia,” and the issue of the League, “Mr. Johnson has gone far beyond any other 
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Presidential candidate in courageous loyalty and in effective serviceableness to principles and to 
results which you would like to see established and achieved”: 
 
Please understand I am not disputing the immense superiority which Mr. Hoover possesses over 
Mr. Johnson in certain knowledges and experiences and aptitudes. Nor am I disputing Mr. 
Hoover’s enlightened inclination toward perceiving and admitting and in some way remedying 
the sicknesses of the society which has blessed him with fortune and fame without cursing him 
with a conviction of its unerring rightness…I am simply pleading: have a heart and a word for my 
candidate’s astonishing knowledge and experience and aptitudes; those of a man – I say – skilled 
in man’s nature, deep into simple insight into human fraud whether at Paris or at Washington, 
open in simple courage against it whether at Sacramento or Geneva.”549 
 
The relative importance of efficiency as a defining virtue of progressivism is a debate that 
would continue to play out as the Twenties unfolded.  For now, despite the pleas of old-line 
progressives like Hard, Hoover, according to one biographer, enjoyed the support in 1920 of a 
veritable Who’s Who of prominent reformers, including “William Allen White…Franklin 
Roosevelt, Herbert Croly, Jane Addams, Louis D. Brandeis, Walter Lippmann, Edward Bok, 
Oscar Straus, Edward A. Ross, Ida Tarbell, Ray Stannard Baker, Frederick Lewis Allen, 
Heywood Broun, and Frank W. Taussig.” Writers such as Robert Benchley and Dorothy Parker 
added compositions to a pro-Hoover paper published during the Republican convention. In fact, 
Hoover seemed so far above the field in 1919 and early 1920 that he even garnered the support 
of the interminable cynic from Baltimore. “Of the whole crowd at present in the ring,” Mencken 
wrote: 
“it is probable that only Hoover would make a respectable President. General Wood is a simple-
minded old dodo with a delusion of persecution; Palmer is a political mountebank of the first 
water; Harding is a second-rate provincial; Johnson is allowing himself to be lost in the shuffle; 
Borah is steadily diminishing in size as he gets closer to the fight…Only Hoover stands out as a 
man of any genuine sense or dignity…But can he be elected? I doubt it.”550 
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Part of the reason Hoover’s prospects to Mencken seemed dim – as they did to the Great 
Engineer himself – was that Hoover was, for all intent and purposes, a man without a party. “It 
was obvious enough,” Hoover later wrote of 1920, with perhaps some 20-20 hindsight, “that I 
could not be nominated by either party, even if I wanted the honor.” A supporter of TR’s 
Progressive Party in 1912, Hoover had gone on to serve important roles in the Wilson 
administration and – incurring the wrath of Boies Penrose and the Republican Old Guard, who 
had not forgiven this apostasy –  encouraged voters to vote Democratic in 1918. As late as March 
1920, Hoover still labeled himself an “independent progressive” who disliked both the 
“reactionary group in the Republican party” and “the radical group in the Democratic party.”551 
 
By his own reckoning, however, Hoover was a Republican through and through. “I had 
two generations of Republican blood in my veins,” Hoover later wrote. “I was a registered 
Republican from my twenty-first birthday…My work in Washington had given me intimate 
opportunity to observe the Democratic party in its political aspects, all of which reinforced my 
Republicanism.” While conceding there were a few Democrats “of the highest purpose and 
ideals,” Hoover mostly saw the Party of Jefferson and Jackson as an uneasy three-way marriage 
of “an ultraconservative Southern group,” “a set of plundering political machines in many of the 
large cities,” and, in the West, “agrarian fanatics and near-Socialists” formed out of “Bryanesque 
demagoguery.” By contrast, while he had no truck with “such Republican phenomena as 
Senators Penrose, Watson, Knox, Lodge, and their followers…the rank and file membership of 
the Republican party in the North and West comprised the majority of skilled workmen, farmers, 
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professionals and small-business men. They gave it cohesion in ideas whose American 
aspirations I greatly preferred.”552 
 
Hoover had more prosaic reasons for choosing the Party of Lincoln as well. For one, 
surveying the electoral landscape in early 1920, it looked rather obviously to be a Republican 
year. “I knew no Democrat could win in 1920,” Hoover later told a friend, “and I did not see 
myself as a sacrifice.” The Great Engineer wanted to play a long game. Agnes Meyer, the wife of 
one of Hoover’s friends, thought the man was “consumed with ambition…The man’s will-to-
power is almost a mania. The idea of goodwill, of high achievement, is strong in him, but he is 
not interested in the good that must be accomplished through others or even with the help of 
others. Only what is done by Hoover is of any meaning to him. He is a big man but he cannot 
bear rivalry of any sort.” For the time being, Hoover had his eye above all else on a potential 
Cabinet spot, which means he had to get his name bandied about in Republican circles. In any 
case, when Democratic Franklins Roosevelt and Lane visited Hoover and implored him to run as 
a Democrat, their pleas fell on deaf ears. Instead, not unlike Democrats Wilson and McAdoo, 
Hoover insisted he was sitting out the race – while his supporters feverishly tried to solicit letters 
of support from Stanford alumni, Hoover’s fellow miners and engineers, and every person listed 
in Who’s Who.553  
 
Hoover managed to make himself even more of a persona non grata in conservative 
circles by formally declaring the principles he expected the Republican Party to stand for, should 
it expect his support. If Republicans adopted “a forward-looking, liberal, constructive platform 
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on the Treaty and on our economic issues,” emphasized “measures for sound business 
administration of the country” and promised to be “neither reactionary nor radical in its approach 
to our great domestic questions,” Hoover would “give it my entire support.” Indeed, while not 
seeking the nomination himself, of course, “if it is felt that the issues necessitate it and it is 
demanded of me, I cannot refuse service.” As one newspaper summed it up, Hoover would be a 
Republican if Republicans “will be the kind of a party which he would like to belong. And…if 
he belongs to it, he would have no objection to leading it.”554 
 
Hoover did officially break from the Wilson/McAdoo statesman-in-the-wings strategy 
once, when he allowed his name to be entered in his home state primary of California – also the 
electoral base of Senator Hiram Johnson – so “as to allow an expression on the issue of the 
League.” In his own words, Hoover, while “fully aware of the weaknesses of the treaties… 
perhaps more aware than most Americans…had concluded that they should be ratified in order to 
save what was left of the European structure.” And so he welcomed the chance to go up against 
Hiram Johnson and his “violent anti-League platform,” even though “as Senator Johnson 
controlled the state organization, there was no possibility that he could be defeated.”555 
 
Claiming to “not make a single political speech or statement in the primary,” Hoover still 
endured what he felt was irresponsible calumny, an “orgy of personal slander and abuse directed 
at me,” from Johnson forces. “Their general line,” he recalled, “was that I was an Englishman 
and even a British citizen; that I was possessed of untold millions, and so on.” Whoever cast the 
first stone, to the Penroses of the world the California primary was manna from Heaven. In the 
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end, Johnson defeated Hoover by 370,000 votes to 210,000, but the end result was that the two 





Even though TNR’s editors remained Hoover’s biggest supporters, arguing he could still 
“embody the progressive crusading disposition that is always latent in America,” even they 
looked in chagrin as Hoover’s candidacy in California was “used by experienced professionals to 
neutralize the progressive forces at the convention…Mr. Hoover cannot afford to destroy the 
influence of men like Senator Johnson,” they argued. “He cannot afford to disperse progressive 
strength at this juncture…If he must contest California, he will do well to remind his supporters 
that they are dealing with a veteran who as governor, progressive leader, and United States 
Senator has earned the respect and appreciation of American progressives. No man can destroy 
Hiram Johnson’s position, and call it a good day’s work.”557 
The Smoke-Filled Room 
 
 
In early June of 1920, 984 Republican delegates – including, for the first time, 27 women 
– gathered in Chicago to draft a platform and choose a nominee. Conspicuously absent were the 
uniformed members of the Grand Army of the Republic, who had graced every Republican 
convention en masse since the days of Lincoln. Now, only a few stray septuagenarians circulated 




The festivities began with a keynote from the chairman of the convention, Senator Henry 
Cabot Lodge – his “voice,” according to Walter Lippmann “magnified by the electrical apparatus 
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out of all proportion to his body.” For eighty minutes, Lodge decried the chaos and uncertainty 
of the Wilson years and deemed the League of Nations a “breeder of war and an enemy of 
peace” and a threat to “the very existence of the United States as an independent power.” Just as 
he bragged that “he had kept us out of war” four years ago, the Senator said, Wilson “now 
demands the approval of the American people for his party and his administration on the ground 
that he has kept us out of peace.” Before he merits such approval, Lodge suggested, “the 
question [of the League] goes to the people.”559 
 
Before that, however, the question had to go to the resolutions committee, where the 
official Party platform was being drafted. And there, there was not much in the way of overlap 
between a William Howard Taft, who had once stood with Wilson in support of a League, and a 
William E. Borah, who saw any form of it as the backdoor to tyranny. As TNR put it, “[t]here 
were mild reservationists, strong reservationists, irreconcilables, and partisans of a League 
sweltering in the heat of the Coliseum, and all represented constituents with votes to cast.”560 
 
After Borah and other Irreconcilables threatened to bolt the party if a plank for the 
League with reservations was included, raising the specter anew of a 1912-like split that would 
once again see a Democrat in office, a solution was drafted by Elihu Root that squared the circle. 
Republicans, it read, stood for an “international association…based upon international justice” 
which could “maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and the decision of 
impartial courts.” But Wilson’s League “failed signally to accomplish this great purpose, and 
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contains stipulations, not only intolerable for an independent people, but certain to produce the 
injustice, hostility, and controversy among nations which it proposed to prevent.” 561 
 
As a result, and despite the “unfortunate insistence of the President upon having his own 
way,” the Senate had “performed their duty faithfully” in killing the Treaty. “We approve their 
conduct and honor their courage and fidelity.” Any future agreements made by a Republican 
administration “shall meet the full duty of America to civilization and humanity, in accordance 
with American ideals, and without surrendering the right of the American people to exercise its 
judgment and its power in favor of justice and peace.” Both “a tangle of contradictions” and “an 
ingenious piece of politics,” in the words of TNR, this compromise plank was sufficiently vague 
that everyone could read what they wanted to out of it. Taft argued it included “the things that 
would lead the party into the League,” while papers deemed it an “astounding surrender to 
League foes” and a victory for “Bitter-Enders.” The Survey just argued that “it leaves the subject 
where it was. In the present tangled situation that is perhaps just as well.”562 
 
With the League thus addressed, much of the rest of the platform-writing was relatively 
smooth sailing – The Republicans just had to remind the American people that they were not the 
party of Wilson or Wilsonism. The platform lambasted the administration for an “inexcusable 
failure to make timely preparations” before the War, and for being “as unprepared for 
peace…vision, leadership, and intelligent planning…have been lacking.” While “the country has 
been left to shift for itself, the government has continued on a wartime basis.” To Republicans, 
the administration has used “the emergency of war to continue its arbitrary and inquisitorial 
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control over the life of the people in the time of peace, and to carry confusion into industrial life. 
Under the despot’s plea of necessity or superior wisdom, executive usurpation of legislative and 
judicial function still undermines our institutions.”563  
 
As such, time and again Republicans vowed to put a stop to the types of excesses that had 
characterized the post-war experience. While recognizing “the justice of collective bargaining as 
a means of promoting good will…[and] realizing the true ends of industrial justice,” the “strike 
or the lockout, as a means of settling industrial disputes, inflicts such loss and suffering on the 
community as to justify government initiative to reduce its frequency and limits its 
consequences.” Similarly, while “every American citizen shall enjoy the ancient and 
constitutional right of free speech, free press, and free assembly…no man may advocate 
resistance to the law, and no man may advocate violent overthrow of the government. Aliens 
“who constitute a menace” shall and should be deported, but “in view of the vigorous 
malpractice of the Departments of Justice and Labor,” they would first be granted “an adequate 
public hearing before a competent administrative tribunal.” In short, Republicans pledged “to 
end executive autocracy and restore to the people their constitutional government.”564 
 
As with the League plank, the Republican platform had enough in it to make all the 
varied constituents of the Party happy. To the former 1912 Progressives, it promised that, while 
“the federal jurisdiction over social problems is limited,” solutions would be enacted into law “in 
accordance with the best progressive thought of the country.” To Old Guard conservatives, it 
promised “no persecution of honest business,” “to free business from arbitrary and unnecessary 
official control” and “to repel the arrogant challenge of any class.” To acolytes of Hoover, the 








platform promised to “substitute economy and efficiency for extravagance and chaos.” To new 
women voters, it offered support for suffrage, a Women’s Bureau in the Department of Labor, a 
federal child labor law, “the independent naturalization of married women” (meaning women 
who married aliens could retain their citizenship),  and “federal legislation to limit the hours of 
employment of women engaged in intensive industry.” To African-Americans, it promised an 
anti-lynching law, to put an end to “a terrible blot on our civilization.”565  
 
And for all voters, it promised an “earnest and consistent attack upon the high cost of 
living,” which was caused by the “unsound fiscal policies of the Democratic Administration,” 
and which would be remedied by, among other things, “encouragement of heightened production 
of goods and services,” “prevention of unreasonable profits,” “exercise of public economy and 
stimulation of private thrift,” and by “revision of war-imposed taxes unsuited to peace time 
economy.”566   
 
There was, in short, something for everybody. As Senator Borah remarked to Mark 
Sullivan of the New York Evening Post, “the people are getting a little weary of the ambiguity of 
modern language in political platforms. It has been reduced to a science.” William Allen White 
argued it  “successfully met the requirement of saying nothing definite in several thousand well-
chosen words.” Edward T. Devine of The Survey deemed it “long and tedious and badly written,” 
and lamented that, for all its rhetoric against the Wilson administration, it did not call for the 
impeachment of A. Mitchell Palmer. The editors of TNR were similarly phlegmatic. “For seven 
years it has been the privilege of the Republicans to stand back and observe how their opponents 
manage or mismanage the affairs of the nation,” they wrote. “Accordingly we had a right to 








expect evidence of valid political ideas, of awareness to present and prospective conditions, in 
the platform of 1920. We do not find them.” Instead, they argued, the Republican platform was 
marked by “general feebleness and colorlessness...It is the product of a party impulse enfeebled 
by age, moribund.” 567 
 
Of course, making enough promises in the platform to satisfy everyone would be an 
easier lift than finding a nominee to embody those promises, and by mid-June, Republicans 
weren’t much closer in solving the dilemma than they had been in the weeks after Colonel 
Roosevelt’s demise. After several days of nominating speeches, the voting began, with General 
Wood leading Frank Lowden by 287 ½ votes to 221 ½ on the first ballot, Hiram Johnson a 
distant third at 133, and Warren Harding at 65 ½. Several states, most notably New York and 
Pennsylvania, clouded the picture further by choosing favorite son candidates on this early ballot 
– as did Wisconsin, who chose Robert La Follette and was summarily booed for it.568 
 
After three more ballots, the figures stood at 314 ½ for Wood to 289 for Lowden, with 
Johnson at 140 ½ and Harding at 61 ½. Feeling some small danger of General Wood pulling 
away – unlikely, since Wood’s inexperienced political team had pooled all of their strength into 
the first few ballots – the Republican Party bosses called an adjournment for the evening and 
gathered to the “smoke-filled rooms” at Chicago’s Blackstone Hotel to sort out a more palatable 
solution.  
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To help gain traction for Johnson, Senator William Borah – still aghast at “the corruption 
of the American people” the Kenyon Committee had unearthed – publicly threatened to bolt the 
party if Wood or Lowden were nominated. But others, including the candidate himself, began to 
resign themselves to the fact that this would not be a progressive year. “Nineteen twelve was a 
Sunday School convention compared to this,” Johnson deadpanned. William Allen White argued 
he had never witnessed a convention “so completely dominated by sinister predatory economic 
forces as was this.” Oswald Villard felt “money was written all over the convention” and 
wondered if there was even a quorum on Wall Street to conduct any business. La Follette’s 
Magazine reported that “men representing every form and shade of monopoly, swollen by war 
profits” reigned over both the Blackstone Hotel and the convention floor.569  
 
Walter Lippmann bemoaned that Johnson never had a chance against “the hysteria and 
the reaction among the well-to-do and powerful. The delegates and the galleries were proof 
against progressivism in any form, not merely stolidly proof as in 1916, but violently proof.” 
This they had indicated by shouting down a proposed plank, by way of Wisconsin, advocating 
public ownership of the railroads with cries of “Socialism!,” “Bolshevik,” and “Throw Him 
Out!” Before the fateful evening was over, Hiram Johnson would still be offered the vice-
presidency by all of the other major candidates – progressivism was fine on the bottom of the 
ticket, it seemed – but this year the top spot would be reserved for someone else.570 
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Although he began the evening in the lead, General Wood also felt his candidacy being 
frozen out by the usual powers-that-be -- although not before he was granted an offer from the 
Old Guard’s kingmaker, Senator Boies Penrose. From a sickbed in Pennsylvania, Penrose called 
the Wood camp – Wood himself would not speak to him – and offered their candidate the 
nomination in exchange for three Cabinet members. The general’s response to this “wicked 
game”: “Tell Senator Penrose that I have made no promises, and am making none.” Oklahoma 
oil baron Jake Hamon, who had bought up his own sizable cache of delegates as an investment 
for his oil business, made a similar offer to Wood: Let him pick the Secretary of the Interior and 
the Ambassador to Mexico (where oil was as plentiful as the politics were dicey), and Hamon 
would put Wood over the top. “I’m an American soldier!” Wood bellowed at the offer. “I’ll be 
damned if I betray my country. Get the hell out of here!” These fine displays of rectitude 
effectively ended General Wood’s candidacy. Hamon and Penrose instead began to take another 
look at Warren Harding, and by three in the morning, Wood was reduced to complaining, quite 
correctly, “They are combining against me!” at his exhausted campaign staff.571 
 
With the two mavericks, Johnson and Wood, sidelined, the Republican Old Guard who 
gathered in the Blackstone Hotel’s Suite 404/405/406 could now choose one of their own 
candidates. But, even though he was currently second in balloting, Frank Lowden was still tarred 
with the brush of Johnson’s campaign finance investigation, and had lost his upside. “Lowden 
came the nearest to success because Lowden most nearly fitted the specifications,” Walter 
Lippmann wrote soon after the convention, “He probably would have been nominated, but for 
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the revelations in Missouri.” A number of favorite sons, each with their own various 




One of the senior kingmakers in the room, Henry Cabot Lodge, was reported to have 
settled on the choice of Harding early in the meeting. He reminded the assembled gathering that 
Ohio had been in the column of every single Republican ever elected president, and Governor 
Cox of Ohio was currently a leading candidate for the Democrats. But others in the smoke-filled 
room, like Senator James Wadsworth of New York, reported nothing but “confusion, 
puzzlement, and divided counsels” from the deliberations, deeming the “the alleged influential 
senators…as futile as chickens with their heads cut off.” Either way, when the smoke cleared, the 
Senator from Ohio was the Republicans’ choice. “There ain’t any first-raters this year,” Senator 
Frank Brandegee of Connecticut thereafter told the press. “This man Harding is no world beater, 
but we think he is the best of the bunch.”573 
 
Word of the smoke-filled room’s choice reverberated through Chicago in the late hours 
of the night, and when the voting began anew the following morning, Harding slowly and 
inexorably gained on Friday’s leaders over the course of the day. As Walter Lippmann put it, 
“Chicago was too hot, the Coliseum too crowded, the hotel lobbies too nerve wracking, and the 
prices too high,” so when word came down from “the Old Guard, speaking through the neo-
classic Mr. Lodge,” “Harding was chosen, not because the convention was in love with him, but 
because he was the first name seriously proposed to end the deadlock.”574 
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By the seventh ballot, Harding moved to third place. On the ninth, Kansas – whose 
Governor, Henry Allen, had officially put Wood’s name in contention – broke from Wood’s 
camp to Harding’s, setting off a stampede that culminated in Harding’s official nomination on 
the tenth ballot, which was then declared unanimous – despite loud protests from the direction of 
Wisconsin’s delegation and Chicago’s own Harold Ickes.575 “Because neither in this campaign 
nor any other time in his life,” mused the editors of TNR, “has he done anything positive enough 
to cause offense, Harding was picked from the discard by the men who know how to run 
conventions. The moral seems to be that the man who does worst in the primaries is considered 
safest for the nomination.” The nominee himself was scarcely any more impressed by what had 
transpired. “Well,” said Harding, “we drew to a pair of deuces and filled.”576 
 
If the nomination of Harding at Chicago has taken a circuitous route, the choice of his 
running mate arose much more organically. During the tenth ballot, Republican leaders, 
including Borah and Daugherty, hastily conferred on the floor and came up with Wisconsin 
Senator Irvine Lenroot, a progressive, to balance the ticket. But after a number of speeches to 
this effect, Judge Wallace McCamant of Oregon took the stage and instead offered the 
considerably more conservative hero from Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge. On the first ballot, 
Governor Coolidge won handily over Lenroot, 674 ½ to 146 ½. Only eight years after Colonel 
Roosevelt and the Progressives had walked out of the party to stand at Armageddon, there would 
once again be no progressive on the Republican ticket.
577
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The Democrats, meanwhile, convened to choose their nominee a few weeks later, in San 
Francisco. There, the eyes of distraught progressives looked for a more promising endgame than 
what had transpired in Chicago. If the Republicans “had pronounced for conservatism, and for a 
conservatism lacking in vision,” argued the New York Evening Post, Democrats now had a 
chance to “lend complete reality to our party system by declaring, in platform and candidate, for 
liberalism. That is a great opportunity.” Similarly, TNR argued, the Republicans “had furnished 
the Democrats with an opportunity they did not expect, and have not earned.” And, again, in the 
words of progressive writer Edward G. Lowry: “the Democrats have in a manner of speaking had 
the game put in their hands. They have been given an opportunity, a wide-opened chance.” The 
question now was whether the Democratic Party would capitalize.”578 
 
As in Chicago, women delegates officially joined the proceedings for the first time. And, 
as in Chicago, the proceedings began with a keynote address that put the issue of the League 
squarely at the forefront of the election. The orator this time was national committee chairman 
Homer Cummings, who argued there was “no blacker crime against civilization” than what 
Senate Republicans had done to the League. They had chosen “provincialism, militarism, and 
world chaos,” Cummings argued, “over peace, disarmament and world fraternity.”579 
 
But, also as in Chicago, the League was more in dispute in the platforms committee, this 
time chaired by the Senator from Virginia, Wilson ally Carter Glass. With the exception of 
irreconcilables like Senator James Reed of Missouri, virtually all Democrats in attendance 
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agreed that Wilson’s League, in the words of the platform, was “the surest, if not the only, 
practicable means of maintaining the permanent peace of the world and terminating the 
insufferable burden of great military and naval establishments.”  
 
But some Democratic leaders, most notably William Jennings Bryan, Senator Thomas 
Walsh of Montana, and Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts, also wanted a commitment in 
the platform that the Democrats would not balk at reservations if they were needed to make the 
League a reality. Knowing Wilson’s inflexibility in this matter, Chairman Glass and the 
administration officials present opposed this concession, deadlocking the platform committee for 
five days.
 580
   
 
The final, eleven-paragraph compromise language on the League, passed over some 
objection from the Wilson camp, endorsed the president’s “firm stand against reservations 
designed to cut to pieces the vital provisions of the Versailles Treaty,” and advocated “the 
immediate ratification of the treaty without reservations which would impair its essential 
integrity.” It also argued against the “utterly vain, if not vicious” Republican claims that 
“ratification of the treaty and membership in the League of Nations would in any wise impair the 
integrity or independence of our country. The fact that the covenant has been entered into by 
twenty-nine nations, all as jealous of their independence as we are of ours, is as sufficient 
refutation of such a charge.”581 
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That being said – and this was the rub for Wilson –  Democrats, argued the platform, “do 
not oppose the acceptance of any reservations making clearer or more specific the obligations of 
the United States to the league associates. Only by doing this may we retrieve the reputation of 
this nation among the powers of the earth and recover the moral leadership which President 
Wilson won and which Republican politicians at Washington sacrificed.”582 
 
Also in serious contention in these first five days was the Democrats’ official stance on 
prohibition: Wilson and administration Wets like Albert Sidney Burleson favored liberality, 
while Drys like Bryan and Glass wanted no such retreat from the hard-fought and only-recently-
established noble experiment. Foreshadowing later problems for Democrats, the 1920 platform 





Aside from these two issues, the platform predictably lauded Wilson, hailing “with 
patriotic pride the great achievements for country and the world wrought by a Democratic 
administration under his leadership…a chapter of substantial achievements unsurpassed in the 
history of the republic.” Among these achievements were the Federal Reserve System, the 
Smith-Lever Act and farm loan system, the creation of a Department of Labor, workman’s 
compensation, anti-child labor laws, and eight-hour day laws, female suffrage, and a wartime 
leadership that “exhibited the very broadest conception of liberal Americanism.”584 
 
Having cast its lot with Wilsonism, the Democratic platform was a more progressive 
document in many ways than the one earlier articulated by Republicans in Chicago. It declared 
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Democrats’ “adherence to the fundamental progressive principles of social, economic and 
industrial justice and advance,” and promised, with the war over, that the Party would “resume 
the great work of translating these principles into effective laws.” To America’s farmers, the 
party “does not find it necessary to make promises. It already is rich in its record of things 
actually accomplished.”  Similarly, it argued, Democrats were “now, as ever, the firm friend of 
honest labor and the promoter of progressive industry,” and that “those who labor have rights, 
and the national security and safety depend upon a just recognition of those rights.” It advocated 
for “for the protection of child life through infancy and maternity care,” “the prohibition of child 
labor,” “full representation of women on all commissions dealing with women's work or 
women's interests,” ending gender discrimination in the civil service, “a continuance of 





That being said, there were sour notes struck for progressives as well. Democrats took 
issue with Republican “unfounded reproaches” over civil liberties, arguing rather dubiously that 
“no utterance from any quarter has been assailed, and no publication has been repressed, which 
has not been animated by treasonable purposes, and directed against the nation's peace, order and 
security in time of war.” While reaffirming “respect for the great principles of free speech and a 
free press,” the platform also asserted “as an indisputable proposition that they afford no 
toleration of enemy propaganda or the advocacy of the overthrow of the government of the state 
or nation by force or violence.” The editors of TNR were galled by this inclusion. In trying to 






“defend the tactics of Messrs. Palmer and Burleson,” they argued, Democrats has included a 
plank in their platform “that simply isn’t true.”586 
 
And  to many, the platform’s rhetorical feints in the direction of progressivism had more 
to do with the exigencies of partisan politics than with any concessions to principle. “If labor can 
still content itself with generalities and platitudes,” opined The Nation, both platforms were 
“soothing and comforting…But the most careful reading of the platform shows nothing tangible 
and solid of which labor can take hold.” “So far as Progressivism is concerned,” Harold Ickes 
wrote one newspaper editor, “these [two] platforms are literally ‘tweedledee and tweedledum.’” 
Summed up one progressive reader of the platform, Bruce Bliven, reporting in from San 
Francisco for TNR: “[E]very possible evil thing was declared to be the fault of the Republican 
Congress. Every other evil thing was declared, with adjectives and adverbs, to be non-existent. If 
it was an evil for which the administration is obviously and directly responsible, it was declared 
to be (a) non-existent and (b) a great achievement, pricelessly valuable to the nation.”587 
 
And, indeed, the Democratic platform went at great length to assail Republicans 
wherever it could. “The shocking disclosure of the lavish use of money” in the Republican 
primaries, it argued, “has created a painful impression throughout the country.” Coupled with the 
recent conviction of Republican Senator Truman Newberry of Michigan for “criminal 
transgression of the law limiting expenditures” – Newberry had spent over $175,000 to win his 
seat over automobile pioneer Henry Ford – “it indicates the reentry, under Republican auspices, 
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of money as an influential factor in elections, thus nullifying the letter and flaunting the spirit of 
numerous laws, enacted by the people, to protect the ballot from the contamination of corrupt 
practices.” Thus Democrats pledged “earnest efforts to a strengthening of the present statutes 
against corrupt practices, and their rigorous enforcement.”588 
 
While ascribing one of the most important issues in 1920 – the high cost of living – 
“primarily…to the war itself,” as well as “private extravagance,” “the world shortage of capital,” 
“the inflation of foreign currencies and credits,” and “conscienceless profiteering,” Democrats 
argued that it was, naturally, the Republican Party who was most “responsible for the failure to 
restore peace and peace conditions in Europe…[the] principal cause of post-armistice inflation 
the world over.” Republicans, the platform argued, had ignored Wilson’s call for “necessary 
legislation to deal with secondary and local causes” and instead “wasted time and energy for 
more than a year in vain and extravagant investigations, costing the tax-payers great sums of 
money.” 589  
 
In short, it argued, the Republicans in Congress had “raged against profiteers and the high 
cost of living without enacting a single statute to make the former afraid or doing a single act to 
bring the latter within limitations.” Democrats, on the other hand, knew the high cost of living 
could “only be remedied by increased production, strict governmental economy and a relentless 
pursuit of those who take advantage of post-war conditions and are demanding and receiving 
outrageous profits.” As such, Democrats pledged “a policy of strict economy in government 
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expenditures, and to the enactment and enforcement of such legislation as may be required to 
bring profiteers before the bar of criminal justice.”590 
 
These attempted demarcations notwithstanding, the editors of The New Republic found, 
with very few exceptions that “the platform drawn in San Francisco is as nebulous as the 
program of the Republicans…They want the cost of living to come down, but they are as 
helpless about it as the Republicans are – except that they find one additional cause for our 
present difficulties: the inertia of a Republican Congress.” Taken in total, “the Democrats trim as 
cautiously as the Republicans do.” It seemed to them that “the authors of the platform were so 
exhausted by the delight of contemplating their own past that they refrained wisely, considering 
that past, from any definite convictions about the future.” W.E.B. Du Bois’ Crisis took as similar 
pox-on-both-your-houses approach to both platforms. “In the Democratic convention…we had, 
as Negroes, no part,” he editorialized. “The Republican Convention had for us more personal 
interest but scarcely more encouragement.”591 
 
A disgusted Bruce Bliven argued the Democrats had blown a tremendous opportunity 
with their platform. “The Republicans by the character of the platform and nominee they selected 
at Chicago threw open for the Democrats a door which everyone had believed closed. Where 
upon the Democrats assembled in San Francisco and, after due deliberation, slammed the door in 
their own faces and locked it shut”: 
 
On every point where a bold stand might have lost some votes, the convention pussyfooted…If 
there is one instance in the whole platform where truth was not sacrificed to political expediency, 




 “The Week,” “Cox: Away From the White House” The New Republic, July 14, 1920 (Volume XXIII, No. 293), 




I am unaware of it and in my judgment the platform committee is equally unaware of it or it 
would have been stricken out. 
 
True, the platform is a liberal document – more liberal than the Republican instrument. But it 
should have been apparent to everyone who averages better than high grade moron that a mere 
plurality of liberalism in the Democratic platform this year can never wrest victory from the 
Republicans. A platform which endorses the League and the Treaty as though nothing had 
happened since June 1919, which ignores Russia altogether, which defends free speech and a free 
press with such a faint praise as to constitute an endorsement of all Mr. Palmer has done, which 
pussyfoots on Ireland and pussyfoots on labor, which has only praise for Burleson, which does 
not dare mention prohibition, and which leaves the great problem of Russia untouched – such a 
document cannot cause the flaming enthusiasm among liberals which could alone have made a 




“One is forced to the belief,” Blivens concluded, “that the forces which are seeking a 
restoration of genuinely Democratic conditions in America are balked, so far as political action is 
concerned until 1924.”593 
 
In any event, with the Democratic platform thus worked out, attentions in San Francisco 
turned to the matter of the nomination – but not before an attempt on the floor by three-time 
presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan to add reservations and dry planks to the 
document.  Having helped Wilson “to become immortal” by giving him “my treaty plan” to take 
to Paris, Bryan “would walk up to the scaffold today and die with a smile on my face” if he 
could get the League passed without reservations. “But I cannot do it, my friends; nobody else 
can do it.” Reservations were required to get the Treaty through the Senate, and when “someday 
I shall stand before His judgment bar…there shall not be upon my hands the blood of people 
slaughtered while I talked politics.” As for Prohibition, he encouraged the party to “be not 
frightened; time and again in history, the timid have been afraid. But they have always found that 
they underestimated the number of those who had not bowed the knee to Baal.” And when 
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suffrage passed “on the mountain tops you will see the women and the children of our allies in 
every righteous cause.” 
 
The crowd cheered for nearly half an hour for Bryan. No Democratic convention in over 
two decades had felt quite complete without some rousing and florid oratory from the Great 
Commoner, and he had not failed his audience this time either. But when it came time to vote, 
Bryan’s suggested planks went down to defeat quite easily. “I never thought they would beat me 
so badly,” Bryan allegedly said to himself. The party was changing. “When a country gets into a 
frame of mind where it smiles indulgently at such a man,” wrote Bruce Bliven, “it is in a bad 
way, and the convention smiled indulgently at Mr. Bryan.” As TNR deadpanned in their 
editorial, “[a]ll correspondence agree that Mr. Bryan scored a personal triumph. He received a 
twenty minute demonstration. But all…of his proffered planks were buried. It was a typical 
Bryan victory.” “This is not my kind of convention,” the Great Commoner conceded. “Four 
years from now it will be my kind of convention.”594  
 
On the matter of the nomination, Democrats were scarcely any more united than the 
Republicans had been in Chicago. The allies of the administration were split into three camps: 
Some followed A. Mitchell Palmer, the man who had, in the words of his nominator John 
Bigelow, “deported and imprisoned the defamers of the nation – aye, even at the threat of the 
terrorists’ bombs.” Some stubbornly stuck to William Gibbs McAdoo, despite the still 
conflicting signals coming from their candidate about his availability. And some – most notably 
Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, Burleson, and other top administration officials – waited 
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for exactly the right moment to put forward Woodrow Wilson’s name – a moment that never 
seemed to come. 
 
Along with a scattering of favorite sons, like Bryan, the perennial candidate, and New 
York’s Governor Al Smith, whose name was seconded by Franklin Roosevelt, that left Governor 
James Cox of Ohio, who hailed from the home state of the Republican nominee, and who, more 
importantly, was not really affiliated with the administration in any way. And so the balloting 
was a grinding affair, where the war of attrition between administration candidates eventually 
redounded to Cox’s favor. The first ballot, Friday night, showed McAdoo with 266 votes, Palmer 
with 256, Cox with 134, and favorite sons with the rest. By the sixth ballot the next morning, 
McAdoo stood at 368 ½, Palmer 265 ½, and Cox with 195. New York and New Jersey switched 




By the twelfth ballot, Cox passed McAdoo to take first place, where he remained until the 
thirtieth ballot Monday afternoon, when McAdoo once again took the lead, reaching a high of 
421 against Cox’s 380 ½ on the thirty-third ballot. But before the McAdoo forces could break the 
deadlock and extend their lead, Palmer surged one last time, forcing both McAdoo and Cox back 
before the Attorney General finally conceded and gave up his delegates without instruction. 
These men and women slowly, fitfully, turned to Cox – even the southern Democrats, for whom, 
apparently, being Wet turned out to be less of a sin than being a Wilsonian. The Governor of 
Ohio gained more than a majority of delegates for the first time on the forty-third ballot, and on 
                                                          
595




the forty-fourth, at 1:40am Tuesday morning, his nomination was declared unanimous. Whoever 




To some, the choice of Cox as the Democratic standard-bearer was as contentious as that 
of Harding across the aisle. “My heart is in the grave with our hopes,” lamented William 
Jennings Bryan who abhorred the idea of a Wet leading the ticket, “and I must pause until it 
comes back to me.” Nonetheless, while the selection of Governor Cox’s partner on the ticket was 
made by Democratic leaders, their choice of running mate was as universally popular and well-
regarded on the convention floor as Calvin Coolidge had been over in Chicago. The strapping 
young Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had a famous name, a vigorous 
glow, and a winning disposition. Just as important, the thirty-eight-year-old rising star carried the 
blessings of both administration and anti-administration Democrats. Roosevelt’s name had been 
bandied about as a running mate in Democratic circles all summer, prompting FDR to ask his 
law partner “who started this fool Vice-Presidential boom.” By the time of the convention, he 
was chosen by acclamation, prompting nods of approval outside the party from the likes of 
Herbert Hoover and Walter Lippmann. “When cynics ask what is the use,” Lippmann 
telegrammed Roosevelt, “we can answer that when parties can pick a man like Frank Roosevelt 
there is a decent future in politics.” To the Chicago Tribune, however, the choice of FDR “is to 
put the honey of a name on the trap of a ticket. Franklin is as much like Theodore as a clam is 
like a bear cat…If he is Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root is Gene Debs, and Bryan is a 
brewer.”597 
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Whoever Franklin Roosevelt was, the most important factor coming out of the 
Democratic convention is that James Cox was not Woodrow Wilson. “Having proclaimed the 
League of Nations and the record of the Wilson administration the transcendent issues of the 
campaign,” summed up TNR’s editors of the events in San Francisco, “the convention 
nominated a man as far removed as it was possible to be both from the League and the record of 
the administration.”598 
 
A Third Party? 
 
 
“One discerns in the all current discussion of MM. Harding and Cox,” argued H.L. 
Mencken, “a certain sour dismay. It seems to be quite impossible for any wholly literate man to 
pump up any genuine enthusiasm for either of them.” And indeed, for many on the left, the 
nominations of Harding and Cox, and the partisan circumstances from which each occurred, 
further suggested that America was in desperate need of a third party.  
 
“I am so low in my mind that I wouldn’t laugh at Charlie Chaplin throwing the whole 
custard pie at Cox or Harding or both,” William Allen White confessed to Herbert Croly. “I think 
that the only honest vote either a Republican or a Democrat can cast should be a spite vote 
against his own party.” The election, Walter Lippmann explained to a friend, now boiled down to 
“two provincial, ignorant politicians entirely surrounded by special interests, operating in a 
political vacuum. Nobody believes in anything.” To the muckraking journal The Searchlight on 
Congress, it seemed that “an epidemic of political blundering” had “gripped America. Each 
succeeding national convention had outstripped its predecessor in the greatness of its mistakes. 
First, the Penrose Republicans nominated the pathetically incompetent Harding. Next…[the] 
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Democrats named Cox, sending him into the race weighted with Wilsonism and tainted by the 
odors and atmosphere of the underworld of politics.” The Nation was similarly phlegmatic. 
“Precisely as the Republican Convention turned at the end to the weakest candidate, so has the 
Democratic,” it argued. “Their followers must, therefore, choose between two mediocrities, 
between two second-rate Ohio newspaper editors, neither of whom can truthfully be said to have 
the caliber requisite for the Presidency even in ordinary times.” Privately, Oswald Villard 
pleaded Robert La Follette to get involved on a separate ticket. “We need you sorely in these 
dark times,” he wrote. “If you, Johnson, and Borah would start a third movement, at least 
Harding’s election could be made impossible.”599  
 
Although exacerbated by the two party conventions, third party sentiment was not new. 
Talk of a viable third party had been in the air ever since Roosevelt and the Progressives had 
stood at Armageddon in 1912, and, as the Herbert Hoover boomlet made plain, some 
progressives had spent much of the entire election season looking outside the normal party lines 
for a standard bearer.  
 
“The New Republic does favor the organization of a third party,” the journal opined in 
March 1920, attempting to explain its gushing support for Hoover over Hiram Johnson. “We 
have repeatedly explained why neither the Republican nor the Democratic machine is worthy of 
confidence as an agency of progressive economic and political policy.” And so, while Senator 
Johnson deserved “a large measure of sympathy” for his “up-hill fight for the nomination,” the 
editors of TNR “cannot support him because he is running as a Republican on the straight and 
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narrow path of party regularity. That fact renders his candidacy barren. He must subordinate his 
progressivism to his Republicanism.” On the other hand, because – at this moment – Hoover had 
not made clear his party affiliation, “[t]he agitation in favor of Mr. Hoover is equivalent to 
propaganda for the formation of a third party.” In the present two-party system, the magazine 
argued, voters of “independent mind and liberal opinions” were “harmless and ineffective,” but 
if united behind Hoover “in a single party organization, they might at least form a fighting and an 
increasing minority.” In short, TNR concluded: 
 
There is no future for progressivism in American politics until a sufficient number of American 
voters believe sufficiently in the need of it and agree sufficiently in the meaning of it to organize 





The New Republic was not alone in its advocacy of a third party movement. “The largest 
party in the United States,” Borah wrote one constituent in May 1920, “although it has not yet 
received its name nor has been organized is the third party. Everywhere we go the people are 
utterly distrustful that either one of the large parties will really do anything.” “Take Wilson out of 
the Democratic Party,” former Bull Mooser Amos Pinchot had similarly written a friend in 
December 1918, “and what is left? Take a little minority of fairly progressive politicians out of 
the Republican Party and you are in darkest Egypt.”601 
 
Hoover’s candidacy suggested to progressives what the vanguard of a third party might 
look like. In an article the previous year, the editors of TNR had articulated who they believed 
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the rank and file of a new party had to be. In that August article, the problem remained the same: 
“Democratic regularity, based on the Negro-White complex, produces Republican regularity, 
based on fear of the Democrats…That Gronna and La Follette should be in the same party as 
Smoot, Penrose, and Lodge is a joke, but it is a persistent joke. That Hiram Johnson and Borah 
should be under the same label as Brandegee or Warren would be inconceivable if these men 
weren’t tied in a bundle by party regularity.” As a result, TNR explained in Lippmannesque 
terms, both parties “drift helplessly, incapable of foreseeing the needs or expressing the energies 
of the nation. They merely divide the constructive forces and then neutralize them.”602 
 
So a new party was clearly needed. But if this party were to enjoy any success at all, it 
would have to find a way to square “the ancient conflict of interest between the producers of 
food and urban industry, between dear food and cheap food.” In other words, it would have to 
represent the interests of both “the organized farmers and the organized workers,” and find ways 
to soothe the longstanding enmities that divided agriculture and labor, or even labor from each 
other. “The powerful unions occupying strategic positions as in the railroads, for example, have 
hitherto used their power to raise wages, regardless of the effect on the prices which other 
workingmen have to pay for their goods.”603  
 
But if labor interests “unite to insist on a reduction of the cost of living,” TNR thought it 
was inevitable they would “discover that there can be no permanent relief short of a cooperative 
system of distribution for the necessities of life. When they have gotten to that point, they will 
reach common ground with the progressive farmers, and a penetrating social programme will 
begin to define itself. The distributing cooperative, dealing with the farmer on one side and 
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industry democratically controlled on the other, is not only the surest way out of our economic 
troubles but the true bond of unity for all those who want a progressive democracy.”604 
 
In such a party, the editors argued, “[p]olitical representation would follow inevitably and 
naturally. It would not be something based on the popularity of a politician but the expression of 
forces at once aware of their interests and of the larger groupings into which those special 
interests fall.” In other words, disinterested progressive leadership and progressive ideas would 
be the alchemists that could unite laborer and farmer, show them their common interests, and 
thereby transmute class interests into the Public Interest. This, presumably, is why the already-
extant Socialist party was never mentioned as a viable alternative by the editors of TNR in either 
article. Along with being anathema in public life in 1919 and 1920, the Socialists were an 
avowedly class-based party, and progressives were not yet ready to abandon the concept of the 




The problem with a viable Third Party in 1920 is that the progressive vanguard and the 
class-based rank-and-file were not on the same page. From the beginning of the election cycle, 
even if they could agree – despite however often millionaire publisher William Randolph Hearst 
intimated he was available -- that Robert La Follette would make an exemplary standard-bearer, 
progressives and labor leaders often worked at cross-purposes. 
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As early as January 1919, Amos Pinchot and a like-minded “gathering of men and 
women interested in public affairs” came together in New York City to create what they hoped 
would be the seeds of a new third party in the Committee of Forty-Eight. The primary instigator, 
and eventual Chairman of the Committee, was J.A.H. Hopkins, who had led Bull Moose forces 
in 1912 in his native New Jersey, served as national treasurer of the Progressive Party remnant in 
1916, and had also been active in the formation of a National Party – comprised of pro-war 
Socialists – in 1917. Eventually setting up shop on E. 40th St., the Committee set out to organize 
a national “Conference of Liberals” that could agree on a “tentative platform dealing with 
political, social, industrial, and international reconstruction.” Among its executive committee, 
along with Pinchot, were the leading lights of High Society progressivism in New York, 
including academics like Will Durant, Horace Kallen, and Swinburn Hale, ministers such as John 
Haynes Holmes, writers like Lincoln Concord, Robert Morss Lovett, and Harold Stearns, and 




“It was learned yesterday,” the New York Times commented wryly in June 1919, “that the 
organization was representative of the forty-eight States in the Union, not of forty-eight 
individuals.”607 And yet, even as it aspired to be a national movement – sending out platform 
questionnaires to progressive-minded men and women across the country – the Committee 
remained a highly parochial organization of New York progressives, who saw themselves as the 
disinterested focal point of any potential new third party. In the words of the Justice Department 
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surveillance reports compiled by agents infiltrating the organization, the Committee was mostly 
comprised of “parlor Bolshevilks.”608  
 
Nonetheless, the Committee of Forty-Eight opened its doors to all, sending out leaflets 
and advertisements encouraging anyone with interest in a progressive third party to gather in St. 
Louis in December 1919 in order to help develop a platform. Remembering this process, lawyer 
Arthur Garfield Hays said: 
We sat up long hours listening to every crank suggestion presented as the only road to salvation. 
We heard from single-taxers and birth controllers, from health enthusiasts, gymnosophists, 
nudists, fundamentalists, and scientists, from back-to-nature and forward-to-technology orators, 
from silver, gold, and fiat-money adherents. One delegate proposed the building of an Arcadian 
highway around the world with little houses, each with its own garden, dotting the road, as a path 
to international understanding and a method to end war. The suggestion was made that we should 
set up as our standard a sign from a near-by candy store: “If there’s a nut, we have it.”609 
 
From this whittling-down process, the Committee devised a platform that, in the words of 
TNR, was “extremely short and wholly definite and uncompromising”: 
It provides merely for public ownership of transportation, of all public utilities, and of the 
principal natural resources. It declared against the holding of land and patents out of use for 
speculative purposes. It demands equal rights irrespective of sex and color, the immediate and 
unqualified restoration of all civic liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, and the effective 
abolition of injunctions in labor cases. It “endorses” the effort of labor to share in the 




While arguing that public ownership did not inherently result in sound administration 
(“Prussian government owned the railroads…but public ownership did not prevent the rate 
structure from favoring the cartels”) and that “the elimination of economic privilege among 
property-owners will not be sufficient to create a socialized democracy,” TNR thought the 
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Committee’s platform was a “succinct statement of one fundamental cause of American 
economic abuses” that would appeal to “essentially the same traditions and interests which were 
expressed by the progressive movement of 1910-1912…a demand for the more equal distribution 
of the opportunities for making money.”611  
 
With the platform thus set, the Committee of Forty-Eight polled its members in early 
1920 on who they desired to be their standard-bearer. Counted in June, their choice was Robert 
La Follette with 310 first or second-place votes, followed by Herbert Hoover (177), Hiram 
Johnson (155), and Eugene Debs (151).  Wrote one Illinois farmer to the Committee: “La 
Follette is right on labor, liquor, woman suffrage, the treaty, the league, freedom of speech and 
press, amnesty to war prisoners, profiteering, monopolies, initiative and referendum, government 
control and ownership, banking taxation, strikes, lynching, and anything that can be named. He 
is the hope of these states.” “To place his name before the people as a candidate for President,” 
argued another Committee member from Texas, “would be the best way to show the DRAGON 
and its followers that American people repudiate…the last four years of tyranny.” (To further 
stand against “the shylocks and profiteers of our great country,” this man urged Tom Watson of 
Georgia as a running mate.) If it is “Robert M. LaFollette and Henry Ford on the LaFollette 
platform,” urged another Committee member from NY, “the people will do the rest and you and 
yours will have made history by saving their country from the Invisible Government.”612 
 
The Committee also advertised once again in progressive publications and newspapers an 
invitation to all interested to come to a national convention in July to officially form the new 
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party – “a national party representing the needs and hopes of average American men and 
women.”  Since the Republicans and Democrats were “but rival lackeys to great monopolies” 
that “do the bidding of the interests that filled its campaign coffers and paid for its publicity,” the 
ad read, since they were “bankrupt of democratic purpose and have made their peace with a 
treasonable reaction…the time has come for lovers of the real America to organize themselves 
anew, to inaugurate another such period of resolute construction as four generations ago raised 
Jefferson and the once American Democratic party to power, and two generations since raised to 
power Lincoln and the once American Republican Party.”613 
 
That very same generation, however, another group of left-minded individuals were 
trying to build a slightly different third party. Only a few weeks before Arthur Hays and the 
Committee held a cattle call for progressive ideas in St. Louis, delegates of organized labor from 
thirty-five states met in Chicago to form a brand-new Labor Party for America. This Labor Party 
movement was mainly the brain child of the Chicago Federation of Labor, who chafed at the 
yoke of Samuel Gompers’ more conservative and apolitical approach to labor relations. On 
January 4, 1919 – only a few weeks before the Seattle general strike would galvanize the nation 
– the CFL had begun a new publication, The New Majority, under the editorship of former 
Socialist alderman Robert M. Buck, to push for a new worker’s party in America.614 
 
While the Labor Party movement, as one reporter put it, was “born of hatred for the 
American Federation of Labor and nurtured in wrath against its president, Samuel Gompers,”  
the actual convention saw delegates “from every important craft union” in the AFL, according to 
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TNR’s Charles Merz. “The Mine Workers had 179 delegates,” reported Merz, “the Machinists, 
40; the Railway Brotherhoods, 65. There were Plasterers and Nurses and Glassblowers; 
Moulders and Waitresses and Bill Posters; Teachers and Blacksmiths and Lighter Captains.” 
(There were however, very few Farmers in attendance, although the Nonpartisan League had 
sent two “fraternal delegates” to advocate in favor of a farmer-labor alliance.) “Labor is the 
primary and just basis of political responsibility and power,” the universally adopted Declaration 
of Principles at the Convention began. “It is not merely the right, but the duty of workers by hand 
or brain to become a political party.”615 
 
Like the Forty-Eighters, the architects of the Labor Party decried the two existing parties 
for the corruption “by which they gain and keep control of the government. They withhold 
money from the worker and use it to make him pay for his own defeat.” In order to break “the 
shackles of the sinister forces of reaction, corruption, and greed,” it was now time “for the 
workers of the United States to…disengage themselves definitely and permanently from old 
party ties and henceforth support only those who openly espouse the cause of the workers who 
constitute the large majority of our citizens.”616 
 
 Before the Labor convention had convened, organizers had sent out a brief platform that 
looked much like what the Forty-Eighters would eventually agree upon – “freedom of speech, 
nationalization of public utilities and natural resources, and taxation of unused land.” But, in the 
words of Merz, the delegates at the convention “had ears for every voice crying in the 
wilderness,” and so the platform soon swelled from three planks to thirty. In its final declaration, 
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the Labor Party called for “the destruction of autocracy, militarism, and economic imperialism,” 
“complete political and industrial equality of the sexes and of races, nationalities, and creeds,” 
and that government abolish the injunction and do more “to reduce the unreasonable cost of 
living and to curb the depredations of profiteers.” It also advocated an estate tax, an end to child 
labor, the eight-hour day, clean voting, a national referendum on constitutional amendments, 
popular election for federal judges, an end to both federal contractors and unemployment, and 
abolition of both the Senate and the “unlimited power of veto over national legislation now 
exercised by our Supreme Court.”617  
 
Surveying the final product, the editors of TNR deemed Labor’s platform “an exhaustive 
schedule of miscellaneous economic and political reforms, compiled for the purpose of 
assembling on one comprehensive platform as many discontented groups as possible.” Still, they 
argued, the platform included “the raw material…out of which the party can eventually forge the 
needed instrument of progressive agitation and legislation: 
 
It is a clear, even if unwieldy and blundering expression of the needs of a class, whom the 
existing economic and political organization neglects, the class of the wage-earning worker. It 
insists on a method of satisfying those needs which, if carried out would profoundly modify the 
relation among all the classes in American life, but which seeks finally to bring about a class 




To Charles Merz reporting in from the convention floor, some of the planks were 
admittedly “doubtful.” “But whatever the sins” of the Labor platform, he argued, “it is politically 
honest. It does not attempt to substitute unreal issues for genuine ones.” As a reward for focusing 
on these issues, Merz thought, “is likely to be the charge that it is pandering to class sentiment… 
[But] if it is indeed class feeling to which a party of hand and brain workers appeals, it is at least 
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not that minority class which profits from a stand-still order, but that larger class, not only of 
trade unionists, but of farmers, and professional men and small business agents whose interests 
demand a democratic reconstruction in America.”619 
 
With their respective platforms set, both the Committee of Forty-Eight and the Labor 
Party held simultaneous conventions in July of 1920, at the Hotel Morrison and Carmen Hall in 
Chicago respectively – with the hope that the two organizations could unite as one third party 
under the leadership of their mutual first choice as candidate, Robert La Follette. In fact, before 
the respective conventions took place, both the Committee and the Labor Party tendered their 
nominations to the Wisconsin Senator, who was recuperating from the gallstone surgery that had 
been long put off due to the influenza epidemic. In both cases, La Follette – through his 
lieutenants Gilbert Roe and Bob La Follette, Jr. – demurred, for now.  If the Senator had desired, 
he and his aides could likely have foisted the already-written Wisconsin platform, recently 
rejected by the Republicans in Chicago, on both conventions as a condition of his nomination. 
But, instead, La Follette argued that the two groups must first come together on a common 




And so, even as nine hundred Committee delegates from forty-three states listened to 
speeches from the likes of Eamon de Valera (calling for Irish independence) and Taraknath Das, 
secretary of the Friends of Freedom for India, and seven to eight hundred Labor Party delegates 
cheered at pro-worker (and pro-Russia) speeches from the likes of CFL president John 
Fitzpatrick, the real work was being conducted behind the scenes. In several marathon sessions, a 
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five-member Labor Party subcommittee, headed by New Majority editor Robert Buck, and a 
Committee of ’48 subcommittee, under longtime New Jersey progressive George Record, met to 
discuss a common platform that could bring both organizations together and garner La Follette’s 
approval. Each party to the negotiations had brought their own draft platform – the Committee 
had one penned by Record and Pinchot, while the Labor Party had one that already gone through 
their side’s platform committee (and thus could not be easily amended.) In addition, La Follette 
lieutenant Gilbert Roe, participating as an observer, had brought his own draft modeled on the 
Wisconsin platform, which he offered through New York lawyer – and soon-to-be Labor Party 
candidate for Governor of New York – Dudley Field Malone, a delegate at both conventions.621 
 
On much of the substance, there was widespread agreement between the Committee and 
Labor negotiators. As Gilbert Roe informed La Follette after the dust had settled, “agreement 
was readily reached…upon the following propositions: 
(1) Repeal of Esch-Cummins law, (2) government ownership and operation of railroads and 
transportation and of public utilities generally, (3) government ownership and operation of mines 
and other natural resources, (4) right of workers to a voice in the management of above 
industries…(5) Labor’s right to strike, the eight-hour day in industry, and in fact a long list of 
propositions set out as Labor’s Bill of Rights.” (6) The establishment of public markets, rural 
credits, and other aid to farmers and the promotion of cooperation between producer and 
consumer. There was also substantial agreement with regard to all manner of civil liberties, 
military training,, the principle of curtailing the power of the federal courts, and also agreement 




“Here was a program,” Roe concluded, “upon which substantial agreement was reached, 
which was sweeping in its character and which, if put in operation, would have revolutionized 
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the politics and industries of the country and have made of the United States the freest and most 
progressive country in the world.”623  
 
But, even though there was so much in the way of agreement, Committee negotiators 
balked at language and planks that seemed, in Roe’s words, “made from a Trade Union point of 
view rather than from a political point of view.” A plank on “Democratic Control of Industry” – 
“The right of labor to an ever increasing share in the responsibilities and management of 
industry” – caused particular consternation, with Record and Pinchot objecting first to the entire 
inclusion, on the grounds that efforts “should be governed…by actual experience with the 
working of the principle, instead of the opinions of some social theorist or labor union,” and then 
mainly to the word “ever-increasing…whatever that might mean.” Also at issue was a single-tax 
plank, which Roe argued “would have lost us the entire farmer vote,” as well as “an impossible 
banking scheme.”624  
 
Concerns about class bias aside, Committee negotiators also thought the Labor Party 
platform was just too long and unwieldy. “Unless we can agree upon one or two simple, clearly 
understood issues,” Record had told La Follette of the Wisconsin platform, “it is hopeless to 
launch a new party.” This was mainly because, as Robert told La Follette in true progressive 
fashion, a long platform diluted the message and made it nigh impossible to educate Public 
Opinion. “[T]here is very little use,” he wrote, “in putting things in the platform upon which we 
have not the power or do not intend to educate the public in the campaign. The effect of such a 
campaign upon such a platform would be such a wide scattering of our energies and such a 
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confusion of the popular mind that when the campaign was over no central idea would have 
taken possession of the public mind.” And the Labor Party’s proposed platform was considerably 




For both of these reasons, the Committee dug in their heels. But eventually, so too did the 
Labor Party negotiators. “We want Senator La Follette as our candidate just as much as you of 
the Committee of Forty-Eight want him,” Buck told the subcommittee, “but we do not want even 
Senator La Follette as much as we want our programme. And so we now refuse to make any 
further concessions either to bring about harmony between the groups or to get the Senator.”626 
 
The Forty-Eighters’ negotiating position was further harmed when its own convention 
disappeared. Pinchot and Record were already concerned that western members of the 
Committee did not hold the same views as the New York leadership. “[N]obody has understood 
our platform,” Record remarked. Socialists “in the West,” for example, “identify government 
ownership with socialism.”On Tuesday morning, as the platform subcommittee bogged down, 
western Committee delegates walked out of the Hotel Morrison en masse and joined the Labor 
Convention at Carmen’s Hall. Labor Party officials welcomed the swelling of their ranks, but 
also made sure they continued to control the convention floor. “The Labor Party had simply 
swallowed up the ‘48’ convention, reported Frances Tyson of The Survey. “[S]pectators later had 
the unpleasant experience of seeing the ‘48’ leaders disgorged, amid much bickering; when all 
had been said, Labor had its way.”627 
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On the Labor convention floor, delegates considered possible nominees like Henry Ford 
(whose name was booed) and Jane Addams (who removed her name from consideration and 
offered instead “the Jesus Christ of today,” Eugene Debs.) But ever since the beginning of the 
process, it had been assumed by La Follette’s aides, both conventions, and the popular press 
alike that Wisconsin Senator’s nomination was a fait accompli. But since no agreement on the 
platform ever emerged, the Senator’s son and other lieutenants advised him via telegram that he 
should not put his name into nomination. “The ailing Senator,” Arthur Hays wrote in his 
memoirs, “was a good enough politician to realize that there was no national interest in the 
internal warfare in the A.F.L. and that union labor could get nowhere politically without the 
support of the middle class and the farmers. He refused to run as our candidate.” When this was 
announced to the joint convention on the last day of the conference, an impromptu demonstration 
nonetheless broke out all over the floor on behalf of La Follette, with all the campaign 
accoutrements – photograph and banners – that had been planned for his acceptance speech. 
Eventually, Bob La Follette, Jr. had to rush the podium and read a telegram from his father: “I 
have just been informed that contrary to my expressed wishes my name has been placed in 
nomination before your convention. In view of the circumstances which have arisen I do not 
consider myself available and must therefore decline to run if the nomination be tendered me. I 
earnestly hope that my name will be withdrawn without further delay.”628 
 
This enraged several of the Labor men in attendance. One of the platform subcommittee 
members, C.J. France, told the audience (falsely) that La Follette had objected to the Negro 
equality plank. Robert Buck took the stage and argued that “never again would a ‘liberal’ ticket 
hope to win. It must be a radical ticket.” Soon thereafter, the Labor Committee’s platform 
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officially defeated the Committee of Forty-Eight’s alternative, 308-125, at which point what 
remained of the Committee of ’48 delegation – around six hundred delegates – left the building. 
The Labor Party then renamed themselves the Farmer-Labor Party and named Parley Christensen 
of Utah their presidential candidate. “Just before the final vote was taken,” Hays recalled, “Amos 
Pinchot, who had no sleep for three smoke-laden nights, peered quizzically through his pince-nez 
and murmured ‘Parley P. Christensen, oh, very well.” As for Christensen’s running mate, “[s]o 
many tenders of the nomination were made and so many persons refused to submit to the honor 
that it began to look as though the delegates were handing out a term in jail. Finally, in the wee 
hours of the morning, we named by acclamation, and as his back was turned, Max Hayes, a labor 
man from Ohio.” In any case, “[h]ope of an extensive new party movement that would challenge 
the old parties,” reported The Survey’s Francis Tyson, “was dead.”629 
 
To many, it seemed the negotiators had snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, and in 
the wake of the collapse there were plenty of recriminations to go around. “We did not form a 
coalition with the Labor Party because we could not accept its class, guild-socialistic platform,” 
Committee Secretary Allen McCurdy announced in a letter to all Committee of ’48 members. 
“By our refusal to join a class party our position has been clarified. The country now understands 
us to be a group of people intent on economic reconstruction, secured through the ballot for the 
benefit of all people regardless of class.” Arthur Garfield Hays has suspected trouble going in. 
“Some of our younger idealists,” he wrote later, “thought of Labor, spelled with a capital L, as 
some brawny figure come out of a symbolic painting, spiritually and mentally devoted to the 
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democratic ideals that we espoused. Others were more realistic…[and] feared that we would be 
used as pawns in the fight against Gompers…And we were right.”630 
 
Similarly, wrote Amos Pinchot, “[a] great opportunity has been lost” because “the men 
who controlled the Labor Party…were not bent on a new people’s party drawing from the whole 
American public, but on a trade unions party” to “spread British guild socialism in the United 
States” and “destroy Gompers’ leadership” in the AFL. While “the need of a third party that is 
not a class party” still exists, now it was time, Pinchot thought, “to allow to sink home the 
lessons of our miscalculations.” Sympathetic to labor’s claims – “How can people vote 
classlessly when they do nothing else classlessly?” – William Hard also argued in The New 
Republic that La Follette had made the right decision to stand down. “[I]t is not the function, 
since it is not the impulse, of Mr. La Follette to be a labor movement leader.”631  
 
Members of the Labor Party, on the other hand, believed it was the Committee that had 
attempted a class coup at the proceedings. According to Committee negotiator Gilson Gardner, 
Labor leaders said “they did not need our people and did not want us. These leaders saw in any 
successful amalgamation or third party movement with La Follette as candidate an absorption of 
their new labor party. They felt they would be swallowed up by the white collared element. The 
more successful the movement, the less there would be left of them, their leadership, and their 
party.” Dudley Field Malone – now candidate for New York Governor on the Farmer-Labor 
ticket – berated the Committee leaders who had bolted as disconnected eggheads without 
“political knowledge and experience.” They “had formed very strong and definite views as to the 
character of the programme that was to be adopted, and as to the character of the leadership of 
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the new party, without ever consulting the rank file of their own organization, or even trying to 
gauge its views.” As a result, “they are accompanied on their return trip into the political 
wilderness by so few of their rank and file that their defection is not likely to affect the fortunes 
of the new party.” This new party, Malone made sure to mention, “is not a class-party except as 
it is the party of every man and woman who by hand or brain creates the wealth out of which e or 
she lives.”632 
 
Whoever had the right of it, several newspapers portrayed the happenings in Chicago as a 
radical act of class warfare. Much was made of the presence of William Z. Foster, the presumed 
orchestrator of the great steel strike, at the Labor convention, and the New York Times bemoaned 
the attempt to “set up something very like a soviet in this country.” Others remained mostly 
amused at the fumbling attempts to create a third party – a lack of respect that greatly irritated 
the editors of The New Republic. When Republicans left having Chicago “having rubber-
stamped what eight or nine men in a hotel room decided, it is a solemn occasion. It marks a 
return to American ideals. It is the salvation of the Constitution. It is the protection of American 
sovereignty. But if a group of men and women journey to Chicago determined to find some 
alternative…to inject a creative idea into the phrase-mongering of politics, it is excruciatingly 
funny. They are a collection of nuts. They are ridiculous. They are absurd.” While TNR 
conceded that the eventual platform was “badly written, rather confusing at important points, and 
open to the fundamental criticism that it seems to have taken no cognizance of the progress of 
thought and experience since the time when government ownership seemed a simple remedy…it 
is a beginning worth the effort.”633  
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Regardless of who was at fault, the failure in Chicago devastated the leadership of the 
Committee of Forty-Eight. Disgusted that the platform snafu – on which he had been a hard-liner 
at the time – had not been worked out weeks before the convention. Amos Pinchot argued the 
Committed had been “infiltrated by a lot of honest, well-meaning mushheads, who without any 
economic ideas whatsoever, cherished the simple faith that you could form a union of forces by 
getting the discordant elements under the same roof…cat and dog, monkey and parrot, lamb and 
lion would all become a united army of the righteous, marching with brass bands and waving 
banners toward a glorious and gilded millennium situated not farther than half a dozen city 
blocks from the convention hall.” Along with George Record, he left the organization a few 
months later, saying “I do not want again to be off shore in a boat without a compass, and with 
the quartermaster steering consistently for the breakers. I am willing to pull oar, but not in that 
direction.” Another defector was Mercer Green Johnston of Maryland, who told Senator La 
Follette he was resigning due to the “unsportsmanlike conduct of the ‘responsible leaders’ who 
had “played fast and loose with the Labor Party,” and that the Maryland branch of the 
Committee was dissolving as a result. “If the conduct of our ‘responsible leaders’ in Chicago was 
not a crime,” Johnston wrote, “it was perhaps worse for the purposes of practical politics: it was 
a joke. I feel sure you have little or no idea of being the butt of this joke.”634 
 
Even after the schism in Chicago, the Committee of ’48 worked to nominate Robert La 
Follette on their own ticket, with Secretary Allen Curdy urging all members to “send a short 
telegram” to the Senator, “expressing your views as to the state of public opinion in regard to a 
new party in your locality.” In his epistle, Johnston told La Follette “it would be a colossal 
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blunder for you to be sponsored by the discredited ‘rump’ of the Committee of ’48…That 
sponsorship would be a liability rather than an asset in Maryland.”635  
 
Gilbert Roe agreed. “To enter the field now at the head of another party,” he wrote the 
Senator, “will necessarily bring you in conflict with a considerable number of labor leaders who 
have always been and who I believe still are your friends and supporters.” And besides, “[t]he 
time is so late, the situation so confused, the forces naturally friendly to you so divided and 
largely embarked upon separate political enterprises that you cannot hope to poll a vote even as a 
protest vote to which you were entitled.” As such, Roe advised La Follette to wait a cycle. “The 
Democratic and Republican parties as now organized and run can safely be trusted to be wrong 
on both our domestic and foreign policies,” he argued. “In the meantime you will have several 
years to educate the public through your lectures, through your writings and in the Senate and 
will be building up a strong sound sentiment for a new radical but constructive party which this 
country is going to stand in great need of in the very future.”636 
 
La Follette’s son concurred with Roe’s assessment of the situation. “The edge has gone 
off in the third party movement at this time,” he wrote his uncle, “and…the public generally have 
slumped back in the belief that nothing can come of it during this campaign…I do feel…a 
wonderful opportunity has passed and regret it exceedingly, but I think it would be a task 
comparable to lifting one by one’s boot straps to attempt anything now.” 637 
 
Nonetheless, Bob, Jr. continued, “this distinctly is not dad’s attitude…I think if someone 
came along with the money to conduct a campaign he would be a candidate over night, and 
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therefore for the first time I will look askance at anyone who comes along and seems to have any 
indication of carrying money bags.” Eventually, however, Senator La Follette heeded the advice 
of his inner circle and decided not to make any third party run in 1920. Instead, planning for 
what looked to be the now-inevitable future ahead, Senate La Follette spent the remainder of the 
election ignoring requests from the Harding campaign to appear on his behalf, and instead began 
feeling out fellow Members of Congress to see if there was any interest in creating a bipartisan 
bloc of progressives – an Independent Congressional Campaign Committee – moving forward.638 
 
While the failure of third part attempts rankled in 1920, some saw a silver lining in the 
party that almost was. “I think the gains from the convention far outweigh the losses,” Roe wrote 
the Senator. “We uncovered the fact that there was a tremendous sentiment all over the country 
for a third party. It is undoubtedly the fact that you were the choice of such party. And it is also 
the fact, and this is the point I wish to emphasize, that the principles which were agreed upon 
were so fundamental and far reaching that they constituted a programme fully as large and fully 
as advanced as any party ought to consider.” 639  
 
However unsightly the proceedings, The Nation also thought the “efforts to create a third 
party has not been wasted. The beginning seems at the moment unpropitious, but at least it was a 
beginning.” Even the curmudgeonly Pinchot didn’t feel the experience was entirely a waste. “In 
the first fight for these things,” he wrote, “we have been repulsed with loss. But we have gained 
the knowledge, that a new movement has got to grow from the grass roots up and consist of 
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people who not only believe in the goal but agree substantially on the way the goal can be 
reached.” 640 
 
“It was not labor’s cause we differed on,” Pinchot concluded, “nor the need of a great 
party that would give to all the fruit of their own toil and a representation in the management of 
industry. It was whether the way to do this was by a class movement.”641 
 
Mr. Ickes’ Vote 
 
 
Even as Senator La Follette and his confederates tried to fashion a third party in reponse 
to the nomination of Warren Harding, another Republican and former Progressive, Harold Ickes, 
contemplated what was to many a similarly drastic response – leaving the party of Lincoln and 
joining the Democrats. 
 
Ickes, who had been deeply afraid of this outcome ever since the death of Roosevelt, 
suggested bringing former Progressives together in conference as a show-of-strength in 
December 1919, well before the convention. “The standpatters don’t respect anything they don’t 
have reason to fear and that is pretty much human nature,” Ickes argued to Governor Henry 
Allen of Kansas, another veteran of 1912. “You never got anything in this life that you didn’t go 
after and the Progressives of the country won’t get anything merely by lying down and asking 
the standpatters to feel generous towards us because of our self effacement.” But if the 
Progressives met as a group and agreed on basic principles, Ickes thought, “we will have, in my 
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judgment, a strong tonic and moral effect, not only upon the republican organization, but the 
country at large.”642 
 
Governor Allen was cautiously positive about Ickes’ idea, so long as his name, being a 
possible dark horse for the nomination, wasn’t brought up as part of the proceedings. Ickes also 
received favorable responses from other Roosevelt notables, including Raymond Robins, Gifford 
Pinchot, William Allen White, Medill McCormick, and Hiram Johnson. But, nothing much came 
of the idea, and soon enough Ickes was supporting his Governor, Frank Lowden, officially, and 




But the Old Guard’s choice of Harding changed matters. “Frankly, I wouldn’t believe 
Harding under oath,” Ickes wrote Senator Johnson in August, after the nomination. “I think he is 
a double-dyed political crook…a stuffed figure who has no mind or convictions of his own and 
wouldn’t know what to do with them if he had them.” To William Allen White, Ickes called 
Harding “a platitudinous jelly-fish whose election I would regard as distinctly detrimental to the 
best interests of the country.” Instead, Ickes began to consider switching his support to Cox. 
“Aside from the League of Nation issue,” Ickes told Johnson, he found himself “in substantial 
accord with Governor Cox. On the Russian question he opposes the policy of sending soldiers 
into Russia, is against an economic blockade, and believes that trade relations should be resumed 
at once. He thinks Russia should be left free to work out her own political salvation…I like his 
attitude on the question of free speech, free press, the right of free assemblage, and I equally 
approve of his attitude on the question of labor.” 644 
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In contrast to Harding, Ickes deemed Cox “sincerely a progressively-minded man who 
has real concern for the men, women, and children of the country. His policy as shown by his 
record seems to be to get business and labor together wherever possible to work out their 
differences, but where this can’t be done and it is necessary for the state to intervene and protect 
labor from business, then he has no hesitation in taking his stand with labor.” Governor Cox had 
the added virtue, to Ickes as to many others, that he was “not a Wilson man…one can support 
him without running the risk of waking up after [the] election and finding that he has helped to 
keep the Wilson administration in power.” In short, Ickes concluded of the Governor of Ohio: 
“Cox isn’t the man by a good deal that I would have chosen to be president, but he is so far 
superior in my judgment to Harding, both in ability and character and political independence, 
that he offers a clear choice at this time.”645 
 
Ickes expounded on his contempt for Harding in a discussion with Republican Party 
chairman Will Hays. “I told him,” he later reported to Johnson, “that if Harding was elected he 
would leave the party in worse condition than Taft left it in: 
 
that I had been hopefully waiting since 1912 for the Republican party to give some evidence that 
it stood for the things I believed in; that instead of improving it had gone from bad to worse; that 
no political party within the last twenty years had nominated a man as little qualified to be 
president as Harding; that he had been in public life, especially in the United States, for a good 
many years and that he was merely a voting member that he had never stood for anything that 
savored of progress…[and] that I had come to the conclusion that it was hopeless to expect the 








 Ickes to Johnson, August 14, 1920. HLI. Box 33: Hiram Johnson. Despite his own defection, Ickes thought 
Johnson was doing the right thing by staying in the party and solemnly supporting Harding. “You simply have to 
play your part in the campaign,” he told him. “There isn’t anything else you can do and there never has been 
anything else. I am more uncompromising than is good for me and I cannot reconcile myself to the graceful ease 
with which progressives who a few years ago put their hearts into a fight to do away with what Harding so 
preeminently represents in our political life, now rally to his support. But you are in a different situation and if I 






In order to accomplish this goal, Ickes sent out a letter supporting Governor Cox to all the 
members of the 1912 Progressive movement he could find, in order to ascertain the depth and 
commitment of progressive Republicans to the Harding ticket. “After careful consideration,” his 
form letter began:  
 
“I have come to the conclusion that it is my duty as a believer in the progressive principles it was 
my privilege to fight for under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt, as well as my duty as a 
citizen, to support the democratic national ticket in this campaign. I have prepared a statement 
giving some of my reasons for this decision, a copy of which statement I enclose. If you are 
sufficiently interested to read this and write me how you, personally, react in the present situation 
I will be obliged to you.”647 
 
 
The enclosed statement argued that “the nomination of Senator Harding was a distinct 
shock to the Progressives,” that the Senator from Ohio “has the Mark Hanna conception of 
party,” and, knowing his audience, that he is “seeking to capitalize the affection and respect the 
American people feel for the martyred president.” Ickes also sent the statement to 575 
newspapers nationwide, and passed it along to the candidate himself, Governor Cox. “I think 
much might be done to crystallize the sentiment of doubtful Republicans and former 
Progressives in your behalf,” Ickes said to Cox, “and I hope that your managers will undertake 
something along this line as soon as possible.”648 
 
For his part, Hiram Johnson – who remained a regular Republican – applauded Ickes’ 
move, calling his letter of support for Cox “the most powerful thing which has been put out 
against us in this campaign.” Looking to future battles, if not another presidential bid in 1924, 
Hiram Johnson asked Ickes to “tell him the reflex” among former Progressives. “I know the 
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attitude in this campaign, of what I have been pleased to term the ‘shirt-front’ and ‘plug-hat’ 
Progressives,” he told Ickes, “and I am very curious to know whether that represents as little the 
attitude of the rank and file of Progressives as it did in the pre-convention days.”649  
 
After amassing a few hundred responses, Ickes obliged. “To date I have received 256 
letters from progressives in various parts of the country commenting upon my statement in 
behalf of Cox,” he told Johnson a few weeks later. “Of those 256 I find that 114 are against 
Harding. Not all of those who are against Harding have announced that they will support Cox. Of 
those who are supporting Harding practically none is doing it with any heart or enthusiasm.” 
Those who were sticking with the Republicans, he argued, were doing so mainly out of 
misguided party loyalty. “They fool themselves that there is such a thing as party government in 
this country and they have decided that the republican party ought to be restored to power 
regardless of the personality or capacity of its candidate.” 650  
 
Some, according to Ickes, backed the GOP candidate because they “think that Harding is 
an irreconcilable on the League and that Cox is on all fours with the Wilson position.” (Ickes 
personally found this view naïve.) Others were staying with the Republicans because they 
believed “that if Roosevelt were alive he would found back of the republican ticket.” Ickes 
thought this “an easy way of passing the buck,” as “the republicans would not have dared to 
nominate Harding” in that instance. “If these persons would only think back and remember that 
Roosevelt not only supported Taft in 1908, but wished him on the country, they wouldn’t be so 
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certain that they ought to support Harding,” he quipped. “But then it is asking a great deal of 
people to expect them to think or remember politically.”651 
 
Looking over the responses to Ickes’ support, it is clear that, to many Roosevelt 
Progressives only two generations after the Civil War, voting Democratic was simply a bridge 
too far. “I think you have pulled the most colossal ‘bone-head’ in your career,” wrote in one 
correspondent from Snyder, Oklahoma. “You certainly have demonstrated your ability to support 
the ‘Jackass’ party. Them’s my sentiments.” An Omaha attorney concurred with “sorrow and 
great surprise at the stand you seem to have taken: 
 
The Republican party has some bad men in it…but the party itself is good and true and it has 
accomplished the greatest results in statecraft of which we have a historic account. Desert it for 
the democratic party? Ye Gods, No. The candidate may change, but the party never…My idea of 
a good, standard democrat is a good boozer who belongs to Tammany Hall, has a winter home in 
Alabama or South Carolina, favors the league of nations without reservations and can smile at 




“No Democratic party for me in 1920,” began another such missive.  “No Republican 
president would make as many mistakes and be as careless of American interests. The same 
autocratic office-holding southern dishonest bunch will direct the affairs if Cox is elected as now 
direct them…I prefer the company of your so-called ‘Senate Oligarchy’ to the company of 
Tammany.”653  
 
To some former Progressives, Ickes had insulted the memory of the Colonel by 
contemplating such a heresy. “You ought to be ashamed to mention Theodore Roosevelt’s name 
in the same breath with the Democratic Party,” wrote in one correspondent from Boston. “You 
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and every poor misled soul in my opinion are best described by the national emblem of that 
party, which is an ‘ass.’” Similarly, argued a writer from Burlington, Iowa, “if Theodore 
Roosevelt but knew his former supporters were supporting the outfit heading the Democratic 
procession,” he argued, “he would rise in his grave to damn them.” As it was, those 
“consummate asses” Cox and Roosevelt “are making votes for Harding every time they open 
their mouths. I have no time to read your slush so I herewith return it.” 654 
 
Others also invoked Roosevelt’s memory, but in more pragmatic terms. “If the Col. had 
lived the old guard would never have pulled off that old convention gag,” argued a Progressive 
from Panama, Oklahoma, but “of the choice of the two evils I sincerely believe we should 
support Harding.” “Of all prominent candidates before the Chicago convention,” conceded a 
writer from Carson City, Nevada, “Harding was least acceptable to me…[But] we have had eight 
years of Democratic administration.  I am heartily tired of it…My belief is that Col. Roosevelt 
were alive he could now support Mr. Harding.” A member of the Park Board in Excelsior 
Springs, Missouri was also “convinced that if Theodore Roosevelt were alive today he would be 
for Harding and Coolidge with all his strength.” For, while “Harding may be an extreme 
reactionary…many changes have taken place since 1912, and we now need a steady hand at the 
Wheel.”655 
 
Still others thought Ickes was effectively endorsing all the excesses of Wilsonism – the 
“extravagance, southern domination, dishonesty, and visionary schemes,” in one letter-writer’s 
words – by switching parties. “I must say that I regard any man who has ever been a real 
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republican and now falls in line with the Cox-Wilsonian autocracy,” diagnosed a pharmacist 
from Marked Tree, Arkansas, “is a fit subject for an insane asylum. After you have taken 
treatment in a hospital for the insane and restored to a normal condition, I will be glad to give 
you some of the reasons.” One particularly vociferous letter on this front came in from a 
conservative-leaning former Progressive from Cumberland, Maryland:656 
 
“We have seen the ‘Progressives,’ so-called, in power in this country for more than seven years 
and there never has been, in my judgment, in the administration of public affairs in this country, 
such a saturnalia of extravagance and waste. If what has been going on in this period is 
‘progressive’ it is quite time for a ‘shock’… 
 
The Democratic Party unregenerate, vilified and hounded the martyred President until his death 
and now seeks to capitalize his great fame by naming as Vice President a man bearing the name 
of Roosevelt…it has put itself in the role of a grave robber… 
 
If you wish to join the party which in 1916 deceived twenty million women in the United States 
by persuading them that if Mr. Wilson were elected he would keep their husbands, sons, and 
sweethearts out of war, I have no quarrel with you. If you with to join a party, now suffering with  
a stroke of Paralysis, it is no affair of mine…If you prefer to mingle with the party of broken 
promises, the policy of which has filled the country with unrest and turmoil, until thoughtful men 
have begun to tremble for the perpetuity of our institutions…I as a former associate of yours enter 
no protest, but I cannot join you in taking up your habitation in a cemetery… 
 
If you believe in multiplying committees, and commissions to meddle and tamper with the 
industries of this country, you are on the right road…In fine, your pamphlet….reads like the wail 
of a poor loser. The deductions are illogical and the absence of facts prominent. It bears the ear 
marks of insincerity and lack of candor and smacks of the methods used by attorneys when they 
have a bad case.”657 
 
 
Not surprisingly given the irreconcilable campaign of Hiram Johnson, several 
Progressives wrote to Ickes emphasizing the critical importance of the League. “Unlike 
yourself,” argued a lawyer from West Plains, Missouri, “I think the League of Nations is the 
paramount issue in this campaign…I agree with all you say (and with sadness I confess it) about 
the reactionary qualities of Harding’s mind. But I believe we have more chance to win 
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progressive measures in the Republican Party than the Democratic.” Another argued the League 
of was “such transcendent importance that, feeling as I do, I could not support the Democratic 
Party no matter who the candidates of either party were.” Yet another thought that “Cox stands 
absolutely for the League of Nations – which is nothing more than a League with the Devil and 
all his imps. “658 
 
As with many others, that last correspondent thought Ickes was “jumping out of the 
Frying Pan into the Skillet” by going Democratic, and that he should instead take the more 
courageous route of going third party. “The nominees on the old party tickets are both controlled 
by the devils out of hell who are engaging this country in some of the dirtiest deals that humanity 
throughout its whole history has ever witnessed,” continued Mr. Nalley of Forsyth, Georgia. “If 
Cox is any better than Harding I don’t know where he comes in. The Farmer Labor ticket or the 
Socialist ticket may appeal to me when I go to the polls.” As an attorney from Crookston, 
Minnesota, contemplating a Debs vote, put it, “if there is anything more rotten than the 
Republican Party, it is the Democratic Party, and if there is anything more rotten than 
Democratic Party, it is the Republican Party.” 659  
 
Another, from Santa Ana, California, argued that neither a Cox nor a Harding victory 
mattered a whit. “’Big Business of Wall Street will run the government just as it has since 
Roosevelt’s time.” A minister from Naponee, Nebraska said he was voting Harding or 
Prohibition because “I am so disgusted with the democratic administration…[Still] I have yet to 
hear a single man in this section of the country that is satisfied with either candidate.”  A writer 
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from Baltimore who had “gone over to the ‘Drys’, argued that “that old crowd needs another 
licking before they will try to be good.” A dry goods merchant in Quincy, Illinois, deeming the 
two old parties “boss ridden,” argued that “the Farmer Labor Party seems to be the only party 
which puts humanity in first place and the dollar in second place.”660 
 
Still others, even if they themselves had not figured out where they would vote, admired 
Ickes’ stand on principle, and many endorsed his switch to Cox. “You are the first former 
Progressive of national caliber of whom I have heard who has not returned to the Republican 
party on his knees,” noted a correspondent from Indianapolis. Another, a State Treasurer from 
Utah announced he “was very happy to learn that you and some other former Progressives…are 
going to work for Governor Cox whom I have for a long time regarded as a real progressive in 
both word and deed.”661 
 
Ickes wrote many of these correspondents back, or litigated the arguments he was hearing 
in letters to the editor. “If party loyalty requires me to support a man for office whom I believe to 
be unfit,” Ickes wrote in a letter to Charles Sumner of the Pocatello Tribune, “then I have no 
desire to be a loyal party man...The cheapest trick in the whole bag of political controversy is to 
call names when you can’t meet argument with argument…You don’t prove that Harding is fit to 
be President of the United States by calling [me] a ‘Benedict Arnold.’” 662  
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To those who suggested that Ickes had taken Theodore Roosevelt’s name in vain – like 
the Colonel’s own sister, Mrs. Robinson from Mohawk, New York – Ickes replied that “I have 
not said, either publicly or privately, at any time that if Theodore Roosevelt were alive he would 
be supporting the Cox-Roosevelt ticket…I revere his memory too much to use it as a lever to pry 
into public office men who are not worthy to be mentioned in the same breath as him.” To those 
who argued his Cox vote was a vote for Wilson, Ickes reminded readers “as to the present 
administration…I have been against it with all my might…not merely because it has been 
democratic maladministration, but because it has been maladministration. I wouldn’t, if I could, 
jump from Wilson’s maladministration to Taft’s and that is the reason I’m opposing Harding.”663 
 
With regard to the third party issue, Ickes responded with a letter to the editors of The 
New Republic, who, like The Nation, loudly and vociferously called for progressives to vote third 
party in 1920. “If the protest vote is really a protest vote and has the courage of its convictions,” 
he argued, “it won’t throw itself away” by voting for Parley Christensen or Eugene Debs. 
Instead, he argued, “it will make itself felt in the only way in which it can be felt and that will be 
by supporting the democratic national ticket.” The Old Guard, he argued, are “counting upon the 
independent or ‘high-brow’ voters who think they are protesting when they are merely throwing 
their votes away…A vote for Christensen or Debs is half a vote for Harding.”664 
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As these letters attest, a lot of venom was directed Ickes’ way for his apostasy, and, as the 
Chicago political veteran confessed to Hiram Johnson, he was particularly perturbed by the pro-
Harding stance of old friends from Roosevelt’s circle like Raymond and Margaret Dreier Robins. 
The latter supported the Republicans, according to Ickes, “because she believed Harding’s 
position on the right of free speech and free assemblage was better than Cox,” although he added 
that her husband Raymond “didn’t believe Harding would stick to that position longer than 
November 2.”665  
 
The Robins were not alone in this regard. In fact, when pro-Harding forces wanted a 
former Progressive of stature to go on the record with a response to Ickes’ public disavowal, they 
found a ready partner in former Secretary of the Interior Gifford Pinchot. “So many former 
Progressives have asked me why I am for Harding,” Pinchot’s form response to newspapers 
began, “that perhaps your readers might be interested in my reasons.” They were many of the 
same that Progressives had already made to Ickes. For one, Pinchot argued, “I am a follower of 
Theodore Roosevelt alive or dead…I am a Roosevelt Republican. Had he lived my choice for the 
Republican nominee and for the next President would have been Theodore Roosevelt. But only 
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the spirit of Roosevelt is with us still...That, however, is no reason for throwing my vote 
away.”666 
 
Similarly, while Harding was no Roosevelt and “was not made to my order,” Pinchot 
argued, “he is by no means the Reactionary I thought him.” He “is no super-man, but simple 
earnest, and human, best thought of where best known.” Most importantly, “[t]here is nothing 
autocratic about him. Under him, there will be no one-man rule at Washington…the government 
will be American again.”667 
 
Governor Cox, meanwhile, was “in bad company.” The “liquor men are for him,” but it 
wasn’t just the forces of criminal wetness at the Democratic candidate’s back:  
 
Cox stands for Palmer, who promised to reduce the cost of living and conspicuously failed, but 
for political reasons let the liquor traffic go on; who denied the rights of free speech and fee 
assembly; imprisoned hundreds of people in defiance of the law he was sworn to enforce…There 
may have been more unfaithful public servants than Mitchell Palmer, but not many. 
 
Cox stands for Wilson…The people of the whole earth have learned at bitter cost that what 
Wilson says is no indication of what he has done or what he will do; that his words and actions do 
not match; and that to have his own way is more important in his eyes than the safeguarding of 
America…If a man believes in Wilson, argument is useless. As for me, I hold that it is time to 
finish with all that smacks of Wilson, with the inefficiency, extravagance, and secretiveness with 






“The only way to repudiate Wilson,” Pinchot concluded “is to vote against Cox.” Writing 
to Ickes personally, Pinchot confessed that Harding might well fail in the job, at which point, 
“there will be a repetition of 1909-10-11, with an insurgent group in Congress, and the overturn 
of the Republican leadership, probably this time for good.” Still, Pinchot confessed he had been 
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taken by the positive statements he was hearing about Harding, and hoped “we are all going to be 
most pleasantly surprised – at any rate, I hope so.” Either way, Pinchot told Ickes, “I still have 
the feeling that our day is not over, that Progressive sentiment in the country will revive rapidly 
and powerfully as soon as the immediate shadow of the War passes over.” 669  
 
Ickes disagreed strongly with Pinchot’s public endorsement of Harding, but he too 
thought there remained a few chapters left in the tale of the Bull Moose Party. “I am very much 
encouraged by the large proportion of former Progressives who are still willing to do their own 
thinking and stand by their own convictions,” he told Hiram Johnson after reviewing the many 
responses he had received. “I have had some really fine intelligent and encouraging letters from 
progressives in various parts of the country.”  Nonetheless, Ickes had no illusions about the 
contest to come: “On the basis of the letters…my opinion is confirmed that if Harding is elected 
(and I always have expected him to be elected) it will be really on account of the anti-democratic 





Countdown to a Landslide 
 
 
As the general election season ran its course – one of the “most joyless, futile, and 
irritating campaigns in our history,” lamented The New Republic – few if any political observers 
gave James Cox even an outside chance of winning the presidency. The nomination of Harding, 
argued southern progressive Edward G. Lowry, had revealed the “absolute surety and confidence 
of the managers of the Republican party that they have the elections next November in the palm 
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of their hands: that they can win in a walk.” The Old Guard was not alone in this way of 
thinking. “All indications,” editorialized The Nation, “are that reaction is to carry the coming 
elections by overwhelming majorities…That Governor Cox faces an overwhelming defeat is 
now freely conceded…by even the pro-Cox newspapers.” “Never within my recollection of 
politics,” said William Howard Taft, “has a Republican victory been so assured.” Calvin 
Coolidge wrote to a friend that he expected “something more than a landslide,” while Hiram 
Johnson surmised that “if it were a prize fight the police would interfere on the grounds of 
brutality.” 671 
 
 The sense of impending doom for the Democrats was further heightened by a number of 
trends. While most Republicans, including even Herbert Hoover, Hiram Johnson, and William 
Borah, gamely talked up Harding’s candidacy on the trail – a still-irate Leonard Wood being a 
notable exception -- prominent Democrats like William Jennings Bryan and an equally peeved 
A. Mitchell Palmer took no part in the general election proceedings. In addition, there was the 
matter of money: In total, Republicans spent nearly four times as much on their candidate -- $8.1 
million to the Democrats’ $2.2 million. And the early returns from Maine, which held its 
presidential election in mid-September, further demoralized Democrats. Cox had hoped to come 





In fact, the only man in America who seemed to think a Cox-Roosevelt victory was 
assured in 1920 was Woodrow Wilson. When Josephus Daniels prophesied that the Democratic 
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ticket was a goner, Wilson was baffled. “Do you mean,” he replied, dumbfounded, “it is possible 
that the American people would elect Harding?” When Wilson’s postmaster general tried to tell 
the president much the same, Wilson exclaimed “Burleson, shut up! You are a pessimist!” When 
his brother-in-law tried to prepare Wilson for what was to come, the president just said, “You 
don’t understand the American people.” A week before Election Day, Wilson received a group 
of pro-League Republicans, several of whom were moved to tears by the pathos of the moment, 
and told them how “the nation was never called upon to make a more solemn determination than 
it must now make. The whole future moral force of Right in the world depends upon the United 
States.” Even on Election Day, Wilson told his Cabinet not to worry. “The American people will 
not turn Cox down and elect Harding. A great moral issue is involved. The people can and will 
see it.”673 
 
In his denial and despair, the president could not see it. But everyone else in America 
knew the biggest problem facing the Cox-Roosevelt ticket was, of course, the legacy of the 
Wilson years. As Governor Cox was forced to respond to a heckler at a Kansas pitstop, “Wilson 
isn’t running for president this year. Cox is running for president.” But the shadow of Wilson 
was everywhere. “The second four years of Wilsonism were too much for the ordinary 
American,” remarked The Nation. “The one fundamental issue is now evident: it is Woodrow 
Wilson himself…It is obvious that the determining factor in this campaign is a desire to rebuke 
and put an end to the policies of the Wilson administration.”674  
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“Here,” prophesied H.L. Mencken, calling the election for Harding, “is the reason the 
overwhelming majority of Americans are going to vote for him”: 
They tire, after twenty years, of a steady diet of white protestations and black acts; they are weary 
of hearing highfalutin and meaningless words; they sicken of an idealism that is oblique, 
confusing, dishonest, and ferocious. The thing began under Roosevelt, the bogus Progressive. It 
has continued ad nauseum under Wilson, the bogus Liberal. Today no sane American believes in 
any official statement of national policy, whether foreign or domestic…Tired to death of 
intellectual charlatanry, he turns despairingly to honest imbecility.”675 
 
This view of Harding as an explicit repudiation of Wilsonian overreach was cultivated by 
both his allies and adversaries. As the Senator himself had famously argued in May, “America's 
present need is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums, but normalcy; not revolution, but 
restoration; not agitation, but adjustment; not surgery, but serenity; not the dramatic, but the 
dispassionate; not experiment, but equipoise; not submergence in internationality, but 
sustainment in triumphant nationality.” In the same speech, Harding reminded his Boston 
audience that “all human ills are not curable by legislation, and that quantity of statutory 
enactment and excess of government offer no substitute for quality of citizenship.” The problems 
America faced, Harding argued, “are not to be solved by a transfer of responsibility from 
citizenship to government,” but by “the normal forward stride of all the American people.”676 
 
 Similarly, advertisements for the Republican ticket promised that Harding and Coolidge 
“will concern themselves with immediate problems – not fancy theories. They are of the people 
and for the people – old-time Americans who place their faith in the Declaration of 
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Independence.” At campaign events, Republicans sang, “We’ll throw out Wilson and his crew. 
They really don’t know what to do.”  Harding continually spoke out on the campaign trail 
against “one-man government” and “weird economic and social theories” and for “more business 
in government and less government in business” and “party government as distinguished from 
personal government, individual, dictatorial, autocratic, or what not.” The rejection of the Wilson 
years was also embodied in the slogan of the Harding campaign: “Let’s be done with wiggle and 
wobble.”677  
 
In the early months of the general election season, Harding’s handlers had him 
deliberately recreate the Front Porch campaign of William McKinley, complete with McKinley’s 
old flagpole transplanted from Canton to Harding’s front yard in Marion. (As Boies Penrose 
purportedly said, “Keep Warren at home. Don’t let him make any speeches. If he goes on a tour, 
somebody’s sure to ask him questions, and Warren’s just the sort of damn fool to try to answer 
them.”) In one concession to changing times – conceived by Albert Lasker, now working for the 
Republican ticket – Harding was also visited in Marion not just by eminent Republicans but by 
the Chicago Cubs and Hollywood celebrities like Mary Pickford, Tom Mix, D.W. Griffith, 
Lillian and Dorothy Gish, and Al Jolson, who sang a tune of his own devising: “We Think the 
Country’s Ready / For Another Man Like Teddy / We need another Lincoln / To do this 
country’s thinkin’ / Mister Harding / You’re the man for us.”)678 
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Writing in TNR, Edward G. Lowry concurred with this assessment of Harding as an anti-
progressive throwback. “He has not changed with the times,” wrote Lowry. “I don’t know that he 
has even heard the news that’s going round. If he has heard it, he doesn’t believe it.” Rather, 
Lowry argued, “Mr. Harding belongs to the same age, era, epoch, or period as the wooden 
Indians who used to stand so massively, so passively, and so innocuously in front of cigar shops. 
He is as old-fashioned as that.” The editors of TNR agreed, describing the Ohio Senator as “a 
reactionary in the exact sense of that word, because he openly desires to return to the politics of 
the nineteenth century. He is not a conservative because he does not wish to conserve the chief 
results of the progressive movement of the last twenty years. He does not wish to stand pat but to 
step back.” To The Nation, Harding was “distinctly a reactionary” who would “always be ready 
to take orders from the financial masters of the party.”679  
 
At times, TNR seemed positively livid by all that the Republican candidate represented. 
Harding “has been told by his friends and his critics that he is colorless and dull, weak and 
servile,” wrote Lippmann. “Right you are, says the Senator. You have described exactly the kind 
of man this country needs”: 
 
It has tried Roosevelt and Wilson and look. It can’t stand the gaff. I am nothing that they were. I 
am no superhuman like Roosevelt and no superthinker like Wilson. Therefore, I am just the man 
you are looking for. How do I know that? I am distinguished by the fact that nothing distinguishes 
me. I am marked for leadership because I have no marks upon me. I am just the man because no 
one can think of a single reason why I am the man.”680 
 
In a venomous piece that verges on the hysterical, TNR’s editors deemed Harding’s 
nomination “nothing short of a calamity”: 
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Only once before in the history of the nation, that is, in the years immediately preceding the 
election of Washington, has the American people been confronted with the necessity for an 
equally grave and complicated group of decisions…Yet the Republican party has selected this 
critical moment to nominate as its Presidential candidate a party hack, without independence of 
judgment, without strength of character, without administrative experience, without knowledge of 
international politics, without any of the moral and intellectual qualities which would qualify him 
even under ordinary conditions for statesmanlike leadership… 
 
The inference to be drawn from this amazing and sinister action of the Republican party is plain. 
It has ceased to be an organ of government on which the American people have reason to depend 
for the enlightened conduct of their political affairs.  By virtue of nominating Harding as well as 
by virtue of its platform it has confessed to bankruptcy; it has confessed to an utter lack of 
convictions, enthusiasms, and ideas; to a preference for cheap expediencies and phrases rather 
than for principles and their courageous and realistic application. It can no longer claim to be a 






In short, they argued, “the Republican Party while cheering the name of Roosevelt has 
finally repudiated his work root and branch...The progressive agitation of the last twenty years 
within the Republican party has ended in a flat failure’” To TNR, the unkindest cut of all was 
seeing the former embodiment of their hopes, Herbert Hoover, endorse Harding. This, they 
argued, was “final proof of the incompatibility of being Republican and progressive or liberal.” 
To which H.L Mencken responded, it is true that Harding “is not a fraudulent Progressive like 
Cox, but a frank reactionary. Well, if we are to have reaction, why not have it willingly and 
without any attempt to disguise it?” 682  
 
One man not quite ready to see reaction ascendant was Republican editor William Allen 
White, who wrote Warren Harding to encourage him to embrace the progressives in his party. “I 
feel that your election is fairly assured by the weakness of the Democratic nomination,” he told 
Harding in July. But progressives “don’t like this ‘back to normal’ business. They don’t like you 
to be called a man of the McKinley type, because they feel that the McKinley day was the least 
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satisfactory in the history of the Republican party.” Instead, White begged the candidate to drop 
the “school-reader Americanism and resounding phrases of that sort” and explain the “specific, 
progressive performance” America could expect from him as president. 683 
 
A magnanimous sort in any event, Warren Harding could afford to be magnanimous to 
the progressives in his party. In order to hold the Republican coalition of reservationists and 
irreconcilables together, the Senator was already forced to tack back and forth on the question of 
the League. More often than not, Harding decried both Article X and “Wilson’s league,” while 
leaving the door open to some sort of future international association that would follow the 
judicial template supported by conservatives. In this manner, everyone from Taft and Root to 
Borah and Johnson presumed that they could sway Harding to their view of things after the 
election. On the League issue, TNR argued, Harding “frankly does not know exactly what he 
wants, and consequently he does not know how to do it, and all that he is certain about…is that 
he will not accept” what Wilson stands for. The Nation put it more succinctly. “Senator Harding 
is a master of ambiguous utterance.”684 
 
And so, even as he continued to run against Wilsonism in general, Harding gave a speech 
on “Social Justice” in early October that attempted to allay some progressive concerns about 
him. Speaking from his front porch to a delegation of women headed by Margaret Dreier Robins, 
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Harding pledged “to support with all that is in me whatever practical policy of social welfare and 
social justice can be brought forward by the combined wisdom of all Americans.” Specifically, 
Harding pledged to “careful and adequate protection” for women in the labor force and an 
expanded Children’s Bureau “capable of educating and assisting in pre-natal care and early 
infancy.” While bureaucracy was not the answer, he also pledged a stronger federal commitment 
to both the public health and education by advocating for a Department of Public Welfare which 
could stimulate “by research and education, the communities and local governments of the 
United States to the most active and efficient campaign against low standards of physical well-
being” and work to support child and adult education that could be “the true bulwark against 
extreme radicalism” and “the basis for an intelligent, free, and tolerant thought.” 685 
 
In the same speech, Harding also emphasized his support of the right to unionize and 
collective bargaining, and lamented that, in the modern workforce, “tasks…have become so 
specialized that the men and women themselves have become almost pieces of mechanism…In 
such a condition men and women are burned dry of the impulse to create.” Under his 
administration, Harding argued, labor and employers would “combine to make every job, no 
matter what it is, a friend of the man who does it.” Florence Kelley, who was in attendance, 
found the whole event heartening but somewhat mystifying. The candidate, she told her son 
Nicholas, gave “promises [that] were evidently written for him by highly intelligent, well-
informed women.” On the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act, Harding “committed 
himself to the whole subject…in a manner very surprising to Mrs. Robins, Mrs. Gifford Pinchot, 
and myself. He will have no rest until the bill is passed!”686  
 
                                                          
685
 Edward T. Devine, “Social Justice and the Government,” The Survey, October 23, 1920, 119. Bagby, 149. 
686




Harding’s Social Justice address was loudly applauded, not just by the women in 
attendance, but by members of the larger progressive community in general. In The Survey, 
Edward T. Devine heralded that both candidates “have clearly committed themselves to 
enlightened and progressive action in the interest of the social welfare, interpreting this term in 
its specific sense as applying to health, including maternity care, to education, and to industrial 
relations.” And even Oswald Villard of The Nation conceded that Harding, for once, was on the 
right track.
 But Hiram Johnson, for one, wasn’t buying it. The idea that Harding had somehow 
“metamorphosed from a ruthless standpatter into a militant progressive” was ludicrous to 
Johnson. Yet, he wrote to Harold Ickes “[t]his is exactly what many of our common friends think 
has transpired. It is what I am perfectly certain has not happened.”687 
 
Whether or not Harding’s Social Justice speech convinced progressives, there was no 
identifiable surge of left-minded Republicans leaving the party for Cox, even as the Governor 
tried desperately to conjure one. “The normalcy voiced by [Harding] as visioned by his masters,” 
Cox proclaimed on the campaign trail. “is the bayonet at the factory door, profiteering at the 
gates of the farm, the burden of government on shoulders other than their own and the Federal 
Reserve System an annex to big business.” But, like so many other of Cox’s attacks on the 
overwhelming frontrunner, his nods to progressivism didn’t help to move the needle in the 
Democrats’ favor.688 
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For Cox, nothing seemed to work. Early in the general election season, the Governor of 
Ohio – relying on Republican fundraising documents that had come his way – accused Harding 
and the Old Guard of collaborating in a “business plot” to “buy the presidency” through the use 
of a gigantic “slush fund…so stupendous as to exceed the realm of legitimate expense.” Cox first 
set the size of this “corruption fund” at $15 million, later $30 million. (It later turned out to be 
$8.1 million, and heavily financed by oil barons like Jake Hamon, Harry Sinclair of Sinclair 
Consolidated, and even Democrat Ed Doheny, who gave $25,000 to Harding and $75,000 to 
Cox.) Harding responded by calling Cox’s accusation “ridiculous and wholly without 
foundation,” and Republican Party officials called the documents to which Cox was alluding 
merely a “roseate estimate” of fund-raising prowess. While Cox succeeded in getting a Senate 
Committee to look into the accusations, it otherwise didn’t stick during the election season. 
Boies Penrose argued Cox was trying to deflect attention away from the high cost of living, 
Wilson officials wondered why Cox wasn’t staking his central claim on the League, and, by 




To H.L. Mencken, writing after the fact, Cox’s slush fund attack revealed a “defective 
political sense.” “Assuming that his allegations are all true,” Mencken argued, Cox “obviously 
made them too soon. He should have let the Republicans collect the money, and then exposed 
their method of spending it. This is what Borah and Hiram Johnson did in their battle against 
Wood and Lowden – and the success of the device is history. But Cox shot off all his 
ammunition before the enemy was in range.” 690  
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In early September, Harold Ickes suggested to Cox that “after the Senate Committee has 
proceeded a little further with its investigation it might be good political tactics” for him to offer 
Harding a mutual pledge “not to expend more than $2,000,000 each in this campaign,” and to 
create an independent commission to enforce it. “My confident belief,” Ickes argued, “is that the 
Republicans will refuse to accept such a proposition and such a refusal would give point to the 
charges that you have already made that they are relying too much upon the mere use of money 
to win the election. I believe that such a refusal will do violence to the sense of fairness that the 





Nor did Cox and Roosevelt make much headway on the matter of the League. Although 
he eventually gave ground on the question of reservations, Cox was for the most part a good 
soldier in the Wilson cause: He told Wilson himself, when the Democratic ticket came to pay 
respects to the sickly president, that he was “a million per cent” behind the League. He charged 
that Republican “conspirators of hate,” under Henry Cabot Lodge’s diabolical leadership, had 
managed “the greatest instance of partisan obstruction of human progress in all of human 
history.” In standing for Wilson’s League – a question that “has possessed my very soul,” Cox 
argued he was fighting “for the creed of Christ and not the creed of Cain.” The question before 
the American people, Cox argued on the final day of the campaign, was “whether the civilization 
of the world shall tie itself together into a concerted purpose to prevent the tragedies of war.” As 
such, “[e]very traitor in America will vote tomorrow for Warren G. Harding.”692 
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Unfortunately for Cox, the League never really took as an issue either. For one, Harding 
– to placate his expansive base – had managed to muddy the waters successfully as to where he 
actually stood on the League. “The League of Nations? There was no real difference between the 
parties,” wrote W.E.B. Du Bois. “It was all a matter of punctuation and style.” For another, a 
statement by “Thirty-One Proleague Republicans” – including Herbert Hoover, Elihu Root, 
Charles Evans Hughes, and William Allen White – on behalf of Harding gave the Senator from 
Ohio valuable political cover. And, in any case, after two long years of debating the subject, the 
American people had had enough of the issue. “I do not believe that most Americans are 
positively against the League,” wrote H.L. Mencken. “But an enormous majority of them are 
violently against any further discussion of the League. They are tired of the whole vexatious 




On this question, Governor Cox wasn’t helped by, in what turned out to be one of the 
biggest gaffes of the campaign, the grandstanding of his running-mate. In the midst of a western 
campaign swing, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt assured an audience that, 
much as the various members of the British Empire were in England’s pocket, Haiti and the 
Republics of Central America would essentially be a voting bloc for the United States to use at 
will, should America join the League. “The Republicans are playing a shell game on the 
American people,” boasted Roosevelt: 
 
They are still busy circulating the story that England has six votes to America’s one. It is just the 
other way. As a matter of fact, the United States has about twelve votes in the Assembly. Until 
last week, I had two of them myself, and now Secretary Daniels has them. You know I have had 
                                                          











Warren Harding immediately leapt on the mistake, deeming it “the most shocking 
assertion that ever emanated from a responsible member of the government of the United 
States.” The Ohio Senator promised that his administration would never “empower an Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy to draft a constitution for helpless neighbors in the West Indies and jam it 
down their throats at the points of bayonets borne by U.S. marines.” To W.E.B. DuBois, 
Roosevelt’s “impudent assertion” showed how “this great government has been made the 
catspaw of thieves…May the League of Nations be delivered from its fool friends, and may Haiti 
find New Freedom when the impossible Wilson and his lackeys disappear.” FDR eventually 
backtracked by saying he was misquoted, but the damage was done, both to the campaign and 
the young Roosevelt’s reputation.695 
 
As the presidential race seemed to move further and further out of reach, some political 
onlookers suggested additional potential Hail Marys. In mid-October, Harold Ickes and Donald 
Richberg informed Cox that Harding’s election could well mean “a war of aggression against 
Mexico.” “I got additional information from a confidential source,” Ickes wrote the Governor, 
“which thoroughly convinces me that it is the present purpose of the republican candidate to 
intervene in Mexico in the hope and belief that intervention will be followed by annexation.” 
(Presumably, this confidential source had gotten wise to the oil interests, like Jake Hamon, now 
backing Harding’s candidacy.) Cox did not bite. For his part, H.L Mencken argued, when all was 
said and done, that Cox could “have carried every large city in the country” if he had just come 
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out more forthrightly as a Wet. “More, he would have done serious execution upon Gamaliel in 
many a rural district,” Mencken thought, “for the yokels are growing weary of paying $17 a 
quart for two-day-old redeye, and are ready to go over to the devil.” But Prohibition too 




One gambit which Cox and the Democrats did try was the race card. However 
progressive he was purported to be, Cox was not above trying to disparage the Republican ticket 
in front of certain crowds with the threat of Negro equality. Attempts by Republicans to get out 
the African-American vote, such a handbill featuring Harding and six black candidates, was 
fodder for a Democratic response entitled, “A Timely Warning to the White Men and White 
Women of Ohio.” It blared, much to the consternation of The Crisis, that “Ohioans should 
remember that the time has come when we must handle this problem in somewhat the same way 
as the South is handling it!”697  
 
In the final month of the campaign, the genealogical research of one Professor William 
Estabrook Chancellor began making the rounds. It claimed, after multiple discussions with 
members of Harding’s family, that the Republican candidate was in fact one-eighth black – an 
octoroon, in the parlance of the time – on account of a West Indian great-grandfather. While Cox 
did not partake of this opposition research – perhaps because Cox and Harding were also 
rumored to share a family tree – some of his more unsavory surrogates did, and soon the rumor 
was all over the campaign trail. In Ohio, some Republicans on the ground began to panic. “You 
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have no conception of how the thing is flying over the state,” one operative wrote Daugherty. “It 
is everywhere. It is affecting the woman vote.” 698 
 
Will Hays and the Republicans responded by drawing up lily-white ancestral trees for 
Harding to be printed in newspapers as a rebuttal. Some Republican papers, like the Dayton 
Journal, who deemed this whispering campaign “the vilest plot and conspiracy in the history of 
the worst epoch of American politics” – posted and then rebutted the charges. W.E.B. DuBois 
was disgusted by both sides in this flap. “Suppose President Harding is colored – What of it?” he 
asked in The Crisis. “He would be but one of hundreds of distinguished Americans who served 
their country well from the days of Alexander Hamilton.” DuBois added that he couldn’t 
determine “which was worse: the shrieking whispers of the Democrats, or the vociferous denials 
of the Republicans of the taint! Taint, forsooth! What could taint America?”699 
 
Harding, meanwhile, refused to explicitly deny the rumors at first, vociferously or 
otherwise. Asked by a reporter from the Cincinnati Enquirer, Harding responded, “How do I 
know, Jim? One of my ancestors may have jumped the fence.” In any case, despite some drama 
in the final weeks of the campaign trail, which forced the Republican candidate to return to his 
home state to smother the rumors, the question of Harding’s possible mixed-ancestry never 
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If nothing else seemed to work, Cox and Roosevelt tried to beat the Republican ticket by 
dint of sheer effort. While Senator Harding took callers at his front porch in Marion, Cox 
undertook a coast-to-coast campaign schedule that was deemed “the most strenuous ever 
undertaken by a nominee for the Presidency.” In total, Cox traveled 22,000 miles across 36 
states, and gave 394 speeches to approximately two million people, sometimes as many as 26 
times a day. Although he developed a reputation on the road as being somewhat immature, Cox’s 
strapping young running mate also lived up to the vigorous Roosevelt reputation, traveling 
18,000 miles and averaging ten speeches a day on behalf of the ticket. (Roosevelt told audiences, 
in Rooseveltian fashion, that he’d drag Harding off his Front Porch. Amiable, if confused, former 
Bull Moosers often replied, “I voted for your old man, and I’ll vote for you!”) And, while Bryan 
and Palmer remained aloof, Democrats like William McAdoo and Al Smith also helped to carry 




 It was all for naught. 
 
The Triumph of Reaction 
 
 
“Well, I suppose even you are surprised at the overwhelming character of the Republican 
victory last Tuesday,” Harold Ickes wrote Hiram Johnson after Election Day. “I expected 
something in the nature of a landslide for Harding, but I didn’t think the vote would be as near an 
approach to unanimity as it was.” Ickes was in good company -- Nobody had expected such a 
consummate thrashing. The results, according to KDKA in East Pittsburgh, delivering the first-
ever breaking radio news broadcast: Harding and Coolidge won 404 electoral votes and 60 
percent of the popular vote, compared to 126 and 34% for Cox and Roosevelt respectively – the 
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largest margin of victory at that time since James Monroe ran virtually uncontested in 1820. 
(Eugene Debs, still in prison, won 3.4%, including the vote of Jane Addams. Parley Christensen 
and the Farmer-Labor Party, only 1%.) Republicans also wrested ten Senate seats and 64 House 
seats from the Democrats, giving them a 22-seat majority in the Senate and a 303-131 edge in the 
House – the largest in the party’s history. “We have torn up Wilsonism by the roots,” beamed 




The Republican tidal wave was remorseless, washing over even such heretofore 
Democratic strongholds as Tennessee, thus breaking the Solid South for the first time since 
Reconstruction; New York, where the otherwise-popular Governor Al Smith – running a million 
votes ahead of Cox -- was still ousted from office; and Boston, where Irish-Americans were 
deeply antagonistic to the thought of Irish independence being decided by the League of Nations 
– where England had six votes. (For similar reasons, Democratic Senator James Walsh of 
Massachusetts developed a strange laryngitis during the campaign that inhibited his ability to 




The north end of Boston was no happier – Italian-Americans resented Wilson’s attempts 
in Paris to prevent Italy’s post-war incursion into Central Europe, and voted accordingly. And 
German-Americans, another traditionally Democratic vote, were also unhappy with the ticket, 
thanks to Governor Cox’s proud and often-mentioned record of anti-German legislation during 
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the war. (Despite the popular convention now, there is no evidence that new women voters 




The outcome was so decisive that neither of the Democratic candidates took it personally. 
“It was all inevitable,” Governor Cox wrote Harold Ickes after the returns were in. “Therefore, 
we must face it with the right sort of philosophy”: 
 
There was never a time that I did not recognize the tremendous odds against us, but frequently I 
felt that there was some evidence of returning fervor of the war. It is nothing more nor less than 
the manifestation of human nature. The fact that the landslide operated everywhere the same is 





Now that the “reactionary forces will have such power, prestige, and patronage” in the 
Republican Party “that there can be little hope of principle over-riding expediency in that 
organization,” Cox expected to see “a breaking down of party lines” in the years to come, and he 
had “every hope that the Democracy will be the means of promoting true progress…The crowd 
that is in control believes in reactionaryism. The interests behind them are emboldened by what 
they will convince themselves to be a protest against progressive movements.”706 
 
Ickes was inclined to agree. “The pendulum swung just as far as it could,” he wrote 
Hiram Johnson. “It will have to come back and I confidentially expect it to come back before 
long. I simply can’t conceive of the possibility of a man without either character or ability 
making good as president of the United States.” Regarding his own apostasy in voting for Cox, 
Ickes claimed he hadn’t “any regrets for the position I took during the campaign. On the 
contrary, even in the light of the results on Tuesday, I would do exactly the same thing again. We 
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are suffering from a political disease that has to run its course, but that it will run its course I 
haven’t a particle of doubt.”707 
 
Although he now signed his letters “Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ex V.P., Canned 
(Erroneously reported dead),” Cox’s running mate was similarly philosophical. Roosevelt 
attributed the overwhelming Harding victory to the “tidal flow of discontent and destructive 
criticism” that followed the end of the great conflagration. “Every war brings after it a period of 
materialism and conservatism,” he argued. “[P]eople tire quickly of ideals and we are now 
repeating history.” FDR predicted to his running mate that Democrats would be now out of 
power until a serious depression occurred. Until then, it could be a bumpy ride. “Thank the 
Lord,” he confessed to a friend, “we are both comparatively youthful.”708 
 
Like Roosevelt, Senator Hiram Johnson also blamed the war for the ascendancy of 
Reaction. The war “has set back the people for a generation,” he told one journalist. “They have 
bowed to a hundred repressed acts. They have become slaves to the government. They are 
frightened at the excesses in Russia. They are docile; and they will not recover from being so for 
many years. The interests which control the Republican party will make the most of their 
docility.” But unlike Franklin Roosevelt, Hiram Johnson was no longer a young man. “In the 
end, of course,” he concluded, “there will be a revolution, but it will not come in my time.” 
“During our generation,” he told another, “it cements in power the old standpatters. It is the end 
of Progressivism.” He would spend the next several years fighting off serious depression – One 
observer deemed him “a pale fat man, moping in and out of the Senate.”709 
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Reading the election results specifically as a repudiation of the League, Senator 
Johnson’s Irreconcilable comrade in arms, William Borah, was much happier about the Harding 
landslide. “We won a great victory for our country,” he exclaimed to one constituent. “It can 
hardly be underestimated in its import and its far-reaching effect provided we gather the fruits of 
victory.” But, to Borah, now was not the time to forsake vigilance. “[Y]ou know General Grant 
once said something to the effect that the true test of military genius was the capacity to avail 
yourself of the fruits of victory…You will see now a scheme cooked up by Wall Street attorneys 
which will be advertised as a new and perfectly safe scheme [to enter the League.] Let us be on 
our guard.”710 
 
Also content with the process of the election, if nothing else, were progressive suffragists 
who saw women for the first time exercise the franchise in balloting booths all across the 
country. Meeting three weeks after the election, representatives of ten of the largest women’s 
organizations – including the League of Women Voters, the General Federation of Women’s 
Clubs, the National Consumer’s League, the Women’s Trade Union League, and the American 
Association of University Women – convened in Washington DC to begin planning for the next 
steps forward. “No such body of unselfish citizens has ever before made itself articulate,” 
announced Maud Wood Park, chair of the LWV. “The members of Congress are apt to forget 
that good government is desired. They hear so much from the self-seeking, rather than the 
average citizen.” Achieving suffrage was only the beginning – To add women’s voices to 
politics, and to begin the process of changing government for good, these organizations agreed to 
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form the Women’s Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC), which would become one of the 




Borah and the WJCC founders were some of the only progressive minded individuals to 
draw a silver lining from the Harding boom. Most agreed with William Howard Taft that the 
election results had made progressives politically irrelevant – “[I]t prevents,” Taft chortled with 
glee, “their exercising that instrumentality of blackmail with which they love to manifest their 
nuisance importance.” “Reaction is in control today, both in the politics and in the sphere of 
public opinion,” lamented Father John Ryan in January 1921. Nonetheless, The Survey 
responded to the Harding landslide by reiterating all the progressive planks the Republican 
candidate had committed to, in his Social Justice speech or otherwise. Harding, The Survey 
reminded its readers, had declared himself “in favor of trade unionism and collective 
bargaining”: 
 
On October 1, he came out in favor of a Department of Public Welfare…At the same time he said 
he favored the eight-hour day for women, the living wage, the extension of the activities of the 
Children’s Bureau, and that he desired to see the government take the lead in proposing 
legislation for the protection of women and of the national health. Senator Harding also stated his 





The Survey notwithstanding, most observers did not look as favorably at the prospect of 
progressivism under Harding, and many progressives seemed to lapse into despair. “What a God 
damned world this is,” William Allen White confessed to Ray Stannard Baker. “I trust you will 
realize that I am not swearing; merely trying to express in the mildest terms what I think of the 
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conditions that exists.” For his part, Baker had already succumbed to depression during the 
campaign. As he confided to his journal, his “former silly illusions” were gone, and he “now 
ready to begin at the bottom.”713 
 
W.E.B. Du Bois was also among the disgusted. “Never have the American people 
endured such a Presidential campaign,” he argued in The Crisis. “[T]he major parties were all 
fog or reaction,” while “the third parties have made a singularly spiritless campaign: 
 
And the Black Man. He had no chance. He was less than free and more than a slave. He was a 
machine – an automatic registration mark for the Republican party. He could not be otherwise. 
From the day Woodrow Wilson shamelessly betrayed his black supporters of 1912 to the day 
when the flippant Cox of Ohio built his Ohio campaign on the cheapest brand of ‘nigger’-hatred, 
the black American had but one political choice or mission: to defeat the South-ridden 
Democratic party. He could not even think of taking an off-shot at the Millennium by voting 
Socialist or Farmer Labor – he must defeat the Democrats. 
 
And he did his bit. 
 
And so the great farce ends. The People have spoken – and said nothing.714 
 
For Oswald Villard and The Nation, Harding’s election – “the Triumph of Reaction” – 
showed “the country is bound and delivered to the Republicans. They may work their sweet will 
upon us and interpret the verdict as they see fit.” On the bright side, the magazine argued, the 
election results showed that “the effect of the women’s vote was just what everyone but its most 
ardent opponents and its most fanatical supporters knew it would be – slight indeed.” In other 
words, the election proved that “men and women are much alike in their opinions and 
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prejudices,” and it was heartening to see the franchise extended to “all the men and women of the 
country, even though it may sometimes result in the election of a Harding.” Otherwise, however, 
the results made it abundantly clear that “for liberals there is a long road ahead before the United 
States can be ranked as a politically progressive nation.”715  
 
 “The chief distinguishing aspect of the Presidential campaign of 1920,” Herbert Croly 
wrote similarly in TNR, “is the eclipse of liberalism or progressivism as an effective force in 
American politics.” A despairing Croly thought that “various progressive groups are no longer 
sure or clear about what they want. They do not know how to get what they want; nor are they 
willing to pay the price…Their political futility is born of the equivocal meaning of American 
liberalism, its failure to keep abreast of the best available social knowledge and its inability to 
interpret candidly the lessons of its own checkered career.” Now, “the hodge-podge of factions 
and sects which remain of the progressive movement know neither their own minds nor the 
dangerous world in which they live.”716 
 
Croly’s young editorial partner, Walter Lippmann, ascribed the defeat to “the final twitch 
of the war mind” and “because the Democrats are inconceivably unpopular.” (Otherwise, he told 
his friend Graham Wallas, “there would be cause for profound discouragement with universal 
suffrage.”)  Surveying the mindset of progressives several months later, after Harding’s 
inauguration, Lippmann told Wallas “there’s no use pretending that the atmosphere is cheerful 
here. It is not. The hysteria has turned to apathy and disillusionment in the general public, and 
cynicism in most of my friends. “I feel that we shall not have much immediate influence in 
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America for perhaps a decade,” Lippmann told Wallas. “[B]ut I’m not discouraged because we 
can use that time to reexamine our ideas.”717 
 
For his part, Woodrow Wilson issued no public statements of any kind, although his 
private secretary, Joe Tumulty, proclaimed that “[i]t was a landslide, it was an earthquake.” 
Wilson deferred the writing of the usual Thanksgiving Day proclamation to his Secretary of 
State. The following month, the American Minister to Norway officially accepted Wilson’s 
Nobel Peace prize. His daughters, his cabinet members, and his friends tried to rouse him from 




One day, Ray Stannard Baker joined the president and his wife to watch a new film that 
had been made of the president’s trip to Europe, when Wilson had been feted by kings and 
adored by millions. As the film ended and the room went dark, Baker remembered, “[a]ll that 
glory had faded away with a click and a sputter.” In a memory that would haunt Baker for years 
to come, Wilson said not a word the entire time, and then simply, silently, painfully got up and 
walked out of the room. When Edmund Starling, one of Wilson’s Secret Service men, told the 
president that a friend of his, a Mr. Barker, would still follow him into battle wherever he went, 
Wilson said “Tell Barker I thank him, but there is nowhere now to go.”719 
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“Although forgotten in years to come, the early 1920s was an exceptionally 
fertile period for progressive politics.” 
 
- Alan Dawley720 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE POLITICS OF NORMALCY 
PROGRESSIVES AND THE FIGHT FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT 
 
“I think we are all just marking time under Harding. So many people expected nothing at all 
from him, or worse, that they are agreeably surprised that he hasn’t done as badly as they 
thought he would. And so we hear the general expression that ‘Harding is doing better than we 
expected.’ All of which means only that nothing at all was expected.” – Harold Ickes, 1922721 
 
“I do not suppose there has been in the history of the world an era of more sordid corruption than 
has characterized public life during the last few years.” – Willam Borah, 1926.722 
 
“One of the very foundations for which the Progressive cause stands is that every man, whether 
he be an official or a private citizen, should vote his conscientious convictions and should not be 






Entering office with a decisive mandate and large majorities in Congress, the Harding 
administration introduced an agenda in April 1921 that, for the most part, set the 
template for federal public policy during the decade. While attempts by Congressional 
progressives to organize in opposition were usually of limited effect, Senate 
progressives did find one useful rallying cry in decrying the influence of money in 
politics. Through dogged persistence over many years, they worked to uncover and 
expose the full extent of the Harding scandals, but garnering the righteous indignation of 
a cynical and distracted nation turned out to be a harder climb. 
 
*** 
The Harding White House 
 
“Ring out the old, ring in – something a little older,” grimaced The New Republic in 
March 1921, the week of Warren Harding’s ascendancy to the White House. Like many 
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progressives, the editors of TNR were still coming to grips with the clear mandate the American 




In January 1921, perhaps as a reflection of either the denial or bargaining stage the 
editors had reached by that point, the magazine had hoped beyond hope that somehow Harding 
was contemplating a break with the Old Guard and a move toward progressive statesmanship. 
“The circumstances have conspired to endow Harding with a measure of freedom of choice such 
as no other President-elect, at least in our generation, ever enjoyed,” the magazine pleaded. “The 
upshot is that Harding stands at the crossroads, the most remarkable exemplification of free will 
in American political history. He may go either to the right or to the left, as he chooses. He may 
give us the best or the worst administration we have ever had. Nothing is fixed by the stars.” If 
Harding looked to posterity and decided to choose the road of “toil and virtue” over that of “ease 
and joy,” great things might still be expected from the coming administration.725 
 
Of course, as with every other new president, the first indication of Harding’s intentions 
would be his selection of a Cabinet. This, from a progressive perspective, was looking to be a 
split decision. “Apparently, Mr. Harding’s cabinet is a mixture of oil and water,” TNR reported 
the week of the inauguration. On one hand, Harding’s choice for Secretary of State, Charles 
Evans Hughes, “represents his conscience.” On the other hand, Attorney General Harry 
Daugherty and Secretary of the Interior Albert Fall of New Mexico – a Senate friend of 
Harding’s who took the position after the intended occupant, oil baron Jake Hamon. was shot 
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and killed by his mistress -- were “unspeakably bad appointments,” and “exactly the sort of men 
who drove Roosevelt to rebellion in 1912…They are full blown specimens of the manipulating 
politician who serves private and predatory interests.” 726  
 
The rest seemed like a wash. “It is bad business to select a political manager” like 
Republican Chairman Will Hays to be Postmaster-General, but “every President has done it” 
and, anyway, he was assuredly better than Burleson. “[I]f Mr. Hays were the only concession to 
that bad principle, he would be acceptable.” As for Treasury, that “will go either to Mr. Mellon 
of Pittsburgh or to Mr. Dawes of Chicago…About Mr. [Henry] Wallace, who is mentioned for 
Agriculture, we hear good things but nothing very definite. About Mr. John J. Davis, mentioned 
for Labor, we hear nothing except that he is somehow related to the A.F.L.” In any case, Labor 
“will never be much of a department until some man of large calibre makes it important.”727 
 
Such a man, to TNR, would be the make-or-break element of the coming administration 
anyway, if he chose to join it – Herbert Hoover.  If Hoover were to take Secretary of Commerce, 
as rumored, “it would mean that he was virtually a minister without portfolio. But it is not a bad 
job for him” since “only partly occupied by his departmental duties, he could range afield.” And 
if Herbert Hoover and Charles Evans Hughes were to make common cause against the likes of 
Daugherty and Fall, then all the better. “They are the two men, the only two men in whom the 
people at large have genuine confidence…Both of them take enormous personal risks in entering 
such a cabinet, and both of them will be tested to the limit. Of them much is expected; of the 
others practically nothing, or worse than nothing.”728 
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In fact, the idea of Herbert Hoover in the Harding administration enraged the Republican 
Old Guard. As Frank Brandegee of Connecticut put it, “Hoover gives most of us gooseflesh,” 
and, isn’t this exactly why they had hand-picked Harding in the first place? Already, the 
president-elect had chosen “the whiskered Wilson,” Charles Evans Hughes, as Secretary of State. 
The fact that the Great Engineer was, like Hughes, demonstrably pro-League only further 





But the president-elect was resolute. “I think there is very much of political significance 
involved in considering him,” he explained. To another friend, he deemed the Great Engineer 
“the smartest gink I know.” As Hoover later remembered it, “Mr. Harding, soon after election, 
sent me word he would like me to join his Cabinet. I heard nothing more for nearly three months 
and assumed there was nothing in it. The long delay in announcement was due to the opposition 
of Senators Penrose and Lodge. They were urging Andrew Mellon for Secretary of the Treasury. 
Harding subsequently informed me that he had told them, ‘Mellon and Hoover or no Mellon.’” 
And so, Secretary of Commerce Hoover came along with the world’s second richest man, after 
John D. Rockefeller, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon – whom Harding soon deemed 
“the ubiquitous financier of the universe” and who gained a reputation in certain circles -- 
namely those who agreed with his multi-year campaign to lower taxes on the rich – as the 
“greatest Secretary of the Treasury since Alexander Hamilton.” Both men would remain central 
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As it happened, the conditions the Great Engineer put forward in taking the Commerce 
post were not unlike those suggested by TNR. “I was interested in the job of reconstruction and 
development in front of us,” Hoover wrote, and so, “for the Department to be of real service, I 
must have a voice on all important economic policies of the administration,” be they “business, 
agriculture, labor, finance, [or] foreign affairs.” Harding promptly agreed and informed all of his 
other Cabinet members except Hughes, since, according to Hoover, “he seemed a little afraid of 
his stiff Secretary of State.” Nonetheless, Hoover recalled, “Mr. Hughes was enthusiastic over 
both the idea and my entry into the government.”731 
 
Incorporating notable figures like Hoover, Hughes, and Mellon into the administration 
had been a campaign promise of sorts. “I should not be fit to hold the high office of president,” 
Harding said on the trail, “if I did not frankly say that it is a task which I have no intention of 
undertaking alone.” Instead, he promised he would bring “the best minds in the United States” 
together to help run the country. But even as Harding took on these notable Secretaries (though 
his original choice for Secretary of State – one Hughes had even suggested – had been Albert 
Fall), the president-elect was not one to turn his back on loyal comrades either. When it was 
suggested to him, more than once, that Harding pick anyone else other than Harry Daugherty as 
the nation’s top lawyer, Harding finally exclaimed, “Harry Daugherty has been my best friend 
from the beginning of this whole thing. I have told him that he can have any place in my Cabinet 
he wants, outside of Secretary of State. He tells me that he wants to be Attorney General and by 
God he will be Attorney General!” Further down the executive hierarchy from the Cabinet, 
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cronyism was even more in evidence -- “God, I can’t be an ingrate,” he apparently said of his 




Although not by nature a man to hold a grudge, Harding did decide to stand in the way of 
Leonard Wood’s dream of retiring as the Secretary of War, and instead offered him the 
Governorship of the Philippines, a post which was also conveniently over on the other side of the 
planet. (Elihu Root thought the offer a “damned insult,” but Wood eventually took it anyway.) 
Instead he chose Republican Party financier John W. Weeks for the post, who in turn 
recommended for Secretary of the Navy three-term Congressman Edwin Denby – another of the 
men who would be integral in Harding’s eventual fall from grace.733  
 
While not a Cabinet choice, the new president managed to enrage progressives in the first 
months of his presidency by choosing one of their ancient nemeses, William Howard Taft, to 
serve as the new Chief Justice. “I regard Taft as utterly unfit to be a member of the Supreme 
Court,” wrote Harold Ickes, who thought the choice “disgusting.” Ickes applauded his friend 
Hiram Johnson for voting against the appointment and noted that “I don’t see how anyone who 
went through the 1912 fight on the Progressive side could have done otherwise.” Senator 
Johnson thought that the nomination was “the most sinister thing that has come to us thus far in 
the administration” and “most depressing…When you think that many of the most grave policies 
of the country have been decided by the United States Supreme Court by a single vote, the 
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possibility of Taft casting that vote makes your heart sink.” Harding’s choice of such an obvious 
conservative, The New Republic argued, was in fact a radical move. “The true conservative view 
is that the Supreme Court ought to be an embodiment of the clearest legal intelligence, altogether 
unmoved by political bias or class preconception,” the journal noted, while progressives and 
radicals believed in a living, changing law. “[T]he very fact that everybody expects such a shift 
toward conservatism proves that the position of the Court itself has been shifted toward 
radicalism.”734 
 
To William Borah, it was less about the conservative than the cronyism. “It is almost 
sacrilegious,” he told Oswald Villard, “to take a man who has dedicated his life to politics and 
who has at best only seven or eight years of service left and make him the head of that great 
tribunal.” The Idaho Senator thought it tantamount to “prostituting” the Court, “as we are so 
many other things, to the mere call of expediency in politics.” Villard told Borah he “felt like 
sitting down and telegraphing ‘Hallelujah!” when Borah publicly voiced his opposition. In The 
Nation, Villard and the editors called the choice of the “intellectually indolent” Taft “a grave 
mistake.” When changing times called for a dynamic thinker, the journal argued, Harding had 
chosen an amiable but calcified political hack. “It must not be forgotten that Mr. Taft’s political 
views were passed upon by the American people in 1912, and that only two States voted for him. 
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He was then, as now, opposed both to the progressive doctrines of the Wilson Democracy and to 
those of the Progressive Party.”735 
 
The respect merits of Chief Justice Taft aside, Warren Harding thought his job, as 
historian Robert K. Murray argues in The Politics of Normalcy, was “to bring the ‘best minds’ 
together” – over a poker game or otherwise – “moderate their discussions, and supply the 
conciliatory spirit that would adjust diverse points of view.” In short, Murray argues, “Harding 
himself…was the central figure in his own cabinet, because he fused the independent talents, 
especially of his ‘best minds’ into a constructive political whole.”736  
 
And whatever the public thought of them years later, Harding’s Cabinet choices – with 
the notable exception of Harry Daugherty, the “best friend” that came along with the best minds 
– were generally considered to be sound at the time. “No presidential cabinet during the past 
half-century,” intoned The Atlantic Monthly, “has been better balanced, or has included within its 
membership a wider range of political experience.” Writing in TNR in 1922, once the bloom had 
begun to come off the rose of many of Harding’s choices, John W. Owens still recalled that 
“[e]verybody was happy when [Harding] announced his Cabinet and assumed office…The 
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pictures of the Cabinet members looked like the pictures of the board of the First National Bank. 
They were familiar, conventional, understandable types, and withal confidence-sustaining.”737  
 
Harding may have surrounded himself with “the best minds,” but he still never got over 
his initial feelings of self-doubt. “Oftentimes, as I sit here,” he once said to a columnist, “I don’t 
seem to grasp that I am President.” To a golfing partner he confessed, “I don’t think I’m big 
enough for the Presidency.” Part of the problem, as Harding himself would be the first to 
confess, is that he wasn’t a particularly bright man. “I don’t know anything about this European 
stuff,” Harding admitted to Arthur Draper of the New York Herald Tribune. He once told Bruce 
Bliven of the New Republic that “the United States should adopt a protective tariff of such a 
character as will help the struggling industries of Europe to get on their feet.” H.L. Mencken, in 
his usual uncharitable fashion, thought that “[n]o other such complete and dreadful nitwit is to be 
found in the pages of American history.”738  
 
To compensate for his lack of innate ability, Harding put in long hours in the position. In 
1922, veteran journalist Mark Sullivan deemed the president “extraordinary” in “the mere 
prosaic quality of capacity for hard work,” and according to one historian, Harding “worked 
harder as president than either Wilson or Roosevelt and twice as hard as Taft.” “I never find 
myself done,” complained Harding a year into the job. “I never find myself with my work 
complete. I don’t believe there is a human being alive who can do all the work there is to be done 
in the President’s office. It seems as though I have been President for twenty years.” When 
Senator Brandegee asked the president how he liked his job, Harding replied “Frank, it is Hell! 
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No other word can describe it.” He disliked the position so much that at one point he thought 
about supporting a constitutional amendment limiting presidents to one six-year term. His wife 




Despite his formidable work habits, Harding is more remembered today for his extra-
curricular activities. “Weekly White House poker parties were his greatest relaxation,” wrote 
Hoover in his memoirs decades later, circumspectly sidestepping all the rumors about Nan 
Britton’s attentions. “I had lived too long on the frontiers of the world to have strong emotions 
against people playing poker for money if they liked it, but it irked me to see it in the White 
House. Hughes and I found some excuse to remain out of the game. Some time afterward 
Harding remarked that I did not seem to like poker, and as I agreed, I was not troubled with more 
invitations.”740  
 
These notorious twice-weekly poker games gave the White House “the atmosphere [of 
the] back room in a speakeasy,” thought Alice Roosevelt Longworth in a quote that would stick 
for generations. “No rumor could have exceeded the reality…the air heavy with tobacco smoke, 
trays with bottles containing every imaginable brand of whisky stood about…a general 
atmosphere of waistcoat unbuttoned, feet on the desk, and spittoons alongside.” But other reports 
suggest these games were less dissolute than the popular imagination remembers. “The stakes 
were modest, since these men played purely for the sport of it,” noted Edmund Starling, the same 
Secret Service man who had protected Wilson in his darkest months and would serve through 
Franklin Roosevelt. While the attendees “played with great zest and good humor, drank 
moderately and sociably, and smoked” until one a.m. in the morning, there was never “the 
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slightest sign of debauch,” and Harding himself never enjoyed more than one highball. Harding 
“suffered from stomach trouble,” Starling recalled, “and was allergic to alcohol in any but small 
doses.” Similarly, while much was made of Harding’s twice-weekly golf outings, he actually 




Of course, there were rumors of darker assignations taking place at the “Love Nest,” the 
Little House on H Street two blocks from the White House, where Harry Daugherty and his 
longtime friend, flunky, and bagman Jess Smith lived, and where the so-called “Ohio Gang” 
congregated. There, according to legend (and the later account of Gaston Means, a member of 
the Gang known for fabulism and later convicted of perjury), Harding would often drink to 
excess and carouse with several women not named Florence Kling Harding. When queried about 
these “woman scrapes,” as Daugherty called them, or “bimbo eruptions,” as a later generation 
would style them, Harding gave the same sort of shrug and non-denial with which he had earlier 
answered questions about his lineage. “It’s a good thing I am not a woman,” he told reporters at 
the National Press Club (in private), “I would always be pregnant. I can’t say no.”742  
 
While “not a man with either the experience or the intellectual quality that the position 
needed,” Hoover concluded of the president, he “had real quality in geniality, in good will, and 
in ability for pleasing address.” And if nothing else, Harding had a keen sense of his own 
strengths and weaknesses, and he guided his presidency accordingly. He did not seek to be a 
Wilson or a Roosevelt. As he confided to a friend, “[f]rankly, being President is rather an 
unattractive business unless one relishes the exercise of power. That is a thing which has never 
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greatly appealed to me.” Rather he sought to be America’s “best-loved” president. In the words 
of Frederick Lewis Allen in 1931, Harding “was the friendliest man who ever had entered the 
White House. He seemed to like everybody, he wanted to do favors for everybody, he wanted to 
make everybody happy. His affability was not merely the forced affability of the cold-blooded 
politician; it was transparently and touchingly genuine.” After his untimely death, the Bishop 
presiding over his memorial service eulogized Harding by saying, “[i]f I could write one 
sentence upon his monument, it would be this, ‘He taught us the power of brotherliness.’”743 
 
As part of his efforts to be liked by everyone, Harding -- a former newspaperman himself 
– opened the White House wide to members of the press. “Unquestionably Harding had the best 
relationship with the press of any president in history,” Robert Murray wrote in 1969, with 
perhaps a modicum of hyperbole. “Reporters liked his frankness in confessing his limitations and 
his refreshing candor about presidential problems. The press was taken behind the scenes and 
shown the inner workings of the presidency to an extent never allowed before.”744   
 
As his first official act, Harding also opened the White House to anyone who wanted to 
stop by during the lunch hour and shake his hand. “I love to meet people,” Harding once said. “It 
is the most pleasant thing I do; it is really the only fun I have. It does not tax me, and it seems to 
be a very great pleasure to them.” As such, Harding would spend at least an hour a day 
welcoming the visitors, occasionally numbering in the thousands, who came by to visit. The 
president further tugged the heartstrings of America by acquiring, the day after his inauguration, 
an Airedale terrier named Laddie Boy. With his own chair for cabinet meetings, his own official 
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portrait, and plenty of photo ops and fundraiser appearances, Laddie Boy was, for all intent and 




However estimable, Harding’s penchant for conviviality ultimately carried a heavy price. 
For one, his desire to be liked by everyone, coupled with his insecurities about his own acumen, 
led him to take an inordinately long time making decisions. “John, I can’t make a damn thing out 
of this tax problem,” William Allen White recalled Harding saying to one of his secretaries. “I 
listen to one side and they seem right, and then – God! – I talk to the other side and they seem 
just as right and here I am where I started…God! What a job!”746 
 
For another, while perhaps a refuge from work at first, Secretary of State Hughes, in his 
1923 eulogy of Harding, thought the president “literally wore himself out in the endeavor to be 
friendly”:  
It was pain to him to refuse a courtesy; personal convenience could never be considered if it was 
an obstacle to any act of grace. He dealt personally with a vast correspondence, not being content 
with the mere acknowledgments, but writing friendly letters with the touch of keen human 
interest. His generous receptivity multiplied the appeals. He sought relaxation in the intimate 
contacts of old friendships, and this led him even in his diversions often to give himself to an 





Marveling at the large stack of trivial correspondence that the president was trying to 
make his way through, Nicholas Murray Butler urged Harding to start prioritizing better. “I 
suppose so,” replied the president, “but I am not fit for this office and should never have been 
here.”748 
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Harding’s desire to trust, and the emphasis on loyalty that resulted, certainly weighed 
heavily on him, and definitely helped to kill his reputation in the years to come. “I have no 
trouble with my enemies,” Harding told Will White. “I can take care of my enemies all right. But 
my damn friends…they’re the ones keeping me walking the floor nights.” Or worse. After the 
first of the Harding scandals broke, a visitor to the White House stumbled upon the president 
throttling one of the many ne’er-do-wells in his administration, Veteran’s Bureau head Charles 
Forbes. “You yellow rat! You double-crossing bastard!,” the president exclaimed before noticing 
they had a visitor.
 
 And in his final days just before his fatal August 1923 heart attack, Harding, 
according to White, “kept asking Secretary Hoover and the more trusted reporters who 
surrounded him what a President should do whose friends had betrayed him.”749 
 
The scandals came later. In the first few months of Harding’s administration, however, 
the goodwill that emanated from the president seemed to envelop much of the weary nation. 
“The Washington atmosphere of today is like that of Old Home Week or a college class 
reunion,” wrote Edward G. Lowry. “The change is amazing. The populace is on a broad grin.”  
And it was in that environment that President Harding, a month after his inauguration, called a 




“[A]mid conditions as difficult as our Government has ever contemplated,” Harding 
argued in a well-received April 12, 1921 address, it was time for Congress to give “consideration 
to national problems far too pressing to be long neglected.” First and foremost, Harding argued, 
it was time “to restrict our national expenditures within the limits of our national income and at 
the same time measurably lift the burdens of war taxation from the shoulders of the American 
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people.” In other words, it was time for austerity – “rigid resistance in appropriation 
and…utmost economy in administration. Let us have both.” For the “high cost of living is 
inseparably linked with high cost of government,” Harding argued. “There can be no complete 
correction of the high living cost until government’s cost is notably reduced.” Consolidating 
overlapping federal programs was also the order of the day, as was the creation of a Budget 




Coupled with this decreased government spending would be “the readjustment of internal 
taxes, and the revision or repeal of those taxes which have become so unproductive and are so 
artificial and burdensome as to defeat their own purpose.” Lower tax rates, including a repeal of 
the excess profits tax and other “unjustifiable exasperations in the present system,” Harding 
argued, were “a requisite to the revival of business activity in this country.” Government should 
also recognize that “business has a right to pursue its normal, legitimate, and righteous way 
unimpeded,” provided that they aid “in stamping out the practices which add to unrest and 
inspire restrictive legislation.” In keeping with traditional Republican policy, Harding also called 
for a “mature revision of our tariff laws” to aid businesses and farmers, as well as investments to 




And, after leading with his business foot forward, the president concluded his speech 
with a few planks of the more progressive variety. In keeping with the promise made in his 
Social Justice speech, Harding called for the creation of a Department of Public Welfare “to 
encourage development of the highest and most efficient type of citizenship.” He argued that 
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“Congress ought to wipe the stain of barbaric lynching from the banners of a free and orderly 
representative democracy.” He called for “effective regulation” at the federal level to oversee 
(and encourage) the new technologies of aviation and radio. He presumed the swift passage of 
the maternity bill. And, while “merest prudence forbids that we disarm alone,” he argued his 
administration was “ready to cooperate with out nations to approximate disarmament.”753   
 
Finally, in a statement of pure Gamalielese that confused onlookers of every stripe, 
Harding made his post-election stand on the League. The president took care to explain that “the 
highest purpose of the League of Nations was defeated in linking it with a treaty of peace” and 
that no such association could ever be acceptable “so long as it is an organ of any particular 
treaty, or committed to the attainment of the special aims of any nation or group of nations.” 
That being said, “we make no surrender of our hope and aim for an association to promote peace 
in which we would most heartily join…we pledged our efforts toward such association, and the 
pledge will faithfully be kept.” First, however, Congress had to officially bring the World War to 
an end. “With the supergoverning league definitely rejected and with the world so informed, and 
with the status of peace proclaimed at home,” Harding concluded, “we may…play our full part 
in joining the peoples of the world in the pursuits of peace once more.” “Emphatically, Mr. 
Harding is closely related to Mr. Facing-Both-Ways,” editorialized The Nation about this part of 
the address. “Both camps claim the president is with them, that the treaty will be eventually 
ratified in much amended form, that it will be discarded.”754 
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As we shall see, not all of the suggestions made in Harding’s April 1921 address came to 
pass in the two years of his presidency. Nonetheless, if taken as a statement of purpose, and 
evaluated only with regard to what actually passed rather than its ideological content, the 
contemporary view of Harding as a failure of a president seems overly harsh. Among the 
achievements of the Republican Congress in the summer of 1921 was an immigration restriction 
act (which Harding had called for in a prior speech), a resolution officially ending the war with 
Germany, and legislation creating the Budget Office – soon to be headed by Charles G. Dawes – 
and General Accounting Office. November 1921 saw passage of federal aid for highways, the 
Sheppard-Towner maternity bill, and the first of Mellon’s tax-cutting revenue acts. The 
following month, the first of the major disarmament conferences opened in Washington. In 
September 1922, the business-friendly Fordney-McCumber tariff – the highest tariff in American 
history to that point – would become law. The 67th Congress which would hold office for most of 
Harding’s presidency would hold session for a record 415 days, pass six hundred bills and ninety 
resolutions. And, within four years of Harding’s death, Congress would pass two more stringent 
Mellon revenue acts, as well as legislation regulating aviation and radio respectively. For better 
or worse, much of what Harding called for in his April 1921 speech, from his McKinley era 
fiscal policies to his few forays into progressivism, was eventually enacted into law.
755
  
Organizing in Opposition 
 
 
Perhaps the only people left cold by Harding’s charms in his first few months were 
progressives still reeling from the ascendance of normalcy. “What a period of reaction we’re in!” 
Hiram Johnson exclaimed to Harold Ickes two months after inauguration day. “Everything dear 
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to progressives seems to be under attack, and worse than this, progressives are often found with 
the attacking party. It begins to look as if the long hard fight of the past two years has been for 
naught…I will continue fighting, although with repeated defeats one’s capacity for 
accomplishment by fighting dwindles.” Ickes tried to encourage his friend. “We grow strong and 
maintain ourselves only by fighting,” he replied to the Senator. “You wouldn’t be yourself if you 
didn’t and I confidently believe that in the end you will be justified in the opinion of the 
country.” Johnson saw the wisdom in Ickes’ words. “You are quite right in what you say. There 
is nothing to do but to fight on, and it goes without saying that is exactly what I will continue to 
do.” This would be the first of many mutually reinforcing pep talks between the two men during 




It went without saying that Robert La Follette remained of a fighting bent as well. When 
President-Elect Harding had returned to the lame duck session of the Senate in December 1920, 
he joked to his colleague, “Now, Bob, be good.” Replied the Senator from Wisconsin: “I’ll be 
busy, making you be good.” And even as Warren Harding worked to form a Cabinet of 
presidential timbre, Senator Robert La Follette was attempting to organize independents and 
progressives in Congress into a unified bloc that could stand against any reactionary tendencies 
in the new administration.
757
   
 
In October 1920, as Harding’s victory looked inevitable, The Nation had called for the 
formation of just such a “Progressive Bloc” – “a saving remnant of individuals,” who “without 
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necessarily breaking party ties, yet recognizing the unreality of the issues separating the parties” 
could come together on behalf of the public interest. “[I]f the progressive thought of the country 
is not to be voiceless in the next two years,” men like La Follette, Norris, Borah, Johnson, and 
others had to come together to “prevent the enactment of reactionary special-interest legislation 
that will otherwise slip through.” Most important “by far,” thought The Nation, “is the education 
which a battle waged by such a group would give to the public…it is almost impossible to get 
before the people the facts on which they might form intelligent opinion and base intelligent 
action. An informed and courageous minority group could make of these facts news that the 
dailies could not afford to ignore.”758 
 
Bringing the progressives in Congress together and finding a way to better educate public 
opinion – Ever since his possible Third Party bid had collapsed, Robert La Follette had begun 
working on both of these projects. Soon after the fiasco in Chicago, Basil Manly -- director of 
the Scripps Economic Bureau, former head of research for the Commission on Industrial 
Relations, former co-chair of the War Labor Board, and a La Follette confidant – wrote the 
Senator that he perhaps had “ evolved an idea…Why shouldn’t we follow the analogy of the 
Republican and Democratic parties and create an Independent Congressional Campaign 
Committee made up exclusively of Representatives and Senators anxious to see men elected to 
Congress who would vote independently of the dictates of big business and the old party 
machines?” Such a committee could be funded by farmer and labor groups and “avoid the 
enormous difficulties involved in bringing groups like the Railroad Brotherhoods, the American 
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Federation of Labor, the Non-Partisan League, and other similar organizations in one working 
unit.”759 
 
La Follette was clearly taken with the idea, for soon thereafter he pitched just such an 
organization to a number of left-leaning House and Senate members. “The developments of the 
presidential campaign make it clear,” he argued, “that the only effective fight against blind 
reaction and special privilege during the next four years must be waged by fearless independent 
members of Congress.” Since “neither the presidential candidates nor the platforms of the 
Democratic and Republican parties offer any hope of sound and rational progress,” and the “vital 
domestic issues of utmost consequence to the people of the United States [are] being ignored,” it 
fell to these men to come together and stand in the breach. “These forces of reaction and 
exploitation,” La Follette argued, “can be checked or defeated only by building up in Congress a 
group of Senators and Representatives who will act independently and aggressively to protect the 
public interest”: 
 
It is proposed, therefore, that an Independent Congressional Campaign Committee be formed 
immediately, composed of those Senators and Representatives who have proved their 
independence and integrity, in order that they may co-operate effectively with organizations and 
independent citizens in the election of men pledged to public service… 
 
The purposes of the Independent Congressional Campaign Committee… are four-fold. 
 
1. To elect progressive candidates regardless of party. 
2. To defeat notorious reactionaries. 
3. To arouse the nation to the vital economic and social questions ignored in the present campaign… 
4. To form the nucleus of an independent progressive movement which may conceivably hold the 
balance of power in the 67
th
 Congress. 760 
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This ICCC, La Follette argued, could bring together the “powerful progressive 
organizations of farmers, industrial, and railroad workers, and other independent citizens” and 
coordinate them “so as to form an effective political force of enormous power. I need not dwell 
upon the potentialities of such a movement for the future. During our time there has never been 
such an opportunity to bring together the progressive forces of the country.” 761 
 
Several of La Follette’s colleagues misconstrued the plan, and thought the Senator was 
trying to create an official third party in Congress. “I do not think it would be wise, at this 
juncture,” replied Senator George Chamberlain of Oregon, a Democrat. “[T]o undertake to 
organize such a committee…would be likely to result in the election of a reactionary Republican 
or Democrat, taking away from each of the old parties a proportionate number of independent 
voters.” As he saw it, “[i]nterference…would be resented” by both Republicans and Democrats, 
and “instead of helping promote the things that are near to your heart and to mine as well…we 
would really retard them.” Another Democratic Senator, James Owen of Oklahoma, was inclined 
to agree. “I have always been a dedicated progressive and shall remain so,” he wrote in response, 
“and will support progressive measures and progressive men wherever I can without leaving my 
own party, within which I have felt better qualified to render service than if I should put myself 
outside of my party lines. The time is so short and my obligations of such character that I do not 
know what I could do.”762 
 
For his part, Democratic Congressman George Huddleston, of the Alabama Ninth, was 
conflicted. “I am usually averse to making pledges,” he wrote La Follette, “particularly when I 
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am not permitted to phrase them.” And, besides, “the race issue here is vital in a sense that one 
not a seasoned resident of this section cannot realize. It is a factor which cannot be ignored, and 
makes any independent movement well-nigh impossible.” As such, Huddleston though that 
“hope for reform and liberalism rests upon action within the Democratic organization, and not 
upon an independent movement.” At the same time, a “group of disinterested Senators and 
Representatives of enlightened and progressive sentiments, who would know each other’s 
attitude, hold conferences together and act in concert, would be of great public value. I would 
gladly become one of such a group.”763 
 
La Follette also received favorable responses from a few of his progressive-minded 
Senate colleagues, like George Norris, David Walsh and Joseph France of Maryland. As for 
Borah, who given his national profile would have to be a lynchpin of such a group, he was 
intrigued, but thought himself currently “occupied in assisting the irreconcilables against a 
terrific fight which is being made against them…I am under great moral obligation to go to their 
assistance.”764 
 
As the first step, La Follette and Manly worked to convene a small, private group of 
interested parties “to generally talk out questions pertaining to the coming legislative program, 
and also to discuss plans for the organization of a bureau of research and publicity which will be 
available to all progressives.” This new bureau, Manly told Bob La Follette, Jr., “would compile 
the data necessary for the fights which will have to be made, and also to see that the work of the 
progressive group secured effective publicity.” The month after Harding’s election, “a number of 
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Senators, Congressmen, leaders of railroad labor organizations, representatives of farm 
organizations, and some fifty progressive men and women of national reputation” gathered in 
Washington, and the People’s Legislative Service (PLS), a new “non-partisan, non-lobbying 
service” was born, with La Follette as Chairman, George Huddleston as Vice-Chairman, and 
Basil Manly as director. Also represented on the executive committee were the International 
Association of Machinists, the Railroad Trainmen, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 
and the Farmer’s National Council. Eventually joining them were progressives like Jane 
Addams, Florence Kelley, John Ryan, and Frederic Howe, who also became the head of the 
PLS’s Resolutions Committee.765 
 
Four months later, in April 1921, the People’s Legislative Service held its “coming out 
party” at the New Ebbit Hotel in Washington, before a crowd of three hundred. “We are met here 
tonight,” began La Follette in his keynote address, “in a critical hour of the history of the 
country: 
The great issue before the American people today is the control of their own government. 
A mighty power has been building in this country in recent years, so strong yet so 
insidious and far-reaching in its influence that men are gravely inquiring whether its iron 
grip on government and business can ever be broken. Again and again it has proved 
strong enough to nominate the candidates for both political parties. It has dominated the 
organization of legislative bodies, state and national, and the committee which frame 
legislation…It fixes the prices of the necessaries of life and imposes it burdens upon the 
consuming public in defiance of the law…In finance its power is unlimited…This great 
power which has taken from the American people the control of their own government is 
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“Never before,” La Follette argued “in a generation of time, has the national capital 
attracted so menacing an army of lobbyists seeking from the representatives of the people unjust 
concessions to special interests.” Among those he cited were the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, The National Association of Manufacturers, the National Petroleum Association, the 
National Coal Association, and the American Railway Association. If these organizations 
“maintained their agents at the capital to safeguard their legitimate rights,” La Follette, “no 
complaint could justly be directed against them. But organized greed does not recognize the 
dividing line between proper agitation and the active influence and coercion of government for 
purposes of private gain.”767 
 
These organizations, argued La Follette, used vast sums of wealth and “personal 
influence” with people in high places to “present an accumulated mass of arguments and 
material,” to “obstruct remedial legislation” and “set afoot a national propaganda” that 
encourages “millions of individuals in the land” to “immediately respond by sending letters and 
telegrams to the members of Congress.” “To meet this intolerable situation, in which 
representative government cannot long survive,” the People’s Legislative Service was 
established. This “is not a lobby,” La Follette emphasized. “It is a fact service”: 
 
But by its influence it can resist the power of the lobby and insure legislation in the interests of all 
the people. It will furnish facts to all members of the House and Senate who will use them in the 
public interest. It will furnish facts to representatives of affiliated organizations so that they may 
present their cases more effectively. It will furnish facts to the public requiring pending 
legislation. It will encourage the new member, honestly aspiring to represent his constituents, to 












“It is true,” La Follette concluded, “that the power of the great interests that today control 
our property and our government is overwhelming.” But “[r]ising up against them is the 
confused voice of the people. Their heart is true, but they cannot find all the intricate sources of 
power to destroy them…To aid the people in this contest the People’s Legislative Service has 
been organized.” Making the case for the Service in The Searchlight, a paper put out by the 
National Voters’ League, Manly called its creation “one of the biggest facts in the political 
history of the present age” and “one of the most important and practicable movements yet 
initiated in the fight to restore the Government of the people by attacking reaction in its very 
stronghold – the Congress of the United States.”769 
 
In its first two years of existence, the People’s Legislative Service essentially served as a 
research and publicity arm for La Follette’s and other progressives’ activities in Congress. Like 
the Washington think tanks of a later era, it compiled statistics and talking points for the 
Senator’s speeches on issues ranging from the wages and purchasing power of various laborers 
to the price of gasoline to the cost of legislation like the Esch-Cummins law, restoring the 
railroads to private ownership, and Harding’s much-desired ship subsidy bill, to help grow the 
nation’s merchant marine. The PLS also worked to support the interests of its farmer- and labor-
intensive executive committee on matters ranging from fighting the open shop to blocking anti-
strike bills to the immigration fight, where it “contributed material service in behalf of salutary 
immigration restriction laws.” One of its more notable accomplishments was in providing La 
Follette with “the facts and figures” to block a foreign trade tax exemption – supported by 
Standard Oil, United States Steel, “and other great corporations engaged in foreign trade and 
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The People’s Legislative Service also became a fixture in La Follette’s Magazine 
beginning in February 1922, with a column by Basil Manly entitled “On Guard for the People,” 
as well as a monthly journal of its own entitled The People’s Business. Still, it is hard to argue 
that the Service made much headway in the broader national discussion, nor did it become a tool 
that many members of Congress other than La Follette ever relied on. In 1922, the PLS brought 
farm and labor groups, as well as the Socialists, together for a Conference for Progressive 
Political Action, which would eventually become the foundation for La Follette’s independent 
campaign in 1924. By the time of the 1924 election, the Service became more obviously a 
mouthpiece for the campaign, with Manly working directly as La Follette’s speechwriter. “[T]his 
Service,” The Survey noted in December 1922, “has been thought of largely as La Follette’s 
personal affair.” And tied to La Follette as it was, the PLS did not persist very long after the 
Senator’s death in 1925 – The Service eventually closed its doors in 1927.771 
 
Nor did La Follette’s Independent Congressional Campaign Committee idea ever really 
take root as hoped. Then as now, organizing all of the progressives in Congress in a bloc tended 
to be an exercise in herding cats. When a seeming progressive resurgence occurred in the 1922 
midterms that saw the likes of Burton Wheeler of Montana and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota 
join the Senate and Fiorello La Guardia join the House (as well as Gifford Pinchot and Al Smith 
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respectively taking the governorships of Pennsylvania and New York), the idea of cross-party 
progressive coalition was broached again, this time with more fanfare in the press. “The time has 
now come,” La Follette declared to the press, “for the organization of a well-defined group, 
cooperating in support of accepted progressive principles and policies.” Seventeen senators and 
thirty-eight congressmen attended a December 1922 meeting to form such a bloc, along with  the 
ACLU’s Roger Baldwin, progressive editors such as Herbert Croly of TNR, and labor 
representatives like Samuel Gompers of the AFL and John Moore of the UMW. “The purpose of 
this conference,” one Wisconsin Congressman told the Washington Post, “is to give every 
progressive the opportunity to know his fellow progressives, to cement progressive forces in a 
harmonious fellowship…We are going to be tried as gold in a furnace. All real progressives will 
be put to the acid test.”772  
 
Once again, however, the potential of such an organization far overshadowed the 
operational reality. This newly expanded progressive bloc enjoyed the most success in the House 
of Representatives. At the beginning of the 1923-24 session, House progressives – arguing that 
“the Old Guard will soon wake up, rub their eyes, and learn that we are living in a new day” – 
were able to join with the Democratic minority to block the reelection of Speaker Frederic 
Gillett, a Massachusetts Republican, until the rules of the House were liberalized to facilitate the 
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passage of progressive legislation. Specifically, the Rules Committee Chairman lost his “pocket 
veto” power, the requirement that any amendment to a revenue bill be “germane” to the topic 
was struck, and the number of Members’ signatures needed to discharge a bill from the 




This show of strength drove regular Republicans to distraction. “[A] small number in this 
House calling themselves Progressives – and God save the word – are not progressives at all but 
radicals,” intoned Rep. Walter Lineberger of California, “and we should not mince words but 
call a spade a spade.” Unfortunately, aside from making it easier for progressives to amend 
Mellon’s tax plan with a higher surtax on wealthy incomes, the liberalized rules did not result in 
any concrete legislative gains for progressives in the 68
th
 Congress, and they were soon rolled 
back by the more conservative caucus that rode Calvin Coolidge’s coattails to victory in 1924. 
The following January, the emboldened Republican caucus, as in the Senate, disinvited thirteen 
House members who had supported La Follette, including Fiorello La Guardia of New York and 
ten members from Wisconsin, among them Henry Allen Cooper, then the oldest member of 
Congress. “We will welcome them back at the first opportunity,” said the new speaker, Nicholas 
Longworth, of the purge, “when they evince any desire to come back and qualify as 
Republicans.” (Responded La Guardia: “I hope that my Progressive friends will not worry 
unduly. If these Republicans will not invite us to their conference or caucus we will not invite 
them to ours.”)774 
 
A more successful attempt at counter-organization in Congress, and a model that inspired 
La Follette in his second attempt at forging a progressive bloc, was the farm bloc organized and 
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led by Senator William Kenyon of Iowa in May 1921. Along with around twenty other agrarian 
senators (including La Follette and George Norris, but usually not Borah) and one hundred 
congressmen, the farm bloc came for a time to control the balance of power in Congress by 
effectively neutralizing the ability of the Republican majority to control the floor or end a 
session. In the first year of Harding’s presidency, the farm bloc managed to successfully lobby 
for and pass several bills reflecting farmer’s interests, including an emergency tariff to raise 
duties for farm products, broader access to federal farm loans, and an exemption for farmer’s 
cooperatives from anti-trust legislation. By February 1922, TNR deemed it “the most powerful 
single influence in national legislation.” To retake control of the agenda and cut off the head of 
the farm bloc, Harding offered William Kenyon a federal judgeship on the Circuit Court of 
Appeals in January of 1922. Kenyon accepted, and his successor atop the farm bloc, Senator 




Both the strength and weakness of the farm bloc for the remainder of the decade is 
encapsulated by the fate of the McNary-Haugen Farm Relief bill, which in effect tried to raise 
farmers’ purchasing power by establishing federal price supports for farm goods. (The 
government would set a higher domestic price for farm goods, while selling off excess supply to 
the world at market rates.) While supported by farm groups, as well as Harding Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry Wallace, the McNary-Haugen bill was vociferously opposed by the decade’s 
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover. (“I have done more of it than any other man who 
lives,” Hoover said, citing his tenure as Food Administrator, “and I would not propose price-
fixing in any form short of again reentering the trenches in a World War.”) First introduced in 
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1924, the McNary-Haugen bill managed to pass Congress twice – in 1927 and 1928 – but neither 




While the Senate progressives were never as successful as the farm bloc in organizing a 
unified coalition during the Harding era, standpatter Republicans inadvertently gave the 
formation of such a bloc a big boost in the wake of Coolidge’s sizable 1924 victory. In no mood 
to brook party disloyalty anymore, Senate Republicans tried in late November 1924 to throw 
Robert La Follette, and three senators who had supported his independent presidential candidacy 
– Lynn Frazier and Edwin Ladd of North Dakota and Smith Brookhart of Iowa – out of the GOP 
caucus. (La Follette, Frazier, and Brookhart missed the caucus meeting where this was decided, 
as did Borah, Norris, and Johnson.) The following March, when the new Congress convened, 
Republicans attempted to strip the four offending Senators of their seniority. “Senator La Follette 
has gone out of the Republican party and has gone voluntarily,” argued Senator George Moses of 
New Hampshire, the president pro tem of the Senate. “He has headed the national ticket of a new 
party which he undoubtedly hopes to perpetuate. Therefore it seems to me wholly within reason 
that we should assume that La Follette has abdicated his Republicanism in the Senate on the 
same footing.”777 
 
Both Borah and Norris balked at this move by their party. They blocked the unanimous 
consent request, and Borah began making the useful political case that this move was less about 
punishing La Follette and more just “a demotion of the West…[I]t is diminishing the power of 
the West in this Chamber. I know it is a distinct political action against our part of the country.” 
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The Senate still voted 65-11 to accept the new committee assignments, but now Borah had the 
makings of a political bloc of his own – one that went immediately into effect to block 
Coolidge’s choice of Attorney General, Charles Beecher Warren.778 
 
 Coolidge had picked Warren to replace Attorney General, and soon to be Justice, Harlan 
Fiske Stone (who in turn had replaced Harry Daugherty after he was forced to step down for the 
Ohio Gang’s multiple transgressions.) A former Ambassador to Japan and Mexico, Charles B. 
Warren would seem to have a sterling record for the position – particularly given Daugherty’s 
recent occupancy at Justice. Except, during his time as the president and counsel of the Michigan 
Sugar Company, a combination of six beet sugar companies, Warren had run afoul of antitrust 
laws during the Roosevelt administration. And Borah, who “felt then and felt a thousand times 
afterwards I did not do my duty” when Daugherty has been appointed in 1921, was now 
“determined I would not escape responsibility again.”779 
 
 Charles Warren’s nomination passed the Senate Judiciary Committee relatively easily on 
a vote of 9-4, but Senator Borah’s no vote there (along with three Democrats) infuriated 
Coolidge, who felt he had just spent eighteen months courting the notoriously fickle Idaho 
Senator. The recently formed “Borah bloc” – which included Norris, Ladd, Frazier, as well as 
other Western senators looking for payback – then sided with Democrats to block a closed-door 
confirmation process, 38-39. Over the next few days, Borah managed to swing more western 
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 On March 11, 1925, the progressives got their first revenge on Republicans for their own 
vindictive caucus of several months prior. The week before, in his first time presiding over the 
body, new Vice-President Charles “Hell and Maria” Dawes – so nicknamed after one of his 
favorite exclamations – had urged a revision of cloture rules in the Senate to prohibit filibusters. 
(At the time, 66 votes were needed to end debate.) This was anathema to the Senate progressives, 
who depended on their ability to keep open debate to have any power in the body. As Burton 
Wheeler of Montana remembered in his memoirs, “Old Bob La Follette, the master of the use of 
the filibuster to arouse public opinion, warned me never to vote for cloture…arguing it would 
destroy the most useful weapon a liberal minority possesses against a conservative coalition. He 
insisted that cloture must be opposed as a matter of principle…[I]f I voted for it once I could 
hardly oppose it another time.” Dawes’ attack on the prerogatives of the Senate, on his very first 
day, also infuriated the regular members of his party, who sat in stony-faced silence during the 
general’s embarrassing harangue. “It was the most acrobatic, gymnastic speech I have ever heard 
in the Senate,” remarked Democrat Henry Ashurst of Arizona.781 
 
The following week, Dawes, after talking with Senate leaders, thought six speakers were 
scheduled before the Warren vote and, already knowing well senators’ disposition for bombast 
and long-windedness, headed over to the Willard Hotel for a nap. Then, five of those six 
scheduled speakers canceled, and the Majority Leader, hearing more and more grumblings about 
sugar trusts on the floor, called for a vote and then called the vice-president. Dawes leapt from 
bed and traveled frantically across town to break the ensuing 40-40 tie, but the moment he 
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arrived at the Senate, the one pro-Warren Democrat, Lee Overman of North Carolina, switched 
his vote to make it 39-41. Senator Norris subsequently amused his colleagues with a satirical 
take on “Sheridan’s Ride,” Thomas Read’s Civil War poem about Union General Phillip 
Sheridan twenty-mile ride to rally his troops – this time about Dawes. “Be it said in letters bold 
and bright / Oh, Hell an’ Maria, he has lost us the fight.”782  
 
Calvin Coolidge was not amused. Enraged that such a “man of high character, eminence 
at the bar and great ability” had been brought low by the Senate due to “partisan politics,” he 
resubmitted the nomination. He then called Borah to the White House and urged him to do his 
part for the Party. As a further sign of good faith, Senate Republicans met with Norris and Borah 
and got the La Follette defectors’ seniority reinstated. But Borah was the type of fellow who, 




This time, Warren got out of the Judiciary Committee on a 9-7 vote, with Borah and 
Norris joining five Democrats in opposition. Before the floor vote, Frederick Gillett of 
Massachusetts – as of 1924, a Senator instead of House Speaker – argued that the opposition to 
Warren was solely due to “a combination of Democrats and radicals.” This insult prompted 
Borah to give one of his usual constitutional barnburners about the importance of advice and 
consent. “I think it has come to the time when a radical is a man who believes in the Constitution 
of the United States,” Borah asserted in a thirty-minute speech. “I am trying to meet my 
constitutional obligations as a Senator.” As for Warren himself, Borah argued the nominee had 
clearly taken part in “a combination…formed for the purpose of controlling the production of 
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sugar.” This was “open, deliberate, and unmistakable.” And so Borah was “unwilling to vote for 
the confirmation of a man, however high may be his intellectual attainments or his capacity” who 
had been part of a “conspiracy which had for its purpose peculating from the pockets of the 
people of the United States concerning one of the necessaries of life.” 784 
 
After Borah’s address, Charles Warren’s bid went down 39-46. (Among the votes against 
him this time was Robert La Follette’s, who had been in Florida trying to recuperate from the 
disease that would soon claim his life.)  Even after all the many yokels in the Harding 
administration that America had endured, Charles B. Warren became the first Cabinet member 




Political observers of all stripes saw in the Warren fight a new balance of power centered 
around the progressives. “From this distance,” a “pleased and encouraged” Harold Ickes wrote 
Hiram Johnson, “it looks to me as if there is the makings of a combination that on proper 
occasion can hold the lines in the senate when necessary to block improper legislation or to resist 
undue encroachments by the executive.” This “insurgent group, beside which the little La 
Follette clique of the last session is a feeble memory,” wrote Charles Michelson in the New York 
World, illustrated that Borah now “wields an influence in the Senate superior to that of any other 
member, regardless of party.” The Lion of Idaho, Frederick Wile of the Washington Evening 
Star agreed, “seems to have succeeded Mr. La Follette in the leadership of the progressive bloc 
in the Senate.” Now a new “hydraheaded nightmare in the Senate, with names like Borah, 
[James] Couzens, Johnson, McMaster, Norbeck, and Norris as its outstanding terrors” had 
subsumed the La Follette “nightmare that kept the GOP writhing in maddening dreams.” After 
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the discouraging events of the 1924 election, progressives like Basil Manly, who relished this 
“body blow” against Coolidge, and Oswald Villard, who wanted to “throw up one’s hat and give 
three hearty cheers,” were ecstatic about thus unexpected showing of power. On Wall Street, 
meanwhile, talk of a “bloc-locked Congress” in the New York Post, sent stocks tumbling to their 




The Warren fight, coupled with the June 1925 death of La Follette, propelled William 
Borah to the forefront of the progressive movement. While Hiram Johnson and George Norris 
did not have the same cachet, The New Republic’s TRB argued, “Borah is the real hope – the one 
best bet…His friends here have a feeling, which I fully share, that the La Follette death will force 
him forward as the real Progressive leader.” Others, such as columnist Mark Sullivan, who had 
always looked askance at the ravings of La Follette, thought Borah’s ascendancy meant 
progressivism could finally be made respectable to Americans’ eyes. Borah himself, according to 
Frank Knox, thought “that possibly the removal of La Follette and Bryan from the stage may 
pave the way to the organization of a real liberal movement in America.” Now, Borah had told 
him “there is an opportunity for tremendously big things.”787 
 
   After the Warren vote, Vice-President Charles Dawes tried to forestall any further 
progressive shenanigans by the Borah bloc in the Senate by introducing the majority cloture rule 
he had called for on day one. Borah, for one, was not having it. “I am opposed to cloture in any 
forum,” he told Lynn Haines of Searchlight on Congress. “I have never known a good measure 
killed by filibuster or a debate. I have known of a vast number of bad measures, unrighteous 
measures, which could not have been killed in any other way except through long discussion and 
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debate.” If “sinister and crooked interests,” he argued “succeed in reducing the situation to a 
point where they only have to see one or two men, either to put through or kill a measure, they 
are masters of the situation.” For various reasons, most of the other Senators agreed. A New York 
Times poll of the Senate found only six Senators in strong support of Dawes’ proposal, while 
forty-five strongly disagreed with it. The proposal, the Times concluded correctly, would go 
down in “almost certain defeat.”788 
 
In the end, filibuster reform or no, the Borah bloc turned out to be as ephemeral an 
antagonist as La Follette’s earlier attempts at progressive organization. When the Democratic 
Party joined the Republicans, as it often did, to cement the foundations of Coolidge prosperity, 
the Borah bloc were lonely lions in the wilderness. “[P]rogressives can do nothing but protest,” 
wrote one of the Senate’s newest members, young Bob La Follette, Jr., to a friend, “unless the 
Democrats are willing to offer some resistance to the Coolidge program.” In the end, the Idaho 
Senator’s powerlessness was made particularly evident by his inability to prevent the Senate 
from voting, 76-17, to join the World Court, one of Borah’s long-time bête-noires.789  
 
Borah himself – always happier taking a lone principled, irreconcilable stance than he 
was putting forward constructive legislation – was never temperamentally suited to be the head 
of a constructive bloc regardless. Walter Lippmann argued in 1926 that “the career of Borah is 
built upon opposition…He is an instinctive conscientious objector, and his mind seizes swiftly 
upon the reasons why anything that is about to be done should not be done.” Hiram Johnson, 
who knew him as well as anyone, eventually derided him as a “spearless leader.” Borah, Johnson 
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told Harold Ickes, “is variable as the wind and as fickle as a maiden” who “if you notice…never 
attacks power except in the abstract.” (The variability at least is a charge to which the Senator 
from Idaho, a devoted fan of Ralph Waldo Emerson, pled guilty. “I lay no particular claim to 
consistency,” he once said, “indeed I do not know that consistency is a virtue of particular 
worth.”) George Norris, meanwhile, thought Borah had a penchant for “shooting until he sees the 
whites of their eyes.” By late in the 1920’s, Harold Ickes came to think of Borah as a man “who 
has no disposition to make a last ditch fight for progressive principles. It makes me boil to hear 
him constantly acclaimed as the outstanding progressive by such journals as The New Republic 
and The Nation which ought to know better. If he has ever gone through I don’t know when it 
was or on what issue.” Whatever the Idaho Senator’s foibles, he in the end was no more 





Lobbies Pestiferous and Progressive 
 
When decrying the power of lobbies at the April 1921 rollout of the People’s Legislative 
Service, Robert La Follette and Basil Manly were echoing a common lament among progressives 
about the growth and abuse of lobbying in Washington. “Washington has never been jammed to 
the extent that it now is with representatives of special economic groups,” wrote Donald 
Wilhelm in The Survey in July 1921. “The trade association is today what the corporation and the 
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trust were less than a generation ago, a national problem that threatens the sovereignty of the 
individual citizen.” An article in the January 29, 1921 Literary Digest discussed attempts in 
Washington “To Curb the Pestiferous Lobbyist.” “I do not know where this lobbying business is 
going to stop,” lamented Senator Kenyon of Iowa. “Washington is swarming with lobbies of 
every kind and description, so that is impossible for Senators to get to their offices without being 
intercepted.” The New York Evening World lamented “the epidemic of lobbying…spreading like 
a plague.” Soon, it argued, “we must make up our minds whether this is to be a government by 
duly elected and responsible representatives of the people or a government by lobby.” 791 
 
To many progressives, who envisioned themselves as committed to the Public Interest 
above all else, the proliferation of lobbies was deeply troubling, particularly as it was hard to 
draw the line between good lobbying – the healthy education of public opinion – and bad 
lobbying – the misuse of government by special interests. That is why, commenting on the 
creation of the People’s Legislative Service, The Nation once again emphasized again that the 
PLS “is not to be a lobby nor a source of propaganda, but a source of facts and therefore an 
organization around which the free men of Congress should gradually coalesce.” As William 
Kenyon argued, “there are proper kinds of lobbies. Nobody wants Congress to be shut off here 
on the Hill and have people unable to get to Congress.” In fact, even as Kenyon co-sponsored 
legislation in 1921 with Lee Overman to strengthen disclosure requirements
 
for lobbyists, so that 
a record of each could be kept in the House, Senate, and executive departments, he was 
assembling his farm bloc in frequent consultation with the recently-created American Farm 
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Bureau Federation. (Kenyon’s bill did not pass, and the issue was not meaningfully dealt with 
again until the 1930’s.)792  
  
In some cases, the growth of lobbying encouraged progressives to be more at peace with 
class legislation. “At last,” Frederic Howe wrote of his work with the People’s Legislative 
Service, “I had found a class whose interests ran hand in hand with things I desired.” And one of 
the strongest lobbies of the Harding years was also a progressive-minded one – the Women’s 
Joint Congressional Committee (WJCC). Organized in 1920 immediately after passage of the 
nineteenth amendment with Maud Wood Park, president of the League of Women Voters, as 
Chairwoman, the WJCC was a combined effort of ten (and eventually twenty-one) of the most 
prominent women’s organizations in America. It would launch into action any time three (and 
later five) of the founding organizations agreed on a given stance.793  
 
In 1921, the WJCC formed its “Six P’s” agenda: Prohibition, protection of infants, public 
schools, physical education, peace through disarmament, and the protection of women in 
industry. Strongest in the first two years of Harding’s presidency, when male politicians of every 
stripe still feared the swing potential of a unified woman vote, the WJCC first worked to pass the 
Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act, the first federal welfare program of its kind.   The 
brainchild of Julia Lathrop of the Children’s Bureau, Sheppard-Towner appropriated $1.5 
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million a year in 1922, and $1.25 million a year for the next five years, for $5000 grants to child 
and maternal health programs at the state level.
794
 
   
“It is now proposed to turn the control of the mothers of the land over to a few single 
ladies holding government jobs at Washington,” bellowed Senator James Reed of Missouri 
during debate over Sheppard-Towner. “We would better reverse the proposition and provide for 
a committee of mothers to take charge of the old maids and teach them how to acquire a husband 
and have babies of their own.” Thanks to the hard work of the WJCC, Reed’s sexism lost the day 
in decisive fashion: The Sheppard-Towner Act passed the House 279-39 and the Senate 63-7. 
Senator Kenyon, who decried the influence of lobbies on other occasions, noted that “if the 
members could have voted on that measure secretly in their cloak rooms it would have been 
killed as emphatically as it was finally passed in the open under the pressure of the Joint 
Congressional Committee of Women.”795 
 
The WJCC’s work was not done. Since the Act prescribed funds on a voluntary basis, the 
WJCC and new Children’s Bureau head Grace Abbott began lobbying governors and state 
legislatures to make sure the money went to good use. Within a year, 42 of 48 states had 
accepted the Act, and by 1923 forty of them began accepting funds. Within five years, every 
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The WJCC also scored another success the following year with the 1922 Cable Act, 
which, as promised in both the Republican and Democratic platforms of 1920, at last made 
women’s citizenship independent of their husbands. That same year, according to historian 
Dorothy Brown, both the Ladies’ Home Journal and the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (who saw Sheppard-Towner as an unwarranted federal incursion into their domain) 
described WJCC as the “most powerful and highly organized lobby in Washington” and “one of 
the strongest that has even been seen in Washington” respectively. Another journal, according to 
historian Robyn Muncy, deemed it “the most widespread and popular lobby that probably has 
ever visited this city.” By 1924, the director of the U.S. Women’s Bureau bragged that 
“American women are organized, highly organized, and by the millions. They are organized to 
carry out programs of social and political action.” In her May 1924 annual report to the LWV, 
Maud Wood Park noted that two-thirds of the League’s thirteen-plank program in 1920 had been 
made law, and that the LWV – now organized in 346 of 433 congressional districts – had passed 
420 and defeated 64 bills at the state-level. The following month, the WJCC added to the total:  
Working with Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt, the highest-ranking 
woman in the administration and the person in charge of Prohibition efforts, it secured passage of 
legislation creating a federal women’s prison in Alderson, West Virginia.797  
 




 Skocpol, 505. Brown, 52-57. Muncy, 105. Cott, 98-99. “The Week,” The New Republic, May 14th, 1924 (Vol. 38, 




In many ways, the WJCC’s power and efficiency was the result not just of its broad 
constituency and male fears of a “women’s bloc”, but a reflection of the decades of experience 
its founders had amassed in fighting for suffrage and other battles from the sidelines.  Twenty 
years previously, one of the first progressives to recognize the potential of lobbying for social 
change had been Florence Kelley, who established the National Consumers League in 1899. As 
Arthur Schlesinger put it, “the League’s investigations turned up facts to stir the public 
conscience. Then the League’s lawyers drafted bills, and the League’s lobbyists sought to push 
them through legislatures.” By the time Florence Kelley was head of the WJCC’s subcommittee 
in support of Sheppard-Towner in 1921, she was a veteran hand at the lobbying arts. “Every year 
from a quarter to a third of a million little children, and approximately 20,000 mothers in 
childbirth, die from preventable causes,” Kelley had argued in The Survey in June 1920. “There 
is no visible, or audible, responsible opposition to the bill.” Under her leadership, in the weeks 
before passage, the WJCC interviewed fifty Members of Congress a day and flooded the Hill 
with letters from concerned women from all over the country. “I think every woman in my state 
has written to the Senator,” said one exasperated aide.798 
 
So, as much as some progressives lamented lobbying as a pernicious tool of special 
interests, they also took advantage of it to press reforms when the opportunities arose. In fact, 
one could argue that organized lobbying of the government had originally been a progressive 
reform. As historian John Danbom writes, the Progressive Era reforms that had worked to break 
the post-Civil War stranglehold the two national parties had on politics also “created greater 
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opportunities for organized groups to influence politics…Political reforms weakened the parties, 
but this merely increased the ability of self-serving groups to influence the system, regardless of 
the public interest.”  In the words of another historian cited by Danbom, John Whiteclay 
Chambers, “in their search for a larger public interest, progressives inadvertently contributed to 
the growth of the interest-group democracy they bemoaned.” 799 
 
The Twenties were the apotheosis of this transformation. “The 1920s,” Lynn Dumenil 
argues in The Modern Temper, “saw the systematizing of lobbying that caused a permanent 
change in the political process.” William Allen White, for one, thought that lobbying was an 
auspicious development – It made government more accessible to all. “One has but to reach out 
his hand to become effective in it,” he wrote in 1924. “Democracy never was so near the people 
as it is” today. But this innovation came with a cost. “The more suffragists behaved as simply 
another interest group, trading a principle there for an advantage here,” argued William O’Neill 
in his 1971 history of feminism, Everyone Was Brave, “the less capable they became of 
preserving what had brought them into politics to begin with. In a sense, suffragists and social 
reformers were depleting their moral capital.” 800  
 
As Danbom argues, citing O’Neill, what was true of women’s groups “applies in some 
degree to virtually every progressive group.” As more and more organizations entered the 
lobbying game on behalf of a particular constituency, it became harder and harder to maintain 
the progressive idea of a public interest against a variety of competing special interests. In 
opening the door to lobbying, the progressives helped to facilitate the philosophical shift away 
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They also, Lynn Dumenil argues, helped to encourage the type of disgust with the 
political process that turned the engaged citizens of the Progressive Era into the disinterested 
consumers of more recent times. Lobbying, argued another Donald Wilhelm article, “operates to 
disfranchise the individual citizen so unfortunate as to be unrepresented by any of them.” 
Because of these “Washington Soviets,” Wilhelm argued, “the average citizen has half-
consciously sensed his individual impotence.” As a result, “less than sixty percent of us take the 
trouble to cast our votes.” In the words of one disgruntled Klansman of the period, “Everybody 
knows that politicians nowadays cater to all kinds of ‘elements’ mostly selfish, some corrupt, and 
some definitely anti-American. They cater to the German vote, the Catholic Vote, the Jewish 
vote, the Italian vote, the bootleg vote, the vice vote, and sometimes even to the violently 
criminal vote.” Wherever you stood in the political spectrum, left or right, the growth of 








Also working to discourage citizens from politics were the sordid campaign finance 
revelations that had been unearthed by the Kenyon Committee during the Election of 1920. The 
extravagant spending by Wood and Harding, the direct bribes that were unearthed in Frank 
Lowden’s Missouri campaign – these, to progressives, were a problem that must be addressed, or 








the entire American experiment was at risk. “We have traveled further over the road of money in 
politics in 100 years than Rome traveled in 500 years,” lamented William Borah. “It is assumed 
that men become radicals because they are naturally criminal, or because they have been bribed 
by Russian gold, or because they have not been properly Americanized,” similarly argued H.L. 
Mencken. “But the thing that actually moves them, nine times out of ten, is simply the conviction 
that the Government they suffer under is unbearably and incurably corrupt.” A radical, he argued 
“is not a bad citizens turning to crime; he is a good citizen driven to despair.”803 
 
Soon enough, dark dealings within the Harding administration would furnish several 
poster children in the fight against government corruption. But in the early years of the Harding 
era, the most compelling exhibit of money in politics was Senator Truman H. Newberry of 
Michigan, the same Senator who had been vilified by name in the Democratic platform of 1920.  
In a 1918 Republican primary against Henry Ford, Newberry – a former Secretary of the Navy 
under Taft – spent between ten and twenty times the $10,000 maximum that had been set in the 
1910 Federal Corrupt Practices Act. (Michigan state law prescribed an even lower acceptable 
figure – 25% of the anticipated salary of the position, which amounted to approximately $3750.) 
While Newberry went off to Congress, Henry Ford used his considerable pull to get an official 
investigation launched, one that – with the help of evidence culled by Ford-hired detectives -- 
brought multiple indictments and a lower court conviction against the sitting Senator and 133 
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But in a 1921 5-4 decision, U.S. v. Newberry, written by Justice James McClark 
Reynolds, the Supreme Court determined that Congress had no constitutional authority under 
either Article 1, Section 4 or the Seventeenth Amendment to set spending limits on primaries or 
nomination proceedings – only general elections – and thus the spending limits in the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act were unconstitutional. One of the concurring opinions, written by Justice 
Mahlon Pitney and joined by Louis Brandeis, agreed there were irregularities as to how the case 
against Newberry was brought, but found the stance of the Court hugely troubling. “That a 
government whose essential character is republican…has no power by appropriate laws to secure 
this election from the influence of violence, of corruption, and of fraud, is a proposition so 
startling as to arrest attention and demand the gravest consideration.”805   
 
Either way, Truman Newberry’s conviction was overturned…in the court of law. In the 
court of public opinion, his fate was still to be decided. As the 1920 platform attests, Democrats 
saw an easy chance to score political points against the Republican majority by complaining 
about Newberry, and they did so with a relish – arguing that seating him was an offense to the 
august institution of the Senate. James Heflin of Alabama decried “the slimy trail of the boodle 
serpent” that Newberry left in his wake. Oscar Underwood of Kentucky argued his presence put 
the whole Republican Party under indictment. Other Democrats argued his presence in the 
Senate was a first step “into ruin and oblivion.” 806  
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Old Guard Republicans, meanwhile, rallied around one of their own. Newberry was a 
Navy man whose sons served in the war, argued Michigan’s other Republican Senator, Charles 
Townsend, while Henry Ford was a pacifist whose sons did not. What more did you need to 
know? For his part, the president, a former Senate colleague of Newberry’s, didn’t play the 
veteran card, but Harding did conspicuously embrace the Senator by inviting him to golf, a 
private dinner, and a seat in the White House box at the theater. “Hardly a day passes,” declared 
The Searchlight in Congress in disgust, “when the Washington newspapers do not report some 
parlor or dining room event in which Newberry commingled with the elite.”807 
 
What gave the case more than a partisan resonance was the opposition of Republican 
progressives – most notably Borah, La Follette, Norris, and Kenyon – to the seating of 
Newberry. William Borah in particular became, according to the Baltimore Sun, “a mountain of 
strength against Newberryism.” “The Newberry case,” the Senator wrote a constituent, “is in 
many respects the most intolerable thing which has happened in the whole history of the Senate.” 
To another, he called it “one of the most deplorable things which has happened as I see it since I 
have been in public life, indefensible and intolerable it seems to me from any possible 
standpoint. Neither Party interest nor anything else can justify such a fearful moral breakdown in 
politics.” The Searchlight agreed. The whole sordid case, it opined, revealed “the political morals 
of the ruling group at the lowest ebb in the history of the Republic.”808  
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On January 10, 1922, Borah delivered a wrathful hour-long address to the Congress about 
why the Senator from Michigan should not be seated, in which he excoriated “the leprous disease 
of venality [which] has fastened itself upon the body politic though the cursed customs and evil 
practices which seem to luxuriate in the soil of free peoples.” La Follette, meanwhile, called 
Newberry’s conduct “reprehensible” and “injurious,” and argued that the question at hand was 
“whether it is possible to buy a seat in the United States Senate for a quarter of a million to half a 
million dollars.” Because of the progressive pushback, what should have been an easy partisan 
vote for Republicans became suddenly contested. The final vote was a much-closer-than-
expected 46 to 41 in favor of Newberry, though it came with a censure of his campaign finance 
misdeeds as unbecoming “the honor and dignity of the Senate.”809 
 
For Democrats and progressives, this was a tactical defeat, with Borah particularly 
disgusted by the outcome of the vote. “We find the defendant guilty, therefore, he is acquitted,” 
he summed up the resolution. Deeming its passage “one of the most significant in the whole 
history of American politics,” Borah hoped that it would “serve to awaken the people to greater 
vigilance, for the cure of these things at last lies back with the masses.” But, in terms of keeping 
the corruption charge alive against the Old Guard, the Newberry incident turned out to be a 
strategic victory – especially after a letter from Harding to Newberry congratulating him leaked 
to the press. “Many comments are to be heard to the effect that the admission of Mr. Newberry is 
a disgrace to the Senate,” argued TNR in an editorial called “The Senate: Pay As You Enter,” 
“and there are cartoons picturing Uncle Sam gazing mournfully at a huge splotch of mud on the 
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Senate door. As if there were not sufficient mud already floating about in a body which could 
muster forty-six votes in favor of seating a beneficiary of corruption.” Newberry, stung by all the 
criticism and deeply unpopular by this point in any event, resigned his seat in November of 1922. 





Along with the Harding scandals to come, the Newberry imbroglio set the stage for a 
revision of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act in 1925. While this new Act still could not extend 
to primaries for constitutional reasons, the revised FCPA strengthened disclosure requirements 
considerably. All House and Senate candidates and multi-state political committees now had to 
file quarterly reports that included the source of every donation above $100. In a concession to 
changing times, it also raised the limit for Senate races to $25,000. (House races remained at 
$5000.  If a state law set a lower maximum, it still took precedence.) In addition, banks and 
corporations under federal charter “were expressly forbidden” from donating to political 
campaigns. Unfortunately for combatants of congressional corruption, both enforcement and 
compliance remained haphazard at best in the years to come. In the entire history of the act, only 
two men were denied their congressional seats for going over the limits – William Scott Vare of 
Pennsylvania and Frank L. Smith of Illinois, both Republicans who ran for the Senate in 1926.
 811 
 
First, Mr. Vare. Pennsylvania had always been a state particularly susceptible to political 
bossism, as evidenced by the iron grip, in their day, of both Matthew Quay and Boies Penrose 
over the state. But, when Penrose died in 1921, it left a battle for succession in the Keystone 
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State between the (Andrew) Mellon machine, which controlled Pittsburgh, and the Vares, who 
ran Philadelphia. (This confusion, along with a nationwide electoral surge for progressives in 
1922, helped to pave the way for Governor Gifford Pinchot.)  William Scott Vare and his two 
older brothers – both deceased by 1922 – were scions of the Philadelphia machine, and 
collectively known as the “Dukes of South Philadelphia.”812  
 
In 1926, Vare decided to challenge Penrose’s successor, George Wharton Pepper, for his 
Senate seat. To block the move, the Mellon interests backed Senator Pepper. And, further 
confusing matters, Governor Pinchot – who was term-limited – decided to make a run for the 
seat also. (All three were Republicans. This being Pennsylvania, the Democrat in the race, 
former Wilson Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, never stood a chance.) As the only Wet in 
the race, Vare managed to win by over 100,000 votes, with Pepper coming in second. “I have 
just taken a very thorough licking, running a poor third in a three cornered race,” a demoralized 
Gifford Pinchot wrote his nephew. “The man who won is a wet gangster who represents 
everything that is bad in Pennsylvania. The man who ran second was the candidate of the great 
special interests and the respectables who want to stand well with the powers that be.”813 
 
 But rumors of excessive spending and other campaign illegalities prompted Senator 
James Reed, a Missouri Democrat, to ask for a formal inquiry into the spending situation in 
Pennsylvania (and Illinois, where Frank L. Smith won a similarly dubious victory.)
 
The 
conclusions drawn by this investigation put the case of Truman Newberry to shame. In 1918, 
Newberry was thought to have spent as much as $200,000 to win over Henry Ford. By 1926, the 
Mellon-financed Pepper ticket had spent $1.8 million in the primary, the Vare machine 
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$789,000. (Pinchot had spent $187,000, William Wilson, uncontested on the Democratic side, 
only $10,000.) In an editorial, an aghast George Norris deemed these figures abhorrent to the 
“national conscience” and a threat “to the fundamental principles that underlie every free 
government,” and argued that “the only remedy the country has is to demand of the Senate that it 
refuse to seat” Vare. This set up a quandary of its own, for, however much Vare spent, Mellon 
had doubled it for Pepper, so Norris, a Republican, pleaded with the “honest, patriotic citizens of 
Pennsylvania” to vote for William B. Wilson, Democrat, in the general election. Norris then 
went on a whirlwind election tour of the Keystone State, visiting as many as seven cities a day to 
stump against Vare. Vare still won the seat, although he ran well below the rest of his ticket and 
lost by 50,000 votes outside of Philadelphia – suggesting some of that old machine magic might 




In any case, Senator Norris did not accept Vare’s victory as legitimate. In December of 
1926, he argued that his seating would mean “the domination of the Senate and the entire 
country by political machines, corrupt and immoral.”815 Vare’s hopes took another blow the 
following month when Governor Pinchot, in the customary letter of certification, argued Vare 
hadn’t really been “duly chosen” since “his nomination was partly bought and partly stolen.” 
William B. Wilson made his own objections known in March 1927, and the Senate voted 56-30, 
on a resolution submitted by Norris, not to seat Vare until a full investigation was completed by 
the Reed Committee. That took over two years, but on December 6
th
, 1929, another resolution 
introduced against Vare by George Norris passed 58-22. A subsequent resolution to seat William 
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B. Wilson failed 66-15, at which point yet another would-be Pennsylvania political boss, textile 




As for Frank L. Smith of Illinois, here was another situation where winning the 
Republican nomination was tantamount to general election victory, and, in a rematch of the 1920 
Senate election, Smith had managed to beat the sitting senator, William B. McKinley (no relation 
to the ex-president.) But Smith, the Chairman of the Illinois Commerce Commission overseeing 
public utilities, had not only spent $400,000 in the race – He had taken $125,000 from Chicago 





This $125,000 donation was a particularly egregious offense to George Norris, who at the 
time was leading the fight for public ownership of the Muscle Shoals power plant, and once 
again he threw himself into the case. “These stupendous figures stagger the imagination of the 
ordinary citizen,” Norris exclaimed on the Senate floor. As for Insull, “[i]t is quite apparent,” 
Norris argued, “that his interest in the Senate of the United States is a financial one. He is 
interested in what he can get out of it. Can any citizen of the United States look upon conditions 
such as these without a feeling of regret, of horror, and even with shame?” When McKinley died 
in December 1926, a month after the election, the Governor of Illinois replaced him with 
Senator-Elect Smith. (“If after the holidays on your approach to the Capitol,” Harold Ickes told 
Hiram Johnson, “you detect an unpleasant and unusual smell, please be advised that it will 
probably be Colonel Frank L. Smith with the appointment to your august body of Governor Len 
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Small in his pocket.”) But here again, on a vote of 48-33, the Senate refused to seat Smith until 
an investigation could be conducted. Unlike Vare, Smith gave up the fight relatively early, in 
February of 1928, at which point Otis F. Glenn defeated future Chicago mayor (and assassination 




“Money has come to be the moving power of American politics,” lamented William 
Borah in August of 1921. “Let us hope that…exposure will arouse the whole country to the 
necessity of dealing with a problem which has assumed the proportion of a great national evil.” 
But the Newberry and Smith-Vare battles aside, progressives lost the war when it came to 
keeping money out of politics in the New Era. “The news item to the effect that the two parties 
are to spend twenty million in this campaign seems incredible,” Borah said seven years later, in 
August 1928. “It is impossible to spend twenty million dollars in this campaign without 
transgressing every rule of decency and common honesty. It would be nothing less than an 
attempt to debauch the American electorate.” And it would not be stopping any time soon.819 
 
The Harding Scandals 
 
 
The Newberry and Smith-Vare cases may have riled the feathers of congressional 
progressives, but they were but bookends to the corruption scandals that emerged from the 
misdeeds of the Harding administration. Before all was said and done, the malfeasance within 
the Harding White House would result in several prolonged Senate investigations, jaw-dropping 
testimony, multiple resignations, a handful of suicides, the first conviction of a Cabinet member 
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in American history, the gradual unveiling of an even grander conspiracy that drenched the entire 
Republican Party in oil, and a shadow over an otherwise extremely popular president and his 
legacy that would heretofore be impossible to shake. And yet, while newspapers and onlookers 
would cover the scandals like they were the Greatest Show on Earth, progressives, try as they 
might, were never very successful in making political hay from the sordid revelations. To a 
cynical generation who had seen the idealism of the Great War devolve into a sad joke, who had 
begun the decade witnessing even the national pastime being fixed, and who had to break the law 
with regularity just to indulge in a drink, the Harding scandals were less a shocking blow to 
good, clean government and more just another good, old-fashioned entertainment. 
 
While hints of the darkest scandal, Teapot Dome, began to leak out as early as April 
1922, the first of the illegalities to come to full flower was the Veterans Bureau Scandal 
perpetrated by one Charles R. Forbes. Forbes was a charismatic huckster who had first met the 
Hardings in 1915, when the Senator and the Duchess were visiting Hawaii and he – only fifteen 
years after deserting the army for four years – was now in charge of building a naval base at 
Pearl Harbor. With poker skills and charming words, Forbes was able to woo his way into the 
hearts of both Hardings on that trip. Five years later, after Forbes had served with distinction in 
France and won a Distinguished Service Medal, he reconnected with Warren Harding, and 
helped to swing the Washington delegation at the 1920 convention to his side. On the advice of 
his wife, the president appointed Forbes head of the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, which after 
the passage of an August 1921 consolidation bill (yet another of the items Harding had asked for 
in his April address to Congress) became the Veteran’s Bureau.820 
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In keeping with the sheer number of veterans now out and about two years after the 
World War, the Bureau was granted the biggest budget of any federal department in 1921 – close 
to half a billion dollars a year. Forbes set himself to grifting as much as of this as he possibly 
could -- according to a later Senate investigation, as much as $2 million. Given control of the 
Army’s surplus warehouses in Perryville, Maryland, he began to sell all of the equipment and 
supplies therein below-cost to private firms (or, in the case of the alcohol and drugs on storage, 
to less savory entities), taking a percentage of the cut each time. (One Boston firm paid Forbes 
$600,000 for an estimated $5 to $7 million of supplies.) Granted the authority to determine 
where future veteran’s hospitals would be built, Forbes first set up a dummy architectural 
department that overcharged the government for shoddy proposals, then awarded the contracts 
only to those private contractors who gave him massive kickbacks. He also gave imaginary jobs 
on the Bureau’s payroll to friends and cronies. And when he wasn’t on extended, profligate 
junkets to tour fake hospital sites, he cut a playboy swath through Washington, publicly spending 
and gambling far more than his modest $10,000 salary should ever be able to withstand. 
Meanwhile, thousands of legitimate veterans’ claims went unprocessed.821 
 
Given the scale of Forbes’ graft, and the sheer audacity with which he flouted the law, it 
was likely only a matter of time before he got caught. As it was, the president’s surgeon general 
and personal physician, Charles Sawyer, got wind of the corruption and informed Harding in 
February, 1923. When the president asked his old friend for an explanation of why he was 
apparently liquidating the army’s reserves in Perryville, Forbes first gave the dubious 
explanation that it simply cost too much to store supplies there. But this time, the charm 
offensive failed. A few days later, Harding called Forbes to the White House again, where, as 
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noted before, he was seen by a visitor shaking him by the throat. In the end, the president 
allowed Forbes to resign and hide out in Europe, but the abrupt resignation – phoned in from 
Paris – caught the eye of Congress. Soon thereafter, the Senate called for a formal inquiry into 
dirty dealings at the Veteran’s Bureau. Twelve days later, Forbes’ general counsel, Charles 
Cramer, killed himself in the bathroom of his home – the same Wyoming Avenue home, it so 
happened, where Warren and Florence Harding had resided before the White House. The 




The Senate began its formal investigation into Forbes’ activities in October 1923, during 
which his misdoings were exposed by one of his old partners-in-crime, Elias Mortimer, whose 
wife Kate had cleaned out the bank account and gone off to Europe with the defendant. In 
February 1924, Forbes was indicted for conspiracy to defraud the government. His trial in 
Chicago took place the following winter, with Mortimer the star witness, and Forbes was 





Another esteemed veteran turned ne’er-do-well in the Harding administration was Lt. 
Colonel Thomas W. Miller, a former Delaware Congressman, war hero, American Legion co-
founder, and chairman of the Republican National Campaign Committee. In 1921, Miller was 
appointed the Alien Property Custodian, meaning the government official who oversaw all the 
property, trusts, and assets that had been confiscated from German nationals during the war. One 
of these assets was roughly 49% of the American Metal Company – worth $6 million – that had 
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been owned by a German bank. Converted into bonds by an earlier Alien Property Custodian, A. 
Mitchell Palmer, these company’s shares were now worth approximately $7 million.824  
 
In September 1921, a Swiss national named Robert Merton came to America claiming 
that a corporation owned by his family had, in a verbal transaction, bought out the German’s 
shares of the company in March 1917, one month before America entered the war. Through Wall 
Street connections, Merton was introduced to former Roosevelt and Wood campaign manager, 
John King, who brought him to meet the Alien Property Custodian and Harry Daugherty’s #2, 
Jess Smith, in New York. Within a week, Miller had delivered the $7 million in assets to Merton, 
who then gave King $391,000 in bonds and $50,000 cash. This “finder’s fee” very quickly 
looked to be a bribe when King subsequently gave $50,000 to Miller and $224,000 to Jess Smith 
“for expediting the claim,” $50,000 of which eventually ended up in a joint bank account shared 





By 1922, there were also rumors that a Massachusetts lawyer and good friend of Miller’s, 
Edward Thurston, was the man to see in order to make similar such bribes to the Custodian for 
other confiscated property. In any case, in 1926, Lt. Col. Miller was indicted, along with John 
King and Harry Daugherty, with conspiracy to defraud the government. A year later, in a second 
trial he would be convicted and spend eighteen months in prison. Daugherty, for his part, 
managed to beat the rap both times despite pleading the fifth, but not before it came out that he 
just happened to have burned all of the records associated with the particular joint bank account 
in question in 1925. As for Jess Smith, he couldn’t be indicted because, in the second suicide to 
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rock Harding’s administration, he had killed himself with a gunshot to the head in the early 






The question is still open as to exactly why Jess Smith killed himself, or even if he killed 
himself at all. (The first official on the scene was Bureau of Investigation head William “Billy” 
Burns, another member of the Ohio Gang, who promptly misplaced the murder weapon. In 
addition, while there was no autopsy conducted, the bullet apparently entered the left side of 
Smith’s skull. Smith was right-handed.) Before his death, Smith had burned all of his personal 
papers, a strangely common occurrence among members of the Ohio Gang. It is clear that, as 
Harry Daugherty’s roommate and friend since childhood (and, some rumored, lover), Smith 
knew of most of the misdeeds going on in the administration. Along with their H-Street abode, 
he and Daugherty also shared another property, what became notorious as the “Little Green 
House on K Street,” where they purportedly sold pardons, paroles, and liquor permits and 
stashed much of their ill-gotten lucre. In a later Senate investigation, Smith’s ex-wife, Roxy 
Stinson (with whom he had remained on friendly terms), would tell the world much of what she 
heard and knew about Smith and Daugherty’s escapades, including the fears Smith had that he 




On the other hand, Smith was apparently very sickly (he suffered from diabetes, and was 
recovering badly from an appendectomy) at the time of his death. He was also particularly 
depressed at the time – since, just before his death, Warren Harding had effectively banned him 
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from the White House premises. Smith had always been a regular visitor in the past, poker 
parties and otherwise, and he had been a favorite companion of the First Lady’s. But he was also 
indiscreet – “running with a gay crowd, attending all sorts of parties…using the Attorney 
General’s car until all hours of the night,” as the president put it to Harry Daugherty. And, after 
the Forbes scandal broke, Smith was a very visible symbol of the perhaps not-quite-kosher 
activities of the administration. As such, Harding told Daugherty to tell Smith he was not 
welcome to join the forthcoming presidential trip to Alaska, and in fact should probably leave 
Washington in all due haste. Upon hearing the ultimatum, Jess Smith – if it was in fact a suicide 
– instead chose to depart this mortal realm at the end of the month. (Alice Longworth thought the 
cause of death “Harding of the arteries.”)828  
 
In any case, however Jess Smith perished, the president himself would not be long in 
following. On June 20
th
, 1923, Harding left Union Station aboard the Superb for the start of what 
was to be a two-month “Voyage of Understanding” – part campaign tour, part chance to get out 
of Washington while the scandals simmered – up to Alaska and through the West. Along for 
much of the trip was Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Agriculture Henry 
Wallace, the new Secretary of the Interior, Hubert Work, Speaker of the House Frederic Gillett, 
and William Allen White, who later reported the president seemed to be sickly and acting 
erratically. Hoover also thought the president “exceedingly nervous and distraught.” One day, 
Hoover remembered, “Harding asked me to come to his cabin. He plumped at me the question: 
‘If you knew of a great scandal in our administration, would you for the good of the country and 
the party expose it publicly or would you bury it?” 
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My natural reply was “Publish it, and at least get credit for integrity on your side.” He remarked 
that this method might be politically dangerous. I asked for more particulars. He said that he had 
received some rumors of irregularities, centering around [Jess] Smith, in connection with cases in 
the Department of Justice. After a painful session he told Smith that he would be arrested in the 
morning. Smith went home, burned all his papers, and committed suicide. Harding gave me no 
information about what Smith had been up to. I asked what Daugherty’s relations to the affairs 




Harding, Hoover thought “grew more nervous as the trip continued.” After touring the 
Alaska territory and western Canada, the president – in an eerie moment reminiscent of his 
predecessor’s struggles through the West – faltered in the midst of a pro-conservation speech in 
Seattle, dropping his prepared remarks all over the floor. Hoover, who had written the speech 
give or take a few of Harding’s “usual three-dollar words and sonorous phrases,” also wondered 
why Harding kept saying “Nebraska” instead of “Alaska.” It would be the president’s last 
address. In San Francisco a few days later – August 2nd, 1923 – Harding died of what was 
thought to be a cerebral hemorrhage or apoplexy at the age of 57. (The First Lady refused to 




Late that night, in Plymouth Notch, New Hampshire, Vice-President Calvin Coolidge 
took the oath of office by candlelight, as administered by his father John Coolidge, the local 
notary public. The Voyage of Understanding had now become Warren Harding’s funeral train. 
Millions of grieving Americans came out to see the Superb pass by as it wended its way back 
East to Marion, Ohio. There, before President Coolidge, Chief Justice Taft, and such luminaries 
as Thomas Edison and Henry Ford, the 29
th
 President was laid to rest. A week later, on August 
11
th
, Florence Harding returned to the White House, where, while Coolidge chivalrously gave 
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her the space she needed, the Duchess spent the next five days sorting through and burning most 
of her husband’s papers. A few short months after that, the biggest and most-defining of the 
Harding scandals would break wide open.
831
 
Tempest from a Teapot 
 
 
In the spring of 1922, soon after having the Veterans Bureau buy a potential hospital site 
in Excelsior Springs, Missouri for $90,000 (it was worth $35,000), Charlie Forbes confessed to 
his associate, Elias Mortimer, that he had his eye on bigger fish. Soon, he told the man whose 
wife he stole and who would eventually put him behind bars, Albert Fall would step down and 
Harding would names Forbes the Secretary of the Interior, where the real money was at. As it 
played out, Forbes never got the chance to move to Interior -- his criminal empire at the Veterans 




Like Woodrow Wilson, a president he despised, Albert Fall of New Mexico was another 
good hater. Fall never forgave the former president for making a political speech against his 
reelection to the Senate in 1918 the same week – unbeknownst to Wilson – that Fall had lost his 
daughter and only son to the influenza plague. Similarly, as a rancher barely removed from the 
Wild West – in his earlier days, Fall had run-ins with Pat Garrett, Billy the Kid, and John Wesley 
Hardin – he detested the dictates of federal bureaucrats from the East, like former head of the 
Forest Service Gifford Pinchot, who thought they could tell him what he could and couldn’t do 
with his property. In 1911, Fall had written Pinchot warning him that he would “rue the day” that 
the Forest Service stepped in and prevented Fall from grazing twice as many sheep as was 
allotted on public lands. And so, once he was named Harding’s Secretary of the Interior, Fall 
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very quickly planned to use his position to thumb his nose at the conservationist busybodies he 
had loathed for so long. “I don’t know how succeeding generations will do it – maybe they will 
use the energy of the sun or the sea wave – but they will live better than we do,” Fall once said. 
“I stand for opening up every resource.”833  
 
 For Gifford Pinchot, the feeling was mutual – In fact, he thought Harding’s appointment 
of Fall was a particular slap in the face, given that he had very publicly played the part of the 
Loyal Roosevelt Progressive against Harold Ickes during the election. And so, even as Pinchot’s 
former conservationist lieutenant in Washington, Harry Slattery, vowed to keep a close eye on 
the new Secretary of the Interior’s doings, Pinchot wired a friend that Fall “has been with the 
exploitation gang...Trouble ahead.”834 
 
 Trouble indeed. Albert Fall came into office at Interior Secretary with grand designs for 
his Department. As a personal screw-you to the conservationists, he wanted to take control of 
Pinchot’s precious Forest Service, which was then a part of the Department of Agriculture, and 
effectively destroy it. Fall also planned to open every single part of the country over which the 
federal government had jurisdiction, be it national parks, lands promised to Native American 
tribes, or the Alaska Territory, to private concerns. Among these were the rich oil fields at Elk 
Hills and Buena Vista, California and Teapot Dome, Wyoming, which the Navy was holding as 
reserves for national security purposes. Jake Hamon, the Oklahoma oilman and Harding backer 
who had effectively bought the Interior Secretary position for himself before getting shot by his 
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mistress, also planned to use these public oil fields for private gain, but had died before he could 




 First things first, Fall had to acquire control of the naval reserves from the Navy 
Department. And so, on April 1
st
, 1921, less than a month into his new position, Fall asked 
Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby to hand these reserves over to Interior. Denby, who had no 
love for conservationists either, did so almost immediately, telling his staff that Fall’s power-
play “was full of dynamite. I don’t want anything to do with it.” Some of Denby’s underlings at 
the time, including Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., presumed Albert Fall was an honorable man and 
voiced no objections to the transfer – even after Harry Slattery warned him that something 
troubling seemed to be afoot. Those in the Navy Department who did kick up a fuss about the oil 
grab, on Fall’s orders to Denby, were quickly shuttled out of Washington and buried in dead-end 
jobs elsewhere in the Navy. In any case, President Harding signed the transfer of the oil fields 






 As it happened, Albert Fall, who as a longtime public servant was generally strapped for 
cash, wanted to make improvements to his Three Falls Ranch in New Mexico, including buying 
up some of the nearby properties in order to secure water rights for his place. And so he secured 
a loan from fabulously wealthy oil man Edward Doheny – $100,000 in cash, to be exact, 
transferred to Fall via a black bag carried by Doheny’s son Ned. A year later, in May of 1922, 
Fall would receive close to $230,000 in sequentially numbered US Liberty Bonds from another 
oil baron, Harry Sinclair, the first of several such payments. In between these two payouts, Fall 
was also visited in New Mexico by the Chairman of Standard Oil of Indiana, Robert Stewart, 
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who wanted to purchase the rights to the oil-rich Salt Creek fields, adjacent to Teapot Dome, 
from another wealthy individual, Harry Blackmer. Theoretically, this deal could not happen due 
to the same anti-trust laws that had broken up John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil into constituent 
parts, like Standard Oil of Indiana, in the first place. But soon after this meeting, at which 
presumably a fee was extracted, Fall met with Daugherty and eliminated any possible legal 




A month before Sinclair’s bonds were paid, in April of 1922, Albert Fall announced that, 
because private interests had already drained much of the naval reserves by way of diagonal 
drilling offsets (not true), he would lease the California reserves to companies who could get out 
whatever oil was left. Though he did not announce it, the Elk Hills and Buena Vista leases would 
in fact be going to Edward Doheny’s Pan American Petroleum and Transport Company. A few 
days later, the Wall Street Journal broke the story that Fall was also leasing the Teapot Dome 
fields to the Mammoth Oil Company, a recently-created subsidiary of Harry Sinclair’s Sinclair 
Oil. This, effused the Journal in a front-page story “marks one of the greatest petroleum 
undertakings of the age and signalizes a notable departure on the part of the government in 
seeking partnership with private capital for the working of government-owned natural 
resources.” In neither transfer was there anything resembling competitive bidding.838 
 
Up to this point, Gifford Pinchot and Harry Slattery had mainly been fighting Fall’s 
attempt to hijack the Forest Service from the Department of Agriculture. This crusade, waged 
mainly in the newspapers and on the golf course, where Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace 
had the president’s ear (and Fall, unfortunately for him not a golfer, did not), was for the most 
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part a successful one. Pinchot later remembered Harding telling him that “[y]ou are absolutely 
wrong in opposing the transfer of the national forests, but I pay you the compliment of saying 
that [Fall] cannot put it over against your opposition.” Nonetheless, the revelation of the oil 
leases changed the game. In April of 1922, just before news officially leaked, Harry Slattery 
went to Senator Robert La Follette asking him to begin a formal Senate inquiry into the oil 
matter. At first, La Follette suggested that Borah or Hiram Johnson might be a better point man 
for this sort of effort. But, after asking around, he too discovered that Navy officers who were 




And so, on April 21, 1922, La Follette called for a formal Senate inquiry into the leasing 
of the naval reserves to private interests. “I am going just as far as I can in the charges I make,” 
La Follette told Slattery a week later, “I can’t prove that there has been corruption but if we get 
this investigation I am confident that it will be shown.” La Follette then repaired to the Senate 
floor and formally asked that a Senate committee “be authorized to investigate this entire subject 
of leases upon naval reserves.” “We cannot permit a record to be made here which will parallel 
the record of Mr. Ballinger,” La Follette argued, citing the controversy that had taken place 
between conservationists and the Interior Department during the Taft administration. Now, it 
looked like Interior was “the sluiceway for a large part of the corruption to which this 
government of ours is subjected.” America should know “who were the real organizers of the 
Mammoth Oil Co. who were to be favored by the Government with a special privilege in value 
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At first, Harding seemed unperturbed by the call for an investigation. “This wasn’t the 
first time that this rumor has come to me,” the president told his Chair of the Shipping Board, 
former ad man Albert Lasker. “but if Albert Fall isn’t an honest man I’m not fit to be president of 
the United States.” Fall worked to further assuage everyone’s fears through various document 
dumps. He sent Harding an intentionally boring and obfuscatory 75-page-report on the lease 
transfers – which he knew the president likely wouldn’t be able to make head or tail of. This, the 
president sent on to the Senate, saying it “was submitted to me prior to the adoption thereof, and 
the policy decided upon and the subsequent acts have at all times had my entire approval.” Fall 
also sent along to the Senate committee thousands of pages of extraneous maps, surveys, memos, 




 Still, while as of yet no corruption had been uncovered, and none would be for a year to 
come, the La Follette resolution knocked Albert Fall back on his heels. Until this point, his grand 
consolidation plans had been continuing to unfold as planned, with Harding agreeing to transfer 
control of Alaska over to the rapacity of Interior as well. In a July 1922 Cabinet meeting, 
however, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace threatened to “expose the case against Fall, his 
colleagues, forests, oil and everything to the nation” if the Forest Service was sent to Interior. At 
that point, Harding decided not to approve the transfer. And, while he wrote to Fall in October 
1922 that he had “no concern about Wyoming oil matters” and that he was “confident you have 
adopted the correct policy and will carry it through in a way altogether to be approved,” the 
president also began to distance himself from Interior’s policies in general. In January of 1923, 
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believing his consolidation attempts had failed and he had made out as well as he likely would, 




The scandal took another turn for the baroque when the two editors of the Denver Post, 
Frederick Bonfils and H.H. Tammen, heard word from a disgruntled oil lobbyist that Harry 
Sinclair had begun buying up all of the private holdings around the Teapot Dome field. They 
dispatched their best reporter, one D.F. Stackelbeck, to New Mexico, who soon reported that 
apparently the Secretary of the Interior had come into a good deal of money of late. In the catbird 
seat now, the editors of the Post ran an editorial calling the Teapot deal “one of the baldest 
public-land grabs in history.” They then contacted Harry Sinclair, and told him to expect more of 
the same sort of hard-hitting watchdog journalism…unless he saw fit to pay them one million 
dollars. Sinclair balked at first, then made the payment. The Denver Post never posted an unkind 
word about Harry Sinclair or the Teapot scandal ever again. And Bonfils, after the payout had 





During all of this, the Senate was getting its ducks in a row for its formal inquiry. In 
offering his resolution, Senator La Follette had shrewdly asked for an investigation not from the 
Naval Affairs Committee, which was brimming over with Old Guard administration loyalists, 
but in the Public Lands Committee, which included among its number progressive Republicans 
George Norris, Edwin Ladd, and Peter Norbeck, as well as progressive Democrat Thomas Walsh 
of Montana. Along with committee member John B. Kendrick of Wyoming, who was hearing 
from angry and frozen-out-of-the-deal oil interests back home that something shady had 
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occurred, and new Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana, who had been enlisted to the cause at 
the December 1922 meeting of progressives, La Follette prevailed upon Walsh to head up the 
investigation. Senator Walsh was considered one of the best lawyers in the Senate, but he was 
reluctant to take the reins – He had seen the size of the document dump that had been carted over 
to Congress, he was already serving on more committees than any other Senator, and he, being 
another man of the West, had no real truck with conservationists anyway. Nonetheless, the 
Montana Senator agreed to do it, and for the next several years – much to the consternation of 
the guilty parties – he would remain steadfastly dogged to his duty, even when other Senators 




The actual Senate investigation did not begin until October 1923, after the resignation of 
Albert Fall, the deaths of Jess Smith and Warren Harding, and well after news of the lease 
transfers had petered out in the press. By then, the chair of the Public Lands Committee, 
administration loyalist Reed Smoot of Utah, had commissioned his own study arguing (wrongly) 
that Teapot Dome had been all but tapped out before the lease transfer anyway. With no money 
seemingly involved, the public’s interest in the scandal ebbed even further. Albert Fall was the 
first to testify, followed by Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby and the two oilmen, Harry 
Sinclair and Edward Doheny. While Doheny admitted he’d given Fall some cattle, there were no 
other revelations of note. After a week, the Committee took a month’s recess, and it seemed the 




But there was one major loose end, which Senator Walsh heard about through a mutual 
friend of Denver Post reporter D.F. Stackelbeck, who was still irritated his reporting got spiked – 
                                                          
844
 Wheeler, Yankee from the West, 217. Noggle, Teapot Dome, 43-44. McCartney, 110, 116-118. 
845




How had Albert Fall come into all of this money? When the Senate investigation started asking 
questions to this effect, Fall began to panic and – following the advice of Edward Doheny -- 
asked a wealthy friend, newspaper publisher Edward B “Ned” McLean, to agree to say he lent 
him the money. Soon thereafter, Fall was visited in Washington by some high-ranking 
Republican officials, including former party chair Will Hays – now head of the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (better known today as the MPAA) – and two of the 
leading Republicans on the committee, Reed Smoot and Irvine Lenroot of Wisconsin, as well as 
Harry Sinclair and a Sinclair lawyer. Perhaps with their help, perhaps without – the stories differ 





When this was announced, here again was a moment where the investigation could have 
run its course. McLean was known as both a generous and an eccentric sort, and he was clearly 
fond of Fall and the rest of the Harding administration. But Senator Walsh wanted to hear it from 
McLean personally, especially since Walsh knew from his own girlfriend – Washington society 
dame Daisy Harriman – that McLean was in fact flat broke. “Much of Washington thought 
[Walsh] obsessed, a reformer become fanatic,” journalist Mark Sullivan later wrote. “Throughout 
the country the oil investigation as a spectacle teetered toward the status of a comedy; in the 
newspapers there was a trace of jeering.” When Walsh asked McLean to testify, the publisher’s 
lawyer, A. Mitchell Palmer, informed the Committee that McLean was too sick to make an 
appearance, and could not leave his current location of Palm Springs, Florida. (Also with 
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McLean in Palm Springs at the time: Albert Fall, who had checked in at a hotel under an 
assumed name, and Coolidge’s new private secretary, C. Bascom Slemp.)847 
  
If the witness would not come before the Committee, the Committee would come before 
the witness. In January 1924, Senator Walsh went down to Palm Beach to interview McLean 
personally. In the face of Walsh’s probing questions, McLean said that, yes, he’d written 
$100,000 in checks to Fall, but they had all come back a few days later uncashed. The plot 
thickened when Archie Roosevelt, son of the former president and brother to Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., came before the Committee to say, first, that his boss, 
Harry Sinclair of Sinclair Oil, had just run off to Europe, and, second, that he’d heard Sinclair 
had paid Albert Fall $68,000. (The following witness, Sinclair’s private secretary G.D. 
Wahlberg, tried to argue that Roosevelt had misheard, and in fact Sinclair had given Fall “six to 
eight cows.” The Committee did not buy it.) That same month, Edward Doheny testified that he 
had lent Fall $100,000, in a black bag delivered his by son, but, of course, it had nothing to do 
with the lease transfers a year later. And, besides, $100,000 was a pittance to a man of Mr. 
Doheny’s wealth. The Committee did not buy that either.848 
 
Now, the Teapot Dome scandal was front-page news all over the country, to the point of 
possibly damaging Calvin Coolidge’s electoral chances in the coming November. And so, when 
Coolidge got word (from one of his men on the committee, Irvine Lenroot) that Senator Walsh 
was about to call for the firing of Secretary of the Navy Denby, as well as a presidential 
resolution canceling the leases, the president preempted him by announcing the appointment of 
“special counsel of high rank, drawn from both political parties” to look further into the scandal. 
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The Senate passed Walsh’s resolution regardless, which Coolidge ignored. But Coolidge wasn’t 
the only presidential aspirant in danger of being drenched with oil. At the provoking of Senator 
James Reed of Missouri, who desired the coming Democratic nomination for himself, Edward 
Doheny roiled the national press with more damaging testimony in January 1924 – he admitted 




With the president now committed to an investigation, the dominoes began to drop. On 
February 2
nd
, Fall once again appeared before the Walsh committee and, this time, invoked his 
Fifth Amendment rights. Six days later, Borah made the case on the Senate floor for Edwin 
Denby’s impeachment. “The Senate has been in the past the scene of many notable 
controversies,” he argued. “but I venture to express the opinion that no situation more 
humiliating, more demoralizing, and to some extent more discouraging has ever been here for 
our consideration or the consideration of those who have gone before: 
 
Vigilant observers have known for a long time how subtle and how powerful have been selfish 
and sinister interests in achieving their schemes and in gratifying their sordid ambitions here at 
the Capital. But few, if any, dreamed that they had actually placed a price upon the national 




Ten days after Borah’s speech, on February 18th, Denby resigned from the Coolidge 
administration. The following week, Walsh’s Montana colleague, Senator Burton Wheeler – in 
what he later deemed “the most important speech of my career” – called for an official Senate 
investigation into why Attorney General Harry Daugherty, of the “Department of Easy Virtue,” 
had done nothing to arrest or prosecute the Interior Secretary. “Here the Congress of the United 
States had appropriated one million dollars for the detection and prosecution of crime,” Wheeler 
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roared, and “instead of trying to detect the greatest crooks and those guilty of the greatest crimes 
against the nation that have ever been perpetrated, we find the Department of Justice protecting 
them.” As such, evidence suggests “that the Attorney General of the United States, now 





The following month, on March 12, Wheeler’s investigations began with his star witness 
– Roxy Stinson, the ex-wife of Jess Smith – who testified in lurid detail about the grifts Smith 
and Daugherty had been up to in the Little Green House on K Street, and of the fear Smith held 
just prior to his suicide that the gig would soon be up. “Jess Smith gave his life for Harry 
Daugherty,” Stinson testified, “he absolutely adored him.” Stinson’s five days of testimony 
became a media circus of sorts. The hearing, according to the Washington Times, “had all the 
atmosphere of a murder trial, combined with the bated breath excitement of the opening of King 
Tut’s tomb – the King Tut in this instance being poor Jess Smith.”852 
 
Wheeler followed up Stinson with Gaston Means, one of Billy Burns’ cronies at the 
Bureau of Investigation and an inveterate storyteller. (He would later “write” a sensation-causing 
1930 book – it was ghostwritten – The Strange Death of President Harding, which claimed the 
president has been poisoned by his wife.) “Means had a brilliant mind,” Wheeler later wrote of 
his witness, “and could have distinguished himself if he had used it in constructive channels. But 
you never knew when he was lying.” Means, who was also working as a paid mole in the 
Wheeler investigation for Billy Burns, peddled more dark, mostly uncorroborated tales of 
criminality within the Ohio Gang. ‘The rascally Means was more trouble to us than he was 
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When Daugherty refused to hand over records to the Wheeler Committee – claiming they 
were being demanded by Senators “who spent last summer in Russia with their Soviet friends” – 
Coolidge had had enough. The president forced his resignation from office on March 28
th, 
1924. 
Billy Burns left the Bureau of Investigation a month later, having been pushed out by new 




Before leaving office, the Attorney General tried to fire back at Senator Wheeler by 
falsely accusing him, in his Montana lawyer days, of taking pay from an oilman to represent his 
interests before the Department of the Interior. The smear did not take. “It is safe to say,” Felix 
Frankfurter wrote in The Nation, “that never in the history of our country have congressional 
investigators had to contend with such powerful odds…There is no substantial basis for criticism 
of the investigations of Senators Walsh and Wheeler.” “They’re trying to stop you,” Justice 
Brandeis told Wheeler, “Don’t let them stop you, because that’s all they’re trying to do!”855  
 
Immediately a “Wheeler Defense Committee” of prominent progressives was formed by 
Norman Hapgood and Basil Manly to help the Senator pay his legal fees – It ended up raising 
$15,000. A Senate committee headed by William Borah looked into the charges and found not 
even “the slightest evidence of criminal intent,” and Borah himself called the attempt “a sad, 
sorry story.” In 1925, a Montana jury acquitted Wheeler of the trumped-up charge after only ten 
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minutes of deliberation. “The story of this prosecution against Senator Wheeler,” argued his 
Montana colleague Tom Walsh, who also represented Wheeler in trial, “makes a black chapter in 
the history of American jurisprudence.” Telegrammed an ailing Robert La Follette to his former 
running mate after the verdict: “[E]very decent self-respecting American citizen must bow his 
head with shame in the face of the established fact that the leaders of a political party and its 
highest responsible public officials have prostituted a great department of government to subvert 
justice, shield the guilty, and convict an honest man of crime.”856  
 
In the summer of 1924, meanwhile, having “uncovered corruption without parallel in the 
history of the country,” Thomas Walsh brought his own hearings came to a close. “Corruption in 
public life is a vice that eats into the very structure of our system,” Walsh told a national radio 
audience. “Exposure of it is a service of the highest order and…swift, certain, and condign 
punishment is the only cure for it outside of moral regeneration.” But, after the salacious 
testimony of Roxy Stinson, the nation had once again begun to lose interest. That July, in the 
midst of the Democratic convention, Albert Fall, Harry Sinclair, Edward Doheny, and Ned 
Doheny were indicted for bribery and fraud.  The following November, Calvin Coolidge would 




Even after the public lost interest, there was still some mopping up to do. In March 1925, 
the special counsels appointed by Coolidge – Republican Owen Roberts and Democrat Atlee 
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Pomerene – argued before a Sinclair-friendly judge in Cheyenne, Wyoming that the Elk Hills 
and Teapot Dome leases should be voided. Sinclair won that round on his home turf, but the US 
Circuit Court of Appeals soon overturned the decision, and, in September 1926, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the leases were “tainted with corruption” and should be voided. At long last, the 
oil reserves were back in the hands of the government. In October 1927, Harry Sinclair and 
Albert Fall were tried for criminal conspiracy – which resulted in a mistrial when a juror blabbed 
that Sinclair was buying off jury members with “an automobile as long as a block.” A few years 
later, in October of 1929, Albert Fall was convicted of bribery and sentenced to one year in 
prison and a $100,000 fine. He served nine months and nine days, and became the first Cabinet 




But, even after the leases had been returned, there was still one more loose end. 
 
While helping the two independent prosecutors to build their case in the summer of 1924, 
a Secret Service agent, Thomas Foster, noticed that, back in May 1922, Sinclair paid Fall 
$230,000 in sequentially numbered Liberty Bonds. As it happened, similar bonds kept popping 
up all over the course of the investigation – After leaving Interior, Albert Fall had been paid 
$25,000 in bonds by Harry Sinclair to visit Russia and help open doors there for his oil company. 
Similarly, Will Hays had testified that Sinclair had given him $75,000 in bonds to help pay down 
the $1 million in debt the Republican Party held after the election of 1920. All of these bonds 
were part of the same sequentially numbered set, and they had all been bought by something 
called the Continental Trading Company. Following this trail led the Secret Service to a Toronto 
lawyer named H.S. Osler, who said that he was the sole owner of Continental, that all the records 
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had been destroyed, and that he didn’t know, except by reputation, any of the people he was 
being asked about. But Harry Sinclair’s former secretary, G.D. Wahlberg – the same man who 
had told the Walsh committee of “six to eight cows” – said that, yes, of course Osler knew Harry 




When Foster went back to Toronto with the lie revealed, Osler admitted that Continental 
had been created for some “oil clients” to handle a transaction involving a Colonel A.E. 
Humphreys of Denver, Colorado. Foster then interviewed Humphreys, who told of another dark 
conspiracy afoot. At the Vanderbilt Hotel in New York in 1921, Humphreys had met with Osler 
and the four partners of Continental  -- Harry Sinclair, Robert Stewart of Standard Oil of Indiana, 
Harry Blackmer, the Chairman of Midwest Refining, and James O’Neill, the president of Prairie 
Oil and Gas. He had sold these four prominent oilmen 33,333,333 barrels of oil at $1.50 a barrel, 
who had then sold it to their respective companies at $1.75 a barrel – creating an instant profit of 
$8 billion. Taking 2 percent off the top as his fee, Osler had then converted $3 million of this 




In other words, four of the most respected oil barons in the country had defrauded their 
stockholders of millions to create a slush fund for their own personal use. When Roberts and 
Pomerene tried to incorporate these revelations into their Cheyenne case, they found that Osler 
had gone off to safari in Africa, Sinclair had already taken the fifth, and Blackmer, Stewart, and 
O’Neill all just happened to be in Europe and out of the reach of a subpoena.861 
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In January 1928, prompted by a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter who had been 
connecting the dots himself, Senator George Norris called for a further investigation into the 
Continental Trading Company, to be once again headed by his fellow committeeman Senator 
Walsh. Walsh was sixty-eight and tired by this point, and he didn’t think the investigation would 
gain much traction in the public eye in the midst of Coolidge prosperity. But he once again took 
up the standard. After establishing a link between Fall, Sinclair, and the bonds, Walsh called 
Standard Oil of Indiana’s Robert Stewart to the stand and asked him about the bonds. Stewart 
refused to answer, claiming, “[t]hat is none of your business, Senator, nor is it the business of 
this committee.” For his recalcitrance, Stewart – like Sinclair before him – was threatened with 





In the meantime, Walsh did a better job eviscerating his next witness, former Republican 
National Chairman Will Hays. Over the course of the investigation, Secret Service men had 
noticed that $300,000 of the offending, sequentially-numbered Liberty bonds had ended up in the 
RNC’s account. When Walsh asked Hays how those had got there, Hays testified that Sinclair 
had given him $260,000 in bonds in November 1923 to help pay down the 1920 campaign debt. 
It soon came out that Hays had split up these bonds among several Republican fundraisers – T. 
Coleman du Pont, former treasurer of the committee; Harding Secretary of War John Weeks; 
Fred Upham, another former treasurer of the committee; and John T. Pratt – who sold them to 
prospective donors for their cash equivalent. In other words, Will Hays and the Republican Party 
had effectively presided over a money-laundering operation for the dirty bonds. Upon this 
revelation, Senator Borah immediately began an effort to have small-dollar Republican donors 
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pay back Sinclair to rehabilitate the party. “For the party to keep the money after it is known how 
it was secured is to endorse the manner of securing it,” he argued. “[W]hen the facts are revealed 
we ought to have the courage to deal with the situation ourselves and not permit it to be said that 





Even more intriguing from the Senate’s perspective, among the files of John T. Pratt was 
a handwritten note listing the amount of bonds that had gone to various party officials. It listed 
$50,000 going to a “Candy” or “Andy.” This brought the “greatest Secretary of the Treasury 
since Alexander Hamilton,” “Andy” Mellon, into the fray. Appearing before the Committee, 
Mellon admitted that Will Hays had tried to offer him $50,000 in Liberty Bonds by way of Harry 
Sinclair, but Mellon had refused, “because I would be making a subscription that was not what it 
was reported to be.” When asked why he had never mentioned these bonds over the past five 
years of investigation, Mellon replied that he “can’t follow all these investigations. I have 
troubles of my own and much work to do.” Secretary Mellon being a very important man, the 




Secretary Mellon wasn’t the only man of means for whom the rules seemed different. 
Harry Sinclair already had nine months of jail time in front of him for contempt of the Senate 
and jury tampering in he and Fall’s first trial. But in April 1928, with the best lawyers money 
could buy at his disposal, he was found not guilty of fraud and bribery by a jury. “Why, 
everybody in the United States and even the Supreme Court knows he is guilty,” George Norris 
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spat in disgust. “He has too much money to be convicted. We ought to pass a law now to the 
effect that no man worth a hundred million dollars should ever be tried for any crime.” Hearing 
the news that Sinclair was out of legal trouble for good, another fellow with a good bit of money 
to his name, Robert Stewart, showed the other directors of Standard Oil of Indiana the $759,500 
in Continental Liberty bonds he had always had in his safe. Stewart never did go to prison, but he 
did make one key mistake. When he returned to the Senate witness chair to remove the threat of 
the contempt charge, Senator Bronson Cutting asked him what his boss, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., 
might think of Stewart defrauding stockholders. Stewart replied “I don’t know, and I don’t care.” 
Embezzlement aside, Rockefeller did not like this display of contempt from his chairman, and he 




Through the many years of investigations into Teapot Dome and Continental, there was 
always the potential for one more unindicted co-conspirator. And while he was never brought 
officially into the investigation, and to this day has not been definitively tied to any wrongdoing, 
there is still some circumstantial evidence to suggest that Warren Gamaliel Harding also had his 
hands in the till. Among others, C. V. Berryman, the son-in-law of Denver Post editor Frederick 
Bonfils, claimed that it was Harding who first met with the two editors to get them to “let up on 





And then there was the matter of the Marion Star, Harding’s old newspaper. Two days 
before the President left on his fatal trip, he was visited by newspaper publishers Roy Moore and 
Louis H. Brush, the latter of whom happened to be a friend of Harry Daugherty and the top 
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Republican fundraiser in Ohio. They offered to buy the president’s old newspaper for $500,000 – 
roughly $375,000 more than they had recently paid for a comparably-sized paper in 
Albuquerque. Harding – whose salary was $73,000 a year – took the deal immediately, and the 
two men promised to pay the president shortly…in Liberty Bonds. Harding then told his 
stockbroker to buy $500,000 of stocks for him on margins. The name on Harding’s account was 
Walter Ferguson, one of his Secret Service men. Was this $500,000 a thank you from Harry 
Sinclair for playing ball? Why did Harding use a fake name on his stock account? Did Florence 
Harding burn her husband’s papers on account of his many extramarital trysts, or was he 




“My dear Senator,” William Allen White, wondering much the same, wrote to Thomas 
Walsh in March 1928, “[d]id you ever think that big lot of Liberty Bonds found in Harding’s 
estate…might have come there by way of the Continental Jackpot?” Walsh did think it possible, 
and looked into it. His investigators ultimately found $380,000 in Liberty bonds in the Harding’s 
estate -- but the serial numbers did not match up with the usual sets of Continental activity. Of 




Whether or not Harding was personally involved in the criminality of his administration, 
progressives – Gifford Pinchot, Harry Slattery, Robert La Follette, George Norris, and especially 
Thomas Walsh – had initiated and led an investigation that uncovered flagrant illegalities by oil 
companies and government officials both, a conspiracy that reached right into the heart of federal 
land policy. “To tell you the truth about it, Frank,” Borah wrote a friend in February 1924, as the 
Teapot Dome scandal began to inflict casualties in the administration, “I have been so 
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demoralized…that I have hardly permitted myself to think about it. I must say that it dampens 
my ardor for anything in politics in the future. I do not know where the fearful, sordid trail will 
lead to nor what the consequences are to be. I never supposed that the Capitol at Washington 
would become a cesspool for such miserable transactions.” While he thought the situation 
“indescribable and almost intolerable,” Borah could at least console himself “with the thought 
that it will lead to a heroic effort upon the part of the people and public men who see things right 
to clean up.”869  
 
Unfortunately, no such heroic effort of the people came about. However baroque the 
details, this was a black-and-white case of dirty dealings by what, ten years earlier, would have 
been deemed an “Oil Trust.” Once their interest was piqued, the newspapers went along for the 
ride and reported the scandals as front-page news, thus doing their part to inform and enlighten 
public opinion. And yet, the public seemed to grow disinterested with the scandals. “For God’s 
Sake, Americans, Wake Up!,” screamed a 1922 editorial in The Searchlight on Congress when 
the first of the scandals broke. But at best, columnists such as Will Rogers would later write of 
the “great morality panic of 1924” like it was just another passing New Era fad, like crosswords 
and Mahjong. And even then, this “morality panic” didn’t register much at the ballot box. When 
given a chance to make 1924 a referendum on the Harding scandals and 1928 one on the 
corruption within the Republican Party, the general population of America mostly just shrugged, 
and returned the offending administrations into power in overwhelming numbers.870 
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“What does all this mean?” H.L. Mencken wrote in 1924, surveying the election results 
and summing up the progressives’ dilemma. “That the people of the United States are not against 
robbing the Government? I suspect as much. More, I have suspected it for years. Yet more, I 
have argued it for years…They are not in favor of stealing per se, but stealing from the 
Government somehow seems to them less reprehensible than other kinds.” “The plain fact,” 
wrote Mencken in another column, “is that the American people are not against corruption. They 
do not loathe the successful thief, but admire him. It is precisely the most corrupt political 
machines that are the most secure.”871 
 
What was the point in standing up for the public interest if, in the end, nobody seemed to 
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CHAPTER SIX: LEGACIES OF THE SCARE 
PROGRESSIVES, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND LABOR 
 
“It may seem incredible to many, but to me the most vital problem in American politics at the 
present time is the preservation of the great guarantees of civil liberty, found in our constitution, 
and so long supposed to be secure and indispensable.” – William Borah, 1921872 
 
“One of the master delusions of the American people is to the effect that they are in favor of free 
speech. They are actually almost unanimously against it.” – H.L. Mencken, 1925873 
 
“A liberal journal has recently stated: ‘Within a year after the war began the old causes were 
gone, and we were steadily forced back from our advanced positions – public ownership and 
enfranchisement of labor, economic freedom, industrial cooperation, and political equality for the 
black man with the white man, for the alien with the citizen – these were all abandoned like war 
trenches on the Western Front, and we found ourselves fighting in the last ditch for the primary 
bases of democratic society, the civil liberties proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence and 
guaranteed in the Constitution.’”  – Jane Addams, 1930874  
 
“Although divided over the war and bowed by repression, progressives were not broken. They 
were busy laying down the defense of free speech as a cornerstone of the new progressive politics. 





In working to roll back the excesses of the immediate postwar period, progressives 
gained a newfound appreciation for both the importance and the need to defend civil 
liberties, including the right to organize. But in the process, many progressives lost 
something else – their faith in the general rightness of the masses, and their sense of 
identification with the American people as a whole. And so, even as progressives 
phrased their early defenses of civil liberties as being necessary to the public interest – 
a diversity of opinion being necessary to the formation of sound policy – their gradual 
alienation from the people at large also propelled them closer to a defense of civil 
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The Education of Jane Addams 
 
In her 1922 volume Peace and Bread, of which excerpts were printed in The Survey, Jane 
Addams looked back at her experience as a pacifist during the World War with a shiver. “From 
the very beginning of the great war, as the members of our group gradually became defined from 
the rest of the community,” Addams recalled, “each one felt increasingly the sense of isolation 
which rapidly developed after the United States entered the war into that destroying effect of 
‘aloneness,’ if I may so describe the opposite of mass consciousness.” For Addams and her 
fellow pacifists, this separation from the war fervor was not felt as a triumphant stand of 
principle, but a tortured alienation from the people at large. “We never ceased to miss the 
unquestioning comradeship experienced by our fellow citizens during the war,” Addams 
remembered, “nor to feel curiously outside the enchantment given to any human emotion when it 
is shared by millions of others. The force of the majority was so overwhelming that it seemed not 
only impossible to hold one’s own against it, but at moments absolutely unnatural, and one 
secretly yearned to participate in ‘the folly of all mankind.’”876 
 
 As she recalls, the pressures on Addams and the pacifists were enormous. On one hand, 
many of their longtime progressive and intellectual allies, from President Wilson (who had “kept 
us out of war”) to John Dewey and The New Republic, were now openly deriding the pacifist 
cause. “We were constantly told by our friends that to stand aside from the war mood of the 
country was to surrender all possibility of future influence,” said Addams, “that we were 
committing intellectual suicide, and would never again be trusted as responsible people or 
judicious advisers. Who were we to differ with able statesmen, with men of sensitive conscience 
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who also absolutely abhorred war, but were convinced that this war for the preservation of 
democracy would make all future wars impossible?”  
 
As a result, Addams worried deeply that she had made a mistake somewhere down the 
line in her thinking. “There were moments when the pacifist yielded to the suggestion that 
keeping himself out of war, refusing to take part in its enthusiasms, was but pure quietism, an 
acute failure to adjust himself to the moral world…Every student of our time had become more 
or less a disciple of pragmatism and its great teachers in the United States had come out for the 
war and defended their positions with skill and philosophic acumen. There were moments when 
one longed desperately for reconciliation with one’s friends and fellow citizens; in the words of 
Amiel, ‘Not to remain at variance with existence.’”877 
 
Even more jarring, some of the most basic tenets of the progressive faith seemed 
undermined by what was occurring. Wasn’t educated and enlightened public opinion meant to be 
the fulcrum that would move the world? Instead, Addams and the pacifists discovered that public 
opinion – stoked to nationalistic fervor “in the interest of war propaganda” – was now a spear 
directed against them. “We certainly had none of the internal contentment of the doctrinaire, the 
ineffable solace of the self-righteous, which was imputed to us,” she recalled. “No one knew 
better than we how feeble and futile we were against the impregnable weight of public opinion, 
the appalling imperviousness, the coagulation of motives, the universal confusion of a world at 
war.” Indeed, Addams ascribed “the large number of deaths among the older pacifists” to this 
grievous state of affairs, for “[m]ore than the normal amount of nervous energy must be 
consumed in holding one’s own in a hostile world.” In sum, she wrote: “Solitude has always had 
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its demons, harder to withstand than the snares of the world, and the unnatural desert into which 
the pacifist was summarily cast out seemed to be peopled with them.”878 
 
Amid this wasteland of loneliness and confusion to which the pacifists had summarily 
been expelled, Addams and her colleagues wrestled with the prior tenets of their progressive 
philosophy. “In the hours of doubt and self-distrust,” wrote Addams, “the question again and 
again arises: Has the individual, or a very small group, the right to stand out against millions of 
his fellow countrymen? Is there not great value in mass judgment and in instinctive mass 
enthusiasm, and even if one were right a thousand times over in conviction, was he not 
absolutely wrong in abstaining from this communion with his fellows? The misunderstanding on 
the part of old friends and associates and the charge of lack of patriotism was far easier to bear 
than those dark periods of faint-heartedness.” 879 
 
And yet, in those dark moments of self-questioning, Addams and other progressives 
began to foster a new appreciation for the importance of the individual against society. “We 
could not, however, lose the conviction that as all other forms of growth begin with a variation 
from the mass, so the moral changes in human affairs may also begin with a differing group or 
individual, sometimes with the one who at best is designated as a crank and a freak and in sterner 
moments is imprisoned as an atheist or a traitor.”  
 
Perhaps, it seemed to Addams, both the pragmatic experts and the vast majority of public 
opinion were wrong, and thus it behooved progressive men and women of conscience to stay true 
to their own beliefs, and to endure both the contempt of ones’ peers and the calumny and hatred 
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of the masses in so doing. From the intellectual exile of the pacifists during the Great War, 
Addams observed, “it therefore came about that the ability to hold one’s own against mass 
suggestion, to honestly differ from the convictions and enthusiasms of ones best friends, did in 
moments of crisis come to depend upon the categorical belief that a man’s primary allegiance is 
to his vision of the truth and that he is under obligation to affirm it.”880 
 
Addams was by no means alone in this crisis of confidence – other pacifists and 
progressives who found themselves on the wrong end of public opinion during the war came to 
similar conclusions.  As Frederic Howe put it in 1926, “Liberty was as dear to me as another 
kind of patriotism was dear to other hundred per cent Americans. And when I saw liberty laid 
prostrate by those from whom I had expected protection, when I found my kind of Americanism 
under suspicion, if not denounced as criminal, when I saw my government using its power in a 
hysteria of fear, to crush civil and political liberties, when I saw these things, much of my belief 
in men, in the political state, and in my own America all but died. I think it died for millions of 
others.” 881  
 
Even progressives who had gone along with the war effort at the time were now 
reconsidering their relationship with the public at large. “Many of us,” wrote Chicago lawyer 
Donald Richberg in 1930, “now can look back upon the heroic efforts of La Follette and Norris 
in the Senate…of women like Jane Addams, and feel a little small and ashamed that, even if we 
did not join with those who scowled and spat upon them…yet we watched them through 
troubled, puzzled eyes.” Because of the war and reaction, Richberg said, “to doubt, to question 
the wisdom of the powers that be, to advance new and disturbing ideas, had ceased to be an act 
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of virtue, the proof of an aspiring spirit. Such attitudes were ‘radical’ and ‘destructive.’ 
Progressivism was losing its supreme asset – respectability.” 882   
 
In other words, progressives, who once thought of themselves as the vanguard of the 
people, now began to define themselves in opposition to the masses. This new stance would 
complicate many of the beliefs about the power and efficacy of enlightened public opinion that 
progressivism had always relied upon. 
Prisoners of Conscience 
 
 
“[O]urs is a constitutional freedom where the popular will is supreme,” Warren Harding 
had intoned in his inaugural address of March 1921, “and minorities are sacredly protected.” But 
merely saying such did not make it so. (In fact this pronouncement tickled H.L. Mencken pink. 
Upon hearing it, Mencken wrote, “I abandon myself to a mirth that transcends, perhaps, the 
seemly, and send picture postcards of A. Mitchell Palmer and the Atlanta Penitentiary to all of 
my enemies who happen to be Socialists.”) And so, even as Harding called for normalcy and 
restoration, 1921 began with several residual legacies of the Red Scare left to sort out. Political 
prisoners remained behind bars. Repressive laws remained on the books. And, at least for 
another three months, A. Mitchell Palmer remained in office.883 
 
Taking the last first, now that the wartime and Red Scare fervor had subsided, the Senate 
had some hard questions for Wilson’s overzealous Attorney General. The previous May, as 
Palmer’s grand visions of a White House bid had begun unraveling thanks to a May Day without 
incident, twelve prominent lawyers – among them Felix Frankfurter, Zechariah Chafee, Frank 
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Walsh, Francis Fisher Kane, Swinburne Hale, and Roscoe Pound – penned a prosecutorial brief 
entitled To The American People, Report Upon the Illegal Practices of the Department of 
Justice. “Under the guise of a campaign for the suppression of radical activities,” it argued, “the 
office of the Attorney General…has committed continual illegal acts.” Along with the misuse of 
propaganda and agents provocateurs, these illegal acts included violations of the Fourth (“arrests 
without warrant” and “unreasonable searches and seizures”), Fifth (“compelling persons to be 





“We make no argument in favor of any radical doctrine as such, whether Socialist, 
Communist, or Anarchist,” argued these eminent lawyers. “Nor do we now raise any question as 
to the Constitutional protection of free speech and a free press.” Instead the brief focused on “the 
utterly illegal acts by those charged with the highest duty of enforcing the laws – acts which have 
caused widespread suffering and unrest, have struck at the foundation of American free 
institutions, and have brought the name of our country into disrepute.”885 
 
Among those persuaded by this brief was Montana Senator and future Teapot Dome 
prosecutor Thomas Walsh, who had been mostly silent about civil liberties abuses in the past.  
While he continued to remain a good Democrat during the remainder of the doomed campaign 
season, Walsh called for an official Senate investigation into the Justice Department’s behavior 
the month after Harding’s election, on December 10, 1920. Harold Ickes, for one, found hope in 
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the fact “that a Senator of Mr. Walsh’s political faith should have had the courage and right 
feeling to initiate such action.” Similarly, argued The New Republic, the story of Palmerism 
“must not be allowed to end with…[the] cowardly refusal by the Attorney-General to face the 
facts of his own wrongdoing.” Naturally, the authors of the To the American People were 
similarly moved. “Unless the methods used by the Department of Justice are severely 
condemned by Congress and the American people,” warned Zechariah Chafee in January 1921, 
“they will be repeated in future emergencies.”886 
 
Soon thereafter, the Senate Judiciary Committee formed a subcommittee to look into the 
matter. Chaired by Republican Thomas Sterling of South Dakota, the subcommittee also 
included Democrat William King of Utah, Walsh, and Borah. The star witness in the ensuing 
hearings, of course, was an unrepentant Palmer. Pounding on the table for effect, the Attorney 
General sidestepped the damning legal case against him, basically, by challenging the Senators’ 
right to question the umbrella of protection he had provided. “I apologize for nothing that the 
Department of Justice has done in this matter,” he exclaimed, “I glory in it. I point with pride and 
enthusiasm to the results of that work.”887  
 
As for the legal issues, Palmer argued, if “some of my agents out in the field…were a 
little rough and unkind, or short and curt, with these alien agitators, whom they observed seeking 
to destroy their homes, their religion, and their country, I think it might be well overlooked in the 
general good to the country which has come of it.” Undeterred, Walsh wondered how Palmer 
could have possibly thought that warrants should only be obtained “if absolutely necessary.” “It 
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is difficult to conceive,” Walsh said, echoing arguments Louis Post’s lieutenants had made in the 
Department of Labor, “how one bred to the law could ever have promulgated such an order.”888 
 
Palmer’s appeal to order went over like a lead balloon in the progressive press. “The 
Nation has no animus against Mr. Palmer personally,” it argued after the Attorney General’s 
appearance, “but the evil he did will live after him unless some action is taken to condemn the 
sinister and illegal methods that he injected in to the Department of Justice.” But the Attorney 
General had a sympathetic ear across the aisle in Senator Sterling, who had authored his own, 
even more stringent Sedition Act in 1919. (Passed in the Senate and defeated in the House, the 
Sterling Act gave more powers to the Postmaster General to criminalize offending mail, and, on 
account of broad and vague wording, even made it illegal to advocate for a constitutional 
amendment.) The Subcommittee soon divided on whether to censure Palmer, with the 
Republican Sterling advocating no further action and the Democrat Walsh calling for a 
condemnation of Wilson’s Attorney General. Both reports went to the full Judiciary Committee, 
where, a year later, Walsh’s proposal failed 7-4, with the four votes coming from Walsh, Borah, 




Even as Palmer avoided legal consequence, many of those who had run afoul of the 
authorities during the war and its aftermath remained behind bars, and none were so esteemed as 
Prisoner 9653, the first federal convict to run for president in American history. “Christmas and 
New Years have gone by,” the editors of The New Republic reminded their readers in their first 
issue of the new decade, “and Debs is still in jail”: 
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His imprisonment serves no purpose, either good or bad. From the point of view of expediency, it 
will cast a shadow over the exit of this administration, and it will leave a bitter taste in the mouths 
of those who were generous enough to swallow its idealism whole.  From the point of view of the 
law, we are in fact no longer at war, and to keep in jail a man whose acts would not have been 
punishable in peace times is legalism of the smallest caliber. From the point of view of common 
decency, of morality, there is this to be said of the imprisonment of Debs – that it is a crime, a 
falsehood, and an act of which no honorable government would be guilty.”890 
 
In March of 1920, Republican Joseph France of Maryland had put forward a Senate 
resolution arguing that, especially since the war was over, “the further prosecution and 
imprisonment of the United States of…a body of political prisoners is contrary to the democratic 
idealism and traditions of freedom to which our country is committed,” and thus “immediate 
pardon and amnesty” should be granted “to all prisoners whose religious, political, or economic 
beliefs only” had been cause for their incarceration. This too, the Sterling subcommittee took up 
after Harding’s election, calling witnesses ranging from Senator France to A. Mitchell Palmer to 
Samuel Gompers to Marvin Gates Sperry, head of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Legion.891 
 
“I feel that it was unwise,” Senator France argued in his statement beginning the 
hearings, “for us to enter upon the policy of attempting to preserve our constitutional 
Government by flagrant violation of a constitutional principle.” Samuel Gompers, after spending 
several minutes noting the patriotism of the American Federation of Labor for the record, decried 
the Espionage Act and argued it was time “to see this Republic of ours as soon as possible return 
to the normal relations of life and labor and relations and government,” including giving an 
amnesty and pardon to political prisoners. Marvin Sperry took only a few moments of the 
subcommittee’s time, declaring “[t]he United States is the most powerful country in the world, 
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and we think they could extend an act of generosity and mercy to the political prisoners this 
Christmas.”892   
 
For his part, A. Mitchell Palmer testified that 580 convictions and 315 pending cases had 
been brought under the Espionage Act, and, of those, 199 had been pardoned or commuted by 
Wilson and approximately 130 of these convicted offenders were still serving time. Nonetheless, 
Palmer argued, a general amnesty or pardon wasn’t required because the Department of Justice 
was working its way through all the cases anyway, and those deserving a pardon had already 
been, or would soon be, granted one. “Every case before us,” he assured the Committee, “has 
been carefully considered by its own facts” In fact, Palmer argued, “the conviction of only 580 
persons out of a hundred millions, in all the heat and worry of war times…always seemed to me 
a very striking evidence of the manner in which we have protected the rights of the people during 
the war, and with the small number now remaining in the penitentiary, there can hardly be said to 
be any political prisoner problem in America.”893 
 
When the Sterling subcommittee wrapped up its hearings, it once again took no action on 
the pending resolution. And so, even as Palmer promised that every case was receiving its due 
consideration, Debs and over a hundred others remained in federal prison. The incarceration of 
Debs, a beloved martyr figure to socialists and progressives alike, seemed a particular sin against 
the government, and inspired many to Christ metaphors. “I had never met Debs” before he 
arrived at the Atlanta Penitentiary, Secretary of the AFL’s Amnesty Committee Lucy Robbins 
testified before the subcommittee, but the “fact is that ever since he came there he is considered a 
man that is actually a saint or a Jesus Christ,” 
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because when the night comes and the work is over, he goes into the yard where all the men, the 
criminals, come around him, and for each one he has a word to tell them. For each he has word to 
awaken in them a human spirit, the feeling that has been lost for years and years, of those 
murderers…I am sure that a man of that kind could never be accused in any way that he could be 
harmful to any country or to any man existing in the world. He surely could never propagate 
crime, he could not propagate violence. It is not in his nature. Even if he would attempt to say it, 
he could never say it. He can only say good things, and he can bring out the best that is in the 
worst kind of criminal. 
 
There has been a man there, that has been convicted – I do not know whether it is proper to tell 
you all these things, but I cannot help doing so when it is brought before this committee – there is 
a colored man there convicted of murder. He has been in that penitentiary for years. They could 
never break that man’s spirit. There was murder in his eyes and murder in his heart. The only 
means they used against him was a club; knocked him down and threw him into solitary 
confinement. One time Debs found him swooning in blood. He picks him up, and takes George 
over to the hospital ward, and he takes care of him. Today that boy is like a lamb. He will obey 
any rules in the prison. He will do anything that is asked of him, because he has become a man, a 
human being. It is that spirit that prevails wherever Debs is, and I am sure it is actually a crime to 
keep a man of that type behind iron bars… 
 
Debs will prefer any time to stay in jail and to see the younger man go out. That is his plea at all 
times. He will say, ‘Never mind me. I can do my work right here just as well as in any other 
place.’ And that is Debs. To keep a man of that sort there is a crime. He is there now about 15 
months; not too strong in health, and yet he will not receive or accept any privileges for himself, 
even with regard to food, because he will not permit that any of the other criminals, any of the 
other prisoners are there, should feel that he is an exception and that he is treated better than they 
are; and he suffers with his stomach, suffers with his health, but will not accept any privileges of 
any kind, even with regard to food. And to feel that there have been lies and accusations against 
him, statements against him of trouble because he has been against this country, it is hard to 
believe. I am absolutely sure it is not so, because there is not a country in the world that Debs 
loves more than the United States, and I am sure that a man of that kind has a right to express his 
opinion at all times, and particularly now, when the war is over and that emergency is past, he 




However much a beatific Christ figure to those he inspired, the incarcerated Debs was 
suffused with doubts and fighting a losing battle against despair. Cut off from both his family 
and his life work, he grappled with a sense of isolation that felt like “suffocation and being 
buried alive.” Out in the world, meanwhile, newly christened Communists like William Z. Foster 
belittled Debs as a sellout, and part of “the petty-bourgeois united front.” (To this, Debs replied, 
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“you may be right in your criticism of my position and I may be wrong, as I have often been 
before. Having no Vatican in Moscow to guide me I must follow the light I have.”) Watching the 
Socialist struggle degenerate into internecine feuds, he was haunted by dreams where “all about 
me were ashes…nothing left but ashes.” “I suppose it is because I see the heights I must feel the 
depths,” Debs wrote his brother Theodore, confessing there were times when his “heart is the 
very heart and center of all the sadness and sorrow, all the pain and misery, and all the suffering 
and agony in the world.” The election results further embittered him. “The people can have 
anything they want,” he wrote, “The trouble is they do not want anything. At least they vote that 
way on election day.” Debs’ paramour, Mabel Curry, wrote to Upton Sinclair that “Gene can’t 
stand many more months.” Making things even worse for the old socialist, when Debs lashed out 
at Wilson just before the end of his term, Wilson and Palmer enacted a punitive gag order 




While it may not have seemed like it at the time, Election Day was actually the beginning 
of the end of Debs’ trials. Whatever his faults, Warren Harding didn’t share Wilson’s penchant 
for nursing grievances, and within the first month of his administration, Debs was secretly 
shuttled to Washington to meet with Attorney General Harry Daugherty – who, like the First 
Lady and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, opposed clemency – and other members of 
the administration.
896
 (In his memoirs, Daugherty, a notorious red-baiter at any other time, 
remarked that “I had never met a man of more appealing personality than Eugene V. Debs.”) 
When word leaked of this meeting, the American Legion was livid. Any clemency “would do 
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more to license a wholesale disregard of law and order than any one act the President might 
take,” Legion commander John Emery warned Harding. If he took this action, it would “draw the 
fire of ex-service men” and “set off a fight to the finish.” Such talk forced Harding to back down 




His hopes dashed, Debs began to fall back into despair and started cutting himself off 
even further from the outside world. In the meantime, progressives and socialists pushed back. 
The newly re-formed American Civil Liberties Union, under Roger Baldwin, petitioned for his 
release. Warren Harding was called upon twice by his old paperboy from Marion, Ohio, Norman 
Thomas, imploring the president to release Debs. “I am asking you to break the hate, and the war 
psychology,” Lincoln Steffens wrote Harding, “do the free, uncalled for, magnificent Thing.” 
Notable progressives like Robert La Follette, Basil Manly, and Alice Paul wrote editorials urging 
readers to support the amnesty campaign “if you feel that free speech is worth preserving in 





At one point over the summer, Oswald Villard, Father John Ryan, and William Allen 
White led another delegation of progressives to meet with the President. When Harding said he 
was considering the matter, one of the guests, a social worker, yelled, “Mr. President, that’s no 
way to answer us. We demand a yes-or-no answer now!” Replied Harding: “My dear woman, 
you may demand anything you please out of Warren Harding. He will not resent it. But the 
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President of the United States has the right to keep his own counsel, and the office I occupy 
forbids me to reply to you as I should like to do if I were elsewhere!” To a Socialist delegation 
expecting a tense meeting, however, Harding seemed surprisingly sympathetic to their cause, and 
urged them to keep up the outside pressure. In November 1921, the White House was picketed 
by Debs supporters carrying a petition signed by 300,000 and endorsed by 700 organizations, 
and waving banners reading “Allied Nations, We Congratulate You for Releasing Political 
Prisoners. The United States Alone Keeps Them in Prison.”899 
 
If Harding seemed to suggest he was inclined to free Debs, his Attorney General did not 
follow suit. “In this country there is now being disseminated an extensive propaganda to dignify 
the crimes committed by many persons who are now in prison for disloyal conduct,” Daugherty 
told the American Bar Association in August, 1921. This propaganda, he argued, had now 
infected “very well-meaning people, among whom are ministers of the gospel, teachers, editors, 
and college professors, to say nothing of that vast number of sentimentalists who always stand 
ready to make heroes out of criminals whenever the opportunity offers.” These “well-meaning 
persons seem to have acquired the idea from the phrases ‘political offenses’ and ‘political 
prisoners’ that all the really dangerous radical believers” in prison “are heroes for conscience’s 
sake and somehow akin to the martyrs of old…[S]uch is not the case.”900  
 
The idea of “political offenses,” Daugherty continued, was a product of the Old World, 
but it had no place in a democracy like the United States, where agitators can find redress 
through the political process. “Changes are to be wrought through the constitutional organs of 
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government, and by the orderly processes of law…If any citizen dislikes the law under which he 
is living, his relief is through the legislative department of Government.” In short, the Attorney 
General argued, if “laws are obnoxious to the people, it is their province to repeal them. Until 
they are repealed they must be observed and enforced without fear or favor. The Government 
will endure on the rock of law enforcement, or perish in the quicksands of lawlessness.”901 
 
In private, Daugherty – who, of course, would have his own struggle with the quicksands 
of lawlessness a few years hence – was also troubled by Debs’ refusal to ask for a pardon or 
admit he was in the wrong. In the final reckoning, though, the Attorney General, arguing Debs 
had probably suffered enough, agreed with Harding that he should let the old man go. And so on 
December 23, 1921 -- so that “he could eat Christmas dinner with his wife” – the president 
commuted Debs’ sentence, and that of 24 other political prisoners. This “spirit of clemency,” 
Harding told a stunned friend, was part of what he was “trying to do here in Washington.”902  
 
As Debs walked out of the Atlanta Penitentiary, over 2300 of his fellow inmates – 
released from their cell block by the warden for the occasion – roared out their affection for their 
fellow prisoner. A tearful Debs embraced them back, then got in a car that would take him to the 
train station and an eventual meeting with the president. Before boarding the train for 
Washington, Debs pulled out the standard-issue five dollar bill given him by the prison upon 
release, and sent it off to the committee to release Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti. Upon 
arriving at the White House, the aged Socialist was warmly greeted by the Old Guard President. 
“I have heard so damned much about you, Mr. Debs,” said Harding, “that now I am very glad to 
meet you personally.” After a private meeting between the two, Debs, just before departing to his 
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home in Terra Haute, Indiana, told the press that “Mr. Harding appears to me to be a kind 
gentleman. We understand each other perfectly.”903 
 
The freeing of Debs removed the most visible and potent symbol of the political prisoner 
issue. And it forced a strategic shift on the part of the ACLU and other progressives – from 
pushing for general amnesty for the 76 remaining political prisoners in Leavenworth prison, as 
they had done in the past, to calling for individual pardons. But many progressives thought 
amnesty was the ground that should be fought on, since a pardon presumed guilt, and thus did 
not uphold a constitutional principle of free speech. Oswald Villard, for one, was not happy with 
this shift. “Something very definite and important will have been lost by the American people if 
they persist in regarding amnesty as a matter of mercy or at best a grudging recognition that to 
release a few prisoners may silence an annoying clamor,” he wrote.  Since “all progress begins in 
a protest against generally accepted opinion,” it would be “socially disastrous to punish it by 
legal penalties.”904  
 
William Borah agreed. To an American Legion officer who wrote the Senator to decry 
Debs’ release, Borah say the he “would not myself have granted the pardon of Debs upon the 
principle and for the reasons given out by the pardoning power…I was in favor at the close of the 
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war, and am now in favor, of a general amnesty of all political prisoners.” Borah contended that 
“no government, no class of men, and no views are so sacred that they ought not to be subject to 
criticism.” “There isn’t anything more shameless in the history of free speech,” he told one St. 
Louis editor, “than the treatment of the United States of these men who are now in penitentiary 
in violation of the most fundamental rights known to the free citizen.” Noting that among the 
people who could be convicted under the Espionage Act were not only Daniel Webster and 
Abraham Lincoln, for publicly condemning the Mexican War, but “some of the most prominent 
members of the government” six months before America joined the Great War, Borah continued 
to advocate for a general amnesty. “[I]nstead of persecuting men with ideas to express,” he said, 
“we should hire halls for them.”905 
 
The ACLU continued to work on Harding to release the remaining prisoners, even though 
many of those still held were fundamentally committed to amnesty and railed against the new 
pardon strategy. In October of 1922, the president said he would release any prisoner who 
promised “to be law-abiding…and not encourage, advocate, or be willfully connected with 
lawlessness in any form.” Few took the deal. Nonetheless, on August 2nd, 1923, only weeks 
before his death along the Voyage of Understanding, Harding released sixteen more federal 
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At the state level, the fight for amnesty won a considerable blow when Al Smith won 
back the Governor’s mansion in New York in November 1922. Smith, it will be remembered, 
had vetoed some of the more stringent anti-sedition laws – the “Lusk laws” coming out of the 
state legislature in his previous term – before losing the 1920 election to Republican Nathan 
Miller. Taking office on January 1
st
, 1923, Governor Smith planned to continue where he left off. 
 
On New Year’s Day, Governor Smith immediately called for the repeal of the Lusk laws 
Miller had passed during the interregnum. “I am firm in my belief,” he told the legislature, “that 
the law passed at the last session…which requires the teachers of our public schools to submit to 
a loyalty test is a direct violation of the letter and spirit of the laws of our State…It is wrong in 
principle. It is a violation of the spirit of our constitution, and it is an unwarranted interference 
with freedom of opinion – one of the foundation stones of democratic government.” Smith was 
aided in this veto call by the fact that the architect of the Lusk Laws had lost his luster since 
1920, for in 1921, Clayton Lusk came under suspicion of accepting bribes. “The savior of society 
has been caught with the goods,” editorialized the New Republic with a squeal of schadenfreude. 
“[T]he inquisitor is in the sweatbox. But more than this, the complete turning of public opinion is 
a sign of the recovery of public health.” 907  
 
Seventeen days after the returning Governor’s veto call, and arguing that “political 
progress results from the clash of conflicting opinions,” Smith released James L. “Big Jim” 
Larkin, one of the most notable political prisoners in the state. “I pardon Larkin,” the Governor 
said, “not because of agreement with his views, but despite my disagreement with them…the 
safety of the state is affirmatively impaired by the imposition of such a sentence for such a case.” 
                                                          
907
 Murphy, Meaning of Freedom of Speech, 136-137. “One Hundred Per Cent,” The Survey, February 15, 1923, 




“We are still listening,” said Collier’s Weekly, “for President Harding to say about the political 
prisoners in Leavenworth words as bold and ringing as those that Governor Al Smith of New 
York spoke in pardoning Big Jim Larkin.”908 
 
By August of that year, Harding would speak no more. And the ascension of Calvin 
Coolidge to the presidency – who had made his name standing for public order after the Boston 
police strike – awoke trepidation among civil liberties advocates.  In fact, Coolidge was ready to 
just get rid of the problem. After an appointed three-member committee gave him the needed 
political clearance, he released all of the remaining federal political prisoners on December 15
th
, 
1923. Even though the language was framed as a pardon instead of an amnesty, Senator Borah 
thought the president “had performed a most distinct service to the most fundamental principle of 
free government.” The release, Borah told the press, was a “vindication of the right of free 
speech and free press, and of that spirit which moved the fathers to incorporate that sublime 
principle in the Constitution.”909 
 
The Laws and the Court 
 
Time and again, Borah invoked the constitution to plead the case for the political 
prisoners. He did much the same in his attempts to repeal the laws that had put them in jail. 
“May I trespass upon your time long enough to read from an ancient document known as the 
Constitution of the United States,” he told one New York audience in 1923. “It is so simple and 
so plain that a man need not be a lawyer in order to understand it.” Citing the First Amendment, 
Borah contended that “every clause, every line, every paragraph of that Great Charter obtains in 








time of war just the same as in time of peace.” Thus, he argued, the Espionage Act of 1917 is, 
and always had been, unconstitutional. As he put it to one Idaho constituent, “I opposed to the 
utmost of my ability and voted against all provisions of the Espionage law providing punishment 
for expressions or opinions either by speech or in writing. I thought then, and I think now, that 
such provisions were contrary to the letter of the Constitution, and I know they were contrary to 
the spirit of our institutions and at war with the whole theory of free government.”910 
 
As it happened, repealing the Sedition Act amendments to the Espionage Act was not a 
particularly contentious question. Even A. Mitchell Palmer, who still believed some sort of law 
“against the attempt or threat to injure or destroy the government of the United States by force of 
violence” was necessary, told the Senate investigatory subcommittee that he “went on 
record…within 30 days after I became Attorney General in favor of the repeal of the espionage 
act.” (By this, Palmer meant the Sedition amendments.) As such, the Sedition Act amendments 
were taken up by Congress soon after Harding’s election, and repealed on December 13, 1920.911  
 
But not everyone agreed it was time to roll back sedition laws. In the summer of 1921, 
Senator Thomas Sterling tried once again to pass his more stringent Sedition Act, which had 
passed the Senate but failed in the House the year before. The Sterling bill “will clamp the lid on 
free speech tighter than ever,” the ACLU warned in a mass mailing. “It must be stopped, and will 
be if Senate leaders say the word.” The Union knew just the right Senate leader to go to. “I know 
that you are opposed to measures of this character,” ACLU co-director Albert DeSilver wrote 
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Borah when the Sterling bill was reported, “and I write to inquire what useful steps can, in your 
opinion, be taken at this time to insure against its passage.”912  
 
DeSilver wasn’t the only concerned citizen asking Borah to move into action against 
Sterling’s sedition law. “I want to go on record as vigorously opposed to this bill and any other 
bill which would further curtail the rights of the people, or interfere with the constitutional rights 
of free speech, free press, and free assemblage,” wrote a banker from Buffalo to Borah. “Let us 
do away with un-American propaganda, masked as ‘pure’ Americanism.”  “You can imagine 
how I feel in the matter,” Oswald Villard wrote the Idaho Senator. “[S]uch legislation is utterly 
unnecessary and…constitutes a grave danger to our institutions through the possibility of its 
arousing the very evils it purports to prevent.” In the words of one Wellesley professor to Borah, 
“it seems foolish to urge you to oppose the Sterling Sedition Bill, since all your political life 
indicates that you will do so gladly and without urging. No one wants it save a few old ladies – 
and some of your colleagues. Palmerism has seen its day “913  
 
Borah was inclined to agree. “I am very much opposed to the Sterling Sedition bill,” he 
told Villard, “and I do not believe it has any chance of passing, although of course, there are 
some who are very much in favor of it.” Nonetheless, to further weaken its chances, Borah 
introduced an amendment to the Sterling bill calling for a five-year prison sentence, or a $10,000 
fine, for any “officer, agent, or employee of the United States in the civil, military, or naval 
service who injures, oppresses, threatens, or intimidates any person in the free exercise or 
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enjoyment of any right or privilege secured or guaranteed to him by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.”914  
 
The amendment also criminalized attempts “by force, threat, intimidation, order, advice, 
or otherwise…to prevent any person from freely exercising his rights, privilege, or immunity by 
lawful means to advance, promote, agitate for, or discuss any amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.” And it banned any warrantless attempt to search a room, seize papers, or 
otherwise  “enter a hall, room, or other premises for the purpose of obstructing, interfering with, 
or breaking up any meeting.” “Glad to see you put out a fine amendment,” Villard wrote Borah. 
The Survey similarly thought Borah’s “very interesting amendment” to the Sterling bill would 
“‘pull its teeth’ so far as practical enforcement was concerned.” This “admirable move,” the 
ACLU’s DeSilver thought, “will make some of those who favored Senator Sterling’s bill hesitate 
about starting the debate on it.”915   
 
But even if the Sterling sedition bill could not pass, the original Espionage Act remained 
on the books, including the provision, Title XII, allowing for censoring of the mail. In September 
1921, after the Sterling issue had died down, Roger Baldwin wrote Borah reminding him that 
“when certain matters in connection with foreign affairs were out of the way, you would stand 
sponsor for the repeal” of Title XII. Borah asked the ACLU to draft a bill for him, which the 
Union’s co-director, Albert DeSilver, sent along in early October. “I know that I do not need to 
suggest to you the dangers which inhere,” in Title XII, he wrote to Borah. “Such vague powers 
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should not reside in administrative officials in peace time, it seems to me.” This exchange of 
letters was enough to get Borah listed in Elizabeth Kirkpatrick Dilling’s lurid 1934 anti-
communist expose, The Red Network, as a “pro-Soviet” sleeper agent. But the bill, if Borah ever 
in fact introduced it, didn’t go anywhere. The Espionage Act, while amended in 1940 and 
thereafter, remains law up to the present day. 
916 
 
“It sometimes seems that the less law one knows,” Borah said in a March 1923 speech on 
political prisoners, “the better he understands the Constitution!” In fact, the civil liberties 
protections Borah and others assumed were stated unequivocally in the First Amendment were to 
be litigated often during the 1920’s. In most cases, the forces of reaction would win the day, 
while either dissents or the legal reasoning involved would carve out space for later rulings in 




The same month Harding ascended to the White House, the Supreme Court handed down 
a 7-2 decision, Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes dissenting, in the case of US 
Ex Rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson. This case emerged from Wilson 
Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson’s used of his Espionage Act powers to silence Victor 
Berger’s Socialist newspaper, the Milwaukee Leader – the bone of contention being that 
Burleson, deeming past issues worthy of censorship, blocked mailing of all subsequent issues of 
The Leader as well. Could the Postmaster General issue a blanket ban of a publication based on 
previously published material? “It would not be possible for the United States to maintain a 
reader in every newspaper office of the country, to approve in advance each issue before it 
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should be allowed to enter the mails,” argued Justice John Hessin Clarke, writing for the 
majority.  Instead of re-applying for their mail permit, Clarke argued, Berger and the Leader 
“preferred this futile litigation, undertaken upon the theory that a government competent to wage 
war against its foreign enemies was powerless against its insidious foes at home.”918 
 
Progressives vehemently disagreed. In his dissent, Justice Brandeis wrote that “[i]f, under 
the Constitution, administrative officers may, as a mere incident of the peace-time administration 
of their departments, be vested with the power to issue such orders as this, there is little of 
substance in our bill of rights, and in every extension of governmental functions lurks a new 
danger to civil liberty.” “No more vicious and dangerous decision has ever been handed down by 
the Supreme Court of the United States,” proclaimed The Nation, who saw its own existence at 
stake. “[A]ny ordinary publication would be ruined. This is not a war-time decision. It grants 
permanent despotic power to one single government official.” “[W]ithout any jury, without any 
court,” Zechariah Chafee argued in the same magazine, a Postmaster General “can punish by 
extinction a periodical which ventures to discuss problems of sex and family life when he 
considers obscene though many others think them valuable.” No other decision, Chafee 
concurred, “has gone so far in sustaining governmental powers over the press.”919 
 
The following year saw the first of several decisions of note in the civil liberties space 
that revolved around the appropriate application of due process. First was the case of Ng Fung 
Ho v. White, in which four men of Chinese descent challenged their deportation, two of them on 
the grounds that they were American citizens. Justice Brandeis, writing the unanimous opinion 
                                                          
918
 US Ex Rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). 
919
 Ibid. The Nation, March 16, 1921 (Vol. 112, No. 2906), 391. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., “The Milwaukee Leader 




of the court in May 1922, agreed. “To deport one who so claims to be a citizen,” he wrote, 
“obviously deprives him of liberty.” The Court reversed the deportation order of the two 
probable citizens, arguing that they were “entitled to a judicial determination of their claims” 
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
920
   
 
In February 1923, the Court heard the case of Meyer v. Nebraska, a 7-2 decision that 
would have broad implications for the future of jurisprudence. The case arose from the May 
1920 arrest of a Nebraska schoolteacher, Robert Meyer, for instructing his students in the 
German language – He was caught by a local attorney having a fourth-grader read the story of 
Jacob’s Ladder from the Bible in German. This was a violation of Nebraska’s Siman Act, passed 
in April 1919, which forbid instruction in or of any language other than English. In June 1923, 
conservative Justice James McReynolds, writing for the seven member majority, argued the 
Siman Act violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it infringed on 





For several decades, as perhaps best embodied in the Lochner case of 1905, the Court had 
determined that the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed liberty of 
contract and the rights of property, but this had previously mainly been used to uphold the rights 
of corporations and to block progressive regulations of them. But McReynolds’ application of 
the same clause to guarantee Meyer’s right to work as an educator was relatively new ground for 
the Court. “While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 
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guaranteed,” McReynolds wrote, “the term has received much consideration and some of the 
included things have been definitely stated”: 
 
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men…The established 
doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered  with, under the guise of protecting the public 
interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose 




“That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its 
citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear,” Justice McReynolds concluded, “but the 
individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the 
Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with 
English on the tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of 
our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution 
-- a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.”923 
 
The Court expanded on this reasoning two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, a 
unanimous decision overturning Oregon’s 1922 Compulsory Education Law, which mandated 
that all students between the ages of eight and sixteen attend public schools. Educator John 
Dewey had argued this Oregon law “seems to strike at the root of American toleration and trust 
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and good faith.” Writing again for the majority Justice McReynolds argued that the parochial and 
Catholic schools bringing the case “have business and property for which they claim protection” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and which “are threatened with 
destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present 
and prospective patrons of their schools.” In addition, McReynolds argued, “[u]nder the doctrine 
of Meyer v. Nebraska…we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes 
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children.”924 
 
The Pierce decision, Felix Frankfurter argued, rendered “immediate service on behalf of 
the essential spirit of liberalism.” It and Meyer would pay dividends further down the road as 
well. In taking these first tentative steps to expand the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process 
clause to personal rights other than liberty of contract, the Court unwittingly fashioned the 
beginnings of the legal reasoning that would flower in later seminal cases such as Loving v. 
Virginia, Griswold v. Connecticut, and Roe v. Wade. This broadening of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s applicability was also evident in one of the major civil liberties cases of the 




In 1919, as part of the November sweep conducted by A. Mitchell Palmer and New York 
authorities, Socialist-turned-Communist Benjamin Gitlow had been arrested and charged under 
New York’s criminal anarchy law for passing out The Revolutionary Age, a pamphlet which 
included “The Left Wing Manifesto,” a statement of Socialist philosophy which included the 
expected overthrow of capitalism. (“A dull document,” according to TNR. “Any agitator who 
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read these thirty-four pages to a mob would not stir them to violence, except possibly against 
himself.”) Gitlow was defended in Court by two lawyers from the National Civil Liberties 
Bureau, Charles Recht and Walter Nelles, as well as one of the great defenders of the age, 
Clarence Darrow. “Oh, I know you are innocent,” Darrow told Gitlow upon taking the case sight 
unseen, “but they have the country steamed up. Everybody is against the Reds.” Darrow argued 
in the subsequent trial that there should be “no fetters on the thoughts and actions and dreams 
and ideals of men, even the most despised of them. Whatever I think of their prudence, whatever 
I think of their judgment, I am for the dreamers.” In February of 1920, the judge and the jury 




Once it had wended its way to the Supreme Court, one of the ACLU’s top lawyers, 
Walter Pollak, joined Walter Nelles as Gitlow’s remaining counsel. Pollak and Nelles argued to 
an unsympathetic Court that New York’s criminal anarchy law violated Gitlow’s First 
Amendment right to free speech. Only three years earlier, in 1922, the Court had determined 
once again in the case of Prudential Insurance. Co. v. Cheek that First Amendment protections 
did not carry over into state law. But this, Pollak argued, was a problem, because the due process 




The final 7-2 majority opinion in Gitlow v. New York, written by the newest member of 
the Court, Justice Edward T. Sanford, upheld Benjamin Gitlow’s earlier conviction, on the 
grounds that “a State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of organized 
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government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means.” But, in making this 
determination, the Court also argued that “for present purposes we may and do assume that 
freedom of speech and of the press – which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress – are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.” Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, writing in dissent, agreed that “the general principle of free 
speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of 
the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as there used.” They thought Gitlow’s 
conviction should be overturned, on the grounds that it did not meet the “clear and present 
danger” test established in Schenck.928 
 
Either way, the Court had now taken the unprecedented step of extending First 
Amendment protections to the States. In the words of TNR – who otherwise thought that 
Gitlow’s conviction showed America has “lost vision and courage; The Left Wing Manifesto is a 
tepid hash of the Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels” – a “profit and loss account of the 
Gitlow case shows one new gain, the possibility of federal protection against state suppression. A 
more liberal Court may prevent a checker-board nation, with ultra-conservative states into which 
moderately radical Americans come at peril of imprisonment for sedition.” One of the legal 
minds greatly perturbed by this shift was Charles Warren, soon to be Calvin Coolidge’s rejected 
candidate for Attorney General. “This most recent development,” he argued in 1925, “may well 
awaken serious thoughts as to whether there is not danger that the ‘liberty’ of the States is being 
unduly sacrificed to this new conception of ‘liberty’ of the individual…If the doctrine of the case 
is carried to its logical and inevitable conclusion, every one of the rights contained in the Bill of 
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Rights ought to be and must be included within the definition of ‘liberty,’ and must be 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation by a State ‘without due process of 
law.’” And so they would be.929 
 
Another notable victory-in-defeat for the ACLU and civil liberties advocates occurred in 
the 1927 case of Whitney v. California. Here again, the defendant was a Communist who had 
been arrested in November 1919 and was convicted under a state criminal anarchy law. This 
time, the agitator in question was California social worker Charlotte Anita Whitney, who had 
been charged with “criminal syndicalism” for advocating the Communist Labor Party and the 
workers’ overthrow of capitalism. And once again, Walter Nelles and Walter Pollak of the 




Anita Whitney lost her appeal 9-0, with Justice Sanford, writing for seven members, 
concluding that “the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an 
absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose.” As such, “a State in 
the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical 
to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the 
foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means.” In short, 
the Majority concluded, “[w]e find no repugnancy in the Syndicalism Act as applied in this case 
to either the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment on any of the 
grounds upon which its validity has been here challenged.”931 
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However, in a concurring opinion, Louis Brandeis argued for he and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes that they were “unable to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of the Court that 
assembling with a political party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution 
by mass action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right within the protection of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Instead, they upheld the conviction on other evidence of a 





“Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive,” Brandeis 
argued, returning to the Meyer, Pierce, and Gitlow cases, “it is settled that the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of 
procedure. Thus, all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the 
Federal Constitution from invasion by the States. The right of free speech, the right to teach, and 
the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.” Moreover, he continued:  
 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to 
develop their faculties…They valued liberty both as an end, and as a means. They believed 
liberty to be the secret of happiness, and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that 
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery 
and spread of political truth; that, without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile; 
that, with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of 
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is 




“Fear of serious injury,” Brandeis and Holmes argued, “cannot alone justify suppression 
of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech 
to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must 








be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be 
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable 
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one.” In short, “[t]he fact that speech 
is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its 
suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State.”  Otherwise, “the remedy 
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”934 
 
With the Whitney case, as with Gitlow, civil libertarians lost the battle and won the war. 
Justice Brandeis’s concurrence would go down in legal history as one of the more eloquent 
summations of the importance of free speech in case law. (In fact, much of Brandeis’s most 
memorable language was originally meant to be a dissent in the 1927 case of Ruthenberg v. 
Michigan, upholding the conviction of Communist Charles Ruthenberg under a similar criminal 





 But even if together, the ACLU, civil libertarians, and the progressive members of the 
Court had succeeded in establishing the sanctity of free speech and the authority of the First 
Amendment over state law, there were still notable and grotesque limits to their vision of what 
constituted individual liberties. Take for example, the now-notorious 1927 case of Buck v. Bell.  
 
Born in 1906 in Charlottesville, Virginia, Carrie Buck was a young woman to whom life 
had been decidedly unkind. Born to a father who abandoned her and a mother, Emma, who 
reportedly worked as a prostitute, Carrie was given to foster parents and upstanding members of 
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the community, J.T. and Alice Dobbs, at the age of three. She attended school through the sixth 
grade, and then became a maid and helper to the Dobbs family. When Carrie was 14, her foster 
father, a local police officer, succeeded in getting her biological mother Emma committed on the 
grounds of feeble-mindedness. In 1923, at the age of seventeen, Carrie was raped by the Dobbs’ 
nephew, Clarence Garland. And, in January of 1924, two months before giving birth to a 
daughter, Vivian, from this rape, Carrie herself was committed by the Dobbs to the Virginia 
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded. There, it was determined by eugenicists that traits like 
feeble-mindedness, “moral delinquency,” and promiscuity had been passed down three 
generations, from Emma to Carrie to Vivian Buck – the latter because, at the age of seven 
months, Vivian had given a nurse a look that was “not quite normal.” (In another tragedy in a life 
full of them, Vivian, actually considered a “bright” child who made the school honor roll, would 




And so, Carrie was slated to become the first mandatory sterilization performed under 
Virginia’s new 1924 Sterilization Law. As it happened, the major proponent of this sterilization 
law was the Superintendent of the Virginia Colony, Dr. Charles Priddy – who up to that point 
had been conducting illegal sterilizations under the auspices of “pelvic disease.” And, so to 
strengthen the statute and protect the Colony from liability, Priddy specifically chose Carrie’s 
situation as a test case to go before the courts. Enlisting a former member of the Colony Board 
and friend-of-a-friend Irving Whitehead to go through the motions as counsel for the ostensibly 
feeble-minded plaintiff, Priddy put forth a challenge to the law that argued Carrie’s sterilization 
would be “void under the Fourteenth amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due process 
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of the law and equal protection of the laws.” Priddy died of Hodgkin’s disease before the case 
reached the Supreme Court, and so the new superintendent of the Virginia Colony, James H. 




In May 1927, Oliver Wendell Holmes – who was on record as a supporter of eugenics – 
penned a decision for the eight-member majority that even his colleagues thought was “brutal.” 
(Justice Pierce Butler, a conservative Irish Catholic, silently dissented.) “We have seen more 
than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives,” noted the Civil 
War veteran: 
 
It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for 
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being 
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those 
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory 





 As for the due process question, Holmes barely addressed it. “It is the usual last resort of 
constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort,” he harrumphed. And, besides, 
“so far as the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the 
world, and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.”939 
 
On October 19, 1927, Carrie Buck’s fallopian tubes were removed. She would be the first 
of over eight thousand men and women legally sterilized in the Commonwealth of Virginia, the 
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most outside of the considerably more populous state of California. (The total number of 
sterilizations across the country was roughly 65,000.) Among them would be Carrie’s sister 
Doris, who was hospitalized for “appendicitis” at the age of 16 and did not find out until 1979, at 
the age of 67, why she and her husband were never able to have children. Before she died in 
alone in a nursing home in 1983, Carrie Buck was interviewed by researchers and historians, and 




While later generations would condemn Holmes’ lazy reasoning in Buck v. Bell, 
especially after it was cited as a defense by lawyers representing Nazis at Nuremberg, the civil 
libertarians of the time were universally silent. Neither the ACLU, under Baldwin, nor the 
NAACP, under DuBois, objected to the decision. Neither The New Republic nor The Nation 
made any editorial comment. For all their grasping towards “a new conception of liberty of the 
individual,” in Charles Warren’s words, the progressives and civil libertarians of the 1920’s still 
felt Theodore Roosevelt’s dire forebodings of “race suicide” were a more fundamental concern 
to society than was Carrie Buck’s control of her own body.941 
The Shoemaker and the Fish-Peddler 
 
 
While progressives of the Twenties may not have been attuned to the plight of Carrie 
Buck, the grim fate of Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti was a cause 
célèbre throughout much of the Twenties. In fact, the many well-publicized legal discrepancies 
attending their case, and their ultimate execution on August 23, 1927, did more than almost any 
other event of the decade to embitter progressives on both the judicial system and American 
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public opinion at large. “Nothing since World War I,” wrote historian Eric Foner in 1977, “so 
shook the liberal faith in the workings of American institutions or the self-sufficiency of the rule 
of law.” “No single act,” argued William Leuchtenburg, “did more to turn liberal intellectuals to 
radicalism.”942 
 
Both supporters of Luigi Galleani, the Italian anarchist whose compatriots had sent out 
the fifteen mail bombs to A. Mitchell Palmer and others in 1919, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti were taken from a streetcar and arrested in West Bridgewater, Massachusetts on the 
evening of May 5
th
, 1920. Apparently presuming they were being arrested for their radicalism – 
not a wild presumption given it was the week of May Day, and the Attorney General had 
promised everyone fireworks – both men lied about their anarchism, their whereabouts, and their 
companions that night, as well as their earlier failure to register for the draft in 1917, when they 
had both fled to Mexico. Both Sacco and Vanzetti were carrying firearms at the time, a .32 Colt 
Automatic and a .38 Harrington and Richardson pistol respectively. Also in Vanzetti’s pocket 
were a handful of shotgun shells, and in Sacco’s pocket was a flier announcing an upcoming 




As this handbill attested, Sacco, a cobbler at a shoe factory with a wife and children, and 
Vanzetti, an itinerant but well-read fish peddler, were both active in anarchist circles. In lying to 
the police like this, Sacco and Vanzetti may have been thinking about their fellow anarchist 
Andrea Salsedo, whose prolonged two-month detention in New York City Vanzetti had only just 
returned from looking into. Two days before Vanzetti’s arrest, Salsedo had, in the midst of an 
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interrogation by federal agents, somehow fallen to his death from a fourteen-story window, soon 





In any case, the police had more than radicalism on their minds anyway, for a robbery 
and double murder had occurred three weeks earlier, on the afternoon of April 15
th
, 1920, in 
nearby South Braintree, Massachusetts. Then, two Italian men had shot and killed Fredrick 
Parmenter and Alessandro Beradelli, a paymaster and guard at the Slater & Morrill shoe factory, 
grabbed the $15,776.51 they were carrying, and absconded in a getaway car carrying three other 
men that arrived as soon as the foul deed was done. Since the authorities knew of an Italian 
radical with a car in the area, one Mike Boda (a.k.a. Mario Buda), they wanted to talk to him. 
Instead, they found Sacco and Vanzetti, who had just left the garage where Boda’s car was under 
repair. Sacco and Vanzetti also claimed not to know Boda, which added to the “consciousness of 
guilt” they were charged with from then on.945 
 
Since a previous attempted robbery at a shoe factory in Bridgewater had involved a man 
firing a shotgun, Bartolomeo Vanzetti – on account of the shells found in his pocket – was 
quickly tried on June 1920 of that earlier crime. The defense brought forth almost a dozen 
witnesses that put Vanzetti in Plymouth, Massachusetts on the day of the robbery, but, within a 
month, Vanzetti – who did not take the stand in his own defense, to avoid the radicalism charge – 
was found guilty regardless. The judge, Webster Thayer, sentenced him to 12 to 15 years. Two 
months later, on September 11
th
, 1920, Sacco and Vanzetti were indicted for the Braintree 
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murders. And five days later, possibly as retaliation for this indictment, Mike Boda, just before 




A year later, on May 31
st
, 1921, Sacco and Vanzetti were tried for the Braintree murders 
in the Boston suburb of Dedham. And, whether the two men were innocent or guilty in the end, 
the proceedings very quickly took on the air for many of an out-and-out railroading. Prosecutors 
delivered multiple witnesses putting Sacco at the scene of the crime – only, it turned out, Sacco 
had previously been shown to these witnesses by the police in a lineup of one. One eyewitness 
pegged Vanzetti as the getaway driver, but others had testified the wheelman as having markedly 
paler features and no moustache.
 
 Another testified that he clearly saw Sacco in the getaway car, 
but then confessed on cross-examination that he had in fact run away as soon as the shots were 
fired.
 
 Yet another “thought at the first glance that the man was a Portuguese fellow named Tony 
that he knew,” before testifying it was instead, definitively, Sacco. And yet another complained 
to a Quincy shopkeeper afterward that “the Government took me down [to jail] and want me to 
recognize those men and I don't know a thing about them. I have never seen them and I can't 
recognize them.” None of these witnesses knew Sacco or Vanzetti personally.947   
 
The heart of the state’s case was the .32 slug pulled from the corpse of the guard, which 
State Police Captain William Proctor testified “was consistent with being fired” from Sacco’s 
pistol. It later came out that Captain Proctor had been coached by the prosecution. “Had I been 
asked the direct question: whether I had found any affirmative evidence whether this so-called 
mortal bullet had passed through this particular Sacco’s pistol,” Captain Proctor later confessed 
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in an October 1923 affidavit, “I should have answered then, as I do now without hesitation, in the 
negative.” The prosecution also claimed that Vanzetti was in possession of the dead guard’s gun. 
There was no evidence of this being the case. As for the nearly $16,000 in missing funds, it 
played no part at all in the prosecution.
948
   
 
Meanwhile, the defense – led by one Fred Moore of California, a Socialist who 
specialized in defending radicals and thus no friend of the Court – provided thirteen witnesses 
putting Vanzetti in the fish market at the time of the crime, and several others who testified that 
Sacco had gone to, and was seen at, the Italian consulate in Boston that day obtaining a passport. 
To explain their initial lies to the police, around which the “consciousness of guilt” argument 
was formed, Sacco and Vanzetti revealed themselves to be anarchists, further damning them in 
many observers’ eyes – especially when the prosecutor got Sacco going about his new homeland. 
“I thought here a man was free, free to give his own opinion, not to be put in prison for it as in 
the Spanish Inquisition” Sacco said on the stand. “But I found that too, was wrong; men of 
education were put in prison, kept there for years, like Debs, put there because he was a Socialist 
and dared to work for the labor classes. The capitalists didn’t want the working class to get up. 
They do not want our children to go to high school or Harvard.”949 
 
Judge Webster Thayer, now presiding over his second case involving Vanzetti, was a 
Dartmouth man, but he was not one to cotton to such seditious talk in his courtroom. “Oh how 
unfortunate that any such doctrine,” he had written after the anarchist bombings of 1919, “so 
destructive in its character and so revolutionary in all its tendencies should ever have reached the 
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sacred shores of these United States!”  A month before the first Vanzetti case, Judge Thayer had 
lectured a jury who had decided to acquit one Segris Zagroff. “Gentlemen, how did you arrive at 
such a verdict?” he berated them. “Did you consider the information that the defendant gave to 
the police officers…that he was a Bolshevist and that there should be a revolution in this 
country?” And during the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, he told a friend at the Worcester Golf Club (who 
later told humorist Robert Benchley, who then swore an affidavit to this effect) that “a bunch of 
parlor radicals are trying to get those Italian bastards off. I’ll see them hanged and I’d like to 
hang a few dozen of the radicals too…No Bolsheviki could intimidate Web Thayer!”950 
  
In any event, Judge Thayer had the two defendants sit in a metal cage in the center of the 
courtroom throughout the proceedings. According to Boston Globe writer Frank Sibley, Thayer 
said of defense counsel Fred Moore that “no longhaired anarchist from California is going to run 
my court!” He gave the prosecution free rein to delve not only into Sacco and Vanzetti’s political 
beliefs, but into their earlier trip to Mexico to avoid the draft.  He then began his summation to 
the jury by telling them that “the Commonwealth of Massachusetts called upon you to render a 
most important service. Although you knew that such service would be arduous, painful, and 
tiresome, yet you, like the true soldier, responded to that call in the spirit of supreme American 
loyalty. There is no better word in the English language than ‘loyalty.’”951  
 
Judge Thayer’s inferences from the bench worked their magic: After a seven week trial, 
Sacco and Vanzetti were found guilty. “The verdict caused great surprise among persons who 
followed the trial,” reported John Nicholas Beffel at the time in The New Republic. “[B]ecause of 
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the wide conflict in the testimony of identification witnesses, many persons believed that the jury 
must either acquit the defendants or fail to reach an agreement.” Clarence Skinner noted in The 
Survey the “persistent belief on the part of many” that the trial had been “an endeavor to railroad 
innocent men to death because they are radicals.” “When in the face of this evidence, the jury 
brought in a verdict of guilty,” wrote Elizabeth Glendower Evans in The Nation, “one has a 
confused sense of non sequitur, such as one feels when a prestidigitator produces a rabbit out of 
a hat.”952 
 
These articles aside, when the Sacco and Vanzetti case had begun, one Socialist reporter 
from New York sent to cover it reported back that “there’s no story in it. Just two wops in a 
jam.” Their conviction was noted in the papers, but over the next few years, as Judge Thayer 
singlehandedly rejected any and all motions to reopen the case – according to Massachusetts law, 
the presiding judge held the power to determine whether a new case was warranted – the plight 
of Sacco and Vanzetti was a story only followed by the radical press, the ACLU, agents of J. 
Edgar Hoover’s Bureau of Investigation (who saw it as a window onto potential subversive 
activity), and a few well-meaning Bostonian matriarchs, such as Elizabeth Glendower Evans, 
who took on the cause of the two men and reported often in The Nation and The Survey. H.L. 
Mencken had cited the case as yet another unremarkable bout of hypocrisy in American law, and 
author John Dos Passos had been active with the Defense Committee since 1920, but otherwise 
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But the case began to heat up once again in November 1925 when a cellmate of Sacco’s, 
Celestino Madeiros, confessed that he had committed the crime, along with a Providence-backed 
gang led by one Joe Morelli, who happened to look remarkably like Nicola Sacco. In fact, 
defense lawyers soon discovered, this Joe Morelli was already under federal indictment for five 
similar shoe factory robberies, he carried a .32 pistol, and when the defense team looked into the 
gang’s whereabouts on the fateful evening, none of them had any alibis that could hold up. But, 
on October 23, 1926, after defense lawyers had put forward a motion to retry the case based on 
this confession, Judge Thayer – for the seventh and final time – denied it. “The decision of this 
capitalistic judicial tribunal is not surprising,” wrote Eugene Debs in a statement released the 
month of his death. “It accords perfectly with the tragical farce and the farcical tragedy of the 
entire trial of these two absolutely innocent and shamefully persecuted working men.” The 
following April, the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to get involved for the second time, 
meaning Judge Thayer’s sentence stood: death by electric chair. As the Judge bragged to a friend 
at a Dartmouth football game, “Did you see what I did with those anarchistic bastards?”954 
 
The following month, May 1927, Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter, who had been 
aware of the case since the early days through his wife’s friendship with Elizabeth Glendower 
Evans, released an article for The Atlantic Monthly and a book, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti. 
In both, he carefully laid out the reasons why the two men had received a prejudicial trial, and 
exposed Judge Thayer as a partisan. The judge’s seventh denial, Frankfurter wrote, “cannot 
accurately be described otherwise than as a farrago of misquotations, misrepresentations, 
suppressions, and mutilations. The disinterested inquirer could not possibly derive from it a true 
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knowledge of the new evidence that was submitted to him as the basis for a new trial. The 
opinion is literally honeycombed with demonstrable errors, and a spirit alien to judicial utterance 
permeates the whole.”955 
 
Along with awakening other progressives to the injustices of the case, Frankfurter’s 
article suddenly gave Sacco and Vanzetti a frisson of both respectability and newsworthiness. (It 
also encouraged the police to secretly wiretap Frankfurter’s phone.) Within the next few months, 
the case would become a worldwide sensation, with everyone from Albert Einstein and Charlie 
Chaplin to H.G Wells and Helen Keller calling for Sacco and Vanzetti’s freedom. Frankfurter 
and the Sacco-Vanzetti Defense Committee deliberately worked to mainstream the two Italian 
radicals, by downplaying their anarchism and instead recasting them merely as two poor victims 
of injustice and intolerance. (Frankfurter even asked the ACLU to stand down. “I hope very 
deeply you will do nothing until after the Sacco-Vanzetti case is out of the way completely,” he 
wrote. “If the Civil Liberties Union and other like-minded organizations now come in, it is 
bound to be entangled with the efforts on behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti, and all such 
entanglements will hurt the cause of these men. I speak from a great deal of attention to the 
situation and a detailed familiarity, I believe, with the governing forces of the community.”)956 
 
For his part, William Allen White entreated with these same governing forces, urging 
them to reassess the case. “I now know why the witches were persecuted and hanged by upright 
and godless people,” White wrote Governor Alvin Fuller of Massachusetts in June 1927. “This is 
a tremendously important case for America. It seems to me that our courts would be vastly more 
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discredited before the world if we executed innocent men than they would be if we refrained to 
execute innocent men when there was even a shadow of doubt as to their guilt. Pardon this 
intrusion but this case seems to be wider than your state. It is America and America’s justice 
which is on trial.” Such attention from media figures and progressives prompted Fuller to 
appoint a three-man commission to ensure that justice had been done. This consisted of the 
president of Harvard, Abbott Lawrence Lowell, the president of MIT, Samuel Stratton, and a 
former judge, Robert Grant. These forces of respectability apparently decided to close ranks 
around Judge Thayer, and they – and Governor Fuller – decreed that there was “no sufficient 
justification for executive intervention.”957  
 
Observers were aghast at this final shoe dropping. “This is a matter of life and death, not 
only for Sacco and Vanzetti but for the civilization that Harvard University is supposed to 
represent,” wrote John Dos Passos – who followed the Sacco-Vanzetti case with particular 
passion – in an open letter to Lowell. “As a Harvard man I want to protest most solemnly against 
your smirching of the university…with the foul crime against humanity and civilization to which 
you have made yourself aghast.” The governor, New York World columnist Heywood Broun 
argued, had “no intention in all his investigation but to put a new and higher polish upon the 
proceedings. He called old men from high places” – including Lowell, the president of 
“Hangman’s House” – “to stand behind his chair so that he might seem to speak with all the high 
authority of a high priest or a Pilate.” Deadpanned Broun, who would soon be fired by World 
editor Ralph Pulitzer for his many vociferous editorials about the case, “What more can the 
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immigrants from Italy expect? It is not every prisoner who has a president of Harvard throw on 
the switch for him.”958 
 
It wasn’t just at the World where emotions ran hot. Around the world, from London to 
Paris to Casablanca to Uruguay, boycotts were called, strikes were held, American flags were 
burned, and deadly riots broke out. In an attempt to use these international protests as leverage, 
Jane Addams appealed to Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, William Borah, to 
call for a halt to the executions. This was not the sort of argument that worked well on him. “[I]t 
would be a national humiliation, a shameless cowardly compromise of national courage, to pay 
the slightest attention to foreign protests or mob protests at home,” he responded. “We all you 
know your fine devotion to humanity, but neither humanity nor peace can be served by deferring 
to foreign interference, which is an impudent and willful challenge to our sense of decency and 
dignity and ought to be dealt with accordingly.” The Nation was aghast. “What an extraordinary 
and often how disappointing a public man is William E. Borah!” it exclaimed. “Any petty agent 
of the National Security League might have penned these lines.” Nonetheless, two days after 




By then, it was too late. On August 23, 1927, as crowds of picketers waited outside and 
American Legion members sang “The Star Spangled Banner” – Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti were executed. “Massachusetts has taken two lives with a vindictiveness and brutality 
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unsurpassed in our history,” argued Oswald Garrison Villard and Freda Kirchway in an editorial 
entitled “Massachusetts the Murderer.” People “will speak for years to come with horror of a 
State in which two men could be executed after seven years of monstrous torture.” This “legal 
murder,” they argued, “strengthened the hands of violence and of all those persons who believe 
that the world can be reformed only by bombs and bloodshed. Everywhere they have made 
peaceful men and women despair that progress may be achieved without force…How crass, how 
degrading it all is!”960 
 
The editors of The New Republic agreed. More than just a legal murder, they wrote, the 
execution of Sacco and Vanzetti was a “betrayal of the faith in reason which is inherent in the 
composition of a liberal and humane state.” “The representatives of the most reputable and 
highly educated public opinion in Massachusetts…felt impelled to manufacture out of thousands 
of questionable particular decisions a rope of certainty strong enough to be used as a hangman’s 
cord.” As a result, “what will suffer is the confidence of all classes in an appeal to reason for the 
correction of alleged wrongs and grievances. They have impaired the authority of reason in 
public life…Public opinion has submitted to this betrayal of its own hygienic principle.”961 
 
As a result, TNR argued, the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti was particularly fatal to the 
hopes of liberals and progressives. “Their comrades in anarchy will, of course, do their best to 
apotheosize them as the victims of a ruthless and deliberate class conspiracy…[But f]rom the 
point of the view of the liberals, the judicial execution of Sacco and Vanzetti is a far more 
hopeless tragedy than it is from the point of view of the anarchists. For the cause of justice and 
fair-dealing in the execution of the criminal laws in which liberals were interested is a cause 
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which is already supposed to have been won...The liberal defenders of the two Italians have, in 
failing to save the lives of the defendants, lost practically all that they were fighting for.” 962  
 
No wonder, as Edmund Wilson put it, the executions “made the liberals lose their 
bearings.” Or, as Upton Sinclair put it in Boston, his fictional retelling of the Sacco and Vanzetti 
story, “Don’t you see the glory of this case? It kills off the liberals.” The executions induced a 
“period of depression and heart searching” among progressives, argued Jane Addams three years 
later. “Some of us felt that the outcome of the Sacco and Vanzetti case threw away an 
opportunity unique in the history of the United States for demonstrating that we are here 
attaining a conception of justice broad and fundamental enough to span the reach of our 
population and their kinsfolk throughout the world.” The verdict “forced me,” later wrote Robert 
Morss Lovett, “to accept a doctrine which I had always repudiated as partisan tactics – the class 
war.” 963  
 
Now, TNR, argued, it behooved progressives to realize “from the tragic deaths of Sacco 
and Vanzetti that American public opinion is still suffering from an ugly disease which is all the 
more dangerous because it brings with it the delusion of moral vitality and physical health. 
 
Messrs Fuller and Lowell would never have attempted to deny Sacco and Vanzetti the benefit of 
the doubt except in atmosphere created by the class prejudices, the snobbishness, the confused 
landmarks, the inertia and the weak complaisance of educated American opinion… 
Fundamentally, it confuses intelligence with the definition and with the emotional affirmation of 
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“Such a confusion is fatal,” TNR concluded, “for it exposes public opinion almost wholly 
unprotected to the assaults of propaganda.” In other words, the executions of Sacco and Vanzetti 
were an indictment of public opinion itself. “Remember, please,” wrote Heywood Broun on the 
first anniversary of the executions, “that the commotion against the Italian agitators was not 
confined to any single class in Massachusetts…A majority supported the verdict.” Indeed, Broun 
continued, “it no longer seems to me that the injustice done may fairly be blamed upon the State 
of Massachusetts singled out from all the rest…There are scores of American communities in 
which Sacco and Vanzetti might have been killed with just as much goodwill.” “We stand 
defeated America,” author John Dos Passos would later write of the Sacco and Vanzetti trial:  
 
“[A]ll right you have won you will kill the brave men our friends tonight.  
 
there is nothing left to do we are beaten… 
 
America our nation has been beaten by strangers who have turned our language inside out who 
have taken the clean words our fathers spoke and made them slimy and foul  
their hired men sit on the judge’s bench they sit back with their feet on the tables under the dome 
of the State House they are ignorant of our beliefs they have the dollars the guns the armed forces 
the powerplants  
they have built the electric chair and hired the executioner to throw the switch all right we are two 
nations America our nation has been beaten by strangers who have bought the laws and fenced 
off the meadows and cut down the woods for pulp and turned our pleasant cities into slums and 




For Dos Passos, as for many others, the illusion of a public interest that was independent 
of class interests was gone. 
 
One writer who seemed reluctant to let the case shake his faith was former TNR editor 
Walter Lippmann, who had left for the New York World in 1921. When the Lowell Committee 
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issued its final decision, Lippmann deemed its report one of “fairness, consideration, shrewdness, 
and coolness” and thought the Governor should simply commute the Sacco and Vanzetti 
sentences to life imprisonment. He backtracked on this some four days later, after an angry visit 
from Felix Frankfurter, arguing that since “multitudes of open-minded men remain 
unconvinced,” it would be “bad public policy to execute two men about whose guilt a large part 
of the public had serious doubts.” Nonetheless, after the two men were executed, Lippmann, in 
an editorial entitled “Patriotic Service,” congratulated everyone involved – the Lowell 
Committee for doing “a disagreeable duty bravely” and being “willing to stake their reputations, 
to sacrifice their comfort, to face danger, in an effort to get at the truth,” and Frankfurter and the 
defense committee for working to “uphold the rights of the humblest and most despised.”966 
 
Lippmann’s tone-deaf response to the executions lost him some friends. The recently 
fired Heywood Broun called him “the greatest carrier of water on both shoulders since Rebecca 
at the well.” Another World colleague, the later noir author James M. Cain, thought the “logic-
chopping” editorial in question revealed that Lippmann had approached the executions as “an 
intellectual exercise, nothing more.” Writing several years later, a still livid Amos Pinchot 
argued the “important thing [in Lippman’s piece] is that the contending factions should be united 
by a common appreciation of Walter Lippmann’s fairness.” “Everybody up here was with you,” 
Judge Learned Hand wrote Lippmann from New Hampshire, trying to cheer him up, “except 
Felix, to whom it was monstrous because even hypothetically it assumed that the report could be 
treated as emanating from human beings at all.”967 
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Dwelling on the case further, Lippmann told Hand that he had “not been so troubled 
about anything since 1919, when against what I really believe was my own deepest and best 
feeling I let irritation against Wilson’s stupidity push me into intransigent opposition to the 
Treaty”: 
The Sacco case was particularly difficult because I had so confidently assumed that the Lowell 
report would in no event mean the death penalty. The briefness of the time allowed for reaching 
an opinion, the atmosphere of horror and the very real danger of Red violence followed by White 
violence, made me feel as if we were being rushed into the gravest kind of decision without 
freedom of mind to consider it. You know that I was never convinced that they were innocent. At 
the end my feeling was a) that Sacco might be guilty and Vanzetti less probably, b) that the 
evidence against both was insufficient, c) that the trial was almost certainly conducted in a 
prejudiced atmosphere, d) that the Governor, though probably sincere within his lights, was 
infected with the psychology of class conflict which the case had provoked, e) that a commutation 
was the wiser course even though one could sympathize with the Governor’s difficulty in yielding 





The fundamental problem for Lippmann, was that the members of the Lowell Committee, 
esteemed college presidents and such, were exactly the sorts of dispassionate public experts that, 
according to his 1922 book Public Opinion, should have come to the wisest conclusion. The fact 
that they apparently didn’t – that the case didn’t seem to have been decided with the public 
interest in mind at all – was a cognitive dissonance for Lippmann that he would have to grapple 
with for some time to come. Regardless, within two years, Lippmann settled himself back into 
the new mainstream opinion and argued that both Sacco and Vanzetti were innocent. “If Sacco 
and Vanzetti were professional bandits,’ Lippmann wrote for a back-of-the-book blurb for a 
reprint of Felix Frankfurter’s The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, “then historians and biographers 
who attempt to deduce character from personal documents might as well shut up shop. By every 
test that I know for judging character, these are the letters of innocent men.’”969 
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But were they? To the present day, a sometimes heated debate continues on the presumed 
innocence or guilt of Sacco and Vanzetti. In 2005, a 1929 letter written by Upton Sinclair, soon 
after the publication of Boston, was unearthed that reopened the old wounds once again. In it 
Sinclair speaks of a meeting he had with Fred Moore, Sacco and Vanzetti’s original lawyer, in 
Denver while researching the book. “I face the most difficult ethical problem of my life…Alone 
in a hotel room with Fred,” Sinclair wrote, “I begged him to tell me the full truth. He then told 
me that the men were guilty and he told me in every detail how he had framed a set of alibis for 
them.” But Moore also said Sacco and Vanzetti never actually told him they had committed the 
crime, and Sinclair thought the pair’s former lawyer may just have been “brooding on his 
wrongs.” In 1998, a manuscript emerged written by Joe Morelli, whose gang was accused of the 
crime by Sacco’s cellmate. Morelli had confessed to the crime in 1931, but rescinded the 
confession four years later – In this manuscript, he called Sacco and Vanzetti “cold-blooded 
killers,” and that he “knew of their racket.” Joe’s brother Frank, on the other hand, was quoted in 
a 1973 gangland memoir saying that “we killed those guys in the robbery, [and t]hese two 
greaseballs took it on the chin…That shows you how much justice there really is.”970  
 
Clearly, given the Galleanist bombings of 1919 and Mario Buda’s likely involvement in 
the Wall Street bombing, Sacco and Vanzetti were associated with men who were not above – 
indeed, actively believed in and endorsed – violence as a political tool. Nonetheless, at a certain 
level, these questions are beside the point. As the editors of The New Republic put it after the 
executions, their magazine never “assumed the innocence of the accused and executed men. It 
has only declared that they never received a fair trial.” Whether the State put two innocent men 
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to death or the system tried to frame two guilty men, the end effect was the same: A stunned 
generation of progressives and intellectuals felt even further alienated from both the legal system 





The Shame of America 
 
 One progressive dismayed – but not at all surprised – by the Sacco and Vanzetti verdict 
was Crisis editor W.E.B. Du Bois. “We who are black can sympathize with Sacco and Vanzetti 
and their friends more than other Americans,” he wrote soon after the executions. “We are used 
to being convicted because of our race and opinions regardless of our proven guilt. We are used 
to seeing judge, jury, and public opinion lay down the rule: ‘Better ten innocent Negroes 
lynched, than one guilty go free.’”972 
 
Throughout the Twenties, Du Bois and the NAACP had been fighting to end the scourge 
of lynching in American life. While not much was expected from the new administration coming 
to power in March 1921 on this front, the overwhelming Republican majorities in both House of 
Congress, as well as the recent victories of Prohibition and Suffrage, suggested there may be 
some opportunity for progressive change for African Americans under Warren Harding. “If the 
American people can stop long enough to change the Constitution to decide whether the 
American people shall drink or not, or 6,000,000 people shall vote,” argued The Crisis, “they can 
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at least stop long enough to change the Constitution to say whether 12,000,000 people can live in 
safety.”973  
 
And, indeed at first, it seemed there might be cause for hope. Much more than his 
predecessor, who had openly admired Birth of a Nation and went out of his way to re-segregate 
the White House, President Harding, in his first year in office, took his opportunities to speak out 
against lynching and on behalf of civil rights. In his April 1921 address to Congress, as noted 
previously, he urged House and Senate “to wipe the stain of barbaric lynching from the banners 
of a free and orderly representative democracy.” In June 1921, the president wrote the NAACP’s 
James Weldon Johnson endorsing the idea of “a commission embracing representatives of both 
races” to “bring about the most satisfactory adjustment of relations between the races.” (In the 
end both Harding and Coolidge endorsed this commission plan, but nothing came of it.) And in 
October 1921, while receiving an honorary law degree at the University of Alabama, Harding 
became the first president since the Civil War to address the issue of civil rights – and to 
condemn lynching – in a Southern state.974 
 
 To a segregated Birmingham crowd of 30,000 – 20,000 whites and 10,000 blacks – 
Harding gave a speech on race relations that, for the most part, echoed the conditions laid down 
in Booker T. Washington’s Atlanta Compromise of 1895. Condemning the practice of lynching, 
the president argued that there should be “no occasion for great and permanent differentiation” 
on political and economic matters between the races, but everyone should recognize “the 
absolute divergence in things social and racial.” “When I suggest the possibility of economic 
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equality between the races, I mean it in precisely the same way and to the same extent that I 
would mean it if I spoke of equality of economic opportunity as between members of the same 
race,” argued Harding. “Whether you like it or not,” the president told a crowd of cheering 
African-Americans and sullen Southern whites, “unless our democracy is a lie, you must stand 
for that equality.”975 
 
That being said, Harding thought “it would be helpful to have the word ‘equality’ 
eliminated from this consideration; to have it accepted on both sides that this is not a question of 
social equality, but a question of recognizing a fundamental, eternal, and inescapable 
difference”: 
 
Let the black man vote when he is fit to vote, prohibit the white man voting when he is unfit to 
vote…Especially I would appeal to the self-respect of the colored race. I would inculcate in it the 
wish to improve itself as a distinct race, with a heredity, a set of traditions, an array of aspirations 
all its own. Out of such racial ambitions and pride will come natural segregations, without 
narrowing any rights… 
 
[A] black man cannot be a white man, and that he does not need and should not aspire to be much 
like a white man as possible in order to accomplish the best that is possible for him. He should 
seek to be, and he should be encourage to be, the best possible black man, and not the best 




Possibly as a show of good intentions and magnanimity, Harding also argued that 
African-Americans should begin to look outside the Republican Party for leadership. “Just as I 
do not wish the South to be politically entirely of one party,” he told the Birmingham audience, 
“so I do not want the colored people to be entirely one party. I wish that both the tradition of a 
solid Democratic South and the tradition of a solidly Republican black race might be broken up. 
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Neither political sectionalism nor any system of rigid groupings of the people will in the long run 
prosper our country.” 977 
 
Instead Harding called for an America where “black men will regard themselves as full 
participants in the benefits and duties of American citizenship, when they will vote for 
Democratic candidates, if they prefer the Democratic policy on tariff or taxation, or foreign 
relations, or what-not; and when they will vote for the Republican ticket only for like reasons. 
We cannot go on, as we have gone one for more than half a century, with one great section of our 
population, numbering as many people as the entire population of some significant countries of 
Europe, set off from real contribution to solving our national issues, because of a division on race 
lines.”978 
 
 In retrospect, this seems like rather tepid messaging, and by even as early as the 
following May – when Harding gave a speech dedicating the Lincoln Memorial – the president 
then avoided making any further pronouncements on race relations to a segregated crowd. But, at 
the time, having presidents address issues of race before a mixed Southern crowd was not 
considered normalcy. “It has taken sixty years for a President of the United States – a Republican 
President – to pick up the broken threads of understanding as they fell from the cold hand of the 
martyred Lincoln,” gushed the Birmingham News, who thought Harding’s statement was “was a 
message of vital importance to the South, the nation, and the world.” The New York Globe called 
Harding’s Birmingham address “the most important and the most intelligent statement of the 
right approach to the negro problem sponsored by any public man in a generation.”979 
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Nor did opponents of the speech take it as tepid. “[T]o encourage the negro, who in some 
States, as in my own, exceeds the white population, to strive through every political avenue to be 
placed upon an equality with the whites,” suggested Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi,  “is a 
blow to the white civilization of the country that will take years to combat.” Similarly, Senator 
Tom Heflin of Alabama thought “God Almighty has fixt limits and boundary lines between the 
races, and no Republican living can improve upon His handiwork.” The Nashville Banner 
reminded Harding that “[i]t irritates the South to be lectured on its alleged ill-treatment of the 
Negro,” while the Montgomery Journal, in an editorial entitled “The President’s Mistake,” 
pointed out that “the South resents intermeddling, whether that intermeddling comes from high 
or low.”980 
 
While the Birmingham address was mostly lauded in the African-American press, one of 
the harshest critics of Harding’s words – perhaps because he had been fighting this exact 
delineation of the Color Line since at least the 1903 publication of The Souls of Black Folk – was 
W.E.B. Du Bois and The Crisis. To be sure, Du Bois applauded the president’s call for the right 
to vote, education, and economic justice for all people. “In this the President made a braver, 
clearer utterance than Theodore Roosevelt ever dared to make, or than William Taft or William 
McKinley ever dreamed of. For this let us give him every ounce of credit he deserves.” That 
being said, Du Bois’s thought Harding’s remarks on social equality would “pledge the nation, the 
Negro race and the world to a doctrine so utterly inadmissible in the twentieth century, in a 
Republic of free citizens and in an age of Humanity that one stands aghast at the motives and the 
reasons for the pronouncement.”981  
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Cede the prospect of social equality, Du Bois argued, and all is lost. “No system of social 
uplift which begins by denying the manhood of a man can end by giving him a free ballot, a real 
education and a just wage… To deny this fact is to throw open the door of the world to a future 
of hatred, war and murder such as never yet has staggered a bowed and crucified humanity.” Nor 
did Du Bois believe that the race pride evoked by Harding was a sign of positive progress. “For 
the day that Black men love Black men simply because they are Black, is the day they will hate 
White men simply because they are White.”982  
 
In short, while it was a promising sign to see the president address race relations in a 
comprehensive fashion, in effect Harding’s address was doubly irritating to Du Bois. It not only 
hearkened back to the Atlanta Compromise philosophy of Booker T. Washington, which Du 
Bois had spent much of his professional life railing against. It also incorporated the notion of a 
distinct and separate race pride that was gaining adherents for one of Du Bois’s main rivals in the 
Twenties, Marcus Garvey.  
 
If the president and Du Bois could not see eye to eye on the overarching project of race 
relations, they could at least agree that lynching, in Harding’s words, was “a very sore spot on 
our boast of civilization.” And so, working with the NAACP, Congressman Leonidas Dyer, a 
white Republican from East St. Louis representing a majority black district, re-introduced the 
Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill on April 11, 1921. First introduced in 1919, Dyer’s legislation was the 
first anti-lynching bill in Congress seen since 1900, when the last and only black member of 
Congress for decades, George H. White of North Carolina, had introduced one that went 
nowhere. Defining lynching as any murder committed by three or more people, the Dyer bill 






proposed a $5000 fine or jail time (from five years to life) for any sheriff or law enforcement 
official who refused to protect prisoners from justice or prosecute lynchers after the fact. It also 
mandated that the federal government could step in as the prosecuting authority if the county or 
state failed to take action, and that counties where lynching took place would be forced to pay 




The urgency for federal action on the issue was underscored the following month, when 
another race riot – not unlike the conflagrations of the Red Summer two years earlier – erupted 
in the oil boom town of Tulsa, Oklahoma, home to one of the more affluent African-American 
communities in the South. On Memorial Day, some sort of misunderstanding had occurred in the 
elevator of the Drexel Building in downtown Tulsa between a nineteen-year-old black shoe 
shiner, Dick Rowland, and a seventeen-year-old white elevator operator, Sarah Page. Be it due to 
a lover’s quarrel, an accidental slip, or something more unsavory, a nearby clothing store clerk 
heard a scream and saw Rowland hurriedly exiting the elevator. (The fact that both were at the 
Drexel Building on Memorial Day, a holiday, suggests the two might have scheduled a meeting.) 
Sarah subsequently gave a statement to the police which – like many of the documents 
surrounding the Tulsa riots – is lost to history, although the lackadaisical response of the Tulsa 
police suggests an assault was unlikely. In any event, from the volatile spark of “an impudent 
Negro, a hysterical girl, and a yellow journal,” in the words of Oklahoma’s Adjutant General, 
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The next day, May 31
st
, 1921, Rowland was taken into custody by a white detective and 
one of the two African-American cops on the force. Upon hearing the news, the Tulsa Tribune, 
in an article which seems to have been deliberately removed from the record – it was 
summarized in a 1946 master’s thesis on the incident – blared the headline “Nab Negro for 
Attacking Girl in Elevator” in its afternoon edition. Newsboys screamed “A Negro assaults a 
white girl!” on the street and, though this is also unclear due to the destroyed evidence, the 
Tribune also seems to have run an editorial along the lines of “To Lynch Negro Tonight.” Soon, 
according to one white resident, “talk of lynching spread like a prairie fire,” and by evening, a 




Around 9pm, twenty-five African American men from Greenwood, a reasonably affluent 
black neighborhood referred to as the “Negro Wall Street” or “Little Africa” by disparaging 
white residents, arrived at the Courthouse with shotguns and rifles and offered to aid authorities 
in the protection of Dick Rowland. The police declined and these men left to patrol the streets by 
car – a visible reminder that the African American community would not cower in the face of a 
lynching.  Now, many whites entered a state of panic, running home to get guns and even trying 
to break into the local Armory. By 10pm, as two thousand whites buzzed around the Tulsa 
Courthouse, another armed contingent of African American men arrived to offer their services. 
“Nigger, what are you doing with that pistol?” one white man screamed at a black veteran of the 
World War. “I’m going to use if I have to,” replied the veteran. When the white man lunged for 
the army-issue revolver, a struggle ensued and a shot rang out. Then, in the words of the sheriff, 
“all hell broke loose.”986 
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Immediately the steps of the Tulsa Courthouse turned into a firing range and bloodbath, 
with as many as a dozen dead or wounded. As the heavily outgunned African-Americans began 
retreating back to Greenwood, they were followed by a raging crowd of whites, who began 
breaking into sporting goods stores for more weaponry and sounding the clarion call of “Nigger 
fight!” in nearby movie theaters. In the ensuing bloodlust, Dick Rowland, still under police 
protection, was mostly forgotten, and survived the long evening intact. For the next several 
hours, the fighting would be concentrated along the Frisco railroad tracks separating the black 
neighborhood of Greenwood from the white areas of town. As wild rumors abounded of trains 
headed to Tulsa with hundreds of black reinforcements, all-white National Guard units organized 





At one in the morning, the first fires were lit – Soon all of Greenwood, one of the most 
impressive and successful black communities in the South – would be looted and aflame, 
including dozens of African American-owned businesses and the recently completed Mount Zion 
Baptist Church. (Whites turned back the Tulsa Fire Department’s attempts to quell the fires, so 
they instead worked to keep it from spreading into white neighborhoods.) At 2am, blacks 
defending Greenwood thought they had beaten back the advance, but three hours later, after 
some sort of still-undetermined signal that could have been a train whistle, whites spilled over 
the Frisco tracks in force – systematically looting, burning, and killing.988  
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The African-American community was outnumbered, and those families that had not 
already evacuated – and did not resist the onslaught -- were rounded up into hastily-formed 
internment camps. In the skies above, planes flew over Greenwood, apparently – although again 
reports vary on this front – firing and dropping sticks of dynamite. African-Americans defending 
the church, and using its belfry as a vantage, were forced to retreat when white rioters aimed a 
machine gun at them. Some were shot in the back while fleeing for their lives. Others, like World 
War veteran “Peg Leg” Taylor, followed the advice of Claude McKay’s “If We Must Die” and 





By noon the next day, as the State Police arrived and the fires died out, a thirty-six block 
area of Greenwood had been burned to the ground, leaving 10,000 homeless. Among the 
casualties to the fire were 1256 homes, churches, businesses, two black newspapers – The Tulsa 
Star and The Oklahoma Sun – a library, a school, and the Frissell Memorial Hospital, which at 
the time of its burning had been filled with wounded black men and women. The official death 
toll was 38 dead – 28 blacks, 10 whites – but the actual number was far about that, perhaps as 
many as 300. (It is impossible to say, particularly since many of the African-American dead were 
thrown into unmarked graves.) Approximately 800 were treated at hospitals with injuries, 





To The Nation, disgusted at the “terrible race riot” that had taken place, the “smoking 
ruins of Tulsa” proved the lie of Harding’s Normalcy. “If Mr. Harding is to be President of the 
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whole nation, if he is to do anything about that ‘sweetest concord’ which today is a figment of 
his imagination, he should insist upon an immediate inquiry into the color problem.” The New 
Republic similarly saw in the Tulsa riots “the deliberate sacrifice of law and order and civil rights 
to the passion of patriotism or the greed of business…bearing its proper fruit.” “The Negroes are 
coming into a sense of solidarity,” TNR said of Tulsa the following week, in an editorial entitled 
“Moving Toward Race War.” “[T]he spirit of collective resistance is abroad in the Negro 
population…Mob law and peonage, as every intelligent person now recognizes, can be 
maintained only at the cost of increasing race bitterness, breaking out sporadically in 
manifestations of race war.”991 
 
Looking back on the riots in 1926, Du Bois told of how “White Tulsa and all the 
countryside armed for war. They came down to black Tulsa with machine guns and airplanes. It 
was real war: murder, fire, rape, theft. The same sort of thing that gained the Croix de Guerre in 
the World War. They killed unarmed men, women, children. They left sobbing despair and black 
ruin.” And, writing for The Nation, soon after the incident, Walter White prophesied that Tulsa, 
if crimes like lynching were allowed to persist, was only a taste of things to come. “What is 
America going to do after such a horrible carnage,” he asked, “one that for sheer brutality and 
murderous anarchy cannot be surpassed by any of the crimes now being charged to the 
Bolsheviki in Russia? How much longer will America allow these pogroms to continue 
unchecked?” 
 
There is a lesson in the Tulsa affair for every American who fatuously believes that Negroes will 
always be the meek and submissive creatures that circumstances have forced them to be during 
the past three hundred years. Dick Rowland was an ordinary bootblack with no standing in the 
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community. But when his life was threatened by a mob of whites, every one of the 15,000 
Negroes of Tulsa, rich and poor, educated and illiterate, was willing to die to protect Dick 




 Fortunately for the nation, Congressman Dyer had a presidentially-endorsed legislative 
remedy ready to go in the Dyer bill. “Having myself passed through the throes of our nation’s 
most destructive race riot and massacre in the Tulsa holocaust,” wrote A.J. Smitherman, the 
displaced former editor of the Tulsa Star, to President Harding and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, “having lost a life-time’s accumulation at the hands of the mob, and forced into exile 
with my wife and five children to escape lynching…may I not on behalf of other victims of mob 
hysteria and for the sake of the future security of our country urge an early and favorable report 
of the so-called Dyer anti-lynching bill now awaiting consideration of your committee?” 
Smitherman asked this “in the name of God and justice; in the name of the 4,097 souls American 
mobs have murdered since 1885; in the name of those who sacrificed life and property in the 
Tulsa riot and massacre to prevent the very thing that the Dyer Bill would penalize under federal 
statute; [and] in the name of the future peace and security of our common country.”993 
 
Through 1921 and 1922, both Dyer and the NAACP’s James Weldon Johnson lobbied 
aggressively for the bill throughout the House and Senate. “Lynching is murder, but it is also 
more than murder,” Johnson wrote in his form letter to every interested party. “This bill is aimed 
against lynching not only as murder but as anarchy.” “For nearly two years, during the periods 
which Congress was in session,” Johnson remembered in his autobiography, “I spent the greater 
part of my time in Washington. I tramped the corridors of the Capitol and the two office 
buildings so constantly that toward the end I could, I think, have been able to find my way about 
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blindfolded…I saw and talked with every man in Congress who was interested in the bill or who, 
I thought, could be won over to it” Reporting in to Walter White about his lobbying efforts, 
Johnson told him, “I am pouring into them as much of our dope as they will hold.”994 
 
 Southern House Democrats, meanwhile – even though well outnumbered after the 
Harding sweep – were not particularly enthused by the Dyer bill, and they used every tool they 
could in Roberts’ Rules of Order to block the bill. In December of 1921, when the legislation 
first came up for debate, enough Southerners refused to show up that the House could not make 





Forced to debate Dyer’s bill in January, 1922, Democrats latched onto what one of the 
NAACP’s legal advisors, Albert Pillsbury, had warned was the bill’s weak link – its 
constitutionality. Pointing to the Tenth Amendment, which reserved powers to the states, and the 
Supreme Court’s 1873 Slaughterhouse decision, which circumscribed the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s reach over state behavior, opponents of the bill asked where the federal 
government managed to obtain prosecutorial authority over lynchers in the states. Supporters 
argued this was a point for the courts, not the legislature, to decide, and, in any case, the Dyer 
bill was in accord with other recent laws like Prohibition, the Espionage and Sedition Acts, and 
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Leading the Democratic response on the floor was Congressman Hatton Sumners of 
Dallas, Texas, later to be Chair of the House Judiciary Committee for sixteen years. Mostly, 
Sumners trafficked in the usual racist tropes to fight the bill. “Only a short time ago,” he averred, 
speaking of the African-Americans who thronged the balconies to watch the debates, “their 
ancestors roamed the jungles of Africa in absolute savagery…[Y]ou do not know where the beast 
is among them. Somewhere in that black mass of people is the man who would outrage your wife 
or your child, and every man who lives in the country knows it.” 997  
 
Sumners took particular delight in using the constitutional argument to try to hoist Dyer 
supporters by their own petard. “I say to you can you cannot pass this bill unless you pass it 
under the influence of the same spirit which this bill denounces, viz, the mob spirit,” he argued. 
“You say that the folks down in the South are not doing this thing fast enough, and the folks in 
the South say the officers are not doing this thing fast enough, and you each get ropes and they 
go after the criminal and you go after the Constitution.” Speaking to Dyer directly, Sumner 
declared that “the Constitution of the United States stands at the door, guarding the governmental 
integrity of the States, the plan and the philosophy of our system of government, and the 
gentleman from Missouri, rope in hand, is appealing to you to help him lynch the 
Constitution.”998 
 
 The vociferous attacks of Sumners and the other Southerners aside, the House of 
Representatives passed the Dyer Bill on January 26
th
, 1922 by a vote of 231 to 119, with eight 
Democrats, all but one from the North, voting in favor and 74 abstaining. Now, the focus of the 
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NAACP turned to the Senate, where the filibuster would make passage a heavier lift. To grease 
the wheels, The Crisis emphasized that Republicans had, with sympathetic Northern Democrats, 
the two-thirds votes necessary to beat a filibuster if they tried. As such, Republicans were 
“responsible absolutely for the success or the failure of the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill.” If it did 
not pass, Du Bois argued, “any Negro who votes for the Republican Party at the next election 
writes himself down as a gullible fool.”999 
 
 But first the bill had to get out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, where a man many 
thought would be a natural champion of the bill turned out to be against it. “Honorable William 
E. Borah,” columnist Heywood Broun telegraphed on behalf of the New York Civic Club in May 
1922: “Lynching…is a denial of everything that America stands for and represents the basest and 
most abhorrent form of anarchy. We call upon you to help wipe this disgrace to our country by 
using every legitimate means.” “I agree with you absolutely that lynching is a relic of 
barbarism,” Senate William Borah replied, “and I stand ready to do anything which will 
effectively deal with it…if you can find a leading lawyer in New York City who will cite me to 





 Throughout late 1921 and early 1922, the NAACP and other progressives bombarded 
Borah with arguments to help change his mind. James Weldon Johnson sent along the NAACP’s 
recent report on “Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States,” and offered to put Borah in 
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touch with Congressman Dyer and a number of other legal experts supporting the bill. Moorfield 
Storey, president of the NAACP and former president of the American Bar Association, sent 
Borah his brief, based on Justice Brandeis’s dissent in the 1920 Gilbert v. Minnesota case, 
arguing that “if the right to free speech is a privilege which belonged to every citizen of the 
United States even before the Fourteenth Amendment or even the First Amendment, a fortiori 
the rights to life, liberty, and property must be secured to the citizens of the United States.”1001  
 
Dora Ogan, President of the Women’s Republican Club, also shared her “surprise and 
disappointment” with Borah at his stance. “I cannot believe that senators of the United States 
will so stultify themselves,” she wrote the Senator, “and at the same time assume responsibility 
for the continuance of the inhuman orgies of lynching. That the government of a civilized nation 
should deliberate as to whether it will or will not continue to torture, and burn at the stake, its 
men and WOMEN citizens is a spectacle to which the world will point with horrified 
amazement… Sodom and Gomorrah had nothing on the U.S.A. of today.” Ernest Gruening, an 
editor at the Nation, alerted Borah in June 1922 that “within the last month, there have been a 
dozen lynchings including five burnings at the stake…If some form of anti-lynching bill is not 
passed by this Congress, it is unlikely ever to be, for it is not probable that the Republicans will 
ever again have so large a majority of both Houses.” The Nation itself editorialized that “[i]t is 
the first and most elemental function of a government to protect human life – and no barriers of 
legalistic quibbling should prevent our abolishing the supreme anachronism of civilization.”1002 
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 True to form, Borah only dug his heels in deeper. “No one wants to deal with this subject, 
I think, more than I do,” he replied to Gruening, “But I can’t find a shred of principle upon which 
to hang this measure under the Constitution. I have put a vast amount of time on it during the last 
six weeks and given it the best there was in me, and I can find no authority whatever for the 
law.” To an African-American correspondent, Borah argued that passing an unconstitutional bill 
“will not help your people and…will only add another chapter of insincerity and disgrace to our 
dealing with the negro question since the war.” To the editor of the Boston Transcript, he argued 
that he did not want “to prostitute my intellectual integrity in trying to pass bills which we have 
no authority to pass”: 
We have reached a point in our constitutional history where we must intelligently consider the 
proposition of redistributing the power between the State and the national government…I should 
like to see this great question of whether or not we shall redistribute our powers openly and 
candidly and intelligently presented to the people. I have no doubt at all that under the 
Constitution of the United States as it now stands, our attempt to deal with the lynching 
proposition would be a farce and another exhibition of lawlessness upon the part of Congress 




In the end, Borah agreed not to actively stand in the way of the Dyer bill if it could pass 
the Senate Judiciary Committee without his vote. And so it did, eight to six, with Borah opposing 
the measure. But, with the constitutionality of the bill still in question, the Dyer Bill needed a 
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When asked by Walter White, Senator Hiram Johnson affirmed that he insisted “upon the 
enforcement of the law and abhor its violation. There is no worse blot on our civilization than 
mob violence and lynching.” As such, he was “very glad to do what lies in my power in behalf of 
this measure.” But Hiram Johnson – who had called African-Americans a “shiftless and stupid 
set” in private and written “that perhaps our idea of the…brotherhood of man as applied to our 
citizens of African descent may be a little wrong” –  was not particularly active in guiding the 
bill either. George Norris was generally progressive on issues of race relations. “There are good 
and bad people in all races,” Norris said in 1922, “and there is as much sense in torturing one 
race as there would be in persecuting people with red hair, or every one with blue eyes.” But 
while averse to lynching, Norris hadn’t even formed an opinion on the Dyer legislation – He was 
waiting for it to come to a vote. So eventually, the NAACP turned to the Senate Majority Leader, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, and reminded him that Republicans had relied on the black vote in its 
corner for sixty years now. Congressman Dyer even took an unprecedented trip to Massachusetts 




When Senate debate opened on the bill on September 21, 1922, however, the introducer 
was not Henry Cabot Lodge but Senator Samuel Shortridge of California, a new member of the 
Senate almost completely unversed in procedural warfare. “My heart sank as I thought of the gap 
between a Borah and a Shortridge,” James Weldon Johnson later remembered. Very quickly, 
Senate Democrats left the chamber en masse, then called for a quorum which no longer existed – 
effectively shunting the bill until after the midterm elections. The sheer ineptitude of Shortridge, 
Johnson and others surmised, meant that the fix against the bill was in.
1006
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Nonetheless, in November 1922, supporters of the bill made the full-court press on behalf 
of the Dyer bill. A petition signed by 24 governors, 39 mayors, 47 lawyers and judges, 88 
bishops, 29 college presidents and countless other prominent names was delivered to the Senate. 
In the meantime, the NAACP and the Anti-Lynching Crusaders, a women’s organization 
founded by activist Mary Talbert in 1922, also embarked on a widespread advertising campaign 
denouncing lynching as “The Shame of America” and urging readers to contact their senators 
immediately for passage of the Dyer bill. “Do you know that the United States is the Only Land 
on Earth where human beings are Burned At the Stake?” it informed the over two million readers 
of eleven separate papers, including the New York Times, New York World, Chicago Daily News, 
Washington Star, Cleveland Plain Dealer, and Atlanta Constitution. “In Four Years, 1918-1921, 
Twenty-Eight People were Publicly BURNED BY AMERICAN MOBS. 3436 People Lynched 
1889 to 1922.” The “Shame of America” ads also noted that only 17% of lynchings occurred 
after an accused rape, and that “88 Women Have Been Lynched in the United States and the 
Lynchers Go Unpunished.” The two organizations – calling this “the most amazing 







, 1922, the Dyer bill again came to the floor, whereupon it was 
immediately greeted by a Senate filibuster led by Minority Leader Oscar Underwood of 
Alabama. “I now inform you,” Underwood told the New York Evening Globe, “that this bill is 
not going to become law at this session of Congress.” The Republicans, meanwhile, scarcely 
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seemed to mind. Instead of upping the ante on the filibuster – by forcing Democrats to hold the 
floor around the clock, for example – the Senate Majority mainly just shrugged. “We cannot pass 
this bill in this Congress,” Lodge eventually announced, agreeing to pull the bill until the next 
Congress. When James Weldon Johnson angrily called out Senator Lodge for his lackadaisical 
response to the filibuster, Lodge just as angrily responded that he never promised to get the bill 
through a filibuster in the first place. Either way, the Dyer Bill was dead in the current Congress. 
President Harding’s secretary, George Christian, wrote Johnson soon after the defeat, hoping 
“that our colored citizens will justly place the responsibility for this where it belongs, to wit, 
upon the Democratic minority.”1008 
 
W.E.B. Du Bois and the NAACP were beside themselves. “The Republicans did not try 
to pass the Dyer bill,” he wrote in The Crisis of January 1923. “The Republicans never intended 
to pass the Dyer bill, unless they could do so without a fight, and without appearing publicly to 
defend the rights of the Negro race.” The defeat of the legislation, Du Bois argued, represented 
an indictment of “that century-old attempt at government of, by, and for the people which today 
stands before the world convicted of failure...It is the failure and the disgrace of the white people 
of the United States.” And there would be consequences. Granted it was the Democrats who, in 
the end, had “lynched the anti-lynching bill.” Nevertheless, “[i]n the next two years, the 
Republican party expects us to forget that they have failed and deceived us; but if we Black 
voters, male and female, forget what the Republican party did to the Dyer bill, we deserve 
disfranchisement now and forever.”1009  
 
                                                          
1008
 Dray, 271-272. George Christian to James Weldon Johnson, December 8, 1922. NAACP Papers, Library of 
Congress. Reprinted at http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/learning_history/lynching/harding_secretary.cfm 
1009




As if on cue, the first day of January 1923 saw another large-scale racial incident begin in 
the small community of Rosewood, Florida, which was home to twenty-five to thirty African-
American families, or around 350 people. That day, Fannie Taylor, a 22-year-old woman in the 
nearby white community of Sumner, reported being beaten by a black man. (Other eyewitnesses 
had seen a white man, who was not her husband James, enter the Taylor home that morning.) As 
word spread through Sumner of the incident, a possible suspect was named in Jesse Hunter, a 
black convict who had recently escaped a chain gang and was rumored to have fled toward 
Rosewood. Soon enough, a bloodthirsty white posse had formed up and, by the evening of New 
Year’s Day, they had committed their first murder in Sam Carter, a local blacksmith who 
admitted under duress to helping a fugitive escape. (Whether that fugitive was Jesse Hunter or 
Fannie Taylor’s white lover, a fellow Mason, depends on who is telling the story.)1010 
 
For the next two days, this white posse scoured the Rosewood area for Jesse Hunter. 
Among their travels they met Sylvester Carrier, a black man who refused to leave Rosewood 
when ordered to do so. Sensing trouble, Sylvester encouraged members of the community to 
gather at his mother Sarah’s two-story residence. There, on January 4th, a firefight broke out 
between whites still searching for Jesse Hunter and 25-30 African Americans barricaded in the 
Carrier home, lasting until early into the morning of January 5
th
 and leaving two white men and 
both Sylvester and Sarah Carrier dead. As word spread, hundreds of whites from surrounding 
communities descended on Rosewood, setting fire to the village and murdering at least three 
more African-Americans on the way. On Saturday, January 6
th
, many of the African-American 
families of Rosewood managed to escape via train, never to return. On Sunday, January 7
th
, 
whites burned the entire town – three churches, a school, a Masonic Hall, dozens of homes – to 
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the ground. The official death toll was six blacks and two whites, although rumors linger of 
many more fatalities occurring. With the exception of one home and one general store owned by 
John Wright, a white merchant in town (who, unbeknownst to the marauders, had helped many 





The Dyer Anti-Lynching bill would be introduced in the next few Congresses. 
“Practically everyone,” Du Bois wrote in October 1923, “recognizes now that the Congress has 
the power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce that part of the 14
th
 Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, which says that no State ‘shall deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of its law.’ Our right to do this…is the same upon which we 
acted in providing a law for the enforcement of the 18
th
 Amendment.” But never again, despite 




Nonetheless, Du Bois thought the failed campaign still had some effect on public 
opinion, even in the South. When the number of lynchings in America dropped from 64 in 1921 
and 60 in 1922 to 28 in 1923 and 16 in 1924, Du Bois – with the caveat that “probably hundreds 
of other lynchings have never been reported” – argued that “the NAACP with the Dyer bill put 
the fear of God into the Southern mob and drove the logic of the lynching disgrace out of the 
head of the civilized South.” This was not a solution, he emphasized. “Lynching is not yet 
stopped. It is simply curbed temporarily. Nothing will stop it but federal law. The Dyer bill must 
pass.” But as a legislative priority, even as the NAACP continued to support the bill and draw 













As for the constitutional consternation of Senator Borah, Du Bois was not quite ready to 
let that betrayal drop. In August of 1926, Du Bois published an open letter to Borah asking why 
the Idaho Senator had apparently made a speech opposing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments. “Personally,” wrote DuBois, “I am unable to conceive that a man of your 
breadth and knowledge of world events and sympathy with the struggling classes can except 
from your sympathy the twelve million Negroes of the United States.” In reply – also published 
in The Crisis – Borah said he “had said nothing about the thirteenth amendment,” which had 
ended slavery. “[H]ad I been speaking of it at all, I should have said it was altogether the right 
and noble thing to do.” In a subsequent article, Borah argued that passing the fifteenth 
amendment, giving African-Americans the right to vote, “at the time it was written was a 
mistake. It came before the hot passions of the Civil War had cooled.” Instead, Borah argued, the 
country should have followed Lincoln’s notion, voiced just before his assassination, of granting 
the vote to “the very intelligent and those who served our cause as soldiers.’” By “educating and 
preparing the Negro for his new duties and responsibilities in citizenship,” this policy “would 
have been better for all concerned, for the white and the black and for the whole country.”1014 
 
“[A]ll of this is a discussion of history,” Borah clarified. “The Negro has made great 
progress, all things considered, during the last fifty years:  
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He is particularly entitled to credit for, amid all his adverse circumstances…[showing] little, or no 
inclination to join with those political sects which rail at constitutional government... 
 
It was an almost insuperable task imposed upon the South but, considering all things, I believe the 
South has acted quite as well with the Negro as the North. We have been just as intolerant as the 
South. We have employed the mob also. We have played politics with the Negro…We should 
seek to secure rights and justice to the Negro. But I would do so in recognition of the real facts 
rather than upon the basis of political expediency and at the expense of the physical and moral 
advancement of the Negro… 
 
This is a problem of great national interest and can only be satisfactorily solved by complete 
cooperation between the North and the South. Such bills as…the Dyer Anti-lynching bill were 
and are founded upon a wholly false theory.”1015 
 
In a separate editorial, Du Bois pushed back against Borah’s argument, pointing out 
correctly “that it was the black voter” in the Reconstruction period “that gave the South the 
public school, democratic government and the beginnings of modern legislation for social 
uplift.” Nonetheless, Borah’s thoughts on the Reconstruction amendments suggest that the 
Senator’s views on the constitutionality of the Dyer anti-lynching bill were at least partially 
infused with an undercurrent of racism and condescension. As Walter White put it, he could 
never understand “the extraordinary attitudes of several Western senators who were regarded as 
liberals on economic questions but who have been among the most injurious to the Negroes’ 
cause.” Borah’s position rankled even further in the late Twenties, when he not only became an 
outspoken advocate of Prohibition, which relied on an expansive definition of federal power, but 
seemed to suggest to confidants, with an eye to the 1928 presidential race, that he was glad his 




In any event, with the legislative door apparently closed, the NAACP instead turned to 
the courts to achieve progress in race relations. The primary architect of desegregation, Charles 
Hamilton Houston, and his legal lieutenants Thurgood Marshall and Oliver Hill would not join 
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the organization or begin their long march to Brown v. Board of Education until the 1930s. But 
the NAACP did score significant legal victories in 1925 and 1926 with the successful defense of 
Dr. Ossian Sweet, an African-American doctor in Detroit, and his brother Henry, on charges of 
murder. 
 
In May 1925, Ossian Sweet, a young doctor working at the local black hospital, and his 
wife Gladys bought a house on the corner of Garland and Charlevoix avenues in Detroit, in what 
was then a predominantly white neighborhood. They moved into their new home in September, 
at which point, their new white neighbors went right to work. After receiving abusive and 
threatening phone calls that included death threats, Ossian left his young daughter at his mother’s 
house, then organized a dinner party the next night with several friends. That evening, a large 
crowd of whites gathered outside the Sweet residence and began throwing rocks and bricks. 
From an upstairs window, Ossian’s younger brother Henry Sweet and others opened fire, killing 
one white man, Leon Breiner, and wounding another. The police soon showed up and arrested 




Dr. Ossian Sweet had expected trouble. As a child in Florida, he had witnessed both the 
burning alive of a black teenager and the chilling, glad-handing behavior of the white crowd after 
the deed. As a student at Howard University, he had seen the violence of the 1919 Washington 
DC race riot up close. As a newlywed studying in Paris, he had raged as the American Hospital, 
to whom he had made a sizable donation, refused to admit his wife Gladys when their baby was 
due. And as a new homeowner, Sweet had read of another black doctor in Detroit, Alexander 
Turner, who had been forcibly expelled from his new home by a white mob in June 1925. So, 
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when the inevitable harassing phone calls began, Dr. Sweet had not moved his furniture into his 
new home. He had brought guns. “I have to die a man or live a coward,” he had told his brother 




At the time, the NAACP’s Walter White and James Weldon Johnson were looking to 
make more headway against housing discrimination and restrictive covenants, and the Sweet 
case seemed like a promising avenue in that regard. In order to have a white face to lead the 
defense, the organization went to the most famous criminal defense lawyer in America, who had 
just recently even further embellished his name squaring against William Jennings Bryan in 
Dayton, Tennessee. A longtime civil rights advocate whom even as unsparing a critic as DuBois 
thought “absolutely lacking in racial consciousness,” Clarence Darrow took the case right away. 
He soon arrived in Detroit with Arthur Garfield Hays of the ACLU in tow. The Sweets were also 
fortunate in the judge assigned to the case, future Governor and Supreme Court Justice Frank 
Murphy, who would write a memorable dissent to the Korematsu decision legitimating Japanese 
internment during World War II. In his own way, Judge Murphy – who thought Darrow was “the 
most Christ-like man I have ever known” and that seeing him defend the Sweets was the 
“greatest experience of my life” – would be as favorable to the defense as Judge Thayer had been 
to the prosecution over in Dedham, Massachusetts, allowing Darrow the latitude to put on 




Going laboriously over Dr. Sweet’s previous traumatic experiences, Darrow used the trial 
to indict the culture of fear that rampant and unchecked lynching had produced. “What did he do 
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it for, gentlemen?” Darrow asked the jury in his closing summation.  “Were you born yesterday 
or does the State think you were born yesterday? Why did he do it? He did it because he knew 
that the infinite forces of the universe had painted his face black; he did it because he knew that 
the white man hated him although they would let him work. That is why he did it. I don’t need 
any argument for that, and I don’t need any evidence for it, and you know it.” Warming to his 
theme, Darrow concluded: 
Any reason to expect trouble? Yes. Imagine your face is black, would you have expected trouble? 
Why, why? He is an intelligent man, he knew the history of his race, he knew that looking back to 
the terrible years that have marked their history he could see his answer; loaded like sardines in a 
box in the mid-decks of steamers and brought forcibly from their African homes, half of them 
dying in the voyage; he knew they were sold like chattels as slaves and were compelled to work 
without pay; he knew that families were separated when it paid the master to sell them; he knew 
that even after he had got liberty under the Constitution and the law, he knew that the bodies of 
dead Negroes were hanging from the limbs of trees of every state in the Union where they had 
been killed by the mob; he knew that in every state of the Union telegraph poles had been 
decorated by the bodies of Negroes dangling to ropes on account of race hatred and nothing else; 
he knew they had been tied to stakes in free America and a fire built around living human beings 
until they roasted to death; he knew they had been driven from their homes in the north and in 
great cities and here in Detroit, and he was there not only to defend himself and his home and his 
friends, but to stand for the integrity and independence of the abused race to which he belonged, 
and I say, gentlemen, you may send him to prison if you like, but you will only crown him as a 
hero who fought a brave fight against fearful odds, a fight for the right, for justice, for freedom, 




Whether it was due to Darrow’s silver tongue or not, the jury in the Sweet case 
deadlocked, and Judge Murphy was forced to call a mistrial. The following May, defending 
Henry Sweet, Darrow covered the same territory in similarly lyrical terms. “I believe the life of 
the Negro race has been a life of tragedy, of injustice, of oppression,” Darrow said at the end of 
his eloquent eight-hour summation. “The law had made him equal – but man has not. And after 
all, the last analysis is what man has done. Gentlemen…Not one of their color sits on this jury. 
Their fate is in the hands of twelve whites. Their eyes are fixed on you, their hearts go out to 
                                                          
1020





you, and their hopes hang on your verdict. I ask you on behalf of the defendant, on behalf of this 
great state and this great city which must face this problem and face it squarely, I ask you in the 
name of progress and of the human race to return a verdict of not guilty.”1021 
 
This time, the jury complied, and Henry Sweet was acquitted by a jury of twelve white 
men. Darrow’s summation, which moved James Weldon Johnson to tears, would be distributed 
across the country by the NAACP. Johnson called it “"the most dramatic court trial involving the 
fundamental rights of the Negro in his whole history in this country,” while poet Langston 
Hughes deemed Darrow’s closing argument “one of the greatest in the history of American 
jurisprudence.” The Nation thought the trial “probably the fairest ever accorded a Negro in this 
country.” From his jail cell in Charlestown, Massachusetts, Bartolomeo Vanzetti thought the 
acquittal showed the capability of change. “Darrow said…‘if you have progressed a little, you 
shall acquit these Negroes. And the jury acquitted them.”1022 
 
The Sweet trial was more than just a rhetorical victory. Henry Sweet’s acquittal, recalled 
Walter White in his memoirs, “broke the wave of attacks on the homes of Negroes, and there 
have fortunately been only a few isolated instances of this type of mob violence in the years 
since the Sweet case.” If the doors of Congress were closed to change, then, the Sweet trial 
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The Right to Organize 
 
 
Just as civil liberties violations during the Red Scare had gone hand in hand, more often 
than not, with labor repression, the American Civil Liberties Union – the Union part was not 
accidental – aimed in the Twenties to protect the rights of labor as well as the rights of 
dissidents. In fact, after leaving prison for refusing the draft in July 1919, Baldwin had promptly 
joined the Wobblies and spent several months working his fingers to the bone in various hard 
jobs around the country. (When discussing this period later in life, Baldwin would cite one of 
Clarence Darrow’s more memorable maxims: “I am a friend of the working man, and I’d rather 
be his friend than be one.”)1024 
 
This experience – not to mention seeing the NCLB’s offices raided soon after publishing 
The Truth About the I.W.W – cemented to Baldwin that the right to free speech and the right to 
organize were fundamentally inseparable. “Whether the industrial struggle will be waged without 
resort to violence,” he wrote in 1923, “depends entirely upon how far the right of agitation of 
new ideas can be won and held by the militant forces of labor and their allies.” That right of 
agitation, in the 1920’s, would be under constant threat. “The effort to suppress workers’ 
organization,” wrote The New Republic in 1926, “is one of the most profoundly demoralizing 
tendencies in the United States of our generation.” And while the immediate post-war period is 
remembered as a more fertile period for labor unrest, the 1920’s would in fact see major and 
often violent coal, textile, and railroad strikes – so much so that, in 1922, Secretary of Labor 
James Davis feared the nation was “on the verge of industrial collapse.” “The days are most 
trying,” First Lady confided to her journal that same year, “and I have not made up my mind that 
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the days of the war had no harder problems to meet than the present time.” In all of these 




Within weeks of its January 1920 formation, the ACLU dispatched several organizers 
and a freelance journalist, John L. Spivak, into the unfriendly terrain of Appalachian coal 
country to help miners there organize under the auspices of the United Mine Workers. 
Overworked in a backbreaking job and often paid in scrip, these miners were ripe for 
unionization, especially after they missed out on the 27-cent wage increase negotiated to end the 
1919 coal strike. The UMW was equally eager to unionize them, since non-union mines that 
continued to produce coal had eroded the union’s bargaining position during that coal strike. As 
such, John L. Lewis sent along his best men and women, including the venerable Mother Jones, 




By mid-May, the UMW had succeeded in organizing around 3000 miners in the coal-
producing counties. But standing athwart their attempts were the mine operators and their hired 
army, the Baldwin-Felts Detective Agency. Soon, operators began firing miners who held a 
union card and forcibly evicting them and their families from company housing. In short, 
conditions on the ground were ugly. Do not be “under the impression that there is some 
semblance of legal procedure here,” Spivak warned Baldwin in his report. “There is not. You 
can’t hold a meeting here, get pinched and then fight it out in the courts…[Y]ou’ll never live to 
see the courts…The state is on the verge of civil war, due to the suppression of the Constitutional 
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rights of free speech and free assemblage. That’s where you come in – or are rather are supposed 
to come in, for the Union, besides sending me down, has not came in.”1027  
 
The truth of Spivak’s words became clear on May 19th, 1920, when a deadly firefight 
erupted in the town of Matewan, West Virginia. That morning, Baldwin-Felts detectives – 
among them Albert and Lee Felts, younger brothers to founding partner Thomas Felts – arrived 
in Matewan to evict miners from a nearby camp owned by the Red Jacket Coal Company. On the 
way back to the train station after this deed, the Baldwin-Felts boys were stopped by the chief of 
police Sid Hatfield, who sided with the miners. (The Felts had tried to buy off Hatfield earlier to 
the tune of $300, but the sheriff – who bragged of being a descendant of those Hatfields – was 
not for sale.) Sheriff Hatfield told the detectives that their agency had no authority for these 
actions, and that he held a warrant for Felts’ arrest. Albert Felts pulled out his own warrant for 
Hatfield’s arrest, and as words were exchanged, Mayor Cabell Testerman – who supported 
Hatfield and the strikers – stepped in to defuse the situation. Surrounding this increasingly 
escalating episode were a contingent of armed miners, there to back Hatfield and get the 
interlopers out of Matewan. Eventually, shots were fired, and within two minutes, ten men lay 
dead, including Mayor Testerman, two miners and seven Baldwin-Felts operatives, among them 




One man who survived the carnage of Matewan was the 27-year-old Sheriff Hatfield, 
who, already well-liked, now became an instant folk hero. Miners spoke of “Two-Gun Sid,” the 
“Terror of the Tug,” the man who had stood up to the mining interests and not only walked out 
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unscathed, but killed two Felts for good measure. While the ACLU tried unsuccessfully to secure 
assistance for the miners from state or federal authorities, the UMW made a silent film about 
“Smilin’ Sid” – mainly Hatfield walking around the mining camps and looking like a leader – 
which was then shown at recruiting drives. Thousands more miners answered the call, including 
90% of the nearby Stone Mountain Coal Company, swelling the number of union miners to 6000 
and giving the UMW enough leverage to declare a coal strike in the region on July 1
st
, 1920. At 




When UMW officials called for the same 27-cent increase enjoyed by miners on the other 
side of the state, coal operators in the Tug Valley turned a strike into a lockout, quickly replacing 
the strikers with immigrant and African-American labor. Even though the strike would 
effectively stop coal production in the area over the summer and last two full years, the mines 
were running back at normal efficiency by the end of 1920. In the meantime, 3000 miners, their 
movements sharply circumscribed by state police, lived in a ramshackle tent city, relying on food 
from the UMW. Violence flared up routinely between the sides, as in August 1920 when a three-
hour firefight resulted in seven more deaths and dozens injured – prompting Woodrow Wilson, 
against the protests of the ACLU, to send in federal troops that would remain in the area until 
February 1921. That July, union official Frank Keeney stated that there had been over one 




In January 1921, once the streets had been cleared of miners and Baldwin-Felts agents 
spoiling for a fight, the trial of Sid Hatfield for the Matewan massacre deaths began in nearby 
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Williamson, West Virginia. The UMW organized the defense, while Roger Baldwin and the 
ACLU conducted publicity for the trial – but neither was particularly needed. Still a folk hero in 
the region, Hatfield was acquitted by a jury of his (admiring or frightened) peers in March 1921, 
after a nine week trial. Thomas Felts, still seething after the death of his two brothers, vowed 
vengeance on the young sheriff. Four months later, Hatfield and his friend Ed Chambers were 
told to report to a different courthouse in Welch, West Virginia to answer to separate violence-
related charges. There, on August 1
st
, 1921, Hatfield and Chambers, climbing the courthouse 




The murders of Hatfield and Chambers further inflamed a situation that was already 
spiraling out of control. In May 1921, union forces had surrounded and besieged strikebreakers 
in the town of Merrimack, who eventually began firing back. After this “Three Days Battle,” 
which resulted in an estimated twenty deaths per side, Ephraim Morgan, the new Governor of 
West Virginia, declared martial law in Mingo County on the first anniversary of the Matewan 
massacre. Morgan then began using state police and deputized private agents to break up 
potential union meetings, halt distribution of the UMW’s newspaper, The West Virginia 
Federationist, and arrest any troublemakers. Two months later, on July 8, 1921, state police 
raided the union’s main office and arrested the UMW officials there for unlawful assemblage. 
The ACLU promptly protested these arrests and, expecting no favorable reply from Harding, 
urged the Senate to look into the situation.
1032
    
 
With the assassination of Hatfield, meanwhile, talk began circulating among the miners 
of a march on nearby Logan County, where the sheriff, Don Claflin, was as anti-union as 
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Hatfield had been pro-miner. (It helped that he was on retainer from the Logan Coal Operators 
Association.) Fearing a bloodbath, 91-year-old Mother Jones urged the miners to stand down, 
claiming she had a telegram from President Harding decreeing “that my good offices will be 
used to forever eliminate the gunmen system from the state of West Virginia.” But her gambit 
was exposed within hours by a telegram to Harding’s secretary at the White House, and Mother 
Jones – deemed a “sellout” and a “traitor” by the angry miners – was sidelined. She promptly left 






, a contingent of over 10,000 miners, wearing red bandannas and, often, 
uniforms from the World War, began a 65-mile march toward Logan. There, Sheriff Claflin – 
promising that “no armed mob will cross the Logan county line” – had deputized a private army 
of around 3000 strikebreakers, all of whom were now strategically deployed around Blair 
Mountain along the path of the march. He also had at his disposal cars, machine guns, landmines, 
and reconnaissance biplanes to monitor the marchers as they drew near. The board was set for 





Hoping to prevent a catastrophe and warning of miners “inflamed and irritated by 
speeches of radical officers and leaders,” Governor Morgan implored President Harding to send 
1000 federal troops and aircraft to defuse the situation. Harding and Secretary of War John 
Weeks instead sent Brigadier General Harry Bandholtz to West Virginia, who promptly met with 
union leaders Frank Keeney and Fred Mooney and warned them to stop the attack. Meanwhile, 
the War Department also sent General William “Billy” Mitchell to Kanawaha Field near 
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Charleston, West Virginia in case air operations were needed. At the time, Mitchell was working 
hard to make the case for a strong national air force, and he saw a potential test case in the Blair 
Mountain situation. “All this could be left to the air service,” Mitchell told the press, “[i]f I can 
get orders I can move in the necessary forces in three hours.” His plan? Mustard gas. “You’d 
understand we wouldn’t try to kill people at first. We’d drop gas all over the place. If they 
refused to disperse then we’d open up with artillery preparation and everything.”1035 
 
While Mitchell plotted his dramatic air raid, Keeney and Mooney finally caught up with 
the main pack of marchers and told them about Bandholtz’s threat of federal intervention. Once 
it was determined that this particular telegram, unlike Mother Jones’s earlier missive, was real – 
one of the miners had fortunately happened to serve under Bandholtz in the Philippine War – the 
miners decided to stand down. “Boys, we can’t fight Uncle Sam, you know that as well as I do,” 
one union man noted. And, so, on Saturday, August 27
th
, the miners broke off their march and 




Sheriff Claflin was still spoiling for a fight, however, and on that same day, he sent a 
contingent of deputies to the nearby town of Clothier to arrest a group of union men there. A 
firefight soon erupted that claimed two lives and, by the following day, rumors of a bloodbath in 
Clothier had become a casus belli. As marchers turned back around and started heading for 
Logan again and Claflin’s anti-union forces – now wearing white armbands to differentiate 
themselves from the red bandannas – were buttressed by volunteers organized by the American 
Legion, Governor Morgan frantically wired the White House for aid. On Tuesday, Harding 
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issued a proclamation calling for “all persons engaged in said unlawful and insurrectionary 
proceedings to disperse and retire peaceably,” or federal troops would follow.1037  
 
Over the next several days, Harding’s proclamation would be air-dropped all over the 
region surrounding Blair Mountain, and mostly ignored. Instead, union forces, estimated at 
around 9000 strong, attempted several incursions into Chaflin’s defenses around the mountain, 
mostly to no avail for the same reason the World War had turned into a stalemate of bloody 
trenches only a few years before – the suppressing fire of defenders’ machine guns discouraged 
forward progress. Meanwhile, Chaflin’s three biplanes dropped tear gas and pipe bombs on the 
encroaching miners, although to surprisingly little effect. By Thursday, the Army Air Service 
was flying over the battles in West Virginia, although, since the bloodthirsty Billy Mitchell had 
been replaced by the more conservative Major General Charles T. Menoher, the Army restricted 
their sorties to reconnaissance only. The fighting on the ground continued until Saturday, when 
2100 federal troops appeared under the command of Brigadier General Bandholtz to break up the 
fighting. The precise death toll of the Battle of Blair Mountain was never ascertained, but 
estimates range between 20 and 50.
1038
 
   
“An army of miners,” TNR reported about the incident after the dust had settled, “had 
learned to believe, from the example of coal operators who employ private gunmen and pay a 
county $32,700 a year to help it maintain deputy sheriffs, that the best answer to violence is 
violence. And this they will continue to believe until the coal operators themselves have been 
reduced to a state of civilization.” After the Battle, however, the coal operators got the best of the 
situation. With the union army disbanded, Governor Morgan quickly convened grand juries and 
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By the time the Senate Education and Labor Committee, under Chairman William 
Kenyon, finally began looking into the situation in West Virginia, Don Chaflin had disappeared 
for an extended vacation and the mine wars had begun to taper off. The Committee’s final report 
on the subject was an indecisive document that blamed labor and capital equally for the recent 
unpleasantness. They were “two determined bodies trying to enforce what they believe are 
rights, which rights are diametrically opposed to one another, and we have the situation of an 
irresistible force meeting an immovable body. In such case,” the Kenyon Committee concluded, 
“there can be nothing but trouble.” In the months and years to come, even as the ACLU 
successfully procured acquittals for UMW leaders indicted for treason, operators consolidated 




While the West Virginia coals wars were petering out, the troubles for coal elsewhere 
around the country were just beginning. As Herbert Hoover put it in his memoirs, “the coal 
industry was filled with grief, woe, and waste.” Overexpansion during the war and the rise of oil 
and electrical power meant, to Hoover, “too many mines and too many men in the industry.” The 
next campaign began eight months after the Battle of Blair Mountain, in April 1922, as the two-
year deal to end the 1919 coal strike was set to expire. Operators – looking to reduce production 
for the peacetime era – wanted the UMW to accept a 20 percent wage cut. Instead, the Mine 
Workers called for a nationwide coal strike in both the bituminous and anthracite fields. 
(Anthracite, or “hard coal,” has a higher carbon percentage than the more abundant bituminous, 
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or “soft coal”. It also burns hotter or cleaner.). Over 400,000 bituminous and 150,000 anthracite 




The UMW faced an uphill PR battle in any event, but the union, and labor in general, 
soon lost an enormous amount of public goodwill after the June 1922 Herrin Massacre, which 
the St. Louis Globe-Democrat deemed “the most brutal and horrifying crime that has ever stained 
the garment of organized labor.”1042 
 
The trouble had begun a few months earlier in September, 1921, when a Cornell-trained 
civil engineer named William Lester, owner of the Southern Illinois Coal Company, purchased a 
strip mine in the union town of Herrin, Illinois. Opening in November, the mine was yet to turn 
back a profit by the time the coal strike began in 1922, so Lester – still deeply in debt from the 
transaction – appealed to local union officials to work out a deal to keep the mine running. It was 
agreed, possibly on account of money changing hands, that Lester could continue to extract 
bituminous coal from the mine, so long as he didn’t ship it or sell it. But the strike itself had 
drastically increased the price of coal, and when Lester discovered he could make a quick 




William Lester was playing a dangerous game in a town as heavily unionized as Herrin. 
But when the local union officials complained, he fired all of his union miners and brought in 
strikebreakers and private guards to keep the mine running. Even the insult of the broken pledge 
notwithstanding, miners were worried Lester’s actions would initiate a race to the bottom that 
would have all the surrounding mines re-staffing with scabs in short order. When miners asked 
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the head office what the status of these new strikebreaking workers was, John L. Lewis replied 
via telegram that “[r]epresentatives of our organization are justified in treating this crowd as an 




, after reading the Lewis telegram aloud, several hundred miners gathered in 
Herrin’s cemetery marched on the Lester mine. A firefight ensued, with mine guards killing two 
union miners and mortally wounding a third before they retreated in to the mine with the 
strikebreakers. After an all-night siege, the mine superintendent and strikebreakers, realizing they 
were trapped, raised a white flag the next day and agreed to a truce. But, as the defeated mine 
employees were being marched to the county line, a second promise was broken. “The only way 
to free the county of strikebreakers is to kill them all off and stop the breed,” declared one 
embittered old-timer. “I’ve lost my sleep four or five nights watching these scab sons-of-bitches 
and I’m going to see them taken care of.”1045 
 
Soon thereafter, the union miners degenerated into a lynch mob. They killed the wounded 
mine superintendent, C.K. McDowell, first. (“There goes your goddamned superintendent,” one 
miner boasted. “That’s what we are going to do to you fellows too.”) Then they brought the rest 
of the prisoners to a barbed wire fence off the beaten path and released them as shooting practice. 
(“Here’s where you run the gauntlet. Now, damn you, let’s see how fast you can run between 
here and Chicago, you damn stumblebums!”) As guards and strikebreakers ran like hell, 
bloodying themselves as they tried to clamber over the barbwire fence, the union men 
commenced the slaughter. Many were shot to death along the fence, another one was grabbed 
and lynched. Even making it past the barbed wire was no guarantee of safety. Six of the Lester 
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men were captured and told to crawl on hands and knees to Herrin cemetery as children 
screamed “Scab!” at them. There, before a crowd of roughly two hundred, they were tied 
together, beaten, tortured, urinated upon, and eventually had their throats slit. When one man 
begged for water in this final stage of the massacre, a woman with a baby declared, “I’ll see you 
in Hell before you get any water.” She then stepped down hard on his bloody wound.1046  
 
 Counting the three dead union miners, twenty-three were murdered in the Herrin 
Massacre. In terms of legal and community repercussions, there were few. The funerals of the 
slain miners were attended by thousands, while the strikebreakers were interred in a potter’s 
field. Those ultimately tried for the murders were all acquitted by a local jury. A coroner’s jury 
blamed the murders on “acts direct and indirect of officials of the Southern Illinois Coal 
Company.” 1047  
 
But, in terms of public relations, the Herrin massacre was an absolute disaster. 
Newspapers across the country called massacre a symphony of “bestial horrors” and an 
“archdeed of savagery.” President Harding decried the “Herrin butchery.” “No crime ever 
committed could be more inhuman or revolting in its nature,” thundered a Republican 
Congressman from West Virginia on the house floor. “I doubt if any German atrocities were 
perpetrated…that were more horrible, more shocking, more inexcusable than the atrocities of 
which I just read,” argued Democratic Senator Henry Lee Myers of Montana.  This was 
“anarchy, pure and simple…defiance of all constitutional law and authority.” The National Coal 
Association spread lurid thirty-eight page pamphlets recounting the massacre all across the 
country, while the Chicago Journal of Commerce began a running count on its front page of 
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“Days Since Herrin.” The Associated Employers of Indianapolis, with a day of the massacre, 
urged all of its members to write the Governor of Illinois “urging him to afford the fullest 
possible protection to life and property in the legitimate mining of coal, notwithstanding the 
miner’s union.”1048 
 
Even notwithstanding the public opprobrium that followed the Herrin massacre, the 
UMW faced heavy obstacles in their 1922 strike. For one, since work stoppages tended to 
increase the price of coal in an industry that was grappling with overproduction anyway, the 
UMW’s strikes did not cause the operators nearly as much grief as they would in normal 
circumstances. For another, the long-entrenched mine operators enjoyed considerable power in 
crucial coal-producing states like Pennsylvania – where they held the advantage of being able to 
deputize a privatized Coal and Iron Police since the end of the Civil War. The operators also had 
a crucial ally in the president of the United States. Harding originally thought capital’s 
intransigence brought on the strike, but by the summer of 1922, he sent telegrams to state 
governors endorsing the use of strikebreakers around the country and promising “the assurance 
of the prompt and full support of the Federal Government whenever and wherever you find your 
own agencies of law and order inadequate to meet the situation.”  Despite all these obstacles, 
after five months out, John L. Lewis and the UMW did manage to secure a one-year contract that 
maintained 1920 wage levels, as well as promises of constructive legislation that would emerge 
from a newly-formed United States Coal Commission.1049 
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Although announced by President Harding in mid-August of 1922, the Coal Commission 
had originally been the idea of the new Chair of the Senate’s Education and Labor Committee, 
William Borah. (As noted earlier, William Kenyon accepted the federal judgeship that had been 
offered him to break the power of the Senate farm bloc.) When the strike had first been called, 
Borah announced that “the government must take over in some way the management and control 
of the coal fields of the United States.” But the Idaho Senator had been a critic of the government 
control of railroads during the war, and, as he admitted later in the decade, he did not where to 
find “the constitutional power to do effectively what we want to do.” Over in the Commerce 
Department, Herbert Hoover wanted coal operators to come together in voluntary association to 
agree on a fair price and handle the problems of production. The Committee of ’48, meanwhile, 
urged Borah and the administration to launch a congressional investigation into depredations by 
the coal industry. In the end, Borah and Harding both settled upon the usual, time-honored path 
of least resistance to a tough political problem, and established a bipartisan, seven member 
commission, chaired by conservative mining engineer John Hays Hammond, to assess the 




True to form, the Coal Commission was, in the words of one historian, a “harmless, 
vaguely constituted, and ultimately almost forgotten body.” Its final report, issued a year later, 
argued that the government should continue investigating the problem. “[I]f no constructive 
program is to result, if no statute is to be enacted or no legislation and control to be had,” Borah 
said in disgust, “I myself do not care to have any interest in it.” Working with the League for 
Industrial Democracy, a socialist organization, the ACLU took the opportunity of the 
Commission to create a Committee of Inquiry on Coal and Civil Liberties, which included Father 
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John Ryan, Kate Claghorn, and Zechariah Chafee. The Committee’s final report, The Denial of 
Civil Liberties in the Coal Fields, was proffered to the government commission, but had little 




Since the Commission was at best a stalling action, coal faced the same industry-wide 
problems when the one-year contract expired in September 1923, and both signs began gearing 
up for another wave of strikes, violence, and repression. But, after initiating a strike in August, 
the UMW caught a lucky break when America’s new president, Calvin Coolidge – uneager to 
grapple with such a political hot potato a year before an election – effectively threw the coal 
problem into the lap of Pennsylvania’s new governor, Gifford Pinchot. (Pinchot had written 
Coolidge imploring him to take action. The president instead suggested Pinchot act as his 




Coolidge had created a win-win political situation for himself – either Pinchot managed 
to solve the seemingly intractable coal crisis, or the blame of failure redounded on the upstart 
progressive from Pennsylvania. As it happened, Pinchot rose to the occasion and negotiated a 
deal with operators that included for miners an eight hour day, a ten percent wage increase, and 
an official recognition of the UMW and the right to bargain collectively. (In return, the UMW 
abandoned their attempt to automatically deduct union dues from members’ wages through a 
“check-off system.”) The successful deal propelled Pinchot back to national recognition 
overnight, and scored for the governor a place on the cover of the recently established 
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newsmagazine, TIME. To his proud brother Amos, Pinchot was now “the only person in the 
country that stands a show of taking the nomination away from Coolidge.”1053  
 
“Uncle Gifford…did a real statesmanlike thing in the matter of the coal strike, a thing 
that required good nerve and true vision,” Hiram Johnson wrote Harold Ickes after the deal was 
announced. “[T]he politicians in Washington were laughing in their sleeves, and saying they had 
handed him a lemon. He did mighty well.” After spending a weekend with the governor and his 
wife, Ickes reported to Johnson that “Gifford was entirely wise to President Coolidge whom he 
holds in even less esteem than do you and I…He realized fully that he was being handled a brick 
that was too hot for those who were holding it. The national administration had a patient on his 
hands which it preferred to see die in someone else’s hospital. Apparently the settlement of the 
strike, in the manner which it was settled, hasn’t brought any joy to the national 
administration.”1054 
 
But one observer who saw Coolidge’s shrewd handoff of the coal situation to Pinchot for 
what it was was the Sage of Baltimore. “The coal strike was shoved off on Pinchot,” Mencken 
wrote “who will remain a hero until the coal bills come in, i.e. until about the time the Coolidge 
campaign really gets under weight.” William Allen White also wrote Pinchot to applaud his 
“righteous act and…fine service to your country,” but similarly warned the Governor that he 
“certainly did put the trimmings on your presidential boom if you had any.” “I was pleased 
beyond words with what you did in every detail, but the country wasn’t,” White explained: 
 
Big newspaper people soft-pedaled it, they didn’t like your wage increase and the eight-hour-day. 
The country is reactionary – against labor, middle-class conscious. The red-baiters have so 
                                                          
1053
 Ibid. Zieger, 155.  
1054
 Zieger, 152-156. Ickes to Johnson, and September 24, 1923. HLI Box 33: Hiram Johnson. Johnson to Ickes, 




thoroughly scared the people, with the bogie of Bolshevism, that any public man who takes any 
public attitude in favor of organized labor, or any other kind of labor as far as that is concerned, 
does so at his tremendous peril politically. A dozen or fifteen years ago your actions would have 
made you a heroic figure in American politics. Idealism, altruism, or whatever you want to call it, 
was on an ascendant wave. Now, the tide is washing out. 1055 
 
 
“I thought we had reached the nadir last year,” White sighed, but “there is no sane, strong 
progressive undercurrent out here.” Instead, there “is rural rage, and a sort of fascists’ hatred and 
suspicion and a paralyzing poison of super-national patriotism which responds to the touch of the 
scoundrel in the Ku Klux Klan, and makes it rather difficult to get ideas of constructive 
progressive change into the hearts of the folks.”1056 
 
White, as we shall see, had recently been forced to come to terms with the costs of being 
publicly pro-labor. As for Governor Pinchot, he made a yeoman’s effort during his gubernatorial 
term to level the playing field for the coal miners’ union, including halving his state’s Coal and 
Iron Police Force and initiating formal inquiries into continued suppression of civil liberties in 
the Pennsylvania coal fields. But he and mine laborers were facing a losing battle. Even as John 
L. Lewis and the UMW, working with Herbert Hoover behind the scenes, agreed to the three-
year “Jacksonville agreement” establishing a détente in the coal wars in 1924, the open shop 





And when Governor Pinchot was replaced by a Mellon conservative, John S. Fisher, in 
1927, the keystone state soon returned to the old ways of doing business with a vengeance. That 
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year, the Pittsburgh Coal Company, the Bethlehem Mines Corporation, and other powerful 
Pennsylvania mining businesses broke the Jacksonville agreement, substantially reduced wages, 
broke off contact with the UMW, and brought in as many as 175,000 strikebreakers from afar, all 
protected by a newly revived and expanded Coal and Iron Police. Initiating another strike in 
retaliation, John L. Lewis complained in Pennsylvania of “a reign of terror and intimidation 
inaugurated that excelled for brutality and lawlessness any union-busting endeavor this nation 
has witnessed in recent years.”1058   
 
Progressives on the scene agreed. “All day long,” remarked Burton Wheeler after a visit 
to the fields, “I have listened to heartrending stories of women evicted from their homes by the 
coal companies. I heard pitiful pleas of little children crying for bread. I stood aghast as I heard 
most amazing stories from men brutally beaten by private policemen. It has been a shocking and 
nerve-racking experience.” Congressman Fiorello La Guardia told reporters he had “never seen 
such thought-out, deliberate cruelty in my life…Imagine, gentlemen, a private army with its 
private jails, where the miners are unlawfully detained and viciously assaulted!...I have been 
preaching Americanism as I understand it, where justice and freedom and law and order prevail, 
but these miners and their families don’t even get a shadow of it.”1059 
 
The savagery in Pennsylvania was brought home to readers of The Nation by the 
February 1929 murder of John Barkoski, a pro-union miner beaten to death by the Coal and Iron 
Police. When Barkoski died, The Nation reported, “his hands were swollen to twice their size 
from warding off blows, his nose was fractured, his entire rib structure was broken, and his lungs 
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were punctured in many places.” That much-reported murder, along with calls for a Senate 
investigation by Hiram Johnson, continued pressure by the ACLU, and especially the return of 
Governor Pinchot in 1931, would begin to ease the labor wars in Pennsylvania. Nonetheless, the 
UMW had been thrust back on its heels over the course of the decade. By 1925, the amount of 
soft coal mined by union workers had dropped from 72 percent in 1919 to 40 percent. The union 




In the mines of the West, the IWW saw scarcely less violence or more success in the 
latter half of the decade. A Colorado strike action in 1927 had already garnered national press in 
part because of nineteen-year-old Amelia Milka Sablich, a.k.a. “Flaming Milka,” a young 
woman in a red flannel dress who urged the strikers on (“They can’t dig coal with bayonets!”) 
and been forcibly arrested for her stand. When, in November of that year, six picketing IWW 
strikers were shot dead and twenty more injured by Colorado state police, what became known 




The Colorado action would be one of the last gasps of a dying organization. Already 
grievously wounded by the repression of the Red Scare and its aftermath, including the 1921 
flight of founder Big Bill Haywood to Russia, the Industrial Workers of the World saw much of 
its membership and many of its leading lights, like William Z. Foster, leave for the newly formed 
Communist Party. In early 1923, the IWW called for a general strike in Los Angeles, and soon 
3000 longshoremen had walked off the job and closed down the port. Law enforcement – led by 
LA police chief Louis Oaks and his “Wobbly Squad” – responded with mass arrests, first of 
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At this point, ACLU member Upton Sinclair and three others got themselves arrested by 
trying to read a crowd of policemen and prisoners the First Amendment and the Declaration of 
Independence. (The fourth ACLU man, Hugh Hardyman, only got out “This is a most delightful 
climate!” before being carried off with the others.) The ACLU immediately filed suit for 
unlawful arrest, and eventually managed to strike a deal that got Sinclair, his three accessories, 
and all but 28 of 600 IWW members released without charges. The ensuing media brouhaha also 
resulted in Chief Oaks being fired and the official establishment of a southern California branch 
of the ACLU. As for the IWW, a 1924 schism further divided the organization, and by 1928, it 
was functionally non-existent. At the official convention that year, seven unions sent along a 




The textile industry also witnessed its share of labor flare-ups in the 1920s.  1924 saw 
6000 members of the Associated Silk Workers walk out in Paterson, New Jersey, a textiles town 
that had seen more than its fair share of strikes and repression over the previous two decades. 
Soon thereafter, fifty police, nightsticks at the ready, smashed up a meeting of 600 strikers and 
made eleven arrests, including ACLU head Roger Baldwin. In the ensuing legal fight, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court reversed the convictions of Baldwin and the others and disputed the 
relevance of the 1796 unlawful assembly law which police had relied upon.
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Over a year later, in January of 1926, 16,000 textiles workers in nearby Passaic, New 
Jersey responded to a ten percent wage cut by striking for, among other things, higher wages, a 
forty-four hour week, and recognition of their union. Led by Albert Weisbord, a recent Harvard 
Law graduate, the Passaic strike was the first major labor action organized by the Communist 
Party, paving the way for later efforts in New Bedford, Massachusetts in 1928 and Gastonia, 
North Carolina in 1929. And here too law enforcement, under the leadership of Chief Richard 
Zober, reacted with a heavy hand, including mass arrests, beatings, fire hoses, and tear gas. 
“Nearly all of the energy and resources of those who are aroused by the plight of the Passaic 
workers,” commented The New Republic, “is absorbed in the struggle for civil liberties. And the 
greater part of the energies of the public officials who have concerned themselves with the strike 
is diverted away from any attempt to find a solution by the attempt to suppress the 
challenge.”1065  
 
After three months of this well-publicized violence – during which Senator Borah began 
calling for a Senate investigation – authorities began reading strikers the Riot Act, an 1864 law 
prohibiting public assemblies. Among those arrested under the Act were Weisbord and ACLU 
member Norman Thomas, giving the organization the in it needed to pose a legal challenge to 
the police abuses. The ACLU eventually secured an injunction against the police to keep them 
from breaking up union meetings, but while the free speech battle was won, the overall war was 
lost. The Passaic strike, which eventually moved out of the hands of the Communists and into the 
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After the coal strike, the largest labor action of the decade occurred in the summer and 
fall of 1922, when 400,000 railroad workers walked off the job to protest a seven cent (12.5%) 
wage cut decreed by the Railway Labor Board, the organization created as part of the 1920 Esch-
Cummins Act to regulate labor disputes in the railroad industry. (This 12.5% cut followed a 
similar 12.5% cut, which railroad unions had agreed to, the previous year.) Railroad operators 
quickly began staffing trains with strikebreakers and preparing to break the railway shop unions 
for good. President Harding – believing that “[i]t is a very great menace to have two great nation-
wide strikes on hand at one time” -- urged a settlement highly favorable to industry in July 1922. 
But management – sensing victory – turned it down by a vote of 265-2. Railroad workers, 
meanwhile, took revenge by leaving trains in the lurch. Along with coal and steel languishing in 
the stockyards and thousands of pounds of fruit left to perish in the summer heat, 2500 
passengers were left stranded in the Arizona desert, 500 more found themselves stuck in Ogden, 




Coupled with the Herrin Massacre the same summer, stories of senior citizens collapsing 
from the heat and babies being born on abandoned trains left the labor movement in a public 
relations bind. But, in September 1922, the administration responded with an overreach of its 
own when Attorney General Harry Daugherty had a sympathetic District Court judge, James H. 
Wilkerson, declare a sweeping injunction against the railroad shopmen. The injunction accused 
shopmen of 17,000 crimes and banned them from picketing, loitering or congregating near 
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railroad property, or even communicating “in letters, circulars, telegrams, telephones, or word of 
mouth, or through interviews in the paper” about the strike.1068 
 
The railroad strike, Daugherty explained in his memoirs, was the “supreme test” of the 
Harding administration. “[T]his country, in my judgment,” he wrote, “has never passed through a 
graver crisis. The principles involved were fundamental to our existence as a free people.” To the 
Attorney General, both the railroad and the coal strikes were clearly concocted by “the Red 
agents of the Soviet Government.” “Here indeed was a conspiracy worthy of Lenin and 
Zinoviev,” he intoned. “The Red borers controlled the Shop Craft Unions.” If they succeeded, 
“our time-tables and freight rates would be made out in Moscow. And the first step would be 
taken in a revolution to overthrow our government and substitute a Soviet regime. No more 
subtle and dangerous move was ever made by a group of American citizens since the foundation 
of the Republic.”1069 
 
Among those not cognizant of this Red Menace, apparently, were Herbert Hoover, 
Charles Evans Hughes, and Albert Fall, all of whom openly assailed the injunction in a Cabinet 
meeting, with Hoover in particular “outraged by its obvious transgression of the most 
rudimentary rights of man.” Samuel Gompers, who declared the injunction was in violation of 
“every constitutional guarantee of free speech, free press, and free assemblage,” contemplated 
initiating a general strike in protest of the injunction, but instead encouraged a sympathetic 
congressman to launch an impeachment of Daugherty in the House. (It failed, 204-77.) As 
counsel for the railway unions, Donald Richberg argued before Judge Wilkerson that decisions 
by the Railway Labor Board had no binding power over unions, and that, regardless, Daugherty 
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Both progressive and conservative constitutionalists in the Senate, as represented by 
William Borah and George Wharton Pepper respectively, decried the injunction as an executive 
overreach. Newspapers and magazines fearful of the new precedent, such as Editor and 
Publisher, thought “the constitutional guarantees of a free press and free citizenship…were taken 
away last Saturday when the First Amendment to the Constitution was abridged by federal 
injunction.”  Other progressives were also incensed. “On the face of it the order is in flat restraint 
of freedom of speech,” summed up The New Republic.1071 
 
In the face of this criticism, Attorney General Daugherty doubled down. “It must be 
remembered,” he declared in a fiery October 1922 speech in Canton, Ohio, “that freedom of 
speech guaranteed under the Constitution is NOT that freedom of speech which incites mob 
violence, destruction of life and property, and attacks on Government. That is NOT what our 
forefathers intended.” Minority rights were fine, he contended, but “the minority has no right to 
promote civil war, impoverish a nation, deprive a people of those things to which they are 
entitled under the law, or to ignore and seek to withhold from the majority rights as equal as 
those enjoyed by the majority.” As such, the injunction “protects the rights not only of 
government, but of all the people.”1072 
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Ten years later, in 1932, Senator George Norris and House member Fiorello LaGuardia 
would pass a legislative response to Daugherty’s argument with the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 
barring injunctions and banning yellow-dog contracts, or contracts that mandated employees 
never join a union. For now, illegal or no, the injunction passed just as the railroad strike was 
beginning to break up regardless – Donald Richberg thought it more “an injunction to prevent 
the settlement of a strike.” By November, most of the shopmen had returned to work. Richberg 
and Hoover, meanwhile, began working with labor and executives respectively on a successor to 
the Railway Labor Board, which culminated in the passage of the Railway Labor Act in 1926.  It 
replaced the Board with a nonbinding Board of Mediation that guaranteed collective bargaining 




One progressive who became personally entangled with the repression of civil liberties 
during the railroad strike was Emporia Gazette editor William Allen White. In July of 1922, 
White’s friend – Governor Henry Allen of Kansas – banned strikers from picketing in his state. 
Believing this an “infamous infraction of the right of free press and free speech,” White printed a 
series of pro-strike posters and put them up in his shop window, reading: “We are for the striking 
railroad men fifty per cent. We are for a living wage and fair working conditions.” (White didn’t 
go 100% for the strikers, he explained, “because I honestly believe that the strikers have a good 
cause but an unfortunate strike.”) For this transgression, White was arrested, immediately 
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In response, White penned an editorial, called “To an Anxious Friend,” which later won 
the Pulitzer Prize. “You tell me that law is above freedom of utterance,” it argued: 
 
And I reply that you can have no wise laws nor free entertainment of wise laws unless there is 
free expression of the wisdom of the people - and, alas, their folly with it. But if there is freedom, 
folly will die of its own poison, and the wisdom will survive. That is the history of the race. It is 
proof of man's kinship with God. You say that freedom of utterance is not for time of stress, and I 
reply with the sad truth that only in time of stress is freedom of utterance in danger. No one 
questions it in calm days, because it is not needed. And the reverse is true also; only when free 
utterance is suppressed is it needed, and when it is needed, it is most vital to justice… 
 
This state today is in more danger from suppression than from violence, because, in the end, 
suppression leads to violence. Violence, indeed, is the child of suppression…So, dear friend, put 
fear out of your heart. This nation will survive, this state will prosper, the orderly business of life 
will go forward if only men can speak in whatever way given them to utter what their hearts hold 
- by voice, by posted card, by letter, or by press. Reason has never failed men. Only force and 




 White was eager to get his case taken to the Supreme Court as a test case, and urged the 
Attorney General of Kansas to give him “a trial, an immediate trial…Don’t dismiss this case. 
Don’t fail to appear. Don’t give the effect of laying down. Go to it. Try it with all your heart and 
let’s see where the right and wrong is in this matter. If I am convicted, I’ll appeal to the Supreme 
Court and there will have fairly able counsel.” But, ultimately, White never got his test case – the 




Earlier in 1922, William Allen White had told a friend that he saw “no reason why any 
boy over eighteen should be denied hearing the doctrine of Taft, of Debs, of Harding, of Wilson, 
of the Nation, of the reactionary New York Times, of the Appeal to Reason, or of the organ of 
the National Chamber of Commerce. In fact, I think the more he gets from all sides the better 
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boy he will be. I should say that it is an open fight and a clear field and the fellow that convinces 
the boys and girls is entitled to them.” 1077  
 
These sorts of free-market arguments for civil liberties would make much more headway 
over the course of the Twenties than would the actual right to organize, which suffered 
grievously during the decade. The United Mine Workers and Wobblies were not the only unions 
to bleed members – In total, union membership would decrease by 20 percent over the course of 
the decade, from one in every five workers to one in every eight. This was due to several 
reasons, among them being that the ACLU and progressives were not the only ones framing the 
labor issue in terms of personal liberty.1078   
 
The idea of the “open shop” had been percolating for decades, for as long as employers 
had fought to prevent the unionization of their workplaces. But after the strike wave of 1919 and 
early 1920, the open shop movement began to coalesce among employers across the country 
with renewed fervor. “American business men are preparing to take a definite and united stand 
on the labor question,” reported the Chamber of Commerce that summer, announcing an alliance 
with the National Association of Manufacturers to establish “the right of an employer to deal 
with his own men without the interference of outside agents.” (The Chamber’s affiliates 




“[O]nly through the principles of the open shop as distinguished from the dominance and 
arbitrary control of the union labor leaders,” argued Judge Elbert Gary of US Steel, one of the 
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movement’s more prominent spokespersons, could the full promise of American industry would 
be realized  In January of 1921, a convention of open-shop advocates in Chicago organized by 
Judge Gary redubbed the open shop “the American plan,” declaring that employers had the 
responsibility to “protect all employees in the American right to earn a livelihood.” Two months 
later, one journalist argued, the “open shop” had been endorsed by “23 national associations of 
industry, 540 employers’ organizations in 247 cities of 44 states, and 1665 local chambers of 
commerce” – as well as the new president, who thought it “the right of every free American to 
labor without any other’s leave.”1080 
 
Public relations nightmares like the Herrin massacre and the abandoned railroad 
passengers also gave ammunition to those who aspired to make the open shop a civil liberties 
cause. “Where whole communities openly sympathize with ruthless murder of inoffensive people 
in the exercise of the right to earn a livelihood,” argued General John J. Pershing on July 4th, “it 
is imperative that public opinion should demand that the strong arm of the law…take action.” A 
Chicago Tribune reporter covering the Herrin trials wrote that “the murder charge will be lost 
sight of…the cause of the open shop versus union labor will be the central issue.” “So long and 
to the extent that I can speak for the government of the United States,” Attorney General Harry 
Daugherty told the nation in 1922, upon announcing his famous injunction, “I will use the power 
of the government to prevent the labor unions of the country from destroying the open shop.”1081 
 
The open shop argument left some progressives, otherwise amenable to civil liberties 
issues, in a bind. Herbert Hoover thought the open shop an “obvious attempt to destroy union 
                                                          
1080
 Allen M. Wakstein, “The Origins of the Open-Shop Movement, 1919-1920,” The Journal of American History, 
Vol. 51, No. 3 (Dec., 1964), pp. 460-475. 
1081
 Angle, 30-32. Carroll Binder, “Herrin – Murder Trial or Holy Cause?” The Nation, October 11, 1922 (Vol. 115, 




organization,” while William Allen White called it a “conspiracy to put American laboring men 
into serfdom.” White also thought that Abraham Lincoln would be against the open-shop 
movement, because “the unions have done more for labor than any other one force in the last 
hundred years, excepting perhaps, universal education” and that “the Christian view of Lincoln 
would try to encourage the unions to give them more and more power and make their 
membership more and more intelligent.”1082    
 
But to acknowledge where the open shop idea broke down – on the issue of yellow-dog 
contracts – would be to concede that the reality of industrial power could and did overwhelm the 
rhetoric of the public interest. “I have always found,” William Borah wrote one constituent, “that 
there were invariably two sides to a controversy between labor and capital, and in dealing with it 
I have endeavored not to be an advocate or attorney for either side. I may have failed but I did 
the best I could.” Similarly, William Allen White argued to Secretary of Labor John Davis that 
“somewhere between forty and sixty per cent of the trouble with the workmen is in the boss.” 
The average of fifty percent was not accidental. To stand successfully against the open shop 
movement, progressives would have had to abandon their notion of the public interest and fight 




The open shop was not the only contested battleground over the meaning of certain rights 
in the 1920’s, and Harry Daugherty wasn’t the only man in America to still fear a Bolshevik 
uprising. Just as progressives re-girded for battle on behalf of civil liberties and social progress in 
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the Harding era, the Bureau of Investigation and its private sector allies, the 100% American 





While A. Mitchell Palmer began the Harding years as a target of congressional inquiry, 
the Red-hunting bureaucracy he and J. Edgar Hoover had constructed still existed within the 
Justice Department. When Harding came into office, it became the new toy of William J. “Billy” 
Burns, a private detective and friend of Daugherty’s named the new head of the Bureau of 
Investigation.  As noted earlier, Burns and his pathologically untruthful lieutenant, Gaston 
Means, were both caught up in the activities of the Ohio Gang – Burns was the first man on the 
scene at the strange suicide of Jess Smith. He was also, not unlike his predecessor, a man who 
saw Reds around every corner. “[R]adicalism is becoming stronger every day in this country,” 
Burns warned the Allied Patriotic Societies in New York in February of 1923, in part because of 
“parlor Bolsheviks” like “this American Civil Liberties Union of New York…Whenever we seek 
to suppress these radicals, a civil liberties union promptly gets busy.”1085 
 
The “tragic fate of Mr. Burns,” as The New York World argued, is that he was sounding 
the tocsin of impending revolution at a time when most of the nation was plumb sick of hearing 
about the Red Menace. “He is the only man in the United States who can still see that famous 
Red Revolution coming,” the World remarked. “He has shown that liberals are capturing some of 
the colleges, that radicals are occasionally allowed to speak on street corners, that the Civil 
Liberties Union has defended free speech for communists as well as for other people. But he has 
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failed miserably to arouse the citizens to a sense of their own danger…It is the tragic fate of Mr. 
Burns that nobody is aware of it but himself.”1086 
 
Actually, that wasn’t quite true. Burns still had many fellow travelers of his own, 
especially among patriotic organizations like the American Legion, the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, and the National Civic Federation, still headed by polemicist Ralph 
Easley. It was with the fundraising aid and material support of this last organization that Burns 
initiated an August 1922 raid of a Communist Party convention in Bridgman, Michigan, which 




But the Bridgman raid posed several problems for Burns. For one, while the assembled 
Communists were ostensibly guilty of flouting Michigan’s state law against criminal 
syndicalism, the Bureau – for much the same reasons the Dyer anti-lynching law was considered 
unconstitutional by some – actually had no federal jurisdiction to intervene in the case. Attorney 
General Palmer had rarely had official legal recourse to act either, but, without Red Scare 
hysteria in the background anymore, this type of extralegal activity seemed even more blatant. 
“No overt criminal act of any sort is charged,” averred the ACLU. “No evidence is offered 
except the doctrines advocated by the Communists…While we thoroughly disagree with the 
Communist attitude toward free speech, with their melodramatic secret tactics and with their talk 
about revolutionary violence, we shall defend their right to meet and to speak as they 
choose.”1088  
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For another, while Burns and the Bureau had hoped to find some evidence from the 
Bridgman raid that tied the Communists to the still unsolved Wall Street bombing of two years 
prior, the only bombshells dropped in the subsequent legal proceedings exploded in the Bureau’s 
face. In the February 1923 depositions preceding William Z. Foster’s trial, one Albert Bailin 
confessed to being a longtime agent provocateur for Burns and his private detective agency. 
According to Bailin, he had created a false paper trail to tie the Communists to the Wall Street 
Bombing, and even written and sent bomb threats of his own, at the behest of Burns and his 
lieutenants, who were eager to “create newspaper publicity, so the bankers would raise a larger 
fund than they have already raised to investigate the Wall Street explosion.” Bailin could prove 
his reports to the Bureau were falsified, and both his stories and his charges lined up with rumors 
about another Burns witness, William Linde, who had been arrested to much fanfare in 





Foster’s defense never put Bailin on the stand, since both his radical background and his 
admitted confession of lying frequently made him a potentially dangerous and unreliable witness 
for cross-examination. In any case, the damage to Burns’ reputation was done. And, proving yet 
again how times had changed since the height of the Red Scare, the Foster jury ultimately 
deadlocked.  “The six on my side did not believe that the Communist Party advocated violence,” 
the jury’s lone female member told the Times, “The other six believed it did. That was all there 
was to it.” To her, “the stage setting of the prosecution seemed overplayed with such a display of 
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detectives and undercover men that it appeared more like trying to railroad Foster than like 
prosecuting him.”1090 
 
A more successful case for the Bureau of Investigation in the early 1920’s was the 
conviction of Pan-African nationalist Marcus Garvey for mail fraud. The seeds of Garvey’s 
downfall had been sown in October 1919, when J. Edgar Hoover had initiated an investigation 
into the charismatic leader. “Garvey is a West-Indian Negro and in addition to his activities in 
endeavoring to establish the Black Star Line Steamship Corporation he has also been particularly 
active among the radical elements in New York City in agitating the Negro movement,” Hoover 
wrote in a Bureau memorandum. “Unfortunately, however, he has not as yet violated any federal 
law whereby he could be proceeded against on the grounds of being an undesirable alien, from 
the point of view of deportation. It occurs to me, however…that there might be some proceeding 
against him for fraud in connection with his Black Star Line propaganda.” To start building a 
case, Hoover asked “Agent P-138” and “Agent 800” to begin burrowing into Garvey’s 





Garvey had no allies with the NAACP, who thought him a dangerous and ignorant 
rabble-rouser. In The Crisis, Du Bois had gone from deeming Garvey “an extraordinary leader of 
men” in 1920 to “a little fat black man, ugly, but with intelligent eyes and a big head” in 
February 1923. (For his part, Garvey thought Du Bois “a lazy dependent mulatto” and the 
NAACP “a group that hates the Negro blood in their veins.”) In fact, NAACP officials and other 
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notable African-American leaders – although Du Bois, James Weldon Johnson and A. Phillip 
Randolph chose not to sign aboard – wrote Attorney General Daugherty calling Garvey an 
“unconsidered menace to harmonious race relationships,” particularly after Garvey began 
meeting with the Ku Klux Klan. (“Between the Ku Klux Klan and the Moorfield Storey National 
Association for the Advancement of ‘Certain’ People,” Garvey had said afterwards, “give me the 
Klan for their honesty of purpose toward the Negro.”) Deeming Garvey’s UNIA as comprised of 
“the most primitive ignorant element of West Indian and American Negroes…Negro sharks and 
ignorant Negro fanatics,” they urged Daugherty to “use his full influence completely to disband 
and extirpate this vicious movement, and that he vigorously and speedily push the government's 
case against Marcus Garvey for using the mails to defraud.” In short, “Marcus Garvey is 
intolerant of free speech when it is exercised in criticism of him and his movement, his followers 
seeking to prevent such by threats and violence.”1092 
 
After several years of investigation by the Bureau, Garvey was indicted and tried for mail 
fraud in May 1923. The “great difficulty” with Garvey, as Du Bois had written in 1920, before 
the two men’s relationship had completely soured, “is that he had absolutely no business sense, 
no flair for real organization and his general objects are so shot through with bombast and 
exaggeration that it is difficult to pin them down for examination.” So it was with the finances of 
the Black Star Line, which had folded in April 1922. Before the end of the Line, Garvey had sent 
out fliers suggesting the business was in considerably better shape than it was, and featuring 
pictures of a ship – the S.S. Phyllis Wheatley – that had not in fact been purchased yet.  While 
prosecutors labored to suggest criminal intent from what had mainly been business 
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grandstanding, Garvey chose to serve as his own lawyer during the case and generally made a 
hash of it. (“If Garvey conducted his business as he did his trial,” one paper noted, “there is little 
wonder it failed.”) Found guilty in June 1923 – a verdict he forever henceforth blamed on a 
Jewish conspiracy -- Garvey was sentenced to five years in prison. After serving time in the 
Atlanta federal penitentiary, his sentence was commuted by Calvin Coolidge in 1927 and he was 




Another man soon to be exiled by Coolidge was Billy Burns, who was forced from the 
Bureau of Investigation by new Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone soon after the March 1924 
ousting of Burns’ old benefactor, Harry Daugherty. (Burns would later go to jail for jury 
tampering in the first trial of oilman Harry Sinclair for the Teapot Dome bribes.) “There is 
always the possibility that a secret police may become a menace to free government and free 
institutions,” Attorney General Stone announced in May 1923, upon his reorganization of the 
Bureau. “It is important that [the Bureau’s] activities be strictly limited to those functions for 
which it was created and its agents themselves be not above the law or beyond its reach.” As 
such, Stone declared, from now on, the Bureau “is not concerned with political or other opinions 
of individuals. It is concerned only with their conduct, and then only with such conduct as is 
forbidden by the laws of the United States.” 1094   
 
Holding the Bureau to this new standard would be its newly-appointed chief, J. Edgar 
Hoover. “I could conceive of nothing more despicable nor demoralizing then to have public 
funds of this country used for the purpose of shadowing people who are engaged in legitimate 
practices in accordance with the constitution…[and] laws of the country,” the new Bureau head 
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piously intoned. Soon thereafter, however, Hoover was back to business as usual. “We never 
knew,” Roger Baldwin declared later in life, “about the way that Hoover’s FBI kept track of us 
after the 1924 reform announcements. They never stopped watching us.”1095  
 
If J. Edgar Hoover and the Bureau were officially tasked with keeping tabs on America’s 
various malcontents, other members of the Harding and Coolidge administrations took on similar 
efforts as more of a freelance hobby. In Evanston, Illinois in the spring of 1923, Charles Dawes – 
Harding’s Budget Director and eventually Calvin Coolidge’s running mate and vice-president – 
formed his own ultrapatriotic organization, the Minute Men of the Constitution, to stand for “the 
renewal and building up of respect for law and the Constitution of the United States” and against 
“the arrogance and lawlessness of certain unworthy leaders of special groups,” meaning the labor 
movement. “We are entirely non-partisan,” explained Dawes to the press, “and we shall not 
hesitate to oppose any politician who shilly-shallies and yields to the demands of various 
aggressive minority organizations.” What minorities he had in mind was evidenced by the fourth 
plank of the Minute Men platform – endorsing “the right of a citizen to work without unlawful 
interference” – and he soon bragged to the president that, thanks to his Minute Men, “the labor 
and political demagogues are already keeping their damned mouths shut.” For his part, Harding 
told Dawes that the Duchess liked their black-and-white cockades, and professed his hope and 
understanding that the Minute Men were simply a healthy, patriotic outfit that would not cause 
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Another government official active in fighting those he presumed disloyal was Brigadier-
General Amos A. Fries, head of the War Department’s Chemical Warfare Service, which had 
been created during the World War to oversee and maintain the nation’s new gas and chemical 
weapons arsenal. Taking none too kindly to all the talk of pacifism and disarmament emanating 
from women’s groups, Fries announced in December 1922 that pacifist groups were “financed, 
inspired, and directed from Moscow…to establish communism in America.” The following year, 
Fries and the Chemical Warfare Department’s librarian, Lucia Maxwell, drew up what became 
known as the Spider-Web Chart – a chart that aimed to document the ties of fifteen women’s 
organizations and twenty-nine prominent women leaders to socialism. Announcing at its head 
that “the Socialist-Pacifist movement in America is an Absolutely Fundamental and Integral Part 
of International Socialism” – this was a quote from the Lusk Committee report – the Spider Web 
chart named as members of the grand conspiracy  Florence Kelley, Belle La Follette, Margaret 
Dreier Robins, Freda Kirchwey, and Emma Wold and such organizations as the WJCC, the 
League of Women Voters, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the American Association 
of University Women, the National Consumers League, the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Along with making it to 
Edgar Hoover’s desk, the Spider Web chart was circulated by organizations like the American 
Defense Society and eventually printed in Henry Ford’s Dearborn Independent.1097 
 
In naming everyone from the Temperance Union to the YWCA, Fries had cast a wide 
net, and soon the head of the WJCC officially complained to Secretary of War Weeks about this 
“contemptible attack on the women’s organizations of the country.” Weeks put the blame on 
Maxwell, the department librarian, and ordered all copies of the offending chart destroyed – but 
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by now it had been taken up as gospel by all of the many private patriotic organizations still in 
existence. Joining the organizations formed during the war or soon after, like the American 
Legion, National Security League, American Defense Society, and National Civic Federation, 
were many more of similar cast and ambition, including the American Citizenship Foundation 
(established 1923), the United States Flag Association (1924), the National Patriotic Council 




Of these, the most prominent remained the American Legion, who continued its assault 
on those it deemed threats to the republic throughout the decade. To Arthur Warner, who penned 
a multipart series for The Nation in 1921 entitled “The Truth about the American Legion,” the 
veterans’ organization was an unofficial fourth branch of government, a “super-government” 
hell-bent on “hysterical super-patriotism” that aimed “to perpetuate the war psychology as its 
contribution to peace.” While “present tendencies in the American Legion appear to be away 
from the violence and intimidation” of 1919, Warner warned, the 600,000 member organization 
“is still imbued with the spirit of repression and coercion, of prejudice and unreason, which the 
war nourished; but it has to heed the cry of ‘Back to normal!’ which the rest of the community is 
raising, and is beginning to clothe the nakedness of its purposes in peace-time garments.”1099 
 
Normalcy did pose some problems for the Legion, not the least the demise of its old 
sparring partner, the IWW. Nonetheless, the organization set out in peace time on several 
Americanizing projects to keep the flame alive. “The people of our land little realize the 
enormous constructive Americanism program undertaken by the Legion,” national director 
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Garland Powell boasted to William Borah in 1923. These included night schools “for the benefit 
of our illiterates and the foreign born who desire to become American citizens,” playgrounds and 
recreation centers to foster physical education, and endowing chairs and scholarships in 
Americanism and the study of the constitution. Borah was unimpressed. “[W]ith the utmost 
respect of your organization,” the Senator replied, “I think the attitude you have taken with 
reference to the political prisoners is distinctly in violation of the most fundamental principles of 
Americanism…the right of free speech, of a free press, and of peaceable assemblage, in peace or 
in war, is indispensable to any conception of Americanism as I understand it.”1100 
 
This was not the first time the Legion had been called out by Senator Borah. When the 
American Legion asked him to compose an editorial on “Constitutional Morality” in June 1921, 
Borah’s piece argued that “the most vital problem in American politics at the present time is the 
preservation of the great guarantees of civil liberty, found in our constitution and so long 
supposed to be secure and indispensable.” Borah’s editorial also attacked the behavior of “the 
political pharisees – the man who is always professing great devotion to the Constitution and 
always betraying it, or disregarding it,” and who is “constantly expressing the fear that the 
people may have their minds poisoned by false doctrines; hence the necessity of censoring the 
press and circumscribing public meetings and arbitrarily punishing men for expressing 
‘dangerous’ views.” Similarly, William Allen White responded to a Legion member looking for 
similar validation that he did “not feel that we need much of a ‘line of defense against the 
advance of radicalism.’ The radical is a poor fish who doesn’t get anywhere. The real danger is 
your conservative, your reactionary, and he is getting somewhere. He is liable to have this 
country by the throat” In short, White argued, “I wish the Legion would get a little more excited 
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about the dangers of respectable conservatism and insidious reaction and run out a first line of 
defense against some of those ginks.”1101 
 
The Legion begged to differ.  “The American Legion can never watch unconcerned the 
abuse of freedom of speech,” the organization argued in their anti-pacifist pamphlet, 
Preparedness versus Pacifism. “[T]he right of the entire nation to free speech may be 
endangered by the flagrant abuse of the right by a few,” such as those who did not “realize the 
priceless value of the Constitution…and the danger of carelessly departing from its spirit and 
purpose.” Among these ne’er-do-wells, Garland Powell argued in 1924, was the ACLU – “These 
people are advocating ‘free speech,’ speech of the kind that would allow the advocacy of the 
overthrow of a government by forces of arms…Free speech up to a certain point is an excellent 
thing, but free speech that would destroy our nation and the servicemen who defended it cannot 
be tolerated.” To the Legion, pacifists and civil libertarians were “free-speech fakers,” and they 
should and must be silenced for the good of the nation. (As such every Legion convention from 




Still, just as Billy Burns’ raid on the Bridgman Communists were viewed quite 
differently than had been the Palmer Raids during the Red Scare, the breast-beating of the super-
patriots did not have the same impact on the public mind as the decade progressed. “Americans 
have become apathetic to the monotonous appeal of the patriotic exhorter,” a Legion committee 
bemoaned in 1925. “The utmost ingenuity is frequently necessary to obtain publicity.” To 
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change this, the Legion began working to root out un-Americanism in the schools. Along with 
sister organizations like the Better American Federation and the National Civic Federation, who 
wanted to excise those “seeking to de-Americanize our institutions and sap the foundations of the 
Constitution,” the Legion worked to get The Nation and The New Republic removed from 
schools and public libraries, along with books by such radicals as Upton Sinclair, Jane Addams, 
and Henry George. They also worked to create their own pro-American school textbook, the 
two-volume The Story of Our American People, by Charles F. Horne, that aimed to “inspire the 
children with patriotism, preach on every page a vivid love of America and preserve the old 
patriotic legends.” (In the section on the Alien and Sedition Acts of John Adams’ time, it was 
explained that “[t]he moment that anyone threatens to do injury so as to compel others to adopt 
his views…he becomes a criminal.”) Few school systems adopted Horne’s textbooks, which 
were widely panned by journals and educators alike. To one reviewer, they were “so maudlin 
and sentimental about ‘our’ virtues and ‘our’ superiority to the rest of the world that if 
universally used ‘our’ next generation would behave like an insufferable cad toward the rest of 
the world.”1103 
 
By the end of the 1920’s, the progressives and the patriotic organizations were still 
locked in mutual enmity. On one hand, many notable progressives – among them Herbert Croly, 
Felix Frankfurter, Fiorello La Guardia, Raymond and Margaret Dreier Robins, Harry Emerson 
Fosdick, William Allen White, Arthur Schlesinger, Paul Kellogg, Amos Pinchot, and W.E.B. 
DuBois – publicly endorsed the publication of writer Norman Hapgood’s 1927 muckraking 
expose, Professional Patriots (“An Exposure of the Personalities, Methods, and Objectives 
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Involved in the Organized Effort to Exploit Patriotic Impulses in These United States During and 
After the Late War.”) Delineating the many intemperate actions and statements made by, and 
industrial backers of, the patriotic organizations, Hapgood’s tome concluded that “insofar as their 
activities represent privileged interests masquerading as patriots, and insofar as they inspire 
suppression of those with whom they disagree, their activities should be condemned as hostile to 
the country’s interests.” On the other, the Daughters of the American Revolution had by 1927 
criculated a blacklist, entitled The Common Enemy, to its affiliates, consisting of over 200 left-
minded individuals and sixty organizations that were not to be allowed to speak at DAR events. 
Arguing that “Communism, Bolshevism, Socialism, Liberalism and Ultra-Pacifism tend to the 
same ends,” the blacklist included Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt, Clarence Darrow, Felix 
Frankfurter, Florence Kelley, William Allen White, David Starr Jordan and organizations 




“You will find pretty generally over the United States that editors and public men will not 
endorse this foolish and malicious attack upon people like Jane Addams, Mrs. Catt, Florence 
Kelley, and others,” William Allen White wrote the President-General of DAR about The 
Common Enemy.  “There is no reason why men of my type, liberals who hate communism with a 
deep loathing, should not work with the D.A.R. But at one stroke of the pen, when you endorse 
the circular which puts under the ban the officers of every women’s civic organization of the 
country, most of the inter-church organizations and the message boards, the D.A.R. has isolated 
itself in the work of making a better, fairer, lovelier America and must not complain if its 
isolation draws upon it the fire which is directed to those superpatriots who see no good save in 
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their own endeavors and tolerate no associations except those of their own cast and class and 
kind.” For her part, Carrie Chapman Catt responded to The Common Enemy in an open letter 
published in the League of Women Voter’s journal, The Woman Citizen. “Surprising as it may 
seem to you,” Catt argued, “in libraries and laboratories among psychologists and experts on 
inheritance, the D.A.R. is now considered an interesting “case.”: 
 
These men of science say that the qualities which led the Fathers to live and die for certain ideas, 
new in their time, have become atrophied in the Daughters. They say that while the Fathers 
tolerantly recognized the right of others to their own opinions as a part of God's law of progress, 
never pausing, you their Daughters, declare that whatever is, must forever be, and assume a 
petrified standpatness on that pronouncement. The great liberties the Fathers established were 
free thought, freedom of religious worship, free speech, free press, and free assemblage… [But 
scientists] say you have slipped out of the camp of your Fathers and into that of "in spite of 





The Daughters would have been doing the nation a great service in exposing a Bolshevik 
conspiracy, Catt argued, if they had any evidence of such. As it was, the DAR “has not unearthed 
a single Bolshevik nor discovered any evidence of a plot that the newspapers had not previously 
given the public. Instead it has made slanderous, mendacious and brutal attacks on thousands of 
women who never saw a Bolshevik in their lives.” Catt took particular reproach at the treatment 
of Jane Addams, “one of the greatest women this republic of ours has produced.” Citing 
endorsements of Addams’ decades of good works, Catt declared she’d “take the evidence of 
Newton D. Baker, Democrat, and President Coolidge, Republican, as to her integrity, rather than 
the wild ravings of such a pamphlet as you have circulated.” In short, Catt concluded, “there is 
no excuse whatsoever for calling those who differ with you Bolsheviks, Reds and conspirators 
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aiming to tear down the nation…you impugn the motives, assail the honor, question the 
intelligence, [and] malign the representatives of honorable organizations.”1106 
 
While Catt responded to the DAR blacklist with a righteous wrath, many progressives 
returned fire through sardonic contempt. “Dear Fellow-Conspirator,” began the invitation to The 
Nation’s blacklist party of May 1928, “We notice that your name appears on the Roll of Honor 
drawn up by the Daughters of the American Revolution and their allies, the Key Men of 
America. Some call this Honor Roll a blacklist. It includes United States Senators, Communists, 
Ministers, Socialists, Republicans, Editors, Housewives, Lawyers – most of us, in fact.” In reply, 
William Allen White argued his inclusion on the blacklist was a “great fortune…If a good name 
is rather to be chosen than great riches, a place on the D.A.R. blacklist is better than a license to 
steal in a mint, or to have a hand in the Continental Trading Company’s jackpot.” In fact, former 
World columnist Heywood Broun was irritated he had been left off the blacklist, and told The 
Nation he would be suing the DAR for libel for leaving him off. At the May 10
th
 party in New 
York City, over a thousand watched as Clarence Darrow and Arthur Garfield Hays, both 
blacklisted, litigated Broun’s suit – the leading character witness was Groucho Marx.1107 
 
The Nation’s gala was not a one-off event. The following year, a “Free Speech Rally” 
was held in Boston with Harvard professor Arthur Schlesinger, whose history textbooks had 
been deemed un-American, acting as “Chief Roastmaster and Master of Revelries.” Among 
those seated at the head table before a crowd of 700 was Margaret Sanger, wearing a gag as she 
had been forbidden to speak in the city.
1108
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These sorts of highly sardonic celebrations helped to maintain the esprit de corps of 
embattled progressives and civil libertarians, but they also suggested how they perceived 
themselves by the end of the decade. To wit, progressives no longer saw themselves as the 
vanguard of the great mass of American people, but as members of an often-persecuted minority. 
“America is no longer a free country in the old sense,” Katherine Fullerton Gerould wrote in 
1922, “and liberty is increasingly a mere rhetorical figure...everywhere, on every hand, free 
speech is choked off in one direction or another.” Instead of appealing to the good nature of the 
public, Fullerton argued, “the only way an American citizen who is really interested in all the 
social problems of his country can preserve any freedom of expression is to choose the mob that 
is most sympathetic to him, and abide under the shadow of that mob.”1109  
 
“I do know I owe far more to the American Civil Liberties Union than the Union owes to 
me,” Arthur Garfield Hays wrote in his memoir, in part because “[w]ork for the Union has 
required me to keep abreast of various radical movements and to learn something of their history 
and philosophy. It has brought me into contact with a variety of circles, usually the poor, 
defenseless, and unpopular, always the dissenters and persecuted. It has shielded me from the 
corroding influence of the particular groups who would normally be my associates.” By the end 
of the decade, many on the left felt closer to the poor, defenseless, and unpopular than they did 
the public at large. “The tone of intellectual pronouncements,” as historian Leon Fink put it of 
the progressives, “gradually shifted from a confident (if somewhat presumptuous) association 
with the democratic public to feelings of concern, revulsion, and even open resistance to the will 
of the nonintellectual multitude.”1110  
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To be sure, progressives would not completely drop the public interest case for civil 
liberties. As Congressman La Guardia declared in a 1928 speech on the subject, “if the future of 
our Republic depends on the suppression of free speech, there is no future. The right to criticize 
public officials is not only wholesome, but necessary in a republic.” That being said, on political 
prisoners, on lynching, on Sacco and Vanzetti, on labor issues, time and again, American 
institutions and the American public had come down against the progressives in the twenties, and 
by 1929 many on the Left had come around to the world weary cynicism of Mencken.1111  
 
The Sage of Baltimore had begun the decade scoffing at the “naïve and charming belief” 
among progressives “in the intrinsic integrity and passion for justice of the great masses of plain 
men,” and the “laudable superstition that an unveiling of the facts would send them into tantrums 
of indignation.” These superstitions, Mencken argued, “spit boorishly into the very eye of the 
facts…[T]here is actually no such nobility in the public breast.” In fact, he argued, “it is one of 
the hardest things in the world…to stir up public indignation against legal injustice, for the mob 
is always in favor of the man giving the show, and the more violently he flogs his victims the 
better it likes it and him.” After a decade in the trenches, it seemed to many progressives that, 
rather than trusting to enlightened public interest, laws and institutions needed to be forged and 
maintained that would protect individuals of conscience from the wrath of the public instead.1112 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AMERICA AND THE WORLD 
PROGRESSIVES AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE 1920s 
 
“In the 1920s the United States was more profoundly engaged in international matters than in 
any peacetime era in its history.” – Warren Cohen, Empire without Tears1113 
 
“The United States of America, caught in a traditional distrust and dislike of ‘foreign 
entanglements,’ abandons the solemn covenants made in her name, restricts her immigration, 
increases her tariffs, and refuses to consider her war loans as part of an international 
responsibility.”  -- Jane Addams, 19241114 
 





The League of Nations fight strengthened the progressive nationalists in the Senate and 
helped them to articulate a comprehensive view of foreign policy that emphasized self-
determination, national integrity, and anti-imperialism. They would bring this philosophy 
to bear on all the foreign policy issues of the decade. In concert with a powerful 
women’s movement now fully dedicated to the twin causes of disarmament and 
outlawing war, Senate progressives would work to establish an international peace that 
relied almost exclusively on the power of enlightened public opinion. But the issue of 
immigration restriction would test the limits of progressive thought of the period, just as 
the growing power of the American dollar would undermine all progressives’ many 




The Sins of the Colonel 
 
 
 “It won’t be long now before our new president will take hold,” Harold Ickes wrote 
Senator Hiram Johnson in late February of 1921, two weeks before the inauguration of Warren 
Harding, and it “seems to me that you and he are so diametrically opposed in your social and 
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political views that it will be impossible for you to travel the same path very long.” Nonetheless, 
Ickes warned his friend not to be too vocal in his opposition at first, lest he be accused of ruining 
the new president’s honeymoon period out of sheer sour grapes. “It seems to me that the 
inevitable opposition to Harding within his own party will make greater headway in the long run 
by giving him plenty of rope to hang himself with. That he will do this seems to me to be 
inevitable and the day will come when the opposition to him within his own party will be so 
widespread and so bitter that it will not lie in anyone’s mouth to accuse any leader of having 
deliberately created that opposition.”1116 
 
A solid plan – but, already within a week of the inauguration, all bets were off.  After 
Warren Harding took his first Cabinet meeting, he – on the advice of Secretary of State Hughes 
and Secretary of the Interior Fall – sent a message to the Senate urging immediate ratification of 
the Thomson–Urrutia Treaty, which paid Colombia the sum of $25 million in exchange for 
recognition of Panama’s independence, with the implicit message being that the United States 
was now sorry that the Roosevelt administration had facilitated Panama’s revolt in 1903 in order 




The last time the treaty had come up, in 1914, it had included a specific apology – 
“sincere regret” – for America’s actions. This did not sit well with Theodore Roosevelt, who was 
livid that Wilson and Secretary of State Bryan had even negotiated such a thing. In a letter 
dashed off to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in his first public attack on the 
Wilson administration to that point, Roosevelt deemed the treaty “a crime against the United 
States, an attack upon the honor of the United States.” His administration, he argued had been 
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“not only open but absolutely straight…Every action we took was in accordance with the highest 
principles of public and private morality,” and paying Colombia any amount, Roosevelt roared, 
would be tantamount to “the payment of blackmail.” (Explaining his contribution to the 
Panamanian revolt more directly to a friend, Roosevelt exclaimed “I simply lifted my foot!”) 
And so Henry Cabot Lodge and Senate Republicans blocked its ratification, and, with the Great 




But now, with Colonel Roosevelt passed on – and, more importantly, with vast crude oil 
deposits having been discovered in the still-irritated nation of Colombia between 1916 and 1919 
– the situation had changed. Beginning in 1920, soon after Standard Oil of New Jersey had 
purchased the holdings of the Tropical Oil Company in Colombia, James W. Flanagan, the 
operating manager of Jersey Standard’s affiliate in the region, had begun smoothing the way for 
passage of the treaty, namely by bringing Colombia’s minister to the United States, Carlos 
Urrutia, to meet with Senator Albert Fall of New Mexico, as well as Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Warren Harding. As it happened, the government of Colombia had to approve the transfer of 
Tropical Oil over to Jersey Standard, and, well, $25 million from the American government 




Disregarding his advice of a fortnight earlier, Ickes now pressed the Senator from 
California to engage on the Colombia issue. “The Chicago Tribune has been vigorously 
opposing this Treaty,” Ickes told Johnson, “first, on the ground that it would be an affront to the 
memory of Theodore Roosevelt, and, second, that it would be an admission of guilt on the part of 
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the United States.” Johnson agreed, but remained less optimistic than Ickes about the prospects 
of a successful opposition. “Of course, there’s nothing else to do except to fight the Columbian 
Treaty,” he replied. “When you read…Roosevelt’s words concerning it, it seems incredible that 
the first act of this new administration shall be to put this thing over.” That being said, Johnson 
argued, “[t]he majority of the Foreign Relations Committee has about faced, and with the 
tremendous oil interests behind the measures and the power of the President’s office, the treaty 
will doubtless be ratified.”1120  
 
Ickes and Johnson were not the only ones irate about Harding’s first action in office. “For 
Heaven’s sake, can’t we beat the Colombia Treaty?” William Borah exclaimed to the editor of 
the Boston Transcript. “What a smearing, smirching, humiliating thing it would be to pass that.”  
This “very unfair and unjust Treaty,” Borah told another correspondent, “will put the brand of 
shame upon our country and of dishonor upon the name of Roosevelt.” Writing to Arthur H. 
Vandenberg, the editor of the Grand Rapids Herald, Borah implored the future Senator from 
Michigan to “give us some good editorials on this matter. Let us make the fight of our lives not 
only to preserve the honor of a great name, but also the honor of our own country. This Treaty is 
based upon charges of bad faith and dishonorable conduct, for which there is no evidence…It is 
utterly astounding to me that, after seventeen years of fighting this unconscionable piece of 
blackmail, we should now turn about, and not only confess to the infamous charges, but stultify 
ourselves.” For his part, Senator George Norris was fine with an apology to Colombia – he was 
one of the few Republican progressives to concede wrongdoing on Roosevelt’s part – but 
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thought, since this was basically about Colombian oil, “let the oil, rather than the Treasury of the 
United States, pay for the smiles we are trying to get.”1121 
“We must strike fast and strike hard,” Borah concluded to Vandenberg, “for the lobbying 
behind this thing is simply stupendous.” And so he did -- Arguing that “Theodore Roosevelt was 
not a common adventurer and John Hay was not a liar,” Borah tried to amend the treaty on the 
floor with a statement declaring that “neither said payment nor anything obtained in the treaty 
shall be…regarded as an admission that the secession of Panama…was in any way aided…by the 
United States.” Borah’s amendment failed 49-39, and, with the votes of many Republicans who 
had assailed the treaty seven years earlier, the Senate passed the Treaty in April, 69-19.
 
After 
passage, Hiram Johnson gave an address on the floor of the Senate designed “in a 
straightforward fashion to make plain the rotten attitude of our leaders.” Why, asked Johnson, do 
“we have $25,000,000 to squander in the first act that a Republican administration does…if it 
was a blackmail demand for seventeen years, tell me, some of you gentlemen whose views have 
undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, tell me when the blackmail demand shed its awful outer 
garment and became a rosy-hued request.” Here, Johnson was speaking to the Old Guard 
Republicans of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – Lodge, Albert Fall, Frank Brandegee, 







Johnson’s speech, he told Ickes, “got under the skin of the men who denounced the 
Treaty as blackmail, and then put it over under blind partisanship.” It also received exactly the 
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sort of press Ickes had warned the Senator about. Johnson, James W. Owens argued in The New 
Republic, has “marked his escape from the prison builded of policies and political ambitions 
which he entered rebelliously last June, when Mr. Harding was nominated for president.” Now, 
“even before the President has got his new eight-food bed and had made himself otherwise 
comfortable,” Johnson had broken with the administration and reverted to form. “In the first 
place, fist-shaking defiance based on solid conviction; in the second place, the company of the 
old insurgent-progressives; and in the precious and tremendous third place, defense of the 
memory of Roosevelt, and the corollary of appeal to the emotions of some millions of 
Rooseveltians.” Hiram Johnson, Owen concluded “went to it with the rush of a Niagara. Out in 
the open before the world as a rebel, but his Republicanism undiluted. Escape! Freedom! 
Opportunity!”1123 
 
Johnson was incensed about Owens’ article, which he deemed a “left-handed smash, 
founded in falsehood,” and took the opportunity to pick a scab from the 1920 election. “This 
holy publication can see nothing wrong in a Hoover, who begged the people of the United States 
to vote for Harding in order that we might go into the League of Nations.” Johnson still thought 
his nemesis in California “an intellectual crook” and “unfit for the Cabinet” -- not that he 
expected TNR, “in its internationalism and its blind idolatry of a Hoover,” to see it thus. “[W]e 
cannot expect anything more, I presume, of the New Republic than we can expect of the New 
York Times or the New York World, and I am really sorry for this.”1124 
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While arguing to Johnson that the TNR article “did have the grace to say that your speech 
was the best upon the subject, that it expressed your honest convictions; that you, personally, are 
fearless and that you are the only in man in sight for leadership of the great republican majority,” 
Ickes agreed that the magazine had indulged incessantly in uncritical adulation of the Great 
Engineer. “I neither respect nor trust Hoover,” he told Johnson. “I don’t think he has any 
political principles. I think he is out for Hoover and will go along with anyone who will advance 
his personal interests.” As for the Colombia treaty, Ickes thought the whole affair “a most 
disgraceful proceeding,” and troubling for what it portended. “The Senate is docile enough to do 
anything the administration wants if its action on the Colombian Treaty is any indication of its 
temper,” Ickes thought. Johnson concurred. “We have now a Senate more subservient, more 
servile, and more contemptibly sycophantic than the Senate has ever been during my residence 
here,” he fumed.1125 
 
The story of the Thomson–Urrutia Treaty’s passage is illuminating of American foreign 
policy in the Twenties, and progressives’ relationship to it, in several ways. First, the fact that 
Harding’s first initiative was a long-stalled treaty suggests the highlighted importance of foreign 
policy in the decade. “Far from isolation,” historian William Appleman Williams wrote while  
working to debunk “The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920’s,” “the foreign relations of the 
United States from 1920 through 1932 were marked by express and extended involvement with – 
and intervention in the affairs of – other nations of the world.” “In the 1920s,” writes historian 
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Warren Cohen, “the United States was more profoundly engaged in international matters than in 
any peacetime era in its history.”1126   
 
Second, the fact that this first act of Harding’s was related to encouraging foreign crude 
oil production is not an accident. In the Twenties, after the 1921-22 recession receded, the United 
States became both the world’s leading exporter and the world’s largest consumer and importer 
of raw materials (and the second biggest importer overall, after Great Britain.) Automobile 
exports rose from $303 million in 1920 to $541.4 million by 1929. The export of petroleum and 
petroleum products rose from $161 million to $561 million over the same period. Over that time, 
the export of rubber products surged by 600%. And, as these domestic automobile-related 
industries surged, the Harding and Coolidge administrations – especially Senator Johnson’s 
nemesis, Herbert Hoover – worked increasingly frantically to ensure America enjoyed unfettered 
access to key raw materials like crude oil and rubber. (In fact, a month after passage of the 





Third, the dispute over the Colombia treaty followed to form the usual concerns of 
William Borah and the Senate “peace progressives,” who, as during the League of Nations fight, 
were most concerned over the decade with preserving American nationalism, retaining the export 
value of American ideals, and fighting anti-imperialism, in that order. (In this case, while they 
used the anti-imperialist Big Oil argument, their love of nationalism and preserving American 
honor clearly trumped any serious consideration of the imperialistic urges that may have guided 
Roosevelt’s Big Stick diplomacy in the first place.) And, as in many of the foreign policy issues 
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of the decade, Senator Borah, with his attempted amendment, would manage to worm his way to 
the center of the issue. This is true particularly after Borah succeeded Henry Cabot Lodge as 




And, fourth, the Senate progressives would on occasion find themselves at loggerheads 
with other progressives, in this case James Owens of The New Republic, who embraced the new 
internationalism. “W]hether we care for it or not,” Jane Addams wrote in 1930, “our own 
experiences are more and more influenced by the experiences of widely scattered people; the 
modern world is developing an almost mystic consciousness of the continuity and 
interdependence of mankind.” “The hope of the world today,” John Haynes Holmes argued 





This new internationalist spirit among progressives – evidenced in everything from the 
growth of women’s international organizations to the Interchurch World Movement of 1919, 
which embraced “the vision of a united church uniting a divided world” – had its in origins in the 
works of two writers who had not survived 1919 – Randolph Bourne and Walter Weyl. “In a 
world which has dreamed of internationalism,” Bourne had argued in his “Transnational 
America” essay of 1916, “we find that we have all unawares been building up the first 
international nation,” by allowing immigrants from all the world’s shores. As such, “only 
America…can lead in this cosmopolitan enterprise” for the world. So, Bourne argued, “let us 
make something of this trans-national spirit instead of outlawing it. Already we are living this 
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cosmopolitan America. What we need is everywhere a vivid consciousness of the new ideal. 
Deliberate headway must be made against the survivals of the melting-pot ideal for the promise 
of American life.” Similarly, Walter Weyl had argued in his book The End of the War, it is time 
to “leave behind our old Americanism to find abroad a new and broader Americanism: an 
Internationalism.” This spirit of internationalism, as we have previously seen, took heavy blows 
in the failure of the League of Nations and the Red Scare, but it was a dream that still persisted 





It was also a spirit, as we have also seen, that was anathema to the progressive 
nationalists in the Senate, whose foreign policy philosophy was briefly and ably summed up in 
an exchange of letters between Lawrence Abbott, editor of The Outlook, and William Borah. 
“The older I grow,” Abbott wrote to Borah, “the more I become a strong Nationalist. I do not 
believe in the weak and visionary internationalism whose advocates think that all mankind 
should live in a kind of gigantic Oneida community. It seems to me that a more reasonable 
analogy is that every nation should perfect itself as highly as possible, and then should live with 
other nations in the amity with which vigorous and highly developed families live with other 
equally highly developed families in a neighborhood.” Responding to Abbott, Borah echoed his 
argument back to him. “I am like you, the older I grow, the more I become a strong 
nationalist….This is my doctrine, Mr. Abbott:”  
I am just as much in favor of this nation doing its duty as a member of the family of nations as 
any man can be. But I want it to perform that duty as a great powerful moral force, disentangled, 
but nevertheless in thorough amity and most complete harmony with other powers. I think, Mr. 
Abbott, what we need now in international affairs is a distinct leadership upon the part of this 
great nation, not an entanglement, not alliances, but a creed of international honor, morality, 
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decency, and justice, and back of that creed a great nation like ours. I would rather have the 
mobilized moral forces of the world behind such a leadership than all the armies and navies 
which could be gathered together upon the land or sea.”1131 
 
Borah strongly disagreed with the notion that believing in nationalism as such made him 
an isolationist. “The League people like to argue,” Borah told another correspondent, “that 
because we do not propose to be tied into political commitments and entanglements we therefore 
are not concerned with the affairs of the world and not disposed to serve humanity where we can. 
The United States has always been interested in the affairs of the world and always will be.” But 
how to respond to those affairs was a question that these two groups, internationalists and 








Perhaps the most obvious crux of difference between the progressive internationalists and 
the Senate nationalists in the Twenties was on the continuing issue of the League of Nations. 
Particularly after pro-Leaguers Charles Evans Hughes and Herbert Hoover entered Harding’s 
cabinet, the former irreconcilables kept waiting for the other shoe to drop. “Instead of going into 
the League of Nations gaily by the front door,” Hiram Johnson grumbled to Harold Ickes in May 
1921, “”apparently, we are going to sneak in by the back door.” Ickes concurred. “During the 
campaign I felt that Harding’s position was such that he could jump either way once he was in 
the White House and since March 4 he certainly jumped in different directions,” he replied. “The 
Lord only knows where he will end up finally in our international relations, but my guess is that 
we will be in the League of Nations in some way at some time.” Writing in April 1921, Borah 
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had much the same thought: “Having failed to enter the front door and having received the open 
condemnation of the people,” he argued, “the plan [for the League] seems to be now to enter the 
back door.” After all, if leading Republicans would change their vote on the Colombian Treaty, 
who was to say they now wouldn’t do the same on the Treaty of Versailles?1133 
 
In fact, the Senate irreconcilables were right to worry. According to Charles Evans 
Hughes later in life, Harding thought coming into office that “we would ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles, with reservations, and enter the League with reservations,” while Hoover had 
promised Colonel Edward House after the election that “pro-League Republicans expect to make 
the fight of their lives.” In the first weeks of the new administration, Harding asked Hughes to go 
see Frank Brandegee of Connecticut on the Foreign Relations Committee, who had proved 
pliable on the Colombian treaty, and see what he thought about reopening the League question. 
Not this time – Senator Brandegee told Hughes that “ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 
any form is impossible,” and warned the president that the Senate Republicans would bolt his 
administration for good if he attempted to force it on them. Hughes then contemplated resigning 
his position, but eventually decided to stay since the Senate would not accept “participation in 
the League on any terms.”1134  
 
With the Treaty of Versailles apparently dead, Senator Philander Knox of Pennsylvania 
introduced a resolution the day after Harding’s address to Congress, calling for an official end of 
hostilities between the United States and Germany. This passed quickly, and with the House 
version became the Knox-Porter Resolution, which Harding signed on July 1
st
, 1921. But a peace 
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treaty still needed to be devised – a responsibility which fell upon Hughes. (Hughes had 
suggested resubmitting the Versailles Treaty with the League of Nations scrubbed and additional 
reservations included, but advisors in the Senate balked at this as well.) And so, he assembled a 
treaty that let America avail of all the “rights, privileges, indemnities, reparations, and 
advantages” of the Treaty of Versailles, without any of the encumbering responsibilities. “The 
United States,” read Article Two, Section Two, “shall not be bound by…any provisions of that 
Treaty…which related to the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor shall the United States be 
bound by any action taken by the League of Nations.” This was signed by both America and 
Germany on August 25
th




Even this language was not removed enough from Versailles for William Borah, who 
thought, by citing the rights and advantages favorably, the United States gave “its moral 
sanction” to a treaty that “comes as near creating a complete autocracy based upon military 
force.” The Versailles Treaty, Borah told the Senate, “is the most pronounced negation 
of…moral law which has yet been crystallized into form by the hand of man.” Anything less 
than a full repudiation of it, he warned, opened America to “every conceivable question which 
can arise in Europe.” Senator La Follette, for his part, wondered aloud why the Harding 
administration was focused on “foreign policy, in which the international bankers and imperialist 
of Wall Street have billions at stake.” Nonetheless, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took 
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only two days to peruse the Treaty of Berlin before voting it out 9-1, with only Borah dissenting. 




The treaty’s smooth sailing through the Senate was interrupted, however, by a ghost from 
the past who took its bilateral approach as a personal insult. “It is not to be wondered that this 
Treaty was so readily and rapidly negotiated and agreed upon,” former President Wilson wrote 
his closest Senate ally, Carter Glass of Virginia. “It is of the sort most familiar and most easily 
understood in Berlin, inasmuch as it is based upon the old Prussian principle of sacrificing the 
interests of every other nation, whether friend or foe, in order to gain your own object. We now 
figure as the pupils of Prussia.” Wilson urged Glass to organize the Democrats in opposition, 
after which “I will be glad to put at their disposal the utmost resources of my thought and 
judgment. Otherwise, I should not feel justified in adding such a responsibility to the present 
tasks of my brain.”1137 
 
Glass tried valiantly to rally the Democrats in opposition, and managed at least to delay 
the vote several times as Republicans worried if the balance of Wilson Democrats and ornery 
progressives could defeat the treaty. (Democrats took a particular relish in reading Henry Cabot 
Lodge’s earlier words from the League fight back to him: “We cannot make peace except in 
company with our Allies. It would brand us with everlasting dishonor and bring ruin to us also if 
we undertook a separate peace.”)1138  
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Nonetheless, on October 18
th
, 1921, the Treaty of Berlin passed easily, 66-20. Fourteen 
Democrats voted for the final treaty, including Minority Leader Oscar Underwood and former 
Minority Leader Gilbert Hitchcock, who had led the Democratic fight for the League in the 
previous Congress. (From his house on S Street, Wilson asked for the full list of fourteen, so he 
knew exactly who to despise forever after. “I have washed my hands of them entirely forever,” 
he told Breckinridge Long.) Senators Borah and La Follette joined the majority of Democrats in 
opposition, while George Norris, who was sick at the time, missed the vote but had already 
announced his opposition. Hiram Johnson, for his part, happily voted for the Treaty. “I remember 
very vividly that Mr. Hughes desired to take us into the League of Nations, and the restraining 
hand of the President prevented him. I recall that Mr. Hughes desired to send back to us the 
Versailles Treaty…and again it was the power of the President which prevented it.” Now at last, 
Johnson averred, “We have accomplished all that we fought for.”1139 
 
William Borah was not so sure. From the early days of the Harding administration, there 
had been talk of restructuring the debt of America’s former allies from the Great War, which 
stood somewhere between $10 and $11 billion. After Secretary Mellon asked the Senate for the 
power to exchange long-term bonds for demand notes from the former Allies, Robert La Follette 
had introduced a resolution early in 1921 forbidding the administration from refunding the 
British debt without a vote from Congress. Mellon’s request made it out of the Senate Finance 
Committee, and La Follette’s resolution was buried there by Boies Penrose. So La Follette issued 
a minority report arguing that “no man has ever lived who should be intrusted with such a 
gigantic responsibility…No man should ever be given such untrammeled control over the 
finances of this country and the destinies of other nations.” Instead, the Senate allowed Mellon to 
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convene a commission on the subject instead – This commission chose to favorably restructure 
England’s war debt in 1923. This decision, La Follette declared in a front-page editorial in his 
magazine, would “foster and stimulate imperialism” by allowing Britain to “extend their 
monstrous schemes of conquest” and forcing America to support the “vastly over-extended and 
shaky structure of the British empire.”1140  
 
For his part, Borah was “absolutely opposed to the cancellation of the debt, or any part of 
it, or to the forgiving of the interest,” since “[t]here would be no difficulty about these 
governments paying the debts which they justly owe if they would curtail their armaments and 
settle down and go to work.” He was not alone in this assessment. “In view of the recent 
[armaments by Britain and France],” wrote former Senator Albert Beveridge to Borah, “the pleas 
that these nations are not able to pay even the interest on our debt does not appear to me to be 
convincing.” Harold Ickes thought similarly. “Raymond Robins tells me he has written you 
advising you to fight the proposal of the administration to refund the debts of Europe and I 
believe his advice is sound,” he wrote Hiram Johnson in June 1921. “I don’t believe our people 
are in any mood to assume further financial burdens for Europe. I don’t think it is sound 
economics for us to do so. We need our own capital for the development of our own industries 
and the greatest contribution we can make to the prosperity of the world is for us, ourselves, to 
become prosperous.”1141  
 
Nonetheless, William Borah’s had an altogether different concern about debt 
restructuring, which he confided to Beveridge. “[W]ithout accusing anybody individually,” 
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Borah wrote, “the Senegambian in this woodpile is the thought and hope in some places that 
another back door has been found to the League. Imperial finance is to my mind about as 
objectionable as militarism.” The situation became even more fraught in January 1923 when the 
Treaty of Versailles brought on another European crisis. After the Weimar Republic defaulted on 
its reparations payments, French forces initiated a two-year occupation of the resource-rich Ruhr 
valley in Germany as recompense, with the intention of extracting German coal, iron, and steel 
for themselves. (While legal under the Treaty, this action prompted an international outcry and 
sent the German currency spiraling into hyperinflation.) To address the ensuing crisis, a 
committee led by Chicago banker and former Harding Budget Director Charles Dawes concocted 
a plan in 1923 that included a restructuring of Germany’s repayment schedule and a $200 million 
loan to Germany, $110 million of which was ultimately floated by the United States. This 
“Dawes Plan” – America pays Germany, Germany pays France and England, France and 
England pay the United States, with international banks taking a cut at each stage – was accepted 





The Dawes Plan ultimately garnered its namesake the Nobel Prize, but it was less well-
taken by Senate progressives. Henrik Shipstead called it a “gold brick loaded with dynamite” and 
wondered “why is it not stipulated in the contract that Europe disarm before she gets the money.” 
Robert La Follette thought the plan was the obvious product of a committee “entirely controlled 
by Morgan influences.” And George Norris, looking back on the plan from the vantage of 1931, 
argued that it was devised “mostly by international bankers to enforce as much of the Versailles 
Treaty as they thought the world, and particularly Germany could stand.” Writing in 1958, 
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historian William Leuchtenburg argued “[i]t would have made equal sense for the United States 
to have taken the money out of one drawer in the Treasury and put it into another.” Nonetheless, 
whatever enterprises American dollars may have been used to fund around the world, neither the 
restructuring of allied debts nor the Dawes Plan ended up being exactly the back door to the 




But the threat was still not quite past. In his inauguration address, Warren Harding had 
equivocated in Gamalielese on the issue of the League. (On one hand, “a world supergovernment 
is contrary to everything we cherish and can have no sanction by our Republic.” On the other, 
“we are ready to associate ourselves with the nations of the world, great and small, for 
conference.”) But he had also been firm and specific in his endorsement of a World Court. 
America, Harding said, “would gladly join in that expressed conscience of progress, which seeks 
to clarify and write the laws of international relationship, and establish a world court for the 
disposition of such justiciable questions as nations are agreed to submit thereto.”1144  
 
As noted previously, an association of nations based on law conformed more to the 
wishes of conservative internationalists like Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes, and William 
Howard Taft. And, given it was now the best thing going, progressive internationalists rallied 
behind the court plan as well. The National Women’s Trade Union League, for example, adopted 
a resolution advocating “a permanent international court representative of peoples as well as 
governments for the settlement of international disputes” in June 1921. By 1923, it had joined 
with the National Council for the Prevention of War, a broad umbrella peace organization 
encompassing twenty-eight diverse groups, ranging from the Women’s International League for 
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Peace and Freedom to the American School Citizenship League, and including members such as 
the American Association of University Women, the International Association of Machinists, the 
National Education Association, and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union. As part of its 
“Law Not War Day” platform – held in 2000 communities each year on July 28th, the day the 





Even Borah himself – strangely enough for someone who prized American independence 
above all else – was not averse to a World Court if it had the power to adjudicate disputes 
between nations and, more importantly, was not tied in any way to the League of Nations. (This, 
as we shall see later, was integral to his Outlawry of War plan.) But the World Court that came 
into being in January of 1922 had arisen directly out of Article XIV of the League Compact, 
which called for “the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice.” As such, to 
Borah, it was conceived in original sin, and was merely another iniquitous tool of the League to 
further its own devious and imperialistic ends. “I am in favor of a real international judicial 
tribunal,” he argued. “I am not in favor of an international political tribunal masquerading in the 
guise of a judicial tribunal. I am not in favor of a court which shall be under the thumb of the 
European Premiers.” To Borah, this “Court is inseparably a part of the League. It is tied to it in 
every conceivable way that we would tie a tribunal of this kind to a political institution.”1146 
 
In the summer of 1922, facing pressure from the Federal Council of Churches and other 
progressive internationalists to become more involved with both the League and the Court, the 
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administration sent State Department liaisons to sit in on the League’s meetings, and began using 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft as an unofficial go-between with the League’s leadership to 
feel out the question of America joining the World Court. By the following February, Secretary 
of State Hughes had drafted a resolution for membership that included specific reservations 
emphasizing that America’s joining the Court was no indication of its stance on the League. 
President Harding sent this draft on to the Senate on February 24, 1923, where – it being close to 
adjournment – it was tabled by the Foreign Relations Committee for the following session.1147 
Progressive internationalists and the peace movement strongly rallied behind Harding’s 
move, with the Federal Council of Churches pushing their 20,000 member congregations to 
lobby the Senate, and pacifists making the case around the country for the Court on "Law-Not-
War" Day. But anti-League forces felt blindsided by the president. “The glorification of the 
World Court is an attempt to draw a red herring across the trail of the great domestic issues,” 
declared Senator La Follette. It “is a part of the cleverly-conceived plan of the International 
Bankers to entangle the United States in the affairs of Europe.” Deeming the Court "the League  
in disguised and diluted form,” La Follette and Borah began making plans for a summer 
speaking tour against it. Harding, argued the Hearst-owned New York American, wanted to “put 
the United States in a position of obedience to a Supreme Court chosen by and controlled by the 
League of Nations. Having refused to be led into the League of Nations through the front door, 
the American people are now to be squeezed in through the kitchen door.” Exultant Democrats 
argued that Harding, in the words of Gilbert Hitchcock, was having America join the League “on 
the installment plan.” (This was too slow for Woodrow Wilson, who from his sickbed penned a 
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 Over the next few months, as domestic scandals rather than foreign policy began to move 
to the fore in Washington, Harding insisted that America would not join the League “by the side 
door, or the back door, or the cellar door.” Instead, he proposed simply and unilaterally 
separating the Court from the League, which Hughes and others thought might not go over well 
with the current members of those two organizations. On the first stop of the Voyage of 
Understanding, Harding put this plan forward, and – perhaps thinking of the ill-fated western 
tour of his predecessor – promised a St. Louis audience that “I shall not attempt to coerce the 
Senate of the United States. I shall make no demand upon the people. I shall not try to impose 
my will upon anybody or any person. I shall embark on no crusade.” Harold Ickes, for one, was 
dumbstruck by the president’s new position, which alienated pro-League forces without swaying 
any irreconcilables. “It has been unseasonably and unreasonably hot here for several days and I 
may be suffering from the heat,” Ickes wrote to Senator Johnson the day after Harding’s speech, 
“but it does seem to me that this is the damnedest fool proposition in the way of international 
relations and cooperation that has yet been advanced...[Harding] has deserted his ground and is 
now occupying an entirely new position which to me seems utterly untenable from any American 
point of view and impractical as a matter of international politics.”1149 
 
Soon thereafter, the president was dead. In his last address, published two days before his 
passing, Harding declared he “would be insensible to duty and violate all the sentiments of my 
heart and all my convictions if I failed to urge American support of the Permanent Court of 
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International Justice. ‘I do not know that such a Court will be unfailing in the avoidance of war, 
but I know it is a step in the right direction and will prove an advance toward international peace 
for which the reflective conscience of mankind is calling.”1150 
 
 With the president’s death, the idea of joining the World Court was put on the back 
burner while the nation confronted the depths of the Harding scandals. But it did not slumber 
completely. Two months before the president’s passing, wealthy philanthropist and former 
Ladies Home Journal editor Edward Bok had put forward what became known as the Bok Peace 
Prize, a $100,000 grant to “the American individual or organization presenting the best 
practicable plan by which the United States may cooperate with other nations for the 
achievement and preservation of world peace.” “This is the psychological time,” Bok argued in 
announcing his prize, “to crystallize public opinion on the question of the United States’ 
responsibility for preventing wars.” (The Crisis’s succinct answer to Bok: “Stop despising men. 
Stop hating and suspecting ‘foreigners’ and fearing yellow men and enslaving brown and black 
men…If white men believed Negroes were men ever as they are, they would not murder each 
other in order to mortgage the labor and raw material of Asia and Africa”)1151  
 
In February 1924, after over 22,000 submissions, the Bok committee chose Peace Plan 
No. 1469, a relatively straightforward solution by an academic named Charles Levermore. His 
plan: Cooperate with the League of Nations without joining, and adhere to the World Court.  
“Five-sixths of all nations, including about four-fifths of mankind, have already created a world 
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organization,” Levermore noted. “Therefore, the only possible path to cooperation in which the 
United States can take an increasing share is that which leads toward the some form of 
agreement with the world as now organized, called the League of Nations. By sheer force of 
social international gravitation such cooperation becomes inevitable.” Furthermore, “an 
immediately practicable step is the Senate’s approval of the proposal that the United States 
adhere to the Permanent Court of International Justice.”1152 
 
Charles Levermore and the Bok Committee were not alone in calling for increased 
American involvement on the World Court. 83% of newspaper editors, according to a poll 
conducted by the Bok committee, also approved Court membership, as did both party platforms 
in 1924. The following year, the World Court issue moved to the fore once more when new 
Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, arguing that “civilized nations are now beginning to recognize 
the real principles of international law,” reintroduced the treaty into the Senate. “[D]id you ever 
such a sordid, nation-wide, corrupting, common, ordinary lying propaganda as is now going on 
for this World Court,” Borah exclaimed to one correspondent. “It is as corrupt and un-American 
as it would be to stand at the polls with dollar bills in your hand.” On the floor, the Idaho Senator 
again argued that this Court was merely the legal arm of the League, designed to rubber-stamp 
the “unrighteous fruit of the vicious secret treaties.” While the elder La Follette had passed on, 
his son, recent arrival to the Senate Bob La Follette, Jr., spoke out against the Court as well, as 
did Farmer-Labor Senator Henrik Shipstead of Iowa, who argued its purpose was “to decide that 
loot acquired as a result of the last war has been legally acquired.”1153  
 









While Borah could not defeat the World Court treaty this time – it passed 76-17 – he did 
manage to load it up in committee with various poison pill reservations, including giving 
America veto power over any case that involved the United States – something the rest of the 
Court’s members would never consent to. Threatening the Court would “put this country into 
Europe,” Borah pledged after the vote to devote “every inch of energy and ability I have to this 
cause from now on,” including acting as “America’s new Paul Revere” to warn the people about 
this new threat to their independence.  
 
Hiram Johnson – who thought the Court victory meant that “we have taken our first stop 
and that we’ll ultimately now go into the League” – was one with little faith in Borah’s staying 
power on this issue. A year earlier, when Borah had made a similar rhetorical rally to arms about 
the Court issue, Johnson “noticed too, as always happens with Borah, that after making one 
speech he was assailed by the League of Nations men and he then retired to Idaho:” 
 
From this friendly retreat he has indulged in one fulmination praising economy and Coolidge. 
Probably from Jenkins Cross Roads or Main Street of Babbitsville he will deliver a Philippic 
upon the World Court, but will take extraordinary pains to see that it is not offensive to the World 
Court people and that it may be utilized by Mr. Mellon and Mr. Coolidge. If the fight on the 
League of Nations had been left to him, this is just what would have happened with that epochal 
struggle. His leadership in the present instance…will result as his efforts, when he has undertaken 
anything in the past, always have resulted – either in compromise or surrender, and, if not either 
of these in utter and irretrievable defeat.  
 
He is, however, the only man in the Senate with any pretense to Progressivism who can get great 
publicity now, and while it is true he gets this by virtue of the fact that he is Mr. Mellon’s man 
and Mr. Coolidge’s spokesman, nevertheless I think it a good thing for the cause, for it does, after 
all, give some publicity occasionally to a little of that in which we believe.”1154 
 
 In this case, Johnson’s cynicism about his colleague may have been slightly unfair, since 
Borah’s poison pills did in fact work their magic. Coolidge, knowing neither the Senate nor the 
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other Court members would be willing to back down over the issue of the extra reservations, 
simply tabled the treaty for good. In her study of the foreign policy of the 1920’s, Populist 
Nationalism, historian Karen Miller gives credit to Borah and Johnson both for the defeat of the 
League and the Court. These men, and the small band of progressive irreconcilables they led, 
were able “to effectively thwart the will of three presidents. Not only were these men of complex 
ideas; they were remarkably skillful practitioners of institutional politics.” Even if, by the end, 




Disarming the World 
 
 
William Borah was no isolationist. He knew that, if he wanted to succeed in keeping 
America free of European entanglements, he would have to offer an alternative to the League 
and the Court through which the United States could involve itself in international affairs. So 
when the League of Nations took up the issue of arms limitation in 1920, Borah put forward an 
alternative plan that would attempt to wrestle with the issue of disarmament without 
compromising American independence or integrity. It was the first step in what would become 






, 1920, six weeks after Harding’s election, Borah introduced a 
resolution urging the President to call a conference of England, Japan, and the United States – 
the three major naval powers of the time – to discuss the prospect of “promptly entering into an 
understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditures and building programs…shall be 
substantially reduced annually during the next five years.” The resolution passed the Senate 54-
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0, but it went down with the naval bill to which it was attached – Wilson had opposed Borah’s 




Nonetheless, Borah had lit a spark, and – particularly after the idea of a disarmament 
conference was seconded by two men with impeccable military credentials, John J, Pershing (on 
December 29
th
) and former Army Chief of Staff Tasker Bliss (on January 11
th
, 1921) – that spark 
became a public relations brushfire. By the time Borah reintroduced the resolution on April 13
th
, 
1921, it had, in the words of The Searchlight on Congress, “aroused a public opinion that was 
irresistible.” This time, Borah’s resolution passed the Senate 74-0 on May 26th and the House 
330-4 on June 29
th
. Borah, exulted The Searchlight in July, had “won perhaps the greatest 
legislative victory ever achieved in America. What comes of it must depend on the sincerity and 
statesmanship of those into whose hands the whole epoch-making matter has now passed. Borah 
has done his part: He is an outstanding world figure.”1158 
 
“In my opinion, the beginning of peace is disarmament,” Borah explained his gambit to 
one correspondent. “A world armed to the teeth cannot be other than a fighting world. We do not 
pauperize ourselves to maintain great armies and we do not build vast navies merely for 
exhibition. They are built and maintained for the purpose of destruction…In other words, 
armaments beget not only pauperized communities and nations, but they beget suspicion, 
jealousy, hate, and finally, war.” And since “there is no possible chance to disarm by land so 
long as the Versailles Treaty is in existence,” Borah explained to another, America and the world 
nevertheless still had the power to “disarm by sea. For there is no one building a navy, or 
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purporting to build a navy, except Great Britain, the United States and Japan. If they see fit to 
disarm, or to reduce their armaments to a minimum, by sea, it will go a long way toward 
relieving the human family of the burdens and the crushing militarism fixed upon it by the 
Versailles Treaty.”1159  
 
As important for Borah’s purposes were the effects disarmament would have on 
restraining taxes, minimizing debt, and slowing the growth of the federal government. “Our 
current expenditures for the national government,” he explained to one constituent, “are running 
from $4,500,000,000 to $5,000,000,000 annually. Like a watchman upon his beat, we are 
hunting now in Congress for something more to tax….How can you reduce taxes unless you 
reduce expenditures? And how can you reduce expenditures unless you stop paying out money 
for that which constitutes the bulk of expenditures?” To Borah, “taxes have been the cause of 
more revolutions and more break-downs in government than any other one thing.” “We are being 
literally demoralized and sterilized in our industrial life by reason of taxes,” he told another. “It 
is practically impossible to secure any relief along this line, except through disarmament. 90% of 
our taxes go for war, either past or anticipated.” 1160 
  
Just as taxes were destabilizing, a large public debt, Borah thought in true Jeffersonian 
fashion, was inherently demoralizing. “We now have a public indebtedness upon the part of the 
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national government of about $24,000,000,000,” he argued. “Who could calculate the drudgery, 
the misery, the deprivation, the insanity, the crime and the suicide involved in the struggle for the 
payment of this sum? There is nothing so onerous, so deadening, so sterilizing, to human energy, 
so demoralizing to the morale of a people, as an unbearable public debt like this…Ninety-three 
cents out of every dollar of this sum represents war – wars past or anticipated. Our expenditures 
for the army and navy annually are equal to the annual reparation obligations of Germany…Only 
seven cents out of every dollar goes for all other governmental activities.”1161 
 
That being said, the only way disarmament could possibly happen, Borah thought, is by 
way of the traditional progressive method of leveraging public opinion. “War scares, based upon 
secret knowledge, are the common instruments for those who would keep a Nation in a fighting 
frame of mind,” he argued. “Already it has been suggested by high authority that knowledge is 
within the possession of the Government which makes it very dangerous to consider 
disarmament.” The reduction of arms can only succeed, Borah argued to William Allen White, 
“through the driving power of public opinion. Governments are inherently against disarmament, 
the people are unalterably for it.”1162 
 
Borah was adamant on this point, and it runs through virtually all of his letters on the 
subject. “The only hope for disarmament,” he wrote to one constituent “is in organized public 
opinion. If the matter is left to a fight with the bureaucrats in Washington, there will be no 
chance for success.” “[G]reat social and moral revolutions, such as the breaking down of the 
military power and military spirit,” he told another, “cannot be accomplished other than through 
mass movement.” “This is the people’s fight,” he told yet another, “and the people will have to 
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make it.” To make any dent in the world’s weaponry, he argued to Stanford President David 
Starr Jordan, “we ought to organize and direct public opinion as we never have before. The 
subtle influences which are always scheming against things of this kind are active…There are 
bureaucrats here who expect to wake up any morning and hear the Japanese guns battering away 
at the Capitol.”1163 
 
As it happened, an organized army of volunteers was ready to help Borah leverage public 
opinion for disarmament and against war in the women’s movement. Already, Jane Addams and 
Carrie Chapman Catt had formed the 6000-member Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom (WILPF) in 1915 in response to the outbreak of the World War. Now, new pacifist 
organizations arose from the old suffrage networks to stand alongside WILPF, including the 
Women’s Peace Union, established in 1921 by former suffragists. A “Woman Army against 
War,” announced Fanny Garrison Villard (mother of The Nation editor), “is taking shape a tidal 
wave of disarmament sentiment…Within a month this supreme women movement has so made 
itself felt as to frighten out of a reluctant Congress approval of the Borah resolution for a 
disarmament conference.” “Thousands of thinking women,” wrote Dora Haines in The 
Searchlight on Congress of May 1921, “are preparing to play their part in the saving of 
civilization.”1164   
 
According to Maud Wood Park, head of the League of Women Voters and Women’s 
Joint Congressional Committee, her members were “‘interested in peace almost to the exclusion 
of any other topic” in the first two years after suffrage. The rank-and-file members of the League 
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and Alice Paul’s National Women’s Party, soon to break on differing approaches to securing 
equal rights for women, were as one on this issue. In fact, the most discussed topic at the 1921 
LWV convention was disarmament, prompted when Carrie Chapman Catt forewent her prepared 
remarks on “Psychologies of Political Progress” and delivered instead an impromptu address to 
“compel action in Washington.” “The people in this room tonight,” she proclaimed, “were there 
no others interested in all the world, could put an end to war if they put themselves to it…let us 
make a resolution, each and every one of us, to consecrate ourselves individually and collectively 
to the business of putting war out of the world.”1165   
 
A disarmament resolution brought up at the 1921 NWP convention was ultimately voted 
down, due to the belief among Party leadership that the organization should remain exclusively 
dedicated to the issue of women’s equality. Nonetheless, it was mostly NWP members, among 
them Belle La Follette, who gathered to form the Women’s Committee for World Disarmament 
(WCWD), headed by Emma Wold. “We women have the power to compel disarmament,” La 
Follette told a Christmas 1920 open-air meeting of the soon-to-be-formed organization. “We 
need not plead nor beg. We have the ballot…And here on this day precious to the Christian 
world, at the very door of the Capitol of our beloved nation, we vow to use our voices to defeat 
those senators and representatives in Congress who stand for Militarism and War and to elect 
senators and representatives who stand for Peace and Disarmament.”1166  
 
Immediately upon its formation, the WCWD worked to make Easter Sunday, March 27
th
, 
1921, Disarmament Day – Borah was the lead speaker at the Washington event -- and planned a 
Disarmament Week in late May. Working alongside the WILPF and other women’s 
                                                          
1165
 Brown, Setting a Course, 64-66. Cott, 243-245.  
1166




organizations like the Women’s Christian Temperance Union and the National Federation of 
Business and Professional Women’s Clubs, the WCWD held mass meetings in sixteen states, 
established chapters in twice as many, and dispatched delegations of women to appeal to the 
president in person. Alongside the WCWD grew a sister organization in 1921, the National 
Council on Limitation of Armaments, which eventually became the aforementioned National 




Looking back on the twenties, Frederick Libby, head of the National Council, argued that 
at least two-thirds of the peace movement in America had been women. They, argued peace 
activist Laura Puffer Morgan, “are instinctively more interested than men in humanitarian 
projects and matters of the common welfare because they have more leisure for study and 
activity, because they have fewer financial entanglements, and as a result a more objective 
viewpoint and greater moral courage – in other words, because they are freer.” A women’s 
organization, thought Alice Park of the WILPF and NWP, “will be able to do things to forward 
world peace that perhaps cannot be done in any other way.” “It has evidently got to be the 
women who stop war,” argued one member of the Women’s Peace Union, “men are too steeped 
in tradition to brave such a break.”1168 
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To some advocates of disarmament, real peace was never possible until women had a full 
voice in politics. “For centuries men have conducted the governments of the world,” Dora 
Haines wrote in The Searchlight. “The result is a stricken world, war-weakened, with bankruptcy 
in the background. Civilization itself is threatened. In this crisis women are preparing to take a 
hand. They have trusted male politicians as long as it can safely be done.” To fix this problem, 
Haines argued, Congress needed more women members immediately. “Congress, man-made and 
man-minded, while talking disarmament, is proceeding upon the theory that we must be prepared 
for war. Women believe down deep and through and through…that continued armaments, even 
without fighting, will break the back and crush the soul of humanity...What women will soon 
understand, and men apparently cannot…[is that] if our political affairs were conducted openly, 
honestly, and democratically, no special interest, nor any combination of the beneficiaries of 
war, could exert their selfish power to profit by plunging the world into war.”1169 
 
With the fully mobilized force of the former suffragists’ organizations behind it, the issue 
took the nation by storm in 1921.  “The question of international disarmament,” wrote William 
Allen White, “is the biggest question before mankind today.” Borah -- the Senator, notes 
historian John Chambers Vinson, who had “lately been the chief opponent of peace through the 
League,” was now “the leading advocate in a great crusade to save the nation at once from the 
peril of war and the pain of taxes…Indeed, [Borah] had wrought something of a miracle. The 
desire for disarmament and peace, previously resembling a stagnant pool, had been transformed 
into a rushing river. Soon it was to assume the proportions of a tidal wave as it gained the 
enthusiastic support of the press, peace societies, churches, civic clubs, and women’s 
organizations all over the nation.” Borah, as The Searchlight on Congress put it in November 
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1921, “has become the great apostle of world peace. He sees the evils of military and commercial 





Harding, meanwhile – who had supported Woodrow Wilson’s call to expand the Navy in 
1916 and was on record as supporting “the largest navy anyone has cared to suggest,” in the 
words of The Searchlight – now felt increasing pressure to include disarmament as a cornerstone 
of normalcy. Al Jolson, who had sung the virtues of Harding on the campaign trail the year 
before, now proposed to the president that he “start the song of peace thinly coated with ragtime, 
a-echoing though the land.” (“Take away the gun/from every mother’s son/We’re taught by God 
above/to Forgive, forget, and love/The weary world is waiting for/Peace, forevermore/So take 
away the gun/From ev’ry mother’s son/and put an end to war.”)1171   
 
Given this push in both the public and in Congress, Warren Harding had no choice but to 
accede to the idea of a disarmament conference, and so, for maximum impact, he and Hughes 
decided to go Borah one farther. On July 11, 1921, the State Department extended invitations to 
England and Japan, as well as France and Italy, to discuss the issues of naval disarmament and 
Far East policy in a conference that would begin one day after the third anniversary of the 
Armistice. Because several other nations had spheres of influence in the East, the nations of 
China, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal were also invited to send representatives to the 
convention. Borah was dismayed. “The more nations called in,” he had argued to New York 
World editor Herbert Bayard Swope when proposing his original resolution, “the more the 
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situation will be involved, the more chance for delay and jugglery, and the less opportunity to fix 
responsibility for delay or for defeat…There is no possible reason for including France or Italy in 
a Navel disarmament program, for neither one of them has any Navy to cause serious 
consideration.” And the presence of so many of the former World War allies – including those 
without navies of any account – exacerbated Borah’s fears that the disarmament conference 
would now become yet another “back door” into the League. Other pacifists jested that bringing 
top-ranking French and English military officers like Ferdinand Foch and Douglas Haig together 
to discuss disarmament was “like sending butchers to a vegetarian conference.”1172 
 
Nonetheless, if this assembly of nine nations is where the world was to make its stand on 
disarmament, Borah thought, it behooved the public to apply maximum pressure there. “[I]t 
would seem that something in the nature of a propaganda is going out of Washington,” Borah 
argued to the editors of Farm and Home Magazine, “calculated, if not intended, to wholly 
discourage the people and break down the entire morale of this movement”:  
 
The people are being almost daily advised that they must not expect too much from the 
Conference, that the outlook is discouraging, and that we must not allow our hopes to rise too 
high…It would seem to me that it would be better to arouse public interest and gear the morale of 
the cause to the highest pitch, knowing full well that just in proportion that that is done shall we 
make progress. When the Great War was on, everything, songs, movies, public addresses, 
proclamations, days of prayer, were utilized to put the public uncompromisingly and 
enthusiastically behind the cause. Is this movement, which, if effective, means nothing less than 
the preservation of civilization, less important than the preparation of the indiscriminate 
destruction of your fellow men? 
 
Is there any way to win this great fight except through the power of public opinion? Is anyone so 
fatuous as to believe that it will as the result alone of official initiative? Yet this subtle and 
sinister campaign, calculated to discourage the people, goes on… 
 
With anything like a sane policy, there is no reason why the United States and Japan should ever 
have trouble. We are a different people, speak a different language, and have somewhat different 
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standards of life, but we are two great peoples. But if every time Japan builds a battleship we feel 
compelled to build two…how long will it be until the people of both countries are saturated with 
suspicion, jealousy, fear and hate. And thus fallow the sea for war…1173 
 
“You can organize all the leagues which the human mind can conceive of and you can 
establish your international courts,” Borah concluded. “But if the world is to be an armed world, 
it will be a fighting world. Your courts and leagues will disappear under the glare of the first gun 
that is fired.”1174 
 
In fact, the Harding administration also thought the moment was right for impressive and 
decisive action. On Armistice Day, November 11
th
, 1921, the Unknown Soldier was interred in 
Arlington Cemetery – a ceremony which had moved the attending Woodrow Wilson to tears 
when the crowd had cheered for him once more. “They seek him,” Ida Tarbell wrote of the 
crowd’s spontaneous reaction to Wilson that cold morning. “He means something to them; they 
don’t quite know what. He is a living link with their noblest phase.” On the next day, President 
Harding and Secretary of State Hughes furthered the compliment by beginning the first day of 
the Washington disarmament conference in Wilsonian fashion. This meeting, Harding declared 
in his opening remarks, is “an earnest of the awakened consciences of twentieth century 
civilization…a coming together, from all parts of the earth, to apply the better attributes of 
mankind to minimize the faults of our international relationships.”1175 
 
“War,” the president argued, “has grown progressively cruel and more destructive from 
the first recorded conflict to this pregnant day, and the reverse order would more become our 
boasted civilization.” Thus, while ensuring the crowd (and the anti-Leaguers of America) that “I 
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do not mean surrendered rights, or narrowed freedom, or denied aspirations, or ignored national 
necessities,” Harding urged the congregated diplomats to “a sober contemplation of the existing 
order and the realization that there can be no cure without sacrifice, not by one of us but by all of 
us.” Following the president’s opening address, Secretary of State Hughes ignited a firestorm 
when, in his own remarks – which everyone had assumed would be compromised of similar 
diplomatic niceties – he enumerated the exact sacrifices America expected the world to make.1176 
 
“We can no longer content ourselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, 
with the circumlocution of inquiry,” Hughes told the assembled diplomats. “The essential facts 
are sufficiently known. The time has come, and this Conference has been called, not for general 
resolutions or mutual advice but for action.” And so Hughes proposed “that for a period of not 
less than ten years there should be no further construction of capital ships.” He then prescribed, 
that America, British, and Japanese ships be maintained at a 5:5:3 ratio respectively. To 
accomplish this, America proposed to scrap thirty of its own capital ships – half old, half under 
construction – in return for Britain and Japan sinking nineteen and seventeen of their ships 
respectively. “Thus, under this plan,” concluded the Secretary of State to an audience now 
shocked awake, “there would be immediately destroyed, of the navies of the three Powers, 66 
capital fighting ships, built and building, with a tonnage of 1,878.043.”1177 
 
The mood in the conference hall after Hughes speech was electric. A “tornado of 
cheering” ensued, according to one report. The Secretary of State, noted one wag, had just sunk 
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more English ships “than all the admirals of the world had destroyed in a cycle of centuries.” 
Progressive journals, who had waxed cynical about the conference before it had begun, were 
equally dumbstruck. “Not in modern times has there been so clear and so astounding and so 
brilliant a feat in statecraft,” exclaimed Oswald Villard. “It is good to be an American when 
conservative American leaders employ methods of open diplomacy and propose reductions in 
armament which are positively revolutionary,” opined The Nation. “If Mr. Hughes’ naval 
holiday does not guarantee peace, it is a long step toward it…[and i]f the public opinion of 
mankind can win a victory for a naval holiday it may obtain the other conditions of peace.” The 
Secretary of State, applauded The New Republic, “has justified the confidence of his friends and 
well-wishers by starting the Conference off with a bold and deep plunge into the waters of 
disarmament…Mr. Hughes’ leadership…[has engendered] an atmosphere in which a great and 
enduring work of public statesmanship can be accomplished.” Sensing where the public mood 
now was on this question, presidential aspirant William McAdoo published an editorial calling 
Hughes’s opening bid “admirable” and arguing further for the complete abolition of navies, 
“except for such light craft as may be needed for coastal defense purposes….If all nations are 
without navies, all will be secure from attack by water and the seas will become, as God intended 
them to be, the great highways of peaceful intercourse between the peoples of the Earth.”1178 
 
But if progressives were moved by Hughes’ grand kickoff to the disarmament 
conference, they were less pleased when the gathered diplomats got down to brass tacks and old 
habits began to reemerge. “It is called a conference for the limitation of armaments,” wrote Lynn 
Haines in The Searchlight. “In reality it is more a meeting of world war strategists.  No 
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internationally known advocate of peace is there. No woman, pleading for the sanctity and safety 
of the race, is there. All the greatest and most brilliantly blind of the old-school diplomats are 
there. Their deliberations are guarded and guided by militarism. The uniform and regalia of the 
battlefield are everywhere.” To Nathaniel Peffer, writing in The Nation, “the farce of the plenary 
session with all its rodomontade of peace cynically flung in the face of a world haggard with the 
suffering of one war and the fear of another” had been exposed by the rest of the Conference, 
with its “jockeying for position and diplomatic Huckstering behind closed doors in the best 
Foreign Office manner.” At the very best, “a maze of detail,” wrote Adolf Berle in The Survey, 
“has overcast the initial splendor of the conference.”1179 
 
Sure enough, along with securing the naval holiday originally outlined, the Washington 
Conference also resulted in two agreements that carried a whiff of the old Versailles deal-making 
– a Four-Power Treaty, among England, Japan, France, and the United States, to consult with 
each other on matters regarding the Pacific, and a Nine-Power Treaty, among all nations 
assembled, to preserve the Open Door policy with regard to their respective spheres of influence 
in China. The usual suspects were livid that the Washington Conference had instead become the 
site of old world deal-making. “The American people have asked for bread and they have been 
given a stone,” declared Borah of the two ensuing treaties, and American negotiators – who had 
negotiated the treaties behind closed doors – have “kept the word of promise to the ear and 
broken it to the heart.” To Borah, the Four-Power Treaty was “far more vicious than the League 
of Nations…It is simply linking us up with the depredators in the Far East.” “I am frank to say,” 
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he even ventured to one correspondent, “that as between the League of Nations and this Alliance, 
I would prefer to try the League.”1180  
 
Pointing to Article II of the Four-Power Treaty, which argued that all four signatories 
would consult with each other about potential threats in the region, Borah compared it to the 
iniquitous Article XI of Versailles. It would create a four-power armada in the Pacific, Borah 
argued, “compared with which the Spanish Armada was an insignificant affair…[T]he practical 
carrying out of Article 2 [would mean] the assembling of the armed forces of the four great 
powers of the world.” Without further steps taken toward disarmament, Borah argued, “alliances 
and leagues and understandings and associations of nations organized for the purpose of 
peace…become a league for war…League covenants, associations, and understandings are 
construed one way when vast armaments are at hand and another after armaments have been put 
aside.” As for the Nine-Power Treaty, it was “nothing but a naked combination of military 
powers to dominate the Orient,” one that would soon be intent on “underwriting…imperialism in 
the Pacific.” Meanwhile, “the Conference has not touched a single weapon of war with which the 
next war will be fought if it should come. Submarines, poisonous gas, airbombs, aeroplanes, and 
so forth, are uncontrolled and unregulated.”1181 
 
To Senator La Follette, the two treaties – “hatched in secret” under “the cloak of a 
conference made possible by a worldwide sentiment for disarmament” – recalled the alliances 
that had forced the world into global conflict in 1914. “For the United States,” he argued, “to 
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enter into an alliance with the only great imperialist nations which survived the war is a rash 
substitute for the peaceful, anti-imperialist American policy, tested by a century and a quarter, 
and based upon friendship with all nations and entangling alliances with none.” Looking at the 
men who had served as American negotiators for the treaties – Hughes, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, and Oscar Underwood, La Follette argued they had been designed by “representatives of 
the imperialistic policies of the big banking interests.” As it was, the Four-Power Treaty, La 
Follette concluded, had “all the iniquities of the League of Nations covenant with none of the 
virtues claimed for that document by its advocates.” Hiram Johnson echoed La Follette’s 
evocation of Washington’s Farewell Address, as well as his concerns that men like Hughes, a 
man of “diabolical cunning,” had orchestrated the treaties.1182 
 
Johnson’s reservations were shared by other progressives, including his friend Harold 
Ickes. “I haven’t made a deep study of the proposed four power treaty,” Ickes wrote the Senator, 
“and I confess that my judgment with respect to it is not very clear. On the whole my feeling is 
one of distrust…Certainly this proposed treaty represents a radical departure from our traditional 
American policy in international affairs.” Ickes found the deal with Japan particularly troubling. 
“I dislike and mistrust Japan. I wouldn’t believe a Japanese diplomat under oath…I think the 
United States did a shameful thing at Versailles in betraying China on the Shantung issue and, so 
far as I’m personally concerned, the proof is distinctly upon the proponents of any treaty of 
alliance between the United States and Japan.” In The Nation, Nathaniel Peffer concluded that 
the Nine-Power Treaty meant “America will not only have suffered an immeasurable defeat in 
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diplomacy; it will have committed a shameful act of betrayal against the Chinese, a people 
whose cause it had voluntarily sponsored.”1183 
 
Still, not all progressive-minded observers shared these concerns. “The Four Power 
Treaty is an imperfect and in some minor respects a dubious arrangement,” editorialized The 
New Republic. But “it builds up an effective, immediate barrier against war without committing 
the United States to the guaranteeing of doubtful land frontiers or to any egregious offenses 
against national rights.” As for the Nine-Power Pact, TNR thought it “wiser…to accept the 
Concert as a step in a promising direction and then work for its extension rather than reject it in 
favor of the adoption of an irreconcilable and non-cooperative policy by the American 
government.” The larger pacifist organizations were inclined to agree. “Agreements looking 
toward peace will provoke other agreements for peace,” S.E. Nicholson of the National Council 
for Reduction of Armaments wrote to Borah. “The value of the Four-Power Treaty lies in its 
announced purpose. If it fails and one or more nations violate its terms, the nations are in no 
worse condition than they were before, but there is a chance that they will not only observe the 
terms of their agreement, but in doing so will set an example to other nations that is bound to be 
contagious.” At the very least, Adolf Berle argued in The Survey, “when passions run high it will 
give an opportunity for the quieter voices to be heard, and for excitement to die before killing 
begins.”1184 
 
As it was, the treaty passed the Senate 67-27, with Borah, La Follette, Johnson, and 
Joseph France joining 23 Democrats in opposition. (George Norris voted for passage, to the great 
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dismay of La Follette. “It was a great tug to have him leave us in this fight,” the Senator confided 
to a friend. “It is the first time we have been separated on any important issue since he came to 
the Senate.”) The Women’s Committee for World Disarmament, declaring victory after passage 
of the arms reductions, disbanded.1185 
The Outlawry of War 
 
As his dismay over the final fruits of the Washington Conference suggested, Senator 
Borah was still looking for a way to engage in international diplomacy without snaring America 
in any sort of entangling pacts or alliances, least of all anything that smacked of the League of 
Nations.  “‘I feel…indeed as I have always felt, that we have our obligations as a member of the 
family of nations and that we cannot in justice to ourselves and to humanity disregard these 
obligations,” Borah wrote one friend in 1923. “My objection to many programs which have been 
proposed is that they commit us in advance to political obligations and hamper us when the hour 
comes as to the wisest course which we should pursue. But I would be shortsighted and foolish 
indeed to say that American must not confer with other powers when world interests are 
involved because we are a part of the world.’”1186  
 
To square this circle, he, and many other progressives of the period, eventually saw a 
potential way forward in the Outlawry of War movement. “I have no doubt the state of society 
was such at one time that it was thought impossible to outlaw murder,” Borah explained to one 
constituent. “We can outlaw war if the public mind can be educated up to it and it can be.”1187 
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The Outlawry of War was an idea first concocted by Salmon O. Levinson, an enterprising 
Chicago lawyer, in March of 1918. “If it is lawful to do a thing,” Levinson inquired to the 
readers of The New Republic that month, “why make such a cry about its being done? If war is 
legal, why object to militarism, which is a necessary effect of the legality of war rather than, as is 
popularly assumed, the cause of war?...As long as international law continues to legalize war all 
nations are moral accessories before the fact to ‘collective murder.’” However, if the world were 
to make war illegal as it had with dueling, and a subject to be adjudicated by a powerful 
international Court, Levinson argued, the calculus becomes very different. “War, though made 
illegal, might still conceivably occur but it would be branded as a crime and the force of the 
world would be organized to deal with the criminal…[R]eduction of armaments would occur as a 
matter of course to the point required to protect domestic tranquility and other intra-national 
needs…Moreover, the elimination of war would automatically sweep away most of the present 
vexing international questions. The problems of contraband, blockade, in short the freedom of 
the seas, buffer states, the so-called balance of power, the sanctity of neutrality treaties, integrity 
of small nations, the ‘rectification of boundaries,’ are created by the existence of war and have 
no significance under peace conditions.”1188 
 
Having formulated this idea, Levinson spent the next several years working to promote it. 
He quickly garnered a key philosophical endorsement from John Dewey, who thought the 
argument “simple and understandable.” “Like all really simple and intelligible propositions,” 
Dewey wrote in the introduction to a 1921 pamphlet on the idea, “it goes to the root of the 
situation. Above all it does more than any other plan yet proposed to provide natural and orderly 
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agencies for enlightening the peoples regarding disputes among nations, and for concentrating all 
the moral forces of the world against modern war, the abomination of abominations.” In short, by 
making the law illegal, the great force of public opinion could finally work against ending it for 
good. “It does not follow that all wars will automatically cease,” Dewey argued in a 1923 
editorial on the subject:  
 
Crimes continue after there are laws against them. But for the average person law is almost a 
measure of morality. Ask almost anyone except someone who has given the matter thought why 
something is wrong and he will reply that it is wrong because it is against the law. The law has 
been a great educative force in fixing the moral beliefs and sentiments of men. As long as war is 
lawful it will be right to a great many persons…Outlaw war and the sentiment that it is criminal 
to resort to war will be strengthened. At present the pacifist in time of war is looked upon with 
suspicion by his fellow citizens; he is thought dangerous, almost, if not quite a criminal. Outlaw 
war and provide a world court to try all disputes that are not settled by conference and the 
militarist becomes the criminal, and the upholder of peace is the good and useful citizen.”1189 
 
Another key early adopter of Levinson’s Outlawry plan was former Roosevelt 
progressive Raymond Robins. “The people of the world are ready and eager for the next step in 
the slow advance from savagery toward international civilization,” Robins argued in his own 
introduction to the Outlawry pamphlet. “They want war unmasked and declared in international 
law to be what it in fact is, the supreme enemy of the human race…They want war outlawed as a 
crime against the law of nations and the life of humanity.” “As long as war continues to be the 
only method whereby nations can compel the settlement of international disputes,” Robins wrote 
in 1923, “just so long does war serve a social function, and however bloody, cruel, and 
destructive, war will continue to remain because it is the only way…Internationally shall we live 
by violence or by law? Between these two we have to choose. There is no third alternative.”1190 
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Robins also enlisted his wife Margaret Dreier Robins, head of the Women’s Trade Union 
League, to the cause, and the WTUL, working with the other members of the National Council, 
helped to promote Levinson’s idea at Law Not War day and other anti-war festivities. Once 
again, the full force of the women’s peace movement was brought to bear on the issue. “Women 
won suffrage,” argued Alice Park, “women won prohibition. Now women are putting through the 
outlawry of war.” The Women’s Peace Union, an anti-League, pro-peace organization, began 
devoting all of its efforts to passing a constitutional amendment outlawing war, and then some: 
In 1924, the WPU pushed for a amendment removing Congress’s power to declare war. One 
particularly active and notable supporter of Outlawry was Ohio judge and peace activist Florence 
Allen, the first women elected to a state Supreme Court. “Outlawry of war is not only the ideal 
for whose attainment we must strive,” she wrote in 1925, “but…a practical and indispensable 
part of the machinery necessary to establish a warless world…We cannot stop war so long as we 
sanction its use.”1191 
 
While harboring some reservations about the idea’s practicality – among other things, she 
preferred the creation of a Department of Peace within the State Department – Carrie Chapman 
Catt thought Outlawry could revive the “spiritual strength of the World.” In 1925, Catt became 
the first Chairwoman of the newly-founded Committee on the Cause and Cure of War, a 
coalition of nine women’s organizations including the WTUL, AAUW, League of Women 
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Voters, Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and General Federation of Women’s Clubs, that 




Dewey, Robins, and the women’s peace movement were early and important allies, but to 
have a decisive policy impact, the Outlawry plan needed a sponsor in Congress. And so, once 
William Borah put forward his original call for a disarmament conference, Levinson and other 
Outlawry advocates began to work on him. “I have always maintained that although you were an 
‘irreconcilable’ in the League fight,” Levinson wrote to Borah in February 1921 while sending 
him his plan, “you were as strongly in favor of the world peace movement on a practical basis as 
any man in the United States Senate.” For his part, Dewey explicitly endorsed Outlawry as the 
solution to the Gordian knot Borah had been grappling with. Americans “don’t want 
entanglement in European affairs, and at the same time they want the United States to do its part 
in international cooperation,” Dewey wrote Borah in May 1922. “It seems to me that the man 
who first takes the leadership in a constructive movement at the present time will put himself in a 
position to go as far in politics as he may wish, even to the presidency, and that you are far better 
situated to lead this movement than anyone else.”1193 
 
Similarly, Doremus Scudder of the Greater Boston Federation of Churches and Religious 
Organizations wrote to Borah a month later, urging him to act. “I do not believe that any 
previous proposal concerning international relations ever issued in this country has met with 
such immediate and widespread acceptance,” Scudder argued, noting the endorsement of the 
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National Committee, the YWCA, WILPF, Federal Council of Churches, the LWP, fifty 
presidents and professors, and even the American Legion. “I trust that you may in this thinking 
this matter over,” Scudder concluded, “be guided by the great Directing Spirit of history to take 
the right and wise step in this crisis in human affairs.” 1194 
  
Directing Spirit or no, Borah was indeed intrigued by the idea, but he remained worried 
about the enforcement issue. Could public opinion alone prevent nations from going to war? The 
last thing Borah wanted was Levinson’s original plan, which argued that the League of Nations 
could help to enforce the edict. Eventually, however, Borah came around to the idea of an 
international Court – completely separate from the existing World Court – that had the power to 
deem individuals guilty of warmongering, at which point the nations which were home to these 




This was the plan Borah officially put forward in a Senate resolution on February 14, 
1923.  It first called for a universal treaty that declared war “a public crime under the law of 
nations” and called for every nation “to indict and punish its own international war breeders or 
instigators and war profiteers.” It also called for the creation and adoption of a “code of 
international laws of peace based upon equality and justice between nations.” Finally, to create 
“a judicial substitute for war,” the resolution authorized the creation of a court – modeled on the 
US Supreme Court – “to hear and decide all purely international controversies as defined by the 
code, or arising under treaties” Its authority rested not on the power of force but upon “the 
compelling power of enlightened public opinion.” Pushing the plan a year later in identical 
editorials for The Christian Century, The Central Christian Advocate, the Pacific Christian 
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Advocate, and The New Republic, Borah argued “that the first successful step in the ending of 
war is to declare it a crime, to array against it the moral and legal condemnation of mankind – to 
outlaw it – to place it outside the place of respectability, of legality – to brand it as a criminal 
monstrosity. Other steps will follow.”1196 
 
Borah once again received extravagant praise for this new idea among peace advocates. 
To the New York Evening Post’s Mark Sullivan, Borah had made himself “the principal leader of 
world thought in the field of the relations of the nations with each other, a pioneer in a new 
conception of international relations.” But others found the Outlawry plan less satisfying. 
“Abolishing war means abolishing the power of the interests that in each country control the 
destiny of society [through] the ownership and control of certain entities,” thought Amos 
Pinchot. “Those who own and control these things control society.” As such, outlawry, like 
disarmament before it, was mainly just telling people “to bite at the stick with which they are 
struck” rather than the hand wielding it.1197 
 
A particularly virulent critic of the Outlawry plan was Walter Lippmann, who assailed it 
in a long essay in the August 1923 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. Now that Borah was 
advocating Outlawry against the World Court, he argued, the phrase “outlawry of war” had been 
“employed in order to strengthen a league before there was a League. It was used to defeat the 
League after there was a League, and to advocate an international court before there was a Court. 
Now that the Court has been created, it is being used to defeat the Court and to advocate another 
court which does not exist.” Now, “Mr. Borah’s confirmed objections to a superstate sleep 
comfortably with his demand for a Supreme Court of the World, modeled on our Federal 
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Supreme Court, having its gigantic power in conflicts between states…A position so illogical 
must be a political accident.”1198 
 
In short, Lippmann thought the whole Outlawry movement was absurd. “[I]f you have 
the right to go to war for what you call your liberty, and the right to go to war because you think 
an attack is imminent, it would be a stupid Foreign Office indeed which could not legalize any 
war it thought necessary or desirable. The only war outlawed under this plan is a war openly 
announced to be a war of aggression. There are no such wars.” Moreover, Lippmann thought, 
“the notion that a judicial process in a court is the only method of peace is fantastic. Mr. Borah, 
every day of his life, is engaged in adjusting disputes…If he believed that the only alternative to 
war was resort to the courts, he would not be wasting his talents in a nonjudicial body like the 
United States Senate. He would either be a judge or arguing before judges.” In short, “if 
diplomacy is a necessary method of maintaining peace, then no plan which does not provide for 
it can be an effective plan to abolish war.”1199 
 
Among those persuaded by Lippmann’s devastating critique was Senator Hiram Johnson. 
“I read Lippmann’s article very carefully,” Johnson told Harold Ickes. “I resent his article 
because of my affection for Raymond, and the fact that it seemed to me in certain phases 
practically to demolish the plan Raymond presents. In any argument and on anything I would 
prefer Raymond Robins to prevail rather than Walter Lippmann.” That being said, Johnson 
admitted his doubts. “I am fearful this scheme is chimerical, and not only that, but it would 
involve a super-legislature and a super-court wholly at variance with the genius of our 
institutions and outlaw only those wars which would never occur anyway.” As for Ickes, who 
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noticed the idea “seems really to be taking hold with a good many people,” he could not figure 
how the “‘Outlawry of War’ scheme would fit in with the Versailles Treaty, but off-hand it 
would seem to me that a revision of that Treaty would have to precede the drafting of an 
International code outlawing war.”1200 
 
Like Lippmann, Johnson and Ickes were also confused about the differences between the 
Court, which Borah had opposed, and this new court, which Borah now supported. “I am not all 
surprised at what you say about Borah espousing the World Court…He is as variable as the wind 
and as fickle as a maiden,” Johnson told Ickes. “I have no faith in Borah’s espousal of that cause, 
and I believe he would as readily drop it as he changed his position upon international affairs to 
seize it when he thought we were at low ebb last year.” When Raymond Robins explained to 
Ickes in 1925 that he was supporting the World Court only if its members agreed to outlaw war 
within two years, Ickes and Johnson were left perplexed and irritated by Robins’ maneuvering. 
“Raymond assured me,” Ickes told the Senator, “that he was as unalterably opposed as ever to 
the League of Nations and the World Court. He insisted that the whole object of the compromise 
agreement…was to divide the pro-court advocates into two groups and that has been done.” 
“What a tangled web we weave,” Johnson replied. “Robins’ idea…I take it from your letter, is by 
putting up a job on someone else, deceiving those with whom you agree to act, and voting 
ultimately a lie. In the days of the Stuarts this kind of public activity was justified by one great 
party and to it was applied by the other term ‘Jesuitical,’ which in the succeeding centuries has 
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been the designation of crooked and treacherous policy.” Either way, Johnson thought, it “leaves 
him pretty nastily naked intellectually.”1201 
 
Borah had to fight off a similar conflation of goals when former Columbia history 
professor James Shotwell – who, with Lippmann, had been a member of Wilson’s Inquiry during 
the war and helped to fashion the Fourteen Points, and who now served as director of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s economics and history division – began to push 
the Outlawry idea as an argument for American participation in the League of Nations and the 
World Court. While the peace movement and its aims of disarmament and international goodwill 
were “gaining strength in America,” Shotwell argued in The Survey in 1924, “the refusal of the 
United States to cooperate in the work of the League of Nations…constituted an almost 
insuperable obstacle to their practical realization.” So Shotwell and a “small group of 
Americans,” mostly from the Carnegie Endowment, had drafted a new treaty with Outlawry as 
its centerpiece, “which the Council of the League of Nations has accepted from their hands and 
placed before the leading governments of the world for their consideration.” This fusion of 
Outlawry and Wilsonism came to be known in 1925 as the Harmony Peace Plan, and while it 
would help to tie the various factions of the peace movement together for a time, Borah never 
signed aboard, and the two groups of backers eventually went their separate ways.
 1202
   
 
                                                          
1201
 Johnson to Ickes, October 8, 1923. HLI Box 33: Hiram Johnson. Johnson to Ickes, October 2, 1923. HLI Box 
33: Hiram Johnson. Ickes to Johnson, September 4, 1925 Box 33: Hiram Johnson. HLI. Johnson to Ickes, September 
10, 1925 Box 33: Hiram Johnson. HLI. “The trouble with you is you are too far removed from the Puritan strain that 
I suppose you have in you,” responded Ickes. “If you were a good time old Puritan and a regular church attendant, 
especially if you solemnly passed the plate on Sundays, you wouldn’t revolt the way you do at deceiving one’s 
friends in order to overcome one’s enemies. Fortunately the destinies of the country are safe in the hands of those 
good old Puritans of undiluted stock and pillars of the church, Silent Cal and anything but silent General Dawes.” 
Ickes to Johnson, September 15, 1925. HLI Box 33: Hiram Johnson. 
1202
 Vinson, 96-103. David Swanson, When the World Outlawed War (Washington: eBookit, 2011). James T. 
Shotwell, “Security and Disarmament,” The Survey, August 1, 1924 (Vol. LII, No. 9), 483-486.  David Steigerwald, 




Nonetheless, it was Professor Shotwell, along with his Carnegie and Columbia colleague 
Nicholas Murray Butler, who brought Outlawry to the next stage of fruition in 1927. On a visit to 
France, Shotwell suggested the notion to the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, who was 
eager to form some sort of alliance with the United States.  On April 6
th
, 1927 – the tenth 
anniversary of American entry into the Great War –Briand sent a letter to the American people 
(drafted by Shotwell) suggesting that the two nations agree to renounce “war as an instrument of 
national policy.” “If there were any need for those two great democracies to give high testimony 
to their desire for peace, and to furnish other peoples an example more solemn still,” Briand’s 
letter argued, “France would be willing to subscribe publicly with the United States to any 
mutual engagement tending to ‘outlaw war,’ to use an American expression, between these two 
countries.”1203  
 
Two weeks later, Nicholas Murray Butler implored America to take notice of Briand’s 
“epoch-marking offer” in a letter published in the New York Times. Noting that Briand had sent 
an open letter rather than a diplomatic communiqué, Butler suggested that France was trying “to 
ascertain whether the will to peace really exists among the people of the United States…Where 
and how could we find a more fitting tribute to the memory of those whose lives were given in 
that stupendous struggle,” he argued, speaking of the World War, “than by taking a solemn 
compact with that nation more severely stricken by that war, for the formal and definite 
renunciation of war itself as an instrument of national policy?”1204 
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Secretary of State Kellogg and Calvin Coolidge had also noted the fact that Briand’s 
letter was public, and they did not appreciate either the French Foreign Minister or the Carnegie 
Endowment trying to jam them up. (In fact, Kellogg and Coolidge contemplated indicting 
Shotwell and Butler under the Logan Act, which forbade private citizens from negotiating with 
foreign governments, before concluding that would cause even more of a stir.) William Borah 
also disliked the bilateral approach to outlawry, especially since the chances of the United States 
and France ever going to war were negligible. As a counter-offer, Borah suggested and 
ultimately convinced Kellogg to offer a multilateral treaty instead, open to any nation who 
wanted to join the movement to renounce war. This Kellogg proffered back to France on 
December 28
th
, 1927 – much to the irritation of Briand, who had simply wanted to lock the 
United States into a bilateral alliance, and who now found the powerful groundswell of public 




And so on August 27, 1928, Kellogg, Briand, and representatives from thirteen other 
nations – including England, Italy, Japan, and Germany – signed the Pact of Paris, declaring “in 
the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations 
with one another.” From now on, these nations announced, “the settlement or solution of all 
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise 
among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.” Eventually, sixty-four nations 
would join the Pact. A satisfied William Borah declared the Kellogg-Briand pact “the only kind 
of treaty the United States could sign.”1206 
                                                          
1205
 Leinwand, 122-123. Vinson, 132-148. 
1206





 But first, of course (and as Borah well knew), the Treaty had to get through the Senate. 
To make it happen, the peace movement again moved into full gear. “The women of this 
Nation,” argued Carrie Chapman Catt, “are more united in their endorsement of this treaty than 
we have ever known them to be on any other question.” Beginning in September, Catt pushed 
each affiliate of the Committee on the Cause and Cure of War to get their senators on record as 
supporting the pact. At each meeting of the Committee, of which there were over 10,000, a 
resolution calling upon the Senate to pass the treaty was adopted – Laid end to end, Catt told 
Borah, these 10,000 resolutions would stretch almost two miles. While Catt remained doubtful of 
its potential impact on ending war, the Pact, she argued, “will go far to prepare the way for 
disarmament. Such a treaty…must produce a psychological reaction that will give a new 
viewpoint to politics and lend a bolder spirit to disarmament conferences.” It was, in short “a 
mighty stride toward peace.”1207 
 
Like the original Outlawry plan, the Kellogg-Briand Pact had its share of critics. “It did 
not seem possible that the State Department could have been spending its efforts on a project so 
obviously absurd as this one seemed to be,” Walter Lippmann scoffed in the New York World, 
arguing it was ridiculous that “Europe should scrap its whole system of security based on the 
enforcement of peace and accept in its place a pious, self-denying ordinance that no nation will 
disturb the peace.” The Kellogg-Briand Pact and “the renunciation of war,” he concluded, were 
“excellent devices for stopping wars that nobody intends to wage.” Former irreconcilable James 
Reed of Missouri deemed the Pact an “international kiss,” while former Wilson ally Carter Glass 
of Virginia, while agreeing to vote for ratification, was “not willing that anybody in Virginia 
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think that [he was] simple enough to suppose that it is worth a postage stamp in the direction of 
accomplishing a permanent peace.”1208 
 
Nonetheless, since its opponents presumed it was at best a harmless rhetorical gesture, 
the Senate ratified the Treaty 85-1 in January of 1929. (The sole no vote was John J. Blaine of 
Wisconsin.) It went into effect the following July, after all the original signatories had ratified it.  
“I think it is not too much to say that the Kellogg Pact, “declared Judge Florence Allen, “would 
not have been ratified in this country if women had not been voting.” Democratic Senator Robert 
Wagner of New York, elected to that body in 1926, was similarly moved. While he thought the 
treaty should have gone farther – it “fails to denounce war as a crime” and “fails to outlaw war,” 
he pointed out correctly – Wagner suggested the Kellogg-Briand Pact “gives basis to the hope 
that public opinion, successful in its first effort at treaty making, may push on to more substantial 
victories.” “Here, at last,” he argued, “we have a treaty which may be said to have its birth in 
popular initiative and its approval in a popular referendum.”1209 
 
Jane Addams also thought the pact a much-needed victory for the increasingly troubled 
progressive engine of enlightened public opinion. “This comprehensive treaty,” she argued in 
1930, “illustrates, as nothing in all history has done, the genuine movement for peace taking 
place all over the world. It has been endorsed and ratified by government officials and voted 
upon favorably by hard-headed, even by hard-boiled politicians.” Nonetheless, Addams thought, 
there was still much hard work to do. “The difficulties ahead lie in the enforcement of this high 
resolve and unless it is to prove an example, like the Prohibition Amendment, of government 
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action outrunning public opinion, every effort for popular backing must be made along both 
educational and empirical lines.” The enforcement problem would rear its head the following 
year, when Japan attacked one of its fellow signatories, China, in Manchuria, beginning the 
terrible conflagration that would come to be known as World War II. But even before then, there 
were signs that the “parchment peace” would not hold. In the first vote taken after the treaty’s 
ratification in January 1929, despite the vociferous objections of Senate progressives and the 
peace movement, the Senate appropriated $274 million for fifteen new heavy cruisers.
1210
  
The Temptations of Empire 
 
 
Before he passed away too soon in 1919, Walter Weyl had warned in The End of the War 
that America is “as likely to become imperialistic as are other nations.” “After the war, we too 
have a victory to win, over ourselves,” Weyl wrote. “Unless we achieve that victory, here, at 
home, we may become an aggressive and imperialistic power, a menace to the nations…”: 
 
[W]e have been gradually strengthening our strategic positions in the approved English, Russian, 
and German manner. We have acquired Hawaii to protect our Western shores, the Canal Zone to 
permit the passage of our warships from Atlantic to Pacific, and finally, in order to maintain our 
supremacy in the Caribbean and to guard the Canal Zone, we have taken over Porto Rico, a few 
naval stations in Cuba, and the Danish West Indies, and have acquired a quasi-protectorate over 
Nicaragua, Hayti, and Santo Domingo. We seem to be moving toward some form of domination, 
open or concealed, partial or complete, over all Caribbean countries. Moreover, while 
strengthening our defenses, we have also begun to enter the phase of financial imperialism… 
Today, we are coming into a new phase in which, unless we change conditions, we shall desire to 




“The war,” Weyl concluded, “has immensely increased this danger of an eventual 
American imperialism…Never before have we been so likely to become a danger to ourselves 
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and to the world. It is no man’s fault nor even the nation’s, but the inevitable result of our own 
economic development.” Walter Lippmann wrote similarly in 1926. “We continue to think of 
ourselves as a great, expanding world power,” he noted. “Our imperialism is more or less 
unconscious.” In the years after the war, America’s potential imperial entanglements moved into 
the visible realm, as progressives who had felt cheated by the sordid realpolitik that had ended 
the war to end all wars now saw bad intentions and economic determinism rife throughout 
America’s diplomacy. ‘Our State Department,” wrote Frederick Howe, “was thinking in terms of 
oil in Mesopotamia, of oil in Mexico, of gold and railroads in Haiti and Santo Domingo.”1212 
 
The peace progressives in the Senate were inclined to agree. In fact, one of the reasons 
they remained distrustful of entangling alliances was because, in the words of George Norris, 
even “we ourselves have not shown the right kind of spirit that a civilized country ought to show 
to those who are weak and those who cannot defend themselves.” William Borah thought it 
telling in 1922 that “[w]henever a dependent people are discovered to be in the possession of 
vast natural resources…immediately some great nation feels a benevolent desire to go in there 
and lift them up. I do not believe in that doctrine at all. I think each people have in a measure got 
to work out their own salvation.” Throughout the decade, Norris, Borah, and other progressive 
nationalists would work to uphold not just the independence and integrity of the United States, 
but the self-determination and nationhood of other countries as well. “The peril to the white 
race,” Borah argued in 1925, “is not the yellow or the brown race, but the oppressive and 
imperialistic attitude of the white race toward these races.”1213 
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The 1920 election had furnished a prime example of that imperialistic attitude when 
Democratic vice-presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt had openly bragged of writing the 
Haitian constitution. In fact, United States Marines under the command of Admiral William 
Caperton and General Smedley Darlington Butler, a grizzled veteran of everything from the 
Philippine War to the Boxer Rebellion (and thus nominally under Roosevelt, as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy) had occupied and effectively run the country since 1915, when they were 
sent in to restore order after the overthrow and violent death of Haitian president Vibrun 
Guillame Sam, the seventh president of Haiti in seven years. After dissolving the legislature and 
rewriting the Haitian constitution, General Butler and the Marines worked to prop up the foreign 
investment-friendly puppet regime of Sudre Dartiguenave. In 1918, even as American attentions 
looked across the Atlantic to the war to make the world safe for democracy, Haitian insurgents 
known as Cacos rebelled. By the time the Cacos rebellion was put down in 1919, with the death 
of rebel leader Charlemagne Peralte, roughly 3000 Haitians (and possibly as many as 11,500) 
were dead, as were thirteen Americans. This massive discrepancy in the casualty rate, Oswald 
Villard argued, “was the completest proof that it was not war that was waged in Haiti.”1214 
 
In 1920, the situation in Haiti received a more thorough accounting in the American press 
thanks to James Weldon Johnson. Johnson conducted an investigation into the origins and 
conduct of the American occupation for the NAACP, which was subsequently published in The 
Crisis, The Nation, and as a standalone book, Self-Determining Haiti. “To know the reasons for 
the present political situation in Haiti,” Weldon explained, “it is necessary, among other things, 
to know that the National City Bank of New York is very much interested in Haiti…and that Mr. 
R. L. Farnham, vice-president of the National City Bank, is virtually the representative of the 
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State Department in matters relating to the island republic.” National City Bank (today, 
Citibank), Weldon explained, had taken over the Haitian National Bank in 1910, and since even 
before the 1915 coup had been using the power of the American government to protect its 
investment in the region. After going over the unsavory details of the American occupation and 
pacification, Johnson concluded that “[t]he United States has failed in Haiti. It should get out as 
well and as quickly as it can and restore to the Haitian people their independence and 
sovereignty.” Johnson’s reporting was buttressed by Herbert Seligmann, who told readers of The 
Nation how “Haiti has been regarded and has been treated as conquered territory…Machine guns 
have been turned into crowds of unarmed natives, and United States marines have, by accounts 
which several of them gave me in casual conversation, not troubled to investigate how many 
were killed or wounded.” 1215 
 
In fact, the United States Marines held both sides of the island of Hispaniola when 
Harding came into office. In 1916, one year after landing in Haiti, Admiral Caperton and the 
Marines entered Santo Domingo (today, the Dominican Republic) after the US-friendly 
government of Juan Isidro Jiménez Peraya fell to opposition forces. When Dominicans refused to 
recognize a puppet government similar to Dartiguenave’s in Haiti, Admiral Caperton abolished 




Taking advantage of the media furor that accompanied Franklin Roosevelt’s impolitic 
boast in 1920, Hiram Johnson called for a special investigation into both occupations in 
February, 1921. Around the same time, Oswald Villard, his fellow Nation editor Ernest 
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Gruening, and Moorfield Storey created the Haiti and Santo Domingo Independence Society to 
further press the issue. In response, the Senate authorized a special committee, the US Select 
Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, to investigate the twin occupations in Hispaniola. 
Chaired by Republican Medill McCormick of Maryland, the Committee conducted inquiries into 
both situations over 1921 and 1922. During these investigations, at which James Weldon 
Johnson and Ernest Gruening testified, the NAACP implored its members to demand of 
Washington that they “withdraw the United States army from Haiti and…treat black republics in 
the way white republics want to be treated.”1217  
In The Nation, meanwhile, Gruening publicized the revelations of atrocities – “murder of 
women and children, wholesale killing of prisoners, torture with red-hot irons, the ‘water cure,’ 
arson, robbery, violence of every kind – they constitute a stain on American honor. If this report 
does not arouse the American people then its conscience is indeed dead.” The New Republic was 
only slightly more measured: “There is nothing in the worst annals of imperialism to exceed the 
savage callousness of the behavior of our forces in Haiti, as charged by responsible men and 
never refuted.” But even though the records of the special committee came to several thousand 
pages, the fix had been in all along. Senator McCormick had written an article in 1920 entitled 
“Our Failure in Haiti,” which argued that “[w]e are there, and ought to be there for twenty 
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This was not good enough for the progressives in the Senate. “I confess I am at an utter 
loss to understand the policy of this government toward Haiti and Santo Domingo,” Senator 
Borah wrote a friend in 1922. “It is not only impracticable should we view the matter wholly as a 
matter of expediency, but more than that, it is contrary to every principle which we profess as a 
government or as a people.” To another correspondent, Borah lamented that “we are wandering 
these days from those principles without which we cannot continue as a republic.” Borah thought 
“the manner of our taking possession of the Island and the method by which we have governed 
the Island are intolerable under any theory of our constitutional government.” What is more, he 
believed the people of Haiti “are capable now [of self-government], and so do they.” In short, he 
argued, “the whole Latin –American countries look upon us as imperialistic, cruel, and 
hypocritical…by reason of such acts as ours in Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo. [A small 
force of American troops had been stationed in Managua, Nicaragua since 1912.] This is one of 
the main reasons why it seems to me so essential that we change our policy, not alone for the 
sake of our own honor and for the sake of our principles, but also for the sake of the friendship 
and esteem of the whole South American continent.”1219 
 
In early 1922, the Senate progressives rallied around an amendment to the naval 
appropriations bill put forward by William King of Utah that would cut off all federal funding 
for the Haitian occupation. King, a Wilson Democrat, admitted he did not want to litigate the 
origins of the invasion – he mainly just wanted to save some money in the naval budget. And so 
Borah took the lead, deeming the American occupation “sheer brutal despotism,” a “shameless 
tyranny,” and “exactly the authority which any military despot has over a helpless people” – all 
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fueled by predatory financial interests. “We go to Haiti ostensibly to restore law and order,” he 
scoffed, and “[w]e immediately begin the wrecking of their form of government” The uplift 
argument was a canard as well, Borah said, since even in America, in “one big city 90,000 
remained out of school last winter because they could not have the clothes necessary to enable 
them to go.” The United States was doing the bidding of the National City Bank, argued George 
Norris, taking up the standard, with “the American Navy and the American Army…the 
guaranties that the bonds shall be paid in full:” 
 
When we stand before the world as one of the leading nations of civilization and take advantage 
of a poor, weak, ignorant nation…and perform the little tricks that we have been performing 
there, we ought to withdraw in shame and humiliation. All these things are being charged up in 
history against us. All over South America they know about it, and we are gaining every day in 
the reputation…that we are trying to conquer the balance of this continent and that we intend in 
the end to take all without their consent under our flag and under our jurisdiction. It is no defense 





Nonetheless, many Senators otherwise sympathetic to the cause of exiting Haiti, such as 
Joseph France of Maryland, thought it an unwise precedent to dictate foreign policy through the 
power of the purse, since “general legislative matters should not be passed upon in connection 
with appropriations bills.” Others thought it prudent to wait for the McCormick committee to 
offer its final report. And others still, particularly those of the Southern Democratic persuasion, 
had no desire to vote on the independence of a majority black nation. And so the King 
amendment went down to defeat, 43-9, with a goodly part of the Senate abstaining. Among the 
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Despite the failure of the King amendment, progressives continue to rally on the issue of 
Haiti. In April 1922, Nation editor Ernest Gruening – who had become personally invested in the 
fight – released a report condemning the Haiti occupation under the auspices of the Foreign 
Policy Association, which included the signatures of Zechariah Chafee and Felix Frankfurter. 
The following month, he organized a May Day speech at Carnegie Hall on the issue by William 
Borah, which drew a crowd of 3500 and a nationwide audience by radio. (Borah calling the 
actions of the Marines “a disgrace to the American people” precipitated a minute-long ovation. 
In response, supporters of the occupation placed a full-page ad in the New York Herald praising 




For his part, President Harding had campaigned against imperialism in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic in 1920, even before Franklin Roosevelt’s blunder. Discussing the issue 
with candidate Harding on the Marion front porch in August, 1920, James Weldon Johnson 
noted that the Ohio Senator “looked upon the Haitian matter as a gift right off the Christmas tree. 
He could not conceal his delight.” Soon thereafter, in a speech on August 28, 1920, Harding 
declared that Woodrow Wilson had “made enemies of those who should be our friends” and 
“rightfully discredited our country as their trusted neighbor.” If he became president, Harding 
promised never to “misuse the power of the executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated 
acts of unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of the little Republics of the Western 
Hemisphere.” And, in fact, President Harding did initiate the machinery for a military 
withdrawal from the Dominican Republic as early as June 1921, although troops did not leave in 
full until September 1924, and the nation remained in the nominal control of American financial 
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interests until well after. Harding and Secretary of State Hughes also pulled troops from 
Camaguey, Cuba in 1922, to help normalize relations there, and began laying the groundwork for 
a withdrawal from Nicaragua, which did not occur in full until August 1925. In December 1922, 
Hughes presided over a Washington conference of Central-American nations where all agreed 




But Harding never pulled troops out of Haiti -- if anything, American control over that 
nation was only consolidated during his administration. And so progressives spent the rest of the 
decade continuing to rail against American involvement there. In 1926, an interracial delegation 
of WILPF members, headed by Emily Greene Balch, and the International Council of Women of 
the Darker Races initiated their own investigation in Haiti. They released a report detailing the 
considerable corruption, human suffering, racism, and civil liberties abuses they uncovered as a 
result of “American despotism,” and called for an immediate end to the occupation. The situation 
in Haiti, they concluded, was “a clear challenge to all who believe in the fundamental principle 
upon which the United States is founded, that government should rest upon the consent of the 
governed.” The case of Haiti, the WILPF argued, illustrated that there “has been for some time a 
drift toward imperialism” by the United States, “a movement veiled and therefore the more 
dangerous, dangerous to the liberty of our neighbors, dangerous to our democracy.” 1224  
 
Nonetheless, at the end of the decade, progressives remained stymied by the continuing 
occupation. Though he thought it “a great wrong being consummated,” Borah lamented in April 
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1928 that he did not know “what we can do in the way of effectuating any change in the 
situation.” When riots broke out in Port-au-Prince in December 1929, Borah found himself 
making the same arguments on the Senate floor he had made seven years earlier in the fight over 
the King amendment, once again to no avail. As it was, the Haiti occupation would continue 





Senate progressives were slightly more successful in their campaigns against the two 
major Latin American policy flare-ups of the Coolidge years, in Mexico and Nicaragua 
respectively. Tensions with Mexico had been high since the Wilson administration, which had 
occupied Veracruz in 1914 and sent 4800 troops under General John J. Pershing to chase Pancho 
Villa in 1916. By early 1921, the new presidents of the United States and Mexico, Warren 
Harding and Álvaro Obregón, eyed each other warily across the border, with Harding (and his 
Secretary of the Interior, Albert Fall) eager to secure and enhance US oil interests in the region 
and Obregón, who had taken power in an election following a 1920 coup, desiring American 
recognition and help with his nation’s massive debt. (In the midst of a decade of revolution, 




In May 1921, Secretary of State Hughes offered the Obregón government recognition if 
they waived Article 27 from the Mexican Constitution, which argued that “natural resources in 
national territory are property of the nation” and thus could be nationalized and/or confiscated 
from American industries at any time. Mexico balked, but the seeds of a later deal were laid 
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when the Mexican Supreme Court deemed that Article 27 was not retroactive and did not apply 
to natural resources already being extracted. And so in 1922, Obregón’s finance minister, Adolfo 
de la Huerta and Thomas Lamont of JP Morgan, speaking on behalf of an international coalition 
of bankers (and, by extension, the United States government) agreed to a deal in which Mexico 
would, among other things, begin to pay back its debts and agree to re-privatizing their railroads. 
The following year, in the Bucareli Treaty of 1923, the United States agreed to recognize the 
Obregón government in return for certain concessions, including an agreement that Article 27 
did not apply to United States oil ventures begun before 1917. (As part of the deal, oilman Edwin 
Doheny – the largest US oil interest in Mexico – magnanimously threw in a $5 million loan for 




Before the treaty could be ratified, however, Obregón’s successor as president, Plutarco 
Elías Calles, threw it out, and began moving to aggressively implement Article 27 against 
American oil interests, including demanding they exchange their land titles for fifty year leases. 
New Secretary of State Frank Kellogg then swung into action, declaring that Calles’ actions, 
“lacking in the essential elements of justice usual in the law and procedure of nations,” struck “at 
the very root of the system of property rights which lies at the basis of all civilized society.” 
Kellogg’s fits of pique stirred the Senate progressives to action. “The truth is,” William Borah 
told a group of journalists in December 1926, “that effort is being made to get this country into a 
shameless, cowardly, little war with Mexico.” Arguing that oil interests likely intended to “steal 
oil lands in Mexico without anybody knowing it, or anybody finding it out,” George Norris 
introduced and passed a resolution calling upon the State Department to release all 
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correspondence pertaining to the issue of American oil titles in Mexico, while Borah asked 




By then, the situation in Mexico had been compounded by a slowly unfolding crisis in 
Nicaragua. In 1925, one year after the election of a fusion government consisting of 
Conservative Carlos Solórzano as President and Liberal Juan Sacasa as Vice-President, the 
contingent of American Marines that had been stationed in Managua since 1912 finally left 
Nicaraguan soil. But, the following year, violence erupted again when the loser in that 1924 
election, an even-more Conservative Emilio Chamorro, led a coup that forced Solórzano to 
resign and Sacasa to flee to Guatemala. As a result, Calvin Coolidge sent troops back into 
Nicaragua to restore order – by the spring of 1927, 3000 Marines were stationed there. Since US 
policy was not to recognize coup-created governments (as agreed in the non-binding 1922 
Washington Conference), Chamorro resigned in favor of an ally, Adolfo Díaz. This Díaz 
government was then recognized by Secretary Kellogg and the Coolidge administration, even 
though Liberal forces under the deposed Juan Sacasa had by then set up an alternative 
government. When Sacasa appealed to Kellogg for recognition, the Secretary of State replied 
that Díaz was now head of Nicaragua and that, if he threatened otherwise, America “could not 
consider him other than a revolutionist.” Complicating matters even further, when the Marines 
arrived, the Liberals were well on their way to retaking Managua, and so now American forces 
faced the unenviable task of buttressing the Conservative Díaz government, while the Calles 
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Progressives were surprisingly divided on the renewed Marine presence in Nicaragua. 
Recent events, argued Walter Lippmann in the New York World, proved that Nicaragua was “not 
an independent republic, that its government is the creature of the State Department, that 
management of its finances and the direction of its domestic and foreign affairs are determined 
not in Nicaragua but in Wall Street.” Burton Wheeler declared that the Coolidge administration 
was “simply bullying the Nicaraguan people because Nicaragua is a small nation,” and submitted 
two resolutions, one calling for recognition of the former Solórzano-Sacasa government and the 
other calling for an investigation into concessions given to American firms in the region. But 
Borah – while publicly breaking with the administration by calling for recognition of the Sacasa 
government -- thought that, in this case, American troops had been rightfully called back in to a 
tense situation to protect American lives and property, and that they should withdraw as soon as 
the situation was “reasonably safe.” Either way, progressives were fearful that, in George Norris’ 
words, Coolidge and Kellogg were “anxious to make what they call a ‘firm stand’ in Nicaragua 
in order to impress Mexico” -- in other words, that the Nicaraguan standoff would devolve into 




Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at Borah’s request on January 
12, 1927, Kellogg aggravated his public relations problem by making the ill-advised mistake of 
pulling a Palmer. Presenting a report entitled “Bolshevik Aims and Policies in Mexico and 
Central America” Kellogg argued that “the Bolshevik leaders have had very definite ideas with 
respect to the role which Moscow and Latin America are to play in the general program of world 
revolution” In short, Kellogg argued, the Calles and Sacasa governments were an arm of the 
Comintern in Moscow. Their overarching ambition: To “set up as one of their fundamental tasks 






the destruction of what they term American Imperialism as a necessary prerequisite to the 
successful development of the international revolutionary movement of the New World – Thus, 
Latin America and Mexico are conceived as a base of activity against the United States.”1231 
 
Kellogg was virtually laughed out of the room. “[E]ver since the Swedes up in Minnesota 
threw him out of the Senate,” wrote Burton Wheeler, “Kellogg has been seeing a red behind 
every bush.” Soon thereafter, Wheeler, attacking Kellogg’s “faulty logic” and “fevered 
imagination,” called on Kellogg to resign. The New York Times attacked Kellogg’s “singular 
lack of perspective” and thought it “humiliating” that the State Department “stands in dread of 
the hands of Soviet Russia.” In a series of editorials, Walter Lippmann argued that what was at 
work throughout Mexico and Latin America was the “desire to assert the national independence 
and the dignity of an inferior race,” and that “‘the thing which the ignoramuses call bolshevism 
in these countries is in essence nationalism, and the whole world is in ferment with it.” “All this 
talk by ‘Nervous Nelly’ of communistic plots and propaganda,” wrote Harold Ickes to Hiram 
Johnson two days after the hearing, “gives me a feeling, half of amusement and half of illness. 
Bolshevism is the most famous red herring of all time.” The bigger issue here, thought Ickes, 
was that “[w]e paint ourselves as the most peaceful country in the world, we criticize other 
nations for foreign aggression, for imperialism, for disregarding the rights of weaker nations and 
yet we reveal ourselves as being no less a bully than the greatest bully of them all.”1232 
 
Two weeks after Kellogg’s testimony, on January 25th, 1927, Borah helped to steer a 
resolution put forward by Arkansas Democrat and Senate Minority Leader Joseph Robinson 
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calling for arbitration with Mexico, which passed the Senate 79-0. (This was a weaker version of 
a resolution put forward by Lynn Frazier of North Dakota, which attempted to block Coolidge 
sending in the armed forces during a congressional recess.) Borah then called for the Foreign 
Relations Committee to investigate the situation directly. When his own committee rejected the 
proposal on a 10-8 vote, Borah corresponded with Calles directly, asking him for the same 
information he had requested of the State Department about American oil interests operating in 
Mexico. This Calles provided, prompting administration regulars to call for Borah’s prosecution 
under the Logan Act. “As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” Borah replied 
to one heckler in New Haven who had brought up the charge, “I have a right to get my 
information from any source I wish. This I propose to do, and I know of no power that can stop 
me. We have not yet got Mussolini in the United States.” Borah would spend the rest of the year 





By this point, Coolidge and Kellogg were looking for a graceful exit from both foreign 
policy snafus. And so the president appointed JP Morgan banker (and his Amherst college 
classmate) Dwight Morrow as the new Ambassador to Mexico and former Taft Secretary of War 
Henry L. Stimson as Coolidge’s man in Nicaragua, both of whom were given the latitude to 
reach any deal possible. “My only instructions,” Coolidge told Morrow, “are to keep us out of 
war.” To Stimson, the president asked that “[i]f you find a chance to straighten the matter out, I 
want you to do so.” Kellogg had one additional reservation for Stimson: Whatever arrangement 
he came to should not have to go through the damnable Senate.
1234
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Young Bob La Follette thought the appointment of a JP Morgan banker to sort out the 
Mexico situation was “the most flagrant avowal of domination by the international bankers 
which any President has ever dared to make.” (For his part, Borah endorsed the move.) But as it 
turned out, Morrow was the right man for the job. Bringing such leading lights as Charles 
Lindbergh (eventually to become his son-in-law) and Will Rogers to Mexico City as part of his 
charm offensive, Morrow managed to enamor himself with the local population and convince the 
Calles government to accept an agreement roughly akin to the earlier Bucareli compact – Oil 
companies could hold titles on lands acquired before 1917, and would have to procure leases for 
those acquired after then. By 1928, passions had eased greatly along the border, and Morrow 
could happily call Calles, deemed a Bolshevik agent by the Secretary of State only a year 
previously, “the best President the country has had since [Porfiro] Díaz.”1235 
 
While the situation in Mexico slowly resolved, the tensions did cause two press 
brouhahas of note. First, when Calvin Coolidge grew tired of anti-administration articles on the 
issue from the New York World and other outlets, he called for reporters to clear all their stories 
on Mexico with the government before publication. “It has not been the custom in America to let 
government officials edit newspapers,” replied an irate Walter Lippman. “It is not going be the 
custom”: 
 
‘There is a name for the kind of press Mr. Coolidge seems to desire. It is called a reptile press. 
This is a press which takes its inspiration from government officials and from great business 
interests. It prints what those in power wish to have printed. It suppresses what they wish to have 
suppressed. It puts out as news those facts which help its masters to accomplish what they are 
after. Its comments on affairs consist in putting a good face on whatever the interests which 
control it are doing. It makes no independent investigation of the facts. It takes what is handed to 
it and it does what it is told to do.”1236  
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Meanwhile, Senator George Norris was incensed to discover while reading a Hearst 
newspaper in late 1927, that he, William Borah, Bob La Follette, and Thomas Heflin had all been 
on the Calles government’s payroll – Norris had apparently received $350,000 in the total of 
$1.2 million in bribes. A special Senate committee soon followed, which found that the charges 
had been conjured out of thin air. Nonetheless, Norris took the opportunity to read his reply to 
William Randolph Hearst into the Congressional Record. “A fair analysis of the recent articles 
published in the Hearst papers,” Norris declared, “…that you are not only unfair and dishonest, 
but that you are entirely without honor. These articles show, on the face, a constant attempt…to 
practice deception on the American people…[and] to excite an animosity and a hatred on the part 
of our people against the Mexican Government.” Norris declined to sue Hearst, who apparently 
had been trying to recreate the same publishers’ magic that had helped to furnish the Spanish-
American War. In any case, the following year, when it was reported that Norris and Borah had 
both been paid $100,000 each from the Comintern in Moscow, the same Senate committee 




While Dwight Morrow managed to defuse a second Mexican war, Henry Stimson faced a 
heavier lift. When he arrived in Nicaragua, he found the Díaz government on its last legs and the 
Liberal forces sure to overrun the capital city were it not for the presence of the Marines. Since, 
the last time American troops had withdrawn, “the country learned nothing in the way of self-
government and within twenty five days…there was a coup d’etat,” Stimson thought the answer 
for Nicaragua lay in “constructive American intervention which would endeavor to lead the 
country nearer to self-government.” And so he struck a deal with the Díaz government, the 
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Samasa government in exile, and the top Liberal general, José Moncada, known as the Tipitapa 
accords, that the current government would step down and that American forces would oversee a 
fair election in 1928. Thus, Stimson told the State Department in May, 1927, “the civil war in 
Nicaragua is definitely ended.”1238 
 
Unfortunately, one of General Moncada’s lieutenants, Augusto Sandino – whom Stimson 
had dismissed as a member of the “bandit fringe” – refused to abide by the deal and began to 
escalate his guerilla attacks on American troops and Nicaraguan Conservatives. As the situation 
became increasingly violent, Coolidge dispatched additional troops under General Frank McCoy 
to oversee the “election-monitoring” efforts in Nicaragua, raising the number to 3700 Marines 
in-country, accompanied by five cruisers and 1500 sailors offshore. Meanwhile, the rhetoric in 
the Senate grew more heated. The Sandinists were only “called bandits,” declared progressive 
Senator C.C. Dill of Washington, “because they would not sell their ammunition and their right 
to fight for what they believed to be self-government in their own country.” Burton Wheeler 
argued Sandino’s forces were fighting for “exactly the same principles of liberty and free 
government” as the patriots at Lexington and Concord.1239  
 
George Norris, comparing Sandino’s guerilla army to Washington at Valley Forge, asked 
why American Marines were there “to destroy human life, to burn villages, to bomb innocent 
women and children from the air.” The answer, he argued, was to teach Nicaragua “not to 
contravene the rights of American oil companies.” The United States Marines, the Senator 
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maintained, should not be “a collection agency for Wall Street or any other interest,” and those 
who gambled in Nicaragua have “no right to ask the Government to go to war in order to collect 
it.” As it was, by acting “as a Great Colossus,” America’s troops in the region were trampling 
“under military foot every doctrine of democracy” and besmirching the nation “with bloody 
disgrace.” And Borah, who supported the Sacasa government-in-exile rather than the Sandino 
insurgency, conceded that American Marines until 1925 “had kept in power those who 
represented not the people…so much as the foreign capitalists who were investing in Nicaragua.” 
That being said, he alone of the peace progressives argued for maintaining the troops in 
Nicaragua until the election – Otherwise, “we would leave the Liberals in Nicaragua absolutely 
subject to the dictation and the power of those who had driven them out prior to the time that 
Díaz had become president.”1240 
 
In the end, the 1928 election was won by General Moncada of the Liberals – and yet 
Sandino’s guerilla campaign persisted. Over the course of that year, Wisconsin Senator John J. 
Blaine had put forward two resolutions of note – the first arguing that American citizens and 
industries abroad had to obey the laws of their location, and the second – like the King 
amendment on Haiti in 1922 – calling for a proscription on funding the military effort in 
Nicaragua as of Christmas 1928. Both went down to defeat, but on February 22
nd
, 1929, C.C. 
Dill introduced a variation on the latter amendment once again, arguing that, with the Nicaraguan 
election come and gone, it was time to stand down. Dill’s amendment passed 38-30 before 
administration forces figured out what was going on and – after leaning heavily on South 
Carolina’s two Democrats to change their vote or lose $350,000 for Charleston Harbor – re-
voted the amendment down in a special session the following day, 48-32. This, historian Robert 
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David Johnson notes in his study of the peace progressives, “marked the first occasion in 
American history on which a branch of Congress had cut off funding for an overseas military 
conflict still in progress.” Nonetheless, US Marines, while beginning to draw down in 1931, 
remained in Nicaragua until January 2
nd
, 1933 – one day after the inauguration of Juan Sacasa, 
the recognized president at last. The following year, Augusto Sandino would be assassinated, in 
violation of a safe-conduct agreement, by Nicaragua’s US-trained National Guard, headed by 
Anastasio Somoza – soon to be the dictator of Nicaragua for two decades.1241  
 
Surveying the events in Mexico and Nicaragua with Hiram Johnson in January 1927, 
Harold Ickes called into question the American behavior that he thought precipitated both 
diplomatic crises. To Ickes, the “Nicaraguan situation…[was] particularly distasteful”: 
 
I haven’t seen anything to date to prove the assertion that our intervention in that country was 
necessary in order to protect American lives and property. Even in cases where American lives 
and property are endangered I have often wondered to what extent our government should go in 
order to protect our business adventurers. If I go into another country because I see a chance of 
making an extraordinary profit it would seem to me that I ought to be willing to assume whatever 
personal risk is involved. Of course, there are practical limits to any theory, but, generally 
speaking, I don’t see why you should be called upon to spend your money and risk your life to 
protect me in my deliberately chosen pursuit of large profits. 
 
But waiving this point…Why do we have to land marines, censor news, disarm inhabitants, and 
chase belligerents in Nicaragua?...What concern is it of ours and what right have we to decide for 
the Nicaraguans at the point of a pistol who their president should be? It seems to me that the 
furthest we have the right to go is to assure ourselves that whoever is in control of the 
government, legally acquired American rights will be safeguarded. It is difficult for me to believe 
that such assurances could not have been secured from Sacasa as well as from Diaz. 
 
We all hate a bully and this country of ours seems to be occupying very completely the role of a 
bully with respect to Nicaragua. Of course, there is no doubt about our being able to determine 
the result in that country, but it looks to me to be a case of losing even if we win. We will lose in 
the accumulation of distrust and misunderstanding that we will add to throughout Central and 
South America. We will lose even more in world opinion because we will be accused, and justly 
so, of cant and hypocrisy…. 
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Is American to be committed to an indefensible policy in Nicaragua merely because a nervous 
Secretary of State and an inadequate President commit us to that policy without our knowledge or 
consent? That is the theory on which ghastly wars have been waged and millions of men slain 
throughout the ages. Who are Coolidge and Kellogg? Why should they have the right and power 
to sign in blank a check against the moral and spiritual resources of America that America is 
bound to honor although America has not been consulted? Why should we back them up merely 
because they have made fools of themselves and are playing fast and loose with our foreign 
affairs? What a salutary thing it would be for future Coolidges and Kelloggs if America, instead 
of following through on a course which America did not chart, should order these misguided 
pilots of ours to take a different tack… 
 
The administration complains of Mexican aid and comfort given to Sacasa. Why hasn’t Mexico 
as much right in Nicaragua as we have?...As to Mexico I haven’t any doubt that matters will be 
adjusted to the satisfaction of the Standard Oil Company…What right have we to dictate to 
Mexico its policy with reference to the holding of lands and mineral and oil rights? 1242 
 
 
“I hope that some day, some time,” Ickes concluded, “some great power will really point 
the way to international understanding, good-will and peace by its own real consideration of the 
rights of other nations and by its forbearance under seeming provocation. I wish the United 
States might be the country thus to point the way. If we don’t do it, if we continue to bully 
weaker nations, what real hope is there that the world can ever be composed of anything but 
selfish, grasping, warring nations?”1243 
 
That was the question that progressives would continue to grapple with over the course of 
the decade. And it didn’t apply only to the nations of Latin America.  As best they could, the 
progressive nationalists in the Senate tried to accord the American rights of self-determination 
and non-interference to all nations who desired them. “How shall the rights of small nations be 
guarded or maintained?” Borah told the Jewish Congress in 1927. “It is not war between the 
great powers but the spoliation of the weak nations which seem the most vital and imminent in 
international affairs at this time.” This included the colonial assets of the French and British 
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Empires.  “In my opinion,” Borah wrote in 1925, “there will never be any peace among the 
Syrian people or in that region of country until the specific pledge made to the Syrian people 
during the war is in good faith carried out. The Syrian people are entitled to their independence 
and to the right of self-government and the pledge have being made to that effect should be 
kept.”1244 
 
In April 1921, one month into the Harding presidency, George Norris put forward a 
resolution protesting the continued British suppression in Ireland. While Britain was acting in 
“violation of every rule of war, peace, or humanity,” the Irish, according to Norris, deserved to 
be accorded “the same freedom, the same liberty that by the will of Almighty God and the 
sacrifices of our forefathers we ourselves enjoy.” Norris had previously served, along with Jane 
Addams, Frederic Howe, and Norman Thomas, on the American Commission on Conditions in 
Ireland, also known as the “Villard Commission” due to its primary backer, which had 




That same month, Robert La Follette followed with his own resolution forcing the 
Harding administration to recognize Irish independence, arguing that America must lead in “the 
establishment of new nations throughout the world founded upon the consent of the governed.” 
(Henry Cabot Lodge bottled it up in committee.) And Senator Borah – who thought “that too 
much praise cannot be given for the service which the Irish race in America rendered to America 
in the League fight” – argued “it is for the interest of England, certainly for the interest of 
Ireland, and for the interest of the peace of the world, that the Irish question should be settled in 
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accordance with 700 year old demands of Ireland…So long as they exist as a people, they will 
demand their liberty…I voted for the independence of the Philippines,” he concluded, “and I 
would like to see the Irish free.” The following year, 1922, saw the Irish Free State – minus six 
provinces in Ulster – created. India received less attention than Ireland from the Senate 
progressives, but it did not go completely unnoticed. Wisconsin Senator John J. Blaine 
continually urged the Senate to pass a resolution supporting India, “mindful of the struggle for 
independence that gave birth to our Republic,” and blaming the British for “the most atrocious 
conduct known to history.” It never passed. 1246  
 
Perhaps the best example of the peace progressives’ agnostic approach to other nations 
during the decade was their fight to extend recognition to Soviet Russia, a nation on which 
progressive views ran the gamut during the Twenties. On one hand, Woodrow Wilson, in one of 
his last published essays, argued that the Bolshevik revolution was a cautionary tale for the 
democracies of the world. “The world has been made safe for democracy,” the former president 
argued, “But democracy has not yet made the world safe against irrational revolution. That 
supreme task, which is nothing less than the salvation of civilization, now faces democracy, 
insistent, imperative.” On the other was muckraker Lincoln Steffens’ oft-quoted statement after a 
trip to Bolshevik Russia, “I have seen the future, and it works!” and the effusive endorsements of 
the regime by Social Gospel ministers like Harry Ward and Sherwood Eddy.  “[I]f what I have 
seen with my ears and heard with my ears in Russia is Bolshevism,” wrote W.E.B. Du Bois from 
Moscow in November 1926, “I am a Bolshevik.” At the very least, Jane Addams argued in 1930, 
“it would seem obvious that the most important condition for the peaceful and fruitful 
development of the world would be at the lowest, a theory of live and let live between countries 
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organized on different economic systems.” That is the theory which the Senate progressives tried 




As noted earlier, Johnson, Borah, La Follette, and Norris, among others, had all been 
harsh critics of Wilson’s Polar Bear Expedition in 1919.  “I can’t help but believe,” Borah told 
one constituent, “that the most short-sighted, selfish policy that was ever practiced toward one 
people by another, has been the policy of this Government toward Russia from the hour the old 
regime broke down.” The Idaho Senator thought “our sacrifice of our boys in Russia the most 
remarkable instance of wholesale murder that has ever took place by reason of the action of a 
free government. We have no business in Russia. There is positively no justification for our 
being there.” When told that this position made him a potential Bolshevik lover, Borah argued he 
had not “defended the…Bolshevists unless it be considered defending them to have objected to 
sending our troops there to shoot them down. While I do not believe in their practices I do not 
consider it our business to go there and engage in bloody riots with them.”1248  
 
Arguing for recognition of Russia throughout the decade (to no avail), Borah continually 
made the point that the behavior of the Bolshevik regime in Russia was irrelevant. “For one 
hundred and fifty years we traded with Russia at a time when she we governed by an autocratic, 
militaristic and brutal regime,” he noted in 1920. “We never complained of the fact that the Czar 
was in the habit of putting his people into Siberia to freeze and die in exile, and that he was 
shooting them when they became restless about their conditions; we kept on trading. In other 
words, we have never made the question of our trade depend upon whether the government was 
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a government we liked or not, and no sane people ever did such things.” Three years later, Borah 
told a constituent that recognizing Russia, “instead of helping bolshevism…will tend to destroy 
bolshevism. Anything which restores normal conditions will help to destroy bolshevism. 
Bolshevism has been greatly aided and helped by the course which the Allies have pursued 
towards Russia since the war.” Nonetheless, Borah contended, the question of how recognition 
affected bolshevism was beside the point: 
Of course, wrongs have been committed in Russia. No one defends them. But that is not a 
controlling proposition in the matter of recognition. We have recognized Turkey for the last 
hundred years, didn’t even break with her during the War, and yet, under official authority, 
literally thousands of Christians have been murdered in Turkey by the Turkish government. On 
the day that the priest was condemned to execution, thirteen Germans were shot down in 
Germany, unarmed and helpless, by an invader. That didn’t have any bearing upon our continued 
recognition of France. For years and years the British government shot and killed Irishmen, 
priests and everybody else, but it didn’t cause a break with our government.1249 
 
 
In sum, Borah, argued, “[t]he basis of recognition rests upon a principle wholly aside 
from these cruelties which may be practiced.” Harold Ickes thought similarly. “I believe Russia 
should be recognized,” he told Hiram Johnson in December 1923. “I had always thought that it 
was a well-established principle of international relationships that the question of recognition 
depended upon the apparent stability of the government of the country proposed to be recognized 
and not upon the form of government of that country…We never had any difficulty in 
recognizing the Tsarist regime; we never recalled our Ambassadors when pogroms were 
instituted against the Jews; we have recognized the bloody Turks and yet we cannot recognize 
Russia which, even if mistakenly and haltingly, is reaching out toward a popular form of 
government.” As Burton Wheeler put it after a 1923 visit to Russia – during a long Senate recess 
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that also saw Robert La Follette, Edwin Ladd, and Smith Brookhart visit Moscow – the USSR 
appeared to be “the most stable government in Europe today,” and thus deserved American 
recognition. Besides, Wheeler later explained, “I had discovered on my trip that Britain and 
France were buying cotton from us and reselling it to the Russians at a profit…it was silly for us 
not to recognize the Soviets when doing business with them might help pull us out of a growing 
depression.”1250 
 
While Borah never succeeded in extending recognition to Soviet Russia, his attempts led 
the Kremlin in Moscow to think of the Idaho Senator as their most likely ally in the United 
States. As historian Robert David Johnson put it, Borah in the late 1920’s “functioned as a de 
facto Secretary of State in dealing with the Soviet Union,” working to release American 
prisoners, end the persecution of Catholics, and otherwise interact with the regime while Frank 
Kellogg and Hoover Secretary of State Henry Stimson remained silent. In fact, Borah held a 
similarly sterling reputation in China, where his “reputation for liberalism and anti-imperialism,” 
noted one correspondent, “was nowhere greater.” 1251  
 
Over the course of the Twenties, from the Nine-Power Treaty on, Borah had argued that 
the Open Door was “contrary to the spirit of the times and the modern conception of national 
integrity.” When the Kuomintang nationalist movement began to take hold and Senators worried 
about Bolshevik influence, Borah argued that, as in Mexico and Nicaragua, it was not radicalism 
“but the spirit of nationalism which is aflame.” And he wasn’t bashful about attacking the bad 
behavior of American interests in the Middle Kingdom, such as when he called the “American 
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Chamber of Commerce…part of the imperialistic combine which would oppress and exploit the 
Chinese people and charge the result of their offenses to someone else.” “The truth is that 
China,” Borah argued in 1925, “tortured and demoralized by the imperialism of a few nations 
beginning with the vicious opium war and running down to this day, has at last, like the worm, 
turned. Unless these imperialistic nations see fit to conform their practices in the future with the 
wave of nationalism in China, we have only seen the beginning of this trouble.”1252  
 
When Kellogg briefly dispatched American Marines to Shanghai in 1927 to protect 
Americans there, Borah urged the State Department not to use the opportunity to interfere with 
Chinese politics. “The most magnificent scene in the world is to see a great people, after years of 
turmoil and strife and oppression by outside powers, coming into their own,” Borah proclaimed. 
“The nationalistic spirit, in my judgment is uniting these people and I look to see them ultimately 
accomplish their complete redemption as a great power and take their rightful place among the 
family of nations.” George Norris, meanwhile, asked the Coolidge administration to declare that 
“we sympathize with those who believe that foreigners should not make laws for an unwilling 
people, simply because they are too weak to defend themselves.”1253 
 
Instead of engaging in entangling alliances or the building of empire, Borah and the 
peace progressives, in Jeffersonian fashion, urged the State Department to recognize all nations’ 
rights of self-determination and non-interference, and then to conduct trade with them. The “one 
fundamental thing which must be done in order to restore anything like economic sanity or 
business prosperity in this country,” Borah argued soon after the war, was to “restore trade 
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relations with the different nations of the earth, and get things back to normal conditions in the 
world of commercial trade..” That following year, he argued the best path to prosperity and 
normalcy was for the Harding administration “to find markets for our products. That can only be 
done by opening up the channels of trade between all Nations of the world. There are some 
people in this world who would rather see bankruptcy than to trade with the Russian 
government…There are those who would rather see bankruptcy than to restore immediately and 
promptly our business relations, and therefore our trade relations, with Germany – and they have 
largely had their way. But you will pardon me for saying I have not been one of them.”1254 
 
It is for this reason that Borah, unlike many of his allies in the farm bloc, resisted the 
Emergency Tariff of 1921, and why he was the only Republican vote against the Fordney-
McCumber Tariff of 1922 (although Norris and La Follette, both abstentions, said they would 
have also voted against the bill.) “It would be like putting a porous-plaster upon a cancer,” Borah 
argued in 1921. “Tariff is alright. The principle is alright. But the things from which we are 
suffering now are not to be cured in that way…What we want is the restoration of trade 
throughout the world.” The idea of higher tariffs, Ickes told Hiram Johnson similarly, “leaves me 
stone cold. I thought it was axiomatic that a creditor nation must of necessity be a free trade 
nation, but it seems we are going to prove all history and economic theory wrong.”1255 
 
They were and they weren’t. “A creditor nation unwilling to absorb more imports than 
exports,” historian William Leuchtenburg noted in The Perils of Prosperity, “the United States 
maintained world trade by private investment of dollars abroad.” As waves of tourists, flush with 
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cash, visited the Old World, “American dollars,” writes Leuchtenberg, “developed rubber 
plantations in the Dutch East Indies, built American branch factories in Scandinavia, mined tin in 
Bolivia, and drilled oil wells in the Middle East.” Between 1919 and 1929 around $12 billion 




For one, this made for a deeply unstable world economy, almost entirely dependent on 
continued capital investment abroad by the United States and American corporations. When that 
capital flow dried up at the onset of the Great Depression, the world economy collapsed soon 
thereafter. For another, American investment overseas led to an explosion of multi-national 
corporations. The decade saw over $4 billion in direct investments overseas, and by 1929 over 
1300 corporations owned wholly or in part by American interests were active in Europe. For 
decades, progressives had tried to constrain bad behavior by their ancient adversary, the Trust, 
by either growing the American government to regulate them (the New Nationalism) or breaking 
them up into smaller parts (the New Freedom). But now, even as Senate progressives worked to 
maintain the inviolable integrity of nations, corporations were spilling over and beyond the 





In the Commerce Department, the Great Engineer was semi-cognizant of both of these 
world-historical developments. In March 1922, Hoover and Hughes pushed Harding to issue a 
series of federal guidelines for loans overseas – While there was no penalty for non-compliance, 
from now on foreign loans, it was argued, ought to be approved by the State Department first. 
Hoover wanted this government oversight to make sure the money was going to efficient, 
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worthwhile, and constructive endeavors, while Hughes didn’t want private money undermining 
diplomatic attempts to isolate the Soviet Union or other potential adversaries. Either way, 
government oversight of loans was extensive, but not particularly effective at regulating the flow 
of capital. Hoover was also worried that the growth of corporations with multi-national holdings 
would eventually result in stronger global competitors and American jobs shipped overseas, and 
he urged these businesses to voluntarily make investments that were also in the public interest – 
say, investing in the infrastructure of underdeveloped China rather than backing the 




Hoover’s fears for America’s long-term future proved as prescient as his ability to alter 
the behavior of business interests was ineffective. The money – much to Hoover’s consternation 
– pooled where the easy, low-risk profits where, not where it may have potentially made most 
sense from a diplomatic or public interest perspective to invest. Despite government oversight of 
loans and Hoover’s prodding, “[a]t no time in the 1920s,” notes historian Warren Cohen, “did the 
government exercise effective control over American economic activity abroad.”1259 
 
The sheer importance of American capital to the global economy had one additional 
effect as well. It enmeshed America in the dealings of the rest of the world as thoroughly as any 
alliance, pact or League ever could. Senator Borah was right to worry, as he told Albert 
Beveridge in 1921, that “[i]mperial finance is…as objectionable as militarism.” Because even as 
he and the other Senate progressives worked desperately to avoid entangling alliances or 
imperialistic behavior in the political sphere, the flow of money in the absence of normal trade 
created for America, in Cohen’s word, an “Empire Without Tears,” in which “the dollar, if not 
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the flag, could be found wherever the sun might shine at any given moment.” By the end of the 
decade, Cohen writes, “[o]fficially or otherwise, the government of the United States had to 







In the same 1927 letter to Hiram Johnson that Harold Ickes, discussing Nicaragua and 
Mexico, bemoaned imperialistic and “bullying” behavior by the United States and lamented that 
America was not leading the way to “international understanding, good-will, and peace,” Ickes 
also took a brief digression into the status of Japanese immigrants. “I have always believed that 
California was well within her rights in forbidding the Japanese to own land,” Ickes told one of 
the authors of that particular policy. “I don’t believe American culture and Japanese culture can 
effectively amalgamate and for that reason California was performing a real service to the whole 
country in setting up a barrier on the Pacific Coast. I believe in letting foreign nations alone and 
in asserting our own right to be let alone…[I]f our national and state governments choose to 
exercise their unquestioned sovereign power to limit or to destroy altogether the rights of 
foreigners in this country than other countries have exactly the same right with respect to 
Americans and American rights within their national domains.” 1261  
 
In other words, a restrictive immigration policy here at home was perfectly in keeping 
with the anti-imperialism and nationalism that informed progressives on other matters. “I am in 
full sympathy with your plan and your purpose,” William Borah told John S. Chambers, 
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chairman of the executive committee of the Japanese Exclusion League of California, in 1921. “I 
am in favor of saying to Japan courteously, but conclusively, that while we respect her as a great 
nation and shall always be glad to live in terms of utmost harmony with her, we will absolutely 
determine who shall own property and be citizens of this country.  Even if Japan objected to this 
treatment of her former citizens, Borah told another constituent, “there is one thing that every 
people must reserve absolutely, and that is the right to say who shall hold real estate within the 
Nation’s boundaries and who shall be admitted as immigrants.”1262 
 
The Senate progressives’ blindness on the issue of immigration was a tragic lacuna in 
their otherwise humanist philosophy, and their discussions of the issue often exposed the limits 
of their tolerance. To take just two examples, George Norris argued for “more stringent laws to 
bar the undesirable foreigner” and Borah attempted in 1927 and 1928 to add Mexican 
immigrants to the 1924 restriction act, since it “was a mistake to limit certain other countries to 
the quota and leave Mexican immigrants out. We certainly do not want them as citizens.” But 
they were not alone in this unfortunate oversight.
 
Even before the World War, as settlement 
house workers like Jane Addams extolled the “immigrant gifts” new arrivals brought to 
American life and writers like Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne were singing the praises of 
group differences and the cosmopolitan American of transnational stock, there had been 




 “Freedom of migration from one country to another, The New Republic opined in 1916, 
“appears to be one of the elements of nineteenth-century liberalism that is fated to disappear.” In 
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the first fifteen years of the twentieth century, over fifteen million immigrants had entered the 
United States, many of them from Southern and Eastern Europe. Now, suggested TNR, with 
“[t]he responsibility of the state for the welfare of its individual members…progressively 
increasing,” American “democracy…cannot permit…social ills to be aggravated by excessive 
immigration.” These sorts of philosophical musings were soon amplified and exacerbated by the 
hyper-nationalism and anti-German hysteria of the War period, which saw even the ostensibly 
progressive President of the United States declare that the “infinitely malignant” Hyphenates 
must be “crushed out.” (Wilson carried this attitude into the postwar period: “Hyphens are the 
knives that are being stuck into this document,” he lamented of the Versailles Treaty.)1264   
 
Meanwhile, across the country, American citizens were bombarded by George Creel’s 
Committee of Public Information with grotesque caricatures of the German Hun in the midst of 
rapine, and the Enemy did not appear to make a friendly neighbor. “Shall we permit the bestial 
hordes who ravished Belgium women [sic] and bayoneted little children to make their homes 
where American womanhood is sacred and where innocent childhood is loved?” asked the 
National Civic Foundation in 1918. “There is no doubt,” Jane Addams wrote after the dust had 
settled, “that the immigrant population in the United States suffered from a sense of ostracism 
during the war, which, in spite of their many difficulties, their sorrows and despairs, they had 
never encountered in such universal fashion.”1265 
 
Adding further fuel to the fire were the theoretically science-based warnings of writers 
like amateur anthropologist Madison Grant, whose 1916 volume The Passing of the Great Race 
– which aimed to “rouse…Americans to the overwhelming importance of race and to the folly of 
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the ‘Melting Pot’ theory” – remained a popular book into the early Twenties. Dividing the 
peoples of Europe into the “Alpine,” “Mediterranean,” and “Nordic Races,” Grant warned that 
“the American [had] sold his birthright in a continent to solve a labor problem. Instead of 
retaining political control and making citizenship an honorable and valued privilege, he intrusted 
the government of his country and the maintenance of his ideals to races who have never yet 
succeeded in governing themselves, much less anyone else.” As a result, “the man of the old 
stock is bring crowded out of many country districts by these foreigners, just as he is today being 
literally driven off the streets of New York City by the swarms of Polish Jews. These immigrants 
adopt the language of the native American, they wear his clothes, they steal his name, and they 
are beginning to take his women, but they seldom adopt his religion or understand his ideals.” In 
short, Grant argued, “democracy is fatal to progress when two races of unequal value live side by 
side.”1266  
 
Grant’s fears were further expounded on by Harvard-educated history professor Lothrop 
Stoddard in his 1920 book The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy. (Grant 
wrote the introduction.) “We stand at a crisis – the supreme crisis of the ages,” Stoddard told his 
readers. “If white civilization goes down, the white race is irretrievably ruined. It will be 
swamped by the triumphant colored races, who will obliterate the white man by elimination or 
absorption…if the present drift be not changed, we whites are all ultimately doomed.” 
Fortunately, “the horrors of the war, the disappointment of the peace, the terror of Bolshevism, 
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To meet this race crisis head-on, along with thoroughly revising “the wretched Versailles 
business,” and forsaking “our tacit assumption of permanent domination over Asia,” Stoddard 
prescribed immigration restriction right away. “[E]ven within the white world, migrations of 
lower human types like those which have worked such havoc in the United States must be 
rigorously curtailed. Such migrations upset standards, sterilize better stocks, increase low types, 
and compromise national futures more than war, revolutions, or native deterioration.” Grant and 
Stoddard’s pseudo-scientific arguments were given even more play in the Saturday Evening 
Post. Immigration left unrestricted, influential Post writer Kenneth Roberts argued, would make 
of Americans “a hybrid race of people as worthless and futile as the good-for-nothing mongrels 
of Central American and Southeastern Europe.” Among the millions of converts to this line of 
reasoning was Calvin Coolidge, who affirmed in 1921 that “biological laws show us that Nordics 
deteriorate when mixed with other races.”1268 
 
The virulent racism in these arguments is impossible to ignore, and the works and 
popularity of Grant and Stoddard testify to historian John Higham’s thesis in his classic 1955 
study of immigration and nativism in America, Strangers in the Land – that the immigration 
restriction of the “Tribal Twenties” was the end result of an upsurge in racial nationalism in 
America. Certainly the Red Scare, with its anti-Bolshevik hysteria, well-publicized mass 
deportations like Palmer’s Ark, and accompanying explosion of “100% American” 
organizations, compounded the hyper-nationalism of the war, made “Americanization” a very 
different project, and sent immigration restriction well on the path to legislative victory. Because 
A. Mitchell Palmer “tried to throw the nation into a panic, making it believe that every 
immigrant was a potential Bolshevist and bomb thrower,” Edward Hale Bierstadt wrote in The 
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New Republic in 1921, “Americanization and anti-radicalism became interchangeable terms.” 
This lumping tendency drove Jane Addams to distraction, who railed against it in February 1920, 
as the fevers of the Scare were beginning to burn out. “The application of a collective judgment 
in regard to aliens in the United States is particularly stupid,” she wrote, since immigrants “are 
not only quite as diversified in their political opinions as those of us forming the remaining 
millions of the population, but they are in fact more highly differentiated from each other by 
race, tradition, religion, and European background then the rest of us can possibly be, even 
although we are as diverse as the cracker in Georgia and the Yankee in Maine.”1269 
 
But it is important to note that simple prejudice, however potent, isn’t the whole story. In 
fact, some of the targets of one-hundred-percenters’ wrath in 1919 and 1920 also backed 
immigration restriction, namely labor and the African-American community. “Every citizen of 
the United States should make protest against the influx of people from other countries,” AFL-
CIO head Samuel Gompers wrote in April 1921, since “[s]o many immigrants coming into this 
country will break down the standard of living of our people.” Gompers did not indulge in 
specious racial arguments to explain his stance. Rather, he saw unrestricted immigration as the 
sharp point of the spear that would eventually force the open shop on all of American labor. 
“Shutting out from our shores the poor of other nations and races is caused by the law of 
necessity and self-protection consequent upon our industrial system,” Gompers explained: 
 
Labor does not desire to erect a wall around our country and prevent the poor of other nations 
from entering. It does not declare that America is for Americans alone, but it does insist that there 
should be and must be some restriction of immigration that will prevent disintegration of 
American economic standards. 
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Those who favor unrestricted immigration care nothing for the people. They are simply desirous 
of flooding the country with unskilled as well as skilled labor of other lands for the purpose of 
breaking down American standards. You must not forget that if low wages, long hours of 
employment and unbearable working conditions are signs of prosperity China and India would be 
the greatest commercial and industrial countries in the world. They have no strikes in China. It is 
the utopia of the ‘open shop.’ America, however, where men are free to voice their desires for 
greater and still greater advancement in economic conditions, is the greatest country on earth. Its 





Similarly, A. Philip Randolph, soon to found the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in 
1925 and become a leading figure in the civil rights movement, argued in 1924 that “instead of 
reducing immigration to two percent of the 1890 quota, we favor reducing it to nothing…We 
favor shutting out the Germans from Germany, the Italians from Italy…the Hindus from India, 
the Chinese from China, and even the Negroes from the West Indies. This country is suffering 
from immigrant indigestion…It is time to call a halt on this grand rush for American gold which 
over-floods the labor market, resulting in lowering the standard of living, race-riots, and general 
social degradation. The excessive immigration is against the interests of the masses of all races 
and nationalities in the country – both foreign and native.”1271 
 
While opinion was not unanimous – the NAACP’s Walter White for example, opposed 
immigration restriction – Randolph was not the only prominent African-American leader 
thinking thus. As the Chicago Defender put it in January 1924, “It is vitally important to keep the 
immigration gates partly closed until our working class gets a chance to prove our worth in 
occupations other than those found on plantations. The scarcity of labor creates the demand. 
With the average American white man's turn of mind, the white foreign laborer is given 
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preference over the black home product. When the former is not available, the latter gets an 
inning.”1272  
 
Although he always remained dismissive of “the worship of the Nordic totem,” W.E.B. 
Du Bois also eventually came around to this way of thinking. Writing in January 1920, Du Bois 
called the push for restriction a “despicable and indefensible drive against all foreigners [to shut] 
the gates of opportunity to the outcasts and victims of Europe.” But by 1925, Du Bois wrote in 
The New Negro that “despite the inhumanity” of immigration restriction, “American Negroes are 
silently elated at this policy. As long as the northern lords of industries of the white land could 
import cheap white labor from Europe, they could encourage the color line in industry and leave 
the Negroes as peons and serfs at the mercy of the white South. But to-day with the cutting down 
of foreign immigration the Negro becomes the best source of cheap labor for the industries of the 
white land. The bidding for his services gives him a tremendous sword to wield against the 
Bourbon South and by means of wholesale migration he is wielding it.” In sum, Du Bois 
conceded, revisiting the topic again in 1929, “the stopping of the importing of cheap white labor 
on any terms has been the economic salvation of American black labor.”1273 
 
In any case, immigration restriction had a full head of steam behind it by the time of 
Harding’s election. Leading the charge in the House of Representatives was Republican 
Congressman Albert Johnson of Washington, a former newspaperman who had been elected in 
1912 after leading an armed revolt against an IWW lumber-mill strike in the community of 
Gray’s Harbor. Elected with a promise to run the Wobblies and other radicals out of the country, 
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Johnson had been chomping at the bit to pass immigration restriction since he had arrived in 
Congress, and he now found a sympathetic ear in President-Elect Warren Harding. To court 
German and Irish votes in 1920, Harding had downplayed most nativist talk during the election 
season, although he happily endorsed Asian exclusion while in California. Otherwise, Harding 
had usually placed the blame for “hyphenated-Americans” on “American neglect.” “We talked 
of the American melting pot over the fires of freedom,” he told one group of foreign-born 
visitors to the front porch in Marion, “but we did not apply that fierce flame of patriotic devotion 
needed to fuse all into the pure metal of Americanism.”1274 
 
Congressman Johnson moved a stopgap bill forward in the lame duck Congress following 
the 1920 election. That bill, suspending all immigration except for close relatives of resident 
aliens for one year, passed the House 296-4. Its Senate counterpart was introduced by William P. 
Dillingham of Vermont, who had chaired the Dillingham Commission from 1907-1911, a Senate 
investigation into immigration which ultimately declared that immigrants from Southern and 
Eastern Europe were less assimilable than other Europeans. Dillingham instead proposed a 
system whereby the number of European immigrants per year would be limited to five percent of 
however many immigrants of that nationality lived in America in 1910, according to that year’s 
Census. Immigration from Canada and Mexico was left untouched, as was immigration from 
Asia, which had already been snuffed out in years prior by the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and 
the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement with Japan. 1275   
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Dillingham’s bill also passed easily, and in conference the House dropped the total 
suspension plan in exchange for the yearly quota being lowered to three percent – thus allowing 
for approximately 350,000 immigrants a year. This bill then went off to the desk of Woodrow 
Wilson, who, for reasons unknown – be it post-election despair or a stricken conscience – chose 
never to sign it. Once Harding had entered the Oval Office, the Johnson-Dillingham bill was 
quickly introduced and passed – there was no recorded vote in the House, the Senate voted in 
favor 78-1 – and the new president signed it into law in May of 1921. “[T]he real un-
Americanism, therein the great treason,” Harding told the American Legion Weekly, had been 
native-born Americans not working to fully Americanize new immigrants. Nonetheless, “we 
must not take any more of these strangers in a given time than we can make comfortable.”1276 
 
 The Emergency Quota Act went into effect in June 1921, prompting chaos in American 
ports each month as dozens of steamships loaded with hopeful immigrants sprinted to the docks 
before the quota filled. Disgusted with the “gross injustice” of sending immigrants back who had 
liquidated everything they had just to get to America, Ellis Island Commissioner Frederick 
Wallis resigned in protest soon thereafter. Harding, noting his “own distress has been very great 
over some of the specific instances which have been reported to me,” urged his immigration 
officials to move inspections overseas to ensure a more humane application of the quota. When 
this system was put into effect, even strong opponents of immigration restriction, like Survey 
writer Edith Terry Bremer, conceded it was an improvement. “Thus,” she noted in 1925, “the 
fruitless breaking up of homes, the useless squandering of ‘toil money,’ and finally the sickening 
                                                          
1276
 Ibid. US State Department Office of the Historian, “The Immigration Act of 1924” 




anxiety ending in heart-break, a familiar experience for ‘detained aliens’ in the old scheme, is 
enormously decreased.”1277 
 
The 1921 Act, originally set to run for one year, was extended for two more years in May 
1922. In the meantime, Congressman Albert Johnson began pushing the House Committee on 
Immigration to work on a more permanent immigration restriction bill. Working with nativist 
luminaries like Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Kenneth Roberts, eugenicist Harry Laughlin, 
and well-connected New York Anti-Semite John B. Trevor, Johnson used the Committee to lay 




By early 1923, Johnson’s Committee had penned a bill which made the current system 
permanent, reduced the quotas from three percent to two percent, and moved back the Census 
basis for these quotas from 1910 to 1890, a year that saw considerably less in the way of 
immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. It also altered the calculation of the quota so that 
it was based on the total American population in 1890, rather than just the foreign-born 
population, further prejudicing the figures in favor of English, Germans, and Irish stock and 
against Poles, Slavs, Greeks, and Italians. In practice, this meant over 51,000 Germans, 34,000 
English, and 28,500 Irish could come to America every year. But the Italian quota dropped from 
42,000 to 4000, the Polish quota from 31,000 to 6000, the Greek quota from 3000 to 100. No 
nation in Africa could send over 100 people either.  In addition, immigration from Japan – 
already curtailed by the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement – was now officially banned.1279 
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With labor costs rising, irate business interests were able to get the bill stalled for a year. 
But by early 1924 the legislation passed through both houses of Congress easily – 322-71 in the 
House, 62-6 in the Senate – and was signed into law as “a protection to the wage earners of this 
country” by Calvin Coolidge in May. Secretary of Labor John Davis, a strong advocate of 
restriction, told Coolidge that “this is the most important [bill to] which you will attach your 
signature during your term. History will record it as one of the greatest acts of your 
administration.” The 1924 law had an immediate effect, slashing the number of immigrants 
entering the country by over half within one year, from 357,803 in 1923-1924 to 164,667 in 
1924-25. It would also mark the beginning of a forty-year-period when the doors of the nation 
were effectively closed to many of the huddled masses yearning to breathe free. As one 
triumphant Nordic enthusiast proclaimed after the vote, “The passage of the Immigration Act of 
1924 marks the close of an epoch in the history of the United States.” The law had a particularly 
tragic effect in the years before and during World War II, when Jewish families frantically trying 
to escape the genocide taking place in Germany and Eastern Europe were turned back from safe 




And yet, many of the usual progressive suspects heartily endorsed the restriction bills. 
William Borah, Hiram Norris, George Norris, Smith Brookhart, and Thomas Walsh all voted for 
the 1924 act, while Robert La Follette and Burton Wheeler were among the abstainers. “I am in 
favor of a drastic immigration law to prevent this country from being overrun with foreigners,” 
Borah told one constituent. Among the many letters of support the Senator received for this 
position were a thank you from the Allied Patriotic Societies of America, a proclamation from 
the workers of Omaha Nebraska endorsing restriction “in justice to ourselves and the Nation that 
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will over run with the unemployed,” and one warning from Brooklyner Mary Cannon, who told 
Borah “women have the vote now, and if the Government does not do something to stop these 
beasts entering the country, there will be trouble for the politicians, and the Italian vote, the 
murderer’s vote, will be a negligible quantity.” Harold Ickes, meanwhile, declared himself “in 
favor of excluding the Japanese as well as other Asiatics. I think we have enough of a race 
problem in this country now,” he wrote in 1924, “and we haven’t shown enough aptitude in 
dealing with that one to warrant us in undertaking an additional burden of the same sort.”1281 
 
So who opposed the immigration restriction acts, other than the affected immigrants 
themselves? The most effective opposition at the time assuredly came from conservatives and 
business interests. Judge Elbert Gary, the apostle of the open shop, thought restricted 
immigration “one of the worst things that this country has ever done for itself economically,” 
while T. Coleman Du Pont chalked it all up to “sheer Red hysteria, nothing more.” Business 
groups lobbied Congress to recognize “[w]e need every respectable, ambitious and industrial 
person the world can spare,” while the Illinois Manufacturers Association argued that “the final 
action [by Congress] will have considerable to do with the success or failure of the open shop 
movement.” The Wall Street Journal also believed the push for restriction was a result of the 
unions, and wondered aloud in 1920, “[i]s there any connection between restricted immigration 
and the closed shop?” Senator LeRoy Percy of Mississippi, who had served on the Dillingham 
Commission, warned that “the crippling of the manpower of the nation is the one thing that will 
check its prosperity, check it effectually, and for an indefinite duration.” And Secretary of State 
Hughes, frowning at the bill for diplomatic rather than economic reasons, thought the 1924 Act 
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“a sorry business and I am greatly depressed. It has undone the work of the Washington 
Conference and implanted the seeds of an antagonism which are sure to bear fruit in the 
future.”1282 
 
In Congress, the most vociferous dissenters against immigration restriction were 
representatives from immigrant-heavy districts in the belt between New York and Chicago – 
perhaps most notably Congressman Fiorello La Guardia, son of a Jewish mother and Italian 
father, who thought restriction was “the creation of a narrow mind, nurtured by a hating heart” 
and who informed Secretary of Labor Davis that his enforcement of it was “cruel, inhuman, 
narrow-minded, prejudiced.” 1283  
 
The 1924 bill, La Guardia told the House, “is unscientific, because it does not fit with the 
economic condition of the country, because it is the result of narrow-mindedness and bigotry, 
and because it is inspired, prompted, and urged by influences…who have a fixed obsession on 
Anglo-Saxon superiority.” “Is not the country made up of immigrants no matter what period of 
history you take?” La Guardia queried his colleagues. When fellow New York representative 
Bertrand Snell condescended to La Guardia about the worthiness of his Northern and Western 
European stock, La Guardia replied that “I hope you can understand my pride when I say the 
distinguished navigator of the race of my ancestors came to this continent two hundred years 
before yours landed at Plymouth Rock.” When the tide began to turn for good, La Guardia 
offered an amendment to change the quota year from 1890 to 1920, but it was easily struck down 
before passage. Two years later, La Guardia was equally unable to stop another bill put forward 
by Albert Johnson that extended from five to seven years the time that any immigrant could be 
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deported for such reasons as insanity, “chronic alcoholism,” or “constitutional psychopathic 
inferiority.”1284 
 
In these battles, La Guardia did not fight completely alone. His Manhattan colleague, 
Congressman Samuel Dickstein – anticipating a trope of the Second World War – recounted to 
the House a tale of wartime bravery, and then gave the names of the eight heroic soldiers 
involved: “John Bilitzko, Lonnie Moscow, Aloizi Nagowski, Isaac Rabinowitz, Epifianio 
Affatato, Wasyl Kolonczyk, Daniel Mosckowitz, and Antony Sclafoni.” Minnesota 
Congressman Ole Kvale warned the House “of the kind of the hyphenates you had better worry 
about. A new breed that is fast springing up and they are your native-born, dollar-a-year, loud-
mouthed, flag-waving, 100% paytriotic graft-Americans. These and not your Americans of 
foreign blood and language are the menace to America today.” (Despite this zinger, Kvale voted 




Robert Clancy of Detroit was glad to see that so many “Members of this House with 
names as Irish as Paddy’s pig, are taking the floor these days to attack once more as their kind 
has attacked for seven bloody centuries the fearful fallacy of chosen peoples and inferior 
peoples.” He reminded his colleagues that, not so long ago, it was the Germans and the Irish who 
were the “riff-raff, unassimilables, ‘foreign devils,’ swine not fit to associate with the great 
chosen people.”  And a few urban papers – although assuredly not the New York Times – echoed 
the message of this handful of embattled representatives. The Brooklyn Citizen deemed the 
legislation “disgraceful and unworthy of America,” while the New York World argued the bill 
would mean the “closing the haven of refuge to the oppressed.” And the Boston Globe wrote that 
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“the immigrants coming into Boston” in 1921 have “a light in their eyes that is good to see and a 
smile that stirs the slumbering pulse of human brotherhood.”1286 
 
Among the old-line progressives, the figures most likely to be in sympathy with the 
arguments against immigration restriction were the settlement house and social workers who 
comprised the bulk of the readership of The Survey, most of whom spent their careers interacting 
with newly-arrived immigrants. “The Johnson bill,” it editorialized, “is based on an unfortunate 
racial animosity, is supported by unsound evidence, and would tend to undo the most earnest 
efforts for Americanization and international friendship.” In a February 1922 article for that 
magazine, “Americans by Choice,” John Palmer Gavit, attempted to destroy for good “the 
legendary presumption of some change for the worse in recent years in the inherent character-
quality of immigration to this country…There has been no such change.” Gavit then 
painstakingly explained the fallacies that had misguided the Dillingham Commission in 1907 – 
namely that the Commission never bothered to ascertain how long the immigrants they studied 
had been here. “The major, not to say exclusively controlling fact in the political absorption of 
the immigrant,” Gavit concluded, “is length of residence. The longer an individual lives in 
America the more likely he is to seek some active membership therein.”1287   
 
Similarly, a December 1923 article by biologist H.S. Jennings turned the pseudo-
scientific arguments of eugenicist Harry Laughlin back on the nativists. Looking at the “groups 
of the foreign-born who, in proportion to their share in the total population of the United States, 
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contribute the largest numbers of inmates to custodial institutions,” Jennings found that the Irish 
led in “Insanity” and “Dependency” and the English were first in “Epilepsy” and second in 
“Feeblemindedness.” “All the lines of evidence presented,” Jennings concluded, “thus converge 
upon Ireland as the chief source of defectives. The general upshot is of a character to discourage 
attempts to regulate immigration on the basis of race and nationality so far as Europeans are 
concerned. He would be a hardy politician who framed a law designed to discriminate against 
Ireland.”1288  
 
  Along with poking holes in the nativists’ arguments, writers in The Survey also worked to 
salvage some progressive form of Americanization. “Since the fevered days of the war there has 
been an immense amount of flag waving and drum beating in the name of Americanization,” 
Robert Bruère wrote in the April 1923 issue. But Americanization is “not flag raising and 
‘patriotic’ howling.’…[It] is a slow, patient and unsensational educative process.” True 
Americanizers, Bruère argued, citing the success of the California Commission on Immigration 
and Housing, “sought knowledge chiefly from the immigrants themselves. They respected the 
soul of the immigrant…They stood firmly against that form of Americanization ‘which hands to 
the immigrant some things which he is supposed to swallow. They sought to understand and to 
preserve ‘the best national cultural elements in art, literature, music, science, the crafts’ which 
the immigrants had to contribute to our American life.” In a series of 1920 articles deeming 
immigrants “the Strength of America,” Simon J. Lubin and Christina Krysto argued similarly. 
Americanization “should lift the inhabitants of America, foreign born and native born alike, to a 
plane which is worthy of the best nation, and in turn make that nation worthy of being the home 
of the best developed people.” But “patriotic perversion,” they argued, had made a “menace” of 
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the project: “It is only the political perverts of Americanization who would force citizenship 
upon anyone.”1289  
 
The Survey also continued its inquiries into how best to achieve Americanization, 
including publishing reviews in each issue on recent studies in the field. If “isolated zones could 
be prescribed for immigrants,” suggested John Valentine in March 1922, “so those of different 
nationalities should not be contiguous but interspersed with native American zones, the process 
of Americanization would work splendidly. Who can estimate the tremendous effect an 
American birthday party, for example, may have on an Italian boy?...A year of visits by social 
workers will not work such wonders as that neighborly invitation of the Jones to the kid of the 
Italian family who lives in the rear cottage next door.” However improbable Valentine’s specific 
plan, he and many others continued to argue in The Survey that, yes, immigrants were in fact 




On the eve of passage, Edith Terry Bremer wrote a scathing article for The Survey which 
tried to ascertain the “Human Consequences of the Pending Bill.” “On every fundamental 
premise,” Bremer argued, “this new bill strikes at important social attitudes upon which our 
democratic thought and social institutions have been built…The ‘Nordic superiority’ myth which 
has been floating about the halls of Congress for a long time, for which many congressmen have 
felt a sneaking friendliness while reluctant to recognize it in public, has suddenly become the 
basis of the immigration policy of what is still the greatest ‘receiving country’ in the world.” As 
a result of the “thinly veiled discrimination, which fastens the stigma of social incompetence, of 
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cultural inferiority” on all non-native-born Americans, Bremer warned, the world would feel 
intense “disillusionment and lasting bitterness.” Along with dividing families, disrupting labor 
markets and “normal assimilation processes,” and causing “personal disaster” to millions of 
people, “[t]his immigration bill would throw the wholesome social evolution in America into 
violent reverse. The United States is made to declare for discrimination. Sensitiveness, rivalry, 
suspicion are bred by it.” “This nation may be ‘saved for posterity’,” Bremer concluded, but “[i]t 
may be that our children will view matters in a different light. Perhaps posterity will not thank us 
after all.”1291 
 
As for the dean of social workers, Jane Addams once again saw the traumatic experiences 
of the war at work in immigration restriction. The Quota Act, Addams argued, was “the nation’s 
massive attempt to draw its traditional forces together.” It came about because, “as a nation we 
had become during the war overconfident of our own nobility of purpose and had learned to 
distrust all foreigners as ‘unworthy’… Self-righteousness has perhaps been responsible for more 
cruelty from the strong to the weak, from the good to the erring than any other human trait.” 
Along with Wilsonian hubris, Addams also wondered if the desire for conformity she herself had 
felt the brunt of was another reason for “our contemptuous attitude toward immigrants who differ 
from us…Everyone wants to be like his neighbors, which is doubtless an amiable quality, but 
leading to one of the chief dangers of democracy – the tyranny of the herd mind.”1292 
 
Still, Addams did suggest some silver linings to come from immigration restriction. For 
one, she wrote, “there is no doubt that whatever its evils the shutting off of immigration has 
given the immigrant groups already here, a breathing space.” For another, perhaps a subsiding 
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fear of encroaching immigrant hordes in America would help the country finally take the next 
necessary steps toward social progress. “The immigrant is continually blamed for conditions for 
which the community is responsible,” Addams argued: 
 
There is no doubt that America has failed to make legislative provisions against those evils as 
other countries have done, partly because the average citizen holds a contemptuous attitude 
toward the ‘foreigner’ and is not stirred to action on his behalf. This may account for the fact that 
the United States has been so unaccountably slow in legislation designed to protect industrial 
workers.  
 
For instance, if we compare our country with others in regard to Old-Age Insurance, the record is 
most astonishing. Some form of pension legislation for the aged has been enacted in fourteen 
countries since the beginning of the World War, and still a larger number secured such legislation 
in the two preceding decades. If we ask why the United States has been so slow in this world-
wide undertaking, may we not fairly say it is because we are less concerned for the old age of our 
immigrant laborer than the other countries are for their own kinsfolk, and we thus overcome the 





“Is our understanding slower for those whose background is alien to our own,” Addams 
wondered, “so that we have allowed ourselves to become indifferent to old people, surrounded 
too often by poverty and neglect, while Europe, out of its more slender resources, takes care of 
them?” 1294   
 
Addams’ question is a hypothetical one. Still, it is curious to note that, when America 
subsequently took on its own great social experiment in old age insurance, it occurred at a time 
when fears of an alien Bolshevism had been replaced with a begrudging regard for a homegrown 
Popular Front, and newly-arriving masses of immigrants could no longer be forced into the role 
of either scabs or scapegoats.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE DUTY TO REVOLT 
PROGRESSIVES AND THE ELECTION OF 1924 
 
“Very few are thinking of revolution, and yet in the minds of many Americans there is going on 
a process that is akin to revolution, since the Third Party Movement is an American substitute 
for revolution.” – George Henry Payne, 19241295 
 
“I like Silence and Success better than Socialism and Sovietism. Brains mean more to Business 
than a Brainstorm. They produce results without making so much noise. I prefer Coolidge to 
Chaos, and according to the present political situation, there isn’t any other choice in this 
election.”  – E. Bliss, Regal Shoe Company advertisement, 19241296 
 




Spurred by a seeming revival in progressive fortunes in the 1922 midterms and the 
unfurling revelations of systemic corruption in the White House, progressives in both the 
Republican and Democratic parties began to believe a sea change was possible in the 
election of 1924. But the death of Harding and ascent of Coolidge, the disastrous 
Democratic convention in Madison Square Garden, and the formation of an 
independent third party bid behind Robert M. La Follette would each work to scramble 
the political picture. The American electorate, seemingly on the verge of a repudiation of 
normalcy in 1922, would have to make a decade-defining choice between “Coolidge or 






As good a day for Warren Harding and the Republicans had been Election Day 1920, the 
midterm elections of November 1922 saw much of their earlier landslide undone, effectively 
knocking normalcy and the Grand Old Party squarely back on their heels. “The more than seven 
million majority given to President Harding has been wiped out,” lamented the New York Times. 
“The demonstration of disapproval for the Administration was unmistakable.” While they 
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retained control of the House and Senate, Republicans lost seven Senate seats and seventy seats 
in the House, cutting their Congressional majorities to ten and twenty-three respectively. TNR 
noted, with no small amount of schadenfreude, that “there will have to be a remarkable overturn 
in the next two years to make it possible for the Republicans even to consider Mr. Harding for 
the presidency again.” The GOP, they argued the following week, “can no longer count on 
putting through anything it pleases, with surplus votes to spare. It will have to look to its 
defences, through the next two years.” Democrats, meanwhile, were ecstatic at being back in the 
game, thanks in large part to yeoman’s work by their National Chairman, Cordell Hull of 
Tennessee. “What a wonderful victory we won in November!” exclaimed William McAdoo to 
Franklin Roosevelt. “But this is mere circumstance to what we can do to the Republican 
reactionaries and standpatters in 1924 if the Democratic Party convinces the country during the 
next two years that it is truly a liberal and progressive party.”1298  
 
McAdoo wasn’t the only person who saw a revival of progressivism in the 1922 returns. 
Old Guard Republicans were as troubled by the character of the returns as much as the sheer 
losses they absorbed. The first signs of trouble for the Harding administration emerged during 
the primary season, when Roosevelt Progressive Albert Beveridge knocked out Harding ally 
Harry New in the Indiana Senate primary, Gifford Pinchot squeezed out a Pennsylvania 
gubernatorial victory over the Penrose and Mellon machines, and Porter McCumber of North 
Dakota – namesake of the 1922 Fordney-McCumber tariff – lost his primary to Lynn Frazier, 
who quickly took a place alongside the Senate peace progressives. Also joining him on the left 
wing of the Senate in 1922 were Democrats Burton Wheeler of Minnesota and Clarence 
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Cleveland (C.C.) Dill of Washington, Henrik Shipstead of the Farmer-Labor Party, and 
Republicans Robert Beecher Howell of Nebraska and Smith Wildman Brookhart of Iowa. 
(Brookhart, who had won a special election to fill the seat vacated by William Kenyon when the 
farm bloc leader took a federal judgeship, explained that his middle-name “is my mother’s name, 
but it is also notice to the standpatters that I am one Progressive who won’t be tamed.”) And 
even as most Republicans struggled, Hiram Johnson and Robert La Follette coasted to easy 
victories. Now, bemoaned the York Times, “the balance of power will be held by the progressive-
radical group led by Senator La Follette.”1299 
 
The same dynamic held in the House as well. Veteran congressman Joseph Fordney, the 
other namesake of a tariff that many agrarian interests despised, lost the Michigan seat he had 
been holding for twenty-four years. In New York, meanwhile, Fiorello La Guardia – after 
fighting last-minute charges from his opponent that he was a secret Anti-Semite – won back the 
East Harlem seat he had resigned in 1919 to serve as President of the New York City Board of 
Aldermen. While nominally a member of the Republican Party, La Guardia explained to the New 
York World that “I stand for the Republicanism of Abraham Lincoln, and let me tell you that the 
average Republican east of the Mississippi doesn’t know anything more about Abraham Lincoln 
than Henry Ford knows about the Talmud. I am a Progressive.” To further underline the point, 
La Guardia declared on the day of La Follette’s primary victory in Wisconsin that “he was 
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always known as a radical, yet three-fourths of every reform and every forward-looking piece of 
legislation ever advocated by him have been written into the laws of this country.”1300  
 
Another New Yorker returning to his old job on Election Day 1922 was Al Smith, who 
destroyed sitting Governor Nathan Miller, the man who had beaten him two years earlier, by 
close to three to one. “Nowhere except in Wisconsin,” noted The Nation, “where the badgers 
seem to have tried to make it unanimous for their Bob La Follette – early returns gave him a ten-
to-one lead – did any candidate ride on such a tide of personal popularity.” (La Follette ended up 
winning 80% of the vote.) “The overwhelming personal triumph of Al Smith,” wrote a similarly 
enthused TNR, “is a testimony to the good judgment of men that a democracy exhibits when it 
gets a chance…It is not to be forgotten that Smith vetoed the Lusk bills when the panic over 
the imaginary revolution was at its height, while Miller signed them when the panic was abating 
and it would have been safe for him to follow the dictates of common sense.”1301 
 
 In short, the 1922 midterms, in historian David Joseph Goldberg’s eloquent phrasing, 
seemed an “Indian Summer” of progressivism. And while clearly happy about the results, the 
editors of TNR were at a loss to describe exactly what had happened on Election Day. On one 
hand, they deemed it “a convictionless, Tweedledum election – a triumph, not of liberalism or 
any other body of conviction, but of personalities and local issues, diverse and conflicting.” At 
the same time, they conceded “the voting is heartening and encouraging to all Liberals, for its 
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shows not only the spread of the agrarian movement but that all through the land the voters are 
thinking.”1302   
 
Agrarian discontent certainly had a lot to do with the intensity of the Republican rollback. 
By 1922, the economy had begun to recover from its post-war slump, but the general prosperity 
for which the decade is usually remembered had not yet begun in earnest. And regardless of the 
overarching trends, the nation’s farmers were in particularly dire straits, and would remain so 
throughout the decade. (Hence, the creation of William Kenyon’s farm bloc in the first place.)  
 
After a prosperous wartime for farmers, 1920 and 1921 saw over a million farmsteads 
undergo foreclosure or bankruptcy, as the purchasing power of farmers effectively collapsed 
thanks to domestic overproduction – a trend that would only be exacerbated by the adoption of 
farm machinery like tractors in the 1920s – and lessening European demand with the end of the 
war.  Wool dropped from 60 cents a pound in 1918 to less than 20 cents a pound in 1920. Corn, 
at $1.88 a bushel in August 1919, was 42 cents a bushel by late 1921. Wheat, once $2.50 a 
bushel, was less than a dollar a bushel by the same time. In this environment, the pro-business 
posture of the Harding administration was not looked kindly upon by the nation’s farmers, even 
at times when their interests seemed to coincide. Farmers had split on the Republicans’ high 
tariff policy: While much of the farm bloc supported it, the American Farm Bureau Federation 
thought it would raise the prices of farm equipment and raw materials, while discouraging crop 
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But it was not just agrarian interests angry at the Harding administration in 1922. While 
the White House scandals would not break until the following year, already the Republicans had 
been tainted by the Newberry case. In September, Harding had taken a stand for fiscal discipline 
and vetoed a widely popular $4 billion “Bonus Bill” providing all World War veterans with a 
bonus of $1 a day for time served in the army and $1.25 per day served overseas. (The attempt to 
override the veto fell four votes short in the Senate. Standing with the president on this issue 
were Borah and the farm bloc.) That same month, Congress passed the Fordney-McCumber 
tariff, opening up fault lines throughout the country as every business and farm interest in 
America lobbied to secure the most favorable rates for their given industry. Eastern seaboard 
Republicans and the Western farm bloc also spent much of the summer dueling over one of 
Harding’s personal pet projects, a proposed ship subsidy bill allocating $30 million to support a 
private merchant marine. And, perhaps most importantly, the summer and fall of 1922 had seen 
both the coal and railroad strikes flare up across the country and the administration respond with 
the Daugherty injunction, alienating laborers and suggesting to everyone that perhaps normalcy 
was not taking root. Once one factors in that the sitting president’s party normally loses 
congressional seats in a midterm election, and that 1918 and 1920 had both been wave elections 




Nonetheless, progressives were recharged by the apparent repudiation of normalcy at the 
ballot box. “We are really elated at the outcome of this election,” Oswald Villard wrote to 
Senator Borah, “and with the exception of one or two States, the results seem exactly what we 
should have wished. It’s a magnificent beginning, isn’t it?” Borah agreed “It was a most 
significant election indeed…We ought to get ready to do some great things during the next two 
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years.” “The recent election gave promise of renewed vitality for a force in American politics 
which has been submerged for many years,” TNR declared in an editorial entitled 
“Progressivism Reborn.” While the electoral reaction to Harding was definitely inchoate and not 
“a permanent conversion to progressivism…because it did spring up spontaneously in so many 
different localities without the benefit of any national agitation or any central direction, it may 
well prove to be the expression of a permanently effective popular political and social impulse. It 
may endure as no other revolt against stand-pattism has endured since the formation of the 
Republican Party.” 1305  
 
But, for this “New Birth of Progressivism” to achieve anything, progressives had to 
organize. “[T]oday the three most conspicuous insurgents in the Senate, Johnson, Borah, and La 
Follette, all play lone hands,” TNR had argued in an earlier editorial. This would not do 
anymore. “When Theodore Roosevelt became President he…nationalized progressivism by 
identifying in the minds of many of his fellow citizens American national fulfillment with a 
progressive outlook and program...It is the job of progressive leaders to undertake this 
conversion [once more]. Until they restore to progressivism the common meaning and impulse 




The three potential leaders earmarked by TNR agreed, but they themselves were not sure 
of the path forward. “[T]here will be stirring times in the next year or two,” wrote Hiram 
Johnson to Harold Ickes after the election, and “the way is open for Progressive activity and 
Progressive leadership.” But the “lines of the Progressive activity ought to be well marked…I 
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have grown very accustomed to hearing people talk about a ‘constructive program,’ but in the 
last few years, I have observed none. I would like a constructive program that would solve our 
economic ills and cure the pain of the world, but as I have said to you more than once, I haven’t 
either the ability or vision to perfect one. Unfortunately, my fellows seem to be in the same 
category.” The month after the election, to figure out that potential program, Senator La Follette 
convened his summit of congressional progressives in Washington in the hopes of forming a new 
controlling bloc. “There is an amount of political circumspection and good sense about this 
procedure which is rare in American progressive politics,” thought TNR. This “was a gathering 





Along with organizing in Congress, progressives also thought it was time once again to 
think about forging a third party comprised of farmers and laborers and fused together by 
progressivism.  “Labor is getting into a fighting mood,” suggested The Nation in August 1922, 
after the first wave of primaries. “The farmers are slowly beginning to awaken to their real 
opportunities.” “The farmers and the industrial laborers are suspicious of each other,” noted 
TNR. “Yes, but in less degree than formerly. The election of Shipstead in Minnesota shows that 
farmers and laborers can work together…The material for a new national democratic political 
movement is available.” William Allen White, who saw his frenemy, Governor Henry Allen of 
Kansas, go down to defeat for supporting the railroad strike, also thought it looked like “the 
discontented farmer and the aspiring laborer have got together.” So too did Frederic Howe, who 
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a few years later noted that “[t]he election of 1922 showed that labor could mobilize its power. It 
showed the possibility of union with the farmers.”1308 
 
By January 1923, TNR was even more strident for a new party along these lines. “As 
long as the progressives carry on their fight within the Republican and Democratic folds, they 
will find themselves frustrated…Progressivism has no meaning and no future, unless it becomes 
a permanently aggressive, challenging and leavening influence in American society and 
politics…All the important constructive movements in American politics have used new parties 
as their indispensable instruments.” In short, “it may take a long time to bring about an effective 
farmer-labor coalition, but come it eventually will…In order to accomplish its purposes the 
farmer-labor coalition will have gradually to broaden and nationalize its program…It cannot 
succeed unless it works a progressive outlook into the American national consciousness.”1309 
 
As it happens, some people were already working on it. 
Now is the Time… 
 
In September 1921, fourteen months before TNR’s call for a third party uniting farmers 
and laborers, the executive committee of the Socialist Party had sent out an invitation “To All 
Labor Unions, Farmers’ Organizations, and Other Economic Political, Cooperative, and 
Fraternal Organizations of the Producing Class.” “The present situation is so grave that all honest 
and progressive labor men must realize the necessity of some common understanding,” they 
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argued. “In this crisis the one imperative need is Unity. The forces of every progressive, liberal, 
and radical organization of the workers must be mobilized.”1310   
 
Soon thereafter, the heads of the sixteen largest railroad unions in America put out a very 
similar call to arms. “There has been no common understanding to bind the working of all walks 
of life together,” they declared. “For lack of this common understanding we have been divided 
and betrayed.” As such, the railroad unions invited the “progressive elements in the industrial 
and political life of our Nation…to discuss and adopt a fundamental economic program designed 
to restore to the people the sovereignty that is rightly theirs, to make effective the purpose for 
which our Government is established, to secure to all men the enjoyment of the gain which their 
industry produces.”1311 
 
This conference – the first Conference for Progressive Political Action (CPPA) – took 




, 1922. Attending this meeting were 
representatives from fifty labor unions, farmers groups such as the Non-Partisan League, 
delegations from the Socialist and Farmer-Labor Parties, and the progressive Committee of ’48, 
as well as a smattering of other reform organizations ranging from the single-taxers to the 
National Catholic Welfare Council. From this conference arose a general statement of principles, 
an “Address to the American People,” which followed the form of the Declaration of 
Independence, including a list of “repeated injuries and usurpations by the servants 
of…oligarchy in both the dominant parties”: 
 
They have stifled free speech, throttled free press and denied the sacred right of assembly. 
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They have sanctioned wholesale corruption of the electorate by seating in the Senate of the 
United States, Newberry, its most notorious beneficiary. 
 
They have used the Federal Reserve system, controlling the life blood of the nation’s credit, as an 
instrument to deflate and crush farmers and independent business men and cause nationwide 
unemployment. 
 
They have obstructed every honest effort to relieve the distress of Agriculture thus caused, and 
have used every influence to secure betrayal of the farmers’ interests. 
 
They have conscripted four million men and boys while they permitted corporations and 
individuals to extort unconscionable war profits and have sacrificed the soldiers’ just demands for 
equitable compensation to the dictates of Mellonism and the selfish interests of tax-dodging 
capitalists and war profiteers. 
 
They have abolished the taxes upon excess profits of corporations and have reduced the taxes 
upon the incomes of millionaires. 
 
They have squandered the resources of the nation in wasteful and fraudulent contracts and 
subsidies. 
 
They have permitted the railroads, the arteries of the nation, to be operated not for service 
but for speculative gain, and, after subsidizing them heavily and guaranteeing their income, have 
allowed them to be looted by financial manipulation and by contracts to corporations controlled 
by favored railroad directors. 
 
They have engaged in a campaign of ruthless imperialism in Haiti and San Domingo and 
have permitted the arms and resources of the United States to be used to crush nations and 
peoples struggling for freedom and self-government. 
 
They have through the Courts nullified righteous laws of state and nation for the protection of 
human rights and exalted judge-made laws above the statutes. 
 
They have permitted organized crimes and conspiracies of Trusts to go unhampered and have 
turned the sword of the Anti-Trust Law only against organizations of farmers and industrial 
workers. 
 
They have held in prison men convicted of no crimes and have pardoned without warrant 
notorious profiteers and monopolists. 
 
They have used the Army and the troops and police forces of states and cities to crush labor in its 
struggles to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 
 
They have prostituted the highest offices of government as channels of pernicious propaganda. 
 
They have surrendered Americanism to Garyism, creating new privileges and immunities 
for capital and trampling under foot the rights of man.
1312
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“We therefore, CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,” concluded the 
general statement, “declare that…[the] present usurpation by the invisible government of 
plutocracy and privilege must be broken, that this can be best accomplished by united political 
action suited to the peculiar conditions and needs of each section and state; and that to this end, 
we do hereby pledge ourselves to organize for the coming campaign in every state and 
congressional district so that this may become once more in very truth a GOVERNMENT OF 
THE PEOPLE,  FOR THE PEOPLE, AND BY THE PEOPLE.” To this end, the various 
assembled members of the CPPA went right to work. It “carried on a vigorous fight in the 
congressional elections of 1922,” reported the new organization’s secretary, Frederic Howe, 
three years later. “We prepared political instructions for primaries and elections; unions were 
circularized; the labor executives sent their best men into strategic States – Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, Iowa, Montana. They demonstrated real political ability. As a result, a half-dozen 
men were elected to the United States Senate, and nearly fifty to the Lower House.”1313 
 
While Howe downplayed their importance in Confessions of a Reformer, the Socialists 
comprised some of the CPPA’s most potent shock troops. As historian Kenneth MacKay noted 
in 1947, “the importance of the Socialists in the CPPA must not be minimized…They had the 
local organizations which could provide the framework for the construction of the new party, 
and, moreover, unlike many of the promoters of a progressive party, whose enthusiasm exceeded 
their experience, they had rich knowledge of how to conduct campaigns, in meeting the tactics of 
the old parties, in exchanging blow for blow in practical politics.” Perhaps most importantly for 
future purposes, the Socialists were already on the ballot all over the country, meaning the new 
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The month after the 1922 midterms, even as the Washington meeting of progressive 
members of Congress organized by Robert La Follette and Basil Manly of the People’s 
Legislative Service (also on the CPPA’s National Committee) drew most of the headlines, the 
CPPA reconvened in Cleveland, Ohio to begin discussing plans for 1924. This time, the 
organization adopted a short platform that included establishing direct primaries in every state, 
abolishing the electoral college, government ownership of the railroads, coal mines, and public 
utilities, price support for farmers, higher tax rates on the rich, payment of a veterans’ bonus, 
protective legislation for women, “State action to insure maximum benefit of Federal maternity 
and infancy acts,” and, in one of its most controversial planks, “that Congress end the practice of 
the Courts to declare legislation unconstitutional.”  The conference also tossed out four delegates 
sent along by the Worker’s Party – i.e., the Communists – in order to keep the new organization 
free from any taint of Bolshevism. (“The “SP” [Socialist Party] is trying to become the tail end 
of any sort of organization as an excuse to hide from the contempt of the working class of the 
nation,” seethed The Worker after this snub.)1315 
 
The biggest issue at the Cleveland meeting was on future strategy, with moderates – 
particularly the railroad brotherhoods – advocating a strategy of running primary candidates in 
the established parties, and the “Socialists, left-wings and the intellectuals” (including the Forty-
Eighters) desiring to establish an official, separate third party. A proposal put forward by the 
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Farmer-Labor Party arguing for “independent political action by the agricultural and industrial 
workers through a party of their own” was defeated by a vote of 52-64. Peeved by this result, the 
Socialists’ Executive Committee nonetheless voted 38-12 to stay affiliated with the CPPA, and 
assigned Morris Hillquit, Victor Berger, and Bertha Hale White as official delegates to the new 
organization. The Farmer-Labor Party, however, left the CPPA and called for a new meeting of 
organizations interested in a third party to convene in Chicago in July. There, the agrarian-
minded FLP was essentially the victim of an organized and well-orchestrated hostile takeover by 
the Worker’s Party, who held marching orders from the Comintern to prevent any endorsement 




 The CPPA would not meet again until February 1924. In the meantime, while the more 
conservative labor elements of the coalition gravitated toward the idea of nominating Democrat 
William Gibbs McAdoo, J.A.H. Hopkins and the Committee of ’48 looked to find an interested 
progressive standard-bearer for a third party challenge. While Robert La Follette was the natural 
choice, Hopkins presumed – based on his 1920 rejection of the nomination in Chicago and a 
1921 kerfuffle involving the People’s Legislative Service not reprinting articles from the Forty-
Eighters’ news bulletin – that the Wisconsin Senator was not interested. And so, in late 1921, 





In August 1922, a small public Borah boomlet emerged when The Nation – disgusted 
with the special interest grasping that had attended tariff negotiations in Congress – published an 
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editorial entitled “The Duty to Revolt,” urging the Idaho Senator to break away from the 
Republicans and lead a third party effort. “Who can read the news from Washington,” the journal 
asked, “and not feel that the time has come for men everywhere to raise the banner of revolt?”:   
Dishonest, incompetent to govern, without vision at home abroad, without any domestic program 
whatsoever, and without men of any moral or political stature – this sums up Democrats as well 
as Republicans. The only question of importance is how much longer the American people are 
going to be stupid enough sheep to stand it.  
 
All that the situation calls for is to plant the banner of revolt. There is no doubt whatever in our 
minds that if Senator William E. Borah should rise in his seat in the Senate and announce that he 
had cut loose from the body of death which is the Republican Party and would henceforth lead a 
new party, people would acclaim him as a Moses, even without waiting to read his platform and 
to assay it to see if it were liberal or radical or slightly progressive. 
 
The old parties are but creatures of a worn-out and rotten economic system. There is no hope 
from them. And yet the country is astir, waiting the signal for revolt. In this situation a great 
responsibility rests upon Senator Borah, to whom Liberals and Radicals and even many 
conservatives are turning as to a savior.”1318 
 
This editorial did not come completely out of the blue. In May of 1922, as the primary 
returns began to evince a progressive pattern, Ernest Gruening had told the Senator that “all eyes 
will be increasingly upon you…we hope the day will not be far off when circumstances will 
make it possible for you definitely and militantly to assume the leadership, either of a new party 
or one of the rejuvenated old parties.” To Villard, Gruening noted that Borah “thinks he is the 
man to lead the fight. There is no question about that.” In June, Borah confessed to one 
correspondent that “[e]ither one, or both, of the old parties must undergo a complete 
rehabilitation…or the people will organize another party.” That July, Borah made this same 
statement in public, telling The Literary Digest that while “maybe “out of the old Parties will 
come a new party under the old name,” he was “convinced…that there must be a new political 
party.” Later that month, after talking with the Senator, Oswald Villard told another 
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correspondent that Borah “is ready to cut loose as soon as the sinews of war can be organized 
and the plan is laid out.”1319 
 
And so, after publication of “The Duty to Revolt,” Villard passed the editorial along to 
Borah, with a personal note. “I am still firmly of the opinion that if you will raise the banner of 
revolt yourself the right means and a great army of workers will flock to you at once,” he told 
Borah. “Please live up to the responsibility which we have put upon you…and sound the tocsin.” 
Letters of support began filing in from across the country, including from newspaper editors 
Arthur Vandenberg of the Grand Rapids Herald and Frank Knox of the Manchester Union-
Leader. “I don’t know whether you will ever be President, but I do know you are big enough and 
courageous enough,” Knox wrote Borah. “In these days of wobbling, of indecision and 
ineptitude it is inspiring to have one clear voice whose tones are never shaded or softened by 
expediency.” In his responses to these, Borah mostly played it coy. “Questions pending here in 
the Senate have been so pressing and so momentous that I can say to you most candidly I have 
given my entire time and thought to them rather than to any Party movement,” Borah responded 
to one such missive, rather disingenuously. To Knox, he was more honest. “With reference to the 
third party, Frank,” he wrote, “a person would need about at least a million dollars to pay the 
actual necessary expenses of the organization. Now, I enjoy a salary of $625.00 a month. It costs 
me all the way from $800 to $1,000 a month to live. So I have concluded to dedicate the balance 
to the upbuilding of a third party.”1320  
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Also among the letter-writers to Borah after “The Duty to Revolt” was J.A.H. Hopkins, 
who had continued to work the Senator over on this issue since the previous November. On 
letterhead reading “The Committee of 48 functioning as The Liberal Party,” Hopkins urged 
Borah to share his thoughts about fronting the effort. “I think I understand perfectly well the 
reasons why you have refrained so far from stating anything about your future plans,” Hopkins 
told the Senator. “I hope, however, that you will appreciate that anything you care to say to me 
will be considered purely personal.”1321  
 
Again, Borah was gracious but noncommittal – This dance continued until the early 
months of 1923, when Hopkins thought it time to fish or cut bait. “[I write] very frankly to 
inquire,” Hopkins asked Borah in February, “whether you have reached any conclusion as to 
when and how the new party campaign for 1924 should be launched, [and] when approximately 
you will be ready to discuss this with us.” “You have assured me that you are thoroughly in 
harmony with what we are doing,” he wrote Borah the following month, “and you will 
appreciate the importance of putting me in a position of either being able to deny or affirm” the 
Senator’s involvement. Finally, Hopkins got a definitive answer: “With reference to the third 
party movement and how we can best promote the issues in which I am interested, I am only too 
anxious to discuss this,” Borah replied, putting the onus of the work on the Committee. No “man 
can afford to join a party and then declare himself a candidate for President…he ought to be 
drafted and there ought not to be any mistake about the drafting.”1322 
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Borah, it seemed, was ready to accept leadership of a new party if it looked to be 
demanded of him. In a face-to-face meeting in April 1923 – one which Hopkins afterwards 
transcribed from memory and had Borah review his recounting – Hopkins concurred with Borah 
that “a presidential candidate should not nominate himself but be drafted.” Borah, meanwhile, 
said he was “ready to be of service” to the new party, and was “willing to serve entirely 
irrespective of whether I am a candidate or not.” If the press asked what was going on, Borah 
would say that “the candidate should be drafted,” while Hopkins would say the Committee was 
“proceeding in a way that it seems to you necessary and that you have drafted me for your 
candidate.” In sum, Borah told Hopkins to “certainly” continue on the path outlined, as it “it will 
be the means of building up your movement, and I think if we keep in close touch with one 
another, there will be no difficulty in our agreeing as to what should be done and when we 
should do it.”1323 
 
After this meeting, Hopkins had new letterhead printed up that was emblazoned with 
“William E. Borah for President National Campaign Committee 1924” and included a box 
reading “Resolved: That the National Executive Committee of the Committee of ’48 hereby 
proposes SENATOR WILLIAM E. BORAH as the Presidential candidate of the Progressive 
voters of these United States in 1924 on the Platform of the Committee of 48.” But the Senator 
suddenly seemed to catch cold feet. He was not “a candidate for President and did not want to be 
so considered,” Borah wrote Hopkins one week after their April 6th meeting. “[M]y course these 
days is not the Presidential course.” Hopkins at first presumed that Borah “emphasizing the fact 
that you are not putting yourself forward as a Presidential candidate” was all part of the 
agreement – nudge, nudge, wink, wink – and so continued to proceed on “the matter discussed 
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with you in Washington the other day…I have already made great progress.” Over the next few 
months, Hopkins continued to remind Borah of their arrangement – “our talk in Washington” – 
and tried to push him closer to announcing his intentions. “You may be right in feeling that the 
time has not yet arrived for speaking out in court,” Hopkins wrote in July 1923, “but…don’t 
overlook the fact that the sentiment for you is wide and deep and only requires a public statement 
from you along the lines we have already discussed to be awakened into action.” Hopkins also 
enlisted his fellow CPPA members, Lynn and Dora Haines of The Searchlight on Congress, to 




When Borah told Hopkins (and other correspondents) in October 1923 that Henry Ford 
being the third party nominee was “the most certain thing in politics,” an exasperated Hopkins 
asked the Senator when he would “be in a position to publicly cooperate with us in the 
organization of our new party convention in 1924?” Two months later, in December, Hopkins –
writing on standard “Committee of ‘48” stationery again – chose to mince words no longer. 
Noting the “persistent and it seems to me malicious attempt in certain quarters” to name Borah as 
Calvin Coolidge’s likely running mate, Hopkins asked the Senator where he stood on various 
issues on the Forty-Eighters’ platform. The Farmer-Labor Party would be meeting in convention 
in May, Hopkins noted, “and for my own satisfaction and information I should like an even 
clearer understanding with you than has resulted from our previous interviews in respect to these 
developments…I would appreciate a frank statement from you as to when you will consider it 
appropriate to authorize the introduction of your name…as a candidate for its Presidential 
nomination, or for a renomination to your present office as the candidate of the Progressive Party 
in Idaho.” To this, Borah responded definitively. “I am not a candidate for President,” he wrote 
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Hopkins, “and do not expect to be. I see no facts or circumstances at the present time which 
would justify my permitting or authorizing my name to be used. As I wrote to you sometime ago, 
Hopkins, I do not want to encourage any third party, or any other party so far as that is 
concerned, using my name in connection with the Presidency.”1325 
  
In effect, J.A.H. Hopkins and the Committee had lost well over a year, much effort, and 
sizable stationery expenses chasing Borah to be their third-party nominee, only to fall victim to 
the same vacillating nature that often enraged his Senate colleagues.  So, in January 1924, 
Hopkins moved on to his next possible choice, George Norris. “[N]othing would give me greater 
pleasure to see you or Sen. La Follette step to the front,” Hopkins wrote the Senator from 
Nebraska, but Norris, while appreciative of the offer, argued that a third party could “do more 
harm than good. It would have a tendency to increase the already outrageously partisan spirits.” 




Why did Borah string along Hopkins for so long? Part of it was likely just the Senator’s 
nature – his often-maddening tendency to disappear in the clutch. “[W]hen his every previous 
step indicated that he would be there,” The Outlook wrote of him in 1927, “he was not there.” 
Writing about the Senator in 1962, Claude Bowers, who spent the 1920’s as a Democratic editor 
at the New York World, remembered how Borah “would gallantly march up to the enemy’s guns 
and seem about to take them by storm, and then mystifyingly, he would wheel around and march 
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back again.” Also, in contemporaneous letters to others, Borah – who did not follow Theodore 
Roosevelt out of the party in 1912 – conceded he would rather fix the Republicans than build a 
new party out of whole cloth. “A third party may come,” he wrote to one correspondent in 
December 1922, “but I am thoroughly in favor myself of proceeding now along the line of 
working out things which we want to accomplish inside the old Party. So far as I can see it is 
quite as practicable to rehabilitate the old Party as it is to build a new one…in my opinion, 
parties are not made, they grow.”1327 
 
But, in this case, there were important political developments to factor in as well – 
namely the August 1923 death of Warren Harding. Suddenly, it seemed, there was a power 
vacuum in the Republican Party, and Borah and others thought they could take advantage of the 
new political calculus. “[T]he situation is acutely alive,” Ernest Gruening wrote Borah the week 
of the president’s death. Now was the “strategic moment” for a “definite move toward real 
political progress...You, Senator are the man to lead it.”  Borah agreed it was time “to make a 
most determined effort…to liberalize the political program of the future…I am ready to go into it 
for all there is in it.” That same month, the Senator wrote to one of his key Outlawry allies, 
Raymond Robins, and argued that “by reason of extraordinary conditions, we are now in a 
position to put forward a program and, to do so with success, of real progressive principles and 
policies. I know the country is ready for it. The economic situation is breaking up all party lines 
and breaking away from all past precedents, and I really believe we have an opportunity to 
                                                          
1327
 Ashby, 118. Borah to Magnus Martinson, December 15, 1922. WJB, Box 142: Politics – 3rd Party Movement. 
Sounding the same theme in 1927, Borah declared that “There are times when a complete break with one’s party 
may be justifiable. But my experience and my observation has been that you can fight just as long and more 




liberalize the whole political situation…I feel very keenly that opportunity is knocking at the 
door of the liberalists of this country.”1328 
 
If so, many observers thought Borah had a strange way of showing it. As Hopkins had 
pointed out in his letters, the Senator spent much of the fall and winter of 1923 cozying up to 
Calvin Coolidge, whom Borah deemed “a man of ability and courage” in December. Clearly, 
Borah was trying to get the new president to come around to his views on issues such as the 
Outlawry of War. This was a two-way street, as Coolidge – by no means a certainty at first for 
the 1924 nomination – wanted to show he was amenable to the left wing of his party, and 




Other progressive Republicans, however, could not be wooed so easily. 
 




Writing to Harold Ickes in March 1923, on the eve of a European trip designed in part to 
buttress his presidential bona fides, Senator Hiram Johnson had no illusions about the uphill task 
that would face him if he tried to wrest a sitting president for the Republican nomination. “I have 
no doubt that President Harding will be a candidate for renomination,” he wrote. “I am under no 
illusions about myself. I would not at present get into the position of active candidacy, and as I 
view the situation at present, I could not with any hope of success, because of the power there is 
in the White House, make fight for nomination.” Still, he asked Ickes to start brainstorming 
about how to move the progressive agenda forward. “If I get into a national contest, and I do not 
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necessarily mean a personal candidacy, I am most anxious that you and I go together and see if 
some results along the fundamentals upon which we agree, can…be accomplished. It may be that 
our contest will be futile, and that we’ll have to bide our time for another four years.” Still, 
Johnson advised Ickes to “keep on the alert,” as he “did not believe any individual has sufficient 
vision to tell what may happen in 1924.”1330 
 
Echoing Johnson’s general sentiment about unknowability – “[a]ll any one can do is 
watch the situation carefully and be prepared to take advantage of any favorable circumstance 
that may arise.” – Ickes accepted the Senator’s charge.  “I need not assure you that my dearest 
wish is to see you President,” he replied to Johnson. “I certainly hope that in the next national 
contest I will be fighting under your leadership.” A month later, Ickes outlined what he believed 
would be Harding’s reelection strategy to the overseas Johnson. “I understand that the Harding 
people are expecting to rely upon the returned prosperity of the country as the issue that will put 
him over again,” he wrote. “Restricted immigration has resulted in a scarcity of labor which in its 
turn has brought about an increase in wages with consequent enhanced buying power, which 
means a better market at better prices for foodstuffs and manufactured articles. The Harding idea 
is to let this situation alone and ignore the demand from the manufacturers to let down the 
immigration bars.” Ickes conceded this wasn’t “bad campaign strategy if it will work,” and that 
“there is no denying the fact that the country is in much better shape economically than it was 
eighteen months ago.”1331 
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That being said, Ickes saw a potential opportunity for Johnson in the burgeoning issue of 
entry into the World Court. “It seems to me that people are again thinking very deeply on the 
International situation. The International Court proposition looks [defensible] especially to those 
people who have been in favor all along to entering the League of Nations.” This, to Ickes as to 
many others, seemed yet another backdoor into American participation in the League, and  “[i]f 
we are going to enter the League of Nations…I would prefer to do it by the front door instead of 
by sneaking in the back door.” Nonetheless, the Court fight provided the perfect opportunity to 
set the stage for a Johnson presidential bid. “It may be that the fight you led against the League 
of Nations will have to be made over again and this time it may be the main issue in the contest 
for the Republican nomination,” Ickes told Johnson. “If the fight has to be made than I know of 
no one [as] well qualified as yourself to lead.”1332 
 
A month later, Ickes backed off the idea of using the Court as a primary platform, since 
“[t]here doesn’t seem to be a great deal of interest in the world court proposition just now.” But 
he revisited the issue with Johnson in June 1923, after Harding – on the first stop of his Voyage 
of Understanding in St. Louis – promised to work with the Senate and offered to completely and 
unilaterally dissociate the Court from the League. “I am simply astounded at the new proposition 
made by the president,” Ickes wrote to Johnson the night after Harding’s speech. “It seems to me 
that he has quite effectively crawled out on a limb which, in due course, will be neatly cut off 
between him and the tree trunk. He has always been weak and vacillating, given to 
compromising to the point where neither side is satisfied, but it seems to me that in this instance 
he has surpassed his own past endeavors along this line.” Now, it seemed, Hiram Johnson might 
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have a platform to run on due to “this wonderful scheme of handing our future, internationally, 
over to a group of men in the selection of whom we would, as a nation, have no voice at all.”1333 
 
Two months later, the political landscape shifted again. “How quickly the whole face of 
things can change,” Ickes wrote to Johnson. “Only a week ago we regarded as inevitable the 
renomination of President Harding and now he has passed entirely from the stage.”: 
 
Coolidge is now president. He doesn’t seem like a personality at all to me. I don’t believe he does 
to the country at large. If this be true then the field is an open one with you by far the strongest 
man in sight. I told you in New York that as matters stood I did not believe you ought to become 
a candidate for the presidency…But what now? It seems to me that events, beyond your control, 
have forced your hand and that you not only will have to be a candidate, but that you will go into 
the contest with a very real chance of success.”1334 
 
 
“Politically, things are likely to move fast,” Ickes warned. “New combinations will be in 
the making and I hope that you will allow nothing to hold you back from facing the situation and 
taking advantage of any favorable development.” Ickes was especially worried about Johnson’s 
fellow Californian and 1920 nemesis returning to the fray. “Most of all, I am curious to see what 
line Hoover will now take. Will he continue in the cabinet and thus tie himself to Coolidge, as he 
did to Harding, or will he think he has a chance for the nomination, resign from the cabinet and 
start out on an active campaign? I think he is the man to be watched carefully and checkmated 
every time he starts to make a move. If he can get away with it he won’t have any hesitation in 
trying to capitalize Harding’s last illness and death for his own personal and political 
advantage.”1335 
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Whatever Hoover’s plans were, he would have to contend with his new boss first. In his 
first weeks in office, President Coolidge made two moves that suggested to all observers he was 
planning an aggressive run for the 1924 nomination. “The first important act of Dr. Coolidge, 
after the crown settled over his ears,” noted H.L. Mencken, was to appoint as his personal 
secretary – the equivalent of today’s Chief of Staff – Congressman C. Bascom Slemp of 
Virginia, a man known for his aptitude at securing southern delegates by means both fair and 
foul. “[W]hatever his merits as a husband and a father,” Mencken wrote, Slemp “is surely no 
statesman; he is a politician pure and simple, and he has specialized in the herding of Republican 
jobholders in the South. His appointment thus indicates a plain effort to line up these cattle for 
1924.” The Crisis thought the choice of Slemp – who “has physically kicked Negroes even out of 
his own party convention” and “brazenly declared himself opposed to Negro suffrage” – “is a 
blow so serious and fatal that we have not ceased to gasp at it.”  Surveying the arguments against 
Slemp, the recently-established TIME Magazine noted first, “that he was appointed…to round up 
Southern delegates for Mr. Coolidge,” second, “that he is a “Lily White’ politician trying to 
make the Republican organization in the South white, by divorcing it from the Negro element,” 
third, that “he has been accused, not without reason, of selling appointments, if not for his private 
gain, at least for the Party purse,” and, fourth, “that his name is C. Bascom Slemp.”1336  
 
Second, Coolidge, as noted earlier, threw the political hand grenade that was the 
continuing negotiations in the coal industry into the lap of the new Governor of Pennsylvania, 
Gifford Pinchot – effectively marginalizing Pinchot’s chances to run no matter what happened. 
Either Pinchot failed and America spent a harsh winter without coal, or he succeeded and 
Pinchot would be blamed for the rising cost of coal. 
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“Despite all the Coolidge stuff in the newspapers,” writer and old Roosevelt Progressive 
George Henry Payne wrote to Ickes after these twin moves, “I find that people are not impressed 
except the small financial element who love a Reactionary more than they love their country. 
There is increasing indignation over the appointment of Mr. Slemp, and the passing of the coal 
strike to Governor Pinchot has been taken as an evidence of his avoidance of difficult problems.” 
Ickes agreed on both counts.
 
 “The appointment of Mr. Slemp by President Coolidge was strong 
enough evidence of his political ideals and the kind of politics he is prepared to play in order to 
win the nomination. It is a slap in the face to every citizen who does not believe in the 
domination and control of Republican Party affairs by patronage controlled southern delegates. 
As you suggest, his failure to do anything in the coal strike is an instance of his disinclination to 
tackle a difficult problem.”1337  
 
Still, both moves evinced a certain political savvy on the part of the new president as 
well. “It seems to me that your real difficulty with Coolidge,” Ickes wrote to Hiram Johnson, 
“will be that you will be opposing a man that won’t fight back. He is the greatest static statesman 
in American history. It will be hard to set up an argument with a man who won’t argue or fight[,] 
with a man whose idea of motion is a comfortable arm chair. I think Coolidge is even less 
disposed than Harding was to join issue or to do anything that he can by any possibility avoid 
doing.” H.L. Mencken agreed, and by September 1923 he was already calling the race for the 
Republican nomination over. “There will be no vain and vexatious gabble about World Courts 
and other such scare-yokels. The Government will function in a silent and inoffensive manner.” 
With Slemp securing the South for Coolidge, “[d]elegate after delegate will march up and dive in 
the tank. The Hon. Hiram Johnson, the California Citrus aurantifolia, will sweat more and more 
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citric acid…All the other aspirants will fade and deliquesce.” Coolidge, the Sage of Baltimore 




Senator Johnson had no illusions about the uphill fight ahead of him if he should run. 
“There is little new to report to you,” Johnson wrote Ickes in August, “except that among the 
‘old guard’ here there is absolute agreement that they’ll have to dispose of one individual in 
order that they may, without difficulty, re-nominate Mr. Coolidge. You can guess who that 
individual is. Everybody is being lined up that can be lined up, and as usual, the politicians are 
deciding the fate of the Nation without reckoning upon the people.” Before committing to a 
candidacy, Johnson wanted Ickes to feel out some of the other old Roosevelt Progressives and 




Ickes soon reported back that Governor Pinchot was in the Johnson camp. “I told both 
Gifford and Mrs. Pinchot on separate occasions that, in my judgment, you would have to be a 
candidate for the presidency,” Ickes wrote, “and their reaction was practically the same. Both of 
them were very glad indeed to learn of such a possibility. They both feel that Coolidge ought not 
to be nominated to succeed himself and they both expressed fervent hope that you would get in 
the fight and stay in to the finish.” Johnson was “immensely pleased with what you had to say 
about Uncle Gifford,” particularly after Ickes told the Senator that Pinchot was crucial to 
Coolidge’s nomination strategy. “I was told yesterday what is supposed to be the general outline 
of campaign plans by the Coolidge people, Ickes reported in. “Their idea is that they can carry 
New England and hold the south. They believe they will have Gifford with them in 
Pennsylvania….In their tactics they are not considering anyone but yourself. Their whole effort 
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is to divide the anti-Johnson sentiment as much as possible…[but] they are reckoning without 
their host so far as Pinchot is concerned.” 1340  
 
Pinchot further aided Johnson – and scored some political payback for being dumped 
with the coal issue – by attacking Coolidge’s lax enforcement of Prohibition. “I write to inquire 
what the Governor of Pennsylvania means by persisting in making the front pages of newspapers 
throughout the country,” Ickes jested with his old friend. “That last wallop you handed ‘Silent 
Cal’ must have well nigh loosened his back teeth. Of course you are dead right when you say 
that the state authorities cannot enforce the Volstead Act without federal cooperation and you are 
even more right when you charge that the federal administration of the Volstead Act is shot 
through with bribery and corruption.” Two weeks later, Ickes suggested to Pinchot that the 
Pennsylvania Governor was “having more fun just now than any other man in public life. You 
have taken on not only the national administration, but two United States Senators, the Secretary 
of the Treasury and the standpat republican machine. You are courageous, but I believe you can 
lick them all to a frazzle in your back yard and here’s hoping that you will do it.” To Johnson 
Ickes remarked that “the thing has been breaking beautifully lately with Gifford hammering on 
the law enforcement issue and being regarded generally as all but an avowed candidate for 
president. It means that you won’t have to set the pace and that, of course, is highly desirable. I 
don’t think there is any doubt that Coolidge is losing strength gradually, but unmistakably and if 
the impression once gets abroad that he is nothing but a sly wire puller he will have a hard road 
ahead of him.”1341 
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If Johnson and Ickes could rely on the Governor of Pennsylvania, the former Governor of 
Kansas, Henry Allen, seemed to have defected to the Coolidge side. “It seems to me that Gifford 
put the Prohibition question up pretty strongly to Coolidge and I am not surprised that 
Coolidge’s friends are incensed over the matter,” Ickes told Johnson in mid-October. That being 
said, “our old friend, Henry Allen, lunched with ‘Silent Cal’ yesterday and then rushed into print 
criticizing Gifford’s speech. From what I gather…Henry Allen would not be adverse to running 
for vice-president on the Coolidge ticket. I have always liked Henry personally…but I am 
disgusted at his apparently headlong plunge into the Coolidge camp.” Writing Kansas off, 
Johnson replied that it was “just like Henry Allen to be licking the boots of power again… 
Henry’s activities are never observable until they have been purchased in some fashion.” A week 
later, Ickes confirmed Johnson’s suspicions. According to Raymond Robins, Ickes wrote, “all the 
Republican political forces in Kansas are lined up with Henry and are for Coolidge on the basis 
of Henry’s going on the ticket with him.”1342 
 
As it happened, Colonel Robins was a man weighing heavily on Johnson’s mind. “I’m 
worried about Raymond,” he told Ickes, “because of my great affection for him. I would like 
him, if we go into this fight, to be with me and with me prominently. I cannot say to him, 
because it would be neither fair to him nor honest to myself, that I would adopt his plan for the 
outlawry of war. The most I could say…is I would ever hold myself open to conviction, ready to 
listen sympathetically to him and more than sympathetically, affectionately.” A week later, 
Johnson repeated to Ickes his concern about Robins. “I do hope that my failure to espouse his 
particular plan will not affect him at all. If I go into a fight, I do want him with me, but beyond 
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that I would not for the world have anything spoil the long friendship which has existed between 
us.” Three weeks later, Johnson was on the verge of pleading.  “I have worried a great deal about 
Raymond,” he told Ickes once more. “I haven’t any desire to take a position of opposition to his 
scheme, and I have not thought of doing so, and cannot conceive of any set of circumstances 
which would require it…Of course I could not make his plan an issue in the campaign. The fact 
that he has not written to me in response to my letter makes me think that this he deems a 
condition precedent to support and it makes me feel very sorry, indeed.”1343 
 
In response, Ickes told the bereft Johnson that Raymond Robins was probably a no-go. 
“The only thing that is worrying him,” Ickes replied, “is, of course, the ‘Outlawry of War’ 
proposition. He says he has been devoting several months of time to speaking in advocacy of this 
proposition. He appreciates your entire frankness and sincerity in the matter, but he is afraid that 
some time during the campaign, unless your mind changes, you will be forced to declare against 
the plan just as you have against other schemes for international cooperation and he wonders in 
what position you will then stand with the people before whom he has been appearing as an 
advocate.” To his sister, Robins confessed he was not particularly happy about being outside the 
“Uncle Hi” camp. But “with the promises to free the Politicals [political prisoners] and to 
recognize Russia and to give aid and comfort to the Outlawry of War program by Coolidge I am 
in quite a quandary. I am working with Borah and as He Hates Johnson it is a bit of a twist.”1344 
 
William Allen White was another old Roosevelt Republican who would not be joining 
Johnson and Ickes at Armageddon on account of foreign policy issues. “I am sorry I can’t line up 
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for Hiram Johnson,” he wrote to a friend, “I am so entirely opposed to his position on foreign 
relations and am so thoroughly convinced he will make that the major issue of his campaign and 
if elected, make it his major activity – his isolation policy – that I can’t go with him. Heaven 
knows, I’d like to! I admire his courage and am proud of his character and admire him greatly 
personally. But I feel nearer to Pinchot on the whole than Johnson.”1345 
 
Before embarking on this next crusade, Johnson worked hard to secure the support of his 
friend and publicity man the last go-round, Albert Lasker. “[W]e embark upon a mighty troubled 
sea,” Johnson wrote Lasker in a discursive thirteen-page letter to the advertising guru. “We will 
be buffeted by politicians and press alike, our motives will be misconstrued, our actions will be 
distorted, our words will be misrepresented, but we will be men; and if in the end defeat comes, 
we can accept it with equanimity and philosophy, say good-by forever to our ambitions and live 
our lives in the consciousness that we fought a good fight, our fight, as we saw the light.” 
Johnson knew that he was a longshot and “that my kind of politics, “merely fighting one’s way 
through without regard to power or influence, with no thought of strategy, standing only for that 
in which I believe and contemptuously rejecting all overtures to soft pedaling, depending solely 
upon people, rather than politicians or press, may not be appealing. I realize it makes success 
doubtful and difficult; but unfortunately it is the only way I know. Politicians distrust me, the 
press apparently fears my activity. I am where I am because I have never heeded either; and this 
very fact,” he confessed candidly, “will probably prevent me from ever going higher.” 1346  
 
Lasker joined the Johnson team nonetheless. In fact, Lasker had previously cut a deal 
with former President Harding before his death – If Harding supported Hiram Johnson’s Senate 
                                                          
1345
 White to Paul Ewert, January 2, 1924.  White, Selected Letters, 239. 
1346




campaign in 1928, Lasker would help Harding get reelected. This Harding agreed to, provided 
Lasker could convince Johnson not to run for the presidency in 1924, and so Lasker had 
immediately left for Europe to catch up with the Senator overseas and talk him out of running. 




With the board set, Hiram Johnson officially announced his candidacy for the Republican 
nomination in mid-November of 1923. In a statement drafted by George Henry Payne, Johnson 
pledged to represent the “overwhelming numbers of Republicans who fear the Republican Party 
has been captured by the forces of reaction and who themselves cry for a party of Progressivism 
through which to express themselves.” Moreover, he argued, someone must stand up against “the 
effort now being made to inopportunely, and I believe disastrously, plunge America into 
European affairs.” “Reaction and Progress must fight it out again in the Republican Party,” the 
Senator averred, and while “I question not men now but their philosophy of government,” 
Johnson concluded that only a Republican party animated “with the broad understanding, vision, 
and human sympathy of progressivism can solve our present day problems.” Johnson’s plan – 
not unlike Theodore Roosevelt’s in 1912 – was to challenge the sitting president in every open 
primary. But to indicate to everyone he was still a mainstream Republican, Johnson named as his 
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Had Senator Johnson expected the leading progressive journals to rally behind his 
candidacy – he hadn’t – he would have been vastly disappointed. One year before The Nation 
begged Borah to run as a third party candidate, it had published a retrospective of Johnson’s 
years in office by one George P. West that suggested the California Senator had consistently 
knifed other progressives to get ahead. “In justice to Johnson,” West offered backhandedly, “it 
should be said that he was never a radical, that he is not a profound thinker or a wide reader, and 
that his conception of politics has in it something of a sporting-page conception in which 
pugnacity is a major virtue, with red blood and guts as the true criteria of a proper man.” In the 
first issue after Johnson’s announcement, The Nation was similarly cruel. “Hiram Johnson has 
tossed his hat into the ring,” it yawned, “but somehow none of the ringside spectators seem 
excited about it”: 
 
Most of them probably thought that the hat had been lying in the ring lo, these many years. 
Almost every speech which the Senator from California has made in the last eight or ten years has 
been rather in the way of practice at presidential hat-tossing. Ten years ago…Hiram Johnson 
stood out as a fighting progressive with a record of real wrestling-matches with the Southern 
Pacific Railroad Company. Today he seems merely the familiar politician who ducked the 
Newberry issue, raised his voice in a piteous plea for protection for California lemons, and took 
his full share of patronage under the Harding Administration – from the same “materialist, stolid, 
and stubborn men” in whom he now suddenly discovers such “irreconcilable differences.” 1349 
 
 
The New Republic was slightly more circumspect, arguing that “Senator Johnson’s 
announcement is the first attempt since the extinction of the Progressive party to expound 
progressivism in a form available for national popular consumption.” That being said, they 
ridiculed “the almost ridiculous vagueness of Senator Johnson’s account of what voters will get 
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if they elect the spokesman of progressivism. It may be well for progressivism to proclaim that it 
is a philosophy, but if it is a philosophy minus a program it will be and should be devoid of 
political poignancy.” Johnson, TNR argued, “is reluctant to specify what progressivism means in 
relation to domestic policy for one very good reason…He is afraid to choose and to risk his 
candidacy on the success of his combination of choices.”1350 
 
 
While Johnson took to the campaign trail, and party regulars began to attack him as a 
disloyal Republican who had walked out in 1912 and helped to elect Wilson, Calvin Coolidge 
ignored the California Senator. Instead, he worked to neutralize one of the other serious dangers 
to his candidacy by inviting automaker Henry Ford over to the White House for a discussion. 
This talk may or may not have involved an agreement to let Ford purchase the government-
owned nitrate plant and unfinished dam at Muscle Shoals, Alabama – something Ford had 
coveted since 1921. Whether there was a specific quid pro quo or not, Coolidge urged Congress 
in his December 6
th
 Annual Message that the Muscle Shoals complex be sold. Twelve days later, 
on December 18
th
, Ford surprised many by declared that he “would never for a moment think of 
running against Calvin Coolidge for President on any ticket whatever.” Johnson, among others, 
was quick to suggest the payoff. “Henry Ford has declared for Mr. Coolidge because, as he says, 
Mr. Coolidge is 'safe,’ scoffed the Senator. “Immediately the part of the press of the country 
representing special privileges, which has always denounced and caricatured Mr. Ford, gives him 
a certificate of character and with open arms welcomes him to its ranks. Perhaps the time is 
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propitious for Emma Goldman and Bill Haywood to return, declare for Mr. Coolidge and be 
acclaimed by the same special privilege press.”1351 
 
For his part, Ickes put on a good face for his allies in the Johnson camp. “So far as Hiram 
Johnson is concerned he is in the fight to the finish and I have never seen him in better fighting 
trim, both physically and intellectually,” he wrote to Pinchot in December. But to the candidate 
himself, Ickes admitted his doubts. “I don’t like the feeling of things,” he told the Senator. “The 
Coolidge people are working busily in every possible direction and they have the advantage of 
control of the organization pretty generally throughout the country. We seem to be standing still 
and to stand still in this kind of a fight means to slip.” The only way forward, Ickes suggested, 
was a “smashing, driving, relentless campaign…The only way we can counter is to rally public 
sentiment.” In their reporting on the election in January 1924, TIME agreed that Johnson was 
coming out of the box “badly handicapped,” and that, while the Senator “is apparently 
undismayed by the great start which Coolidge has taken from him…[t]o the less partisan 
observers it seems that Johnson’s chances depend on a ‘break.’”1352 
 
Before the month ran out, such a “break” presented itself in the revelations emerging 
from the Teapot Dome scandal. Even as both Thomas Walsh and C. Bascom Slemp ventured 
down to Palm Beach, Florida to visit Ned McLean, and Edwin Doheny told Congress of his 
$100,000 “little black bag” donation to Albert Fall, Ickes urged Johnson to take the lead in tying 
Coolidge to the corruption. “Teapot Dome is going to be a heavy load for Mr. Coolidge to 
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carry,” he wrote Pinchot. “[H]e sat in as a member of the cabinet when the deal was considered 
and approved. And he has retained in his own cabinet and administration men of whom the least 
the can be said is that they didn’t know enough, as representatives of the public, to protect the 
public interests against a bunch of crooked oil operators.” Now, Ickes thought, Johnson could 
make his campaign by using the corruption card against the sitting president. “It begins to look 
as if Coolidge were going to be permitted to avoid any political damage from the Teapot Dome 
scandal,” Ickes wrote the Senator. “I believe a great opportunity is being lost. Coolidge ought to 
be made to bear his share of the load.”1353  
 
Ickes kept up the pressure into February, telegramming Johnson that “[e]veryone [is] 
talking about Teapot Dome scandal and it is become increasingly important issue. On this issue 
you are not yet in the picture.” Three weeks later, Ickes suggested Johnson take the fight to the 
Senate floor. “Don’t you think it is about time to go after Slemp in a vigorous speech?...[T]he 
President is slipping as a result of the oil scandal in Washington…I think he can be tied up hard 
and fast through Slemp, so hard and fast that he won’t have a wiggle left in him.” (Along with 
visiting McLean in Palm Beach, Slemp, it came out, had speculated in Sinclair oil stocks while a 
member of the House.) Coolidge “is a perfect product of the system,” Ickes pleaded again in 
March. “He is part and parcel of a rotten and corrupt administration….I think a terrific smash out 
to be taken at Slemp…I don’t think the case against Slemp has been driven into people’s 
consciousness.”1354 
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Johnson, however, refused to engage on this front, apparently since he thought “the 
psychology would be bad.” In truth, the Senator’s psychology was taking a beating on the 
campaign trail. The problems had begun when Johnson had tried once again to patch things up 
with his old friend Raymond Robins. “I have been hoping in the last two months that I might see 
you personally,” he wired Robins. “I have despaired of catching up with you…I am wiring you 
therefore, assuming the privileges of our dear old friendship, asking you if you will not unite 
with me in this campaign.” Robins’ reply was curt and cutting. “Your telegram received. We do 
not agree on what seems to me fundamental in depending campaign. I regret this more than I can 
say.” 1355   
 
Adding insult to injury, it began to seem to Johnson that, as with Henry Allen, his friend 
had betrayed him for a payoff. Once Robins was seen aboard Coolidge on the presidential yacht, 
The Mayflower, Johnson told Ickes, the word in Washington was that “the Borah Resolution for 
recognition of Russia would soon be passed with the consent of the Administration, thereafter 
Coolidge would recognize Russia, and it was agreed Robins should be appointed Ambassador to 
that country. I don’t know how true this is. I repeat it to you, simply as it was told to me.” By 
April, Raymond Robins was persona non grata to Ickes and Johnson both, with Ickes confessing 
a “deep disgust” for his former friend. “Of course, Raymond has a right to be for Coolidge if he 
can bring himself to such a state of mind and he has a right to accept the President’s hospitality. 
What gets my goat is that he affects to regard with unutterable scorn functions such as these. He 
derides them, laughs at his hosts and seeks to give the appearance of being infinitely above such 
affairs. He then jumps the fastest train to Washington so as not to miss one of them. He pretends 
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to be against Coolidge and yet accepts his hospitality. He joins one of the President’s social 
outings and then jeers at his host and his social efforts. What the hell!”1356 
 
The onus of Robins’ apparent betrayal was only a foretaste of the depressing primary 
season to come. “Senator Johnson has been carrying on a campaign mainly of criticism and 
condemnation,” reported The Outlook in April, “but he has not made the impression upon the 
Republican voters that he did four years ago.” That was putting it charitably. In state after state, 
Hiram Johnson would make barely a dent against the Coolidge onslaught. In New Jersey, 
Coolidge won by a factor of eight or nine to one. In Pennsylvania, Governor Gifford Pinchot’s 
candidacy as a delegate to the convention was defeated by a Coolidge man. In Maine, Missouri, 
Washington, Connecticut, Oklahoma, Ohio – all across the country, Coolidge swept primaries 
and state conventions instructed their delegates to vote for the sitting president. Only in South 
Dakota did Johnson manage to eke out a narrow win of a few hundred votes – giving him all of 
ten delegates. (Even then, he was wrathful in victory, denouncing “the most reckless and 
shameless use of money…by the President.”) Political journalists looking for apt metaphors 
found several on the trail, from Johnson’s voice giving out, forcing an early end to a Midwest 
speaking tour, to his campaign car skidding at a railroad crossing and almost being obliterated by 




While Johnson continued his doomed mission from coast to coast, Ickes tried everything 
to rally support behind the Senator. To Jane Addams, he sent a “summary of legislation 
particularly affecting women and the home enacted in California.” To Dry voters wondering 
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where Johnson stood on prohibition, Ickes promised Johnson “would enforce the law and do it 
on the square.” When The New Republic editorialized that Republicans were remaining silent on 
the Teapot Dome issue, Ickes angrily fired off a letter to Herbert Croly arguing that Johnson has 
“arraigned the unholy alliance between crooked big business and crooked politics and has 
demanded a thorough cleaning of the Republican house…in this fight…he has had no more help 
from The New Republic than he has personally had, let us say, from The New York Times. Not 
only this, but apparently you haven’t even known that Senator Johnson, with inspiring courage, 
has been carrying on a fight, the supposed lack of which you earnestly deplore.” (To this, Croly 
responded with a vicious dismissal: “By Republicans in that article we obviously meant the 
attitude of the organization of the Party and those Republicans associated with it. The success of 
Senator Johnson’s campaign with the nomination indicates very clearly how few Republicans, 
that is in any but three or four states in the northwest, favor that kind of thing.”) Eventually, 
Ickes was even begrudgingly ready to accept what support he could get from the Ku Klux Klan.  
“I suppose I have as strong feelings as anyone but I have never yet reached the point where I 
refused to support a candidate of my choice because someone I didn’t happen to like was also 
supporting him…And so in this campaign.”1358 
 
Despite all his efforts, Ickes couldn’t even win his home state of Illinois for Johnson. 
“We had the same damn old gang to fight here as in former years, every machine henchmen in 
this neck of the woods had out his knife,” reported an Ickes ally from Murphysboro. Another 
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from Macomb, Illinois explained that “the farmer vote through the country did not turn out 
owing to the uncertainty that exists caused by the money stringency, which I may state to you is 
serious…if they voted for their choice Senator Johnson and not succeed they might incur the 
enmity of the banks.” 1359 
 
The unkindest cut of all came in early May, when even California – with the aid of 
Herbert Hoover, who garnered his revenge on Johnson for 1920 by running the president’s 
primary operations in the state – moved into Coolidge’s corner by over 50,000 votes. “Of course, 
I am broken-hearted over the result in California,” Ickes told Johnson. “I had hoped even against 
hope that your own state would not disgrace itself.” Now, Ickes began to wonder “whether there 
is ever any use trying to fight the people’s battles.”: 
 
You went into that state practically single-handed against a corrupt and strongly entrenched 
politico-business machine that was a disgrace to the state. You put that machine out of business. 
You cleaned out the state administration and made California the most progressive and forward 
looking of any of the states in the country…You did more than this: You put California on the 
map nationally. One would think that, regardless of results in other states, and disregarding any 
other consideration whatsoever, California would lose no opportunity to show to you its 
appreciation for the very real service that you have performed.  
 
Yet a narrow-souled, small-minded time serving politician, with neither character nor ability, 
with no single public achievement to his credit, is given the preference vote. And people wonder 
why we have bad government, why our political ideals are so low and why men prefer to take 
their chances with the political machine rather than with the people themselves. 
 
And yet what can a man do except to keep up the fight for what he believes in? You have tried to 
do what you thought was the right thing to do and you will just naturally have to go on doing the 
right thing regardless of political consequences to yourself. People are ungrateful; they forget 
easily; they follow false gods and yet one has to go on fighting for them just the same. It is just 
these qualities that make them need champions. Like children, they require protection against 
themselves. 
 
As for being defeated you aren’t defeated. All the political machines and all the voters in the 
world can’t defeat any man. He can only defeat himself. In my political experience I have seen 
many a man apparently irretrievably beaten, but I have also seen these same men fight their way 
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back. No man is ever beaten who keeps up the fight. You still have your two good fists left and 
the wonderful courage that has carried you through the cruelest political fight I have ever seen a 
man engage in. This engagement has gone overwhelmingly against you, but you haven’t been 
defeated in the war because you still have those same two good fists and your high spirits. And 
may I say in passing that you also still have devoted and loyal friends who are glad and willing to 
face the future with you.”1360 
 
 
Johnson would not give up the fight, but he would spend much of the rest of the 1924 
campaign season licking wounds and grinding axes. In the meantime, the Coolidge machine 
rolled on. 





, one month after Coolidge’s victory in California, the 1924 Republican 
Convention opened in Cleveland, at a time when most of America’s attention was focused on the 
Leopold & Loeb trial unfolding in Chicago. Unlike the fiasco the Democrats were soon to 
unleash on an unsuspecting America from Madison Square Garden, it, noted The New Republic, 
“contain[ed] no surprises. From first to last, it was disingenuous, cold, and conservative.” To 
former Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, the Cleveland convention was “already cut and 
dried…[and] done up in moth balls to prevent injury.” However predetermined the result, it soon 
became clear to all assembled that, with Boies Penrose in his grave three years, Will Hays in 
Hollywood, and Henry Cabot Lodge wandering the floor looking lost and bereft – one observer 
thought Lodge looked “like someone unemployed” – the usual faces of the Old Guard were no 
longer behind the wheel.
1361
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Instead, the convention was almost completely controlled by Coolidge and his business-
minded allies. The new Republican Party chairman was longtime Coolidge backer William 
Butler, a wealthy Massachusetts textile manufacturer, who, TNR thought, “was so dictatorial and 
arrogant that even machine politicians, accustomed to their serfdom and prepared to kiss the 
hand which wields the whip, found his overbearing attitude unendurable.” Before the end of the 




And, right down the line, the new power behind the Republican throne made itself 
known. “The mass of the convention,” wrote William Hard in The Nation, “perceived that Mr. 
Butler was making the Republican Party less and less in the image of a political party and more 
and more in the image of a patriotic, efficient, businesslike rotary club.” William Allen White, 
noting the presence of Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon in the Pennsylvania delegation, 
declared that “for the first time, the owners of America were appearing in Republican 
conventions.” Oswald Villard, watching the opening invocation, was tickled in light of Teapot 
Dome by the bishop’s call that “the crooked shall be made straight,” and noted that the deity 
being appealed to was “the God of business success, the God of special privilege, the God of the 
exploitation of the masses on behalf of the big-business masters of the Republican Party.” 
Clearly, argued TNR, “the big business interests which in the past have exerted their influence 
through deputies…at Cleveland came out in the open and themselves made their demands.”1363 
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The convention certainly moved with a business-like efficiency. On the second day of the 
convention, June 11
th
, the 1924 platform – a sober-minded, innocuous document – was reported 
to the floor and accepted. After a preamble that eulogized the “reverent memory of Warren G. 
Harding” and reminded America of the tumult of the Wilson years, the platform endorsed “rigid 
economy in government,” lower taxes and higher tariffs, investment in roads and waterways, 
America’s joining the World Court, and the continuance of Harding’s policies with regard to 
disarmament and immigration restriction. Sidestepping a pit trap that would ensnare the 
Democrats, the document said nothing about the Ku Klux Klan other than a general statement 
that “[t]he Republican Party reaffirms its unyielding devotion to orderly government under the 
guarantees embodied in the constitution.”1364  
 
For progressives, there were nods to conservation, an anti-lynching law, the eight-hour-
day, increased regulation (but not ownership) of public utilities, and protective legislation for 
women, as well a promise to root out “dishonesty and corruption” and support “clean and honest 
government” – although the platform also took pains to emphasize that corruption was a problem 
of “both parties.” (“It is a grave wrong,” the platform warned Democrats and progressives 
“against…patriotic men and women [in government] to strive indiscriminately to besmirch the 
names of the innocent and undermine the confidence of the people in the government under 
which they live.”) While recognizing “the fundamental national problem” facing agriculture and 
blaming it on Wilsonism, the platform prescribed higher tariffs, opening foreign markets, 
“reduction in taxes, steady employment in industry, and stability in business,” along with a few 
rhetorical flourishes in the direction of cooperative marketing and McNary-Haugenism. Perhaps 
the most important lines in the platform were these: “The prosperity of the American nation rests 
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on the vigor of private initiative which has bred a spirit of independence. The Republican Party 
stands now, as always, against all attempts to put the government into business.”1365 
 
As in 1920, the platform impressed few. The New York Times thought it “not only 
verbose but labored,” and recommended instead: “Coolidge, that’s all.” To The New Republic, 
the “wordy platform was written as usual for the sole purpose of catching as many votes as 
possible.” In fact, the platform was more noteworthy to the editors of TNR for what it did not 
contain. “With the single exception of the World Court,” they noted, “it evaded every important 
question…The prohibition question was dodged. The Ku Klux issue was evaded with a statement 
so mild as to be meaningless. The Japanese exclusion aspect of the immigration law was 
ignored.” The closest thing to passion in this “dull and dispiriting document” was the evocation 
of the “protective tariff…The farmers were actually assured that they are in fact pretty well off 
and that the tariff is responsible for this happy state. Cynical contempt for the intelligence of the 
people could hardly be carried much further than this.”1366 
 
As usual, the delegation from Wisconsin had tried to put forward a completely different 
platform for the Republicans – one composed by La Follette – but they were laughed out of the 
platform committee, and their progressive-minded minority report was dismissed just as 
contemptuously on the floor by the assembled delegates. In making the case, Congressman 
Henry Cooper of Wisconsin reminded the assembled Republicans that 26 of the 31 planks 
Wisconsin had put forward since 1908 were now the law of the land. It didn’t take. The 
Wisconsin planks, particularly the one calling for government ownership of the railroads, were 
booed down. When the convention band, led by John Phillip Sousa, began to play “Hail, Hail, 








the Gang’s All Here” to ease the tension, the crowd began to croon “All except Wisconsin, All 
except Wisconsin.” To Villard, “the Wisconsin representatives blew the breath of life into the 
proceedings, redeemed the convention from the subserviency of a herd of soulless delegates, and 
quickened our faith in the survival in America of truth and honesty, reason and courage.” He 
reminded his readers that Wisconsin “is always in advance of the party,” and that “if another 
party does not get ahead of them,” the Republicans will be “talking about these same issues a 
few years hence.” But Villard was one of the few sympathetic observers there.1367  
 
Wisconsin made no friends on the floor on the morning of the third and final day of the 
convention either. After the president of the University of Michigan, Marion Burton, extolled the 
virtues of Calvin Coolidge, the convention erupted into a party that included everyone but 
Wisconsin. (The delegates ignored the continual cries of “Stand up, Wisconsin!” until Sousa 
played “The Star-Spangled Banner.”) Then, the Republicans took the first and only presidential 
ballot of the convention: Coolidge led with 1065 votes, while La Follette had thirty-four (from 
Wisconsin and North Dakota), and Hiram Johnson ten (his winnings from South Dakota.) After 
the vote was taken, the floor called for unanimity, which Wisconsin refused to offer – prompting 
the chair to announce in oxymoronic fashion that “with the exception of a very few voices the 
nomination of Calvin Coolidge for President of the United States is made unanimous.”1368 
 
Only in the afternoon of the third day, when it came time to choose a vice-presidential 
nominee, did the officious and business-like tone of the proceedings to that point begin to slip. 
Throughout the convention, party leaders – among them Nicholas Murray Butler, Secretaries 
Andrew Mellon and John Weeks, Speaker Frederic Gillett, and a smattering of other Old Guard 
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senators and representatives – had been trying to pick a good running mate for Silent Cal. (After 
one marathon session that lasted until four in the morning, Senator Harry New of Indiana 
declared “I am going off to bed. The kind of man you are looking for as vice-president was 
crucified nineteen hundred years ago.”) After talking with Coolidge, William Butler said the 
president wanted William Borah as his running mate, since having a progressive of note would 
balance the ticket. When Butler asked the assembled wise men what they thought of Borah, 
Secretary of War Weeks began spewing forth expletives, while Secretary Mellon shrugged and 
answered, “I never think of him unless somebody mentions his name.”1369  
 
But Borah wanted no part of it, and, as the convention story went, when the president 
called the Idaho Senator to offer him a place on the ticket he replied “At which end?” (To a 
friend, Borah confessed he “had no desire to sit mute and be a figure head for four long years; in 
fact, I would die of nervous prostrations.” To another, he argued that “one of the saddest things 
in the world was for a person to attempt suicide and not succeed but maim himself for life. 
Politically, I think that is just what the [vice-presidency] would be.”) The convention then turned 
to 1920 also-ran Frank Lowden of Illinois, who was nominated on the second ballot and 
announced to the world – except Lowden had no desire for the post either. By his third telegram 
unequivocally refusing the position, Republicans realized they had to go into a special evening 




At this session, names began popping up all through the convention hall – the farm bloc 
wanted William Kenyon, the Klan wanted James Watson of Indiana, Chairman Butler thought 
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Herbert Hoover made the most sense. But the business-minded representatives running the show 
desired one of their own: Chicago banker, former Budget director, Open Shop advocate, and 
originator of the Dawes plan Charles Dawes. On the third ballot, Dawes has 682 ½ votes, while 
his nearest competitor, Herbert Hoover, had only 234 1/2. And so, in what the nominee called 





Temperamentally, the choice of the fiery, hot-blooded “Hell and Maria” Dawes well 
offset the prim, taciturn Coolidge – As one wag put it, “Coolidge and Dawes, Coolidge and 
Dawes, one for the freezes, and one for the thaws.” But, in terms of political orientation, it was 
now a conservative businessman backing a business-minded conservative. His inclusion, noted 
TNR, “shatters the last hope that any spark of liberalism will be found inside the ranks of the 
Republican Party this year.” Oswald Villard called the choice of Dawes “the greatest political 
blunder of all from the point of view of vote-getting,” while his journal called the choice 
“eminently fitting. If there is a rotary club or a chamber of commerce in America whose 
members are not swooning with joy at this beatification of big business…we should like to know 
which it is. No other man so well personifies the opposition of big business to union labor. We 
don’t see how anybody could have slapped the face of the American Federation of Labor more 
deliberately.”1372  
 
To The New Republic, the net result of the Cleveland Convention…will be to commit the 
Republican Party to a much more explicit and extensive support of big business as distinguished 
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from small business, and of industry as distinguished from agriculture, than it ever has accepted 
in the past.” Clearly, “the advocates of the divine right of industry have become the most 
aggressive, self-confident and articulate faction among the Republicans.” Now, with a Coolidge-
Dawes ticket and “with Mellon as economic spiritual advisor…they can for the present make the 
Republican Party smell like a Chamber of Commerce.” William Hard also saw “a new 
Republican Party” in Cleveland. “Gone were the emotionality of Lincoln, the dare-devilry of 
Blaine, the humanity of Hanna, the impetuosity of Roosevelt; instead there were a rising 
calculation, preciseness, scientific management, and autocratic orders from the planning room.” 
Oswald Villard was more succinct. “After three days one is inevitably forced to the conclusion 
that there is no longer any republic in America, or any democracy. We are ruled by a king and 
his name is Bunk.”1373 
 
“There never has been a time in our lives,” Hiram Johnson wrote Ickes of the Cleveland 
convention, “that big business has been so firmly in the saddle, and so determined in its 
activities.” In fact, he argued, “the invincible alliance of crooked big business and crooked 
politics will not brook the slightest opposition even from their former favorites, and the alliance 
has not only been admonishing, but punishing those who dare in any matter vote against the 
sacrosanct program which it has given to Coolidge.” Among those on the outs, Johnson noted 
with a certain relish, were “the pseudo-progressives…[Those] who have crawled during our 
campaign, and who were received during that period so graciously, have been kicked as 
viciously and as thoroughly as under the old Taft regime.”1374 
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That is with one exception, which Johnson noted with both exasperation and envy: 
Borah. “He is able to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds in a fashion that I believe no 
other man in politics has ever equaled,” Johnson told Ickes of his colleague: 
 
He has been the spokesman for Mellon and he is praised by LaFollette…He has been the constant 
adviser of Coolidge, and the beautiful child of the New Republic and other parlor liberals. The 
World Sunday published a table of votes of senators for or against Coolidge and the policies that 
have been given Coolidge. It looked like a baseball score. There was only one man who batted 




“I admire the ability, perhaps you would call it cunning, with which Borah can be upon 
both sides and get away with it,” concluded Johnson. “I think it is the most remarkable exhibition 
we have ever seen in our politics.” In a letter the following month, Johnson marveled at an article 
he “read in the New Republic that there were really only two Progressives, LaFollette and Borah. 
And yet I observe the latter, not only voting against the Child Labor amendment, but actually the 
leading exponent of Mr. Mellon and voting in favor of the Mellon Tax Plan, and the chief 
adviser with Mr. Dwight Morrow of President Coolidge. With such contrary exponents of 
Progressivism as LaFollette and Borah held out to us by our omniscient intellectuals, the 
ordinary intellect may be pardoned a bit of confusion.”1376 
 
Borah aside, Johnson asked Ickes whether “it might be a good time for some of the old 
Progressives to get together, not for the purpose of bolting the Republican Party, nor for the 
purpose of fighting Coolidge, but simply to keep in touch with one another upon the general idea 
of Progressivism. It has been suggested that William Allen White, Henry Allen…Pinchot, Payne, 
yourself, Robins, myself, and such others as might be appropriate, get together in a kind of love 
fest at a dinner or luncheon, so that there might be some sort of cohesion of the progressive 
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forces in the country.” At the very least, thought Johnson, it might be a good idea to prevent “the 
wild-eyed radicals of the La Follette group” to lay claim to the name. And in any case, the 
California Senator argued, “it seems ridiculous that men who on many points have a similarity of 
views, have let their forces be dissipated and destroyed, because upon a single point they may 
not agree. However, this is perhaps the mental attitude of our so-called Progressives and 
probably always will be.”1377 
 
Ickes was even more disgusted than Johnson with the goings-on in Cleveland. “I never 
had the slightest intention of voting for Coolidge,” he told his friend. “It would have been much 
easier for me to support Harding in 1920.” The convention, Ickes thought, had exposed that there 
“is a distinct cleavage now. The futility of attempting to reform the Republican Party from the 
inside, to make it voluntarily progressive, must appeal to any open minded man as being quite 
futile. To work for Coolidge and help to keep him in the White House is to sin against the light; 
is to kill republican-progressivism and put reaction in the seat of power; is to advocate what we 
have against all our political lives…there is a higher duty than that of mere party loyalty. There 
is a duty to the principles that we believe in.” 1378  
 
The nomination of Dawes only cemented Ickes’ resolve.  “No one can any longer have 
any doubt about the Republican Party and what it really represents. It is the party of reaction and 
it glories in its shame…The issue is straighter and more definite than any issue we have ever 
faced not even excepting 1912.” There was no way Ickes was going to “vote for the political 
bell-hop who is at the present moment masquerading as a President.” Arguing that the “futility of 
attempting to reform the party from within must appeal to every reasonable mind,” Ickes told his 
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friend he was done forever with the party of Lincoln and Roosevelt. “My present disposition is to 




As for the old Roosevelt Progressives, Ickes thought the group was unsalvageable and 
any meeting a “futile gesture.” “[P]ersonally, I don’t see the use,” he told Johnson. On one hand 
“some of those who naturally would be invited and who ought normally to attend wouldn’t come 
because they are so busy being regular that they would be afraid of being caught playing 
hookey.” On the other, given the political predilections of Robins and White, the group would 
assuredly try to go on record as endorsing Coolidge. Upon further consideration, Johnson agreed 
with Ickes that “the calling of the old Progressives together is wholly useless…Indeed, there are 
not any Progressives left. We have a mild sort of protestant, who in reality hopes and prays he 
may exchange his protest for an office bestowed by the regulars or for a pat on the back by 
them.” Now, Johnson sighed, the so-called progressives were people like “Borah, who plays both 
ends against the middle,” and “our friend, Raymond, posing as the people, and longing for a 
place in the sun with selected few. We’ll forget the suggestion about those who once were our 
Progressive brethren.” 1380 
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Nonetheless, Johnson told Ickes, “I see myself in the next four years as a pretty lonely 
individual.”1381  
Schism in the Democracy 
 
 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the aisle, spirits were high. After the midterm results in 
1922, and especially after Teapot Dome began to leak, the coming presidential election looked in 
all likelihood to be a Democratic year. “We have the next election in the hollow of our hand,” 
bragged WIB financier Bernard Baruch, while Congressman John Nance Garner of Texas 
thought “Teapot Dome is giving us sufficient fuel to heat up the entire country.” Even on the eve 
of the 1924 convention, TNR thought that “the Democratic leaders are clearly suffering from 
over-confidence. They believe they are sure to win, and like all politicians under these 
circumstances they will be no more liberal or courageous than they have to be.” But, first, the 
party had to find a candidate to rally behind, which would prove no small feat. If the Republicans 
had shown the nation the ascendancy of the business class, the Democrats would become an 




After losing the 1920 nomination primarily on account of his indecision – which arose 
from a sense of duty to his ailing father-in-law, Woodrow Wilson – William Gibbs McAdoo was 
determined not to make the same mistake in 1924. Now based in California, where he gained the 
favor of local boss James D. Phelan, McAdoo spent the 1922 election season campaigning for 
congressional Democrats in the West and building up both his name recognition and his bullpen 
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of potential allies. As soon as the midterms were over, he began to build his organization for the 
coming fight, comprised mostly of fellow former Wilson men, the most notable of which was 
Baruch. By June 1923, H.L. Mencken lamented that the coming presidential election was 
undoubtedly going to be a McAdoo versus Harding contest, which, Mencken thought, “would 
bring us one step nearer…to the goal toward which American politics have been moving for 
years past: the amalgamation of the two great parties. Both have lost their old vitality, all their 
old reality…[their only difference] is their division on sectional lines. In the South the morons 
still vote the straight Democratic ticket.”1383 
 
Mencken’s “moron” comment speaks to the significant cultural divide that McAdoo, or 
any Democratic contender, would have to bridge. While Mencken was a proud and avowed 
Baltimore Wet, McAdoo was particularly popular in the South and West on account of his 
steadfast Dryness over the years. From America’s earliest days, saloons had been the political 
meeting place of choice for parties out of power, be they colonial revolutionaries or Irish 
immigrants, and so the Dry vs. Wet issue had never been just about alcohol. But by the mid-
1920’s it had become a loaded signifier for other deep cultural schisms in American life.1384  
 
In effect, the real question was about who was really in the driver’s seat in modern 
America. Supporters of Prohibition in rural America often viewed themselves as the hardy, 
Protestant, and 100% American native stock that comprised the backbone of the republic – men 
and women who stood for respecting the law, the flag, and the literal truth of the Bible. By 
contrast, Wets were thought be lawbreakers, the teeming immigrants of the festering cities, or at 
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best, the intellectuals and parlor Bolsheviks who thought themselves too smart and all-knowing 
to heed the Word as it was written. A list of bootleggers, evangelist Billy Sunday argued in 1921, 
“reads like a page of directories from Italy and Greece.” Conversely, urban Wets saw themselves 
as modern, tolerant, and cosmopolitan folk, and – not unlike Mencken – looked on rural Drys as 





That these stereotypes were broad (and often misleading – as historian Kenneth Jackson 
has noted, the Ku Klux Klan emerged in many a Northern city as well) did not diminish the 
intensity of feeling behind them. In effect, the passions that animated the anti-German and anti-
Red sentiment of the war and post-war eras became sublimated into the liquor issue, and the 
question of Prohibition became fraught with geographic (urban vs. rural), religious (Protestant 
vs. Catholic), and racial (native vs. immigrant) import. Compounding matters even further, 
Prohibition also took on the quality of a religious crusade, with notable speakers like Sunday and 
William Jennings Bryan, the longtime kingmaker of the Democratic Party, freely invoking the 





Another indicator that the lines between Wet and Dry were not as well demarcated as 
stereotypes suggest was the presidential candidacy of Senator Oscar Underwood of Alabama.  
Hailing from the Deep South, Underwood was for state’s rights, the League of Nations, and the 
World Court and resolutely against Big Government, women’s suffrage, the Ku Klux Klan, and 
Prohibition. To Bryan, Senator Underwood was an “anti-progressive” and a “tool of Wall 
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Street,” a “New York candidate living in the South.” To the Klan, he was the “Jew, jug, and 
Jesuit” candidate. While never pulling much of a following outside of his native state, 
Underwood would be a particular thorn in the side of McAdoo, particularly once he vowed to get 




When it came to the Klan, McAdoo at times wasn’t shy about voicing an oblique 
criticism of the organization. (After all, his principal benefactors, James Phelan and Bernard 
Baruch, were Catholic and Jewish respectively.) When specifically asked about his stance at a 
Georgia campaign stop in March 1923, he replied that he stood “four-square with respect to this 
and every other order, on the immutable guarantee of liberty contained in the first paragraph of 
the Constitution of the United States, that is, for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, 
freedom of religious worship, and the right of peaceable assemblage.” That being said, McAdoo 
never castigated the Klan by name either. Upon his official announcement that he was running in 
1923, The Nation thought him a decent choice on some issues. “Unfortunately, he has hitherto 
avoided the issue of the Klan, and he cannot be unaware that in the South he is coming to be 
generally regarded as the Ku Klux Klan’s candidate.”1388 
 
The Klan issue would continue to nettle McAdoo, but it would be a slicker substance than 
beer that would cause his campaign to truly start unraveling. On February 2
nd
, 1924, upon 
hearing the news that Woodrow Wilson was at death’s door, McAdoo and his wife Eleanor 
boarded a train in Los Angeles for Washington to pay their last respects. If McAdoo was looking 
forward to being free of his father-in-law’s shadow at last, he did not have long to savor the 
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moment. At a stop in Albuquerque, the McAdoos were informed that President Wilson had 
perished. What’s more, newspapers were breaking the story of Edwin Doheny’s testimony before 
the Walsh Committee the week before, when the oilman had admitted to keeping McAdoo on the 
payroll to the tune of $250,000. Urban newspapers immediately began dancing on McAdoo’s 
grave – the joke being that McAdoo would now be attending two Washington funerals this week, 
Wilson’s and his own – while party leaders began asking him to withdraw from the field. “You 
are no longer available as a candidate,” a grieved Thomas Walsh told his friend.1389  
 
Having been derailed in 1920, McAdoo refused to cede the field without a fight this time. 
“McAdoo is mad,” wrote one of his advisors, Breckinridge Long, in his diary on February 8th. 
“He is full of fight. He is swearing mad. He is just as profane as I get when I get mad. He is 
cursing and swearing, damning every opponent and every obstacle.” As such, the campaign 
immediately went on the offensive. McAdoo himself appeared before the Walsh committee on 
February 11
th, 
arguing that the payments were for proper legal services and nothing more. A 
week later, on February 18
th
, McAdoo gave a fire-and-brimstone speech in Chicago to three 
hundred supporters gathered from forty states, promising, in the words of the resolution passed at 
the event, to “accept the leadership of the Progressive Democracy of the nation.” 1390  
 
But even after the successful Chicago pep rally, the air began to let out of the McAdoo 
balloon over the next few months. In his review of Mary Synon’s election-year bio McAdoo: The 
Man and his Times, A Panorama in Democracy – entitled “McAdoo, Plunger” – Nation writer 
Harry Elmer Barnes joked that“the unforeseen ramifications of the oleaginous archaeology 
initiated by Senator La Follette and executed by Senators Walsh, Wheeler, and others seem 
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likely to have converted this book, intended as a prompt and opportune campaign biography, into 
a political obituary.” To fight this emerging storyline, the McAdoo camp began to campaign 
aggressively everywhere for delegates, thus – much like General Leonard Wood in 1920 – 
aggravating several of the favorite son candidates in the 1924 hunt. When McAdoo marched into 
Georgia in March 1924 and, with the aid of the Klan, subsequently thumped Alabama’s Oscar 
Underwood by a two-to-one margin in the state, he both gained a lasting enemy in Underwood 
and fueled the whispers nationwide that he was in fact the Ku Klux’s Kandidate. McAdoo stoked 
further animosities by rushing headlong into Missouri (Senator James Reed’s territory), Illinois 
(the backyard of Chicago boss George Brennan), and Ohio, where he was decisively defeated by 




While McAdoo’s forays into everyone else’s territory made him the delegate leader 
heading into the Democratic convention in New York City, it didn’t alter progressive opinion of 
his candidacy. “We must state our opinion,” The Nation editorialized in June 1924, “that Mr. 
McAdoo’s nomination would be a moral disaster for the whole country. It would mean that a 
great party had overlooked offenses against good taste and decency which ought never to be 
overlooked. He sold his influence as the son-in-law of the President to Doheny and to others.” As 
for the legal services claim, “no legal services could be worth such a fee.” In short, McAdoo’s 
continued bid was “another proof of that decay of moral sensibility in America which tolerates 
the candidacy of Calvin Coolidge, who never lifted a finger to drive the rascals out. Surely the 
next proper step if such as these prevail would be to auction off the Presidency from the steps of 
the Capitol at Washington to the highest bidder.”1392 
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In addition, the oil gusher soaking McAdoo’s candidacy encouraged several other 
favorite sons to enter the presidential contest, including the esteemed Senator Carter Glass of 
Virginia, the Klan-backed Governor of Indiana, Samuel Ralston; the younger brother of the 
Great Commoner, Charles Bryan of Nebraska, and the relatively unknown former Ambassador to 
Britain, John W. Davis of West Virginia. But the person it most helped was the candidate that 
urban Wets had rallied around from the start, and who McAdoo’s followers most despised, 




As soon as Smith decisively took back the New York governorship in 1922, his name 
started being mentioned among the possible presidential candidates. That being said, however 
enamored he was in New York, the governor’s baggage in a national race was considerable. “We 
have frequently expressed our admiration of Governor Smith as a man and as an executive,” 
wrote TNR in November 1923. “He is courageous, honest, and a genuine democrat. We regard 
as unworthy of America the religious intolerance that would dismiss forthwith his claims to 
consideration as a candidate for the presidency on the one ground that he is a Catholic. But a 
Roman Catholic candidate on a wet platform is about as good a definition of unavailability as 
could be devised. Anybody could beat such a combination – even Nicholas Murray Butler.”1394 
 
Charles Francis Murphy, the boss of Tammany Hall, wanted to make a go of it 
regardless. For decades, Tammany had backed Smith – as a backbencher state assemblyman in 
1903, as Democratic floor leader in 1911, as Speaker of the Assembly in 1913, as sheriff of New 
York City in 1915, President of the Board of Aldermen in 1917, and as Governor in 1918. But 
the organization, recognizing Smith’s talent, had also kept him from the dirtier side of the 
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patronage business and instead gave him free rein to do what he did best. In the wake of the 1911 
Triangle Fire, a disaster which saw 146 garment workers, mostly women under the age of 25, 
consumed by fire or forced to leap to their death – all because the factory’s owners had locked 
the doors of their ninth floor sweatshop on the way out – Smith proved that the Tammany 
machine and progressive reform could co-exist together. Working with State Senator Robert 
Wagner and social worker Frances Perkins, who would become one of Governor Smith’s key 
aides, Smith publicized the disaster and pushed through worker protections and fire safety laws 




By 1924, Smith was a nationally-known figure with impeccable progressive credentials – 
and yet, as a Catholic, Wet New Yorker of Irish, German, and Italian descent, he was also the 
worst nightmare of a not-inconsiderable percentage of the Democratic Party. Moreover, Smith 
was not the type of fellow to tone it down for potentially hostile audiences. Quite the contrary, 
the Governor was proud of who he was and from where he hailed – Wherever Smith went after 
1920, a band would strike up “The Sidewalks of New York” soon enough. He claimed to hold a 
degree of FFM (Fulton Fish Market), wore his trademark derby hat everywhere he went, 
consistently pronounced words  in Noo Yawkese (for example, “orspital” (hospital), “foist” 
(first), “poisun” (person), “soivice” (service), “woik” (work) and “raddio” (radio)), and proudly 
proclaimed he’d “rather be a lamppost on Park Row than the Governor of California.” If all this 
weren’t frightening enough to the hinterlands, Smith was also very publicly Wet. “Wouldn’t you 
like to have your foot on the rail,” he once waxed nostalgic to a reporter, “and blow the foam off 
some suds?”  Smith thought he was off the record then, but, in 1923, he was certainly on the 
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record when he signed the repeal of the Mullan-Gage Act, which was New York’s state-level 
version of the Volstead Act. Prohibitionists across the nation were aghast that the Empire State, 
so often a trend leader across the nation, had taken the first step toward repeal. “Governor Smith 
has simply dishonored his office and disgraced himself,” declared William Jennings Bryan, “he 
cannot lead the nation back to wallow in the mire.”1396 
 
All of that being said, Boss Murphy still wanted to see Smith in the White House, if 
nothing else than as an example to the nation that a Catholic could be President. So, from 1922 to 
1924, he met with some of his fellow Northern Democratic bosses, like George Brennan of 
Chicago, James McGuffey of Pennsylvania, Albert Ritchie of Maryland, and Tom Taggart of 
Indiana, in an attempt to build an anti-McAdoo coalition around Smith. But before Murphy could 




With Murphy’s death, “the brains went out of Tammany Hall,” noted journalist Arthur 
Krock, and consensus in the political media was that Smith’s brief foray into the presidential 
field was now over. But, while visibly distraught at the loss of his mentor, Smith had no plans to 
stand down. He and his close-knit political team – Joseph Proskauer, Belle Moskowitz, and 
Robert Moses, all of whom were of Jewish descent, and thus as suspect as their candidate to the 
eyes of many – knew they needed to find someone new to front the Smith candidacy. They 
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Despite his bungling of the Haiti issue, Roosevelt’s energetic performance on the 
campaign trail had been one of the few silver linings for the Democratic Party coming out of 
1920. But in August 1921, while vacationing at his usual family retreat on Canada’s Campobello 
Island, fate struck an unkind blow. One day after a long, strenuous sail to the island, the 39-year-
old Roosevelt fell into the cold waters of the Bay of Fundy. “I never felt anything so cold as that 
water,” he later recalled. The day after that, the Roosevelt family spent several exhausting hours 
fighting a nearby forest fire, which the hardy Franklin followed up with a two-mile jog and 
swim. (“I didn’t get the usual reaction, the glow I’d expected.”) Sorting through the mail that 
evening in his wet bathing suit, Roosevelt suddenly felt light-headed – “I’d never felt quite that 
way before” – and retired to bed, believing he had contracted a “slight case of lumbago.” The 
next morning, he woke up feverish, aching all over, and with his left leg feeling sluggish. By the 
afternoon, that leg was dead weight. By the next morning, both legs had gone numb – yet also 





As it happened, one of the most eminent surgeons in America, William Keen, was 
vacationing nearby. A pioneer in brain surgery, Dr. Keen had secretly operated on Grover 
Cleveland in 1893 to remove a cancerous lesion from the then-president’s jaw. Now, he 
diagnosed the ailing Roosevelt with “a clot of blood from a sudden congestion – settled in the 
lower spinal cord.” In the weeks to come, as Roosevelt remained feverish, paralyzed from the 
waist down, and in intense pain, doctors at Presbyterian Hospital in New York diagnosed the 
President with paralytic poliomyelitis, or polio, a viral scourge that would prey on thousands of 
Americans a year before Dr. Jonas Salk’s development of a vaccine in 1955. In 2003, doctors 
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reviewing Roosevelt’s case suggested that his condition might well have been Guillain–Barré 
syndrome, a rare autoimmune disorder after an infection in which the body’s immune system 
attacks the patient’s nervous system instead. In either case, the remainder of 1921 and 1922 
would be some of the bleakest days Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt would ever know, and, 




By early 1924, Roosevelt – after years of physical therapy and soul-searching – had 
begun to take an active interest in Democratic politics once more. “It seems to me that we have 
got to nominate a really progressive, if not a radical Democrat,” he wrote one friend. “[I]f I did 
not still have these crutches I should throw my own hat in the ring.” Although he originally 
supported his fellow Wilson alumnus McAdoo, Roosevelt was among those who thought the 
taint of Teapot Dome would be impossible to overcome. Roosevelt also thought Smith was too 
parochial a candidate to win the nomination in 1924 – “we might be able to get him the 
nomination in 1928” – and that signing the Mullan-Gage repeal had been a political mistake. 
(Despite his secret stash of “Old Reserve,” Roosevelt was publicly Dry.) But the Smith 
candidacy still presented him an opportunity to get back into the game, and to repair relations 
with the Tammany wing of the New York Democratic Party, whom Roosevelt had often feuded 
with during his brief time in the State Senate. (In fact, Roosevelt had run against the Tammany 
candidate for Senate in the 1914 Democratic primary, and had gotten thrashed by a three to one 
margin.) And so, on May 1
st, 1924, Roosevelt accepted the post of Smith’s national chairman.1401 
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While Roosevelt and Smith tried to temper the Governor’s image some for national 
consumption – “No matter what we think of the Volstead Law,” Smith now said, convincing no 
one, “it is the law of the land and we must support it” – the Governor still remained very much a 
local candidate. Wetness and Catholicism were each high hurdles on their own for a potential 
nominee – Taken together, they seemed nearly insurmountable. Even H.L. Mencken, who, as in 
1920, believed the Democrats could win if they got behind “a safe and incurable wet of national 
reputation…and make the campaign on a beer-wagon,” thought Smith’s candidacy “obviously 
hopeless: the day he was nominated the Methodist Ku Kluxers of every State south of the 
Potomac would begin building forces along the coast to repel the Pope.”  It didn’t help matters 
that, while possessing an impressive mastery of issues affecting the urban realm, Smith could 




Still, Smith mustered his own cache of delegates before the convention, most of them 
from the Northeast Corridor, but also from a primary win in the Wet state of Wisconsin. (“I don’t 
even know anybody way out there,” remarked the Governor, “I’ve never been there, nor in 
Minnesota.”) In Minnesota, Colorado, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, Smith was also strong 
enough to fight McAdoo to a draw, usually forcing either uninstructed or split delegations or 
declarations in favor of a neutral favorite son. And, unlike the hyper-aggressive McAdoo, 
Smith’s more laid-back candidacy hadn’t made enemies of favorite sons like James Cox in Ohio, 
and Oscar Underwood in Alabama, or powerful bosses like George Brennan in Illinois and Tom 
Taggart in Indiana – suggesting that if the balloting continued for awhile, Governor Smith would 
be in a better opportunity to capitalize.
 1403
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By the eve of the Democratic convention in New York City, McAdoo was the clear 
frontrunner with 270 delegates, but Smith was in the hunt with 126 of his own, and the vast 
majority were either with favorite sons (220) or uncommitted (over 1000). In short, anything 
could happen. Since “Smith is too wet [and] McAdoo is too oily,” The Nation predicted “a 
compromise agreement by exhaustion upon some man whom the American people would never 
in the world of their own free choice pick for the Presidency.” H.L. Mencken also guessed – as 
early as October 1923, in fact – the Democrats would likely find themselves impaled and 
writhing on the horns of Wet and Dry. “Whoever is nominated by the Democrats will be a 
palpable fraud,” Mencken mordantly predicted. “No even half-honest man has any more chance 
of getting the nomination than a Chinaman.” But, as cynical as he was, even Mencken couldn’t 





Escape from New York 
 
 
“This thing has got to come to an end,” begged Democratic humorist Will Rogers a week 
into the ensuing fiasco, “New York invited you as guests, not to live.” In years to come, Rogers 
quipped, when little children asked their fathers if they were in the war, they would reply, “No, 
son, but I went through the New York Convention.” Mencken harrumphed that the “convention 
is almost as vain and idiotic as a golf tournament or a disarmament conference.” Journalist 
Arthur Krock deemed the unfolding Democratic nightmare “a snarling, cursing, tedious, tenuous, 
suicidal, homicidal roughhouse.” Lippmann thought the Democrats had taught America “more at 
firsthand about the really dangerous problems of America” and “learned more of the actual 
                                                          
1404




motives which move the great masses of men than anyone of this generation thought possible.” 
“No man or woman who attended the Convention of 1924 in the old Madison Square Garden 
will ever forget it,” Daniel Roper, one of McAdoo’s lieutenants, said later in life. “This country 
has never seen its like and is not likely to see its like again.” Over three decades later, Al Smith’s 
daughter still remembered those sixteen days with a shudder. “Traits that I do not like to think of 
as American played too great a part that year,” she winced.1405 
 
And, for the first time in history, the convention had all been broadcast nationwide 
through the miracle of radio. 
 
From the start, nothing seemed to go right for the Democrats in New York. The month 
before the Democracy convened at the old Garden, the Barnum and Bailey circus had been in 
town, and, in the stifling heat wave that accompanied the overcrowded convention, the smell of 
the circus animals lingered throughout the entire proceedings. While clearly Smith territory, New 
York had also been home to William McAdoo for many years – he had been instrumental in the 
creation of two underground tunnels for the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad (today, the PATH 
trains). But McAdoo’s rural supporters were less used to the vertiginous chasms and hustle and 
bustle of Gotham – “I’d sure hate to be a dog or a boy in New York,” said one – and Smith-
adoring locals took many an opportunity to make fun of the drawling, countrified “apple-
knockers” and “turd-kickers.”1406  
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Even attempts by the City to be neighborly often backfired. A statue of “Father 
Knickerbocker” placed above the Hotel Astor to welcome guests was, to the disgust of Dry 
visitors, holding a mug of beer. A group of fundamentalist Texans who wanted to find out which 
block on the “Avenue of States” had been given to their home found themselves face-to-face 
with St. Patrick’s Cathedral. Others looking for a church on Sunday were encouraged to attend 
Riverside Church, where they were regaled by Harry Emerson Fosdick, America’s foremost 
apostle of Modernism and enemy of Fundamentalism. Others still wandered about only to be 
confronted by the sight of Wall Street or Tammany Hall – ancient and foreboding symbols of the 
Enemy – or any number of speakeasies and nightclubs.1407 
 
Visiting delegates weren’t safe in the Garden either. At one point, the convention band 
inadvertently tried to accompany a pro-McAdoo demonstration by southern Democrats with the 
song “Marching Through Georgia.” And at any time, the upper galleries were crowded with 
rowdy New Yorkers – Smith supporters, all – who would rain down ridicule and opprobrium 
upon the convention floor whenever events took a McAdoo turn, to the point where even the 
Smith campaign tried to tamp them down. Even notwithstanding the Manichean proportions of 
the Prohibition and Catholic issues, these experiences hardened rural delegates’ hearts against 
Smith, just as the intolerance and public machinations of the Klan – on Independence Day, as the 
convention wended into its tenth day, 20,000 Klansmen would rally against Smith at Long 
Branch, New Jersey – hardened Smith delegates against McAdoo. As the nominating contest 
became less and less a friendly political rivalry among fellow Democrats and more a holy war 






for America’s future, delegates on both sides became increasingly intransigent, refusing to 




Further compounding matters were the idiosyncrasies of the convention rules. The two-
thirds rule – providing that the eventual nominee must garner two-thirds of the total vote, or 732 
delegates – was a stumbling block for McAdoo, who, while usually polling first, had made too 
many enemies to get over the hump. But the unit rule, which decreed (if a given delegation had 
been instructed by their state party to use it) that a nominee got an entire state’s vote if he held a 
majority of that state’s delegates, further kept McAdoo’s forces from dissipating to other 
candidates. Taken in total, it was a recipe for grinding stalemate that would result in over a 
hundred ballots being cast – close to doubling the previous record of fifty-seven, set by the 1860 




The first day of the convention, Tuesday, June 24
th
, was deceptively calm, with 
introductory speeches by noted orator Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi, who decried the 
“saturnalia of corruption” in the Harding White House, and the hometown mayor, John Francis 
Hylan. (When an English visitor in the galleries complained of being bored, an American 
reporter told him, “Just wait, those are Democrats down there.”) The second day started off 
relatively normally as well, with Senator Thomas Walsh being named the permanent chairman. 
As the prosecutor of Teapot Dome, his presence not only suggested Democratic rectitude in the 
face of Republican corruption, but also a fusion of the two warring campaigns – Walsh was an 
anti-Klan Catholic from the West who had previously supported McAdoo. As such, it was the 
last savvy public relations move of the convention. And even then, many of the pros of Walsh’s 
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appointment would be overshadowed by the increasingly ornery Senator having to become ever 
more heavy-handed with the gavel over the next fortnight. At one point, Walsh banged the gavel 




Soon after Walsh’s ascension, the official nominations of candidates began, which 
encompassed the next three days. The order being alphabetical, Alabama went first, with Forney 
Johnston, a young lawyer and former senator’s son, putting Oscar Underwood’s name into 
consideration. Over the course of his nominating speech, Johnston also called for a plank in the 
Democratic platform denouncing the Klan, at which point a twenty-five minute demonstration 
broke out among Smith supporters while the delegates along “McAdoo Alley” sat sullen. When 
the roll of states got to California, boss James Phelan gave a florid fifty-minute nominating 
speech for McAdoo that was deemed by observers “the worst speech never heard.” It, according 
to others, nearly “stampeded the convention of Smith” and would have killed “Thomas Jefferson 
running on a ticket with Andrew Jackson.” Long before Phelan got to his closing, the galleries 
were desperately screaming “Name your man! Name your man!” When he finally Mc’did, 
McAdoo forces festooned with buttons and hatbands reading “Mc’ll do!” broke out in an hour-
long celebration, chanting “we don’t care what the Easterners do; the South and West are for 
McAdoo!” In response, the galleries bellowed “Ku Ku, McAdoo!” and “No oil on Al!” The 




The third day offered for many Democrats what would be the lasting highlight of the 
convention. When the roll of states reached Connecticut, the delegation yielded to their neighbor 
New York, meaning, everyone knew with bated breath, it was time for Al Smith’s official 
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nomination. The deliverer of this good news to the galleries, on account of his relative stardom 
and offsetting attributes to the candidate, was Smith’s campaign manager, Franklin Roosevelt. 
(When Joseph Proskauer first pitched the idea to Smith, the candidate asked, “For God’s Sake, 
why?” Proskauer replied, “Because you’re a Bowery mick and he’s a Protestant patrician and 
he’ll take some of the curse off of you.”) Helped by his teenage son Jimmy, whose arm he 
gripped so hard it bruised, Roosevelt slowly made his way to the lectern on crutches. Once there 
– Joseph Guffey of Pennsylvania had already tested that “the pulpit” could bear Roosevelt’s 
weight – he threw his head back and turned on the FDR charm, winning the McAdoo crowd over 
right away by gently admonishing the galleries above. Then, delivering a speech written by 
Proskauer (although Roosevelt would rarely admit to it later), Roosevelt praised Al Smith as “the 
Happy Warrior of the political battlefield,” a moniker, derived from Wordsworth, that would 
stick to Smith as surely as “The Sidewalks of New York” had in 1920. The Smith crowd loved 
every minute of it, and the McAdoo crowd was quietly impressed – Franklin Roosevelt was 
back. Thus followed a rowdy celebration of over an hour, as Smith forces paraded up and down 
the aisles while McAdoo’s delegates defended their state standards to prevent them from being 
carried into the pro-Smith entourage. “Yesterday’s protracted outburst showed that Smith could 
carry New York – or more accurately that it carry Tammany Hall,” reported the New York Times. 
“It did not show that he could carry the Democratic National Convention.”1412  
 
The roll of states continued into the rainy fourth day, as numerous favorite sons got their 
moment in the sun. By the morning of the fifth day – Saturday, June 28th – sixteen presidential 
candidates had been nominated by forty-three speakers. The convention was already running two 
days longer than the Republicans had in Cleveland, and the balloting hadn’t even begun. Even 
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worse for the Democrats, Saturday was the day that a contentious debate that had been dividing 




As always, much of the Democratic Party platform of 1924 was to be expected. Like the 
Republican document, it began in eulogy – this time for the fallen Woodrow Wilson, “whose 
spirit and influence will live on through the ages.” Like many a Democratic platform in the past, 
it called for “equal rights to all and special privilege to none” and denounced Republican tariff 
policy, deeming Fordney-McCumber “the most unjust, unscientific and dishonest tariff tax 
measure ever enacted in our history…It heavily increases the cost of living, penalizes 
agriculture, corrupts the government, fosters paternalism and, in the long run, does not benefit 
the very interests for which it was intended.” 1414  
 
Encouraging voters to compare the Harding years to the early days of Wilson, much was 
made of the “political depravity” unearthed by the administration scandals. “Never before in our 
history has the government been so tainted by corruption and never has an administration so 
utterly failed.” On prohibition, the platform faulted Harding’s lax enforcement and declared that 
Democrats would “respect and enforce the constitution and all law.” Otherwise, the platform 
called for “the spirit of local self-government,” stronger campaign finance regulations “to 
prevent Newberryism and the election evils disclosed by recent investigations,” immigration 
restriction, disarmament, conservation, investment in highways and aviation, protective laws for 
women, public works projects to offset unemployment, and support of collective bargaining. In 
sum, it declared, “[t]he republican party is concerned chiefly with material things; the democratic 
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party is concerned chiefly with human rights…The democratic party stands for remedial 
legislation and progress. The republican party stands still.”1415 
 
Perusing the final document, TNR, was nonplussed, deeming it a “timid document” and a 
“political catch-all. It is firm and decisive only on issues concerning which there is no internal 
strife within the party, and of these there are very few.” But, whatever the platform’s merits or 
faults, they were quickly overshadowed by the disputes over what was not included. William 
Jennings Bryan, who had been mostly ignored at the 1920 convention in San Francisco, had 
come to New York with his own platform, which included a stronger Dry plank and which he 
had run by McAdoo. After many hours of debate on the platform committee, it was not included. 
Former Secretary of War Newton Baker, meanwhile, wanted to replace language calling for a 
referendum on the League of Nations with an endorsement of immediate entry into the League. 
But most Democrats didn’t want to stake another election on this issue, and so, despite a 
barnburner of a speech on the convention floor, Baker’s minority report went down on Saturday 





From the beginning of the campaign, Oscar Underwood of Alabama had wanted a plank 
in the Democratic platform specifically condemning the Klan by name, just as the 1856 platform 
had condemned the Know-Nothing party – “a party claiming to be exclusively American” – as a 
“secret political society.” Bryan and McAdoo, on the other hand – hoping to remove the Klan as 
an issue – wanted a general condemnation of “any effort to arouse religious or racial dissension” 
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without specifically mentioning the Invisible Empire. For long days and nights the platform 
committee had wrestled over this issue, nearly coming to blows more than once. When the 
committee finally voted 40-14 to include the generic proposal in the platform, the anti-Klan 




As soon as the anti-Klan plank was read, the floor and the galleries both went into full 
hysteria. Walsh tried to mitigate the fever pitch by announcing several hours of debate on the 
League issue first, but by the time pro- and anti-Klan speakers began making their remarks late 
in the evening, the assembled Democrats were cheering and hissing with abandon. The wall of 
noise became particularly intense during the remarks of Andrew C. Erwin, the former mayor of 
Athens, Georgia. Expecting pro-Klan nostrums from the Georgian, the galleries booed Erwin 
mercilessly – until the room slowly started to realize that Erwin was actually denouncing the 
Klan, at which point a lusty cheer erupted from up above even as McAdoo Alley wailed with 





The last speech on the Klan issue was delivered by William Jennings Bryan, who pleaded 
with anti-Klan delegates that everyone could agree if only the three words “Ku Klux Klan” were 
left out of the platform. It went over like a lead balloon. The galleries were so vociferous in their 
booing of the Great Commoner that Bryan had to stop three times. On the third such interruption, 
Walsh rose up and began gaveling and screaming in fury to quiet the balconies down. Rattled, 
Bryan slipped into the cadences of the church and implored the unruly congregation “in the name 
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of the Son of God and Savior of the world. Christians, stop fighting and let us get together and 
save the world from the materialism that robs life of its spiritual values.” The crowd was having 
none of it, and Bryan retreated to a chair on the platform, too tired to walk back to his seat with 
Florida. It wasn’t even his worst speech of the convention.1419 
 
Just after 11:30 at night, the convention began its vote on the Klan issue, and all was 
confusion. Each delegation broke out into shouting, shoving, and even fist fights as the issue was 
debated amongst themselves. Americans across the country blanched at the fury and 
indescribable noise coming over the radio. Votes had to be counted and counted again as 
delegates decided to switch their position. Miss Marion Colley, granddaughter of the 
Confederacy’s Secretary of State, Robert Toombs, and the only member of the Georgia 
delegation to welcome back Mayor Erwin, shouted “I’m against the Klan!” before the irate men 
around her pushed her into a No vote against the amendment. (The next day, she told reporters 
she was still “in favor of the minority report and against the Klan.") At nearly two in the 
morning, the final vote was determined to be 541 
3
20
  for the anti-Klan plank, and 542 
3
20
  against – 




In effect, before the balloting had even begun, the Democrats had torn themselves apart 
before a nationwide audience. “Saturday will always remain burned in my memory as long as I 
live,” noted Will Rogers, “as being the day when I heard the most religion preached, and the 
least practiced, of any day in the world’s history.” And while Oswald Villard was thrilled to see 
so many delegates “prefer to have their party wrecked…than to have it silent in the presence of a 
sin that threatens the very fundamentals of American life,” most of the politicians on hand 
                                                          
1419
 Ibid, 157-159. 
1420




lamented that Democrats had self-immolated over an issue on which few of the principals had 
ever wanted to engage. Like McAdoo, Bryan, and many of the favorite sons, Franklin Roosevelt 
saw little to be gained over a fight on the Klan – it merely accentuated Smith’s Catholicism – and 
even Smith later conceded the push to name the organization was a bad idea. But once the issue 
had been named and unleashed, passions had flared on both sides of the divide, and no one 
wanted to back down. The animosity unleashed on Saturday night would continue to fester over 
the remainder of the convention, making the balloting even more of a Sisyphean task for all 
involved. In the words of TNR’s John W. Owens, after the Klan vote “the Convention entered a 
form of insanity, and became divided into a pack of bull dogs.”1421 
 
On the sixth day, the bull dogs rested. On the seventh, Monday, June 30
th
 – the day the 
convention was supposed to end – the balloting finally began. “Alabamah casts twenty fo-ah 
votes for Oscah Dubble-yuh Undddawood!” drawled Governor William Brandon, for the first of 
102 times, to start the vote – creating an instant catch-phrase across the country. (For years later, 
a resolute man or woman would be considered “as steady as Alabama for Underwood.”) With 
732 votes needed for victory, McAdoo had 431 ½ votes to Smith’s 241 on the first ballot, with 
the rest scattered among favorite sons. (240 of Smith’s 241 first-ballot delegates had voted to 
name the Klan the Saturday before, just as a high percentage of McAdoo delegates had voted not 
to.) By midnight on Monday, fifteen roll calls later, McAdoo had 479 votes, Smith had 305 ½. 
Tuesday saw fifteen more roll calls and, other than a brief 56 vote rally for John W. Davis of 
West Virginia, there were no noticeable shifts in the deadlock. By Tuesday night, McAdoo stood 
at 415 ½, Smith 323 ½ Davis 126 ½, with no hope of compromise in sight.
1422
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The eighth day, Wednesday, July 2
nd
, began much as the previous ones had, until, on the 
thirty-eighth ballot, William Jennings Bryan asked permission of the convention to explain his 
vote. Then, calling for party unity, Bryan explained there were a number of great candidates the 
Democrats could get behind – except he explicitly refrained from mentioning Carter Glass (who 
refused to cede his Virginia delegation to McAdoo), John W. Davis (whom Bryan had earlier 
called “a Wall Street man” and “the lawyer from J.P. Morgan,” prompting one woman to ask 
him, “Who’s McAdoo the lawyer for?”), and, of course, Al Smith, who as a Wet, Bryan thought 
must be stopped. Immediately the jeers came pouring down from the galleries. For an hour, the 
Great Commoner feuded with the audience. He was cheered only when he said that this would 
likely be his last Democratic convention. When Bryan finally gave up a podium, the convention 
was even less united than it had been before. “This man must be for another candidate than 
McAdoo,” suggested one New York delegate, while one reporter deadpanned that the howling 
galleries had perhaps convinced Bryan of the existence of evolution’s missing link. Franklin 
Roosevelt merely lamented that “Bryan has killed poor McAdoo, and he hasn’t done himself any 
good.” Twenty-eight years after he had first electrified a Democratic convention with the “Cross 
of Gold” speech, Bryan left the stage a caricature of his former self.1423 
 
And so the death march resumed. At first it seemed Bryan’s speech only had the apparent 
effect of losing McAdoo half a vote, dropping his total from 444 ½ to 444. (Smith remained at 
321.) But, after their display during Bryan’s oration, many of the non-New York delegates were 
sick of the rambunctiousness of the balcony. After a recess until Wednesday night, McAdoo 
jumped up to 499 votes on the thirty-ninth ballot and to 505 on the fortieth ballot – over the 
psychologically important number of 500 and just under the majority mark of 550. But he lost 
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fractions of a vote on the forty-first and the forty-second ballot, and the evening adjourned. 
McAdoo has passed the 500 mark,” Roosevelt confidently declared to the press, “and he may go 
higher, but he will never pass the majority mark.”1424 
 
On the ninth day, the situation was static once again. Thursday, July 3
rd
 saw the most 
ballots called in American history – nineteen – and a brief boom for Indiana Governor Samuel 
Ralston, but when the sixty-first ballot was finished at one in the morning, Ralston had fallen 
back down to earth and nothing had changed. Compounding the stalemate was the increasing 
sense among the favorite sons that, at this point, a compromise candidate would have to be 
chosen, and few wanted to remove their name from consideration. One who did on the tenth day, 
however, was Ralston, who had been the stalking horse for Indiana boss Tom Taggart and who, 
being sickly, had never wanted the job anyway – but Indiana then split its votes 20/10 for 
McAdoo and Smith. James Cox also removed his name on Independence Day, but the crucial 
state of Ohio merely shifted its votes to another favorite son, Newton Baker. On the 67
th
 ballot, 
Will Rogers got his first vote for president from a member of the Arizona delegation, and on the 
69
th
, McAdoo reached his convention high of 530. But on the seventieth ballot, McAdoo receded 




The situation for the Democrats had become critical. Aside from the catastrophe on the 
radio, even Democratic delegates were now leaving town in disgust, among them Congressman 
and McAdoo supporter John Nance Garner of Texas, who proclaimed “Hell, this convention 
won’t nominate a candidate in a hundred ballots!” “I never dreamed it would be anything like 
this,” one exhausted woman told those around her. “I’m through with politics.” Franklin 
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Roosevelt was among those now looking for a way out, as was his candidate. In fact, Smith had 
hoped to speak to the convention on Independence Day, stand up for himself and his religion, 
and then announce his withdrawal – but irate McAdoo forces had shouted down Roosevelt’s 
request for Smith to speak. And even as Smith was now willing to compromise, McAdoo was 
digging in even further. “I fear for the man who would approach Mr. McAdoo,” one of his 
lieutenants declared. “He is like General Grant and is going to fight it out on this line if it takes 
all summer.”1426 
 
As the remaining amassed delegates began to grind down in despair, Saturday, July 5
th
 
saw only seven ballots. On the seventy-seventh, McAdoo had 513 votes, Smith 367, Davis 76 ½, 
Underwood 47 ½ Glass 27, Robinson (of Arkansas) 24, Ritchie (of Maryland) 16 ½ -- meaning 
McAdoo still did not have a majority of the convention, and Smith had exactly the third he 
needed to forever deny McAdoo the nomination. All parties now agreed to a “harmony 
conference” over the weekend to sort out the situation – in effect creating a “smoke-filled room” 
akin to the one that had nominated Harding four years earlier. But McAdoo showed little 
inclination to deal, and, so after two days of marathon meetings, Monday, July 7
th
 dawned with 
no deal in place and every other candidate now loathing the frontrunner. As a result, McAdoo 
saw his number of votes dwindle down to the true believers. On the eighty-seventh ballot at 
11:45pm – which was the last of the evening, on account of the sad death from blood poisoning 




 – the fourteenth day – saw a morning boom for Indiana Governor 
Samuel Ralston, who had removed his name from contention the week before. Nonetheless, 
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McAdoo delegates looking for another safe harbor fled to the standard of the Klan-supported 
governor, and by the ninety-third ballot Tuesday afternoon, Smith had 355 ½, McAdoo 314, and 
Ralston 196 ¼. But Ralston was adamant about not wanting the job – he would perish the 
following year – and so the convention took another recess to assess the situation. For the first 
time, Smith gamely and McAdoo reluctantly met face-to-face for over an hour to plan a joint 
withdrawal and agree on a candidate. That meeting ended in doubt, but that evening, Franklin 
Roosevelt announced to the remnants of the convention that “Governor Smith authorizes me to 
say that immediately upon the withdrawal by Mr. McAdoo of his name, Governor Smith will 
withdraw his name also.” Desperation then began to emanate from the McAdoo hardliners. 
“Before God, before Christ, we want McAdoo!” bellowed one Arizona delegate.  But while the 
McAdoo faithful stayed true, Ralston’s former delegates began to move toward John W. Davis. 
On the 99
th
 ballot, the count was McAdoo 353, Smith 353, Davis 210, Underwood 39 ½, Glass 




At this point, well after two in the morning, McAdoo then announced that “if I should 
withdraw my name from the Convention I should betray the trust confided to me by the people in 
many states which have sent delegates here to support me. And yet I am unwilling to contribute 
to a continuation of a hopeless deadlock. Therefore, I have determined to leave my friends and 
supporters free to take such action as, in their judgment, may best serve the interests of the 
party.” Instead of withdrawing, McAdoo had released his delegates – a final thumb of the nose at 
the Smith contingent. Nonetheless, eager to see the ramifications of McAdoo’s announcement, 
the convention called a 100
th
 ballot. At four in the morning, the count was Smith 351 ½, Davis 
210, McAdoo 190, Meredith 75 ½, Thomas Walsh 52 ½, Robinson 46, and Owen (of Oklahoma) 
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20.  Even now, there was still no candidate, and nobody knew what to do. When William 




While the convention delegate had been fighting in the trenches Monday and Tuesday, 
the 1920 presidential candidate, James Cox, had returned from Ohio to build a compromise 
boom for Davis of West Virginia, a man whom everyone seemed to agree would be satisfactory 
with the exception of William Jennings Bryan. (Again, Bryan loathed him for his lawyerly 
connections to Wall Street. For this reason, Mencken – overestimating Bryan’s waning influence 
– had told his readers that “John W. Davis will never be nominated.”) On the afternoon of 
Wednesday, July 9
th
, as delegates were tired, despairing, and late to file in – another Alabama 
delegate besides Governor Brandon announced the twenty-foah votes for Underwood – Cox’s 
efforts began to pay dividends. The 101
st
 ballot saw Davis at 316, Underwood at 229 ½, 
Meredith at 130, Smith at 121, Walsh at 98, Glass at 59, McAdoo at 52, and Robinson at 22 ½. 
Finally, the end was in sight. Even as Bryan raced all over the floor bellowing that “the 
convention must not nominate a Wall Street man,” the 102nd ballot saw Davis rise to 415 ½. At 
3pm on the fifteenth day and the 103
rd
 ballot, John W. Davis finally, mercifully became the 
Democratic candidate with 844 votes over Underwood’s 102 ½. When a newspaperman 
congratulated Davis on his victory, the candidate replied, “Thanks, but you know how much it is 
worth.”1430 
 
Even then, the convention still had to pick a vice-president. With the presidential 
balloting finally done, delegates all over the room began to call out for Thomas Walsh to join the 
ticket. Wanting no further part of the proceedings, Walsh suddenly adjourned the convention and 
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left town, leaving a note to be read to the floor proclaiming he would refuse the vice-presidential 
nod under any circumstances. (In this decision, he had been aided by his Montana friend and 
colleague Burton Wheeler, who asked him point-blank, “What would you rather be – a defeated 
candidate for Vice President or a re-elected Senator?”) The Democracy would have to look 




The next and final day of the convention, Thursday, July 10
th
, Congressman Alben 
Barkley of Kentucky held the gavel. After a slew of names were put forward, Al Smith was 
finally given his chance to speak to the delegates, and, while he promised to “take off my coat 
and vest” and work hard for the ticket – which was more than McAdoo, who immediately fled 
for Europe, would do – the hard edge of his defensive speech alienated the crowd on the way out. 
Even as John W. Davis also stepped to the platform and gave a more endearing speech, the 
problem of the vice-presidency lingered – Few even seemed to want it. An afternoon of party 
elders eventually came up with Charles W. Bryan of Nebraska – younger brother of William – to 
balance the Eastern Wall Street lawyer on the top of the ticket. (When the younger Bryan was 
told the news, he replied, “Quit your kidding.”) At 1:10am Friday morning, Bryan’s name was 
officially put into contention, and the exhausted delegations, after some confusion, began to 
move their votes to his column. When Bryan had received 740 votes, eight more than needed, the 
convention – at 2:30 in the morning – abruptly drew to a close.1432  
 
“The two factions lost everything that they had fought for,” wrote a stunned Mencken 
about the selection of Davis. “It was as if Germany and France, after warring over Alsace-
Lorraine for centuries, should hand it over to England.” (Mencken also hoped his editors would 
                                                          
1431
 Murray, The 103
rd
 Ballot, 208-213. Wheeler, Yankee from the West, 249. 
1432
 Murray, The 103
rd




know to reverse the line about Davis never being nominated in his last dispatch.) Still, the very 
Wet Mencken was delighted to see the very Dry Great Commoner brought so low by the 
proceedings. “They not only shoved his arch-enemy, Davis down his throat; they shoved his 
brother, the Nebraska John the Baptist, after Davis, and so made it impossible for him to yell. 
This joke upon Bryan was worth all the long sessions, all the lost sleep, all the hard usage of the 
gluteus maximus  I shall be snickering over it many long years. I shall recall it upon the scaffold, 
and so shock the sheriff with a macabre smirk.” As it happened, Bryan was delighted by the 
choice of his brother. “The age of miracles has not passed,” he declared, urging “Charley” to join 
the Wall Street-headed ticket. This abrupt turnaround, joked writer Clinton W. Gilbert, made it 
clear that “[i]f monkeys had votes Mr. Bryan would be a champion of evolution.” Nonetheless, 
taken in total, the 1924 convention had been Bryan’s Waterloo. “I have never been so humiliated 
in all my life,” he later tearfully confessed to Senator Heflin of the experience. It would indeed 




Bryan wasn’t the only man to meet his political demise in Madison Square Garden. For 
his truculence in defeat as much as for his reluctance to bend the knee at any point in the 
proceedings, William McAdoo lost any hope of being considered a viable presidential contender 
in the future. McAdoo, thought The Nation, “took his terrible disappointment with poor grace 
indeed – and gave no evidence of being a generous loser. Much of the delay of the convention 
was due to his obstinate refusal to see what was plain from the start to every unprejudiced 
observer – that he could not win.” Al Smith, on the other hand, took his defeat “in such excellent 
spirit” that he seemed “a more sympathetic figure than ever.” The most compelling figure to 
emerge from the wreckage of New York, however, was Franklin D. Roosevelt. To the 
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Democratic New York World, he was “the real hero…the one leader commanding the respect and 
admiration of delegations from all sections.” Kansas City boss Tom Pendergast, the man who 
would later pluck Harry Truman from obscurity and start him on the road to the White House, 
thought Roosevelt “the most magnetic personality of any individual I have ever met, and I 
predict he will be…the Democratic candidate in 1928.”1434 
 
As for the Democratic candidate in 1924 – former Solicitor General, Ambassador to 
England, and president of the American Bar Association John W. Davis – progressives were 
charitable to the man but unenthused about his candidacy. The New Republic deemed his 
nomination “an inglorious and insignificant ending of the bitter and significant contest between 
the Smith and the McAdoo factions…From the progressive point of view his high character and 
his eminent abilities are simply irrelevant.” In a separate editorial, TNR, who thought Thomas 
Walsh was the best choice for the Democrats, argued that “Coolidge is an arid conservative who 
makes conservatism repellent. Mr. Davis is an engaging conservative who makes it attractive.” 
Neither, they thought, was a particularly good choice for America in 1924.
1435
 
   
From the sidelines, Harold Ickes also saw similarities between the two major-party 
candidates. “Davis is at least an upstanding man,” he wrote Hiram Johnson, “and when he serves 
the house of Morgan he charges for his services. Coolidge is an even more facile servant of the 
same master, but he does it for nothing.” For Senator Johnson, the “choice with the major parties 
is merely the way in which you wish to enter the House of Morgan, whether by Wall Street with 
Dwight Morrow, or by Broad Street with Dan Lamont.” Still, he noted, “[h]ow true was Grant’s 
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exclamation that the Democratic Party could be relied upon at the right time to do the wrong 
thing.” For his part, Mencken looked askance at the Democratic candidate with his usual leery 
eye. “He used to work for J. Pierpont Morgan, and he has himself said that he is proud of the 
fact,” noted Mencken. “I knew a man once who was proud of his skill at biting off little dog’s 
tails.” As for his term as head of the ABA, Mencken noted it “coincided exactly with a revolt 
against the wholesale invasions of the Bill of Rights that were begun under Wilson…Dr. Davis 
took no part in it. To this day he has uttered no word about it. Is he in favor of shoving men into 
jail without jury trials, or is he against it? No one knows.”1436 
 
The Nation agreed that Davis was at least a man of presidential timbre. Before the New 
York fiasco had even gotten under way, the magazine had suggested him as the best potential 
compromise candidate – “He has presence, dignity, force; he is in the best sense a gentleman.” 
But they too thought a Wall Street lawyer didn’t fit the need of the nation in 1924, and for both 
TNR and The Nation, there was now only one compelling choice. “The need of today,” argued 
the latter “is a four-square man as to whose sincerity there can be no question, who shall have 
given proof that he is ready to pay any price for his beliefs and that he is unselfishly devoted to 
the public interest. Such a man is today to be found in neither Republican nor Democratic camps, 




One of the few places in America where the Coolidge operation had completely run 
aground during the 1924 Republican primaries was in Wisconsin. There, even with the president 
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and Hiram Johnson on the ballot, Robert La Follette had won two-thirds of the vote simply 
through write-ins. “La Follette,” commented the New York World on that April 1924 victory, “is 
the only man now on the political horizon who can lead hosts in an independent pilgrimage.” 
And even though the Senator was in fading health, he was eager to take up such a standard if 
neither of the two major parties chose a progressive nominee. With the Republican convention in 
Cleveland no doubt in the hands of reactionaries, La Follette queried his old friend, William 
Jennings Bryan, about the potential goings-on among Democrats in early June. “If you care to do 
so,” La Follette wrote Bryan, “I will be pleased to have your judgment as to the probable 
outcome at New York.” Bryan, of course, had no clue what he was in for, and, as the Democratic 
convention dragged on, La Follette dispatched his son Bob to New York to keep an eye on the 




That being said, La Follette did not want his third party attempt to get tarnished out of the 
box with the Bolshevik brush. In fact, William Mahoney, the head of the Farmer-Labor Party, 
had begun trying to draft La Follette as their candidate well before their June 1924 convention in 
St. Paul, Minnesota. This was not quite the same Farmer-Labor movement that had experienced 
a Communist takeover in Chicago – In fact, Mahoney and his powerful Minnesota branch of the 
FLP had refused to send delegates to that ill-fated 1923 convention. But Mahoney had 
nonetheless allowed the Worker’s Party a place at the table, provided they remained a minority 
and were open about their status. This FLP also had the support of J.A.H. Hopkins – who had 
earlier pushed Borah to throw his hat in the ring at St. Paul – as well as both the Forty-Eighters 
and the Socialists. The more conservative labor wing of the CPPA, as well as Samuel Gompers’ 
AFL, however, were less enthused, and pushed La Follette to renounce this movement – which 
                                                          
1438




the Wisconsin Senator eventually did. “I have no doubt that very many of those who have 
participated in bringing about the St. Paul Convention have been actuated by the purest desire to 
promote genuine political and economic progress,” La Follette wrote. Nevertheless, he added, 
“those who have had charge of the arrangements for this convention have committed the fatal 
error of making the Communists an integral part of their organization.”: 
 
The Communists have admittedly entered into this political movement not for the purpose of 
curing, by means of the ballot, the evils which afflict the American people, but only to divide and 
confuse the Progressive movement and create a condition of chaos favorable to their ultimate 
aims. Their real purpose is to establish by revolutionary action a dictatorship of the proletariat, 
which is absolutely repugnant to democratic ideals and to all American aspirations… 
 
Reposing complete confidence in the soundness of the deliberate judgment of the American 
people, I have no apprehension that the Communist Party can ever command any considerable 
support in this country. I do not question their right, under the Constitution, to submit their issues 
to the people, but I most emphatically protest against their being admitted into the councils of any 
body of progressive voters… 
 
Not only are the Communists the mortal enemies of the progressive movement and democratic 
ideals, but, under the cloak of such extremists, the reactionary interests find the best opportunity 





“I have devoted many years of my life to an effort to solve the problems which confront 
the American people by the ballot and not by force,” concluded La Follette. “I have fought 
steadfastly to achieve this end, and I shall not abandon this fight as long as I may live. I believe, -
therefore, that all progressives should refuse to participate in any movement which makes 
common cause with any Communist organization.”1440  
 
As a result of La Follette’s open letter, the Committee of ’48 subsequently separated all 
ties from the Farmer-Labor party as well. In the end, the St. Paul convention included less than 
400 delegates, most of them heralding from the Worker’s Party. Their eventual nominee, Duncan 
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McDonald, returned the Senator’s scorn. “If the man who frowned on this gathering has gone 
over to the crowd that plundered the public domain at Teapot Dome and acted as bootleggers 
down in Washington, then it is our right to return the compliment. If he calls us reds then by God 
he is ‘yellow.’” As it happened, La Follette’s dismissal of the Communists turned out to be 
opportune for them. Soon after the St. Paul convention, the Comintern in Moscow officially 





The Conference on Progressive Political Action, on the other hand, had from the start 
steadfastly kept Communists out of their gatherings. And, at their third meeting in February 
1924, the associated members – the railroad unions, the Committee of ’48, the Socialists – began 
laying the groundwork for a political convention in July to choose a coalition candidate for a 
third party bid. Joining them in the spring of 1924 was the Women’s Committee for Political 
Action (WCPA), an organization initially led by Carrie Chapman Catt and including Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman, female Forty-Eighters, journalists like The Nation’s Freda Kirchwey, and 
various members of the National Women’s Party, among them suffragists Harriet Stanton Blatch 
(daughter of Elizabeth Cady Stanton) and La Follette family ally Zona Gale. At a May 1924 
conference in Washington DC, timed to coincide with the end of an international WILPF 
meeting in the same city, the WCPA created a platform advocating international peace, public 
ownership of the railroads and natural resources, defense of civil liberties, various welfare and 
protective measures, and the election of “a substantial woman’s bloc in Congress.”1442  
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By the time the CPPA conference opened in Cleveland on Independence Day – in the 
same building where the Republicans had recently nominated Coolidge – the WCPA had 
members from forty-two states, was organized in twenty-five, and could send thirty-six delegates 
from seventeen states to the proceedings, where they joined roughly 1000 delegates from the 
various coalition members of the CPPA and around 9000 more young faces. If “the Republican 
convention was a gathering of Babbitts [and] the Democratic a meeting of Southern gentlemen 
and Northern sportsmen and politicians,” noted a reporter from the New York Herald Tribune, 
“this is a gathering of students” – including sizable contingents from Columbia, Harvard, Yale, 
Dartmouth, Vassar, Barnard, and Union Theological Seminary. The average delegate, the 
Herald-Tribune estimated, was under forty. Meanwhile, representing the other end of the 
generational spectrum in Cleveland was Jacob Coxey, the seventy-year-old Ohioan who had led 
“Coxey’s Army” of unemployed to Washington in 1894.1443 
 
The conference still harbored the occasional crank – one fellow claiming to represent 
“The Migratory Workers of America,” James Francis Murphy, kept trying to steal the 
nomination from La Follette; another Forty-Eighter from Boston, known as “Old Sock Joe” 
wanted official planks forcing Klansmen to wear their hoods round the clock and suspending 
Prohibition for ten days a year. But most on hand were eager to send La Follette on his way with 
a maximum of patriotism and a minimum of fuss. As the credentials committee kicked out 
William Mahoney of the Farmer-Labor Party and burly guards blocked the way of any 
Communists trying to infiltrate the proceedings – outside, they protested “the worst reactionary 
political convention held that year” – delegates continually made reference to the Declaration of 
Independence, the Constitution, and the Gettysburg Address. Compared to the Democratic 
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shenanigans playing out on the radio as well – the local station WJAX transmitted from 





In fact, most of the in-fighting in Cleveland had occurred beforehand in committee, 
between the moderates who still just wanted an independent candidacy, and the Socialists who 
wanted the explicit construction of a third party. When La Follette sent word from Washington 
that he agreed to accept the nomination of the conference – New York had not finished its 
decision-making, but after seventy ballots it was looking less and less likely that any progressive 
Democrat would be chosen – the union men wanted to immediately endorse his candidacy, while 
Morris Hillquit and the Socialists thought the convention should go through the usual party-
building steps of naming official credentials, resolutions, and delegates first. Hillquit won that 
fight – the immediate declaration for La Follette was ruled out of order – but overall he and the 
Socialists lost the war. Since May, La Follette had been adamant against constructing an official 
third party, since he thought it would jeopardize “the election of every progressive Senator & 
Representative in Congress candidates in 1924 – the men who now hold the balance of power in 
both houses and into whose hands will be committed the issue if the Presidency is thrown into 
the House.” The Socialists fought this in committee, sometimes bitterly, but with La Follette 




On the evening of the first day of the conference, Bob La Follette, Jr, speaking on behalf 
of his father, read the nominee’s statement. “I stand for an honest realignment in American 
politics,” La Follette announced, “confident that the people in November will take such action as 
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will insure the creation of a new party in which all Progressives may unite…Permanent political 
parties have been born in this country, after, and not before national campaigns, and they have 
come from the people, not from the proclamations of individual leaders...If the hour is at hand 
for the birth of a new political party, the American people next November will register their will 
and their united purpose by a vote of such magnitude that a new political party will be 
inevitable.” Instead La Follette announced on behalf of his father, “I shall submit my name as an 
Independent Progressive candidate for President…My appeal will be addressed to every class of 
the people in every section of the country. I am a candidate upon the basis of my public record as 
a member of the House of Representatives, as Governor of Wisconsin, and as a member of the 
United States Senate. I shall stand upon that record exactly as it is written, and shall give my 
support only to such progressive principles as are in harmony with it.”1446 
 
The following day, July 5
th
 – as Democrats huddled together for their ill-fated “harmony 
conference” – a series of CPPA coalition members officially nominated La Follette, including 
E.J. Manion of the railroad brotherhoods, Morris Hillquit for the Socialists, George Lefkowitz 
for the farmers, Mabel Costigan and Harriet Stanton Blatch for the WPCA, and William Pickens, 
an African-American delegate, for the NAACP. Also among the speakers at the convention were 
Senator Henrik Shipstead and Republican Fiorello La Guardia, who, speaking on behalf of the 
other New York – “Avenue A and 116th Street instead of Broad and Wall” – declared he would 
“rather be right than regular.” La Follette was then nominated by acclamation by the assembled 
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convention, as was his platform – the same platform Republicans had roundly rejected in 




Arguing that the “great issue before the American people today is the control of 
government and industry by private monopoly,” the Progressive platform called for a “complete 
housecleaning” at Justice and Interior, “recovery of the navy’s oil reserves” and “vigorous 
prosecution of all public officials, private citizens, and corporations that participated in these 
transactions.” With Teapot Dome out of the way, it called for public ownership of water power 
and natural resources, as well as of the railroads “with definite safeguards against bureaucratic 
control” – the latter phrase a compromise between moderates and Socialists.1448  
 
With regard to taxes, it deemed the “Mellon tax plan…a device to relieve multi-
millionaires at the expense of other tax payers,” and called for lower taxes on “moderate 
incomes,” higher estate and excess profits taxes, and the publication, with proper safeguards, of 
all tax returns. The platform also called for “drastic reduction” of the Fordney McCumber tariff, 
disarmament, Outlawry, and a revision of the Versailles Treaty, cooperation in agriculture, the 
abolition of the labor injunction, passage of a Child Labor amendment to the Constitution, a 
bonus for veterans, and a “deep waterway from the Great Lakes to the sea.”  Perhaps most 
controversial, it called for abolishing the Electoral College, extending the initiative and 
referendum to the federal government, mandating a popular referendum for any war not 
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involving an invasion by outside forces, a congressional veto over the Supreme Court, and the 




Perhaps equally telling is what the platform did not include. For example, while much 
was made of the ancient evils of monopoly, the forward-looking provision in the Democratic 
platform calling for public works projects in times of unemployment was not included. In short, 
the initial platform was very much a La Follette document, reflecting more the Senator’s 
personal crusades over the decades rather than many of the issues which had brought 
progressives together to found the CPPA in the first place.  
 
The committee report on resolutions, also adopted by the conference, did cover some of 
the ground missed by La Follette, such as the “unqualified enforcement of the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of speech, press, and assemblage,” the “removal of legal discriminations 
against women by measures not prejudicial to legislation necessary for the protection of women 
and for the advancement of social welfare,” freedom for the Irish and Philippine people, and a 
denunciation of US policy toward “Haiti, San Domingo, Nicaragua, and other nations of Central 
and South America.” But, in total, the progressive platform still remained silent about African-
American rights, Prohibition, and the Klan. (On this last question, La Follette made his position 
clear in early August of 1924, when he declared in a press release that he “always stood without 
reservation against any discrimination between races, classes, and creeds” and was “unalterably 
opposed to the evident purposes of the secret organization known as the Ku Klux Klan...It has 
within its own body the seeds of its death.”)1450 
 








Many of the attendees knew they faced an uphill battle going against the two established 
parties. Nonetheless, the assembled delegates left Cleveland after two days with a spring in their 
step. “There are moments in human history which shape the destiny of nations and of mankind,” 
mused delegate Albert F. Coyle in the Locomotive Engineer’s Journal, “Columbus pleading for 
the support of Queen Isabella, Caesar plunging across the Rubicon, Constantine crossing the 
Milvian Bridge, Luther facing the prelates at Worms, Cromwell picking up the mace of power 
from the Speaker’s table, and Hancock placing his signature upon the Declaration of 
Independence…so with us as we listened to Robert M. LaFollette, junior, read the great 
document in which his father pledged his fidelity to the people’s cause and consented to take 
leadership in a political crusade to regain the ‘freedom and prosperity and happiness of the 
American people.’” It was altogether possible, Coyle told the locomotive engineers of America, 
that “historians of the future may record” the CPPA conference in Cleveland “as the turning 
point in American democracy.”1451 
 
The New Republic and The Nation were also very supportive of what they saw in 
Cleveland, with the editors of both ultimately becoming active in the fall campaign. This was the 
vision of a third party that had animated their very similar discussions in 1920 – a party of 
farmers and laborers fused together and led by a progressive vanguard. Still, it is interesting to 
note how the description of the movement had changed in four years.  “Progressivism, it cannot 
be too often insisted,” argued TNR when surveying “The Meaning of the La Follette 
Candidacy,” “has ceased to be a matter of good intentions, liberal ideas and empty or ambiguous 
public spirit. It has become of necessity the organized effort of the classes who live on the fruits 
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of their own physical or intellectual labor to have their interests and outlook more thoroughly 
considered in the conduct of American business and politics.”1452  
 
In other words, the idea of the Public Interest, once one of the fundaments of 
progressivism, was giving way to the view of government as a broker state among competing 
interests. The Farmer-Labor Party, the editors of TNR noted in August 1924, “looked novel in 
1920 because…according to [the] orthodox theory it was the duty of an American citizen to act 
politically, irrespective of his economic interests and occupations. The Democratic and 
Republican parties were composed of self-sufficient individuals who, on the whole, voted as a 
sense of patriotic duty dictated, and who should not and could not be organized or moved by any 
appeals except their devotion to the public interest.”1453  
 
But now, argued TNR, the situation was different. “The American citizen who lives in 
the highly organized, classified and industrialized society of today cannot remain socially equal 
and politically free unless he forms a part of conscious economic and professional groups, and 
unless he finds his own place in the commonwealth as a conscious and articulate member of one 
or more such groups.” The only way America could remain “a society which escapes from 
becoming the victim of class divisions,” the journal now argued, “[is] by fully recognizing their 
existence and by understanding, promoting and finally adjusting these conflicting activities. If 
there is any other orderly method of accomplishing this result, which is equally plausible and 
promising, we do not know what it is.” In short, TNR argued, comparing the Progressive 
insurgencies of Roosevelt and La Follette, “the enlightened, disinterested, and classless public 
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opinion upon which the Roosevelt Progressives counted simply does not exist to the extent 
which the success of a progressive program demands.”1454 
 
Compared to the two leading progressive journals, H. L. Mencken was unsurprisingly 
less sanguine about the prospects of the Cleveland convention. “If all these guests could agree 
upon one brand,” Mencken argued, “LaFollette would carry twenty-five States, including Illinois 
and New York. But they simply can’t. For Progressives are like Christians in this: that they hate 
one another far more than they hate the heathen. The devil doesn’t have to fight the Catholics: he 
leaves the business to the Ku Klux, i.e. to the Methodists and Baptists. Just so the Progressives 
devour one another, to the delight and edification of the Babbitts.” By Election Day, Mencken 
predicted, “the whole pack will be in chaos, and dog will be eating dog.” 1455 
 
The choice of La Follette’s running mate was not made at the CPPA, nor was it decided 
two days later when the Socialist Party officially and separately endorsed La Follette as well. 
(This separate nomination was the idea of Eugene Debs, who thought the Socialists should make 
sure to preserve their independence as a third party. Nonetheless, Debs praised La Follette as 
someone who “all his life had stood up like a man for the right according to his light; he has been 
shamefully maligned, ostracized, and persecuted by the predatory powers of the plutocracy yet 
his bitterest foe had never dared to question his personal integrity or his personal rectitude.”) La 
Follette first asked Justice Louis Brandeis to join him on the ticket, who kindly but firmly 
declined. (“It would have been a great adventure but it could hardly be expected that Louis 
would make it,” Belle La Follette wrote a friend. “With Bob it is the logic of his life…With 
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Louis it would be stepping into a new field.”) Raymond Robins, firmly (if reluctantly) in the 




Instead, the nomination went to Democrat Burton Wheeler of Montana, who made his 
availability known when he told the press that he could “not support any candidate representing 
the House of Morgan,” meaning John W. Davis. Wheeler’s first instinct, he recounted in his 
memoirs years later, was to turn down La Follette’s offer as well, since while “La Follette 
insisted that the Progressive ticket could get nine or ten million votes…I said he would be lucky 
to get 5,000,000 votes.” When La Follette argued the ticket could capture the labor vote in the 
East just as well as the West, Wheeler insisted the “political bosses in those states will take the 
laboring people away from you like taking candy from a baby.” Nonetheless, when the Montana 
Senator heard whispers from Ray Stannard Baker that the Attorney General’s office would indict 
him on another trumped-up charge if he dared to join the Progressive ticket, Wheeler 
immediately reconsidered and signed aboard with La Follette. “I changed my mind because I 





Officially accepting his place on the ticket on July 19
th
, Wheeler announced he was still 
“a Democrat but not a Wall Street Democrat” – much to the consternation of the third-party 
builders. While he would oppose any man “who bears the brand of the dollar sign,” Wheeler 
would still campaign for progressive Democrats like his state colleague, Thomas Walsh. But, 
Wheeler declared, he could not support “either the Republican candidates, who frankly admit 
their reactionary standpat policies, or the Democratic candidate who may claim in well-chosen 
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phrases that he is a progressive but whose training and constant association belie any such 
pretension. Between Davis and Coolidge there is only a choice for conservatives to make.”1458   
 
The implication of Wheeler’s statement was clear. For progressives, and any other 
American who desired to stand athwart the tide of normalcy, the only choice in the race was La 
Follette-Wheeler.  
 
In fact, that’s exactly the distinction the Republicans wanted to draw as well. 




“In the campaign which is before me,” Charles G. Dawes told the assembled Republicans 
in Cleveland upon receiving the vice-presidential nomination, “I pledge myself to adhere to the 
truth and to the common sense conclusions to be drawn therefrom. As to the demagogue on the 
stump, whatever may be his party, I want it distinctly understood that in the coming campaign I 
ask no quarter and will give none.” With that declaration, General “Hell and Maria” Dawes 
embarked on a 15,000-mile, 100-speech tour all across the country, during which the top of the 
ticket, Calvin Coolidge, remained ensconced in the White House – “Coolidge sat tight and held 
his peace,” was the weekly refrain in TIME’s election coverage. Throughout this whirlwind tour, 
Dawes virtually ignored his Democratic opponent and concentrated almost all of his rhetorical 
fire on Robert La Follette. “The scheme of General Dawes is simple,” wrote Mencken, summing 
up the future Nobel prize winner’s oft-repeated appeal to the crowds. “[W]hen his argument 
needs it, he lies.  I point to his endless denunciations of Dr. LaFollette as the candidate of the 
Communists. No one knows better than Dawes that LaFollette repudiated the Communists long 






before his nomination, and that they are bitterly against him today…In brief, Dawes is a 
fraud.”1459 
 
Nonetheless, the brunt of the Republican general election campaign was taken right out 
of the A. Mitchell Palmer playbook. At each successive campaign stop, Dawes focused on 
painting the Wisconsin Senator as a radical and un-American menace, aligned with in intention if 
not actually a card-carrying member of the Bolsheviks in Russia. In his stump speech, Dawes 
began by telling audiences that he had hoped to spend the campaign talking about the budget, 
But “like a thief in the night, a great issue has stolen upon the consciences and minds of the 
American people – an issue nobody expected – the issue of the Constitution of the United States, 
which…is being assailed by Robert M. La Follette.” “La Follettism in this campaign,” Dawes 
declared, “represents demagogism animated by the vicious purpose of undermining the 
constitutional foundation of this Republic” – a “red menace” – and “unless patriotic citizens 
arouse themselves…the foundations of the Republic may be torn away.” 1460    
 
The fact that La Follette – the “master demagogue” – was by necessity running as a 
Socialist on most tickets was just icing on the cake for Dawes. “A man is known by the company 
he keeps,” Dawes told a crowd of 100,000 in Evanston, Illinois, and “Robert M. La Follette [is] 
leading the army of extreme radicalism.” While patriots across American history had “struggled 
to establish and maintain our constitutional principles,” Dawes argued, La Follette wanted voters 
“to follow into an attack upon them, massed behind an aggressive personality, [and] a 
heterogeneous collection of those opposing the existing order of things, the greatest section of 
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which, the Socialists, fly the red flag.” The argument that “La Follette has gone over to the 
Socialists” was repeated ad nauseum by state and local Republican Party officials anywhere 




As evidence of La Follette’s un-American radicalism, Dawes pointed most often to the 
plank advocating a congressional veto over Supreme Court decisions. When asked “the 
paramount issue of the campaign” the week before the election, Dawes argued that normal 
discussion of issues – the World Court, tariffs, etc. – had all been “subordinated in public 
attention” over the course of the campaign “because Robert M. La Follette, in an attempt to 
amalgamate all the organized forces in our citizenry opposed to the present order of things in our 
country, has launched an assault on our constitutional form of government with a proposal to 
strip the Supreme Court of its power.” “La Follette and the Socialists,” Dawes argued, were 
“striving by one blow to disrupt our present balanced form of government and to make Congress 
supreme.” Such a doctrine “would be disastrous,” for the “bill of inalienable individual rights, 
the general recognition of which is the foundation of civilization, would under the La Follette 
proposition be at the mercy of Congress.” Thus did Dawes shrewdly amalgamate the concerns of 




In sum, Dawes argued, the choice of the election was “Coolidge or Chaos” – The 
American people could either stand with “leaders like Coolidge…who get up and preach 
common sense to you,” or get behind the “political blatherskites and pee-wits” who were 
endangering the foundations of the republic and “running over this country preaching all things 
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to all men.” Voters, he said at another point, must decide whether to “stand on the rock of 
common sense with Calvin Coolidge, or upon the sinking sands of socialism with Robert M. La 
Follette.” As for Davis and Bryan, they were no choice at all – The Democrats, Dawes declared, 
had gone for the “straddle…with one conservative and one radical on its ticket, hoping to get 
votes by avoiding the issue.” Even some La Follette supporters saw the election in those terms. 
“The actual combatants are the Hon. Mr. La Follette and the Hon. Mr. Coolidge,” wrote 
Mencken of the campaign. “Dr Coolidge is for the Haves and Dr. La Follette is for the Have 
Nots.” Davis meanwhile was, “in a very real sense, not in the fight at all: he is simply a sort of 
bystander…He is simply concealed in the crowd, like a bootlegger at a wedding.”1463 
 
Nonetheless, the “radical” on the Democratic ticket was used as a further bludgeon 
against La Follette and Wheeler. In The North American Review and other magazines, 
Republican writers put forward the elite-tailored version of the “Coolidge or Chaos” argument, 
which was that voting for La Follette would throw the election into the House of 
Representatives. “The campaign has resolved,” argued the editors of The Review, “into a contest, 
not between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, not between Coolidge and Davis, 
but between Coolidge and No Election. That is the sole practical issue.” Only “a vote for 
Coolidge would be a vote for a President to be elected by the people.” Otherwise, the ensuing 
House negotiations would mean an empty White House on March 5
th, 1925, after which “there 
could not fail to be…immeasurable confusion and utter chaos, with all attendant evils, the very 
recital of which would be little short of terrifying, spelling, in the grave words of Senator Borah, 
‘as tragic a situation, as, outside of actual war, could arise in a republic.’” After this interregnum 
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of despair, the argument went, congressional Democrats and progressives would eventually 
conspire to choose Charles Bryan as the next president. Summing up this contention for the 
layman, TIME put it as follows: “A vote for La Follette is a vote for Bryan. A vote for Davis is a 
vote for Bryan. A vote for Coolidge is a vote for Coolidge.”1464 
 
The relentless Republican focus on the progressives even drew consternation from the 
Democrat in the race, who thought Dawes was making “a new bogey man” out of La Follette – 
“a Red who will certainly get you like the goblins if you do not look out.” “He is wearing a fur 
cap and a long red robe,” John W. Davis warned his audiences, “and on his breast his name is 
written in characters such as we rarely see in the United States, and they point to him and tell 
you, ‘He is a Bolshevik!’ And when his cape falls down and he lays down his red gown, you find 
that he is none other than our familiar friend Senator Bob La Follette.” At another point, Davis 
quipped that, while the standard of the 1912 progressive was a Bull Moose, the 1924 animal of 
choice should be a salamander, “for no other animal could live in a heat so red as General Dawes 
depicted.”  As for the “Coolidge or Chaos” argument, Davis suggested instead “Coolidge, Then 





Especially for the first few months, Davis criticized La Follette less often than Dawes, 
although he too was a severe and relentless critic of the Court-veto plan. “My real objection,” he 
explained, “is not that it is leading us on to Moscow, but that it is trying to take back to London,” 
away from the “American system of government under a written constitution” and back toward 
                                                          
1464
 “The Paramount Issue: Coolidge or Chaos,” The North American Review, Vol. 220, No. 824 (Sep., 1924), pp. 1-
9. Richardson, Others, 210. MacKay, 168. 
1465
 “Davis Defends La Follette as Republican ‘Bogey Man,’ The Sunday Morning Star (Wilmington, Delaware), 
September 28




“the English theory that Parliament is supreme.” The Bill of Rights, Davis argued instead, “are 
too sacred to leave to Congresses or to Legislatures, and we write them for that reason into the 
body of our written Constitution.” Nonetheless, Davis took particular pains to separate his 
critique from the one made by Dawes. “[B]efore Senator La Follette can make that proposal 
good,” Davis noted, “he must carry a majority of the Electoral College…when I pick up my atlas 
and look at the map of the United States I cannot lie awake nights with the shaking ague for fear 
a Red is going to get me before the morning sun rises. And I cannot accept that, my friends, as 
the cardinal issue in this campaign.” As The Nation said in gratitude, “Mr. Davis is a corporation 
lawyer…But for all that Mr. Davis is too well-informed to stomach Mr. Dawes’ twaddle.”1466 
 
Nonetheless, Republicans continued to paint La Follette in crimson throughout the 
election. “All the old machinery of the notorious Creel Information Bureau,” lamented the 
Steuben Society, a German-American patriotic society formed at the height of the Scare, “was 
dragged out of its obscurity and set up anew to belch forth an avalanche of vituperation and 
mendacity.” Indeed, if General Dawes used the campaign’s Socialist ties to paint La Follette as 
an agent of Bolshevism, many of his Republican understudies skipped the middleman entirely. 
The head of the Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association warned that the Progressive ticket were 
“a Lenin and Trotsky with a formidable band of followers made up of the vicious, ignorant, and 
discontented element, openly organized for battle.” Among those insisting that proceeds from La 
Follette events were financing the operations of Soviet ne’er-do-wells were California 
Congressman Walter Lineberger and Shipping Board chairman T.V. O’Connor, the latter of 
whom insisted that “a large amount of money has been sent from Russia through Mexico to aid 
the campaign.” (When later asked under oath about this claim, O’Connor later said “I believe it 
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in my own heart, though I have no way to prove it.”)  In The Saturday Evening Post, a much-
discussed article entitled “Let X = La Follette” declared definitively that “the Worker’s Party, 
which is now the William Z. Foster party, are now actively canvassing for La Follette” – in fact, 




While excessively dedicated to the anti-La Follette cause, The Saturday Evening Post 
was far from the only periodical to paint the progressive insurgency in an ugly light. With the 
exception of the Scripps papers, whose owners were longtime La Follette supporters, and the 
Hearst papers, whose owner was a longtime promoter of a third party with himself at the head, 
most journals across the country were of a decidedly anti-La Follette persuasion. (The Hearst 
empire ultimately endorsed Coolidge.) “In this campaign the capitalist newspapers could tell the 
public any lies they pleased and we were helpless,” groused Upton Sinclair after the election, 
noting one in particular, printed by the Los Angeles Times, declaring that La Follette had handed 
out miniature champagne bottles “made in Germany” to an audience in Pasadena. In fact, 
painting La Follette as a pro-German Wet, and his adherents as swarthy, skeevy-looking urban 
foreigners, was a popular pastime in opposition newspapers – at least in the formerly McAdoo-
friendly South and West. In the former pro-Smith bastions of the East, newspapers instead 
painted La Follette voters as unsophisticated agrarian country bumpkins, just like the ones that 




As La Follette’s candidacy became increasingly tied to Socialists and Soviets, some of 
the old resentments from the war and post war periods began to flare up anew. “Six years ago, La 
Follette was an enemy to the country, a foe of the army and navy,” reminded the 35th Division 
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Association, while a “Republican Service League [to] scotch La Follettism” arose under the 
leadership of a prominent member of the American Legion. In Rahway, New Jersey, La Follette 
supporter and editor Louis Budenz saw a thousand-member mob descend on his home, headed 
by veterans in uniform and carrying a coffin, yelling “Kill the Socialist!” In Darien, Connecticut, 
a preacher was exiled from town for speaking on behalf of the Progressive ticket and “insulting 
the people of the United States.” In Washington, a Socialist who was arrested for touting the 
ticket was told by the authorities that “maybe La Follette can get you out of this.” And, when 213 
college professors announced their support of the independent ticket, the Cincinnati Enquirer – a 
Republican journal – urged they be fired for being “attached to recognized heresies.”1469   
 
 These sorts of civil liberties abuses were endemic along the trail, especially, according to 
historian Kenneth MacKay, “around factory towns and industrial centers where the Socialists 
and Progressives had made inroads or were active in campaigning.” Joining these efforts this 
time around was the Klan, who – while allowing members to vote their conscience between the 
two major parties -- nonetheless deemed La Follettism “the most pernicious thing in the political 
life of America.” The Wisconsin Senator, gravely intoned Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans, 
wanted to “destroy the people’s confidence in this, the soundest, the greatest and the best 
government on earth.”1470 
 
 Just as prevalent as these more explicit efforts at intimidation were warnings on the 
factory floor that voting for La Follette would mean trouble for workers. Next to “Coolidge or 
Chaos” and “Keep Cool with Coolidge,” the most oft-heard Coolidge slogan on the campaign 
was “A Vote for La Follette is a Vote for Hard Times.” According to the ACLU’s Roger 








Baldwin, who was monitoring election efforts in Connecticut, La Follette lost the state in part 
because “foremen told workers they would lose their jobs if they did not vote for Coolidge.” This 
ultimatum was often heard repeated across the country, from Washington to West Virginia. One 
railroad machinist who tried to affix a La Follette pamphlet next to the Coolidge-Dawes 
propaganda already on the company bulletin board was promptly fired for his misdeed.  In his 
memoirs, Arthur Hays remembered consoling one La Follette volunteer who “made the best 
speech of my life last night and lost lots of votes.” What happened, asked Hays? The volunteer’s 
Republican opponent – “a clever Irishman” – said of La Follette, “I like that fellow. I like his 
ideals. I like what he stands for. I wish I could afford to make such a fight”:   
 
Now you folks are clerks and stenographers and factory workers and such-like. This fellow says 
that big business controls this country. He’s right and it’s a damn shame. Now big business says 
that if Coolidge don’t win, we’ll have hard times and lose our jobs, and I guess those fellows 




Similarly, after the election, Burton Wheeler asked his friend Joseph P. Kennedy how he 
had managed to hold Democrats in line in Massachusetts. “We scared hell out of them,” 
Kennedy replied. “We told them that a Progressive Party victory would close all the mills and 
factories. And in South Boston we told the Irish that the La Follette program would destroy their 
Church.”1472 
 
Farmers in the Northwest, meanwhile, were informed that all the workers who would be 
let go if Coolidge lost would affect their business negatively as well. As it happened, the election 
of 1924 coincided with the first substantive rise in farm prices that farmers had seen since the 
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war. Between July and October 1924, the price of hogs leapt from seven to eleven dollars a head. 
Over the course of 1924, grain prices rose from $0.97 to $1.40 in Duluth, from $1.07 to $1.43 in 
Chicago, and to over $1.50 a bushel in Minneapolis – in part because, thanks to the cash-on-hand 
provided by the Dawes Plan, European demand was rising once again. As Burton Wheeler 
commented after all was said and done, “it is always hard to beat the pocketbook as an election 
issue.”1473 
 
The Contested Inheritance 
 
While Joseph Kennedy worked to keep Massachusetts Democrats in line and General 
Dawes rallied the faithful against the potentially resurgent Red menace, Republicans also worked 
to draft the ghost of Colonel Roosevelt to the Coolidge cause.  The president’s wartime remark 
that La Follette was “one of the most potent enemies of this country and a most sinister enemy of 
democracy” received multiple reprintings during the campaign season. The president’s sister, 
Corinne Roosevelt Robinson, told the papers that her brother was a “prophet of unity” while La 
Follette was a divider – “[U]nder the false name of Progressive this Socialist upholds class 
cleavage and socialism and all ‘isms’ which discontent brings to a banner such as his.” James. R. 
Garfield, son of the assassinated president and Roosevelt’s former Secretary of the Interior, 
called Coolidge “the new exponent of Progressivism and the friend of democracy,” while “La 
Follette is not Progressive; he is Radical. He is not a builder as was Roosevelt; he is a destroyer 
as was Karl Marx.”1474  
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These efforts to enlist the former president from the grave culminated in a September 
1924 statement penned by Raymond Robins and signed by forty-seven other former Roosevelt 
Progressives, including Garfield, Henry Allen, social worker Frances Kellor, and prominent 
newspaper editors Frank Knox, Chester Rowell, and E.A. Van Valkenberg. The purpose of the 
1912 Progressive movement, it argued, “was to improve American institutions, not to substitute 
others for them. It stood for political and social justice, not economic revolution. It believed in 
democracy, not Socialism. It sought the welfare of all the people, not the welfare of class against 
class.” La Follette’s candidacy, on the other hand, was obviously a “class party” being used by 
the Socialists “as a step toward their goal of economic revolution based on class war.” At best, 
its hope was “to deadlock the electoral college and prevent an election by the people.” And so it 
fell to the Colonel’s former comrades “to vindicate the memory of Theodore Roosevelt by 
repudiating this attempt of frustrated ambition to promote the class cleavage in class politics, 
which Roosevelt spent his life to prevent.”1475  
 
In truth, Robins – who thought Coolidge would support Outlawry – was playing the type 
of close political hand for which his friends Harold Ickes and Hiram Johnson thought him so 
untrustworthy. As noted earlier, before the CPPA convention, La Follette had even asked Robins 
to be his running mate, but Robins had turned him down, since he was “opposed to many of his 
domestic planks – government ownership of the railroads, for example – and also to his absurd 
proposal for a referendum on peace or war.” Nonetheless, Robins had privately told his sister 
Elizabeth that the Coolidge-Dawes ticket was “the apotheosis of reaction in American politics. If 
the voters stand for it, they will stand for anything. I regard the ticket as: Coolidge & Dawes, The 
Gold Dust Twins, Address Wall St.” And, during the election campaign, Robins wrote his sister 
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that “[d]eep in my heart, I have a real regret, not to be with brave courageous old Robert Marion 
La Follette. He is the veteran of the progressive movement in American politics.” Two months 
later he again voiced his discomfort to her. “I am the only nationally known Progressive of the 
Roosevelt Adventure of 1912 who is leading the battle for Coolidge. I am finding some strange 
bed-fellows – but such is the brutal game of politics.”1476 
 
To other Roosevelt Progressives, Robins’ statement wasn’t normal politics at all, but an 
abject betrayal of the cause and a “confession of the bankruptcy of progressivism in the 
Republican Party.” “I was a follower of Roosevelt, but I thought I was so for Principle’s sake,” 
one correspondent wrote Robins. But Robins and his co-signers were “hero worshippers… 
Hardly a one would but have supported Taft just as heartily if Roosevelt was not running...And 
now these men and women give out a statement primarily intended to help Coolidge, who by all 
standards is the most completely reactionary candidate who has been before the people in this 
generation.”1477  
 
“I will wait until the final statement of the battle scarred heroes of Armageddon appears 
before I finally make up my mind,” a furious Harold Ickes told Hiram Johnson while the Robins 
statement was still being circulated for signatures. “But a sizzling statement is beginning to 
ferment in my bosom and I am afraid I will have to give it expression one of these days.” At that 
point still undeclared, Ickes confessed to his friend that this latest salvo might well be the straw 
that broke the camel’s back. “I have stuck on in the Republican Party hoping against hope that 
we might be able to make it progressive from the inside,” he said. “I have cherished political 
association within the party with yourself and those other old progressives who stood together 
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and went down together in 1912 and 1916. But when I see Raymond and Van Valkenburg and 
Garfield and Henry Allen…falling on their bellies to lick the hand that has struck them I am 
filled with inexpressible disgust and an almost over-powering inclination to pack my playthings 
and go off with the lunatic fringe.”1478  
 
Besides, Ickes thought, if Coolidge wins “there will be a natural drifting together of the 
La Follette Progressives and the Democrats. The Republican Party will then be the conservative 
party and the new Democratic-Progressive Party will be the Progressive Party. I know how many 
flaws can be picked in this statement and yet it seems to me, largely speaking, the present natural 
trend.” Ickes argued much the same to George Henry Payne. “I think I see an impending break-
up coming,” he explained to his friend. “If I am correct in this view the Republican Party will be 
the conservative party in the future and there will be a liberal party composed of the present 
Democratic part, except such conservatives as go over into the Republican Party, and the La 
Follette Progressives.” While Ickes “had expected to sit on the sidelines” since he didn’t even 
“like La Follette personally” he told Payne, “the statement that appeared recently over the 
signatures of such heroes of Armageddon as Raymond Robins, Henry J. Allen et al delivering 
the progressives of the country, by influence at least, to Coolidge is more than I can stand.”1479 
 
With Robins’ fusillade, Ickes’ break with the Republican Party was complete. “All I can 
say about Raymond Robins is that you had him sized up better than I had,” Ickes told Senator 
Johnson after the statement had been published. “I don’t see how further stultification politically 
is possible for him…he has plumbed the depths.” The Senator, meanwhile, had no names to offer 
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Ickes for a statement of rebuttal. “The difficulty is that all of the prominent progressives who 
were leaders of our Armageddon army in 1912 are so anxious for office, and so mad to bask in 
the sunlight of power,” Johnson confided, “that they will accept anything. Most of them, too, 
[are] heartily ashamed of having been irregular once in their lives, and are atoning for their 
offense by an added subserviency to those they once denounced.” That being said, Johnson – like 
his colleague George Norris, stayed regular as well, although both were well-known to be 




And so Ickes fired off his own angry response to the press, denouncing the “hymn of 
hate” his fellow Progressives had published. If La Follette didn’t stand for the ideals of 1912, 
Ickes argued, “certainly no other individual or political group does.” Along with requesting “a 
frank account of what they have done…to uphold the Roosevelt tradition,” Ickes asked these 
“self-appointed defenders of the faith [to] interpret the oil scandals of the present Republican 
administration in the light of the Roosevelt tradition,” since their statement said “nary a word 
about the little black satchel with its hundred thousand dollars…or of the little green house on K 
Street, or of the Veterans’ Bureau scandal.” Nor, Ickes noted, did it mention “the Mellonaire tax 
plan” or “the Columbian blackmail treaty.”1481  
 
Perhaps most egregiously, in Ickes eyes, the signers had failed “another test of real 
progressivism when Hiram W. Johnson ran as a candidate at the primaries.” Then, these 
“limping heroes of Armageddon, some of them openly and others by their silence, chose to 
support a proven corrupt administration as against Roosevelt’s companion in arms…Bull 
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Moosers had been transmuted into Bull Mousers.” In short, he concluded, “[t]rue progressivism 
is a matter of deeds and not of mere words, however indignantly expressed. Those who vouched 
for Mr. Harding as a Progressive…those who helped to throw Hiram Johnson to the reactionary 
lions; those who can blink at corruption of government at Washington that has never been 
equaled in American history, are ill-fitted to constitute themselves trustees of progressivism.”1482 
 
 Just as he had gauged Progressive sentiment for James Cox in 1920, Ickes again cast out 
a net far and wide to see where his fellow Roosevelt supporters in 1912 were leaning in 1924. 
“Most of the people in this vicinity that have Progressive leanings,” George Henry Payne 
reported in from New York City, “are shouting for La Follette,” though it helped that the people 
running the Davis campaign there “are the grandest collection of boneheads that were ever gotten 
together in a campaign headquarters.” In Chicago, meanwhile, one insurance man found that 
“people engaged in business” – like him – were for Coolidge, while “La Follette unquestionably 
is popular among laboring men.” But La Follette, this correspondent argued, was “a man who 
never could see more than one side to any question,” and an election decided by the House 
“would be disastrous to every man engaged in business and working for a living, however much 
one might welcome it as just punishment for Republican misdeeds.” Another Chicagoan thought  
“the prosperity of the country…will induce many to vote for Coolidge” and the “only real La 
Follette talk is done by some Germans who are always crabbing anyway.” The “intelligent 
average workman,” argued this writer, knows “that a vote for La Follette is a vote for the radicals 
and reds, whose power in office would make a drastic change in our present prosperity…Always 
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remember that the Progressives are Republicans at heart when occasions like the present 
arise.”1483 
  
Outside Chicago, however, reports from Illinois were more promising for Progressives. “I 
may be somewhat over shooting the mark,” wrote Zardia Crain from Murphysboro, “but from 
what I can…[tell] the progressive movement is going much stronger than it did for Teddy in 
1912, especially among our laborers and farmers…90% of the working class, it seems to me, will 
support La Follette and Wheeler.” Crain, a La Follette supporter himself, told Ickes that 
Nebraska, Kansas, and Iowa seemed similarly pro-Progressive. “LaFollette will carry the farmer 
and labor vote in this locality also a great many Democrats who have been doing a little thinking 
for themselves,” wrote in another former Progressive from Atlanta, Illinois. Reporting in from 
Rockford, one attorney thought “there is no doubt that Coolidge will carry this county,” though 
“La Follette will run way ahead of Davis.” But “[i]f we have a killing frost,” he suggested, “La 
Follette will get a much larger following than he will if the frost holds off.”1484 
 
 To assess the situation in California, Ickes turned to Senator Johnson, who gave him little 
reason for hope. “La Follette will get a very large vote in this State,” Johnson reported, “and if 
his campaign were in appropriate hands he might be a very dangerous contender.” But “those 
who come to the front of the campaign do not commend themselves to the ordinary man very 
highly.” La Follette’s candidacy was further hampered by a 4-3 decision by the California 
Supreme Court kicking Independent electors off the ballot and forcing the Senator to run as a 
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Socialist.  Publicly, Hiram Johnson denounced the decision as “unjustified by the law, contrary 
to public policy, and of most harmful consequence. It is decisions such as this that undermine 
public confidence in the courts.” To Ickes privately, Johnson noted that, as a result of the 
decision, “I do not think there is much doubt about what this State will do.”1485 
 
 Even as Ickes surveyed his political contacts, Paul Kellogg of The Survey aspired to put 
together a more formal rebuttal to the Robins Progressives’ grasping of the Roosevelt 
inheritance. “I have a notion that it should be both racy and vigorous,” Kellogg told Arthur 
Garfield Hays of such a proposed statement, arguing it should “subtly convey to the public that 
they are merely the exhaust and we are the real steam” of the 1912 Progressives “in putting 
ourselves into the La Follette movement.” Hays thought it was an excellent idea, but since he 
was tied up with campaign matters, he suggested Amos Pinchot or Harold Ickes take the lead in 
drafting one. Together with input from Donald Richberg, the two put a counter-statement 
together which eventually included the signatures of forty-two former Bull Moosers, including 
Ickes, Pinchot, Richberg, Kellog, Hays, George Record, Fremont Older, and Jane Addams, who 
told Ickes she was “very glad to sign my name to the document, although I always wince a little 
at the terms of political abuse, even when men deserve them!” 1486  
 
Rather than being a Roosevelt Progressive, this counter-statement argued, Calvin 
Coolidge was “a protégé of Murray Crane,” the Massachusetts politician who served on the 
Republican National Committee in 1912 and who was “foremost in the plot that…deprived 
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Theodore Roosevelt of the nomination that was his by right.” Moreover, as president, Coolidge 
had “never by express statement or by intimation… voiced even conventional regret” over the 
various Harding scandals. The “traduced, vilified, and plotted against” La Follette, on the other 
hand, “has stood his ground and has come out of each contest stronger and bigger and more 
trusted by ‘just folks.’”1487  
 
As such, this counter-statement concluded, it was the Wisconsin Senator, not Silent Cal, 
who was the real heir of Roosevelt. To underscore the point, the La Follette Progressives 
counteracted the World War-era bromides of Roosevelt with a 1911 editorial from The Outlook, 
in which the Bull Moose complemented the “extraordinary work that has been accomplished in 
the State of Wisconsin under the lead of Senator La Follette” – work that Roosevelt blessed as 
being in “the true progressive spirit.” After visiting the state, Roosevelt gushed, he felt like 
congratulating not just the locals but “the country as a whole because it has, in the state of 
Wisconsin, a pioneer blazing the way along which we Americans must make our civic and 
industrial advance during the next few decades.”1488 
 
In response to this response, Robins and Valkenberg – along with fifty other Roosevelt 
Progressives this time – penned an additional statement in late October, to commemorate the late 
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Roosevelt’s birthday, reaffirming that the Bull Moose would vote for Silent Cal. “We denounce 
the use of the name Progressive by Senator La Follette, the Socialists, and other extremists,” it 
argued. “If Roosevelt were here today, the Socialists would never have had the hardihood to 
pervert the Progressive name.” Moreover, Robins et al declared “with complete assurance that he 
would be vigorously supporting Calvin Coolidge, who exemplifies the elemental principles of 
Theodore Roosevelt in behalf of democratic civilization and human progress.”1489  
 
Sounding the same chord in TNR just before the election, California newspaper editor 
and old Progressive Chester Rowell, once a close ally of Hiram Johnson, argued, quite 
disingenuously, that “nearly all those who were most conspicuous in the Roosevelt movement of 
1912 are now for Coolidge….[as are] the main body of the Progressive voters of that time” La 
Follette’s bid, Rowell continued, was merely an attempt to form “a third party avowedly founded 
on class. Now, I may be archaic, palaeocrystic, obsolete, Byzantine, mid-Victorian, and all the 
other back-number epithets in the thesaurus, but I am not ready to accept class as the basis of 
political division in America.”1490 
 
While progressives and Progressives wrestled over the legacy of Roosevelt, another high-
level defection to the Davis camp caused similar consternation on the left. “I shall vote for Mr. 
Davis because he is the only man who can be elected in place of Mr. Coolidge, and 1 do not wish 
directly or indirectly to give the present administration another term of power,” argued Walter 
Lippmann in TNR. “I shall vote for him because I believe that in this post-war world of fierce 
nationalisms his strong Jeffersonian bias against the concentration and exaggeration of 
government is more genuinely liberal than much that goes by the name of liberalism.” The La 
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Follette crowd, Lippmann thought, were tilting at windmills, since “it seems extremely unlikely 
that La Follette will break the solid South and almost as unlikely that the Southern Democrats 
will coalesce…with the Eastern Republicans.” Besides, Lippmann wrote, belying his earlier days 
as a Rooseveltian New Nationalist “even though I warmly respect Mr. La Follette, I do not like 
the main drift of his preaching. His political program is almost violently nationalistic and 
centralizing; that seems to me reactionary and illiberal.”1491 
 
 If anything, Lippmann was soft-pedaling his criticism of La Follette in TNR. In the New 
York World – a Democratic paper – he was much more strident. “A vote for La Follette is a vote 
for Coolidge,” he wrote. “A vote to disrupt the Democratic party is a vote to make the reaction 
supreme.” La Follette, Lippmann insisted, had “united the conservatives and divided the 
progressives…paralyzed the liberals and revivified the reactionaries…muddled every issue, 
dragged a red herring across every trail, and done his complete and most effective best to insure 
the re-election of Coolidge.” In launching this assault on the third party bid, Lippmann was in 
part heeding the advice of the 1920 Democratic candidate, James Cox, who told him that, for the 
Democrats, “the all-important thing is the defeat of La Follette.” Nonetheless, Lippmann’s stance 
enraged the progressives supporting the Wisconsin Senator. While not calling him out by name, 
Lippmann’s old colleagues at TNR deemed his argument “a painfully opportunist doctrine. Since 
when has a vote in favor of the principles and men you believe in become ‘a vote thrown away’? 
Must millions of Americans go on forever supporting one of two parties neither of which they 
approve, neither of which differs from the other just because it is difficult for a third party to win 
the first election in which it appears?”1492   
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In another editorial just before the election, TNR took the fight to Lippmann directly. 
Their former colleague, they argued, was rationalizing towards an already-decided viewpoint – 
As such his view of parties “is framed to guarantee the survival of Mr. Davis’s party.” To 
“justify a progressive like himself in voting against La Follette,” they argued, Lippmann was 
attributing “a long life after death to certain structural forms in the two existing parties. He fails 
to attribute sufficient vitality to the destructive and constructive possibilities of an economic and 
political ferment, which just in so far as it spreads will furnish economic groups with sufficient 
motive and momentum to break through old partitions and set free new political forces.” In short, 





Particularly irate by Lippmann’s stance was Felix Frankfurter, who began to fire off 
angry letters to the World at a weekly clip. “Coolidge and Davis had nothing to offer…except 
things substantially as is,” pleaded Frankfurter. “The forces that are struggling and groping 
behind La Follette are, at least, struggling and groping for a dream.” Lippmann was unmoved, 
and after publishing the first few harangues decided to cut his friend off. “I am exercising an 
editorial right to close a correspondence in which the correspondent has no further claim upon 
your space,” he replied to Frankfurter. “Your letter has been published. The World has made its 
reply. We do not wish to conduct an argument with you.”1494 
 
 If the Robins Progressives wanted Coolidge because they were leery of the notion of a 
class party, Lippmann – after the events of recent years – urged Davis in part because he no 
longer wanted to see a strong and centralized federal government that could be bent to the whims 
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of the masses. “You must not complicate your government beyond the capacity of its electorate 
to understand it,” he warned. “If you do, it will escape all control, turn corrupt and tyrannical, 
lose the popular confidence, offer real security to no man, and in the end it will let loose all the 
submerged antagonisms within the state.” Because of this, and because the increasingly foreign-
policy-focused editor thought La Follette’s view of the world was immature and archaic – a 
combination of “American irresponsibility and isolation with provocative statements about the 
policies of France and England” – Lippmann chose to cast his vote for John W. Davis.1495 
 
 
Reds, Pinks, Blues, and Yellows 
 
 
With the might of both established parties and such formidable campaign weaponry 
arrayed against them, few political observers harbored illusions about the unlikely odds of La 
Follette and Wheeler winning the White House. “None of us for a moment thought we had a 
chance to win,” remembered Phil La Follette later, with the possible exception of his father. 
Nonetheless, the La Follette-Wheeler campaign inspired progressives and many others – the 
“Reds, the Pinks, the Blues, and the Yellows,” according to the Saturday Evening Post’s “Let 
X=La Follette” savaging of the campaign – to hope against hope during the fall of 1924, even as 




“More than any other factor,” historian Kenneth MacKay concluded in his 1947 study of 
the campaign, “the lack of funds curtailed the activities of the Progressives in 1924.” And, 
indeed, the lack of steady financing affected every aspect of the campaign effort. David Niles, 
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the head of La Follette-Wheeler’s Campaign Speakers Bureau, soon found that his outfit had a 
budget of only $5,000 to work with instead of the $50,000 promised. According to an official 
Senate inquiry into 1924 campaign spending -- chaired by William Borah – Republicans raised 
$4,360,378, Democrats $821,037, and the Progressives only $221, 977. Put another way, La 
Follette and Wheeler were outspent almost four to one by the Democrats and almost twenty to 
one by the incumbents – and that’s only the money that was counted. Labor lawyer Frank Walsh, 
La Follette’s official representative before the Borah committee, estimated the Republican had 
really spent $15,700,000 – 92% of which he argued was raised from industrialists and bankers, 
and 71% of which was raised in sums larger than $1000. Whatever was actually spent by the 





Unfortunately for the Progressives, their primary constituencies – laborers and farmers – 
usually had no money to give. And compounding the persistent cash flow problems was the fact 
that the campaign had no organization at all in many parts of the country. Outside of Wisconsin 
and Montana, where La Follette and Wheeler had built their respective state machines, and states 
like North Dakota and Minnesota, where the Non-Partisan League still had extant operations, the 
campaign was dependent almost entirely on the Socialists, who were already on the ballot in 
forty-four states and who had become proficient at running a disciplined campaign effort on a 
scant budget. (This posed its own problems, since many voters fond of La Follette still looked 
askance at voting for the party of Debs.) Touring the West – ostensibly La Follette’s stronghold 
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– with Wheeler, Oswald Villard often found “only the merest skeletons of what a fighting 
political force should be.” 1498   
 
Nor, because of the decision to forego a third party, were their often state or local tickets 
to add ballast to the La Follette-Wheeler efforts. Occasionally the third party would endorse a 
majority party candidate, as they did William Borah in Idaho. But often times there were no 
satisfactory options in the race, and even potential candidates were loath to take the third party 
leap of faith. As one candidate for office complained to the campaign, “If I declare for La 
Follette, I cut myself off from my own party, and I cannot join the La Follette party because you 
have not got any.” As such, he had “everything to lose and nothing to gain” by running down-
ballot. This, noted Socialist writer Alfred Baker Lewis, was “the weak spot of the La Follette 
campaign.” And even in some cases where there were down-ballot candidates, such as Montana 
and Nebraska, speakers like Wheeler ended up campaigning against their own ticket, in favor of 
progressive incumbents like Thomas Walsh and George Norris. “The defeat of Walsh,” Wheeler 
declared despite there being a slate of La Follette electors on the Farmer-Labor ticket, “would be 
looked upon by the country as a repudiation of his magnificent fight against corruption in 
Washington.”1499  
 
As a result of this lack of organization and dearth of candidates in most sections of the 
country, La Follette’s efforts were often dependent almost entirely on volunteers, many of 
whom, being single-minded idealists of one kind or another, were of questionable worth to the 
campaign. Arthur Hays recalled several bewildered farmers, at the end of a long pro-La Follette 
oration by an egghead progressive or doctrinaire socialist, asking what all of this had to do with 
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the price of hogs. Similarly, campaign staffer Lionel Popkin took a survey of the various La 
Follette events happening in New York City one evening. In Union Station, he found a drunk La 
Follette orator taking credit for the Teapot Dome revelations. (“What the hell did Bob La Follette 
have to do with that? I’m the man who showed up the scoundrels. Me!”) Elsewhere, an old 
Wobbly urged voters to yell “Hooray for Bob La Follette!” at their polling places, and then take 
an axe to the ballot box. (“That the sort of direct action that will count, fellow workers!”) In 
Columbus Circle, another fellow – “an unfrocked priest from the Pacific Coast” – was amusing 
his Irish audience by deploring the English, while at 96
th
 and Broadway, a volunteer was telling 
workers that, under the new regime, the posh homes lining West End Ave. and Riverside Drive 
would be theirs for the taking. Recounting Popkin’s ill-fated Gotham voyage in his memoirs, 
Hays noted a joke going around the campaign then: The La Follette emblem was the Liberty 
Bell, and “the crack is getting larger every day!”1500 
 
Early in the campaign season, it was hoped that both the financial and organizational 
constraints faced by the Progressives would be leavened by the  unprecedented endorsement of 
the American Federation of Labor in August, 1924 – the first time in history the labor group ever 
officially endorsed a presidential ticket.  This endorsement was an indicator of both the more 
explicitly class-based nature of La Follette’s insurgency in 1924, and the sheer desperation which 
opponents of normalcy felt that year. Twelve times since 1885, the AFL had voted down 
resolutions in favor of a third party, and Samuel Gompers had spent his entire career attacking 
the Socialists and reaffirming the non-partisan nature of his organization.  But, once the 
Democrats turned away pro-labor planks to their own platform and chose a scion of Wall Street 
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as their candidate, the ailing Gompers confessed that “it looks as if we are forced to turn to La 
Follette…there is no other way.” 1501  
 
And so, while noting that “cooperation hereby urged is not a pledge of identification with 
an independent party movement or third party” and that “we do not accept government as the 
solution of the problems of life,” the AFL announced their support of La Follette and Wheeler as 
two men – an “independent Republican” and an “independent Democrat” – who “throughout 
their whole political careers stood steadfast in defense of the rights and interests of wage earners 
and farmers.” (As to the Socialists, Gompers reiterated in an editorial that “These candidates 
have the support of minority groups, in themselves of no great importance, but with which we 
are and have been in the sharpest kind of disagreement. We shall continue to oppose those 
doctrines at all times.”)1502  
 
With the endorsement of the AFL – a clear sign “that the Old Guard in the Federation is 
weakening,” noted The Nation – La Follette and Wheeler ostensibly gained the support of a 
three-million member organization that could further rally urban workers to the progressive 
standard.  As such, The New Republic thought “Senator La Follette’s chances of polling a large 
vote in the eastern cities…much improved.” H.L. Mencken begged to differ. The endorsement 
“will be worth vastly less” than three million votes, Mencken argued, “for, labor, in America, 
seems quite unable to function politically…In November, I dare say, hundreds of thousands of 
union men will cast their votes for the Hon. Charles G. Dawes, perhaps the most bold and 
bloodthirsty enemy of unionism ever heard of in American politics.”: 
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[L]abor leaders, in the Republic, are mainly mountebanks who are for themselves long before and 
after they are for labor…But perhaps the political impotence of labor is due more largely to the 
fact that the American workingman, like every other American, has ambitions, and is thus 
disinclined to think of himself as a workingman. In other words, he refuses to be class conscious. 
What he usually hopes is that on some near tomorrow, he will be able to escape from work and go 




“LaFollette’s real strength,” Mencken argued, is unorganized labor. “It is there that 
discontent is greatest, for the Federation and the brotherhoods are wholly selfish, and not only 
refuse to help the poor fellows without their ranks, but even give capital a hand in oppressing 
them…The White House anterooms are already filled with labor leaders, eager to kiss hands and 
pledge their fealty.” 1504  
 
Whatever the merits of Mencken’s overall description of labor, he was ultimately correct 
about the value of the AFL endorsement. While Gompers urged trade unionists to support “these 
two friends of freedom, progress, and true democracy” right up until Election Day, overall the 
AFL was a casual ally at best, only mustering up $25,000 nationwide to dedicate to the cause. “I 
personally and the Socialist Party ticket in New York State got very little support from the A.F. 
of L,” remembered Norman Thomas, a candidate for Governor of New York that year. “As a 
matter of fact, the La Follette ticket nationally got less support as the campaign wore on from the 
A.F. of L. than was expected.” In fact, just before the election, the New York City executive 
committee of the Trades and Labor Council switched their support from La Follette to Davis, 
since “La Follette has no chance to be elected.” Despite the early hopes of progressives that the 
endorsement would be a game changer, the AFL’s support proved to be something of a non-
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factor. Other major unions – most notably John L. Lewis’s United Mine Workers – threw in with 




 Short of money, organization, and allies, the campaign also had to deal with the problem 
of La Follette’s infirm health, which prevented him from taking to the campaign trail as 
vigorously as hoped.  To combat this, one of the first official acts of the campaign, coordinated 
by Bob La Follette, Jr., was what the NewYork Evening Journal deemed “a unique experiment in 
American politics”: a Labor Day speech specifically written for and delivered by a nationwide 
radio broadcast – arguably the first such campaign address in American history. While the 
address was estimated to have reached several million voters, the technical hassles and 
prohibitive cost ($3500) of arranging such a nationwide broadcast cost the campaign more than it 
was worth.  And, after decades of theatrical speaking and gesticulating on the stump, the senator 
was not at all accustomed to the new technology, and much of the La Follette magic did not 
translate over the airwaves. As Arthur Hays recalled, “for an orator of the old school like La 
Follette, the whole business seemed so much gimcrackery. He was used to striding up and down 
the platform when he spoke. It fretted him to have to stand close to the microphone.” (By 
contrast, the reticent, undemonstrative Coolidge had a voice for the radio and not much else. The 
campaign’s final days saw the president deliver a radio address to the largest network then ever 
assembled – twenty stations.)1506 
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 La Follette’s radio address was followed by a campaign innovation borrowed from the 
Socialists, the fund-raising political rally. At an extravaganza on September 18
th
, 1924, 14,000 
supporters crammed into Madison Square Garden, and approximately 7000 listened over 
loudspeakers outside, to hear the candidate, as well as supporters like Arthur Garfield Hays and 
Norman Thomas, discourse. (According to Thomas, the Democrats were “‘the party of the 
Espionage Law, the cruel and illegal anti-Red raids, the spy system, the war frauds, child labor in 
the South, A. Mitchell Palmer, and his anti-labor injunctions,” and the Republicans were “the 
party of Forbes, Fall, and Daugherty, the party of Judge Gary and company-owned towns, the 
party of big business and big injunctions against labor.”) While half the seats inside the Garden 
were free, the other half cost anywhere between 55 cents and $2.50, thus raising almost $13,000 





 In the end, Senator La Follette ended up conducting a twenty city speaking tour 
beginning on October 6
th 
in Rochester, New York – well after Davis and Dawes had gone out on 
the stump. After events in Scranton and Newark, La Follette swung through a multi-city tour of 
the Midwest – Detroit, Cincinnati, Chicago (where he was introduced by Jane Addams), Kansas 
City, St. Louis, Des Moines, Minneapolis, Sioux Falls, Omaha. Rock Island, and Peoria. Then, 
due both to lack of funds and the sense that the West was La Follette-Wheeler country regardless 
– a critical mistake, thought Burton Wheeler – the candidate returned East for the concluding 
week of the campaign, stopping in Syracuse, Baltimore, Brooklyn, Schenectady, Boston, and, 
finally, Cleveland, the site of the original convention. At each stop, the Senator railed against the 
evils of monopoly, the dangers of “big business,” and the corruption of Teapot Dome – with 
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special attention given to farm issues during the Midwest swing and anti-imperialism in the 
German-American stronghold of Cincinnati. “The tour, taking it all in all,” wrote John W. 
Owens for The Baltimore Sun, “is a marvelous performance. This old man, charging entrenched 
enemies with the furious abandon of a romantic young cavalier, and the throngs of men and 
women massing in city after city to hear him, and to gladly to give mites of money to aid him, 
what has there been in politics in years that is comparable?”1508 
 
 The more vigorous Burton Wheeler, meanwhile, went on his own speaking tour in 
September and October, covering 17,000 miles across twenty-six states. Beginning in Boston – 
Coolidge’s home base – Wheeler ventured up to Portland before wending his way through Rhode 
Island, Connecticut, and New York. He then head west through Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, 
Nebraska, and Montana to the Northwest. After working his way down California – the largest 
event being before 12,000 at the Los Angeles Bowl, which one enthusiastic paper called “the 
greatest demonstration received by a candidate in the history of California” – Wheeler cut back 
through Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma before making several final 




Despite La Follette’s many rhetorical talents, Wheeler turned out to be the better 
campaigner of the two candidates – for while the old Wisconsin progressive would often get 
caught up in abstract diatribes about the evils of monopoly, Wheeler focused like a laser beam on 
the issue of corruption in the White House. “Let’s see who is destroying this government of 
ours,” he would exclaim. “Is it the farmers, the laborers, or the merchants of the country? Or is it 
the Daughertys, the Falls, and the Dohenys?” Continually referring to Coolidge and Davis as the 
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“Gold Dust Twins,” Wheeler defied his audience to “name a single national administration in 
American history that was as venal, as corrupt, and as careless of the rights of American 
citizens” as the one currently in power. “Stop government by special privilege,” Wheeler 
concluded, “and you stop government by corruption.”1510 
 
 “He is doing extremely good work, quiet, modest and unassuming yet dramatic to a 
remarkable degree by his simple straightforward narrative of Teapot Dome and the Daugherty 
scandals,” Oswald Villard – working as Assistant National Treasurer for the campaign – reported 
to La Follette of his running mate. “I have never seen audiences more fascinated, or that listened 
more closely and attentively.” Wheeler got particularly good mileage out of debating an empty 
chair or cross-examining a straw dummy about Teapot Dome and various other campaign issues. 
“You knew all about the oil scandals and the Ohio gang, didn’t you?” Wheeler would ask. Then, 
after the ensuing silence, he would add, “Well, knowing all these things, you kept quiet, didn’t 
you? And now you have the reputation of being a strong, silent man, haven’t you?” Here, 
Wheeler told voters, was America’s “Silent Cal.”1511  
 
 The lack of resources on hand necessitated another political campaign first, as Belle La 
Follette became the first candidate’s spouse in American history to go on her own speaking tour. 
Traveling through New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, Mrs. La Follette 
forewent “technical politics” to speak to her audiences “neighbor to neighbor, friend to friend. I 
want especially to speak to you women…to talk things over with you, get your views, answer 
your questions, and see if we can’t mutually understand and agree.” As “the distaff side of the La 
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Follette party,” Belle La Follette emphasized her husband’s more conservative take on reform. 
“He never advocates a reform that experience has not shown is needed,” he noted, arguing that 
while she was more radical the Senator was “almost old fashioned in his worship of our 
institutions.”1512  
 
 All of these official campaign efforts were buttressed by the work of the various La 
Follette-Wheeler campaign headquarters, run by Wisconsin Congressman John Nelson in 
Chicago, Gilbert Roe in New York, and Basil Manley and Bob La Follette, Jr. in Washington. 
Director of Publicity Ernest Gruening churned out press releases, while the varied members of 
the original CPPA coalition – railroad brotherhoods, socialists, farmers, and forty-eighters – 
amplified the message in their respective journalistic organs, as did The Nation and The New 
Republic. Similarly, aiding La Follette’s pitch to America’s women voters was the former 
Women’s Committee for Political Action, now reconstituted as the Women’s Division of the La 
Follette-Wheeler campaign. (It maintained a separate identity “because when a woman’s 
organization joins a man’s,” said member Isabelle Kendig, “the men always are elected to the 
outstanding posts and given the real jobs.”) The Women’s Committee helped to secure speakers 




 Along with introducing La Follette in Chicago, Addams published a piece in the 
September 10, 1924 issue of The New Republic detailing “Why I Shall Vote for La Follette.” 
Addams recalled how, during her time at Hull House, when she was “represented by corrupt 
aldermen in a city council…the political air of Wisconsin filled my lungs like a breath from the 
mountain tops of the finest American tradition.” She now “rejoice[d] in an opportunity to work 
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for ‘progressive political action’ under a leader who has, since 1898, successfully led a 
progressive movement inevitably expanding through a quarter of a century.” La Follette, 
Addams concluded, was “welding together…the forward-looking voters, whether they have 
called themselves Socialists or liberals, proletarians or agriculturists…They hope under the 
leadership of this wise man – who combines so remarkably the abilities of the expert with those 
of the statesmen – to integrate their cooperating experiences into a progressively efficient 
political activity.”1514 
 
 “Why I Shall Vote for La Follette” subsequently became a regular feature in The New 
Republic up until the election. Also participating were Wisconsin economist John Commons, 
Zona Gale, Edward T. Devine, Norman Hapgood, and  Felix Frankfurter. “I wrote a piece about 
La Follette and said of his program that I probably disagreed with nineteen out of twenty 
planks,” Frankfurter recalled at the end of his life. “The specific program of La Follette meant 
nothing to me, but the general direction in which he was going meant everything to me.” In the 
final installment of the series, TNR editor Herbert Croly recapitulated the class-consciousness 
argument his magazine made upon the nomination of La Follette. (“So far, then, from deploring 
or fearing the organization of a farmer-labor party, I believe it to be the fitting instrument of the 
orderly but sufficiently thorough-going readjustment of American political and economic life.”) 
The week of the election, the magazine’s anonymous editorial voice, declared that a “vote for 
Mr. Coolidge…affirms the ideal of an arrested America. A vote for Mr. Davis, no matter what 
the intentions of the voter, affirms an irresponsible and drifting America. A vote for Mr. La 
Follette affirms a progressive America, which is fully aware of its inherited national purpose and 
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is not afraid to demand those changes in conduct, institutions, and ideas which are necessary to 
redeem it.”1515  
 
TNR also argued over the course of the campaign season that a successful La Follette bid 
would likely mean one of the two major parties – probably the Democrats – would break up and 
disappear. “The La Follette vote will be large,” the journal reported in October. “In many of the 
polls he is almost keeping abreast of Coolidge… If it does destroy one of the two older parties, 
the Democracy will surely be selected for sacrifice.” True, Democrats could always rely on a 
Solid South for votes, but – should La Follette win --  “[i]s there any reason why the Solid South 
and the conservative Republicans should not form a new coalition in order to fight the common 
enemy and to regain control of the government? If the Solid South should form a coalition with 
conservative groups in the rest of the country, it would preserve its own solidarity intact, while at 
the same time it would unite with the other elements in American political and social life which 
are most congenial to it.”1516 
 
 White southerners may not abandon the Democratic Party just yet, but W.E.B. Du Bois 
and The Crisis were urging African-Americans to rethink voting Republican. Ever since the 
failure of the Dyer anti-lynching bill in the Harding Congress, The Crisis had begun to advocate 
for ending the long-standing relationship between African-American voters and the party of 
Lincoln. “The trend toward a Third Party is irresistible,” argued The Crisis in January 1923. 
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“Our duty is clear…Can any Negro voter in the future support the Democratic or Republican 
party in national elections without writing himself down as an ass?” Writing in the magazine in 
June of that year, former Assistant Attorney General William Lewis urged that “colored citizens 
in this country should take a leaf, or a chapter, out of the history of Irish in American politics. Be 
‘agin’ the party in power…There is nothing sacred about party designation. Our debt of gratitude 
to the Republican Party has long since been paid with compound interest.”1517 
 
 The prospects for a break grew stronger with the death of Warren Harding, who, if 
nothing else, had at least tried to broach the issue of race relations in Birmingham. “He was not a 
great man,” editorialized The Crisis upon his death with genuine affection, “but he was 
something just as rare – a gentleman; a man gently bred, good and kind and yearning for peace. 
If there ran in his veins any bit of the blood of Africa…it would explain much of the spirit of 
sympathy and forgiveness in the heart of this over-worked servant of the people.” Coolidge, on 
the other hand, rubbed African Americans who met with him – as he rubbed many other visitors 
who met with him – as distant and standoffish. 1518 
 
 By August 1924, Du Bois argued it was “manifestly impossible” for African-Americans 
to “vote a straight ticket for either” of the two major parties. “Our vote must be primarily a 
matter of individual candidates for office.” Similarly, James Weldon Johnson declared in 
October that “the only way for the Negro to begin to gain political importance and power is by 
smashing [the] ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement” between Republicans and Democrats. “He must 
absolutely destroy the idea that because a man’s face is dark he has the word ‘Republican’ 
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indelibly written across his forehead. He must keep politicians uncertain as to how he will 
vote.”1519  
 
While Du Bois thought it “inexcusable” that the La Follette platform had nothing to say 
about African-American rights and thus apparently “no convictions as to the rights of Black 
Folk,” he also thought “[f]or the uplift of the world this is one of the best programs ever laid 
down by a political party in America. It can be carried out and still leave black folk and brown 
and yellow disinherited from many of its benefits. It can triumph and by its very triumph bring 
new tyrannies upon hated minorities. And yet despite this it will be far better than the present 
America.” A more unqualified endorsement came from Col. Roscoe Conkling Simmons, one of 
the more prominent African-American orators of his day and usually a stalwart of the Colored 
Division of the Republican National Committee’s Speakers Bureau. “Senator La Follette,” 
proclaimed Simmons, “is the hope of the Negro race,” prompting so many African-Americans to 





 La Follette and Wheeler also enjoyed the support of numerous other progressives of note, 
among them Florence Kelley, John Dewey, Paul Kellogg, Donald Richberg, and Helen Keller, 
who praised La Follette’s “courage and vision and unyielding determination to find a sensible, 
just way out of the evils which threaten this country.” As noted earlier, Harold Ickes, despite 
believing it “foolish and futile” not to build “a new party movement” and feeling “a very real 
hesitation in taking a step politically that is likely to change radically my whole political life,” 
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also joined the La Follette cause. And, of course, the La Follette-Wheeler campaign inspired 
millions of laborers and farmers across the country, who formed ad hoc groups such as the “La 
Follette Clerical Workers Progressive League,” the “Illinois Negro Progressive Club,” and the 
“Farmers’ Progressive Conference of Illinois” to back their candidate. Among those rallying to 
the cause were the down-on-his-luck California oil worker Frank Nixon and his eleven-year-old-
son Dick. Holding the White House himself a half-century later, Nixon would still call La 
Follette’s Autobiography one of his three favorite books.1521 
 
 Judging from the journals, the progressives began to feel a sense of momentum behind La 
Follette’s candidacy over the course of the campaign, even despite the long odds. “All the La 
Follette news is good news,” gushed The Nation roughly a month before the election: 
 
Iowa is so certain for La Follette that, according to reliable reports, a group of the leading Wall 
Street financiers was has hastily called together at a luncheon in mid-September, at which they 
pledged a large sum of money to buy Iowa back for Coolidge. But the most amazing news comes 
from California. At the outset of the campaign no one dared hope that this reactionary State 
would turn toward La Follette…the Hearst and Literary Digest polls show an amazing turning to 
La Follette, even in Los Angeles. More than that, Gus Karger, the anti-La Follette correspondent 
of the Taft Cincinnati paper, wires from California that the State is now La Follette’s. In New-
York the tide is turning from Coolidge…Chairman Shaver’s admission that if the election were 
held today it would go into the House is further convincing proof of the growth of the La Follette 
movement. Even in a border State like Maryland the amount of support for La Follette is causing 




 In short, The Nation effused, “the tidal wave is growing.” Three weeks later, Oswald 
Villard reported to his readers that “it is curious how many men one meets who are convinced 
that La Follette will be the next President.” Adding that he was “convinced by personal 
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observation that Mr. Dawes helps the La Follette cause,” Villard insisted that “Minnesota, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa – the deeper I penetrated into the Mid-West the brighter seems the 
outlook for Robert La Follette. I am now certain that if the election were held tomorrow he 
would carry every one of those States, in addition to North Dakota, Montana, and Washington. 
Wherever I have been, save only Kansas, the outlook seems brighter than the political analyses 
of the various newspapers portray it.” By the eve of the election, Villard seemed convinced the 
time of reckoning was at hand. “Republican big business has considerably lost its grip in this 
contest,” he argued, comparing the election to the eve of the Civil War. “As the John Brown raid 
was the curtain-raiser in 1859, so is this the peaceful curtain-raiser in 1924. The long struggle 
from Bull Run to Appomattox is just ahead.”1523 
 
 The editors of TNR kept a slightly more level head, but they too began to prophesy a 
considerable showing for the Wisconsin Senator. “Nearly all the political experts now predict 
that the election will be thrown into the House,” the journal declared in mid-October. “It seems 
certain that fewer popular votes will be cast for Davis than for either of his rivals,” they reported 
a fortnight later. Commenting on a later Literary Digest poll that put Coolidge far ahead of both 
contenders (with La Follette running second) and suggested La Follette would win no state but 
his own, TNR argued “it is certainly incorrect and misleading. It seems clear that the lists of 
voters from which an expression of opinion was solicited were heavily weighted in Coolidge’s 
favor.”1524 
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Perhaps the best indicator of the emotional pull many felt toward La Follette’s campaign 
in 1924 was that it even managed to warm the heart of the Grinch from Baltimore. Going over 
the options at the close of the campaign, Mencken returned last to “the Wisconsin Red, with his 
pockets stuffed with Soviet gold. I shall vote for him unhesitatingly, and for a plain reason: he is 
the best man in the running, as a man”: 
 
There is no ring in his nose. Nobody owns him. Nobody bosses him. Nobody even advises him. 
Right or wrong, he has stood on his own bottom, firmly and resolutely, since the day he was first 
heard of in politics, battling for his ideas in good weather and bad, facing great odds gladly, going 
against his own followers as well as with his followers, taking his own line always and sticking to 
it with superb courage and resolution. 
 
Suppose all Americans were like LaFollette? What a country it would be! No more depressing 
goose-stepping. No more gorillas in hysterical herds. No more trimming and trembling. Does it 
matter what his ideas are? Personally, I am against four-fifths of them…You may fancy them or 
you may dislike them, but you can’t get away from the fact that they are whooped by a man who, 
as politicians go among us, is almost miraculously frank, courageous, honest, and first-rate.”1525 
 
 
As a testament to La Follette’s character, Mencken reminded his readers of the Senator’s 
situation during the World War. “His colleagues, eager to escape contamination, avoided him; he 
was reviled from end to end of the country; all the popularity and influence that he had built up 
by years of struggle vanished almost completely. Try to imagine any other American politician 
in that situation. How long would it have taken him to grab a flag and begin howling with the 
pack?....But LaFollette stuck...he held fast to his convictions, simply, tenaciously, and like a 
man.”  Even to a man as curmudgeonly as the Sage of Baltimore, La Follette’s candidacy held 




But, however momentarily inspiring the radiance of that sunlit dream, to Mencken it was 
a dream nonetheless. “LaFollette will be defeated tomorrow, as he deserves to be defeated in a 
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land of goose-steppers and rubber stamps,” he concluded. “The robes of Washington and Lincoln 
will be draped about a man who plays the game according to the American rules.”1527 




 When America had spoken and all the votes had been counted, Mencken’s cynicism was 
once again rewarded. La Follette and “the Hon. Mr. Wheeler,” he wrote, were “beaten so badly 
that little remains of him save a grease spot. Anon the friends of Mr. Daugherty, aided by the 
friends of Mr. Coolidge, will mop up the grease spot, put it on trial, and try to railroad it to jail.” 
With a shrug of resignation, The New Republic concurred. “Some of the Progressive leaders have 
issued public statements in which they placed a cheerful interpretation on the outcome of the 
recent election,” the editors wrote, “but by so doing they are either fooling themselves or trying 
to fool other people…The overwhelming success of Mr. Coolidge and the Republican Party 
signified a clear and emphatic popular repudiation of Progressivism.” Coolidge’s support “was 
both deep as a well and as wide as a church door,” conceded The Nation in an editorial entitled, 
“Business wins.” “Will Rogers put it exactly when he said that the United States voted to be let 
alone…’Business as usual’ and a cessation of politics was the slogan that carried.” The back 
pages of TNR carried a satirical story by Felix Ray of one Elmer Durkin, a newsdealer in the 
town of Woppington who was the only vote anybody knew for La Follette. "I wish I knew who 
the other guys were that voted for La Follette in this town,” lamented Elmer as his friends came 
by to “pay [their] disrespects.” “We ought to hire a nice, roomy telephone booth and stage a 
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mass meeting.” When asked whether or not he loves America, Elmer replied, “I love it as much 
as the next guy, but I don’t like it very well. Anyhow, not today.”1528 
 
  
This, TIME noted in their own post-election write-up, was “the Second Landslide…In 
1920, the country voted out war and the League of Nations – and voted in Harding and the 
Republicans. In 1924, the country voted out LaFollette and radicalism – and voted in Coolidge 
and the Republicans again.” In total, Coolidge won 35 states and 382 electoral votes, more than 
twice the haul of his two competitors. Davis won twelve southern states – the eleven states of the 
Confederacy and Oklahoma – and 136 electoral votes. La Follette took only Wisconsin, and its 
thirteen votes.  In fact, absent Wisconsin, the final electoral map looked much the same as 1920, 
with only Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Kentucky switching sides – the prior two for Coolidge, the 
latter for Davis. In terms of votes, Coolidge won 15.3 million votes and 54% of the vote, Davis 
8.3 million and 29%, and La Follette 4.8 million and 17% – the third-best third-party showing in 
American history, after Roosevelt in 1912 and Ross Perot in 1992, but still considerably less than 




 Diving deeper into the numbers, La Follette came in second to Coolidge in eleven 
western states – California, Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. While the Progressives pulled over 20% in 
America’s nine largest cities and showed strength in working-class enclaves like Pittsburgh, 
Passaic, Paterson, and Rochester – thanks in no small part to the Socialist organizations on the 
ground there -- the independents only won one county east of the Mississippi not in Wisconsin – 
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Clinton, Illinois. (Fiorello La Guardia, however, did win re-election in New York City on a La 
Follette-Wheeler ticket.) Comparing the La Follette showing to the Debs vote in 1920, historian 
Kenneth MacKay estimated that the third party garnered around one million Socialist votes, two 
and a half million farm votes, and around 200,000 votes from railroad brotherhoods.
 1530 
 
   While Silent Cal won handily, he did not provide much in the way of coattails. The 
Republicans gained four seats for a 54-42 advantage of the Democrats, but after factoring in 
deaths and retirements, this gave them only one more Senator than in 1922. While Farmer-Labor 
Senator Magnus Johnson of Minnesota lost the seat he had won in a 1923 special election, 
among the Senate progressives re-elected for another term were William Borah, George Norris, 
Thomas Walsh and Smith Brookhart. The Republican tide was more dramatic in the House, 
where they picked up 22 more seats for Speaker-to-be Nicholas Longworth of Ohio for a 247-
183 advantage – The previous Speaker, Frederic Gillett, won the Senate seat previously occupied 
by Democrat David Walsh of Massachusetts. Meanwhile in the Governor’s races, Al Smith won 
re-election in New York over Theodore Roosevelt Jr. by 100,000 votes – roughly the same 
number that Norman Thomas pulled on the Socialist ticket, while William Allen White, running 
for governor of Kansas on a Klan protest ticket, came in third, with less than half the votes of the 




Despite the relatively small impact of the results in Congress, the victory for Coolidge 
was, by all accounts, decisive. “It was a famous victory,” exulted Chief Justice William Howard 
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Taft. “This country is no country for radicalism. I think it is really the most conservative country 
in the world.” A disgusted Hiram Johnson was inclined to agree. “The victory is overwhelming,” 
he wrote to Ickes. “The outlanders, pariahs, and outcasts like yourself and myself have the choice 
between devoting ourselves to our private occupations, becoming a part of what we know is the 
crooked political machine, or speaking when opportunity offers our fruitless opposition. I take it 
there is not much doubt about which of the three roads you and I will follow.”1532 
  
In the last weeks before the election, Harold Ickes had reconciled himself to a Coolidge 
victory and hoped it might “more quickly” bring about the “substantially new party alignment of 
Democrats and La Follette Progressives” he had envisioned. But he didn’t expect the types of 
overwhelming margins Silent Cal would receive. As such, he thought the election represented 
the victory of “subnormalcy” and “a great day for reaction…If Coolidge had a wooden leg than it 
would have been acclaimed throughout the country that no one was qualified to be president who 
didn’t have a wooden leg.” Now, on account of the landslide, “Mediocrity is king…When 
Harding was elected I thought the country couldn’t sink any lower. I find I was mistaken…[I]t 
used to be our proud boast that any native born American might become president of the United 
States. In the light of the recent election it can now be affirmed.”1533  
 
Parsing the defeat, Ickes and Johnson both took the opportunity to nurse their grievances.  
“All I can say is that Raymond couldn’t fall much lower than the place he now occupies in my 
estimation,” Ickes had told Johnson just before the election. Now, the enmity grew stronger. 
“Robins’ exultant voice came to me over the telephone the other day,” he reported to the Senator, 
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“but I didn’t prolong the conversation on my part or encourage its continuance on his. He did 
manage to tell me, however, ‘it was the biggest thing I ever put over.’” “The fact of the matter 
is,” Ickes wrote in a separate letter, “I don’t think any of us can ever depend upon him again.” As 
for himself, Ickes told Johnson that “you were very wise to keep strictly to the side lines. I 
suppose I was a fool to do otherwise, but I couldn’t sit still after Raymond and his associates… 
undertook in the name of Roosevelt to deliver the old progressive vote to the mannequin from 
Northampton…As an active force in politics it seems to me that my future is all past.”1534 
 
Senator Johnson was also irritated by Robins and his “honeyed words,” but he preferred 
to vent his spleen over his colleague from Idaho. “I note a dispatch this morning that Borah is to 
succeed Lodge as the Republican leader in the Senate. This I think entirely appropriate. On the 
one hand he can dance a jig on Wall Street with Dwight Morrow as his partner, and on the other 
he can scowl with Wheeler and La Follette, and he even may pursue a third policy and march 
with the southern democrats for states rights. With his capacity for doing all three at the same 
time and being feared by nobody, he ought to make Raymond Robins his secretary and vicarious 
orator, and lead the Republican Party in Congress.” Ickes concurred with Johnson’s assessment, 
“With Raymond to tell him what to do and leave undone,” he replied, Borah “will now outlaw 
war, whatever that means…If Hughes didn’t seem to have such a tight hold on his job Raymond 
might even grow whiskers and be made Secretary of State. He is almost as sanctimonious as 
Hughes, and his political morals are fully as elastic.”1535 
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The progressive apostate on the Democratic side seemed as sanguine as Robins about the 
Coolidge victory. “If to know exactly what you want and where you are going is the prime virtue 
in politics,” Walter Lippmann wrote the morning after the election, “then Coolidge and Dawes 
deserved to win. The World salutes the victors!” Meanwhile, many Democrats, like Ickes and 
Johnson, began to descend into the same sort of internecine bickering that had made a fiasco of 
the New York convention. The month after the election, Franklin Roosevelt – building a web of 
party influence that would serve him well in the years to come – sent a letter to all the delegates 
of that ill-fated convention, asking in which direction the party should now move. The 
Republicans were clearly “for conservatism, for the control of the social and economic structure 
of the country by a small minority of hand-picked associates.” But, “in the minds of the average 
voter the Democratic Party has today no definite constructive aims.” What now should the 
Democracy stand for?
 1536
   
 
Much to Roosevelt’s chagrin, the responses were all over the map. Senator Carter Glass 
thought the party was shot through with “La Follette-ism and Bryan-ism,” and far too radical for 
most voters. Senator C.C. Dill, on the other hand, though it far too conservative. William 
Jennings Bryan wanted the party to forsake completely the wet urban East. One Illinois 
Democrat lamented that there was nothing to do “except wait for the Republican Party to blow 
up.” While Roosevelt himself thought Democrats had to become “by definite policy, the Party of 
constructive progress, before we can attract a larger following,” he too began to come around to 
this latter way of thinking. Before the election returns, Franklin Roosevelt had told Eleanor that a 
Coolidge victory would mean “we shall be so darned sick of [the] conservatism of the old 
money-controlled crowd in four years that we [will] get a real progressive landslide in 1928.” 
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But, in the face of such an overwhelming Republican victory, his resolve began to crumble. 
“Much as we Democrats may be the party of honesty and progress,” he now decided, “the people 
will not turn out the Republicans while wages are good and markets are booming.” The “stone 
wall which we all face at present moment is, of course, the complacency of the multitude of 
voters,” he eventually concluded. “I do not look for a Democratic president until after the 1932 
election.”1537 
 
Looking at the sorry state of the Democrats, the editors of TNR concurred with Franklin 
Roosevelt’s basic assessment, while taking one last opportunity to thumb their nose at 
Lippmann. “The World attributes Davis’s poor showing to ‘treachery’ by McAdoo Democrats 
who did nothing or less than nothing to aid him,” sneered the journal. “But a simpler explanation 
is just as probable. Thousands of progressive Democrats voted for La Follette because Davis was 
too conservative. Thousands of conservative Democrats voted for Coolidge because they had 
been frightened into hysterics by the possibility of a La Follette victory..[This] is the fate which 
is to be expected for a party which does not know, and cannot make up its mind, whether it is 
progressive or conservative.” As for 1928, TNR thought the ascendancy of Al Smith as “the 
solitary leader of the Democracy” only meant the party was likely to “repeat its near-suicide of 
1924” in New York on a larger scale. Besides, since “the fires of conviction having burned 
themselves out long ago,” Democrats were just as likely to pick a conservative in 1928, since 
“[t]oday conservatism’s black appears to be the winning color.”1538  
 
For The New Republic, the only “Possible Consolation” of the Coolidge rout was that 
conservatism was now irrefutably in control. Republicans, in the minds of voters, were now 
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“peculiarly responsible for things as they are and for making things as they are convertible into 
cash prosperity for a majority of the voters.” Although progressives “failed emphatically to win 
the confidence of the American people during the recent campaign,” their fight committed the 
Republican “party to its support of plutocracy and placed the plutocracy itself on trial”:  
 
The question of the adequacy of government by and for business and its effect on the welfare of 
the American people has broken through the barriers into the arena of party politics, and there we 
believe it is bound to remain—the chief bone of contention. The Progressive success in provoking 
so many million American citizens to ignore the sacred party loyalties and allow their votes to be 
determined by conservative fears and economic purposes has resulted for the moment in an 
overwhelming endorsement of the business man's state, but there are other elections to follow. 
The trial will be continued, and sooner or later, the verdict will be reversed.  
 
Government by business in America, like the imperial government of Napoleon III in France, 
now derives its authority not from effective general consent but from a plebiscite in which 
millions of citizens were scared or fooled into voting affirmatively. The day will come when it 
will fall by a plebiscite. The voters when they lose confidence in the Republicans as, by the 
essential conditions of the game of party politics, they must eventually do, will, as a consequence 
of the election, also be disgusted with the business man's government whose interests the 





“If the Progressive protest is as necessary as they think it is,” TNR concluded, “and their 
analysis of the sickness of American industrialism is correct, they can await the ultimate turn of 
the tide with confidence.” In their pursuit of normalcy, Americans “have lost their former 
conviction without substituting anything positive in its place, and in their ignorance and doubt 
they voted for what they took to be their interests and the best chance of social stability. But in 
their own souls there is no stability,” and eventually the tide would turn again. “This outlook 
may or may not console many Progressives for their overwhelming defeat at the polls this year, 
but if it proves to be true, it may prove to be decisive in favor of the ultimate triumph of the 
Progressive cause.”1540 
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While acknowledging the bitterness of the defeat, The Nation took a similarly 
philosophic turn. “We thought the prairies were beginning to catch fire, and so they did at the 
edges, but the blaze must be fanned a good deal yet before it will drive the coyotes and the 
timber-wolves into the open. This year the back-fires easily held the flames in check.” 
Nonetheless, La Follette and Wheeler, given their lack of resources and organization and the 
power of the forces arrayed against them, had delivered a “magnificent achievement…Against 
incredible odds, they took their cause to the people. It gained steadily and what they 
accomplished will endure to their lasting renown.” As for the future, the editors of The Nation, 
were “not at all sure that four years more of the crass materialism now enthroned in Washington, 
of the soulless Republican exploitation of the people for the benefit of the rich and privileged, of 
the licensing of corruptionists to proceed if only they do not caught, and of the loosing of our 
financial imperialism upon the world will not bring about an early reaction and a bitter 
awakening for the masses. We do not – we cannot lose heart.”1541  
 
Even the redoubtable Mencken agreed with that basic assessment. Yes, seeing Coolidge 
and particularly General Dawes win so gloriously was an affront to progressive values. “But let 
us not commit the error, so common among Progressives of all wings, of shuddering over it too 
piously, of seeing in it too much of the lamentable. Dawes…is very typical of the America in 
which he lives, and in particular of the business America now triumphant. His ethical ideas are 
simple and devoid of cant. He believes that any man deserves whatever he can get. That is also 
the notion of at least 98 per cent of his countrymen.” Besides as Mencken had argued before the 
election, “[t]he day good Cal is elected every thieving scoundrel in the Republican party will 
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burst into hosannas…There will follow, for a year or two, a reign of mirth in Washington, wilder 
and merrier even, than that of Harding’s time. And then there will come an explosion.”1542 
 
For his part, W.E.B. Du Bois lamented that La Follette and Wheeler, two “unusually 
honest and straight-forward men,” had been beaten. But in The Crisis, Du Bois saw in the 1924 
results reasons for hope. True, a million of Coolidge’s fifteen million votes came from African-
Americans – “a last pathetic appeal for justice in the face of unparalleled flouting of black men 
by this administration.” Du Bois predicted that, if the Dyer bill did not soon pass, Republicans 
“will lose more and more of its black voters as years go.” But 500,000 African-Americans also 
voted for La Follette, “a splendid and far-reaching gesture” to a third party that “has come to 
stay, and the Negro recognizes its fine platform and finer leaders.” And approximately the same 
number had voted for Democrats in the northern states, including Harlem voting by over a 
10,000 vote margin to help put Al Smith over the top. Thus, Du Bois concluded, 1924 marked a 
year “in which Negroes voted with greater intelligence and finer discrimination than ever 
before.”1543 
 
Some of the participants in the campaign were at peace with the third party showing as 
well. Burton Wheeler, who had never expected much of a better showing, declared after the 
results were in that “the wonder is not that so many millions were intimidated and voted for 
Coolidge but that so many millions stood by their convictions and voted the Independent ticket.” 
Arthur Garfield Hays took solace in a fight hard-waged as well.  “For all its comedy of errors,” 
he wrote in his memoirs, “that campaign of 1924 gave to us who actively participated in it a 
deeper love for democracy and the decent human beings who make up the rank and file. We 
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made all sorts of stupid mistakes, we were outsmarted time and again by professional politicians 
and renegade liberals as well, but somewhere, somehow, we got five million folk to stand up and 
be counted. ‘There was something where there had been nothing.” Still he added, “La Follette 
never recovered from the disappointment of the ’24 campaign.”1544 
 
To be sure, the Wisconsin Senator put on a brave face. “Providence willing,” he told an 
adoring crowd in Madison after the election, “I believe that I shall last long enough to see the 
nation freed from its economic slavery and the government returned to the people.” When 
campaign advisors spoke bitterly of organized labor’s failure to fully back the campaign, La 
Follette called them out for their “lack of understanding.” “Those pay checks are all that stand 
between starvation for those workers and their families,” he admonished them. “You are asking 
too much of them.” Upon his return to the Senate for the lame duck December session, he was 
gracious in defeat, although he confessed to his sister that “[i]t was not easy to face the old gang 
with the election just over and every state lost except Wisconsin. But I sailed in my head up & all 
smiles. You [may] be sure I would give any outward evidence of the taste in my mouth.” A few 
months later, in the opening session of 1925, the Republicans would try to strip La Follette and 
the remaining heretics of their seniority. “As for my committee assignments,” the Wisconsin 
Senator told a reporter, “if I were removed from all committees I would still find plenty of work 
to do in the Senate.”1545 
 
But, soon, La Follette’s health began to fail for the final time. In June 1925, La Follette 
became bedridden. “I am at peace with the world,” he told his son Bob Jr., “but there is a lot of 
work I could still do. I don’t know how the people will feel toward me, but I shall take to the 
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grave my love for them which has sustained me through life.” On the morning of June 18th, 1925 





Five hours later, with his family gathered around him, the Wisconsin Senator passed 
away at his home in Washington DC. “It is hard to say the right thing about Bob La Follette,” 
said Borah upon hearing the news. “You know he lived 150 years.” “His was the voice of justice 
and humanity, calling God’s common people to battle righteousness,” eulogized La Follette’s old 
friend George Norris. “He blazed the path through the wilderness of suspicion and doubt, leading 
the way to a higher civilization, a nobler life, a happier day.” Elsewhere, Norris deemed La 
Follette’s passing “the most serious loss that honest Government could sustain.” When La 
Follette’s family cleared out his Senate desk, they found written on a piece of scratch paper, “I 
would be remembered as one who in the world’s darkest hours kept a clean conscience and stood 
to the end for the ideals of American democracy.”1547 
 
As for the independent party movement that had rallied around La Follette’s candidacy it 
lasted scarcely as long as the Senator. In February 1925, the CPPA reconvened in Chicago, 
ostensibly to discuss their future plans. To Socialist Morris Hillquit, remembering the scene in 
his memoirs, it seemed the convention had been convened to “bury Caesar, not to praise him.” 
Complicating matters, the varying members of the CPPA coalition had only been reconfirmed in 
their prior opinions by the 1924 showing – The railroad brotherhoods and labor organizers 
thought the La Follette-Wheeler bid had proved that a third party would never work, while the 
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Forty-Eighters, Socialists, and Farmer-Labor elements thought it proved a third party, with boots 
on the ground all across the country, was a necessary prerequisite to success. “If five million 
voters were not enough,” pleaded Hillquit to the railroad brotherhoods, “will you wait until we 
have swept the country…Did you start your trade unions on that practice?”1548 
 
Also pleading the case for a continued coalition party movement was an ailing Eugene V. 
Debs, making his first appearance before a CPPA convention. To Hillquit, the frail, sickly old 
man “seemed like a ghost of reproach from their past…calling them back to the glorious days of 
struggle and idealism.” “Do you know that all the progress in the whole world’s history has been 
made by minorities,” Debs told the assembled delegates. “I have somehow been fortunately all 
my life in the minority. I have thought again and again that if I ever find myself in the majority I 
will know that I have outlived myself.” Yes, a third party would be an uphill endeavor. If 
organized, “it must expect from the very beginning to be misrepresented and ridiculed and 
traduced in every possible way, but if it consists of those who are the living representatives of its 
principles, it will make progress in spite of that, and in due course of time, it will sweep into 
triumph.”1549 
 
The gathered convention was awed into silence during Debs’ address. But, nonetheless, 
upon adjournment of that session, the railroad brotherhoods and other unions decided to leave 
the organization. Later that evening, the Socialists and the Farmer-Labor Party began to feud 
over the character of the new party, with the former desiring an explicitly class-based party 
organized along vocational lines and the latter preferring a more traditional party system. When 
the Socialist organizational proposal failed 93-64, they too left the dwindling coalition. 
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Eventually, the only ones left were the Forty-Eighters. Oswald Villard and Arthur Garfield Hays 
remained active in the movement through 1925 and 1926, with Villard co-writing a Declaration 
of Progressive Faith in 1926 for a third party convention that never happened – only seven states 
even showed any interest in gathering. By November 1927, the third-party dream was officially 
over, and the National Progressive Headquarters closed its doors. “Sooner or later,” wrote 
Mercer Johnston of Maryland in explaining the decision, “the principles for which the 
Progressives fought in 1924 will assume definite militant form.” That day had clearly not yet 
arrived. “Throughout this period,” noted Donald Richberg, looking back, “the progressive forces 
had only the vaguest ideas of where they were going.”1550 
 
Even if the message didn’t take, Eugene Debs’ plea before the CPPA was one of the old 
Socialist’s last hurrahs. Since leaving prison, he had remained a symbol of the old Socialist spirit 
to many across the county. “You and I belong to different schools of socialism,” wrote fish-
peddler Bartolomeo Vanzetti to Debs from his Massachusetts prison cell in 1923, “[b]ut you are 
my Teacher…I am positive that if a minority would follow your practical example the reality of 
tomorrow would be above the dreams of many dreamers.” Nonetheless, in his final years Debs 
had been increasingly sidelined by his old party as a venerable and well-meaning relic. “What he 
does not realize is that his imprisonment is an old story and he is not the drawing card he once 
was,” party secretary Bertha Hale White complained to Hillquit in the summer of 1925. “The old 
speeches will not do…I made it as emphatic as I could, saying his old speeches were familiar to 
every person who would be at his meetings.” What’s more, White argued, “Gene’s psychology is 
all wrong…the old Appeal days and methods are of the past.” One longtime admirer of Debs saw 
him speak in 1925 and was shocked at the ill health and lack of vitality in the man. “Had the 
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lecture been delivered by anyone other than Debs,” he reported sadly, “many in the audience 
would have walked out.” Increasingly sick throughout 1926, the old man spent time in Bermuda 
and the Lindlahr Sanitarium in Elmhurst, Illinois to regain his strength. But at Lindlahr, on 
October 20
th
, 1925, Eugene Victor Debs passed away of heart failure, also at the age of seventy. 
“The death of so great a mind and so brave a heart,” wrote W.E.B. Du Bois in The Crisis, is a 
calamity to this poor nation.”1551 
 
La Follette and Debs were but two of the fixtures in American political life to pass on 
within two years of the 1924 election. The day after Election Day, Henry Cabot Lodge – who 
had seemed so lost at the Cleveland convention after being purposefully sidelined by Coolidge 
forces – suffered a severe stroke. He joined his old nemesis Woodrow Wilson beyond the veil 
four days later on November 9
th, 1924, at the age of 74.  The following month, Debs’ old rival 
Samuel Gompers, also age 74, suffered a heart attack in Mexico City while attending a meeting 
of the Pan-American Federation of Labor. Desiring to die on American soil, Gompers was sent 
on the fastest train available back to the United States. He perished on December 13
th
, 1924, in 
San Antonio, Texas. Seven months later, and five days after the conclusion of the Scopes Trial in 
Tennessee in which he was prominently featured, William Jennings Bryan died in his sleep at the 






With Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson already gone, many of the remaining 
pillars that had shaped the American political landscape for decades had now all crumbled away. 
The world, it seemed, was changing – New political forces were in charge and a New Era was 
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coming to light. Those left to continue the fight would be forced to dwell often on the question 
that had haunted Robert La Follette in the last months of his life.  
 
“I believe in democracy,” he had said in 1925, near the end, while lying on his office 
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PART THREE: A NEW ERA 
 
 
“We went to war to make an end to militarism, and there is more 
militarism than ever before. 
 
We went to war to make the world safe for democracy, and there is less 
democracy than ever before. 
 
We went to war to dethrone autocracy and special privilege, and they 
thrive everywhere throughout the world today. 
 
We went to war to win the friendship of the world, and they hate us 
today. 
 
We went to war to purify the soul of America, and instead we only 
drugged it. 
 
We went to war to awaken the American people to the idealistic concepts 
of liberty, justice, and fraternity, and instead we awakened them only to 
the mad pursuit of money.” 
 
 – George Norris, 19271554 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA 
PROGRESSIVES AND THE BUSINESS CULTURE 
 
“What the country needs – just at this present juncture – is neither a college president nor a lot 
of monkeying with foreign affairs, but a good – sound – economical – business – administration, 
that will give us a chance to have something like a decent turnover.” – George Babbitt (Sinclair 
Lewis), 19221555  
 
“Business seems to be in the saddle. Let us see what it can make of the job.” – Harper’s, 19251556  
 
“Our whole business system would break down in a day if there was not a high sense of moral 
responsibility in our business world…You cannot extend the mastery of the government over the 
daily working life of a people without at the same time making it the master of the people’s souls 
and thoughts.” – Herbert Hoover, 19281557  
 
“The early Twenties brought the American people to their knees in worship at the shrine of 
private business and industry. It was said and accepted without question by millions of 




The election of Coolidge both reflected and accelerated trends that had begun under his 
predecessor – the ascendance of the  business class in American politics, and the 
enthronement of business culture at the center of American life. As Warren Harding and 
Calvin Coolidge – and their top two lieutenants, Herbert Hoover and Andrew Mellon – 
aimed to remake American government in the mold of industry, the nation’s financiers 





Two Brooms, Two Presidents 
 
  
“More business in government and less government in business” had been a common 
refrain of Senator Warren Harding’s during the 1920 campaign. In an article by that name for the 
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November 1920 issue of The World’s Work, the Republican candidate explained exactly what he 
meant by this. “Unfortunate indeed is the misapplication of the term ‘progressive,’” Harding 
argued, “because progression may mean moving forwards as well as moving backwards or 
sideways.”  Real progressives, he suggested, would put more emphasis on deeds rather than lofty 
words. “I value the crusader. But I value men and women and nations who see the tasks to be 
done and do them. Because of this, I find idealism in building firm foundations for the economic 
life of our country, and some idealism in the conception of an administrative government which 
serves its people well, with thrift, economy, and efficiency, rather than badly by prodigiality, 
experimentation, and slipshoddiness.” The Wilson administration, on the other hand, was an 
example of what not to do. It had “tinkered and bungled with American business until American 
business has been put into anxiety rather than expectancy, and darkness rather than light.”1559 
 
“American business is not some selfish, privilege-seeking monster,” Harding maintained. 
“The agitator who so describes it, and the statesman who treats it with abuse and suspicion, 
forget that American business is the daily labor of the whole people and the clothes upon their 
backs and three meals a day…American business is a vast fabric woven through the upgoing 
years by the daily tasks of a faithful, virtuous people. It is a blind idealist, indeed, who can find 
no thrill in that magnificent tapestry, and one blind indeed who recklessly pulls at the threads to 
unravel it.” Thus, moving forward, candidate Harding pledged that his administration would 
“instead of experiments establish a close understanding between American government and 
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American business so that one may serve and the other obey and seek cooperation…America is 
proud of her business methods. We have squeezed out of our method of doing business a good 
deal of inefficiency and waste. I think it would be pretty fine piece of idealism to squeeze 
inefficiency and waste out of our administrative government.” If we did, Harding concluded, 
“[g]reat and glorious achievements may present themselves to us for the future,” and, in the end, 
isn’t that what real progressives wanted?1560 
 
Three months later, the President of the Central Trust Company of Illinois, celebrated 
World War veteran Charles G. Dawes gave a very highly regarded speech at the tenth annual 
Trust Companies banquet at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York. This followed the 
publication by Dawes of an article that had gotten the now-president-elect’s attention, “How the 
President Could Save a Billion Dollars.” The wartime tax rates, Dawes proclaimed, were 
“throttling the industries and the commerce and the labor of our country,” a consequence not just 
of Wilson’s largesse but of a “disgraceful business system” in government “which we have 
allowed to grow up without hindrance for over a hundred years[.]”1561 
 
This, Dawes contested, had to change. “The money is being lost in mad administration, 
and it is the duty of the next President of the United States to give this government, for the first 
time, a business head.” Moreover, any “man who endeavors to make it difficult for the next 
President of the United States to call the very best business men he can get into the service…is 
just as much a traitor to the country as a man who in time of war…would rail against sending our 
big and large and fine soldiers to the front because it would make a little runt jealous.” The 
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March 1921 issue of Trust Companies, a publication of the American Bankers Association, 
thought Dawes’ address “masterful” and “one of the strongest indictments ever made against 
Government maladministration and lack of ordinary business principles at Washington.” The 
emcee of the event gushed that “if General Dawes is appointed to head a commission to 
reorganize the Business methods of the Government, it will make an epoch in the history of this 
Nation.”1562 
 
That epoch began on June 10, 1921 when the Budget and Accounting Act was signed into 
law, creating for the first time a Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and 
Budget) and a General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office), and 
mandating that the president from now herein present a yearly budget to the Congress. In fact, 
that purported master of profligacy, Woodrow Wilson, had earlier called for just such a budget 
bill. But he vetoed the final product Congress gave him in 1919 because it also created a 
Comptroller General in the legislative branch with the power to audit federal spending. Wilson 
thought this an unconstitutional restraint on executive power, and, when the bill passed again in 
1921 by a Republican Congress for a Republican President, there was no longer any such 
provision. To take on the job of America’s first Budget Director, Harding turned to Dawes – his 
original choice for Secretary of the Treasury, based on Dawes’ “How to Save a Billion Dollars” 
article – who agreed provided he could return to the private sector after one year. 1563 
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Three weeks into the new position, on June 29
th
, 1921, General Dawes brought together 
“the entire business administration” – the president, the Cabinet, and 1200 other top department 
heads and federal higher-ups – for the first meeting of the Business Organization of the 
Government. This was not a speech but “a talk…as business men, a part of the business 
administration to which I belong, which for the first time commences functioning under a 
president of a business corporation who is also the president of the United States.” By creating a 
budget office, Dawes argued, “the President is simply putting into effect for the first time in this 
country a condition which exists in any business corporation.” He urged every person in the 
room who would aid him in his quest to minimize waste and inefficiency and bring sound 




The meetings of the Business Organization of the Government became a twice-yearly 
ritual, in January and June, throughout the Twenties. “There is no reason why, because the 
Government of the United States does the largest business in the world, it should be the worst 
conducted,” Dawes told the assembled at the second such meeting in January 1922, especially 
given “there is no finer body of business men in this country than these underpaid men of talent 
confronting me.” Nonetheless, to prove the extent of the problem, Dawes showed the audience 
two brooms – one Army-issue, one Navy-issue. “Now, the Army had 350,000 of these brooms in 
surplus,” Dawes noted. “The Navy needed 18,000 brooms. It could have had the Army brooms 
for nothing but because they were wrapped with twine instead of wire, the Navy wouldn’t take 
them as a gift.” If this had happened in the private sector, Dawes argued, “the mere knowledge of 
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it in the body of the business organization would drive the man guilty of it out of his 
position.”1565 
 
In December 1921, General Dawes tried to ensure that any bill put forward by the 
executive branch that would cost the nation money ran through his department first. But he was 
forced to back down in the face of an angry Cabinet, who resented this encroachment by the 
Budget Director between themselves and the President. Nonetheless, after a year of fighting with 
various Cabinet members and department heads to reduce costs, Dawes put together a budget for 
1923 that was $1.5 billion less than the last Wilson budget of 1921. In point of fact, the 1922 
budget came in $1.4 billion less than 1921 and the 1923 budget came in a full $2 billion less – in 
no small part thanks to savings from disarmament. “We have got used to accepting a large measure 
of waste and inefficiency in government with a degree of philosophy that could scarcely be 
exceeded by an ancient Egyptian living under the Pharaohs,” argued The Literary Digest in 1923. 
“Perhaps men like Dawes and Hoover are forerunners of the new race.” Similarly, the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle noted that “[t]he Government is now on the way to an 
orderly and healthy system of business management, thanks to the courage and ability 
of General Dawes, and the prompt and unqualified cooperation of the President.” 1566  
 
Choosing General Herbert M. Lord, the chief finance officer of the Army, as his hand-
picked successor, Dawes returned to private life after his year was up, taking with him only the 
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sign on his door and the two brooms. Introducing Lord at the Business Organization of the 
Government meeting of July 1922, Harding congratulated his government on a job well done, 
and insisted they continue the effort. “Our country is now one of the few in the world which is 
not paying is at it goes,” he told the assembled, “and I must regard with disfavor any tendency to 
interfere with this condition or to increase taxes.” General Lord, meanwhile, who would later 
begin to talk of the American government as a “corporate organization with 115,000,000 
stockholders,” promised to continue the legacy of his predecessor, who he deemed a 
“providential choice” for the position. As for Dawes, he published his diary of the year as a 1923 
book, The First Year of the Budget of the United States. “This book is the review of a great 
undertaking,” declared The Quarterly Journal of Economics in their otherwise-positive 
assessment, “but it is not a great book.”1567 
 
Calvin Coolidge was a fan nonetheless. “I am for economy,” he had said during the 
Business Organization meeting that coincided with the 1924 election campaign. “After that, I am 
for more economy.” At the end of the year, after he had been overwhelmingly returned to office, 
Coolidge told Congress that “the government can do more to remedy the economic ills of the 
people by a system of rigid economy in public expenditure than can be accomplished through 
any other action.” To this task, and perhaps no other, Coolidge devoted himself. 1568  
 
As president, he turned the twice-yearly meetings of the “Business Organization of 
the Government” from a staid business conference in the Interior Department into a 
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festive gala-type experience, with the Marine Corps band playing songs to enliven the 
mood. From January 1925 until the final meeting in January 1929, they were also 
broadcast nationwide on the radio, to be heard “by the invisible audience in whose interests we 
are gathered.” (Coolidge had wanted to start this practice in June 1924, but at the time the 
Democrats had been self-immolating in New York.) “Every dollar that is saved by careful 
administration,” Coolidge told the Business Organization and a radio audience in January 1925, 
the first meeting after the election, “adds to the amount by which taxes may be reduced in the 
future….I had rather talk of saving pennies and save them than theorize to millions and save 
nothing.”1569   
 
To The New Republic, this “Coolidge Gospel of Parsimony” – later generations would 
use the term “austerity” – was admirably sincere, at least. But “is scrupulous parsimony in public 
expenditure,” the journal asked, really “the most effective contribution which the government 
can make to the welfare of the American people?” In fact, TNR argued, it was “private 
capitalism run mad…The logical result of Mr. Coolidge’s policy of parsimony in governmental 
expenditure would be its abandonment of regulative and social activities which both federal and 
state governments are now conducting at a very heavy expense.” Coolidge was not calling for 
better service from the government, but rather “diminished expenditures, irrespective of deserts, 
or diminished activities” – His position “implicitly denounces any attempt by the government to 
remedy economic and social evils which involves public expenditure…When he declares that the 
best way for the government to cure economic evils is to cut down its expenditures, what he 
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really means is that the best way for the government to cure economic ills is to let them 
alone.”1570 
 
Perhaps in response to this line of argument, Coolidge would sometimes temper his 
remarks with nods to the important functions of government. “To conduct the business of 
Government so as to bring the greatest possible benefit to the people is to honor our 
constitutional obligations,” Coolidge told the Business Organization in June 1925. “Constructive 
economy in the business of Government is for the benefit of the people.” Six months later, at the 
next gathering, Coolidge conceded that “[m]erely to reduce the expenses of the Government 
might not in itself be beneficial…No civilized community would close its schools, abolish its 
courts, disband its police force, or discontinue its fire department. Such action could not be 
counted as gain, but as irreparable loss.” The goal, Coolidge insisted, was “national 
efficiency….It is not through selfishness or wastefulness or arrogance, but through self-denial, 
conservation, and service that we shall build up the American spirit.”1571  
 
Self-denial is not usually considered a virtue that was in abundance during the Coolidge 
prosperity, which is why the president so well exemplified the moniker given to him by William 
Allen White – “A Puritan in Babylon,” the still, calm center of the storm during an age of 
transformation and Ballyhoo. And, while seeming so lackadaisical about many of his presidential 
responsibilities, Coolidge would succeed in this, the one endeavor he thought so fundamental. 
Over the course of his presidency, the federal budget would continue in the self-abnegating 
trajectory originated by Harding, remaining the same size at relatively $4 billion a year, while 
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taxes were reduced and national debt would decrease from $22.3 billion to $16.9 billion. In 
addition, Coolidge would enact the early reform that Dawes had called for in December 1921, 
establishing the Budget office as a central clearinghouse for executive legislation.
1572 
 
In this as is in many other ways, much as the agenda put forward by John F. 
Kennedy in the 1960’s only came into fruition under Lyndon Johnson, Calvin Coolidge 
consummated the business-minded trends initiated by Warren Harding. Under his 
administration, less government in business and more business in government would 
reach its apotheosis. 
A Puritan in Babylon 
 
 
“No one can contemplate current conditions without finding much that is satisfying and 
still more that is encouraging,” began Calvin Coolidge in his inaugural address of March 4th, 
1925 – also the first to be broadcast nationwide via the radio.  “Already we have sufficiently 
rearranged our domestic affairs so that confidence has returned, business has revived, and we 
appear to be entering an era of prosperity which is gradually reaching into every part of the 
Nation.” Moreover, “[u]nder the helpful influences of restrictive immigration and a protective 
tariff, employment is plentiful, the rate of pay is high, and wage earners are in a state of 
contentment seldom before seen.”1573  
 
In short, normalcy was working, and the American people had voted for more of it. After 
an extended discussion of international affairs emphasizing the nation’s independence and desire 
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for peace, Coolidge emphasized to foe and friend alike that “[t]his Administration has come into 
power with a very clear and definite mandate from the people,” and, as such, they expected from 
Republicans in Congress “such unity of action as will make the party majority an effective 
instrument of government.” What’s more, Coolidge averred, La Follettism had been roundly 
rejected:  
 
The expression of the popular will in favor of maintaining our constitutional guarantees was 
overwhelming and decisive. There was a manifestation of such faith in the integrity of the courts 
that we can consider that issue rejected for some time to come. Likewise, the policy of public 
ownership of railroads and certain electric utilities met with unmistakable defeat. The people 
declared that they wanted their rights to have not a political but a judicial determination, and their 
independence and freedom continued and supported by having the ownership and control of their 
property, not in the Government, but in their own hands. As they always do when they have a fair 





“The last election showed that appeals to class and nationality had little effect,” Coolidge 
concluded. “We were all found loyal to a common citizenship.” Instead, he maintained, the 
American people had voted “with the greatest clearness” for “economy in public expenditure 
with reduction and reform of taxation…Every dollar that we carelessly waste means that their 
life will be so much the more meager. Every dollar that we prudently save means that their life 
will be so much the more abundant. Economy is idealism in its most practical form.” This was 
the great task before the nation – “not to secure new advantages but to maintain those which we 
already possess” – to continue normalcy, as the American people had demanded at the ballot 
box.1575 
 
While ideologically on the same page as his predecessor, in terms of temperament 
Coolidge was quite a different bird altogether. For one, while Harding was a sociable sort of the 








hail-fellow-well-met variety, the very embodiment of a small-town newspaperman, Coolidge 
was a shy and reticent man. While the friends he made were often lifelong ones – his college 
classmate Dwight Morrow, for example – and while Coolidge continued the Harding tradition of 
meeting visitors to the White House at lunch, the president did not let newcomers past his 
psychological defenses easily, and thus often seemed visibly awkward around people he did not 
know. “When I was a little fellow,” he once told another friend, Frank Stearns, “as long ago as I 
can remember, I would go into a panic if I heard strange voices in the house. I felt I just couldn’t 
meet the people and shake hands with them…the hardest thing in the world was to have to go 
through the kitchen door and give them a greeting…I’m all right with old friends, but every time 
I meet a stranger, I’ve got to go through the old kitchen door, back home, and it’s not easy.” 
(Perhaps in part for this reason, Coolidge was also, in the words of Film Classic magazine, “the 
first national executive to depend on motion pictures as his sole recreation.” Sitting in the dark 
and taking in a film was a much more relaxing pastime for someone of Coolidge’s shy 
disposition than the poker games that marked Harding’s tenure.)1576 
 
However shy from the onset, Coolidge was further scarred by the death of his mother 
Victoria (who died when he was 13) and sister Abbie (who perished five years later). As such 
Coolidge possessed many of the earmarks of a man whose adult personality had been formed in 
grief. As Edmund Starling noted, his “outward reticence and aloofness were part of a protective 
shell” to separate himself from the world.  In fact, the president’s taciturn nature concealed a 
sense of humor that was mordant, ironic about the ways that the world can be embittering, and 
often even caustic. “Mr. Coolidge,” wrote Will Rogers, “has a more subtle humor than almost 
any public man I have ever met.” He could also be prone to black moods, short-tempered, and, in 
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his penchant for nicknames and practical jokes, even cruel to his subordinates. (For example, 
Coolidge, who called his butler Thomas Roach “Bug,” would ring the buzzer informing his staff 
he was on his way, then go out for a walk.) The White House Chief Usher, Ike Hoover, argued 
that his staff was often in “fear and trembling, lest they lose their jobs” and “a state of constant 
anxiety” on account of the president’s temper.1577 
 
If anything, two further losses compounded these traits during Coolidge’s time in office. 
In the summer of 1924, the president’s beloved son Calvin Jr., after developing a blister playing 
tennis with his brother, acquired a case of severe blood poisoning. Naturally, he received the best 
medical attention of the time at both the White House and later Walter Reed hospital. To cheer 
Calvin Jr., Coolidge gave him a rabbit he had caught on the grounds and a family heirloom – a 
locket that contained a picture of his own mother Victoria and a lock of her hair. Neither medical 
science nor these totems worked. A fortnight after that casual tennis game, Calvin Coolidge, Jr. 
was dead at the age of sixteen, his fate soon broadcast to the momentarily-quiet Democratic 
conventioneers at Madison Square Garden. “The president was a stricken man,” Edmund 
Starling remembered, “going about as if in a dream.” And so, even as Charles Dawes raced coast 
to coast to vilify La Folletteism and whip up praise for Coolidge, the president was benumbed to 
it all. “I don’t know why such a price was exacted for occupying the White House,” Coolidge 
later wrote of his son’s death. “When he went, the power and the glory of the presidency went 
with him.” By all accounts, the president lapsed in to a deep despair upon Cal Jr.’s passing, and 
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the death of his stern Yankee father John in 1926, at the age of 81, only added further weight to 
the president’s grief.1578 
 
The president’s more outgoing wife, Grace Coolidge, shared these trials, of course. But, 
unlike the Duchess, who had been both privy to and an active counselor in Warren Harding’s 
political decisions, Coolidge, while undeniably enamored of her, tended to keep his spouse at an 
arm’s distance. “Grace, we don’t give that information out promiscuously,” the president told the 
First Lady once, when she asked about his schedule. When Coolidge announced in 1928 that he 
would not run for another term, Grace Coolidge found out about it from the newspapermen 
asking her opinion on the matter. (“What announcement?” was her initial reply.)1579 
 
 
However, quiet by nature, Coolidge was also a canny fellow when it came to politics and 
the arts of political theater, and was an especially pioneering figure in the White House when it 
came to using newsreels, radio, and the photo-op. (“It was a joke among the photographers,” one 
journalist remembered, “that Mr. Coolidge would don any attire or assume any pose that would 
produce an interesting picture. He was never too busy to be photographed.”) And so, working 
with fellow Amherst graduate Bruce Barton, one of the master publicists of his day, as well as, 
less often, with pioneering advertiser Edward Bernays, Coolidge worked to make of his defects 
political virtues and to cultivate the aura of “Silent Cal.” “Less than five percent of the people of 
America today are doing 95 percent of the talking,” Barton wrote in Collier’s while Coolidge 
was still governor of Massachusetts. “[B]ut the great majority of Americans are neither radicals 
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nor reactionaries. They are middle-of-the-road folks who own their own homes and work 
hard…Coolidge belongs with that crowd.”1580 
 
Throughout his presidency, Coolidge and Barton would continue to refine the “Silent 
Cal” mystique, giving the president an alter ego of the archetypal strong, silent man of action that 
the real Coolidge was all too happy to embody. When one society matriarch told the president 
that “I made a bet today that I could get more than two words out of you,” Coolidge replied, 
“You lose.” The president could be “silent in five languages,” as one wag put it. “A crowd of us 
in Cambridge sat around one night after dinner,” Felix Frankfurter remembered late in life, “and 
the game was what single word most comprehensively conveyed the quality of Coolidge. I think 
the prize was awarded to my wife. She said ‘Arid.’” And, when Coolidge himself died in early 
1933 – just before Franklin Roosevelt would begin to overturn his legacy of budgetary 
retrenchment – humorist Dorothy Parker famously quipped, “How could they tell?”1581 
 
In fact, Coolidge – if you knew him or it was his business to know you – wasn’t 
particularly silent at all. Cordell Hull noted he “talked freely and easily…and was as affable as I 
could have wished.” Twice a week, on Tuesdays and Fridays, Coolidge would hold private press 
conferences at which he would prove quite chatty – although he received the questions written in 
advance and often spoke on background in the guise of “White House spokesman” And, as 
Harold Ickes told Hiram Johnson during one of his anti-Coolidge tirades, Sam Blythe of The 
Saturday Evening Post had called Coolidge “one of the most talkative men he had ever met in 
public life.” “The Coolidge tactics are plain enough and they aren’t lacking in cleverness,” Ickes 
told Johnson. “He will sit still and say as little as possible so as not to give the opposition any 
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opening that can be avoided…[H]is taciturnity is either a hesitation to commit himself or stage 
acting or a combination of both.”1582 
 
Ickes was on to something. Coolidge’s silence was not just a selling point for publicity 
purposes – It was often a negotiating strategy as well. “Nine tenths of a president’s callers at the 
White House want something they ought not to have,” Coolidge advised his successor. “If you 
keep still, they will run down in three or four minutes. If you even cough or smile they will start 
up all over again.” To Bernard Baruch, Coolidge said his manner of leadership was to “say only 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to people. Even this is too much. It winds them up for twenty minutes or more.” 
This hands-off approach extended to Coolidge’s work habits as well. While Harding had spent 
long days and nights struggling to keep up with his responsibilities, Coolidge only put in a few 
hours of work each morning before settling in for an afternoon nap. (Anyone who had to work 
into the night to finish a day’s work, Coolidge told his Secret Service man, probably wasn’t 
particularly intelligent.) To the readers of his autobiography, Coolidge advised as the “first rule 
of action” to “never do…anything that someone else can do for you.”1583 
 
Indeed, the president’s penchant for inaction was a legendary in some circles as his 
taciturnity. Coolidge’s restraint in word and deed, wrote Walter Lippmann, were a tonic for a 
nation that “can afford luxury and are buying it furiously, largely on the installment plan…At a 
time when Puritanism as a way of life is at its lowest ebb among the people, the people are 
delight with a Puritan as their national symbol..[Through Coolidge] we have attained a 
Puritanism de luxe in which it is possible to praise the classic virtues while continuing to enjoy 
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all the modern conveniences.” More to the point, Lippmann argued, it is important to recognize 
that “Mr. Coolidge’s genius for inactivity is developed to a very high point,” and was not at all 
just a reflex of habit, but part and parcel of his philosophy of government. “It is far from being 
an indolent activity,” Lippmann argued. “It is a grim, determined, alert inactivity which keeps 
Mr. Coolidge occupied constantly:” 
 
Nobody has ever worked harder at inactivity, with such force of character, with such unremitting 
attention to detail, with such conscientious devotion to the task. Inactivity is a political 
philosophy and a party program with Coolidge, and nobody should mistake his unflinching 
adherence to it for a soft and easy desire to let things slide. Mr. Coolidge’s inactivity is not 
merely the absence of activity. It is on the contrary a steady application to the task of neutralizing 
and thwarting political activity where there are signs of life.1584 
 
 
Just as impressive to Lippmann was Coolidge’s amazing mastery of the “art of deflating 
interest…The naïve statesmen of the pre-Coolidge era imagined that it was desirable to interest 
the people in their government, that indignation at evil was useful. Mr. Coolidge is more 
sophisticated. He has discovered the value of diverting attention from the government, and with 
an exquisite subtlety that amounts to genius, he has used dullness and boredom as political 
devices.” Take, Lippmann noted, the example of Teapot Dome, which theoretically should have 
destroyed Coolidge’s administration from Day 1: 
 
They hit his party an awful blow. They knocked three members out of his Cabinet and covered 
them with disgrace. And what happened? Did Mr. Coolidge defend his Cabinet? He did not. Did 
he prosecute the grafters? Not very fiercely. He managed to get the public so bored that they 
could bear it no longer, and to make the Democrats thoroughly disliked for raising such a dull 





H.L. Mencken also came around to the same line of thinking. After the 1924 election, 
Mencken thought the president, “for all the high encomiums lavished upon him, at bottom 
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simply a cheap and trashy fellow, deficient in sense and almost devoid of any notion of honor – 
in brief, a dreadful little cad.” By late 1927, Mencken argued that Coolidge “will pass from the 
Presidency as he came to it – a dull and docile drudge, loving the more tedious forms of ease, 
without imagination…Human existence, as he sees it, is something to be got through with the 
least possible labor and fretting. His ideal day is one on which nothing whatever happens.” As 
for the major pressing issues of the day, Coolidge’s “characteristic way of dealing with them is 
simply to evade them, as a sensible man evades an insurance solicitor or his wife’s relatives.”1586 
 
But, reflecting on Coolidge once again at his death in 1933, Mencken divined the method 
to his madness. “His record as President, in fact, is almost a blank. No one remembers anything 
that he did or anything that he said,” Mencken claimed. But “Coolidge, whatever his faults 
otherwise, was at all events the complete antithesis of the bombastic pedagogue, Wilson…If the 
day ever comes when Jefferson’s writings are heeded at last, and we reduce government to its 
simplest terms, it may very well happen that Cal’s bones now resting inconspicuously in the 
Vermont granite will come to be revered as those of a man who really did the nation some 
service.”1587 
 
William Allen White also thought Coolidge’s laconic approach to the presidency was the 
whole point of the exercise. “I didn’t expect you to like the Coolidge book,” he wrote to Harold 
Ickes of A Puritan in Babylon, “and yet I do think the old man is a mystic. Old Scrooge was a 
mystic. He had faith in the divine character of wealth as much as Lincoln in the divine character 
of man.” Ebenezer Scrooge and Coolidge, White contended, “both believe that Commerce is a 
sacrosanct matter. They are whirling dervishes of business, just as blind in their faith as 
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Roosevelt and La Follette were blind in their faith in the people and in the nobility of man and 
the righteousness of the judgments of God. The fact that I don’t agree with this thesis doesn’t 
blind me to the fact that he is crazy about it, sincerely, genuinely, terribly crazy.”1588 
 
So it was that “the business of America is business” became the phrase most often 
associated with Calvin Coolidge in the American public mind. (In fact, this is a misquote: “The 
chief business of the American people is business,” Coolidge had told an assembled gathering of 
newspaper editors in January 1925, while going on to argue, in similarly tautological and 
Gamalielese fashion, that “the chief ideal of the American people is idealism.”) Just as the 
Business Organization of the Government was the one aspect of the job that seemed to kindle his 
passions, it was espousing the principles of hard work, thrift, economy, efficiency, and non-
interference in the private sector that seemed to move Coolidge to his loftiest feats of rhetoric. 
“The man who builds a factory builds a temple,” he declared.  “The man who works there 
worships there.” If nothing else, the president – and the two most important of his inherited 
lieutenants, Herbert Hoover and Andy Mellon – would do what they could to knock down the 








When Herbert Hoover took the job of Harding’s Commerce Secretary in March 1921, he 
soon found that the previous occupants of the position – even those who held the job before 
1913, when the Departments of Commerce and Labor had split into two – had often worked 
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Coolidge hours. “Oscar Straus, one of my predecessors [under Teddy Roosevelt],” Hoover 
recalled in his memoirs, “told me that my job would not require more than two hours a day. 
Indeed, that was all the time that the former Secretaries devoted to it. Putting the fish to bed at 
night and turning on the lights around the coast were possibly the major concepts of the 
office.”1590 
 
But Hoover, always the ambitious sort, had a grander vision. Having secured from the 
president the condition that he could range farther afield in the administration than had previous 
Commerce Secretaries, the Great Engineer immediately began to fashion himself an empire. In 
his first week on the job, Hoover – a firm believer in the value of educating public opinion – 
built his own independent publicity department that could get word out about the feats to come. 
(Within six months, according to one of Hoover’s top lieutenants, it had put out “more than 
enough [press releases] to put 18 columns of type up and down the Washington Monument.”) 
After two weeks, he had created an advisory committee of top businessmen and labor officials to 
help set the course for the expanding department, and to help it “more nearly meet the needs of 
the American business public than it does at present.” While the solution to the “great economic 
difficulties that we inherit from the war” must depend “on the initiative of our own people,” 
Hoover declared, “the rate of recovery can be expedited by greater co-operation in the 
community, and with the community by the government.”1591   
 
To further enable this cooperation, Hoover began co-opting unused departments and 
functions from around the administration – for example, the Bureau of Custom Statistics from 
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the Treasury Department, the Weather Bureau from Agriculture, and the Bureau of Mines and 
Patent Office from Interior. This annexing behavior helped to further Hoover’s reputation in 
Washington, in the words of banker and Mellon aide S. Parker Gilbert, as “Secretary of 
Commerce and Under-Secretary of all other Departments.” It also occasionally incurred the 
wrath of his fellow Cabinet members, most notably Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace, 
who conspired with the otherwise obsequious Labor Secretary, John W. Davis, to prevent the 
poaching of the Bureau of Markets and Bureau of Labor Statistics. What Hoover couldn’t have, 
he replicated. Soon Commerce was putting out its own economic data, the Survey of Current 
Business, which was published in 160 newspapers across the country and became a well-used 
staple of the weekly business section. (One businessman at Goodyear deemed the Survey “the 
most important step in our industrial life since the inauguration of the Federal Reserve System.”) 
Similarly, Hoover tried to wrest control of the child welfare issue from Grace Abbott and the 
Children’s Bureau by forming and leading the American Child Health Association throughout 
the decade, which conducted surveys of public health resources in various cities and pushed for 




In the midst of assembling his organization, and while Charles Dawes was penning his 
diary about his year as Budget Director, Hoover published his own manifesto about his vision of 
and designs for American government. Entitled American Individualism, this well-received (and 
in fact rather trite) 1922 book was mostly a paean to the American republican tradition, as 
opposed to the other “great social philosophies …at struggle in the world for ascendancy,” from 
Autocracy to “Communism, Socialism, and Syndicalism.” (“I have taken great pleasure from 
reading it,” a convalescing Franklin Roosevelt noted of Hoover’s book.) From his experience 
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overseas during the war, Hoover claimed to have come in contact with all of these conflicting 
traditions, and from these experiences “emerge[d] an individualist – an unashamed individualist. 
But let me say also that I am an American individualist. For America has been steadily 
developing the ideals that constitute progressive individualism.”1593  
 
Only in America, Hoover contended, was individualism more than just the laissez-faire 
of classical liberalism. In the United States, he argued “while we build our society upon the 
attainment of the individual, we shall safeguard to every individual an equality of opportunity to 
take that position in the community to which his intelligence, character, ability, and ambition 
entitle him.” Here, “we keep the social solution free from frozen strata of classes…we shall 
stimulate effort of each individual to achievement…[and] through an enlarging sense of 
responsibility and understanding we shall assist him to this attainment; while he in turn must 
stand up to the emery wheel of competition.” In short, so long as equality of opportunity and the 
virtues of service and responsibility were upheld, Hoover argued, America’s specific blend of 
merit-based individualism would lead the world forward, even as other forms of radicalism and 
reaction would inevitably falter. “The one source of human progress,” the Great Engineer 
pronounced, was “that each individual shall be given the chance and stimulation for development 
of the best with which he has been endowed in heart and mind.” As he put it in a different forum, 
“I have great respect for human invention and its ability, on one hand, to solve almost anything 
after a little experience with it, and, on the other, to evade most regulation.”1594 
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While the bulk of the text was spent delineating the specific strengths of American 
individualism, Hoover’s hopes for the future were rather more grounded on the idea of 
cooperation, or as it later became known, associationalism. “Today business organization is 
moving strongly toward cooperation,” Hoover argued. “There are in the cooperative great hopes 
that we can even gain in individuality, equality of opportunity, and an enlarged field for 
initiative, and at the same time reduce many of the great wastes of over reckless competition in 
production and distribution.” This was distinct from Socialism, Hoover added, because 
“Cooperation in its current economic sense represents the initiative of self-interest blended with 
a sense of service, for nobody belongs to a cooperative who is not striving to sell his products or 
services for more or striving to buy from others for less or striving to make his income more 
secure.” And while cooperation was flourishing in the private sector, government had not yet 
caught on to its full promise. “We have already granted relief to labor organizations and to 
agriculture from some forms of regulation,” argued Hoover. “There is, however, a large field of 
cooperative possibilities far outside agriculture that are needlessly hampered.” Promoting this 





One of Hoover’s first attempts to test the benefits of cooperation came in August 1921, 
when, in the face of a worsening recession, he asked the President to call together a Conference 
on Unemployment. Harding obliged, and nine days later “three hundred leaders from production, 
distribution, banking, construction, labor, and agriculture,” as Hoover remembered them in his 
memoirs, were invited to come together in Washington in September to grapple with the both the 
immediate unemployment crisis and the long-term issue of reconstructing the post-war economy. 






(These leaders were handpicked by Hoover, although Harding rejected his first list of attendees 
until the Secretary of Commerce included more women.) “The remedies for these matters must, 
in the largest degree, lie outside of legislation,” Hoover told the gathered in his opening remarks. 
“It is not consonant with the spirit of institutions of the American people that a demand should 
be made upon the public treasury for the solution of every difficulty.” Instead, “a large degree of 
solution” to unemployment “could be expected through the mobilization of the fine, cooperative 
action of our manufacturers and employers, of our public bodies and local authorities.” In so 
doing, the congregated leaders would not just help the unemployed. They would have “again 
demonstrated that independence and ability of action amongst our own people that saves 
government from that ultimate paternalism which would undermine our whole political 
system.”1596 
 
In his relief work during the war, Hoover had seen time and again the power of organized 
and concerted voluntary activity to help feed hungry people. This, in effect, was the same 
principle he wanted to bring to bear on American unemployment. But, while Hoover did manage 
to convince some companies to initiate “workshare”-type programs to spread work-hours among 
multiple employees, most of the fruits of the September conference came from the gardens of 
government. Under Hoover’s “personal direction,” a Bureau of Unemployment – a “vigorous 
organization with headquarters in the Department” – was established to help coordinate efforts 
and raise and disperse private funds to help the jobless. And, as Hoover remembered, “[w]e 
developed cooperation between the Federal, state, and municipal governments to increase public 
works,” which is not quite the same thing as bringing the public and private sectors together in 
common solution. When unemployment did recede, it had little to do with any result of Hoover’s 
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Conference, and more to do with the rising tide that accompanied Coolidge prosperity. Writing 
in 1928, Oswald Villard observed that Hoover’s preference for “conferences and cooperation to 
legislative compulsion” worked better on paper than in fact – “in the matter of the 
unemployment problem, for which [Hoover] called a conference in the fall of 1921, there has 
been no following up of the matter, and no results beyond the acquiring of useful data.”1597 
 
Just as in the foreign policy arena, where, as earlier noted, Hoover found it impossible to 
encourage American companies to invest in places where the needs of national, global, or public 
interest outweighed the likelihood of low-risk, secure profits, the Secretary of Commerce often 
found it was harder than it looked to get companies to move in a direction that didn’t necessarily 
reflect their economic self-interest, and that arguments based on such ideals as service and public 
responsibility often fell on deaf ears. When Hoover suggested to a gathering of insurers in 
January 1923 that they potentially consider creating some sort of system of unemployment 
insurance, he found that “the companies did not with even to experiment with it.” When he tried 
to implore railway executives to come to a deal that would end the 1922 railroad strike, he 
received a “freezing reception” from them. When, working hand-in-glove with John L. Lewis, 
Hoover fashioned the three-year “Jacksonville agreement” in 1924 to maintain labor peace in the 
coal industry, he could do nothing when operators in Pennsylvania and elsewhere began blatantly 
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The same dynamic came into play when Harding and Hoover lobbied for the eight-hour-
day in the steel industry in 1922. In May of that year, Hoover addressed a White House dinner of 
forty-one prominent steel manufacturers, telling them that a study of the facts by his department 
had concluded that the twelve-hour day and eighty-four hour week were both “barbaric” and 
“uneconomic,” and that paying the workers the same amount for an eight-hour day would prove 
just as efficient. This address by the Great Engineer received yet another frigid reception. “[A] 
number of the manufacturers, such as Charles M. Schwab and Judge Elbert H. Gary, resented my 
statement,” Hoover recalled, “asserting that it was ‘unsocial and uneconomic.’ We had some 
bitter discussion…The President, to bring the acrid debate to an end, finally persuaded the group 
to set up a committee to ‘investigate,’ under the chairmanship of Judge Gary. I left the dinner 
much disheartened, in less than a good humor.” In fact, Harding had warned him this would 
happen. “I would infinitely prefer to announce a thing accomplished,” the president told Hoover 
before the dinner, “than to make public the intention to seek the accomplishment.”1599 
 
Now in charge of a proposed commission to look into something he had no intention of 
ever doing, Judge Elbert Gary proceeded to slow-walk it into oblivion. In the meantime, Hoover 
worked to keep “the pot boiling in the press” by encouraging the Federated American 
Engineering Societies, of which he was president, to compile a report on the inefficiency of the 
twelve-hour-day. When this report was released in November 1922, Hoover applauded the 
“unanimity of the whole engineering profession in their demonstration that from a technical 
point of view there is no difficulty with what was obviously necessary from a social point of 
view.” He also ghostwrote a foreword to the report, on behalf of President Harding, further 
condemning the twelve-hour day. Hoover and his lieutenants also pushed the eight-hour day in 
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the newspapers, and with key stakeholders like newly-elected Governor of Pennsylvania Gifford 




If the steel operators felt threatened by these public relations gambits, they didn’t show it. 
In May 1923, Gary and Schwab finally brought forth a report from their committee, which 
declared that getting rid of the twelve-hour day was unfeasible, uneconomic, and unpopular with 
steelworkers, who apparently relished working the extra four hours. Moving to the eight-hour-
day, it contended, would mean that steel prices would go up by 15 percent. And, besides, the 
steel industry couldn’t possibly shorten hours on account of the government-created labor 
shortage – only by ending immigration restriction would such a thing even be attainable. “The 
steel industry has no intention of reforming itself,” summed up TNR of this particular report. 
“That’s the way it always is,” added The Nation. “We cannot abandon the twelve-hour day in 
bad times because the industry cannot afford it and we must not in good times because prosperity 
must not be checked.”1601 
 
In response to this industry proclamation, the Secretary of Commerce ghostwrote another 
letter from the president “expressing great disappointment” at the committee’s conclusions, and 
then “gave it to the press.” “The public reaction was so severe against the industry,” Hoover 
proclaimed in his memoirs, “that Judge Gary called another meeting of the committee and 
backed down entirely.” By early July, as Hoover and Harding were aboard the Voyage of 
Understanding on the way to Alaska, Harding announced the capitulation in a speech in Tacoma. 
Washington. By the end of the year, steel had forsaken the twelve-hour day. This, Hoover wrote, 
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was a triumph of the associational idea. It “was accomplished by the influence of public opinion 
and the efforts of the workers in a free democracy, without the aid of a single law.”1602 
Well, not exactly. By any reckoning, the steel industry did not voluntarily give up the 
twelve-hour-day because it was moved by either the spirit of service or by a clear-cut 
demonstration of the facts. It had been pressed into it. In fact, Hoover’s memoirs leave out one 
key part of the story and obfuscate another.  While denouncing the committee’s report, Harding 
and Hoover’s letter also expressed the hope “that these questions of social importance should be 
solved by action inside the industries themselves” – in other words, the president and Secretary 
of Commerce had made a not-very-implicit threat of a government intercession on the issue if 




In addition, the Harding-Hoover letter was released to the public after Judge Gary had 
backed down, not before. In fact, if anything it seemed Judge Gary was trying to bide for time in 
his concession, if not asking for a quid pro quo on immigration restriction. He wrote the 
president that his industry would end the twelve hour day “at the earliest time practicable,” 
which would be “when, as you stated, ‘there is a surplus of labor available.’” But, following the 
advice he had given Hoover before the May 1922 dinner, Harding jammed the steel men up. He 
immediately announced the abolition of the twelve-hour day as if it were a fait accompli, forcing 
steel – particularly after the president had become a martyr – to hold to the promise.1604 
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 While Hoover perhaps overstated the ability to push businessmen to do much of anything 
when it didn’t seem in their economic self-interest, he nonetheless brought the cooperative ideal 
to full flower during his tenure at Commerce. “We are passing from a period of extreme 
individualistic action into a period of associational activities,” he noted in 1924. If these 
associations “cooperate together for voluntary enforcement of high standards, we shall have 
proceeded far along the road of the elimination of government from business.” That same year, 
arguing against cases brought forth by the Justice Department against business associations, 
Hoover encouraged the Supreme Court to open “the door to reasonable cooperation in matters of 
public interest,” which the Court did the following year in two cases involving the maple 
flooring and cement industries. He then encouraged these trade associations to set up voluntary 
“codes of business practice and ethics that would eliminate abuses and make for higher 
standards,” and to begin policing themselves for violation of these codes. In part as a result, the 
number of associations in America nearly tripled over the course of the decade, from around 700 




In his eight years at Commerce, Hoover also held over 1200 conferences urging the 
adoption of industry-wide standards and common practices to eliminate waste and inefficiencies. 
For example, he encouraged automobile manufacturers to agree on a standard bolt, nut, pipe, and 
wheel size, and, at the 1924 National Conference on Highway Safety, to promote safe practices 
and develop common rules of the road – red means stop, green means go – for traffic control. He 
also set up as many as 229 committees during this time – covering, by Hoover’s reckoning, three 
thousand items ranging from building materials and bedsprings to plumbing fixtures and 
electrical sockets – to help industries simplify their standards and specifications. Hoover thought 
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the “man who has a standard automobile, a standard telephone, a standard bathtub, a standard 
electric light, a standard radio, and one and one-half hours less average daily labor is more of a 
man and has a fuller life and more individuality than he has without them.” As part of this work, 
the Bureau of Standards under Hoover became, in his words, “one of the largest physics 
laboratories in the world.”1606 
 
Concerned that lack of “adequate housing for people of lesser incomes” was “thriving 
food for bolshevism,” and that the American ideal of home ownership was falling by the 
wayside, Hoover also initiated a Building and Housing Division in his department to publicize, 
standardize and simplify best practices in the housing industry. After calling “a national 
conference of public officials and technical experts” and appointing a “committee to formulate a 
standard building code,” the Commerce Department urged the implementation of this standard 
code, as well as zoning laws to keep industrial, commercial, and residential areas separate, in 
towns and cities all across America. Hoover also set up an American Construction Council, led 
by Franklin Roosevelt, to further encourage the promulgation of industry standards, although the 
two men soon differed over tactics: Roosevelt wanted Hoover to use his power to force 
recalcitrant companies to toe the line, while Hoover desired to keep everything voluntary and 
cooperative – and thus not particularly productive.1607 
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Cars were not the only mode of transport to receive the Hoover treatment. Beginning in 
1922 – with, naturally, a conference of all the affected parties – the Great Engineer began to 
advocate for the promotion of commercial aviation in America – mainly through subcontracting 
mail delivery to private firms and encouraging the construction of airports around the country. 
(In these efforts, he was aided by General William “Billy” Mitchell, who, in the years after being 
disallowed from dropping mustard gas on West Virginia miners, continued to proselytize for 
expanded air power.) After a committee headed by Dwight Morrow promoted Hoover’s 
conclusions, and Congress passed a civil aviation law in 1926, Hoover formed an Aviation 
Bureau and mandated lights, radio, and weather services at all newly constructing landing pads. 
“Within a year after the establishment of the Aviation Division,” Hoover later boasted, “we had 
4,000 miles of fully equipped airways; 10,000 miles more in preparatory stages; 864 airports in 
operation, and 144 more cities stirred up to the point of letting contracts for such facilities.”1608 
 
As in aviation, so too in radio. When Hoover took office, only KDKA in Pittsburgh and 
WGY in Schenectady were broadcasting. Six months later, 318 more stations had sprung up 
alongside them. By 1926, the airwaves were divided amongst 536 broadcasting stations, 553 land 
stations and 1902 ship stations for naval purposes, and over 15,000 amateur broadcasters. Here 
again, Hoover’s original voluntarist efforts to divide bandwidth sanely and equitably broke 
down, turning the radio into a “Tower of Babel.” When Aimee Semple McPherson, the popular 
Los Angeles-based radio evangelist, refused to stay on one wavelength, Hoover invoked federal 
authority and shut her down. (“Please order your minions of Satan to leave my station alone,” 
McPherson telegrammed Hoover. “You cannot expect the Almighty to abide by your wavelength 
nonsense. When I offer my prayers to Him I must fit into His wave reception.”) Even Coolidge, 
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no friend of federal interference, conceded that “[t]his important public function has drifted into 
such chaos, as seems likely, if not remedied to destroy its great value.”1609  
Meanwhile, Members of Congress approached the burgeoning technology of radio with 
the same trepidation that would mark a later generation of politicians’ attempts to make sense of 
the Internet. “I do not think, sir,” complained Key Pittman of Nevada, “that in the fourteen years 
I have been here there has ever been a question before the Senate that in the very nature of the 
thing Senators can know so little about as this subject.” (The Supreme Court was scarcely less 
dumbfounded. “Interpreting the law on this subject is something like trying to interpret the law 
of the occult,” complained Chief Justice William Howard Taft. “It seems like dealing with 
something supernatural. I want to put it off as long as possible.”)1610  
 
That being said, in 1927, Congress passed a Radio Act penned by progressive Senator 
C.C. Dill of Washington and, on the House side, Rep. William White of Maine. On the urging of 
William Borah, who worried about the ramifications of executive branch oversight over the 
airwaves, this Act transferred the power of licensing radio stations out of Commerce and into a 
newly created Federal Radio Commission (later the Federal Communications Commission.) 
While George Norris had fought and lost to see full public ownership of the airwaves, the Act 
did demand that the FRC ensure that licenses were doled out with the virtues of “public interest, 
convenience, and necessity” in mind. In theory, this was to ensure that corporations could not 
obtain a stranglehold over the airwaves. In practice, it was usually invoked to keep Socialists, 
Communists, and other potential ne’er-do-wells from receiving licenses. “To the man in the 
street,” said the Washington Post, this was “the most important legislation of the session.” “With 
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all its faults,” Hoover concluded of the system he had pushed for and successfully acquired by 
1927, “the private ownership [of radio] has proved far superior in its enterprise, its 
entertainment, and its use in public debate and in public service to the government-owned 
systems of Europe.”1611 
 
Surveying Hoover’s domain in September, 1925, The New Republic’s TRB noted with 
admiration “how extraordinarily extensive is [Hoover’s] impress upon the government outside of 
his own Department”: 
 
There is reason to doubt whether in the whole history of the American government a Cabinet 
officer has engaged in such wide diversity of activities or covered quite so much ground. The 
plain fact is that no vital problem, whether in the foreign or the domestic field, arises in this 
administration in the handling of which Mr. Hoover does not have a real – and very often a 
leading – part. There is more Hoover in the administration than anyone else…[T]here is more 





William Hard was another progressive who was impressed by the Secretary’s 
performance. “Mr. Hoover has evolved the public-private department,” he wrote in 1928. “He 
has evoked the public-private citizen.” In fact, it’s an open question at which point Hoover’s 
power in the administration reached its zenith. On one hand, the Coolidge years saw Hoover’s 
most potent nemesis in the Cabinet, Henry C. Wallace, replaced with the more pliable William 
Jardine. (Wallace died in office in October 1924, ten days before the election.) On the other, 
Coolidge’s ascent meant Hoover generally lost the sympathetic ear of the president. While 
Warren Harding had been awed and even cowed by his Commerce Secretary’s intellect, 
Coolidge instead thought of Hoover derisively as “Wonder Boy,” and was much more inclined to 
turn to another pro-business voice in his administration instead – That would be the “greatest 
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As one of the world’s richest men, “in every instinct a country banker” in Hoover’s 
words, and someone who came into public life after a long and successful career as a banker and 
investor, the austere, forbidding Andrew Mellon was removed from the rest of the Harding and 
Coolidge administrations by age, income, and general disposition. Mellon thought Harding, as a 
former small-town newspaper editor, was a small man beneath the stature of his position. He felt 
Attorney General Daugherty was a political hack who kept trying to staff up the Treasury 
Department with crooked appointees. (As a Pennsylvanian in the Knox and Penrose era, 
however, Mellon himself was no stranger to the arts of patronage.) And he liked least the 
grasping Hoover, with his annexing raids and publicity bureau, whom he thought “too much of 
an engineer.” (Mellon got on better with General Dawes during his year as Budget Director, as 




Nonetheless, Mellon agreed with the general thrust of both the Harding and Coolidge 
administrations. “The government is just a business,” Mellon wrote in 1924, “and can and should 
be run on business principles.” One of Mellon’s first acts in 1921 was to encourage the Federal 
Reserve to lower interest rates, raised after the war, from 7% to 5%. This would encourage 
investment and consumption – not to mention speculation in the stock market – over savings, 
thereby working to get capital flowing in the economy. It also allowed Secretary Mellon to 
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renegotiate the federal government’s outstanding loans with lower rates and longer repayment 




These savings aside, Treasury’s main part to play in establishing business principles, 
Mellon thought, was to secure lower taxes on incomes. “There is no reason,” the Secretary 
declared in his own quickie administration book, 1924’s Taxation: The People’s Business, “why 
the question of taxes should not be approached from a non-partisan and business viewpoint.” To 
Mellon, that means organizing the tax rates more efficiently than they had been in the past. “It 
seems difficult for some to understand that high rates of taxation do not necessarily mean large 
revenue to the Government, and that more revenue may often be obtained by lower 
rates…Experience has shown that the present high rates of surtax are bringing in each year 
progressively less revenue of government.” While the most efficient rate was still unknown, 
Mellon contended that “by cutting the surtaxes in half, the Government, when the full effect of 
the reduction is felt, will receive more revenue from the owners of large incomes at the lower 
rates of tax than it would have been received at the higher rates.” This, he argued, was the “same 
business principle” that allowed Henry Ford to make “more money out of pricing his cars at 
$380 than at $3000.”1616 
 
Along with it being good for government revenues, Mellon also thought high tax rates 
sapped the virtues that kept the economy and the nation moving forward. “Any man of energy 
and initiative in this country can get what he wants out of life,” Mellon argued. “But when that 
initiative is crippled by legislation or by a tax system which denies him the right to receive a 
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reasonable share of his earnings, then he will no longer exert himself, and the country will be 
deprived of the energy on which its continued greatness depends.” Among progressives, this line 
of thinking was shared in the Senate by William Borah, who despised taxes with a Jeffersonian 
vituperation. “So long as the government grabs all the surplus that a man makes,” the Idaho 
Senator wrote one constituent, “there is not very much incentive to make.”1617 
 
And so, beginning in 1921, Mellon began working to scale back the tax rates left over 
from the Wilson years. The original plan the Secretary put forward lowered the surtax rate on 
America’s highest incomes from 65% to 25%, after a one-year holdover at 32%. Mellon’s 1921 
plan also ended the excess profits tax on corporations, which had been passed as a war measure 
and was hugely unpopular with business groups, and suggesting replacing it with a slightly 




“The design,” as Hiram Johnson explained Mellon’s plan to Harold Ickes in August 
1921, “is to relieve the big fellows of the taxes they have had to pay, and it is done upon the 
theory that it is only in this fashion money will be invested in business.” And although it took 
several bites at the apple over the course of the decade, with tax revisions passing in 1921, 1924, 
and 1926, Mellon eventually got very close to what he asked for. Opposition from the Farm Bloc 
tempered the original Revenue Act of 1921 to include higher exemptions for lower incomes – 
from $1000 to $1500 for a single person and $2000 to $2500 for a couple – and a smaller 
decrease to the highest surtax, from 65% to 50%. In 1924, the highest surtax rate came down to 
40%, but House progressives, working with Democrats led by John Nance Garner of Texas, were 
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able to use rules changes to add a higher estate tax (from 25% to 40%) on estates over $10 
million and a gift tax (to keep the estate provisions enforceable.) The third time proved the 
charm for Mellon, for in 1926, the demoralized progressives and Democrats finally capitulated in 
full. The Revenue Act of that year brought the highest surtax and the estate tax down to 20% 
(meaning a tax rate of 25% on the highest earners), and ended the gift tax that had gone in effect 
in 1924. “I have never seen from a political standpoint,” vented Harold Ickes to a friend after the 
dust had settled, “any more absurd exhibition than the eagerness of the Democrats in Congress, 
supposed to contain the leadership and brains of the party, trying to out-mellon Mellon in 
reducing the tax rate on the very large incomes. After such an exhibition I really don’t see how 
the Democrats can consider it worthwhile to pretend that they are a separate party.”1619 
 
From the start, Ickes had thought the “Mellonaire” plan was designed to help the rich at 
the expense of everyone else. “[T]hose who enjoy incomes of less than $66,000 might also like 
an opportunity to make investments which they cannot make in view of the income taxes they 
are called upon to pay,” Ickes replied to his friend. Writing in 1921, Ickes also thought the 
Mellon tax plan was political suicide. “It will make a fine campaign argument for the Democrats 
to point to the fact that the Republican Congress was so careful to reduce the taxes of the 
Rockefellers and the Morgans. I take it that Mr. Mellon and other members of the President’s 
cabinet will be greatly benefited by the proposed radical reductions…and I don’t suppose the 
Democrats will fail to emphasize the fact.” 1620 
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Especially given that Andrew Mellon was the third highest taxpayer in the country (after 
John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford), Ickes was not the only one to intimate that the Treasury 
Secretary was operating on behalf of his class rather than his country. “I am not going to have 
my people who work in the shoe factories of Lynn and in the mills of Lawrence and the leather 
industry of Peabody,” railed Congressman William Connery of Massachusetts in 1923, “in these 
days of so-called Republican prosperity when they are working but three days in the week think 
that I am in accord with the provisions of this bill…When I see a provision in this Mellon tax bill 
which is going to save Mr. Mellon himself $800,000 on his income tax and his brother $600,000 
on his, I cannot give it my support.” “Mr. Mellon himself,” George Norris argued of the 1925 
iteration of the plan, “gets a larger personal reduction than the aggregate of practically all the 
taxpayers in the state of Nebraska.” That same year, Fiorello La Guardia suggested that Mellon 
was trying to follow the biblical injunction of Mark 4:25: “For he that hath, to him shall be 
given; and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath.” Higher taxes on 
the highest incomes, La Guardia argued, citing Teapot Dome, are “consistent with the progress 
of the Republic. Let us be frank about this…The danger of the concentration of enormous 
fortunes in a few hands is quite obvious – We are now witnesses to a national scandal, the result 
of enormous fortunes.”1621 
 
These sorts of arguments, Secretary Mellon argued in response, were tantamount to class 
war. “I have never viewed taxation as a means of rewarding one class of taxpayers or punishing 
another,” he wrote in Taxation: The People’s Business. “If such a point of view ever controls our 
public policy, the traditions of freedom, justice, and equality of opportunity, which are the 
distinguishing characteristics of our American civilization, will have disappeared and in their 
                                                          
1621





place we shall have class legislation with all its attendant evils.” Nonetheless, Mellon did agree 
that “[t]he fairness of taxing more lightly income from wages [and] salaries or from investments 
is beyond question”: 
In the first case, the income is uncertain and limited in duration; sickness or death destroys it and 
old age diminishes it; in the other, the source of income continues; the income may be disposed of 
during a man’s life and it descends to his heirs. Surely we can afford to make a distinction 
between the people whose only capital is their mental and physical energy and the people whose 
income is derived from investments. Such a distinction would mean much to millions of 
American workers and would be an added inspiration to the man who must provide a competence 





In the meantime, the Treasury Secretary worked to lower his own investment-laden tax 
bill as much as possible, receiving a ten-point memo from the IRS Commissioner – “[p]ursuant 
to your request” – “setting forth the various ways by which an individual may legally avoid tax.” 
Mellon himself partook of five of the commissioner’s suggestions, and then hired the tax expert 




This was hardly the only seeming conflict of interest Mellon was involved in. The 
Secretary later claimed that, when he joined the administration, he separated himself completely 
from his business investments. “I have not concerned myself with their affairs,” he intoned, “and 
I have not endeavored to control or dictate their operations in any way.” In fact, Mellon often 
pitched the companies he was investing in for federal contracts – He specifically asked Secretary 
of State Hughes to choose a Mellon-affiliated construction company to build a bridge in China, 
and encouraged House committee members to maintain appropriations for projects involving the 
Mellon-affiliated Gulf Oil. When everyone in Washington was haggling and bartering for 
favorable rates in the Fordney-McCumber tariff deliberations, the Secretary did not stay aloof 
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from the process – He worked to throw up protectionist walls buttressing his aluminum 
company, Alcoa, while keeping raw materials from Canada needed for another industrial 
abrasives company, Carborundum, on the free list. In short, “More Business in Government” was 




In any case, the lower Mellon tax cuts did not really result in additional tax revenues 
coming in until 1928. That year, coinciding with the unprecedented wave of prosperity that saw 
GNP increase by an average of 4.7% a year between 1922 and 1929, tax receipts brought in 1.16 
billion into the federal coffers, as compared to 1.08 billion in 1920. During the decade, the 
portion of income taxes paid by the poorest Americans – those making less than $5000 a year – 
decreased from 15.4% of the total tax burden in 1920 to 1.4% in 1928. Over the same period, the 
share of the burden paid by the wealthiest Americans – those making over $100,000 a year – rose 
from 29.9% to 61.1%. (It helped that there were four times as many Americans in this bracket by 
the end of the 1920’s.)1625 
 
“While the poor did not grow poorer” over this period, in the words of economist and 
historian George Soule, surveying the effect of the Mellon tax rates, “the rich grew richer more 
rapidly than the poor did,” exacerbating income equality throughout the land. The top 1% of 
earners owned close to 15% of the nation’s total income by 1929, and the top 5% of Americans 
owned over 26% -- increases of 19% and 14% respectively over their share in 1923. And while 
the poorest Americans only saw a one percent gain in their income after taxes as a result of the 
Mellon cuts, the nation’s millionaires received 31% more thanks to the Mellon plan. Over the 
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same time period, manufacturers only saw a 1.4% increase in real wages per year, while 
stockholders, until the bottom fell out in 1929, saw a 16.4% gain per year. By the end of the 
boom, the top one-tenth of one percent held the same amount of income as the 42 percent at the 




Just as the effects of the Coolidge prosperity were more pronounced at the top of the 
economy, the boom times did not reach every American at the bottom. Farmers in particular had 
a rough go during the decade, seeing their share of the national income drop from 16% to 9% 
and crop acreage shrink for the first time in American history. (“Farmers have never made 
money,” shrugged President Coolidge. “I don’t believe we can do much about it.”) With the 
labor movement at best stagnating and often losing by attrition, the average worker’s salary 
remained under $1500 a year throughout the decade, and the average work week remained over 
fifty hours a week – with many businesses aiming to keep it that way. (“Nothing breeds 
radicalism more quickly than unhappiness unless it is leisure,” averred the National Association 
of Manufacturers in 1929.)  Thanks in part to new technologies, standardization, and “scientific 
management” practices in the workplace, manufacturing output per man-hour increased by 32% 
over the Coolidge years – but hourly wages only increased by eight percent. Instead, most of the 
money flowed into corporate profits, which rose 80% over the Coolidge boom – over twice as 
fast as productivity. On Wall Street, where sales on the New York Stock Exchange nearly 
quintupled between 1923 to 1928 (from 236 million shares to 1125 million shares) and more 
than doubled in market value (from $27 billion in 1925 to $67 billion in 1929), profits of 
financial institutions rose by 150%. While great for those at the top, the fact that these profits did 
not translate into manifestly higher wages for ordinary citizens helped to augment the lack of 
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purchasing power, and thus the imbalance between production and consumer demand, that would 




Nonetheless, once the Coolidge prosperity took hold, it seemed for many, even on the 
lowest rungs of economic life, that – with Hoover fostering public-private partnerships, Mellon 
lowering tax rates, and Coolidge encouraging continued parsimony in government – the world 
was moving in the right direction. Notwithstanding those left out of the boom, GNP increased by 
40% between 1922 and 1928, per capita income by nearly 30%, and industrial production by 
70%. “Never before, here or anywhere else,” proclaimed the Wall Street Journal near the end of 
the boom, “has a government been so completely fused with business.’” Perhaps, even some 






“Among the nations of the earth today America stands for one idea: Business,” declared 
Edward Earle Purinton in The Independent in 1921. “[I]n this fact lies, potentially, the salvation 
of the world. Through business properly conceived, managed, and conducted, the human race is 
finally to be redeemed.” The spiritual language in this quote was not unique. As prosperity took 
hold in the New Era and the values of sound business and commerce were increasingly 
enthroned at the center of American life, they began to seep into all other aspects of the culture 
as well. “The successful businessman,” spat H.L. Mencken, “enjoys the public respect and 
adulation that elsewhere bathe only bishops and generals.”1629 
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“America has become almost hopelessly enamored of a religion that is little more than a 
sanctified commercialism,” complained New York bishop Charles Fiske in 1927. “It is hard in 
this day to differentiate between religious aspiration and business prosperity. Our conception of 
God is that he is a sort of Magnified Rotarian [and] Efficiency has become the greatest of 
Christian Virtues…Protestantism in America seems to be degenerating into a sort of Babsonian 
cult, which cannot distinguish between what is offered to God and what is accomplished for the 
glory of America and the furtherance of business enterprise.” The reference to “Babsonian” 
refers to Roger Babson, a prominent promulgator of investment advice in the 1920’s and later 
founder of Babson College. In his 1920 book, Religion and Business, Babson had declared that 
“the best religion is that which makes its people most efficient, most productive, most useful, and 
most worthwhile. This is the test which men demand in business and our religion must pass the 
same test.” Similarly, Babson argued, sidestepping any biblical argument about rich men, 
camels, and needles, “[t]he thing which bothered Jesus in connection with material possession 
was those who came to Him were not interested in producing more but rather in a redistribution 
of what was already produced.”1630 
 
This Babsonian creed of Jesus Christ as the consummate businessman reached its 
fulfillment in The Man Nobody Knows, a 1925 book by ad man, Congregational minister’s son, 
and Coolidge confidant Bruce Barton. The Son of God was the “founder of modern business,” 
Barton argued. He had “picked up twelve men from the bottom ranks of business and forged 
them into an organization that conquered the world.” And so it befell ambitious executives of the 
New Era to aspire to His example, since “every one of the ‘principles of modern salesmanship’ 
on which business men so much pride themselves are brilliantly exemplified in Jesus’ talk and 
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work.” While delineating Christ’s leadership virtues, Barton, ever the incisive ad man, also 
played to the biases of much of his audience while retelling the Gospels. “In the fashionable 
circles of Jerusalem it was quite the thing to make fun of Nazareth – its crudities of custom and 
speech, its simplicity of manner,” Barton wrote, in a passage sure to resonate with the 
McAdooites of the land. “‘Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?’ they asked derisively 
when the report spread that a new prophet had arisen in that country town.”1631 
 
One city dweller not impressed with Barton’s tome was Gilbert Seldes, who reviewed the 
book for The New Republic. “The first judgment of this book,” wrote Seldes, “is that the author 
is a man so fanatic about American business that he must reduce his Savior to the terms of the 
executive and organizer and go-getter. He is presented, in effect, a Rotarian Jesus for, the 
edification of Rotarians.” “Although he labors it manfully,” Seldes argued, Barton “somehow 
fails to persuade you that a Buick Service Station is a temple of the Lord…[and] to suggest 
that…hotels are based on a sheer love of humanity is ridiculous, and a little insulting.” It seems 
most of the nation disagreed. The Man Nobody Knows was the best-selling book in America for 
two years straight, prompting Barton to pen a sequel, The Book Nobody Knows, which brought a 
similar businessman’s eye to the Bible. “The fruit was good to eat,” Barton has Eve, the First 
Consumer, saying of the fated apple, “she had an eye to food values.”1632 
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Barton’s attempt to infuse American spirituality with the business ethic was not confined 
to his famous books. As a partner at the advertising firm of Barton, Durstine, and Osborn (BDO) 
– better known, after the 1928 merger with the George Batten Company, as BBDO – Barton 
spearheaded transformative publicity campaigns for some of the largest corporations in America, 




On behalf of General Motors, Barton turned to another father figure, General 
Washington.  According to the Barton-penned ads, the father of our country “knew that Distance 
was the enemy which menaced the new republic most…Only transportation could make a United 
States.” Barton also encouraged General Motors to drop the word “Corporation” from its ads and 
instead become “a Famous Family,” who helped in “making the nation a neighborhood.” BDO 
ads emphasized that “more than 68,000 investors own General Motors…[and] more than 18,000 
stockholders are women – mothers, sisters, wives.” They depicted families enjoying picnics, or 
ministers and doctors making their rounds in General Motors automobiles, the latter only getting 




For General Electric, Barton’s firm emphasized the liberation from toil and drudgery the 
electric power and light availed. “Women suffrage made the American woman the political equal 
of her man,” one such ad declared. “The little switch which commands the great servant 
Electricity is making her workshop the equal of her man’s.” Other advertisements noted how “a 
friendly lamp invites confidences,” illuminating those moments in the late evening “when the 
hearts of mothers and daughters draw close, and sons discover that father are pals,” or when a 
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young child is scared of the dark. “The letters G-E,” another ad proclaimed, showing the famous 
General Electric symbol, “are more than a trademark. They are an emblem of service – the 
initials of a friend.” In both campaigns, the implications were clear – Big Business was not some 





In many ways, this was not just advertising talk, but a groping towards a new 
understanding of society. Now that business was in the driver’s seat, business leaders, some 
began to argue, had certain responsibilities borne out of noblesse oblige. “The basic remedy for 
the evils of industrialism and hence for strikes,” department store magnate Edward Filene 
suggested in 1922, “lies in making business a profession – that is, in realizing, in act as well in 
thought, that a business has no right to make a profit except as it serves the community.” Once 
constructed in such a way, Filene announced, “the modern business system, despised and derided 
by innumerable reformers, will be both the inspiration and the instrument of the social progress 
of the future.” In short, as Filene put it in 1924, “business in order to be good business must itself 
be conducted as a public service…Good social policies are the surest recipe for big and 
continuous profits.” “We know that real success in business is not attained by the expense of 
others,” asserted the vice-president of New York’s Chemical National Bank. “Business can 
succeed only in the long run by acquiring and holding the goodwill of people.” GE head Owen 
Young argued that his class of executives “no longer feels the obligation to take from labor for 
the benefit of capital, nor to take from the public the benefit of both, but rather to administer 
wisely and fairly in the interest of all.”1636 
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Thus the 1920’s were the heyday of what became known as “welfare capitalism,” a 
system, in the words of historian Lizabeth Cohen, where “the enlightened corporation, not the 
labor union or the state, would spearhead the creation of a more benign industrial society.” 
Throughout the decade, corporations worked to stave off both labor unionism and governmental 
interference by offering better working conditions and benefits like pensions, group insurance 
plans, and stock in the company. Businesses created wage incentive systems to encourage 
individual workers to be more productive, founded company unions to keep out more traditional 
forms of worker organization, and worked to engage the community and foster employee loyalty 
through sports teams and other extracurricular activities. The welfare capitalist vision, while 
never fully attained, was articulated by a labor economist of the period as follows: 
 
If the worker has a toothache, the company dentist will cure it; if he has a headache…he can get 
treatment from the company doctor; if he…needs an operation, the company doctor will help him 
find a more competent surgeon; in some cases, the company optometrist will measure him for 
glasses, and the company chiropodist will treat his corns. If he has legal difficulties, he can obtain 
free advice from the company’s lawyer;…if he wishes to save money, the company will act as an 
agent for a bank, deduct the money from his pay check, deposit it in the bank, and do the book-
keeping for him; if he needs to borrow money, the company will lend it to him at a low rate of 
interest; if he wishes to own a house, the company will build one for him and sell it to him on 




Perhaps the most notable welfare capitalist of the era was America’s most popular 
businessman – and, indeed, one of the most popular Americans of the time, period – Henry Ford. 
In 1914, Ford had moved his workforce to the eight-hour-day – thus helping to alleviate at least 
some of the tedium of working an assembly line job – raised wages to the unheard-of $5 an hour 
(from $2.34, provided workers consented to some intrusive inquiries about their home life), and 
instituted a profit-sharing system, thereby helping Ford workers to be able to afford Ford cars on 
the installment plan. Ford also opened an Americanization school for immigrants in his Detroit 
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factory that graduated 16,000 Ford employees in its first five years. (Since Ford, following the 
suggestion of scientific management theorist Frederick Winslow Taylor, had pioneered the use 





“I do not consider the machines which bear my name simply as machines,” Ford argued 
in his 1922 autobiography My Life and Work, published the same year he decided to cut his 
employees’ work week down from six days to five. “I take them as concrete evidence of the 
working out of a theory of business, which I hope is something more than a theory of business--a 
theory that looks toward making this world a better place in which to live.” For too long, Ford 
thought, business had been mischaracterized. “It has been thought that business existed for 
profit,” he wrote. “That is wrong. Business exists for service.” As such, “[a]ll that the Ford 
industries have done – all that I have done – is to endeavour to evidence by works that service comes 





It was this sort of talk that prompted Lincoln Steffens to say in 1924 that Ford was a 
“reformer without politics,” even a “radical.” The man himself thought he was by no means a 
reformer – “there is entirely too much attempt at reforming in the world.” Nonetheless, Ford 
argued that this project was his real Life and Work.  “The money that I make is inconsequent,” 
he wrote: 
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Money is useful only as it serves to forward by practical example the principle that business is 
justified only as it serves, that it must always give more to the community than it takes away, and 
that unless everybody benefits by the existence of a business then that business should not 
exist…I want to prove it so that all of us may have more, and that all of us may live better by 
increasing the service rendered by all businesses. Poverty cannot be abolished by formula; it can 





“We are, in effect, an experimental station to prove a principle,” Ford argued. “That we 
do make money is only further proof that we are right.” This experiment was important, Ford 
contended, in part because there was a great danger in “a whole country…thinking that 
Washington is a sort of heaven and behind its clouds dwell omniscience and omnipotence[. It 
means] you are educating that country into a dependent state of mind which augurs ill for the 
future. Our help does not come from Washington, but from ourselves.” As such, Ford argued, the 
“slogan of ‘less government in business and more business in government is a very good one” – 
provided business lived up to its responsibilities of service.
1641
   
 
Reviewing My Life and Work for The Nation, Edward Filene deemed it “one of the most 
significant books of this generation...I conceive it to be my public duty to do everything in my 
power to bring it to the attention of the widest possible public.” While disagreeing with Ford on 
most public issues – “I think he has been misled and hoodwinked in his warfare against the Jew. 
I cannot follow him in his adventures in currency reform. I am not sure that his autocratic control 
of his employees is a sound basis for an industry that is to endure.” – Filene thought it 
spectacularly important that Ford had illustrated that “a business man may render his greatest 
public service in and through his private business. We business men are too prone to regard our 
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businesses as private ventures out of which we can make money…We are likely to forget…that 
statesmanship in business is more important than philanthropy outside business.”1642 
 
What is more, Filene argued, Ford’s philosophy illustrated the path of progress that 
America must follow. A “Fordized America,” he wrote, would “ultimately make possible a much 
shorter workingday. It would make possible higher real wages. It would give mankind a margin 
of leisure now unknown. Men would be able to spend, say, five hours a day in providing food, 
clothing, shelter, and insurance against the future, and still have five hours left to devote to an 
avocation that would broaden the mind and give every man’s latent creative abilities a congenial 
outlet.” In short, Filene declared, “[t]he higher real wages and the shorter hours which the Ford 
philosophy makes possible would give men that economic freedom which is the starting point of 
all other kinds of freedom.”1643 
 
Of course, some of the men working under Henry Ford found less freedom in the system 
than Filene intimated. “Ye get the wages, but ye sell your soul at Ford’s,” an English immigrant 
told Edmund Wilson of his experience. “Ye’re worked like a slave all day, and when ye get out 
ye’re too tired to do anything – ye go to sleep on the car comin’ home…It’s worse than the army, 
I tell ye – ye’re badgered and victimized all the time. You get wise to the army after a while, but 
at Ford’s ye never know where ye’re at. One day ye can go down the aisle and the next day 
they’ll tell ye to get the hell out of it. In one department, they’ll ashk ye why the hell ye haven’t 
got gloves on and in another why the hell ye’re wearing them…A man checks ‘is brains and ‘is 
freedom at the door when he goes to work at Ford’s…I’m tryin’ to forget about it.”1644 
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In any case, Henry Ford further expounded on his vision in 1926, with a follow-up book 
entitled Today and Tomorrow. Again, the automaker emphasized that business was intended to 
serve, not profit.  “One cannot hope to live on a community, but in a community,” he wrote, 
noting that his company had “never put in a plant without raising purchasing power and 
standards of living.” In fact, Ford had thought the majority of his fellow executives were 
beginning to take a wrong turn. In the Coolidge era, he declared, “[t]he face of business is bowed 
toward the stockholder and not toward the consumer, and this means the denial of the primary 
purpose of industry.” Running a business to maximize profits, Ford suggested, was heading for 
trouble. “The profit motive, although it is supposed to be hard-headed and practical, is really not 
practical at all, because it has as its objectives the increasing of prices to the consumer and the 
decreasing of wages, and therefore it constantly narrows its markets and eventually strangles 
itself,” leading to depression. Rather than being inordinately focused on profits, Ford insisted, 




“And there we are,” noted Stuart Chase, summing up Ford’s vision in his review of 
Today and Tomorrow for The Nation. “The machine brought to heel at last, but run by engineers 
subject only to referendum of the public as reflected in its buying power. The government is 
invited to keep out and stay out, along with bankers, trade unions, reformers, charitable 
undertakings of all kinds” – This, Chase argued, was the “industrial Utopia of the modern 
Croesus.” But “can we resign ourselves without further scrutiny to the stewardship of the 
engineer-business man?” Chase asked. “What earnest have we that the Ford tradition will 
animate all our engineer-overlords after we have meekly handed over the earth to them?” It is a 
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system that might work well in boom times, Chase thought, but only in those times – “Which is 
not saying that my children will not live under it.”1646  
 
 In fact, even during the Coolidge prosperity, the call to service never escaped very far 
from the profit motive. In Religion and Business, Roger Babson implored business executives 
“to develop efficiency, accumulate capital, and work toward other capitalistic ends; but by using 
some force other than the incentive of profit.” But he also conceded that  “[m]anufacturers and 
merchants are learning that to succeed permanently they must talk service, whatever may be their 
religious opinions.” And just as Hoover had trouble getting businesses to do things voluntarily 
that were not in their immediate self interest, few companies had either the resources or the 
desire to work to achieve Ford’s vision of a state benevolently administered by business-minded 
technocrats. “You know employers do a great many things for their employees, just because they 
want to be men, and they want to have sympathy with them,” Chicago printer Thomas Donnelly 
told a Senate committee. When pressed on this point during testimony, Donnelly exclaimed “If I 
gave my altruistic spirit full rein I would be broke in a month!”1647 
 
“The average American business man,” Bishop Fiske argued in his “Puzzled Parson” 
piece of 1927, “has been encouraged to believe himself religious if he sings long and loud the 
duty of service, and insists that, unlike virtue which is its own reward, service (with a large S) 
brings monetary returns of a real material worth.” And yet, just as businessmen – at least 
rhetorically – aspired to the value of service, so too did many who had followed service as a 
calling now aspire to the values of business. “[W]elfare work,” Bishop Fiske declared, “has been 









commercialized and professionalized to such an extent that a special kind of appeal is now made 
for its support – an appeal to pride of patronage from wealth, and often to fears of radicalism as 
well…The proportion of publicity to actual accomplishment is appalling in volume. We have 
caught the spirit of the trade associations.”1648 
 
Something similar was happening in the field of social work as well. In the January 1921 
Survey symposium on “What Must Be Done to Make This a More Livable World?” several 
correspondents argued for a more scientific and business-like approach to the profession. “Why 
not a long step ahead toward a more united and intelligent profession of social workers?” queried 
David Holbrook of the American Association for Organizing Family Social Work. “Social 
Service,” a University of Toronto Social Science professor argued, “has been built on the abiding 




Some of the old-timers begged to differ. “As settlements like the rest of social effort 
became professionalized,” Wellesley college professor and reformer Vita Scudder wrote of the 
1920’s, “my interest, though not my loyalty, waned a little.” She compared the difference 
between the rising generation of business-minded “social workers” and the social reformers of 
her day as being akin to that “between a salaried clergy and the mendicant orders who had 
become fools for Christ.” Similarly, in explaining why younger settlement house workers no 
longer wanted to live within the communities they serviced, social reformer Albert Kennedy 
noted in 1933 that the new generation think “of themselves as professional men and women, 
rendering a specific service desired by the neighborhood, however paid for, rather than as 
‘neighbors’ or ‘social explorers’…At bottom the revolt is against the grain of sentimentalism, 
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To Jane Addams, the dean of the settlement house movement, the new emphasis on 
business-minded professionalism and expertise in social work meant valuable virtues were being 
lost. Remembering how she spoke to the National Conference of Social Work in 1924 on the 
issue of toothaches, Addams noted that “[h]appily this effort is quite devoid of any social theory, 
but if one should be attached to it I predicted that most of the social workers would be frightened 
and feel that they must drop it. We are quite willing to work hard at the abolition of a toothache, 
but not willing to discuss social theory, and if a powerful newspaper called the effort 
Bolshevistic, so filled with terror have certain words become, that doubtless a few social workers 
would be found to say: ‘We don’t really approve of dental clinics; and, of course, we do not 
extend their services to adults who might be radicals; we are only experimenting with baby 
teeth.’”1651 
 
 It wasn’t just in religion and social work where business mores, virtues, and analogies 
bubbled to the fore. As historian Dorothy Brown notes, business made itself heard in education 
as well. “Just as truly as a manufacturing plant,” a Columbia Teachers College professor of the 
time argued, America’s schools “must work up all its raw material so as to make it maximally 
useful.” “For a long time all boys were trained to be President,” Muncie, Indiana’s school board 
president told sociologists Robert and Helen Merrell Lynd. “Then for a while we trained them all 
to be professional men. Now we are training boys to get jobs.” In August 1928, a writer in The 
American Mercury half-ridiculed, half-lamented the explosion of business schools, “the biggest 
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money-getters in the world of the intellect,” and their course offerings – among them “Business 
Barometers,” “Analysis of Financial Reports,” and “Advanced Problems in Sales 
Administration.” In fact, even labor leaders were beginning to look to business for leadership. 
“[D]istrust and hostility toward the business system wanes,” declared the UMW’s John L. Lewis 
in 1925, “as it is becoming better understood how the general prosperity and individual and 
family welfare of modern peoples has been insured by the use of capital in production to 
multiply the productive power of man’s labor, whether by hand or brain.”1652 
 
 Across the board, business was now moving to the center of American life. “What is the 
finest game? Business,” declared a writer in the Independent. “The soundest science? Business. 
The truest art? Business. The fullest education? Business. The cleanest philanthropy? Business. 
The sanest religion? Business.” The American businessman, argued the Chicago Tribune in 
1927, “has the whole country resting on his shoulders and if he weakens everybody is miserable. 
He keeps the country going…he commercializes everything and makes it possible to exist.” 
Citing Middletown, Stuart Chase argued in his 1929 book Prosperity: Fact or Myth that the 
period between 1922 and 1929 had seen “the emergence of the business man as the dictator of 
our destinies…he has ousted the statesman, the priest, the philosopher, as the creator of standards 
of ethics and behavior" to become "the final authority on the conduct of American society.” The 
United States was now “resting her civilization on the ideas of businessmen,” declared historian 
James Truslow Adams, in his tome Our Business Civilization. In 1928 and 1929, TIME founder 
Henry Luce began planning a follow-up magazine, Fortune, to document the reach and 
attainments of American business at its height. “Accurately, vividly, and concretely to describe 
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Modern Business is the greatest journalistic assignment in history,” Luce proclaimed in his 
prospectus. The magazine went to print in February 1930, four months after the Wall Street 
Crash.1653 
 
During the 1924 election season, when the ascendancy of businessmen over the 
Republican Party became an obvious and inescapable fact, TNR warned about what the 
emerging “businessman’s bloc” meant for politics and society. Unlike the corporate interests of 
the McKinley era, it argued, “the business man of today has lost his innocence. He is conscious 
of living in a society in which the interests of different economic groups no longer coincide”: 
 
His status in his own eyes is not so much that of an individual manufacturer or trader or of a 
citizen, but that of the member of a class whose common interests need to be defended or 
asserted….[Businessmen] are beginning to have the feeling and the outlook of a class who by 
their intrinsic qualities, their training and their peculiarly important stake in the community are 
entitled to rule. They are already strongly entrenched in the prevailing system of law and its 
interpretation. They own the most powerful and prosperous newspapers and operate the most 
effective vehicles of general publicity. They are headstrong, self-confident and impatient of artful 
political dodging. They have no sympathy or imagination about the interests and states of mind of 
those sections and classes which lie outside their own immediate experience. They realize that 
they are a minority, but they propose to compensate for this defect. They expect to dominate the 
government in part by their energy and competence, in part by skillful propaganda, in part by 
sheer determination, and last but not least by their ability to bring on, whenever their opponents 





“The increasing domination of the Republican party by a business man’s bloc,” TNR 
concluded, “is not the expression of an accidental or ephemeral fact. It is the political result of 
the victorious industrialism of American life, of the emerging class-consciousness of the 
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business man, of his prodigious material resources, of his conviction of his own importance.” 
The business bloc now in charge “believe in big profits, big fortunes, big business and 
plenty of it as the clue to the welfare of the American democracy. They intend to govern the 
country as if this belief were true, and to prove their contention by condemning any other form of 
government to economic disaster. Politicians will hereafter have to become either their servants 




Similarly, in the same magazine a year later, Alvin Johnson warned of “the emerging 
business aristocracy” that had moved to the center of American life. “Men who have reached 
high position within their own organization by practice of the art of combination will not find 
difficulty in applying the same art to relations with other organizations.” As a result, Johnson 
argued, “Business and government are coming to be related like the two sides of a dollar. They 
are not identical, nor necessarily harmonious. But conflict is excluded…We hear more and more 
often the demand for a ‘business government.’ Perhaps we may come to live under such a 
government before the world is much older. Not that we shall see it. No doubt we shall still be 
trying to catch up on the Constitution when the lords of the business world are laying the 
adamantine but invisible foundations of a new political economic order athwart our ancient 
highways.”1656 
 
 Many progressives expressed disgust at the emerging order. “Life is something more than 
a matter of business,” said Gifford Pinchot, “No man can make his life what it ought to be by 
living it merely on a business basis. There are things higher than business.” George Norris 









prophesied of a more direct threat to the prevailing philosophy than mere existential malaise. A 
day will come, he warned darkly in 1921, “when you fellows who think more of big business 
than you do of your religion will be on your bended knees to such men as shall follow me – 
because I shall not be here then – praying for protection against the mob. The men who are 
called radicals and progressives now will be the conservatives to whom the weeping, suffering 
world will plead for justice; and it may be that pendulum will have swung so far that justice will 
be impossible.” But, for much of the decade, it seemed that day of reckoning would never come. 
 “It is now a government, by, for, and of Big Business,” lamented Oswald Villard in 1927.1657  
 
Like Villard, Herbert Croly, Frederick Howe, and others, some progressives responded to 
this ascendancy by counter-organizing, and identifying themselves more closely than ever before 
to the aspirations of labor. But others, including many that had been otherwise averse to 
corporate power in the past, began to be swayed by the prospects of a business-led society. 
 
 In 1925, William Allen White deemed the Chambers of Commerce “the outfit that has to 
be put in its proper place in this country, taken down from the throne, and made ordinary voting 
American citizens instead of assuming to rule the land by their eminent respectability.” (At the 
time, he was turning down an invitation to speak to the Wichita Junior Chamber of Commerce. 
“A Junior Chamber of Commerce makes my feet hurt,” he wrote. “Why now let the young 
people have a little indiscretion, a few years of gay irresponsibility? Why harness them to a plug 
hat early in life?”)1658  
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But two years later, White began to relent. “As times change, we change with them and 
business also has changed,” he conceded in 1927. “The business that Bryan and Roosevelt railed 
at in their days is not the business of today.” Now “managers” were in charge rather than “the 
old barons,” and since the problems of the world “are essentially engineers’ problems,” he 
argued, perhaps that was for the best. Walter Lippmann, who had been advocating for an 
America led by a class of experts since the publication of his 1922 book Public Opinion, 
especially welcomed this brave new world. “The more or less unconscious and unplanned 
activities of business men,” he declared in 1928, “are for once more novel, more daring, and in 
general more revolutionary than the theories of the progressives.”1659 
 
 Even Lincoln Steffens, the venerable muckraker who had made his name railing against 
corporate corruption and malfeasance – the same man who had returned from Russia arguing he 
had seen the future and it worked – became a believer in the possibilities of this new economic 
order. “Big business in America,” he wrote, “is producing what the Socialists held up as their 
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CHAPTER TEN: CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION 
PROGRESSIVES AND THE CULTURE OF THE TWENTIES 
 
 “That high and increasing standards of living and comfort should be the first of considerations 
in public mind and in government needs no apology.” – Herbert Hoover, 19221661 
 
“Too much prosperity, too many moving-picture shows, too much gaudy fiction have colored the 
taste and manners of so many Nebraskans of the future.” – Willa Cather1662 
 
“The right use of leisure is the gravest social problem in the United States.” – Leon Whipple, 
The Survey, 1922.1663 
 
“The right to play is the final clause in the charter of democracy. The people are king – et le roi 
s’amuse.” – Edward Duffus, The Independent, 1924.1664 
 
“It is a stiff job that democracy lays upon the brains of her citizens.” – The Survey, 1923”1665 
 
“Prohibition is an awful flop. 
We like it. 
It can’t stop what it’s meant to stop. 
We like it. 
It’s left a trail of graft and slime, 
It don’t prohibit worth a dime, 
It’s filled our land with vice and crime, 
Nevertheless, we’re for it.” – Frankin P. Adams”1666 
 




With the tide of prosperity lifting so many boats, with shortened work days and electricity 
opening up more hours for play, with the war and post-war experiences disenchanting 
so many with progressive calls to morality and idealism, and with new transportation 
and communications networks spreading information, music, and fads more quickly 
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than ever before, the Twenties saw a new culture of leisure, consumption, and 
libertinism flourish. On one hand progressives looked warily at these developments, 
especially as the acids of modernity began to eat away at the long-cherished tenets of 
their faith. On the other hand, they were just as uncomfortable in many ways with the 
fundamentalist response to these emerging cultural mores. Caught in a pincer 
movement between New and Old, despairing progressives labored to salvage what they 
could of their earlier programs and principles of reform.  
 
*** 
A Distracted Nation 
 
 
“Every day, in every way, I am getting better and better.” This was the once-ubiquitous 
catch-phrase of Emile Coue, the French psychologist and promoter of autosuggestion who 
became a national sensation in America in the early 1920’s. A believer in the Placebo Effect, 
Coue encouraged men and women to say this phrase to themselves every day and every night, 
and it would bring forth happier times. Progressives may have winced at the idea of Harding 
Normalcy and Coolidge Prosperity being thought of as better times, but plenty of Americans of 
the period felt there was reason for optimism. As the nation’s businessmen applauded the virtues 
of efficiency and service, and the Coolidge administration steered the ship of state ever more 
definitively into business-friendly waters, “America,” in the words of F. Scott Fitzgerald, “was 
going on the greatest, gaudiest spree in history.”1668  
  
The most important facilitator for this burgeoning culture of consumption was the general 
sense of prosperity that came over the nation after 1923. While the American population 
increased only by nine percent in the Twenties, the ranks of the unemployed dropped from 4.3 
million in 1921 to two million in 1927. Meanwhile, individual income grew by 21%, and soon 
forty percent of American families were making over $2000 a year – enough to partake of the 
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Even those who did not have money on hand could now purchase desired goods through 
the installment plan. According to historian Nancy Cott, 1925 saw American consumers 
purchase over 66% of furniture and gas stoves, and 75% of “cars, pianos, washing machines, 
sewing machines, mechanical refrigerators, phonographs, vacuum cleaners, and radios” using 
credit. Conservative-minded creditors worried that “[s]elling goods at the expense of safe credit 
tends to cheapen it, to make serious losses, and to disturb business morals…Making it easy for 
people to buy beyond their needs or to buy before they have saved enough to gratify their wishes 
tends to encourage a condition that hurts the human morale and supports a form of transaction 
for which credit is not primarily intended.” But these were whispers in the wind. Over the course 





As a result, there were twenty times more cars in America in 1931 as there were in 1913. 
Put another way, the ratio of automobiles to Americans – 1 to 265 in 1910 – had dropped to 1 to 
6 by 1928, with over twenty percent of families now enjoying their own vehicle. Having a car 
opened up the possibility of commuting to work from the suburbs. As such, 750,000 houses were 
built a year between 1922 and 1929, with the regions around large cities seeing the largest boom 
– the New York City area grew faster than 28 other states combined.1671  
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This new aristocratic privilege of mobility was intoxicating. “I had started something that 
I could not stop gracefully or consistently,” one small-town banker told The Atlantic Monthly in 
his 1925 “Confessions of an Automobilist.” “My thrift habits were steadily giving way to 
spendthrift habits….The result upon the individual is to break down his sense of values. Whether 
he will or no, he must spend money at every turn. Having succumbed to the lure of the car, he is 
quite helpless thereafter.” This, the author argued, portended a troubling national problem. True, 
“the automobile stands unique as the most extravagant piece of machinery ever devised for the 
pleasure of man.” But “[m]any families are living on the brink of danger all the time. They are 
car-poor. Savings is impossible. The joy of security in the future is sacrificed for the pleasure of 
the moment. And with the pleasure of the moment is mingled the constant anxiety entailed by 
living beyond one’s means…The thoughts in the minds of many workers is not how much they 
can save, but how long it will be before they can have a motor.”1672 
 
Automobiles not only conferred mobility, but privacy from parents, chaperones, and 
other prying eyes. The number of cars with a top jumped from 10% in 1919 to 83% in 1927, 
offering – much to the consternation of some reformers – myriad new opportunities for would-be 
lotharios of any age. (Compounding this troubling trend toward debauched virtue were the 




With 17 million homes wired for electricity by 1929, the decade also saw the sale of five 
million washing machines (to 25% of households), close to seven million vacuum cleaners (to 
37% of households), and over fifteen million electric irons (80% of families). The sales of radio 
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sets went from $60 million in 1922 to $852 million in 1929 – an increase of 1400%, reaching 
40% of all families by the end of the decade. Americans also took more interest in the movies, 
with weekly attendance at films doubling over the Twenties to between 100 and 115 million at 
20,500 theaters across the country. Chain stores too witnessed phenomenal growth in the decade, 
as did the canned or pre-packaged foods and ready-to-wear clothes they offered. Already by 
1923, F.W. Woolsworth had 1500 stores across America, with Rexall drug stores and the Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company also increasing in number. Between 1918 and 1929, the 
number of chain stores in America grew from 29,000 to 160,000. From 1917 to 1927, sales at 




Along with new technologies and economies of scale, also driving consumption patterns 
in the decade were a seemingly newfound susceptibility to fads. “It is difficult to assign an exact 
date for the beginning of the Age of Play,” argued an author in The Independent in 1924 – but it 
was clear that Age had dawned in America. “One of the striking characteristics of the era of 
Coolidge Prosperity,” recalled Frederick Lewis Allen in Only Yesterday, his popular 1931 
retrospective of the decade just passed, “was the unparalleled rapidity and unanimity with which 
millions of men and women turned their attention, their talk, and their emotional interest upon a 
series of tremendous trifles – a heavyweight boxing-match, a murder trial, a new automobile 
model, a transatlantic flight.”1675  
 
A nationwide Mah Jongg craze that began in 1922, for example, resulted in more Mah 
Jongg sets sold in 1923 than even radios. “From fifty thousand tables strewn with green 
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Bamboos and fallen Dragons comes a nightly chorus, Pung!” wrote Charles Merz in The New 
Republic of this sudden boom. The game had conquered America in only a few months, he 
argued, because “it is a novelty – in a land where novelty ranks next to Godliness…Mah Jongg 
was just The Newest Thing on Broadway.” By the end of the year, Merz predicted, America 
would “forget we ever saw a Six Bamboo…Some new pastime from the Argentine [will be] all 
the rage.” Merz was almost right. “This year those who do not want to play Mah Jong no longer 
have to play to keep up Mah Jong appearances,” the Grey Lady reported in August 1924. 
“Instead, it is now the thing one does, if one wants to do it…It has definitely passed beyond its 
bijou period.” Instead, the next big thing was crossword puzzles, which, although they had been 
around since 1913, took the country by storm beginning that year. Two young publishers, 
Richard L. Simon and Max Lincoln Schuster, came upon the idea of putting a book of puzzles 
together for Simon’s young cousin. “No one concerned,” reported a writer a year later, “had the 
faintest suspicion that they were launching something over which the country would go mad.” In 
the next six years, Simon & Schuster would sell two million copies of their crossword puzzle 
book around the world, including 750,000 in the United States. Later in the decade, marathon 





To sate the public’s increasing desire to be entertained, tabloid newspapers, or “jazz 
journalism,” also enjoyed considerable growth over the period. Beginning with the New York 
Daily News (founded 1919), the Twenties saw an explosion of lurid, photo-heavy periodicals, 
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such as William Randolph Hearst’s Daily Mirror and Bernarr Macfadden’s Evening Graphic, 
that emphasized sex, violence, and scandal to a degree unfathomable to earlier generations. 
Looking at circulation numbers in 1927, TNR estimated that the three main tabloid journals had 
picked up close to 1.6 million readers since 1921, even as other upstanding New York 
newspapers – the Mail, the Globe, the Commercial – had gone under or, as in the case of the New 
York Herald-Tribune, been bought up and consolidated with rivals. (This consolidation was a 
national trend.  Daily papers dropped from 2580 to 2001 between 1914 and 1926, and by 1927, 
as Frederick Lewis Allen notes, “fifty-five chains controlled 230 daily papers with a combined 
circulation of over 13,000,000.”)1677 
 
Over the course of the decade, these tabloid journals – and their more staid competitors, 
eager to keep up – would bring all manner of sensation and scandal into American homes. 1920 
saw the divorce of America’s sweetheart, Mary Pickford, and her subsequent remarriage to 
Douglas Fairbanks, Sr., as well as the collapse of the financial schemes – documented in detail in 
the Boston Post – of Boston-based entrepreneur Charles Ponzi.  The following year brought the 
trial of Hollywood comedian Fatty Arbuckle, who was charged with the rape and murder of 
Virginia Rappe, a woman found dead at a party at his house. It was claimed by the media that 
Arbuckle, among other sordid acts, had crushed Rappe to death under his massive bulk. After 
two mistrials, Arbuckle was acquitted in his third trial in April 1922 – there was no evidence 
connecting him to her murder, and it seems likely she died of some combination of prior health 
problems and bad bootleg alcohol. But he lost badly in the court of public opinion, and his career 
                                                          
1677
 Ralph Giordano, Satan in the Dance Hall: Rev. John Roach Straton, Social Dancing, and Morality in 1920’s 
New York City (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2008), 116. Kathleen Morgan Drowne and Robert Huber, American 
Popular Culture Through History: The 1920s (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2004),  25. “Who Reads the Tabloids?” 
The New Republic, May 25
th




in Hollywood was effectively destroyed. Meanwhile, Hearst bragged that Arbuckle’s trials “sold 
more newspapers than any event since the sinking of the Lusitania.”1678 
 
Two years later, the next “trial of the century” involved Nathan Leopold, 19, and Richard 
Loeb, 18, two scions of wealthy Chicago families that were indicted for the “thrill killing” 
murder of 14-year-old Bobby Franks. As the nation watched in rapt attention, Clarence Darrow – 
the best counsel money could buy – successfully got Leopold & Loeb’s sentence reduced to life 
imprisonment in 1924, mainly by arguing the two amoral youths were stunted products of their 
environment. In 1926, the next scandal du jour was the trial of Frances Noel Stevens Hall, who 
was indicted (and eventually acquitted) for the 1922 murder of her husband, Reverend Edward 
Wheeler Hall, and his alleged mistress, Mrs. Eleanor Mills of the church choir. Among the 
correspondents continually reporting in on the sordid Hall-Mills affair were evangelist Billy 
Sunday and New York-based preacher John Roach Straton, a.k.a. the “Fundamentalist Pope.” 
Similarly, in 1928 Queens housewife Ruth Snyder and her lover, corset salesman Judd Gray, 
were tried, convicted, and executed for the premeditated murder of her husband Albert. Both the 
Hall-Mills and Snyder trials received voluminous play in the tabloids and regular newspapers.
1679
   
 
If there was no prurient trial available to garner readers, there was always another 
sensational story out there somewhere. In 1922, news of the discovery by Howard Carter and 
Lord Earl Carnarvon of King Tutankhamun’s tomb grabbed the world’s attention, prompting a 
flood of Egyptian themed fashions and advertisements in 1923. In 1925, newspapers flocked to 
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cover a different sort of underground burial. Floyd Collins, a Kentucky man, got stuck 125 feet 
deep in Mammoth Cave after a cave-in dropped a large rock on his foot. Even as authorities 
labored to get him out, a local writer from the Louisville Courier-Journal crawled through the 
cave to interview the trapped man. Collins’ eventual death in February 1925 – eighteen days 
after being trapped and before he could be saved – even received front-page attention from The 
New York Times. As Charles Merz later pointed out in TNR, a North Carolina cave-in the 




That same year, the Evening Graphic devoted considerable copy to the marriage and 
divorce of New York society figure Kip Rhinelander and his laundress, Alice Jones – the aghast 
Rhinelander family had forced the break when they discovered Jones’ father was black. To aid in 
their coverage and sales, the Evening Graphic developed “composographs” – composite 
photographs – of Jones (in reality a model, tinted to appear mulatto) stripping topless before the 
court. Sales shot through the roof. In 1926, radio evangelist Aimee Semple McPherson 
disappeared from a California beach, only to show up a month later in Mexico. She claimed to 
have been kidnapped, although evidence suggests she instead had run off with her radio engineer 
– the same one provided by Herbert Hoover to keep her on one wavelength. Either way, the 
nation eagerly devoured the story, as they did the brief, sordid marriage and separation in 1926 
of high school student Frances Heenan “Peaches” Browning, age 15, and her “Daddy,” real-
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estate mogul Edward Browning, 58. Here again, “composographs,” the photoshops of their day, 




In 1927, the tabloids not only tuned into the Sacco and Vanzetti trial but the illness and 
death of  another young Italian taken before his time -- Rudolph Alfonzo Raffaele Pierre Filibert 
Guglielmi di Valentina d’Antonguolla, a.k.a. Rudolph Valentino, arguably the first film celebrity 
to receive the hero’s treatment upon his death. Composographs were once again employed to 
show the smoldering star of The Sheik, mostly naked, resting in bed and dying with peritonitis. 
Indeed, the Evening Graphic even reported Valentino’s death before his time. When the end did 
finally come for Valentino, at the young age of 31, the story was national news. Some observers 
grumbled that the death of the former president of Harvard, Charles William Eliot, around the 
same time resulted in very little comparable press coverage. But, then again, Eliot’s death had 
not resulted in thousands of grief-stricken fans around the world, including more than one 
suicide. And Charles William Eliot didn’t look anything like Rudolf Valentino.1682  
 
While one film star passed on in 1927, another fell from grace, as America also turned its 
attention to the divorce of Charlie Chaplin from his second wife, Lita Grey. Almost two decades 
younger than her husband, Lilita – her original name, and one of many details to suggest author 
Vladimir Nabokov had had the Chaplin story in mind for his later classic – had become pregnant 
with Chaplin’s child out of wedlock at the age of sixteen. Grey’s 52-page divorce filing went 
into lurid detail about the married couple’s woes, noting that Chaplin had not only offered to pay 
for an abortion, but that the “defendant has solicited, urged, and demanded that plaintiff submit 
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to, perform, and commit such acts and things for the gratification of defendant’s said abnormal, 
unnatural, perverted, and degenerate sexual desires, as to be too revolting, indecent, and immoral 
to set forth in detail in this complaint.” (At the time, fellatio was illegal under California’s 
criminal sodomy law.) Within three days of being filed at the court, The Complaint of Lita was 




In every case, the American public seemed to delight in, if not wallow in, these tabloid 
tales of bad behavior or unfortunate happenstance – which aggravated some progressives to no 
end. “The combination between the courts and the tabloids has produced a situation for which 
there is really no precedence,” exclaimed Walter Lippmann in disgust. “If you take the 
succession of cases – Arbuckle, Rhinelander, Hall-Mills, Browning, and Chaplin – and consider 
how they are worked up by officers of the law, by lawyers and journalists…how they are 
exploited for profit, it is evident that what we have here is a series of national spectacles put on 
for the amusement of the crowd…The whole atmosphere of them is fraudulent. They are 
produced by swindlers for suckers.” Arguing the same in sardonic fashion, Charles Merz 
reminded TNR readers that “the Roman Coliseum was a national institution. If we are to have a 
circus of our own, let us develop it with the high purpose and creative effort worthy of a most 
resourceful nation. Let us have the biggest, noisiest, bloodiest murder trials the human 
imagination can conceive.”1684 
 
To Lippmann especially, the salacious appetites of the American public was yet another 
indicator that public opinion, informed or otherwise, was not perhaps the best compass to steer 
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reform by. As such he suggested that some amount of censorship should be applied for the sake 
of the common good. This Lippmann applied to the arts as well. When New York police closed 
down Vanities, the popular showgirl revue orchestrated by Earl Carroll on Broadway, Lippmann 
thought it appropriate punishment for a show that “aimed to provide the maximum erotic 
excitement the law will permit.” The closing would help to “discourage the too-rapid advance of 
competitive smut,” Lippmann suggested. “These modern spectacles are not ribald. They are not 
gay. They are not searching. They are not profound. They are a lazy and solitary and safe 
indulgence in the vices of others.”1685  
 
Often, Lippmann’s problem with the public appetite was less about salaciousness than 
poor taste – If a classic work of art or literature proved titillating, so be it. In defense of a 
performance of Love for Love, a play by Restoration playwright William Congreve, for example, 
Lippmann argued to one correspondent that “I should oppose the suppression of Love for Love as 
I should oppose the suppression of nude statuary at the Museum, of Boccaccio, or of the Arabian 
Nights, or Rabelais.” In short, he argued, if “somebody with taste and intelligence and a sense of 
the value of a free and searching theatre” didn’t decide what was worthy of censorship and what 
wasn’t, “the line will most certainly sooner or later drawn by fools and philistines.”1686 
 
But even as Lippmann manned the ramparts of high culture, some of his contemporaries 
were finding worth in the new spectacles of the Twenties – among them critic Edmund Wilson 
and writer Joseph Wood Krutch, both of whom were known to attend and enjoy Earl Carroll’s 
Vanities, the Ziegfeld Follies, and similar works. Along the same lines, in 1924 Harvard-
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educated journalist and arts critic Gilbert Seldes, the man who had panned Bruce Barton’s The 
Man Nobody Knows, published The 7 Lively Arts, an appreciation of “Slapstick Moving Pictures, 
Comic Strips, Revues, Musical Comedy…Slang Humor, Popular Songs, [and] Vaudeville.” The 
“lively arts as they exist in America today” Seldes maintained, “are entertaining, interesting, and 
important,” and his book aimed to pay homage to some of their most talented exemplars, among 




Unfortunately, Seldes argued, “there exists a ‘genteel tradition’ about the arts which has 
prevented any just appreciation of the popular arts, and that these have therefore missed the 
corrective criticism given to the serious arts, receiving only abuse…[T]herefore the pretentious 
intellectual is as much responsible as anyone for what is actually absurd and vulgar in the lively 
arts.” In effect, Seldes was arguing, contra Lippmann, that the often ribald spectacles of the 
period had their own inherent worth, and that the real threat to art of any period was the 
spiritually deadening tsk-tsking of genteel society. Speaking of the Keystone Kops, Seldes noted 
that “simple and sophisticated people have looked directly at the slap-stick screen and loved it 
for itself alone; in between are the people who can see nothing without the lorgnettes of 
prejudice provided by fashion and gentility.” Slapstick, he argued, “is one of the few places 
where the genteel tradition does not operate, where fantasy is liberated, where imagination is still 
riotous and healthy.” In this defense of what were commonly considered low art forms, Seldes 
anticipated the cultural criticism of later generations, who took popular culture much more 
seriously, and who cared less about the provenance of art and more about its impact.
1688
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Like Lippmann and Seldes, progressives were of different minds on the question of 
censorship. As the worldwide fame of Rudolf Valentino attests, Hollywood embraced the allure 
of the sensual in the 1920s, and created stars out of the likes of Valentino, Theda Bara, and “It 
Girl” Clara Bow mainly by virtue of their sex appeal. As historian Nancy Cott notes, the film 
line-up in back-to-back-weeks in the middle of the decade consisted of titles like The Daring 
Years, Sinners in Silk, Women who Give, The Price She Paid, Name the Man, Rouged Lips, and 
The Queen of Sin. One film of the time, Flaming Youth, was billed as an orgy of “neckers, 
petters, white kisses, red kisses, pleasure-mad daughters [and] sensation-craving mothers.” 
Another promised “brilliant men, beautiful jazz babies, champagne baths, midnight revels, 
petting parties in the purple dawn, all ending in one terrific smashing climax that makes you 
gasp.” In The New Republic, Lloyd Lewis told of how “an American woman may spend her 
afternoon alone” at the movie theater: “Romantic music, usually played with a high degree of 
mechanical excellence, gives her a pleasant sensation of tingling. Her husband is busy elsewhere; 
and on this music, as on a mildly erotic bridge, she can let her fancies slip through the darkened 
atmosphere to the screen, where they can drift in romantic amours with handsome stars…the 
blue dusk of the ‘de luxe’ house has dissolved the Puritan strictures she had absorbed as a 
child.”1689  
 
This, coupled with the opprobrium accompanying the Fairbanks/Pickford, Arbuckle, and 
Chaplin scandals, prompted some reformers and church groups to push for government oversight 
over the motion picture industry, most notably the Federal Motion Picture Council, organized in 
1925 under the auspices of the Presbyterian Church. By 1921, over 100 bills to regulate movies 
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had been introduced in 37 state legislatures, and over the decade as a whole six proposals to 




In most cases, these efforts were deflected by the ascendance of former Republican 
Chairman and Harding Postmaster General Will Hays to the head of the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) in March 1922.  In 1930, to forestall 
governmental interference, and taking a page from both the example of baseball, over which 
commissioner and former Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis now presided after the Black Sox 
Scandal of 1919, and then-President Hoover’s theory of voluntary association, the industry 
adopted the Hays Code, a set of self-policing guidelines to keep the content of films on the up 




One of the most vociferous voices in the public sphere against movie censorship was 
Congressman Fiorello La Guardia. If such a bill ever passed, he argued, it would very quickly 
turn into a tool against reform. “Why…do you suppose the men behind this censorship law care 
how long a kiss lasts or whether the villain uses a gun or an axe?” he queried in 1921. “What 
they do care about is that the motion picture is the most marvelous educator in the world today. 
And if films are shown that will teach people the truth about government, about war, about 
civics, about prisons, and factories and tenements and every phase of life that touches their rights 
and their happiness, there will be trouble.” “Censorship has always been the handmaid of 
oppression,” La Guardia argued similarly to the New York Evening Journal in 1922. “Censorship 
is an agency for the prevention of thought: 
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Think of a film illustrating to the millions of American people the quantity of food produced in 
this country, and how it is monopolized by a few and kept in storage so as to keep prices high; 
how prices are artificially fixed; how much good food is permitted to rot, while many cannot 
afford the mere necessities of life. Think of a picture giving the history of a lump of coal. 
Showing how it is mined and transported, what part of it goes to pay for labor and what big 
majority goes to the coupons cut by persons thousands of miles away who have taken no risks 
and contributed no thought, no labor, no effort towards its production. Think of a picture showing 
how public officials are selected by a hand-picked convention controlled by those who profit in 




La Guardia’s grand vision of a reform-minded cinema was one shared by many other 
progressives. In 1916, Mary Gray Peck had told the General Federation of Women’s Clubs that 
movies could be a “grand social worker” – “Motion pictures are going to save our civilization 
from the destruction which has successively overwhelmed every civilization of the past.” “I have 
wondered, Hays,” Senator Borah wrote the former Postmaster General in 1926, “if a great work 
could not be done for the downtrodden and despoiled of the earth through the movies. If it could 
be shown what has been going on and is going in in Syria, if it could be revealed what is going 
on in India…if the exploitation of children in Asia by foreign powers could be made known, 
would not these things work up such public opinion that the brutal practices would have to 
cease?”1693  
 
The dean of progressives agreed. Yes, Jane Addams wrote in 1930, “it is…said that a 
certain sort of young man tests a girl’s resistance by what she will stand for in a movie, and that 
he boasts it is possible, by a continuous selection of movies, to undermine a girl’s standards, a 
new type of seduction as it were.” But whatever the misuses of the medium, Addams argued, 
“[i]t is no small achievement that millions of men, women, and children with no hope for 
opportunity for travel, are still easily familiar with ships on wide seas, with a moon shining on 
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snow-capped mountains, with the rice fields of China, and the temples in India and Egypt…From 
my own experience I should say that one of the most beneficent features of the movie is the 
recreation and release it offers to old people. I recall an old Scotchwoman whose declining years 
were quite made over by the movies….Her old eyes would shine with the light of youth as she 
told us of yet another wonderful experience in this world of ours which she never had a chance to 
explore until she was about to leave it.”1694 
 
In sum, Addams argued at another point, the promise of cinema for education was “too 
splendid at rock bottom to allow the little evil to control and destroy it.” Similar arguments could 
be heard in progressive circles about radio. “The day of universal culture has dawned at last,” 
effused Joseph Hart in The Survey of the new medium in 1922. “No longer can Gopher Prairie 
say ‘Nothing ever happens in this town.’ As much happens there these days, as on any central 
Broadway in the universe, if one but has the necessary individual head-set. Right truthfully does 
the poet sing: ‘We live in the day of marvels!’” Radio, Hart declared, delivered the “promise of 
culture for all…If any one remains uncultured, today, it will be against the combined efforts of 
the world.” In short, here, in “a means of instantaneous communication to all the peoples of the 
earth,” was the greatest tool for leveraging public opinion toward “universal understanding, 
sympathy, and peace” ever created. “The welfare of mankind demands that its mechanisms shall 
be employed in the service of those great social ideals and knowledges which truly release the 
peoples of the earth from their ancient exclusions.”1695 
 
Film, radio, the automobile, electricity, the telephone – These inventions worked to 
transform both Americans’ daily existence and their conception of the world in profound ways, 
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and, if harnessed properly, suggested even greater potential changes on the horizon. “To an 
intellectual class that watched their native religion turn to fundamentalism, patriotism to 
chauvinism, and politics to reaction,” wrote historian Dorothy Ross of the decade, “science 
appeared to be the one pure and sustaining discipline in the modern world.”  In his 1927 book 
The Rise of American Civilization, noted historian Charles Beard put science and technology at 
the very center of the American story. “[W]hat is called Western or modern civilization by way 
of contrast with the civilization of the Orient or Mediaeval times,” he wrote, “is at bottom a 
civilization that rests upon machinery and science as distinguished from one founded on 
agriculture or handcraft commerce. It is in reality a technological civilization” that “threatens to 
overcome and transform the whole globe.”1696  
 
Reflecting both this new centrality of science and technology in American life and the 
prospects they engendered for continued social transformation, Amazing Stories, the first 
magazine dedicated solely to science fiction – or “scientifiction,” as its founder, writer and 
inventor Hugo Gernsback, deemed it – launched in March 1926. “By scientifiction,” Gernsback 
told his readers in the opening issue, “I mean the Jules Verne, H.G. Wells, and Edgar Allan Poe 
type of story – a charming romance intermingled with scientific fact and prophetic vision…Not 
only do these amazing tales make tremendously interesting reading – they are also very 
instructive. They supply knowledge that we might not otherwise obtain – and they supply it in a 
very palatable form.”  Unfortunately for Gernsback’s vision, he soon discovered that science 
fantasy stories – along the lines of Edgar Rice Burrough’s already-established A Princess of 
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Mars series – still sold better than science fiction, and that his sales dropped precipitously 
whenever he tried to forego the lurid covers painted by illustrator Frank R. Paul.
1697
   
 
The following year, on May 21, 1927, science fiction seemed to become reality as airmail 
aviator Charles Lindbergh – answering a $25,000 challenge put up by Frenchman Raymond 
Orteig in 1919 – piloted The Spirit of St. Louis from New York to Paris in 33 ½ hours, achieving 
the first solo transatlantic crossing in history. Faced with an actual, honest-to-goodness world-
historical moment after years of breathless Ballyhoo, newspapers reached new heights of 
effusive praise to commemorate the moment. Lindbergh “has performed the greatest feat of a 
solitary man in the records of the human race!” declared the New York Evening World. “He has 
exalted the race of men!” proclaimed The Baltimore Sun. The New York Times deemed 
Lindbergh’s flight among the greatest stories of all time, along with “Adam eating the apple” and 
“the discovery of Moses in the bulrushes…Lindbergh’s fight, the suspense of it, the daring of it, 
the triumph and the glory of it…these are the stuff that makes immortal news.” To another 
author, it proved that morality and the old American virtues weren’t dead, “that we are not rotten 
at the core, but morally sound and sweet and good!”1698  
 
In a 33 ½ hour span that would change both his life and the world, the Lone Eagle had 
seemingly collapsed space and time forever. “Nature can’t bully us indefinitely with wind and 
wave and perils of vast oceans,” exulted Heywood Broun after Lindbergh’s flight. “One of our 
boys has put the angry sea in her place. The big pond, hey? Why, after this it is a puddle and we 
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may step across as neatly as Elizabeth upon the cloak of Walter Raleigh.” But even as 
Lindbergh’s daring feat, and the new technologies that had accompanied him, augured fantastic 
new possibilities for human progress, scientific breakthroughs also seemed to be unraveling the 
basic tenets of progressivism as a public philosophy, including the very notion of reason itself.  
The Descent of Man 
 
From the start, progressivism, in all of its many incarnations, had relied on faith in human 
reason, educability, and improvement and the lever of educated public opinion to effect change. 
The traumatic experiences of the war and post-war periods had already shaken progressives’ 
beliefs in many of these fundamental precepts about their fellow men and women. Augmenting 
these doubts in the New Era were the scientific writings in vogue at the time, which further cast 
long shadows across the foundations of the progressive faith. 
 
One of the most substantial assaults on these foundations had begun in 1909 in 
Worcester, Massachusetts. At the behest of eminent American psychologist and president of 
Clark University G. Stanley Hall, controversial Viennese psychologist Sigmund Freud – the 
“Darwin of the mind,” as one contemporary labeled him in 1913 – and his young protégé Carl 
Jung came to America that year to give five lectures at Clark on his theories of psychoanalysis. 
An early American proponent of Freud’s theories of sexuality and the unconscious, Hall had 
written favorably of his guest in his own 1904 study Adolescence – a two-part work one notable 
reviewer deemed as being “chock-full of errors, masturbation, and Jesus” and written by a “mad 
man.” Freud himself thought President Hall was “something of a Kingmaker,” and, indeed, those 









After Freud returned home to the Old World, his standard was taken up by a New York-
based psychoanalyst named A.A. Brill, who, since 1907, had made popularizing Freud’s writings 
his raison d’etre. After translating several of Freud’s works into English, Brill published 
Fundamental Conceptions of Psychoanalysis in 1921, which was a summary of his introductory 
class lectures on the subject at NYU. “The unconscious according to Freud,” Brill explained in 
the first of these, “includes all the psychic manifestations of which the person is not aware. It is 
made up of psychic processes which have been crowded out of consciousness from the very 
beginnings of childhood; they are the primitive impulses that have been inhibited and sublimated 
in the development of the child. The child is originally a primitive being; it is like a little animal, 
and as it gradually gives up the gross animal instincts, it represses them.”1700  
 
As such, Brill explained, “an occurrence in one’s life, at the age of fifty, for instance, 
may be traced back to some childhood repression; there is always some subtle and intimate 
connection in our present emotional experience with something that occurred in the past.” In 
other words, men and women were not beings motivated by reason, but rather by their own 
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By the start of the Twenties, education in American had taken the Freudian turn, through 
books like Wilfrid Lay’s The Child’s Unconscious Mind, published in 1919. It was time for 
educators, Lay argued, to “accept the fundamental postulate of the new psychology and frankly 
admit the existence in each and every human of an unconscious (sometimes called subconscious 
and sometimes co-conscious mentality.) This implies not only that each of us has mental states 
that never enter consciousness but also that these unconscious states are not only states or 
conditions or dispositions, arrangements of something inert, but are activities, energies or groups 
of forces which are operating by mechanisms of which only the special student knows anything 
definite at all. The ordinary person knows practically nothing of the detailed workings of these 
activities.” As such, in the words of education historian Lawrence Cremin, “[t]eachers were 
urged to recognize the unconscious as the real source of motivation and behavior in themselves 
and their students. The essential task of education was seen as one of sublimating the child’s 
repressed emotions into socially useful channels.”1702 
 
While not relying on a strictly Freudian analysis, New York State Supreme Court Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo explained how the same subconscious impulses affected the law in his 
influential 1921 book, The Nature of the Judicial Process, which helped to foment the “legal 
realism” movement. “[T]he whole subject matter of jurisprudence,” Justice Cardozo asserted, “is 
more plastic, more malleable, the molds less definitively cast, the bounds of right and wrong less 
preordained and constant, than most of us, without the aid of some such analysis, have been 
accustomed to believe.”1703  
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This was because, Cardozo argued, there was a “creative element in the judicial process” 
– when “the judge assumes the function of a lawgiver” – that often played out when deciding a 
case where the development of the law seemed at a critical juncture. In these moments, the judge 
determined the case not just based on precedent or even on reason, but on “forces which they do 
not recognize and cannot name, [that] have been tugging at them – inherited instincts, traditional 
beliefs, acquired convictions.” “Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the 
dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits 
and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge.” Like it or not, Cardozo 
argued, “[n]o effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire 
of these subconscious loyalties.” At best, a good judge could be trained to be aware of his own 
fallibility, to help “emancipate him from the suggestive power of individual dislikes and 
prepossessions” and “broaden the group to which his subconscious loyalties are due.”1704 
 
And education and the law were not alone. By the beginning of the Twenties, Freudian 
ideas and language were spreading like wildfire throughout the entirety of American culture. 
“Whereas psychoanalysis is as wonderful a discovery in mental science, as let us say, the X-Ray 
in surgery,” A.A. Brill warned his readers in 1921, “it can be utilized only by persons who have 
been trained in anatomy and pathology…It cannot cure cancer, it cannot make an adjustable 
citizen out of a defective ‘radical,’ it cannot return an errant young husband to a neurotic elderly 
lady…in fine it cannot make a normal person out of an idiot, and does not give a philosophy of 
life to a person who has not brains enough to formulate one himself.”1705  
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But the floodgates had opened, and, as historian William Leuchtenburg notes, “[i]n the 
years after the war, psychology became a national mania…People talked knowingly of ‘libido,’ 
‘defense mechanism,’ and ‘fixation,’ confused the subconscious with the unconscious, repression 
with suppression, and dealt with the torturously difficult theories of Freud and of psychoanalysis 
as though they were simple ideas readily grasped after a few moments’ explanation.”  As a 
result, Freud’s influence was felt everywhere. Among the books hitting the stands at the time, 
Leuchtenberg points out, were the Psychology of Golf, the Psychology of the Poet Shelley, and 
the Psychology of Selling Life Insurance. Former progressive heroes like Ralph Waldo Emerson 
and Henry David Thoreau were now retroactively diagnosed in print as being “chilled, under-
sexed valetudinarians.” “If there is anything you do not understand in human life,” novelist 
Sherwood Anderson proclaimed in his 1925 novel Dark Laughter, “consult the works of Dr. 
Freud.” Which one could now do through mail-order catalog, via titles such as Psychoanalysis 
By Mail, Psychoanalysis Self-Applied, Ten Thousand Dreams Interpreted, and Sex Problems 
Solved. “[J]ust one person in fifty has any glimmer of what sex is,” one of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
flapper protagonists complains in 1920’s This Side of Paradise. “I’m hipped on Freud and all 
that.”1706 
 
Old-line progressives watched this proliferation of Freudian ideas with a combination of 
bewilderment and disgust. Asked about the failure of progressivism in 1926, Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman complained of “the radicals I know” who now “wallow in Freudian Psycho-analysis, 
which has the combined advantages of wide popular appeal in its subject matter, an imposing 
technology, and profitable use of business.” Pondering the same question, Norman Thomas 
declared “[i]t is this generation which rather than a few individuals is most at fault. We have 
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replaced creation with introspection and laugh at the Victorians upon whose stock of ideas we 
still draw without as yet having added one great new organizing principle or basic concept of our 
own.”1707 
 
Even as Sigmund Freud’s theories of the self were entering the popular consciousness, 
the work of another psychologist, James B. Watson, was also gaining adherents. As a doctoral 
student at the University of Chicago, Watson, writing his 1903 thesis on the ability of rats to 
learn a maze, had been struck by the experiments of Ivan Pavlov, who had shown that, through 
conditioning, he could make a dog salivate merely by ringing a bell. Soon thereafter, Watson 
began to apply the same hypotheses to humans. Most notoriously, he and his graduate student 
Rosalie Rayner successfully conditioned an eleven-month-old child, “Little Albert,” to be 
terrified of rats by clanging on a steel bar behind his head every time a white rat (or, sometimes, 
a bunny) was produced. Watson thought this experiment proved that fear was as potent as the sex 
drive in conditioning, thereby proving Freud wrong in some details. He mused that when Albert 
grew up and was scared of fur coats, some wrong-headed psychoanalyst would wrongly try to 
find a sexual basis for this phobia. As it happened, Albert never did grow up. Never 




In his 1914 work Behaviorism, Watson argued that his field was the only real and 
scientific form of psychology, since other schools, focusing on “consciousness,” were really just 
looking for the soul. “[T]he old psychology,” he argued, “is dominated by a kind of subtle 
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religious philosophy…No one knows just how the idea of a soul or the supernatural started. It 
probably had its origins in the general laziness of mankind.” But once one stopped focusing on 
introspection and focused solely on scientifically verifiable stimulus and response, psychology 
became a real discipline. And that discipline showed fear to be a powerful, if not the most 
powerful, influence in a human’s life. “An examination of the psychological history of people,” 
Dr. Watson contended, “will show that behavior has always been easily controlled by fear 
stimuli. If the fear element were dropped out of any religion, that religion would not long 
survive.”1709 
 
As William Leuchtenburg notes, it was “not until its third edition in 1925 that 
behaviorism – the idea that man was nothing but a machine responding to stimuli – took the 
country by storm.” By then, Watson – responding to some errant stimuli himself -- had been 
forced out of his teaching position at Johns Hopkins as a result of an illicit affair with Rayner. 
Instead, he had found a new home with the J. Walter Thompson ad agency, where he had begun 
attempting to put his theories into practice.
1710
  
The Problem of Public Opinion 
 
If Freud and Watson’s emphases on the base and irrational urges driving humankind were 
troubling to some, others saw opportunity in the new paradigm, including Freud’s own nephew, 
adman Edward Bernays. Having honed his public relation skills before the war as press 
representative for the first American tour of the Ballet Russe and during the war as a bureau 
chief under George Creel at the Committee of Public Information, Bernays set out after the war 
to apply his famous uncle’s psychoanalytic nostrums to the practice of selling soap. “The most 
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significant social, political, and industrial fact about the present century,” he argued, “is the 
increased attention which is paid to public opinion.” But “these discussions of public opinion,” 
he contended, were skipping over “the application of their findings to everyday use. None had 
taken up the working relationship between private policies and public opinion.”1711 
 
This Bernays set out to do, not only in his work for his clients -- among them Ivory Soap 
and the American Tobacco Company – but in his two books of the decade, 1923’s Crystallizing 
Public Opinion and 1928’s Propaganda. In the first of these, which aimed to “stimulate a 
scientific attitude toward the study of public relations,” Bernays described the role and newfound 
importance of the “public relations counsel.” “No single profession within the last ten years,” he 
argued, “has extended its field of usefulness more remarkably and touched upon intimate and 
important aspects of the everyday life of the world more significantly.” For the first half of the 
book, Bernays laid out the importance and social utility of his job – noting, for example, that 
because of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, everybody knows Paul Revere warned Colonial 
Massachusetts that the British were coming, but nobody has any clue who the other two riders 




More troubling for progressive purposes was the second half of the book, in which 
Bernays discussed the behavior of “The Group and Herd.” “The public relations counsel,” he 
argued, “must deal with the fact that persons who have little knowledge of a subject almost 
invariably form definite and positive judgments upon that subject.” Citing the practice of witch-
burning in the Middle Ages, Bernays argued that most everyone holds ideas in “logic-proof 
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compartments” where “prejudice superseded logic.” As such the vociferous differences between 
atheists and believers or liberals and conservatives had little to do with logical argument at all. 
“[T]he fundamental assumptions of the antagonists…are derived from herd-suggestions…[Each] 
finds in consequence the rationality of his position flawless and is quite incapable of detecting in 
it the fallacies which are obvious to his opponent, to whom that particular series of assumptions 
has not been rendered acceptable by herd suggestion.” As such, when a commonly-held opinion 
“accords with our own beliefs we call it an expression of the public conscience. When, however, 
it runs contrary to our beliefs we call it the regimentation of the public mind and are inclined to 
ascribe to it insidious propaganda.”1713 
 
In short, Bernays argued, man was not a rational being per se, but rather a creature 
particularly susceptible to herd thinking. “We may sincerely think that we vote the Republican 
ticket because we have thought out the issues of the political campaign and reached our decision 
in the cold-blooded exercise of judgment,” he argued. “The fact remains that it is just as likely 
that we voted the Republican ticket because we did so the year before or because the Republican 
platform contains a declaration of principle, no matter how vague, which awakens profound 
emotional response in us, or because our neighbor whom we do not like happens to be a 
Democrat.”1714 
 
This herd mentality, Bernays continued, was a manifestation of Freudian impulses. “The 
tendency” of an individual’s “instincts and desires which are…ruled out of conduct, when the 
conditions are favorable, [is] to seek some avenue of release and satisfaction. To the individual 
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most of these avenues of release are closed. He cannot, for example, indulge his instinct of 
pugnacity without running foul of the law. The only release which the individual can have is one 
which commands, however briefly, the approval of his fellows.” Crowd psychology, Bernays 
argued, citing psychologist Everett Dean Martin, is “‘the result of forces hidden in a personal and 
unconscious psyche of the members of the crowd, forces which are merely released by social 
gatherings of a certain sort.’ The crowd enables the individual to express himself according to his 
desire and without restraint.”1715 
 
Because of this allegiance to the herd, two things became true. For one, Bernays argued, 
the “average citizen is the world’s most efficient censor. His own mind is the greatest barrier 
between him and the facts. His own ‘logic-proof compartments,’ his own absolutism are the 
obstacles which prevent him from seeing in terms of experience and thought rather than in terms 
of group reaction.” For another, Bernays argued – citing the work of another psychologist, 
William Trotter – an individual’s desire to remain in the herd resulted in certain characteristics of 
particular interest to the public relations man. For example, “‘he is intolerant and fearful of 
solitude, physical or mental’…Man is  never so much at home as when on the bandwagon,” or 
“‘[h]e is more sensitive to the voice of the herd than to any other influence,’” or “‘[h]e is 
remarkably susceptible to leadership.’”1716  
 
Along with the “seven primary instincts” identified by Freudian psychoanalysts – “flight-
fear, repulsion-disgust, curiosity-wonder, pugnacity-anger, self-display-elation, self-abasement-
subjection, [and] parental-love-tenderness,” – these herd concerns were the traits that a good 
                                                          
1715
 Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, 101-102.  
1716




public relations representative should exploit. “People accept the facts that come to them through 
existing channels. They like to hear new things in accustomed ways. They have neither the time 
nor the inclination to search for facts that are not readily available to them.” In short, Bernays 
argued, “[t]he appeal to the instincts and the universal desires is the basic method through which 
he produces his results.”1717 
 
Bernays concluded Crystallizing Public Opinion with a vaguely perfunctory appeal to use 
these new powers for good. “It is certain that the power of public opinion is constantly increasing 
and will keep on increasing,” he wrote. “The danger which this development contains for a 
progressive ennobling of human society and a progressive heightening of human culture is 
apparent. The duty of the higher strata of society – the cultivated, the learned, the expert, the 
intellectual – is therefore clear. They must inject moral and spiritual motives into public opinion. 
Public opinion must become public conscience.”1718   
 
Fair enough. But instead, Bernays, like so many of his contemporaries, used these 
newfound powers to sell things. As historian of advertising Roland Marchand points out, the 
1920s saw a dramatic rise in “scare copy”: “Known in trade jargon as ‘the negative appeal,’ 
scare copy sought to jolt the potential consumer into a new consciousness by enacting dramatic 
episodes of social failures and accusing judgments. Jobs were lost, romances cut short, and 
marriages threatened. Germs attacked, cars skidded out of control, and neighbors cast 
disapproving glances.” Arguably the ne plus ultra of this technique in the 1920s was Listerine’s 
“halitosis” campaign, which turned sales of the antiseptic mouthwash from $100,000 a year in 
1920 and 1921 to over $4 million a year in 1927. Depicting various instances, usually involving 
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the opposite sex, when bad breath – now given the scientific-sounding name “halitosis” – had 
resulted in disaster, Listerine ads, Marchand writes, “took the form of quick-tempo sociodramas 
in which readers were invited to identify with temporary victims in tragedies of social shame.” 
Playing on both the desire for sex and the fear of rejection, Listerine’s campaign showed both the 
promise and the potency of advertisers’ expanded tool kit.1719   
 
As for Bernays himself, among other endeavors he put forward a “saturation campaign” 
for “transparent velvet” to “titillate the spending emotions of 3 ½ million women, all potential 
customers” on behalf of Sidney Blumenthal. He also pioneered the use of “happenings” to 
encourage sales – those who missed out were out of the loop, and thus subject to the ridicule of 
their peers. In this manner, he argued, “the public receives the desired impression, often without 
being conscious of it.” Clarence Darrow told readers of The American Mercury in 1925 of the 
“psychological artillery” and subliminal arts of persuasion now gracing advertising textbooks. 
“There must be enough desire in any particular instance to over-balance all other obstacles and 
make the man desire to do the thing more for some reason – either concealed or expressed – than 
he desires not to do it,” one such tome read. “The whole question is, can the salesman produce 
this much desire?” One way to do it is look “a prospect straight in the eye, it gives him no chance 
to reason or reflect. An idea is planted on the subjective mind. It is not analyzed. It is not 
compared with some past experience. It is taken as truth.” That same year, Stuart Chase did the 
math for TNR and figured out that “[i]n America one dollar is spent to educate consumers in 
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what they may or may not want to buy, for every 70 cents that is spent for all other kinds of 
education – primary, secondary, high school, university.”1720  
 
By the time of his 1928 follow-up tome Propaganda, Bernays, his once-emerging 
profession now enthroned, was even more dismissive of the old progressive notion of individual 
self-improvement through enlightened reason. “The conscious and intelligent manipulation of 
the organized habits and opinions of the masses,” he now argued, “is an important element in 
democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an 
invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country.” The “executive arm” of this 
ruling cabal was propaganda. “Universal literacy was supposed to educate the common man to 
control his environment,” Bernays contended. “Once he could read and write he would have a 
mind fit to rule. So ran the democratic doctrine. But instead of a mind, universal literacy has 
given him rubber stamps, rubber stamps inked with advertising slogans, with editorials, with 
published scientific data, with the trivialities of the tabloids and the platitudes of history, but 
quite innocent of original thought.”1721 
 
To take an example, Bernays offered the Klan. “When an Imperial Wizard, sensing what 
is perhaps hunger for an ideal, offers a picture of a nation all Nordic and nationalistic, the 
common man of the older American stock, feeling himself elbowed out of his rightful position 
and prosperity by the newer immigrant stocks, grasps the picture which fits in so neatly with his 
prejudices, and makes it his own. He buys the sheet and pillowcase costume, and bands with his 
fellows by the thousand into a huge group powerful enough to swing state elections and to throw 
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a ponderous monkey wrench into a national convention.” No matter what aspect of American life 
one was talking about – “[c]harity, as well as business, and politics, and literature” – all “have 
had to adopt propaganda, for the public must be regimented into giving money just as it must be 
regimented into tuberculosis prophylaxis.” In every case, the “mind of the people [was] made up 
for it by the group leaders in whom it believes and those whose persons who understood the 
manipulation of public opinion. It is composed of inherited prejudices and symbols and clichés 
and verbal formulas supplied to them by their leaders.”1722 
 
 The most supportive fellow traveler of Bernays among the progressive intelligentsia, and 
a source he cited often in Crystallizing Public Opinion, was Walter Lippmann. Like Bernays, 
Lippmann had been influenced by Freud’s theories out of the gate. In 1913, he had invited 
Freud’s apostle, A.A. Brill, to Mabel Dodge’s famous salon in Greenwich Village to further get 
the word out among New York’s intellectual class. His book that same year, A Preface to 
Politics, and its 1914 follow-up Drift and Mastery both showed the influence of Freud’s ideas. “I 
cannot help feeling,” Lippmann declared of Freud in 1915, “that for his illumination, for his 
steadiness and brilliancy of mind, he may rank among the greatest who have contributed to 
thought.”1723 
 
As his biographer, Ronald Steel, notes, Lippmann understood from very early on that the 
Freudian view of man posed a problem for progressives, one he tried to address in A Preface to 
Politics. “Instead of trying to crush badness we must turn the power behind it to good account,” 
Lippmann wrote. “Instead of tabooing our impulses, we must direct them” toward “civilizing 
opportunities.” In other words, Lippmann argued in 1913, human beings could still be improved, 
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but it was an improvement that must take account of the Freudian architecture of the brain. It 
could only be done by recognizing man’s fundamental irrationality and “supplying our passions 
with civilized interests.” (Hence, Lippmann’s two-tiered approach to censorship noted earlier.) 
As the Twenties progressed, however, Lippmann became increasingly pessimistic about the 
ability of the public to reason their way toward an enlightened public opinion.
1724
   
 
 At first, Lippmann confined his critique of public opinion to the inability of journalists to 
report the news. In August 1920, as the flames of the Red Scare were at last cooling to embers, 
he and Charles Merz published “A Test of the News” in The New Republic, which examined in 
detail the coverage of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath in the New York Times. “It is 
admitted that a sound public opinion cannot exist without access to the news,” they contended. 
“There is today a widespread and a growing doubt whether there exists such an access to the 
news about contentious affairs.” Since the Times was “as great as any newspaper in America and 
far greater than the majority” – indeed, it was “one of the really great newspapers of the world” – 




After reading through “thirty-six months and over one thousand issues” of the paper – 
“without animus against the Times, and with much admiration for its many excellent qualities” – 
Lippmann and Merz were forced to conclude that “[f]rom the point of view of professional 
journalism the reporting of the Russian Revolution is nothing short of a disaster. On the essential 
questions the net effect was almost always misleading, and misleading news is worse than none 
at all.” To wit, the Times had consistently underestimated the durability of the Bolshevik 
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government and overestimated the strength of counter-revolutionary White forces: “[W]hen 
Kolchak, Deniken, and Yudenitch were moving forward, they were always on the point of 
capturing Petrograd or Moscow; when they were retreating along the whole line (if they got into 
the news at all) they were always about to make a fresh stand.” There had also been much 
inflated reporting of the Red Peril variety – that the Bolsheviks, for example, were planning to 
invade Poland any minute: “The German Peril as the reason for intervention ceased with the 
armistice; the Red Peril almost immediately afterwards supplanted it.”1726 
 
In short, Lippmann and Merz concluded, “[t]he news as a whole is dominated by the 
hopes of the men who composed the news organization…The chief censor and the chief 
propagandist were hope and fear in the minds of reporters and editors. They wanted to win the 
war, they wanted to ward off bolshevism…For subjective reasons they accepted and believed 
most of what they were told by the State Department…and the agents and adherents of the old 
regime all over Europe.” These reporters and editors had displayed a “boundless credulity, and 
an untiring readiness to be gulled, and on many occasions…a downright lack of common sense.” 
In other words, journalists weren’t bad people – they, as per human nature, had just seen what 
they wanted to see. They had “surrendered the fundamental tradition of good journalism by 
failing to resist the editorial invasion of its news columns.”1727  
 
In ascribing the faults of news coverage to the inherent subjectivity of journalists, 
Lippmann and Merz were pointing in the direction of the former’s later works of the decade. For 
now, they argued, reporters and editors “were performing the supreme duty in a democracy of 
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supplying the information on which public opinion feeds, and they were derelict in that 
duty…[W]hatever the excuses, the apologies, and the extenuation, the fact remains that a great 
people in a supreme crisis could not secure the minimum of necessary information on a 
supremely important event.” As such, a “fundamental task of the Twentieth Century” was “the 
insurance to a free people of such supply of news that a free government can be successfully 
administered.” This question, they concluded, “touches the core of democracy, for without 
reliable and disinterested news, representative government is a farce.” Arguing much the same in 
1924, a despairing George Creel lamented that “the very existence of a forceful, effective public 
opinion is much to be doubted…[T]he noise and unintelligibility of a large portion of the press, 
the lack of trustworthy information, the dreary routine of mudslinging that passes for political 
discussion…have killed public opinion, or rather deafened it, confused it, bored it, disgusted 
it.”1728  
 
Lippmann and Merz’s critique of the press built on a book Lippmann released the same 
year, Liberty and the News – which was mostly reprints of Atlantic Monthly articles he had 
written in 1919 and 1920. “Everywhere to-day men are conscious that somehow they must deal 
with questions more intricate than any that church or school has prepared them to understand,” 
Lippmann argued. “Increasingly they know that they cannot understand them if the facts are not 
quickly and steadily available.” The question facing the country, he declared, was “whether 
government by consent could survive in a time when the manufacture of consent is an 
unregulated private enterprise. For in an exact sense the present crisis of western democracy is a 
crisis in journalism”: 
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All that the sharpest critics of democracy have alleged is true, if there is no steady supply of 
trustworthy and relevant news. Incompetence and aimlessness, corruption and disloyalty, panic 
and disaster must come to any people which is denied an assured access to the facts. No one can 





In Liberty and the News, Lippmann argued that the problem with journalism was not 
corruption per se – although there was much of that also – but the belief that “edification was 
more important than veracity.” In other words, all too many journalists and editors thought that 
their job was not to report the news as it happened, but to tell the public “what is good for it.” 
The solution to this crisis, therefore, was more disinterested newsmen who have been trained to 
“seek the truth, to reveal it and publish it…[who] care more for that than the privilege of arguing 
about ideas in a fog of uncertainty.” In the “Test of the News,” however, Lippmann and Merz 
suggested that it was not just bad prioritizing but the unconscious biases of journalists that were 
diminishing the reliability of news coverage. Both of these contentions – that the human brain 
was necessarily subjective and irrational and that a disinterested class of experts was needed to 





In arguably his most influential book, 1922’s Public Opinion, Lippmann moved the onus 
of malformed public opinion away from journalists and towards what he now thought a more 
fundamental problem with democratic life. “[T]he troubles of the press,” he now argued, “like 
the troubles of representative government, be it territorial or functional, like the troubles of 
industry, be it capitalist, cooperative, or communist, go back to a common source: to the failure 
of self-governing people to transcend their casual experience and their prejudice.” This was why 
“governments, schools, newspapers, and churches make such small headway against the more 
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obvious failings of democracy, against violent prejudice, apathy, preference for the curious 
trivial as against the dull important, and the hunger for sideshows and three legged calves. This is 
the primary defect of popular government…all its other defects can, I believe, be traced to this 
one.”1731  
 
Reflecting all the discontent and disenchantment he and his contemporaries had 
experienced in the post-war years, Lippmann’s Public Opinion was a dagger aimed at the heart 
of several long-standing progressive certainties. “[I]t is no longer possible,” he contended, “to 
believe in the original dogma of democracy; that the knowledge needed for the management of 
human affairs comes up spontaneously from the human heart.” This was not only because, in a 
complicated age, it was impossible for the average man or woman to learn everything they 
needed to know, but because, being fundamentally irrational, they did not even live in and 
experience the same reality as one another. Bringing Freud’s arguments to bear on Plato’s cave, 
Lippmann argued that “the casual fact, the creative imagination, the will to believe” all conspired 
to create “a counterfeit of reality” or “pseudo-environment” in which people lived out their days. 
“[I]t is clear enough that under certain conditions men respond as powerfully to fictions as they 
do to realities, and that in many ways they help to create the very fictions to which they 
respond.” On “subjects of great public importance,” reason was not in the driver’s seat – instead, 
“the threads of memory and emotion are in a snarl.”1732  
 
The average human, Lippmann argued, saw the world not in terms of reality but through 
half-formed stereotypes. As such, “[t]he common interests very largely elude public opinion 
entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class.” And so the intentions of enlightened 
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statesmen should not be “to burden every citizen with expert opinions on all questions, but to 
push that burden away from him towards the responsible administrator.”1733  
 
Lippmann continued this line of argument even more emphatically in his 1925 follow-up, 
The Phantom Public. Progressives had always assumed that if the average voter would only 
“read and more better newspapers, if only he would listen to more lectures and read more 
reports, he would be gradually trained to direct public affairs. The whole assumption is 
false…No scheme of education can equip him in advance for all the problems of mankind.” 
Thus, “the problems that vex democracy seem to be unmanageable by democratic methods.” “If 
the voter cannot grasp the details of the problems of the day because he has not the time, the 
interest, or the knowledge, he will not have a better public opinion because he is asked to express 
his opinion more often.”1734 
 
Democracy and the idea of the public were mystical notions, Lippmann argued, and the 
entire engine of progressivism to that point – enlightened public opinion changing the world – 
was based on ephemera, the phantom of the title. “The work of the world goes on continually 
without conscious direction from public opinion,” he concluded. “For though we may prefer to 
believe that the aim of popular action should be to do justice or promote the true, the beautiful, 
and the good, the belief will not maintain itself in the face of plain experience. The public does 
not know in most cases what specifically is the truth and the justice of the case, and men are not 
agreed on what is beautiful and good. Nor does the public rouse itself normally at the existence 
of evil.” In fact, “when public opinion attempts to govern directly it is either a failure or a 
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tyranny.” Instead, the real task of democratic government fell to enlightened administrators who 
could broker among competing visions of the world, and then channel public opinion toward 
constructive problems. “The public must be put in its place so that it may exercise its powers, but 
no less and perhaps even more, so that each of us may live free of the trampling and the roar of a 
bewildering herd.”1735 
 
Lippmann’s sustained assault on the foundations of progressive philosophy did not go 
unnoticed. “No completer picture of the hopeless inability of the average member of the human 
race to grasp the vital problems of the day has been painted,” Ernest Gruening wrote of Public 
Opinion in The Nation. “Mr. Lippmann’s treatment is almost wholly objective…With these 
major premises there can be no disagreement.” A shaken William Borah told the New York 
World that The Phantom Public was “one of those rare books which startles one into a realization 
of how stupendous is the task before us as a people if we are to carry a successful conclusion the 
work initiated in 1789.”  H.L. Mencken, meanwhile, was happy to discover after reading the 
same book that Lippmann, “having started out with such high hopes for democracy…[had] come 
to the conclusion that the masses are ignorant and unteachable.” “There are few living, I think,” 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote one correspondent of Lippmann, “who so discern and 
articulate the nuances of the human mind.”1736   
 
For his part, John Dewey deemed Public Opinion “perhaps the most effective indictment 
of democracy as currently conceived ever penned” and gamely tried to defend democracy from 
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Lippmann’s critique in his own 1927 work, The Public and his Problems, based on a 1926 
lecture series at Kenyon College. Through much of the book, Dewey suggested that Lippmann’s 
basic analysis was correct. “There was a time when a man might entertain a few general political 
principles and apply them with some confidence. A citizen believed in states’ rights or in a 
centralized federal government, in free trade or protection.” But now, Dewey conceded, the 
“social situation has been so changed by the factors of an industrial age that traditional general 
principles have little practical meaning. They persist as emotional cries rather than as reasoned 
ideas.” Given this problem, “the conditions upon which depends the emergence of the Public 
from its eclipse” were so tenuous that it “will seem close to denial of the possibility of realizing 
the idea of a democratic public.” In fact, some could argue “that the democratic movement was 
essentially transitional. It marked the passage from feudal institutions to industrialism, and was 
coincident with the transfer of power from landed proprietors…to captains of industry.”1737 
 
But Dewey was not ready to give up just yet.  “It is not that there is no public, no large 
body of persons having a common interest in the consequences of social transactions,” he 
argued. “There is too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and too intricate in 
composition. And there are too many publics…and each one of them crosses the others and 
generates its own group of persons especially affected with little to hold these different publics 
together in an integrated whole.” The key, to Dewey, was refining the tools of communication 
between these publics. “We have the physical tools of communication as never before…Till the 
Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. 
Communication can alone create a great community.” To Dewey, this communicating was 
democracy in action – true to his pragmatist philosophy, democracy was not an ideal but a 
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process. “Democracy…is a name for a life of free and enriching communion. It had its seer in 
Walt Whitman. It will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to 
the art of full and moving communication.” 1738  
 
This required not only harnessing new technologies, but restoring the face-to-face 
dialogues of local communities – or, as he put it in Dewey-speak, “the flow of social intelligence 
when that circulates by word of mouth from one to another in the communication of the local 
community. That and that only gives reality to public opinion. We lie, as Emerson said, in the lap 
of an immense intelligence. But that intelligence is dormant and its communications are broken, 
inarticulate, and faint until it possesses the local community as its medium.”1739 
 
However hopeful, Dewey’s prescription for restoring democracy and faith in public 
opinion was more aspirational than it was useful. As historian Michael Schudson writes, “The 
Public and Its Problems never clarified how the old-time community could practically be 
restored in the Great Society nor, if it could, how it could be made compatible with modernity, 
science, and liberalism.” Dewey did, however, ably point out the dangers in Lippmann’s call for 
rule by a disinterested expert class. This, he argued, would just be another scheme of aristocracy 
reminiscent of Plato’s philosopher-kings, and the “final obstacle in the way of any aristocratic 
rule is that in the absence of an articulate voice on the part of the masses, the best do not and 
cannot remain the best, the wise cease to be wise.” At best, “a class of experts is inevitably so 
removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private 
knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all.” At worst, these experts could only 
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rule “if the intellectuals became the willing tools of big economic interests.” (Besides, as 
Lippmann himself conceded in the year The Public and Its Problems was published, this rule by 
disinterested experts had been tried with the Sacco and Vanzetti case and found wanting.) 
Instead of ceding the future to a managerial class, Dewey wanted to see “the improvement of the 
methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the 
public.”1740 
Triumph of the Cynics 
 
Despite Dewey’s good faith attempt to plead for the democratic project, his guarded 
optimism in humankind was not much in vogue during the New Era. More attuned to the spirit of 
the times was the gleeful misanthropy of Henry Louis Mencken. “Man, at his best, remains a sort 
of one-lunged animal, never completely rounded and perfect as a cockroach, say, is perfect,” 
Mencken argued in 1923. “If he shows one valuable quality, it is almost unheard of for him to 
show any other…The artist, nine times out of ten, is a dead-beat and given to the debauching of 
virgins, so-called. The patriot is a bigot, and more often than not, a bounder and a poltroon. The 
man of physical bravery is often on a level, intellectually, with a Baptist clergyman. The 
intellectual giant has bad kidneys and cannot thread a needle. In all my years of search in this 
world…I have never met a thoroughly moral man who was honorable.”1741 
 
Mencken of course, had been contemptuous of democracy and public opinion before it 
was fashionable. To take one of innumerable examples, in 1920 Mencken had applauded General 
Leonard Wood’s “genuine desire to find out what would be to the public interest, i.e. to the 
public as he understands the word, i.e. to the propertied classes and their kept idealists, of whom 
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I have the honor to be one.” In the New Era, Mencken’s time had come. “His name, already the 
war cry of the younger generation, is beginning to penetrate all quarters, even the most holy and 
reverend,” proclaimed one writer in 1921. “One finds him everywhere.” F. Scott Fitzgerald 
declared that he valued no man’s opinion more.1742 
 
By 1926, with the world seemingly come around to his point of view, Mencken published 
arguably his most full-throated attack on these cherished idols of progressivism. “Democratic 
man,” he announced in his 1926 book Notes on Democracy, “began as an ideal being, full of 
ineffable virtues and romantic wrongs – in brief as Rousseau’s noble savage...The fact continues 
to have important consequences to this day”: 
 
It remains impossible, as it was in the Eighteenth Century, to separate the democratic idea from 
the theory that there is a mystical merit, an esoteric and ineradicable rectitude, in the man at the 
bottom of the scale – that inferiority, by some strange magic, becomes a sort of superiority – nay 
the superiority of superiorities…Down there, one hears, lies a deep, illimitable reservoir of 
righteousness and wisdom. What baffles statesmen is to be solved by the people, instantly and by 
a sort of seraphic intuition. Their yearnings are pure; they alone are capable of a perfect 
patriotism; in them is the only hope of peace and happiness on this lugubrious ball! The cure for 




This belief, Mencken contended, “is now more preposterous than ever before,” for “[t]he 
dictatorship of the proletariat, tried here and there, has turned out to be – if I may venture a 
prejudiced judgment – somewhat impracticable. Even the most advanced Liberals, observing the 
thing in being, have been moved to cough sadly behind their hands.”  It wasn’t just experience 
that suggested such, Mencken argued, but science. “Man comes into the world weak and naked, 
and almost as devoid of intelligence as an oyster,” he wrote, citing John B. Watson and the 
Behaviorists, “but he brings with him a highly complex and sensitive susceptibility to 
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fear…Make a loud noise behind an infant just born, and it will shake like a Sunday-school 
superintendent taken in adultery.” This innate fear, Mencken argued, was why “the plain people, 
under democracy, never vote for anything, but always against something,” which “explains, in 
large measure the tendency of democratic states to pass over statesmen of genuine imagination 
and sound ability in favor of colourless mediocrities. The former are shining marks, and so it is 
easy for demagogues to bring them down; the latter are preferred because it is impossible to fear 
them.”1744 
 
Mencken also invoked Freud to explain the innate flaws of Homo Boobiens, although 
“[i]n these sad days, when every flapper has read Freud and ponders on the libido, there is no 
need, I take it, for me to explain” the effects of hormones on the human mind – Suffice to say 
“the new child psychology confirms the observations of the Freudians, and reinforces their 
allegation that even the most tender and innocent infant may be worthy of suspicion.” These 
inherent human flaws, for Mencken, were most evident in the agrarian “yokel.” “They may be 
safely assumed, I believe, to represent the lowest caste among civilized men. They are the 
closest, both in their avocations and in their mental processes, to primeval man…The yokel hates 
everyone who is not a yokel – and is afraid of everyone. He is democratic man in the 
altogether…The city proletarian may be flustered and run amok by ideas – ideas without any 
sense, true enough, but still ideas. The yokel has room in his head for only one. That is the idea 
that God regards him fondly, and has a high respect for him – that all other men are out of favour 
in heaven and abandoned to the devil.” As such, “Democracy, as a political scheme, may be 
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defined as a device for releasing this hatred born of envy, and for giving it the force and dignity 
of law.”1745 
 
Educating most men out of this primordial state, Mencken sighed, was quite impossible. 
“Of the sciences, as of the fine arts, the average human being, even in the most literate and 
civilized of modern States, is as ignorant as the horned cattle in the fields…Such things lie 
beyond his capacity for learning, and he has no curiosity about them.” Nor was a moral 
education of much use, for most of the time “the common man…has no yearning for moral 
perfection. What ails him in that department is simply fear of punishment, which is to say, fear of 
his neighbours. He has, in safe privacy, the morals of a variety actor.” Does the average human 
desire liberty? Of course not. “The truth is that the common man’s love of liberty, like his love of 
sense, justice, and truth, is almost wholly imaginary…[H]e is not actually happy when free; he is 
uncomfortable, a bit alarmed, and intolerably lonely. He longs for the warm, reassuring smell of 
the herd, and is willing to take the herdsman with it.” In short, all of this, Mencken said, was 
“man on the nether levels:” 
 
Such is the pet and glory of democratic states. Human progress passes him by…He still believes 
in ghosts, and has only shifted his belief in witches to the political sphere. He is still a slave to 
priests, and trembles before their preposterous magic. He is lazy, improvident and unclean…He 
can imagine nothing beautiful and he can grasp nothing true. Whenever he is confronted by a 
choice between two ideas, the one sound and the other not, he chooses almost infallibly, and by a 
sort of pathological compulsion, the one that is not…What is worth knowing he doesn’t know and 
doesn’t want to know; what he knows is not true.1746 
 
To Mencken, not even the simple Christian faith of Democratic man redeemed him. “I 
simply answer, What faith? Is it argued by any rational man that the debased Christianity 
cherished by the mob in all the Christian countries of to-day has any colourable likeness to the 
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body of ideas preached by Christ? The plain fact is that this bogus Christianity has no more 
relation to the system of Christ than it has to the system of Aristotle. It is the invention of Paul 
and his attendant rabble-rousers – a body of men exactly comparable to the corps of evangelical 
pastors of to-day, which is to say, a body devoid of sense and lamentably indifferent to common 
honesty.” Most contemporary Christians, Mencken declared, “would be repelled by Christ’s 
simple and magnificent reduction of the duties of man to the duties of a gentleman.”1747 
 
From the average American to Christianity, no sacred cow, as ever, was safe from 
Mencken’s withering pen in Notes from Democracy. Public opinion? “Public opinion, in its raw 
state, gushes out in the immemorial form of the mob’s fears. It is piped to central factories, and 
there it is flavoured and coloured and put into cans.” Progressivism? At least earlier despotisms 
had “refrained from attempts to abolish sin, poverty, stupidity, cowardice, and other such 
immutable realities…Now, each and every human problem swings into the range of practical 
politics. The worst and oldest of them may be solved facilely by traveling bands of lady Ph.D.’s, 
each bearing the mandate of a Legislature of kept men, all unfaithful to their protectors.” What of 
the long-cherished pursuit of happiness? “Here the irony that lies under all human aspiration 
shows itself: the quest for happiness, as always, brings only unhappiness in the end.” 1748 
 
In Mencken’s final analysis, the only positive attribute of American democracy was that 
it was a carnival of the grotesque. “Try to imagine anything more heroically absurd! What 
grotesque false pretences! What a parade of obvious imbecilities! What a welter of fraud! But is 
fraud unamusing?...I offer the spectacle of Americans jailed for reading the Bill of Rights as 
perhaps the most gaudily humorous ever witnessed in the modern world.” In sum, Mencken 
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concluded, for all its faults “I enjoy democracy immensely. It is incomparably idiotic, and hence 
incomparably amusing.”1749 
 
Mencken’s Notes on Democracy was not saying anything particularly new. Along with 
the recent revelations of Freud and Watson, it drew on criticisms of democracy that were derived 
from de Tocqueville and Nietzsche and had been mirrored by Bernays and Lippmann. As The 
Nation argued, the book was “essentially a burlesque translation of Mr. Mencken’s personal 
prejudices in favor of the Rabelaisian life into the form of a social manifesto…The effect is a 
huge practical joke on the last century and a half in that highly civilized preposterous vein which 
is Mencken’s genius.” Still, Mencken’s mordant jester’s tone and idol-smashing approach to 
every topic was, by all accounts, enormously influential. Indeed, his cynicism was all the more 
corrosive to progressive values for being proven, time and time again, to be prescient. After 
Notes on Democracy was published, Lippmann called Mencken “the most powerful personal 
influence upon this whole generation of educated people,” and thought his writings had had “an 
extraordinarily cleansing and vitalizing effect,” while Edmund Wilson called the book “quite 
remarkable…a sort of obverse of Whitman’s Leaves of Grass.” Naturally, the book was more 
popular in the urban centers that shared its prejudices. While Notes on Democracy did not sell 
particularly well nationwide, one reporter encountered seven different New York City subway 
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That cynicism – about man, democracy, values, and idealism in general – could be found 
throughout the culture of the Twenties. 1922 saw the publication of Harold Stearns’ Civilization 
of the United States, a compendium by thirty authors (including Mencken on politics, Zechariah 
Chafee on the law, Frederic Howe on immigrants, and George Soule on radicalism) surveying all 
the various corners of American culture and finding hypocrisy regnant in most every one. “[I]n 
most every branch of American life there is a sharp dichotomy between preaching and practice,” 
Stearns noted in his introductory essay. “we let not our right hand know what our left hand 
doeth…there are certain abstractions which are sacred to us, and if we fall short of these external 
standards in our private life, that is no reason for submitting them to a fresh examination; rather 
we are to worship them the more vociferously to show our sense of sin” As a result, “in actual 
practice the moral code resolves itself into the one cardinal heresy of being found out, with the 
chief sanction enforcing it, the fear of what people will say.”1751  
 
What’s more, Stearns and his team of scholars concluded, “the most moving and pathetic 
fact in the social life of America today is emotional and aesthetic starvation…We have no 
heritages or traditions to which to cling except those that have already withered in our hands and 
turned to dust.” If “these main contentions seem severe or pessimistic,” Stearns shrugged, “the 
answer must be: we do not write to please; we strive only to understand and to state as clearly as 
we can.” Besides, “whatever our defects, we Americans, we have one virtue and perhaps a 
saving virtue – we still know how to laugh at ourselves.” Reviewing the tome for The New 
Republic, Horace Kallen – who thought the book missed the dynamism of American life – noted 
that “[i]f thirty American intellectuals are to be believed, their country is in a bad way indeed. Its 
blacks are so very, very black, and its whites so dirty gray.” With only a very few exceptions, 
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“there is nothing, it would seem, except Puritanism, materialism, vulgarity and wealth in which 
the United States excels.”1752 
 
This same cynicism was also rife through the literature of the period. In the words of F. 
Scott Fitzgerald, a lost generation of Americans had come to adulthood “to find all Gods dead, 
all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken.” In June 1920, just as he left London for Paris, where 
an impressive host of disillusioned American writers, poets, and artists had decamped in the 
years after the war, expatriate Ezra Pound lamented in “Hugh Selwyn Mauberly” the millions 
who had perished for no reason in the World War – “the best, among them/ For an old bitch gone 
in the teeth / For a botched civilization.” In 1922’s “The Wasteland” and 1925’s “The Hollow 
Men,” T.S. Eliot conjured a bleak, nightmare world where death always looms, and there are no 
more dreams or ideals left to sustain life – “This is dead land / This is cactus land.” Here in “the 
broken jaw of our lost kingdoms,” the world would end “Not with a bang but a whimper.”1753 
 
Poets like Pound and Eliot expressed this existential despair and disgust with civilization 
in its purest form. But it could be found in countless other writers of the period as well – in the 
broken, battle-scarred veterans of Ernest Hemingway and the cruel and careless flappers of F. 
Scott Fitzgerald. In a 1922 “Interpretive Survey of Recent Fiction,” literature critic Henry Canby 
summed up what he saw as the basic plot of the emerging literature of discontent. “At the age of 
seven or thereabout [the author] sees through his parents and characterizes them in a phrase. At 
fourteen he sees through his education and begins to dodge it. At eighteen he sees through 
morality and steps over it. At twenty he loses respect for his home town, and at twenty-one 
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discovers that our social and economic system is ridiculous. At twenty-three his story ends 
because the author has run through society to date and does not know what to do next.” Among 
others, this prescient summary encapsulates much of Thomas Wolfe’s well-regarded 1929 novel 





At best, writers urged their readers to forsake attempts to improve a broken civilization 
and just enjoy life. Asked how best to make the world a livable place in 1921, Winesburg, Ohio 
author Sherwood Anderson suggested his contemporaries should drop out and form a “leisure 
class.” “I want to hear less about the future splendid physical growth of towns, factories or farms 
and more about trees, dogs, race horses, and people,” he argued. To accomplish this, Anderson 
advised “a body of healthy young men and women to agree to quit working – to loaf, to refuse to 
be hurried or try to get on in the world – in short, to become intense individualists. Something of 
the kind must happen if we are ever to bring color and a flair into our modern life.” “The next 
time a Politician goes spouting off about what this country needs,” advised Will Rogers in 1925, 
“either hit him with a tubercular Tomato or lay right back in your seat and go to sleep. Because 
THIS COUNTRY HAS GOT TOO BIG TO NEED A DAMN THING.” Similarly, Main Street 
author Sinclair Lewis argued in the same venue as Anderson for “a sense of humor, and a sense 
of beauty!” He urged readers of The Survey to refuse aid “to the spiritual demagogues who are 
campaigning for a blue-law Sunday, for an Alles Streng Verboten regime which would cause 
normal persons to turn against all reforms fine and sound.”1755 
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While other writers are now better remembered, Sinclair Lewis was the bestselling fiction 
author of the decade, the first American author to win the Nobel Prize in Literature (in 1930), 
and the only author of the Twenties to have two of his works feature as the top-selling book of 
the year – Main Street in 1921 and Elmer Gantry in 1927. Instead of the searching literary 
despair that marked many of his contemporaries, Lewis was more a cynic of the Mencken mold, 
and, according to Robert Morss Lovett, he and Mencken had become the “most read and 
considered interpreters in American life.” In effect, his books were muckraking tomes, except – 
unlike, say, Upton Sinclair, who wrote thinly-veiled fictional takes on Teapot Dome and the 
Sacco-Vanzetti case in 1927’s Oil! and 1928’s Boston respectively – Lewis, time and again, 




Released in October 1920, Main Street, Lewis’ satirical novel loosely based on his life 
growing up in Sauk Centre, Minnesota, was something of a phenomenon through 1921, selling 
over 415,000 copies. It tells the story of Carol Kennicott, an aspiring young reformer who 
marries a doctor and moves to the small Everytown of Gopher Prairie only to discover that the 
stultifying pedestrian values of the community thwart her every attempt to modernize the place. 
Much of the plot unfolds as an Invasion of the Body Snatchers-like tale of creeping suburban 
conformity, whereby every attempt by Carol to bring progress to Gopher Prairie, Minnesota is 




Throughout the book, and perhaps accounting for some of its broad appeal, Lewis gently 
satirizes the progressive foibles of his main character. Early in Main Street, he describes Carol 
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thinking of herself as a “great liberator” who “enjoyed being aloof…She wanted, just now, to 
have a cell in a settlement-house, like a nun without the bother of a black robe, and be kind, and 
read Bernard Shaw, and enormously improve a horde of grateful poor.” As one of Carol’s few 
progressive-minded friends in town chides her later in the book, “You sneer so easily. I’m sorry, 
but I do think there’s something essentially cheap in your attitude. Especially about religion. If 
you must know, you’re not a sound reformer at all. You’re an impossibilist. And you give up too 
easily. You gave up on the new city-hall, the anti-fly campaign, club papers, the library board, 
the dramatic association – just because we didn’t graduate into Ibsen the very first thing. You 
want perfection all at once.”1758 
 
But these moments aside, the focus of Lewis’ most withering satire is rather clearly not 
on Carol Kennicott’s good intentions, but the soul-crushing drabness of small-town American 
life. “It was not only the unsparing unapologetic ugliness and the rigid straightness which 
overwhelmed her,” Lewis writes of Carol’s first view of the eponymous Main Street. “It was the 
planlessness, the flimsy temporariness of the buildings, their faded unpleasant colors. The street 
was cluttered with electric-light poles, telephone poles, gasoline pumps for motor cars, boxes of 
goods. Each man has built with the most valiant disregard for all the others.” Throughout the 
book, seemingly good-natured residents of the town continually espouse the virtues of Harding 
normalcy to Carol. “I certainly hope you don’t class yourself with a lot of trouble-making labor 
leaders, “says one. “Democracy is all right theoretically, and I’ll admit there are industrial 
injustices, but I’d rather have them than see the world reduced to a dead level of mediocrity.” 
“All this profit-sharing and welfare work and insurance and old-age pension is simply 
poppycock,” pronounces another. “Enfeebles a workman’s independence – and wastes a lot of 
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honest profit…[T]hese suffragettes and God knows what all buttinskis there are that are trying to 
tell a business man how to run his business, and some of these college professors are just about 
as bad, the whole kit and bilin’ of ‘em are nothing in God’s world but socialism in disguise!’”1759 
 
Writing Sinclair Lewis in 1920, William Allen White, well known as a champion of 
small-town values, gushed wildly over the book. “It has been years since I have read anything so 
splendidly conceived and so skillfully executed as Main Street,” the Sage of Emporia 
proclaimed. “I don’t know where in literature you will find a better American, or more typical, 
than Dr. Will Kennicott. Of course, Gopher Prairie is my habitat…If I were a millionaire, I 
should buy a thousand of those books and send them to my friends, and then I would go bribe the 
legislature of Kansas to make ‘Main Street’ compulsory reading in the public schools. No 
American has done a greater service for his country in any sort of literature.”1760  
 
But White, it seems, missed much of the satire. Will Kennicott – Carol’s doctor husband 
– is also the character who, when Carol complains about a Non-Partisan League member not 
being allowed to speak in town, eventually screams at her, “That’ll be all from you!”:  
 
I’ve stood for your sneering at this town, and saying how ugly and dull it is…But one thing I’m 
not going to stand: I’m not going to stand my own wife being seditious. You can camouflage all 
you want to, but you know darn well that these radicals, as you call ‘em, are opposed to the war, 
and let me tell you right here and now, and you and all these long-haired men and short-haired 
women can beef all you want to, but we’re going to take these fellows, and, if they ain’t patriotic, 
we’re going to make them be patriotic. And – Lord knows I never thought I’d have to say this to 
my own wife – but if you go defending these fellows, then the same thing applies to you! Next 
thing, I suppose you’ll be yapping about free speech. Free speech! There’s too much free speech 
and free gas and free beer and free love and all the rest of your damned mouthy freedom, and if I 




                                                          
1759
 Ibid, 197-198, 53. 
1760
 White to Sinclair Lewis, November 23, 1920. White, Selected Letters, 211-212.  
1761





Eventually Carol leaves her husband for a time and moves back to Washington DC. 
There, she gains “not information about office-systems and labor unions but renewed courage, 
that amiable contempt called poise. Her glimpse of tasks involving millions of people and a score 
of nations reduced Main Street from bloated importance to its actual pettiness.”1762 
 
Similarly, it’s hard to imagine White nodding along in agreement to Carol’s devastating 
summary of life in Gopher Prairie midway through the book: “With such a small-town life a 
[Will] Kennicott…is content,” she (and Lewis) argue, “but there are also hundreds of thousands, 
particularly women and young men, who are not at all content”: 
 
The more intelligent young people (and the fortunate widows!) flee to the cities with agility and, 
despite the fictional tradition, resolutely stay there, seldom returning even for holidays. The most 
protesting patriots of the town leave them in old age, if they can afford it, and go to live in 
California or in the cities. 
 
The reason, Carol insisted, is not a whiskered rusticity. It is nothing so amusing! 
 
It is an unimaginatively standardized background, a sluggishness of speech and manners, a rigid 
ruling of the spirit by the desire to appear respectable. It is contentment…the contentment of the 
quiet dead, who are scornful of the living, for their restless walking. It is negation canonized as 
the one positive virtue. It is the prohibition of happiness. It is slavery self-sought and self-
defended. It is dullness made God. 
 
A savorless people, gulping tasteless food, and sitting afterward, coatless and thoughtless, in 
rocking-chairs prickly with inane decorations, listening to mechanical music, saying mechanical 
things about the excellence of Ford automobiles, and viewing themselves as the greatest race in 
the world…She felt herself being ironed into glossy mediocrity, and she rebelled, in fear. 
 
The respectability of the Gopher Prairies, said Carol, is reinforced by vows of poverty and 
chastity in the matter of knowledge. Except for half a dozen in each town the citizens are proud of 
that achievement of ignorance which it is so easy to come by. To be ‘intellectual’ or ‘artistic’ or, 
in their own words, to be ‘highbrow,’ is to be priggish and of dubious virtue.1763 
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And it was not just Gopher Prairie. “Nine-tenths of the American towns are so alike that 
it is the completest boredom to wander from one to another,” Carol concluded. “Always, west of 
Pittsburgh, and often, east of  it, there is the same lumber yard, the same railroad station, the 
same Ford garage, the same creamery, the same box-like houses and two-story shops.” Given 




Nonetheless, Main Street was not a fluke. His 1922 follow-up, Babbitt, also managed to 
be an incisive, even arguably mean-spirited satire that nonetheless enjoyed plaudits from the 
people being satirized. It tells the story of George F. Babbitt, an occasionally Walter Mitty-like 
realtor who lives out his days in the town of Zenith – slightly larger than Gopher Prairie – trying 
to succeed in business and in life by going to Booster Club meetings and church religiously and 
generally doing what he’s supposed to. Like Will Kennicott before him, Babbitt aims to be 
resolutely, almost aggressively “normal,” in the Harding sense, in everything he does. At one 
point, in one of the most satirical monologues in the book, Babbitt gives a speech to the Zenith 
Real Estate Board on “Our Ideal Citizen.” “I picture him first and foremost as being busier than a 
bird-dog,” Babbitt tells his audience of similarly-minded businessmen, “not wasting a lot of good 
time in day-dreaming or going to sassiety teas or kicking about things that are none of his 
business, but putting the zip into some store or profession or art.”: 
 
With all modesty, I want to stand up here as a representative business man and gently whisper, 
“Here’s our kind of folks! Here’s the specifications of the Standardized American Citizen! Here’s 
the new generation of Americans: fellows with hair on their chests and smiles in their eyes and 
adding-machines in their offices. We’re not doing any boasting, but we like ourselves firstrate, 
and if you don’t like us, look out—better get under cover before the cyclone hits town !”… 
 
I tell you, Zenith and her sister-cities are producing a new type of civilization. There are many 
resemblances between Zenith and these other burgs, and I’m darn glad of it! The extraordinary, 
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growing, and sane standardization of stores, offices, streets, hotels, clothes, and newspapers 
throughout the United States shows how strong and enduring a type is ours… 
 
Every intelligent person knows that Zenith manufactures more condensed milk and evaporated 
cream, more paper boxes, and more lighting-fixtures, than any other city in the United States, if 
not in the world. But it is not so universally known that we also stand second in the manufacture 
of package butter, sixth in the giant realm of motors and automobiles, and somewhere about third 
in cheese, leather findings, tar roofing, breakfast food, and overalls!... 
 
But the way of the righteous is not all roses. Before I close I must call your attention to a problem 
we have to face, this coming year. The worst menace to sound government is not the avowed 
socialists but a lot of cowards who work under cover—the long-haired gentry who call 
themselves “liberals” and “radicals” and “non-partisan” and “intelligentsia” and God only knows 
how many other trick names! Irresponsible teachers and professors constitute the worst of this 
whole gang, and I am ashamed to say that several of them are on the faculty of our great State 
University! The U. is my own Alma Mater, and I am proud to be known as an alumni, but there 
are certain instructors there who seem to think we ought to turn the conduct of the nation over to 
hoboes and roustabouts. 
 
Those profs are the snakes to be scotched—they and all their milk-and-water ilk! The American 
business man is generous to a fault, but one thing he does demand of all teachers and lecturers 
and journalists: if we’re going to pay them our good money, they’ve got to help us by selling 
efficiency and whooping it up for rational prosperity! And when it comes to these blab-mouth, 
faultfinding, pessimistic, cynical University teachers, let me tell you that during this golden 
coming year it’s just as much our duty to bring influence to have those cusses fired as it is to sell 
all the real estate and gather in all the good shekels we can. 
 
Not till that is done will our sons and daughters see that the ideal of American manhood and 
culture isn’t a lot of cranks sitting around chewing the rag about their Rights and their Wrongs, 
but a God-fearing, hustling, successful, two-fisted Regular Guy, who belongs to some church 
with pep and piety to it, who belongs to the Boosters or the Rotarians or the Kiwanis, to the Elks 
or Moose or Red Men or Knights of Columbus or any one of a score of organizations of good, 
jolly, kidding, laughing, sweating, upstanding, lend-a-handing Royal Good Fellows, who plays 
hard and works hard, and whose answer to his critics is a square-toed boot that’ll teach the 






H.L. Mencken, for one, ate of this all up with a spoon. “I know of no American novel that 
more accurately presents the real America,” he raved in The Smart Set. “As an old professor of 
Babbitry, I welcome him as an almost-perfect specimen, a genuine museum piece. Every 
American city swarms with his brothers…They are the Leading Citizens, the speakers at 
banquets, the profiteers, the corrupters of politics, the supporters of evangelical Christianity, the 
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peers of the realm. Babbitt is their archetype.” Study Babbitt, Mencken declared, “and you will 
know better what is the matter with the land we live in than you would know after plowing 
through a thousand such volumes as Walter Lippmann’s ‘Public Opinion.’ What Lippmann tried 
to do as a professor, laboriously and without imagination, Lewis has here done as an artist with a 
few vivid strokes.”1766 
 
But even as Mencken applauded Lewis’s satire, the official organ of the Chamber of 
Commerce urged its readers to “Dare to be Babbitt!...Good Rotarians live orderly lives, and save 
money, and go to church, and play golf, and send their children to school…Would not the world 
be better with more Babbitts and few of those who cry ‘Babbitt!’?” Similarly, an editorial by a 
businessman in American Magazine channeled George F. Babbitt in a way that would have filled 
Mencken with a devilish mirth. Entitled “Why I Never Hire Brilliant Men,” it argued, as 
historian John Barry notes, that “business and life are built upon successful mediocrity.”1767 
 
Despite increasingly grappling with the demons of alcoholism, Lewis was remarkably 
prolific over the course of the decade. His 1925 book Arrowsmith, about the coming-of-age of a 
young doctor (and by extension a satirical inquiry into the careerism of the evolving medical 
establishment) won the Pulitzer Prize, which Lewis turned down. 1926 saw Lewis publish 
Mantrap, a love triangle and adventure novel set in the Saskatchewan, 1928 a long-form piece 
called The Man Who Knew Coolidge – a series of Babbitt-esque lectures delivered on a train by a 
fellow who had once met the president, and 1929 Dodsworth, about a retiree and his wife 
journeying through Europe and discovering the expat life. But his most popular book in the 
                                                          
1766
 Brown, 17. H.L. Mencken, “Portrait of an American Citizen,” The Smart Set, September, 1922 (Vol. 69, No 1), 
138-139. 
1767




second half of the decade was 1927’s Elmer Gantry, which Lewis dedicated to Mencken, and 





A dissolute former college football star from the Baptist-founded Terwillinger College, 
Elmer “Hell-cat” Gantry “got everything from the church and Sunday School” growing up 
“except, perhaps, any longing whatever for democracy and kindness and reason.” Nonetheless, 
he eventually becomes a minister both for all the wrong reasons – namely, the sense of power he 
enjoys over the flock while preaching (“Never knew I could spiel like that! Easy as feetball!”) – 
and by them. (Gantry plagiarizes one of his early sermons from an “atheistic” classmate.) He 
then spends the rest of the book having various misadventures that cast ignominy on evangelical 
religion and its adherents, including sleeping around and eventually falling in with an Aimee 
Semple McPherson-like evangelist named Sharon Falconer. (“It was not her eloquence but her 
healing of the sick which raised Sharon to such eminence that she promised to become the most 
renowned evangelist in America. People were tired of eloquence; and the whole evangelist 
business was limited, since even the most ardent were not likely to be saved more than three of 
four times. But they could be healed constantly, and of the same disease.”)1769  
 
Throughout the book, Gantry remains an out-and-out charlatan who knows his sermons 
are “pure and uncontaminated bunk. No one could deny his theories because none of his theories 
meant anything. It did not matter what he said, so long as he kept them listening; and he enjoyed 
the buoyance of his power as he bespelled his classes with long, involved, fruity sentences 
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rhapsodic as perfume advertisements.” Gantry is also an obvious hypocrite, as were his more 
ardent followers. In one sermon, Gantry “explained that hatred was low. However, for the benefit 
of the more leathery and zealous deacons down front, he permitted them to hate all Catholics, all 
persons who failed to believe in hell and immersion, and all rich mortgage-holders[.]” 
Anticipating Lewis’s later book about fascism in America, It Can’t Happen Here, both the lies 
and hypocrisies help Gantry to climb the ranks over the course of the novel. By the end, he has 
become not just the pastor of a Methodist church in New York City – not unlike John Roach 
Straton – but the head of the National Association for the Purification of Art and the Press 
(NAPAP). “Dear Lord, they work is yet begun!” Gantry proclaims in the novel’s final moments. 
“We shall yet make these United States a moral nation!”1770 
 
As Lewis biographer Richard Lingeman colorfully put it, “Elmer Gantry hit America like 
a Sunday punch in the jaw.” Lewis, a TIME cover story decreed, “whose position as National 
Champion Castigator is challenged only by his fellow idealist, Critic Henry Louis Mencken, has 
made another large round-up of grunting, whining, roaring, mewing, driveling snouting creatures 
– of fiction – which, like an infuriated swineherd, he can beat, goad, tweak, tail-twist, eye-jab, 
belly-thwack, spatter with sty-filth, and consign to perdition...This time, the Castigator, instead 
of exerting his greatest efforts,” however, had singled “out the biggest boar in sight and 
hound[ed] him into a gratifyingly slimy slough.” The nation’s men of faith were not amused. 
While Gantry very quickly became the best-selling fiction book of 1927, there would be no 
threading the needle between satire and the satirized this time. John Roach Straton called the 
book “bunk” and the “figments of a disordered imagination.” William Allen White, who had so 
loved Main Street, thought God had struck Lewis’ artistic side dead. From the echoes of Lewis’ 
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original Gopher Prairie, Sauk Center Congregational Church’s minister C.S. Sparkles, who had 
recently helped to bury the author’s father, said that Elmer Gantry showed that “the unclean 
mind of the author” was “dead – dead to goodness and purity and righteousness.” H.L. Mencken, 
meanwhile, stood up for the book, although he told his friend Lewis in private it was equivalent 
to Babbitt, “except the last 30,000 words, which you wrote in a state of liquor.”1771 
 
Lippmann was also highly critical of Lewis, and not just for Elmer Gantry. While an 
admirer of Mencken’s, Lippmann had worried that the Sage of Baltimore’s caustic, often insult-
heavy approach was eating through any chance at ever fixing the problems of public opinion. As 
The Nation’s Benjamin Stolberg aptly summed up the crux of Lippmann’s Mencken problem, “at 
bottom Mr. Mencken’s joke on democracy is Mr. Lippmann’s dilemma with it.” “Have we the 
right to believe that human reason can uncover the mechanism of unreason, and so in the end 
master it?” Lippmann asked Judge Learned Hand soon after publishing Public Opinion. Given 
that “the rate at which science expands is much slower than the pace of politics,” it seemed 
unlikely to him. “I think the Hearsts will overwhelm us before they are tamed…But there is one 
thing I’m sure of…We can’t beat the Hearsts by using their methods, as Mencken, for example, 
thinks. We’d merely be Hearsts in the end. We have to do the other thing, even if we get 
licked.”1772  
 
The satires of Sinclair Lewis, Lippmann believed, carried all the same dangers as 
Mencken without the upside. “Mr. Mencken is a true metropolitan,” Lippmann argued in a 
vicious June 1927 essay soon after Elmer Gantry was published. “Mr. Lewis is a half-baked 
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metropolitan. He has just arrived in the big city. He has the new sophistication of one who is 
bursting to write the folks back home and let them know what tremendous fellows we are who 
live in the great capitals.” More than anything, Lippmann argued, Lewis was a “mere inventor of 
new prejudices” and “a revolted provincial…too much a part of the revolt he describes ever for 
long to understand it.” “Mr. Lewis has an extraordinary talent for inventing stereotypes,” 
Lippmann conceded. “He has prospered by inventing and marketing useful devices for seeing the 
American scene quickly. His psychological inventions are being used by millions of Americans 
to express their new, disillusioned sense of America. They are wholly mechanical and they are 
completely standardized now that they have passed into common use…A Babbitt is no longer a 
man; he is a prejudice.”1773 
 
Having said all that, Lippmann thought Elmer Gantry was a new low. “It is the study of a 
fundamentalist clergyman in the United States, portrayed as utterly evil in order to injure the 
fundamentalists. The calumny is elaborate and deliberate…It is intellectually of a piece with the 
sort of propaganda which says that John Smith is an atheist, and that he beats his wife…in 
“Elmer Gantry” the revolted Puritan has become fanatical. The book is a witch-burning to make 
an atheist holiday.” In fact, Lippmann was so infuriated by Elmer Gantry that he broke ties with 
his mutual publisher, Harcourt Brace, informing them they did “not provide any longer the right 
medium for such books as I write.”1774 
 
Lippmann’s reading of Lewis is incisive with regard to stereotypes and prejudices, as is 
his venomous evisceration of Gantry, a book Lewis ultimately pieced together between alcoholic 
binges. And yet, his distinction between the Mencken and Lewis brands of cynicism doesn’t 
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really measure up. The problem with Lewis, Lippmann maintained in his essay, was that there 
“is no evidence in his writing that he knows or cares much about the good things which the 
world city contains, as Mr. Mencken does with his German music, his fine sense of learning, and 
his taste for speculation about genus homo apart from his manifestations on Main Street.” In 
other words, Mencken seemed to the manor born while Lewis reeked with the flop sweat of a 
striver. “One comes to feel,” argued The Nation’s Benjamin Stolberg in an equally acute 1927 
dissection of Lippmann, “that he is more sophisticated and astute than wise, more competent 
than sound…His urbanity protests a little; it is a trifle pompous. A certain condescension, a touch 
of civilized conceit defends his observations.”1775  
 
There is a reason, Stolberg argued “why Mr. Lippmann never quite satisfies. Mr. 
Lippmann is afraid. He is afraid to venture beyond sophistication to its conclusions. He is afraid 
to leave the noblesse oblige of the open mind.” Stolberg’s cutting critique rings all the more true 
when one considers that Lippmann was all too happy to indulge his Lewis-like cynicism in 
private. “My own mind has been getting steadily anti-democratic,” he confessed to Learned 
Hand in 1925. “The size of the electorate, the impossibility of educating it sufficiently, the fierce 
ignorance of these millions of semi-literate, priest-ridden and parson-ridden people have gotten 
me to the point where I want to confine the actions of majorities.” Lippmann may have preferred 
to sadly shake his head while Mencken and Lewis cackled at the flames, but all three had built 
the same funeral pyre for the progressive conception of democracy.
1776
 
Scopes and the Schism 
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Lippmann’s 1925 letter to Judge Hand about “parson-ridden people” was written in 
reaction to one of the significant cultural flashpoints of the decade: the Scopes Trial, in which a 
high-school science teacher, John Scopes of Dayton, Tennessee, was accused and ultimately 
convicted of violating the state’s statute barring the teaching of evolution in public schools. With 
the Scopes trial, several cultural trends of the period converged, among them the widening 
schisms between both the religious and the secular-minded and, within Christianity, 
fundamentalists and modernists; the increasing faith in science and its demystifying of human 
origins, the growing contempt in elite intellectual circles – fueled by Mencken, Main Street, and 
the Madison Square Garden disaster of 1924 – for the agrarian “yokel,” and the public and the 
press’s penchant for ballyhoo and the amusing distraction.  
 
In reflecting on that sweltering summer in Dayton, perhaps it is best to begin with what 
the Scopes trial was not. As historian Edward Larson noted in his 1998 re-telling of the case, 
Summer of the Gods, beginning with Frederick Lewis Allen’s 1931 bestseller Only Yesterday, 
through the triumphalist writings of Richard Hofstadter and other Consensus historians of the 
1950’s, and culminating in the 1955 play and subsequent 1960 movie Inherit the Wind, which 
like Arthur Miller’s The Crucible bent American history in service against McCarthyism, the 
Scopes Trial has often been depicted incorrectly. From these sources, it is remembered as the 
moment when the forces of science, Modernity,  and liberalism – spearheaded by prosecutor 
Clarence Darrow – prevented the unjust persecution of a devoted schoolteacher,  and won a 
smashing triumph over an aged and broken William Jennings Bryan and the archaic worldview 
of biblical literalists. The Scopes Trial “was Fundamentalism’s last stand,” argued a 1939 college 




concurred author Irving Stone in 1941 -- which would be news to anyone who experienced the 




In fact, the battle lines were not as clearly drawn that summer in Dayton, and 
fundamentalists didn’t seem to think the Scopes trial was much of a defeat at all. (Indeed, they 
won the case.) Rather the trial worked to further widen the cultural conflicts of the day and 
hasten the continuing movement of progressivism away from its roots as a religious-tinged 
philosophy of moral improvement and towards its more modern, secular incarnation. 
 
Like so much else in the decade, the split between fundamentalists and modernists in the 
Christian church had been greatly exacerbated by the experience of the War and its aftermath. 
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection had of course been a source of 
contention in the Christian tradition ever since the publication of On the Origin of Species in 
1859, and the years 1910-1915 had seen the publication of The Fundamentals, a twelve-volume 
series of pamphlets edited by A.C. Dixon and financed by a Southern California millionaire that 
encouraged a return to a strict, literal reading of the Bible. Nonetheless, it was the experience of 
first the war, followed by the upheavals of the post-war period, that firmly drove a wedge 




Before and even during the War, fundamentalist-leaning thinkers ranged from the 
pacifist-minded Bryan, who resigned as Wilson’s Secretary of State to protest the increasing 
militancy of the administration, to the bloodthirsty Billy Sunday, who spoke of Hell as a 
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German-made creation and advocated the summary execution of suspected radicals. But as the 
World War progressed, fundamentalists – like everyone else – were continually exhorted to stand 
against the German menace in all its manifestations, including its increasingly secular Kultur. 
“The Kaiser boldly threw down the gage of battle – infidel Germany against the believing world 
– Kultur against Christianity – the Gospel of Hate against the Gospel of Love,” proclaimed The 
King’s Business, a religious publication of the time. “Never did Crusader lift battle-ax in holier 
war against the Saracen than is waged by our soldiers of the cross against the German.”1779  
 
Whipped into a frenzy against the Hun, fundamentalists continued their holy battle for the 
soul of America into the post-war period, when the twin menaces of creeping Bolshevism and 
loosening morals suggested the nation was in danger of descending into Babylon. “It must be 
remembered that America was born of moral progenitors and founded on an eternally moral 
foundation,” David S. Kennedy, editor of The Presbyterian, argued in an essay entitled “The 
American Crisis”: 
Her ancestors were Christian of a high order, purified by fire, and washed in blood. Her 
foundation is the Bible, the infallible Word of God. The decalogue written by the finger of God is 
her perfect guide in her religious and social life. There has been some weakening of this moral 
standard in the thought and life of America. This is the result of an age of luxury within and 
freedom of conflict from without. There is but one remedy: the nation must return to her standard 
of the Word of God. She must believe, love and live her Bible. This will require the counteraction 
of that German destructive criticism which has found its way into the religious and moral thought 
of our people as the conception and propaganda of the Reds have found their way with poisoning 
and overthrowing influence into their civil and industrial life. The Bible and the God of the Bible 





“America is narrowed to a choice,” Kennedy averred. “She must restore the Bible to its 
historic place in the family, the day school, the college and university, the church and Sabbath –
school, and thus through daily life and thought revive and build up her moral life and faith, or 
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else she might collapse and fail the world in this crucial age.” Put another way, America now 
desperately needed “fundamentalists,” argued Baptist editor Curtis Lee Laws, coining a term, “to 
do battle royal for The Fundamentals.” Among these, declared the editor of The Fundamentals 
himself, A.C. Dixon, had to be a stand against evolution – the pernicious theory granting “the 
strong and fit the scientific right to destroy the weak and unfit” – which had been embraced in 
Germany and led to the many atrocities of the Great War. America had always been about 
“defending the weak from the aggression of the strong,” and so it had to be now. This fight 
against evolution, Dixon proclaimed, was part of “the conflict of the ages, darkness vs. light, 
Cain vs. Abel, autocracy vs. civilized democracy.”1781 
 
Arrayed to take up this standard for the Bible and America were such notable figures as 
John Roach Straton, who had been waging his own battle against loose morals in New York City 
for some time and who, in 1924, won a notable Carnegie Hall debate over evolution against 
Unitarian minister Charles Francis Potter; Billy Sunday, the most popular evangelist in America, 
William Jennings Bryan, never one to miss a good crusade for the soul of the nation, and 
Princeton theologian John Gresham Machen, whose 1923 book Christianity and Liberalism laid 




“[T]he great redemptive religion which has always been known as Christianity,” Machen 
informed his readers, “is battling against a totally diverse type of religious belief, which is only 
the more destructive of the Christian faith because it makes use of traditional Christian 
terminology. This modern non-redemptive religion is called ‘modernism’ or ‘liberalism,’” even 
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though, Machen maintained, “[t]he movement designated as ‘liberalism’ is ‘liberal’ only to its 
friends; to its opponents it seems to involve a narrow ignoring of many relevant facts.” It is only 
right and proper in the contemporary age, Machen argued, to bring scientific ideas to bear on all 
facets of life. But, in trying to make Christianity compatible with science, Modernists had thrown 
the baby out with the bathwater – “In trying to remove from Christianity everything that could 
possibly be objected to in the name of science,” he concluded, “the apologist has really 
abandoned what he started out to defend.”1783 
 
The Modernists, meanwhile, including such figures as Harry Emerson Fosdick of New 
York and Shailer Mathews, dean of the University of Chicago divinity school, felt equally 
aggrieved about what they perceived as an attack on their liberal and tolerant approach to 
Christianity. Modernism, Mathews argued in his 1924 rebuttal to Machen, The Faith of 
Modernism, “is the use of the methods of modern science, to find, state and use the permanent 
and central values of inherited orthodoxy in meeting the needs of a modern world…Modernists 
endeavor to reach beliefs and their application in the same way that chemists or historians reach 
and apply their conclusions.” As such, Modernism was the “use of scientific, historical, and 
social method in understanding and applying evangelical Christianity to the needs of living 
persons.” The Bible, he argued, did not need necessarily have to be read literally – It could be 
taken as “a trustworthy record of a developing experience with God that nourishes our faith.” 
Similarly, Christianity, Mathews argued, was not just blind adherence to ancient doctrines but 
the “process of an ever growing experience with God.”1784 
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Even if you disagreed with the Modernist approach, Fosdick sermonized in 1922, surely 
there was room for both Fundamentalists and Modernists to flourish under the banner of Christ, 
as they had in the years before the war. But, Fosdick argued, “the Fundamentalist program is 
essentially illiberal and intolerant.” It aimed “to drive out of the evangelical churches men and 
women of liberal opinions…if the Fundamentalists should succeed, then out of the Christian 
Church would go some of the best Christian life and consecration of this generation—multitudes 
of men and women, devout and reverent Christians, who need the church and whom the church 
needs.” Now, Fosdick argued, was not the time for a turf war. “The present world situation 
smells to heaven! And now, in the presence of colossal problems, which must be solved in 
Christ’s name and for Christ’s sake, the Fundamentalists propose to drive out from the Christian 
churches all the consecrated souls who do not agree with their theory of inspiration. What 
immeasurable folly!”1785 
 
In effect, the difference between fundamentalists and modernists mirrored the difference 
between originalist and progressive readings of the Constitution, or formalist and realist 
understandings of American law. The Fundamentalists saw the Bible as the literal truth of God 
and following it to the letter the sign of a good Christian, while the Modernists saw it as a holy 
text nonetheless rooted in history and culture, and thought being a Christian was more about 
embracing and reflecting the values of the Savior in life, rather than blindly adhering to the 
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Nonetheless, Fundamentalists did not believe their movement to be opposed to science, 
nor would they necessarily agree with Fosdick that their fight against evolution was inherently 
conservative. As Edward Larson notes, many Americans had long ago conflated Darwin’s theory 
with the Social Darwinism that had followed in its wake, and as such “associated Darwinian 
natural selection, as it applied to people, with a survival-of-the-fittest mentality that justified 
laissez-faire capitalism, imperialism, and militarism.” Evolution, Bryan argued in 1904, was “the 
merciless law by which the strong crowd out and kill off the weak.” Standing against it was 
completely in tune with the stances Bryan had taken all his life. In his 1922 book In His Image, a 
series of lectures on his faith, Bryan explained further his contempt for the Darwinian idea: 
 
Darwin’s doctrine leads logically to war and to the worship of Nietzsche’s “Superman”; the Bible 
tells us of the Prince of Peace and heralds the coming of the glad day when swords shall be 
beaten into ploughshares and when nations shall learn war no more. 
 
Darwin’s teachings drag industry down to the brute level and excite a savage struggle for selfish 
advantage; the Bible presents the claims of a universal brotherhood in which men will unite their 
efforts in the spirit of friendship. 
 
As hope deferreth maketh the heart sick, so the doctrine of Darwin benumbs altruistic effort by 
prolonging indefinitely the time needed for reforms; the Bible assures us of the triumph of every 
righteous cause, reveals to the eye of faith the invisible hosts that fight on the side of Jehovah and 
proclaims the swift fulfillment of God’s decrees… 
 




“My father taught me to believe in Democracy as well as Christianity,” Bryan said near 
the end of his days. Fighting evolution, in his eyes, was fighting for both. Nor was the Great 
Commoner opposed to the general march of science. True, he once wrote that “it is better to trust 
in the Rock of Ages than to know the age of rocks; it is better for one to know that he is close to 
the Heavenly Father than to know how far  the stars in the heavens are apart.” But, as he said 
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elsewhere in In His Image: “Have faith in mankind. It is easier today for one to be helpful to the 
whole world than it was a few centuries ago to be helpful to the inhabitants of a single 
valley.”1788 
 
Just as the religious impulses driving Bryan and the Fundamentalists to Dayton were 
more complicated than the Inherit the Wind model suggests, so too was the relationship of the 
pro-evolution forces to science. On one hand, many supporters of evolution pointed to “Piltdown 
Man” – the pieces of skull unearthed in 1912 from a gravel pit in Piltdown, England – as 
definitive proof of Darwin’s theory at the time. Bryan, meanwhile, scoffed in 1923 that when 
scientists “find a stray tooth in a gravel pit, they hold a conclave and fashion a creature such as 
they suppose the possessor of the tooth to have been, and then they shout derisively at 
Moses…Men who would not cross the street to save a soul have traveled across the world in 
search of skeletons.” Though the world did not find out for sure until 1953, this round 
posthumously went to Bryan – Piltdown Man had been an elaborate hoax, in which someone had 
artificially aged human and orangutan bones to create a “missing link.”1789 
 
Evolution advocates of the time could not be expected to see through a hoax that 
confounded many of the world’s preeminent scientists for forty years. Nonetheless, John 
Hunter’s A Civic Biology – the 1914 textbook from which John Scopes taught evolution – held 
some rather suspect notions of science in its pages as well. Two pages after discussing Darwin, 
Hunter explains the “five races or varieties of man, each very different from the others,” with 
“the highest type of all, the Caucasians, represented by the civilized white inhabitants of Europe 
and America.” Later on in the textbook, Hunter extrapolated from Darwinism to make the case 
                                                          
1788
 Leuchtenburg, 219. Carter, 82. 
1789




for eugenics: “If the stock of domesticated animals can be improved, it is not unfair to ask if the 
health and vigor of the future generations of men and women on the earth might be improved by 
applying to them the laws of selection.” Certain diseases such as tuberculosis and syphilis are 
“not only unfair but criminal to hand down to posterity. The science of being well-born is called 
eugenics.”1790 
 
To make his case, Hunter informed students of the Jukes and Kallikak families: 
 
Studies have been made on a number of different families in this country, in which mental and 
moral defects were present in one or both of the original parents. The "Jukes" family is a 
notorious example. The first mother is known as "Margaret, the mother of criminals." In seventy-
five years the progeny of the original generation has cost the state of New York over a million 
and a quarter dollars, besides giving over to the care of prisons and asylums considerably over a 
hundred feeble-minded, alcoholic, immoral, or criminal persons. Another case recently studied is 
the "Kallikak" family. This family has been traced back to the War of the Revolution, when a 
young soldier named Martin Kallikak seduced a feeble-minded girl. She had a feeble-minded son 
from whom there have been to the present time 480 descendants. Of these 33 were sexually 
immoral, 24 confirmed drunkards, 3 epileptics, and 143 feeble-minded. The man who started this 
terrible line of immorality and feeble-mindedness later married a normal Quaker girl. From this 
couple a line of 496 descendants have come, with no cases of feeble-mindedness. The evidence 





“Hundreds of families such as those described above exist today,” the textbook further 
explained, “spreading disease, immorality, and crime to all parts of this country. The cost to 
society of such families is very severe…They not only do harm to others by corrupting, stealing, 
or spreading disease, but they are actually protected and cared for by the state out of public 
money. Largely for them the poorhouse and the asylum exist. They take from society, but they 
give nothing return. They are true parasites.” And “The Remedy,” as Civic Biology helpfully 
suggested? “If such people were lower animals, we would probably kill them off to prevent them 
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from spreading. Humanity will not allow this, but we do have the remedy of separating the sexes 
in asylums or other places and in various ways preventing intermarriage and the possibilities of 
perpetuating such a low and degenerate race.” In sum, Scopes’ textbook had come very far afield 
from just a basic explanation of Darwin’s theory of evolution, and introduced exactly the sorts of 




In any case, high school teacher John T. Scopes was arrested in May 1925 for violating 
the Butler Act, a first-of-its-kind law that passed in February of that year prohibiting the teaching 
of evolution. (Fourteen other states had introduced similar legislation.) But, here again, the facts 
of the case belie the inexorable clash-of-cultures view of the trial that would become popular in 
later years, especially after Inherit the Wind portrayed angry townspeople pulling the defendant 
from class. In reality, and in response to the Butler Act, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
continuing its postwar defense of academic freedom all across the country, placed an ad in the 
Chattanooga Times “looking for a Tennessee teacher who is willing to accept our services in 
testing this law in the courts. Our lawyers think a friendly test can be arranged without costing a 
teacher his or her job. Distinguished counsel have volunteered their services. All we need now is 
a willing client.”1793  
 
In Knoxville, educators shrugged. “Our teachers have a hard enough time teaching the 
children how to distinguish between plant and animal life,” one superintendent noted. But in the 
small, struggling mining and railroad town of Dayton, Tennessee, a mine manager named 
George W. Rappleyea saw in the ACLU request an opportunity for civic boosterism and much-
needed publicity for the town. After feeling out some of the town fathers, such as school 
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superintendent Walter White and local drugstore owner Frank Robinson, Rappleyea pitched the 
idea first to two local lawyers, Herbert and Sue Hicks, and then to Scopes, who taught general 
science – not biology – and helped to coach the football team. When Scopes agreed to be 
“arrested” by the brothers Hicks, Rappleyea informed the ACLU, who quickly accepted the offer 
and even agreed to pay the prosecution’s expenses, and Robinson called the papers. “Something 
has happened that going to put Dayton on the map!” White exulted to a local reporter.1794 
 
Did it ever. The ACLU had hoped Scopes’ prosecution could form the beginning of a 
legal strategy to overcome the Butler Act. But their plans went awry as soon as Bryan, sensing a 
possible great debate emerging over evolution in Dayton, asked the prosecution if he could join 
their team – despite not having taken a case in over thirty years. (“I shall, of course, serve 
without compensation,” he noted.) Once Bryan was on board, Clarence Darrow – who took 
every opportunity to badger the Great Commoner – wanted in as well. A lifelong agnostic, 
Darrow thought the Christian notions of original sin and salvation were “a very dangerous 
doctrine” and “silly, impossible, and wicked.” “It is not the bad people I fear so much as the 
good people,” he once said to a group of prisoners. “When a person is sure that he is good, he is 
nearly hopeless; he gets cruel – he believes in punishment.” The Book of Genesis, Darrow 
thought, had filled man with the “idea of his importance,” while the theory of evolution helped 
men become “gentler, kindlier, and more humane toward all the infinite forms of being that live 
with us, and must die with us.” (Darrow, it should be noted, had no truck with eugenicists.)1795  
 
Along with New York lawyer Dudley Field Malone – and much to the consternation of 
the ACLU, who felt they had now completely lost control of events – Darrow wired Scopes’ 
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defense team offering his services “without fees or expenses.” For publicity purposes, Rappleyea 
and Dayton’s other boosters had hoped H.G. Wells would mount the defense, but the famed 
defender of Leopold & Loeb was an excellent second option. The day after his services were 
accepted, Darrow – telegraphing his legal strategy – began to lob rhetorical grenades at Bryan. 
“Nero tried to kill Christianity with persecution and law,” he averred. “Bryan would block 
enlightenment with law. Had Mr. Bryan’s ideas of what a man may do towards free thinking 
existed throughout history, we would still be hanging and burning witches and punishing persons 
who thought the earth was round.”1796 
 
To the delight of Dayton’s townsfolk, the trial was now a full-fledged media circus – 
monkeys soon adorned all the shops on Main Street, as well as the police motorcycle 
(“Monkeyville Police”) and town delivery van (“Monkeyville Express.”) The town prepared for 
30,000 visitors, although in the end 3000 came to the trial – among them H.L. Mencken, who 
declared that Dayton “greatly surprised me. I expected to find a squalid Southern village, with 
darkies snoozing on the houseblocks, pigs rooting under the houses and the inhabitants full of 
hookworm and malaria. What I found was a country town full of charm and even beauty.” After 
Scopes was formally indicted – thanks to the testimony of students who Scopes had coached to 
help the case go forward -- both the prosecution and the defense looked to bolster their case with 
experts. The problem was Bryan and the prosecution, now including Tom Stewart, the attorney 
general of Dayton’s district, could not find any scientists who wanted to go on record against 
evolution. And the defense – now augmented with ACLU veteran Arthur Garfield Hays – could 
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When the trial began in July, the actual legal arguments being made for and against 
Scopes were relatively cut and dried. This was a question of majority rule, the prosecution noted.  
The duly elected representatives of Tennessee had passed a statute outlawing the teaching of 
evolution in private schools, as was their right based on substantive legal precedent. As such, 
Stewart argued, “Mr. Scopes might have taken his stand on the street corners and expounded 
until he became hoarse, but he cannot go into the public schools…and teach his theory.” Darrow 
and the defense, meanwhile, emphasized the issue of church and state separation. (For the same 
reason, Darrow continually argued the customary pre-trial prayer each day was prejudicial.) 
“[T]he people of Tennessee adopted a constitution, and they made it broad and plain, and said 
that the people of Tennessee should always enjoy religious freedom in its broadest terms,” 
Darrow told the court, “so I assume that no legislature could fix a course of study which violated 
that.”1798 
 
Of course, both Bryan and Darrow had bigger fish to fry, and the innocence or guilt of 
John Scopes was only a convenient excuse to have a great debate. “If evolution wins, 
Christianity goes,” Bryan prophesied. “There is not a scientist in all the world who can trace one 
single species to any other…And yet they call us ignoramuses and bigots because we do not 
throw away our Bible.” Most scientists, Bryan contended, “do not believe there is a God or 
personal immortality, and they want to teach that to these children.” Darrow, meanwhile, 
declared that “Scopes isn’t on trial, civilization is on trial” and that the fundamentalists aimed “to 
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kindle religious bigotry and hate” by putting their beliefs over everyone else’s. “The state of 
Tennessee…has no more right to teach the Bible as the divine book than that the Koran is one, or 
the book of Mormon, or the book of Confucius, or the Buddha, or the Essays of Emerson. There 
is nothing else, your Honor, that has caused the difference of opinion, of bitterness, of hatred, of 
war, of cruelty, that religion has caused.”1799 
 
The defining moment of the Scopes trial occurred on its seventh day, after the court had 
reconvened outside due to concerns about the heat and the size of the crowd, and after Mencken 
and many of the journalists in attendance, presuming a guilty verdict was a foregone conclusion, 
had left town. Then, even as the prosecution urged him to reconsider, William Jennings Bryan 
took the stand at the request of Darrow and Arthur Hays. (“They came here to try revealed 
religion,” Bryan had said. “I am here to defend it, and they can ask me any questions they 
please.”) Thus proceeded two hours of testimony in which Darrow, using every trick in his 
lawyerly arsenal, badgered Bryan with numerous questions designed to expose the absurdities of 
biblical literalism. Did God really create the world in seven days? Did He really make Eve from 
Adam’s Rib? When God stopped the world for Joshua, did He stop the Earth or the Sun? Was 
the Earth really only 4000 years old? Was Jonah really swallowed by a whale? Where did Cain’s 
wife come from? And so forth. Bryan tried to answer as best he could, but eventually wore down 
under the barrage, increasingly declaring he did not know or care about the answer – He just kept 
the faith. “I am simply trying to protect the word of God against the greatest atheist or agnostic 
in the United States!” Bryan bellowed at one point. “The only purpose Mr. Darrow has is to slur 
the Bible,” he said near the end, to which the Darrow replied his purpose was “examining your 
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fool ideas that no intelligent Christian on earth believes.” As Darrow later wrote to Mencken, “I 
made up my mind to show the country what an ignoramus he was and I succeeded.”1800 
 
The jury never even heard Darrow’s evisceration of Bryan, and in the end, the defense 
encouraged them in a verdict of guilty to preserve the case for an appeal. (Wanting the whole 
thing to go away, the Tennessee Supreme Court later overturned Scopes’ conviction on a 
technicality and convinced the state Attorney General to drop the charges.) As far as the jury of 
public opinion goes, most newspapermen agreed that Darrow had succeeded in making the Great 
Commoner and the Fundamentalists look silly – but also thought the Great Crusade was by no 
means over. “The trial at Dayton is no more than an opening skirmish,” reported The Literary 
Digest in its coverage of the coverage, “and other papers and commentators agree that it may 
mark the beginning of a great fight between the Fundamentalists and the Modernists.” Bryan 
seemed ready for such a fight. Angered by the demeaning experience but flush with victory in 
the actual case, he began prepping an anti-evolution speech that he planned to deliver all over the 
country. By the end of the week, however, he was dead. “God aimed at Darrow, missed, and hit 
Bryan instead,” quipped Mencken in print. Privately, he allegedly exclaimed “We killed the son-
of-a-bitch!”1801 
 
Reflecting on the Scopes trial five years later, Jane Addams argued with characteristic 
magnanimity that, more than anything else, it had been an opportunity for “Education by the 
Current Event,” or what later generations would call a “teachable moment.” The trial had 
“brought before the entire country a public discussion of fundamentalism versus evolution,” she 
argued. “While there was no doubt that the overwhelming public opinion concerning the 
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Tennessee trial was on the side of liberality both in politics and religion, the group of so-called 
narrow-minded men had made their own contribution to our national education.” For one, “they 
had asserted the actuality of religion. It is always difficult to convince youth that reality reaches 
upward as well as outward, and that the higher planes of life contain anything but chilly 
sentiments.” For another, and as per Dewey, they had managed to bring two diverse publics in 
American life into communication. “Nothing could have been further from the experiences and 
mental processes of the intelligentsia of a cosmopolitan city and these mountaineers, nothing 
more diverse than the two methods of approach to the time-old question of the origin of man. 
Only a molten current event,” such as the Scopes trial, “could have accomplished a simultaneous 
discussion upon the same theme by these two bodies of people.”1802 
 
For many other progressives, however, the Scopes trial had just been a sideshow that 
further confirmed them in their biases.  Walter Lippmann, for example, saw in it yet another flaw 
in democracy. “[I]n Tennessee the people used their power to prevent their own children from 
learning, not merely the doctrine of evolution, but the spirit and method by which learning is 
possible…They had founded popular government on the faith in popular education, and they had 
used the prerogatives of democracy to destroy the hopes of democracy.” In short, he wrote, “the 
votes of a majority do not settle anything here and they are entitled to no respect whatever.” The 
New Republic, meanwhile, deemed the trial “a trivial thing full of humbuggery and hypocrisy.” 
The case should have been open and shut – the law was on the books, and Scopes willfully broke 
it. But by prosecuting Bryan in such a manner, TNR said, what Darrow and the defense had 
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“succeeded in doing is to cheapen not only the trial but the issue by subordinating both of them 
to the exigencies of theatrical newspaper publicity.”1803  
 
Despite Darrow’s bad behavior, however, TNR thought the trial, and the law that had 
precipitated it, made clear that something was seriously wrong with “the prevailing system of 
clerical and religious training. Some day American opinion will realize that the supposed 
Christian culture which the average minister now receives in the denominational schools is the 
most serious obstacle in America to human liberation and enlightenment.” The church, they 
concluded, “will continue to lose prestige until it prepares itself for its social responsibilities by 
squaring its accounts with contemporary technology and science.”1804 
 
Two decades earlier, progressives could look to the pope’s 1893 encyclical Rerum 
Novarum, to the Social Gospel of Walter Rauschenbusch, and to religious reformers like Father 
John Ryan and feel that the Church was with them in their quest to remold the state for the better. 
But, in forcing a decision between religion and science, or more to the point between the 
apparently hopelessly retrograde fundamentalism of Bryan and the acerbic agnosticism of 
Darrow, Mencken, and the Smart Set, the Scopes trial worked to further alienate a generation 
from their Christian reformist roots. “[R]eform lost its most powerful public appeal and its 
strongest potential adhesive when it became separated from Christianity,” historian David 
Danbom has argued. “Nothing else – not science, nor nationalism, nor some vague commitment 
to the public interest – would ever work as well…The day when Christianity and liberalism were 
separated was a sad one for reform in this country, for it cost it much of its force, power, and 
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idealism.” And having already come to doubt the fundamental tenets of democracy, 
progressivism, and even reason itself over the course of the decade, thinkers in the Twenties now 
increasingly saw faith as no fallback.
1805
 
Not with a Bang, But a Whimper 
 
Two popular books of 1929 eloquently dramatized the spiritual and existential crisis that 
many progressives now wrestled with. One was another Lippmann creation, A Preface to 
Morals, which went through six editions in its first year and became a pick of the Book of the 
Month club.  “Among those who no longer believe in the religion of their fathers, some are 
proudly defiant, and many are indifferent,” Lippmann argued. “But there are also a few, perhaps 
an increasing number, who feel that there is a vacancy in their lives…When such men put their 
feelings into words they are likely to say that, having lost their faith, they have lost the certainty 
that their lives are significant, and that it matters what they do with their lives.”1806 
 
To wit, Lippmann maintained, “[t]he acids of modernity are dissolving the usages and the 
sanctions to which men once habitually conformed.” As a result, all too many men and women 
were now staring into the abyss Nietzsche had warned about in 1882 when he had declared – in 
despair rather than victory – that God is dead. “The objective moral certitudes have dissolved, 
and in the liberal philosophy there is nothing to take their place.”1807 
 
Reviewing the recent conflict between Fundamentalists and Modernists, Lippmann 
praised Machen’s Christianity and Liberalism and argued that it was the Fundamentalists who 
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had the fairer point. “Something quite fundamental is left out of the modernist creeds,” he 
argued. “That something is the most abiding of all experiences of religion, namely, the 
conviction that the religion comes from God…The Bible to our ancestors was not simply,” as the 
Modernists contended, “a book of wisdom. It was a book of wisdom backed by the power of God 
himself….[It] could not be wrong. But once it is allowed that each man may select from the 
Bible as he sees fit, judging each passage by his own notions of what is ‘abiding,’ you have 
stripped the Scriptures of their authority to command men’s confidence and to compel their 
obedience.” That being said, the Fundamentalists, mostly Baptists and Presbyterians as they 
were, had their own issue to contend with – the Catholic Church. Fundamentalists like Machen, 
as one Father Riggs had put it “cannot, while remaining loyal to the (Protestant) reformers…set 
limits to destructive criticism of the Bible without making an un-Protestant appeal to 
tradition.”1808  
 
Either way, “[t]he modern man has ceased to believe” in the Gospels “but he has not 
ceased to be credulous, and the need to believe haunts him.” According to Lippmann, men and 
women were also now haunted by an overabundance of freedom.  “We have come to see that 
Huxley was right when he said that ‘a man’s worst difficulties begin when he is able to do as he 
likes”:  
The evidences of these greater difficulties lie all about us: in the brave and brilliant atheists who 
have defied the Methodist God, and have become very nervous; in the women who have 
emancipated themselves from the tyranny of fathers, husbands, and homes, and with the 
intermittent but expensive help of a psychoanalyst, are now enduring liberty as interior 
decorators; in the young men and women who are world-weary at twenty-two; in the multitudes 
who drug themselves with pleasure…These are the prisoners who have been released. They ought 
to be very happy. They ought to be serene and composed. They are free to make their own lives. 
There are no conventions, no tabus, no gods, priests, princes, fathers, or revelation which they 
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must accept. Yet the result is not so good as they thought it would be. The prison door is wide 




“It is all very well to talk about being the captain of your soul,” said Lippmann. “It is 
hard, and only a few heroes, saints, and geniuses have been the captains of their souls for any 
extended period of their lives.” (In this, Lippmann was echoing a line from Ernest Hemingway’s 
1926 novel, The Sun Also Rises: “It’s awfully easy to be hard-boiled about everything in the 
daytime, but at night it is another thing.”) Instead, Lippmann argued, “[m]ost men, after a little 
freedom, have preferred authority with the consoling assurances and the economy of effort which 
it brings.” They look “to find the shrine of some new god, of any cult however newfangled, 
where he can kneel and be comforted, put on manacles to keep his hands from trembling, 
ensconce himself in some citadel where it is safe and warm.”1810 
 
In the modern age, however, the post-war generation had nowhere to turn for this much 
desired consolation. The men and women of Modernity “have seen through the religion of nature 
to which the early romantics turned for consolation. They have heard too much about the 
brutality of natural selection to feel, as Wordsworth did, that pleasant landscapes are 
divine…They cannot make a religion of science like the post-Darwinians because they do not 
understand modern science…As for the religion of progress, that is preempted by George F. 
Babbitt and the Rotary Club, and the religion of humanity is utterly unacceptable to those who 
have to ride in the subways during the rush hour.”1811 
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Nor would Lippmann’s earlier hope for a disinterested ruling class of experts be able to 
solve this spiritual crisis of leadership. Man cannot “look to his betters for guidance,” he 
lamented. “The American social system is migratory, revolutionary, and protestant. It provides 
no recognized leaders and no clear standards of conduct. No one” – much to Lippmann’s chagrin 
“is recognized as the interpreter of morals and the arbiter of taste. There is no social hierarchy, 
there is no acknowledged ruling class, no well-known system of rights and duties, no code of 
manners. There are smart sets, first families, and successful people…but these leaders have no 
real authority in morals or in matters of taste because they themselves have few standards that 
are not the fashions of a season.”1812 
 
The acids of modernity, Lippmann warned, were not only eating into the souls of a 
generation, but their very selves. “Novelties crowd the consciousness of modern men,” he 
argued. “The machinery of intelligence, the press, the radio, the moving picture, have 
enormously multiplied the number of unseen events and strange people and queer doings with 
which he has to be concerned…These experiences come to him having no beginning, no middle, 
and no end, mere flashes of publicity playing fitfully upon a dark tangle of circumstances.” 
Coupled with the disappearance of God, this overloading of unnecessary stimuli, this constant 
drip-drip-drip of information, meant that “[t]he modern man is unable any longer to think of 
himself as a single personality approaching an everlasting judgment. He is one man to-day and 
another to-morrow, one person here and another there. He does not feel he knows himself. He is 
sure that no one else knows him at all…He is moved by impulses which he feels but cannot 
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describe. There are dark depths in his nature which no one has ever explored…The precise 
nuances of his likes and dislikes have become very important.”1813 
 
As a result, Lippmann argued, man would have to accept the “vast indifference of the 
universe to his own fate,” and rebuild a new set of values based on humanism, a “religion of the 
spirit” that emphasized living virtuously in the moment. “[T]he mature man would take the 
world as it comes, and within himself remain quite unperturbed. When he acted, he would know 
that he was only testing an hypothesis, and if it failed, he would know that he made a mistake,” 
something “he would be quite prepared for” because “his intelligence would be disentangled 
from his hopes”: 
 
Would he be hopeful? Not if to be hopeful was to expect the world to submit rather soon to his 
vanity. Would he be hopeless? Hope is an expectation of favors to come, and he would take his 
delights here and now. Since nothing gnawed at his vitals, neither doubt, nor ambition, nor 
frustration, nor fear, he would move easily through life. And so whether he saw the thing as 





However worthwhile a road map to a satisfying life, Lippmann’s prescription for 
humanity – stoic detachment and resigned acceptance to an unchanging and existentially 
indifferent world – suggests how low progressive hopes had fallen over the course of a decade. 
The author of Drift and Mastery now seemed to be suggesting that mankind embrace passivity 
and forget the possibility of change, except inasmuch as one could apply it to oneself.  
 
In any case, as Ronald Steel notes in his biography of Lippmann, A Preface to Morals 
struck a chord with a disillusioned generation. William Allen White deemed it a “serious book, 
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but beautifully written and simply written…There isn’t a paragraph in it that the average 
intelligent American cannot understand, and to me that is everything about a book.” Oliver 
Wendell Holmes called it “a noble performance” and critic Harold Laski thought it “simply 
masterful.” Edmund Wilson, in a highly favorable appreciation of the book for The New 
Republic, did worry that “the point of view which Lippmann commends seems to exclude 
intense feelings of any kind, and even to err on the side of complacency.” But he still though it 
“far and away Walter Lippmann’s best book…in thought, it shows a new competence, a new 
inspiration even…[I]t is both outspoken and persuasive in bringing news which has been 
uneasily awaited.”1815 
 
The Nation’s William Seagle liked it less, arguing that its driving impulse was Neo-
Victorian and agreeing with Wilson that Lippmann’s call for a disinterestedness of the soul was 
tantamount to drift – “The implication seems to be that all will be for the best in the most rapidly 
self-improving of worlds.” Nonetheless, Seagle conceded, “Mr. Lippmann’s mood has certainly 
changed since he wrote ‘The Phantom Public.” From Rome, philosopher George Santayana 
suggested that was an “admirable book” by a “brave philosopher,” but it could possibly be read 
as “an epilogue to all possible moralities and all possible religions.” Meanwhile, H.L. Mencken 
told his readers that Lippmann’s book “shows a new maturity…It blazes clear tracks through a 
wilderness of ancient sophistries, some of them divinely inspired…There is cunning writing in it, 
and incisive thinking.”1816 
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That being said, Mencken, turning serious for a moment, thought A Preface to Morals 
“comes to a conclusion that is anything but satisfying.” The book assumes “the present is an age 
of moral chaos…But is this really true? I presume to doubt it. There is no more moral chaos 
today than there has been in other ages. The great fundamentals still survive: honor, truthfulness, 
courage, indomitability, charity, decency. What we lose is simply trash – the accumulated 
rubbish of centuries of bad government and insane theology.” Honor, Mencken declared, “has no 
more to do with religion, whether high or low, than it has to do with mathematics. It is, in a deep 
sense, the very antithesis of religion. It is civilized man’s answer to a God whose arbitrary 
mandates and taboos were framed for peasants.” Honor “looks inward, not outward. Its impulse 
is inward, and so is its reward. And so, also, are the impulse and reward of truthfulness, courage, 
charity, and common decency.” In other words, Mencken did not share the spiritual dilemma of 
Lippmann because he never assumed or expected anything more from the world. While many 
progressives saw their hopes and dreams crushed by the inexorable realities of the decade, 




Mencken aside, many clearly took Lippmann’s tome as a carefully thought-out and on-
point critique of the spiritual dilemma of the times. Another similar such work published the 
same year – expanded from a 1927 Atlantic Monthly article – was The Modern Temper, by 
Nation theater critic Joseph Wood Krutch. “Of all the dirges composed for the death of the once-
familiar human spirit,” writes historian Loren Baritz, The Modern Temper “was the most gentle, 
persuasive, immensely sad, and influential.”1818 
 
                                                          
1817
 Mencken, “Man and the Universe,” 380. 
1818




Citing Freud, Krutch began by arguing that “the baby in its mother’s womb is the 
happiest of living creatures. Into his consciousness no conflict has yet entered, for he knows no 
limitation to his desires and the universe is exactly as he wishes it to be.” This blissful state 
continues in early childhood, when the child is “carefully protected from any knowledge of the 
cruelties and complexities of life; he is led to suppose that the moral order is simple and clear, 
that virtue triumphs…He is prevented from realizing how inextricably what men call good and 
evil are intertwined, how careless is Nature of those values called mercy and justice and 
righteousness which men have come, in her despite, to value.” As with children, Krutch argued, 
so too with races, individuals, and cultures: “As civilization grows older it too has more and 
more facts thrust upon its consciousness and is compelled to abandon one after another, quite as 
the child does, certain illusions which have been dear to it…The universe becomes more and 
more what experience has revealed, less and less what imagination has created.”1819 
 
This was the terrifying point, Krutch argued, that Western civilization had now reached. 
“Illusions have been lost one by one. God, instead of disappearing in an instant, has retreated 
step by step and surrendered gradually his control of the universe,” and even though “there are 
thousands who, unable to bear the thought of losing him completely, still fancy that they can 
distinguish the uncertain outlines of a misty figure…man is left more and more alone in a 
universe to which he is completely alien.”1820  
 
In other words, much as in the dark tales Howard Phillips Lovecraft was then conjuring 
from his Victorian manse in Providence, Rhode Island, the inexorable progress of science had 
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stripped away the veil from man’s eyes and left him quaking in the face of cosmic indifference. 
Before, Krutch argued, man “had believed in even his darkest moments that the universe was 
rational if only he could grasp its rationality.” But now “there is no reason to suppose that his 
own life has any more meaning than the life of the humblest insect that crawls from one 
annihilation to another.” Educated people could no longer ignore the fact that “Nature, in her 
blind thirst for life, has filled every possible cranny of the rotting earth with some sort of 
fantastic creature, and among them man is but one – perhaps the most miserable of all, because 
he is the only one in whom the instinct of life falters long enough to enable it to ask the question 
‘Why?’”1821 
 
Worse, as science yielded more and more inexorable conclusions like tumblers in a lock, 
“man seems caught in a dilemma which his intellect has devised,” and contemporary civilization 
was now trapped next to the “black abyss.” “Time was when the scientist, the poet, and the 
philosopher walked hand in hand…But the world of modern science is one in which the intellect 
alone can rejoice. The mind leaps, and leaps perhaps with a sort of elation, through the 
immensities of space, but the spirit, frightened and cold, longs to have once more above its head 
the inverted bowl beyond which may lie whatever paradise its desires may create.” But 
civilization was no longer a happy, ignorant child. The universe had been demystified, and 
shown to be callous and indifferent to man’s fate, and there could be no unlearning what had 
been learned. “[H]aunted by ghosts from a dead world and not yet at home in [his] own,” Man 
“has arrived at a point where he can no longer delude himself as to the extent of his 
predicament.”1822  








This, Krutch argued, was the Modern Temper, and “only in the bleak, tortuous 
complexities of a T.S. Eliot” did poetry manage to give it expression. As a result “[t]here 
impends for the human spirit either extinction or a readjustment more stupendous than any made 
before.” And, all too likely, that readjustment could only come through the decline and fall of 
contemporary civilization and a new Dark Ages, through which a more primitive culture – the 
Communists, perhaps – could restore the veil of ignorance. “The world may be rejuvenated one 
way or another,” Krutch concluded, “but we will not. Skepticism has entered too deeply into our 
souls ever to be replaced by faith.” In the final analysis, “ours is a lost cause, and there is no 
place for us in the natural universe.” Still, we “should rather die as men than live as animals.”1823 
 
As Mencken summed up Krutch’s thesis in The Modern Temper, “he is really quite ready 
for the coroner.” But as with A Preface to Morals, a generation responded to the dark portent in 
Krutch’s musings. “This book deals candidly, and without offering a solution, with the despair 
which has beset intelligent people in recent years,” wrote Bertrand Russell in his review of the 
book for The Nation. Robert Morss Lovett called The Modern Temper “a masterpiece of clear 
thinking and interesting presentation.” Writing in The Forum, Granville Hicks deemed the book 
a concise distillation of the despair floating around the culture of the time. “The views he 
expresses are those tacitly assumed by the majority of contemporary writers, and the temper he 
describes is, it seems to me, responsible not only for the impotence of many men of talent but 
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also for the way in which true genius is being perverted into strange and sometimes disgusting 
channels.”1824 
 
Hicks didn’t necessarily agree with Krutch’s pessimistic outlook, however, and 
concluded that “what we regard as the modern attitude of inconsolable despair is merely the 
injured expression usually attendant upon disillusionment.” Russell, who found his own solace 
through the steady advance of knowledge but thought that despair was driving the culture 
“toward something rather hard and rather inhuman,” agreed that “the disenchantment with which 
the book deals is…a passing malady, most noticeable among those who have had an old-
fashioned literary education, whose values therefore come out of the past; to them, the new 
world seems very bleak, but I doubt whether it will seem so to those accustomed to it both by 
their education and by their professional activities.”1825 
 
And Mencken, who for a decade had gleefully played the role of the skeleton at the 
progressive feast, now found himself once again talking another reformer off the ledge. Krutch, 
he argued, “simply can’t shake off the Christian delusion that human life is animated by some 
transcendental and grandiose purpose, that a mysterious divine plan runs through it, that there are 
lessons in it for philosophers, which is to say, for theologians.” This, in a word, was, baloney: 
 
The one demonstrable aim of man is to hang on gallantly to his ball of mud, whirling through 
space. That hanging on, viewed realistically, is a superb adventure, and it has bred and developed, 
within the brief span of human history, a series of qualities that are sturdy, useful and noble. Will 
they diminish as man learns better tricks, and hence hangs on more securely, and has a safer and 
pleasanter ride? Are they diminishing today? I see no indication of it. On the contrary, it seems to 
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me that there is a steady improvement. The notion to the contrary arises out of a sentimental 
nostalgia for the old facile certainties, like that of a grown woman for her dolls. 
 
Dr. Krutch somewhere speaks of an increasing "meanness of human life"—as I recall it, in a 
passage dealing with Shakespeare. That is more bolony. Human life is quite as spacious and 
charming today as ever it was. Shakespeare himself, compared to Wagner, lived like a pig. 
Aristotle, compared to Einstein, was an ignoramus. Is it a sign of decay that the Greek tragedies 
no longer make us tremble? Plainly not. It is a sign that we are better men than the Greeks were. 
They never invented anything half so ingenious as the printing press or the photographic camera. 
They never discovered anything as important as the cell. They never produced a political 
document to compare to the Bill of Rights. Their governments were transitory and corrupt, their 
wars were bloody and idiotic, their pleasures were barbaric, and their comforts were those of 
prisoners in a chain-gang.1826  
 
 
“I do not argue here,” Mencken concluded, “that the present age has brought in complete 
human felicity; I do not even argue that it is better than any age of the past, for I believe that the 
Eighteenth Century, in more than one way, was superior to it. But that it is dull and mean, and 
that its ideas are vain and invalid— this I deny in a voice of brass.” As for Krutch’s lament that 
science had exposed too many harsh secrets, Mencken queried “What could be more ridiculous? 
If it had enabled us to see nothing save the flatulent imbecility of theology it would have served 
us far better than any light that ever dazzled the past. To be sure, we still have wars and 
politicians, but is it nothing to have got rid of gods and ghosts?”1827 
 
The despair of so many of the progressive generation notwithstanding, Mencken wasn’t 
the only one who saw reasons for optimism – or at least considerably less pessimism – in the 
current state of things. Many Americans who had been treated as and considered second-class 
citizens in the old days also saw new promise in the culture of the New Era. 
 
New World and a New Woman 
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 “I would like to say a few things about my generation.” So began 23-year-old Yale 
graduate John F. Carter, Jr. – later a journalist, State Department economist, and NBC radio 
commentator – in the September 1920 issue of the Atlantic Monthly, in answer to a recent article 
decrying the habits and mores of “these wild young people” in America today. “In the first place, 
I would like to observe that the older generation had certainly pretty well ruined this world 
before passing it on to us. They give us this Thing, knocked to pieces, leaky, red-hot, threatening 
to blow up; and then they are surprised that we don’t accept it with the same attitude of pretty, 
decorous enthusiasm with which they received it…nicely painted, smoothly running, practically 
fool-proof.”1828 
 
Back when the elders were young, Carter declared, life “was bright and pleasant,” and 
everyone could believe in the pieties of progressivism: 
[T]hey had their little tinpot ideals, their sweet little visions, their naive enthusiasms, their nice 
little set of beliefs…Man was a noble and perfectible creature. Women were angels (whom they 
smugly sweated in their industries and prostituted in their slums). Right was downing might. The 
nobility and the divine mission of the race were factors that led our fathers to work 
wholeheartedly for a millennium, which they caught a glimpse of just around the turn of the 




Everything back then, “masked by ingrained hypocrisy and prudishness, seemed simple, 
beautiful, inevitable.” But now, Carter proclaimed, “my generation is disillusionized, and, I 
think, to a certain extent, brutalized, by the cataclysm which their complacent folly 
engendered…We have in our unregenerate youth learned the practicality and the cynicism that is 
safe only in unregenerate old age. We have been forced to become realists overnight, instead of 
idealists, as was our birthright.” In short,” Carter argued, anticipating Krutch almost a decade 
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later, “we have seen the inherent beastliness of the human race revealed in an infernal 
apocalypse.”1830 
 
So, “forced to live in an atmosphere of ‘tomorrow we die,’” Carter asked, didn’t it make 
sense that his generation had decided to drink and be merry? Every other generation in human 
history, he pointed out, has thought the one after them had gone to Hell. The only real difference 
this time was “our devastating and brutal frankness…We are frank with each other, frank, or 
pretty nearly so, with our elders, frank in the way we feel toward life and this badly damaged 
world. It may be disquieting and misleading habit, but is it a bad one?” Whether it was or not 
was beside the point – it was now a fact of life. Oh, Carter noted, speaking of the older 
generation, “[t]hey’ll make us good. Prohibition is put through to stop our drinking, and hasn’t 
stopped it. Bryan has plans to curtail our philanderings, and he won’t do any good…The oldsters 
stand dramatically with fingers and toes and noses pressed against the bursting dykes. Let 
them!...[W]e shall not trouble ourselves very much about them any more.”1831 
 
Precocious Ivy League-educated twentysomethings have a tendency of purporting to 
speak for their generation. But in this case, Carter was probably on to something. As historian 
Paula Fass noted in her study on the subject, “[i]n the 1920s youth appeared suddenly, 
dramatically, even menacingly on the social scene…Youth suddenly became a social problem.” 
One writer in 1924 declared that “‘Something ails’ the youth of today. This opinion was in 
evidence for several years before the Great War, and since the War it has become an alarmed 
conviction.” As Devere Allen, the editor of Young Democracy, told The Survey on New Year’s 
Day 1921, his generation “had seen something of the works of the fathers during the last few 








years and it has not found them altogether edifying.” Young people were now “examining social 
institutions to the very bottom as the preliminary to a thorough housecleaning.” As a result, 
“social progress” moving forward “will depend largely on the opportunities young people find.” 
In short, Allen argued, “we have abundant evidence of a world-wide revolt of youth.”1832 
 
To be fair, this revolt had not begun with the collapse at Versailles, or even with 
American entry into the World War. In 1913, according to Current Opinion, it was already “Sex 
O’Clock in America.” The following year, a writer in The Atlantic Monthly bemoaned the 
“Repeal of Reticence” happening nationwide. In June 1917, only two months after American 
entry into the war, then-journalist Ray Stannard Baker (age 47) was disgusted by what he had 
seen on a trip to Minneapolis – “a whole common people rolling carelessly and extravagantly up 
and down these streets in automobiles, crowding insipid ‘movie’ shows by the tens of thousands 
– there are seventy-six such houses in this one city – or else drinking unutterable hogsheads of 
sickly sweet drinks or eating decorated ice cream at candy shops and drugstores! All 
overdressed! All overeating! All overspending!” Baker hoped entry into the War might set things 
right. “We need trouble and stress!” he wrote. “I thought once it could be done by some 
voluntary revolt from comfort and propriety…But it was not enough. The whirlwind had to 
come.”1833   
 
By New Era standards, the Minneapolis street scene Baker had complained about was 
almost comically innocent. But even before the 1920s began, working-class women in the cities 
had already adopted what would become known as the “flapper” look and lifestyle – short skirts, 
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bobbed-hair, make-up, and unescorted evenings involving alcohol, cigarettes, dancing, and 
sundry other licentiousness.  
 
In early 1920, young author F. Scott Fitzgerald would make the cultural phenomenon 
official with the publication of his coming-of-age tale This Side of Paradise – which had its 
female characters wearing sleeveless “petting shirts” and mouthing “Girls Gone Wild” bromides 
like “I’ve kissed dozens of men, I suppose I’ll kiss a dozen more,” and “I’m just full of the 
devil.” “None of the Victorian mothers,” Fitzgerald declared in a line cited by Frederick Lewis 
Allen eleven years later, “had any idea how casually their daughters were accustomed to be 
kissed.” Along with sparking a good bit of consternation, The Side of Paradise sold 40,000 
copies – not nearly as well as Main Street but enough to make an impression – and quickly 
earned Fitzgerald such monikers as “Flapperdom’s Fiction Ace,” America’s “Expert on 
Flappers,” the “Flapper King,” and “the recognized spokesman of the younger generation – the 
dancing, flirting, frivoling, lightly philosophizing young America.”1834   
 
“I sometimes wonder whether the flapper made me or I made her,” Fitzgerald once said 
afterwards. The answer was the former – The word “flapper” first came into existence in 1915. 
But in chronicling their meteoric ascent in youth culture, Fitzgerald gave an intellectual 
imprimatur to what had been an organic working-class movement and awoke elite opinion to the 
rumblings from below. “Smoking, dancing like Voodoo devotees, dressing décolleté, ‘petting,’ 
and ‘drinking’, wrote one college student in 1922, “[w]e do these things because we honestly 
enjoy the attendant physical sensations.” “[A]rmed with sexual knowledge,” she told the Ohio 
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State Lantern, she “kisses the boys, she smokes with them, drinks with them, and why? Because 
the feeling of comradeship is running rampant.”1835  
 
Ohio State was not alone. One study of female college students found that 92 percent 
admitted to “petting” or “spooning.” Sociologists Robert and Helen Merrill Lynd reported from 
Muncie, Indiana that a third of teenage girls – liberated from the front porch by that chariot of 
Satan, the automobile – admitted to attending “petting parties.” Writing in The Survey in 1925, 
Eleanor Roland Wembridge reported in “Petting and the Campus” that senior and junior women 
“did not advise young classmen not to pet – they merely advised them to be moderate about it, 
not lose their heads, not go too far.” That suggestion didn’t always take. The Kinsey report, 
published three decades later, found that the number of women born after 1900 who admitted to 
premarital sex before the age of twenty-five jumped to over one in three – 36% -- as opposed to 
14% of women born before 1900. Women’s sexual enjoyment showed a corresponding leap.1836 
 
“Is ‘the old-fashioned girl,’ with all that she stands for in sweetness, modesty, and 
innocence, in danger of becoming extinct?” queried the Literary Digest in a May 1921 
roundtable. “Or was she really no better nor worse than the ‘up-to-date’ girl – who, in turn, will 
become ‘the old-fashioned girl’ to a later generation? Is it even possible, as a small but 
impressive minority would have us believe, that the girl of to-day has certain new virtues of 
‘frankness, sincerity, seriousness of purpose,’ lives on a ‘higher level of morality,’ and is on the 
whole ‘more clean-minded and clean-lived’ than her predecessors?”1837  
 
                                                          
1835
 Zeitz, 38, 46-47. Barry, 136. Rising Tide, Cott, 150. 
1836
 Zeitz, 46-47. Dumenil, 136. Eleanor Rowland Wembridge, “Petting and the Campus,” The Survey, July 1st, 
1925, in Mowry, ed., 175-178. 
1837
 “Is the Younger Generation in Peril?,” The Literary Digest, May 14th, 1921 (Vol. 69, No. 7), 9-12. Reprinted in 




To be sure, quite a few observers of the period were in the aghast column. The 
Educational Journal told of students in Indiana being “jazzed to death,” while another 
correspondent in a subsequent roundtable on the same issue warned that “Society is not only 
undergoing a revolution, it is experiencing a devil-ution. Not only is it undergoing, but it is going 
under…Women paint and powder and drink and smoke, and become an easy prey to a certain 
class of well-groomed and well-fed high livers whose chief business is to pluck the blush of 
innocency from off the cheek of maidenhood and put a blister there.”1838 
 
A number of progressives of a certain age were also within this camp. “Excessive 
indulgence in sex-waste has imperiled the life of the race,” argued Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 
who lamented that “Man is the only animal using this function out of season.” In 1922, a writer 
in The Survey urged settlement houses to begin hiring younger women to “go among the poor 
girls and give them a good time of it – young workers who dance and play games and who will 
bring them in touch with the sort of young men who don’t accost them in the subways.”1839 
  
Senator Hiram Johnson was also disturbed – and mystified – by the new libertinism. 
“Now, you can call me by all the names you want, and designate me old fogey,” he wrote his son 
Hiram, Jr. after attending a boxing match where women were present, “but really, I prefer the 
womanhood of old to the non-child-bearing, smoking, drinking and neurotic creature sitting at 
the ring side in admiration of the nakedness of two horrible human beasts.” While Senator 
Johnson thought the view of the anti-suffragists “that we have unsexed them with suffrage, equal 
rights, etc.” was nonsense, “there has been some subtle change in womanhood, a change which I 
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cannot accurately define, but which I know exists.” William Allen White, also a concerned party, 
thought the problem might just be boredom. “The next time I hear of a man or woman going 
wrong,” he told the editor of the Topeka Capital, “I am going to look and see if that man or 
woman isn’t bored to a nice, crisp brown and see if he wasn’t seeking excitement rather than 
anything else.”1840 
 
Jane Addams, meanwhile, once against saw the effect of the World War at work in the 
new morality. “It was impossible…that experiences of war should not have made changes,” she 
noted in 1930, arguing that “under the post-war conditions young people demanded personal 
happiness as theirs by right, decried sentimentalism and exalted sex.; they were opposed to all 
hampering social conventions and even to established reticences.” Lamentably, “in their revolt 
against Victorian prudery, against innuendoes and distrust of natural impulses,” Addams thought 
“the younger generation had “made a cult of frankness.” “Freudian theories as to dangers of 
repression,” she wrote, “were seized upon by agencies of publicity, by half-baked lecturers and 
by writers on the new psychology and finally interpreted by reckless youth as a warning against 
self-control.”1841 
 
What disturbed Addams most about the young men and women she met was not their 
lack of morals but their desire to fit in – “the spirit of conformity” had become “a sort of 
protective coloring” – as well as their utter disinterest in the old, progressive notion of freedom 
as enlightened citizens engaging in self-government. After WILPF’s trip to Haiti, Addams 
recalled, the committee “had come back to urge public opinion in favor of self-government of 
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Haiti,” and tried to enlist a magazine who had expressed interest in the plight of the island nation 
to take up the cause. “Political liberty, however, seemed of no consequence to this journal, so 
committed to the liberty of individual, and as we talked to them about it we seemed to be 
speaking two different languages. Apparently, to this set of people…freedom meant unlimited 
opportunities for self-development…The desired freedom and development was always 
associated in some way with the breaking down of sex taboos and with the establishment of new 
standards of marriage.”1842   
 
Disappointed as she was by these conversations, Addams conceded that “[o]ur self-
righteousness was pretty well disabled when we were reminded by the Youth Movement that of 
all the generations of men who have lived upon the face of the earth, our generation has the least 
claim to advise the next. The responsible adults living in the world in 1914 had been unable to 
avert the great war which resulted in the annihilation of ten million young men.”1843  
 
For all the tsk-tsking and disappointment felt by older progressives, others saw in the 
loosening of conventional morality and the ascendance of this New Woman something much 
more healthy and fundamental happening in the culture – the rise of a real equality between the 
sexes. In 1925, Bruce Bliven – by then the editor of The New Republic – wrote an imaginary 
interview with “Flapper Jane,” a 19-year-old whose minister thought her “a perfectly horrible 
example of wild youth – paint, cigarettes, cocktails, petting parties” and whatnot. When Bliven 
asked his construct why she behaved this way, Jane answered:  
 
In a way, it’s just all honesty. Women have come down off the pedestal lately. They are tired of 
this mysterious feminine charm stuff. Maybe it all goes with independence, earning your own 
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living and voting and all that. There was always a bit of the harem in that cover-up-your-arms-
and-legs business, don’t you think? Women still want to be lived, but they want it on a 50-50 
basis, which includes being admired for the qualities they really possess.
1844
   
 
 
In short, Bliven suggested, “a good deal more smoke than fire” surrounded the 
controversy over the new sexuality. “Women have highly resolved that they are just as good as 
men, and intend to be treated so.” The Ohio State co-ed who had confessed her petting in 1922 
concurred. “The girl does not stand aloof,” she explained of the new social mores. “She and the 
man meet on common ground.” Similarly, writing in “These Modern Women,” a collection of 
essays published in The Nation in 1926 and 1927 under the auspices of editor Freda Kirchwey, 
psychoanalyst Beatrice Hinkle saw an obvious double standard at work in all the consternation 
about flappers and women’s liberated sexuality. “A general weakening of traditional standards of 
ethics and morals has long been observed in other activities – in business affairs and in the world 
of men’s relations with each other,” she noted. “These aspects of morality belong to the 
masculine world in particular and produce little agitation, while the upheaval in sex morals 
particularly affects the feminine world” and was thus receiving all the attention. “We see women 
assuming the right to act as their impulses dictate with much the same freedom that men have 
enjoyed for so long…The old morality has failed and is disintegrating fast.”1845 
 
This, Hinkle argued, was both a welcome development and a reflection of another, more 
fundamental change in American life. “[T]his overthrow of old customs and sex ideals,” Hinkle 
argued, “must be chiefly attributed to the economic independence of women brought about 
through the industrialism of our age…As long as women were dependent upon men for the 
support of themselves and their children there could be no development of a real morality, for the 
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love and feelings of the woman were so intermingled with her economic necessities that the 
higher love impulse was largely undifferentiated from the impulse of self-preservation.”1846 
 
In other words, young women’s libertine attitude toward sex was not just a reflection of a 
young generation’s amoral world-weariness. Rather, it was one of the most controversial facets 
of a more encompassing and important transformation. Having at last secured the vote after over 
a century of struggle, women now reached towards more equality in other facets of American 
life. To make that happen, some facets of the neo-Victorian culture of pre-war progressivism had 
to change. 
 
In the 1920’s, women were more likely to have received a college education and to hold 
down a wage-earning job than ever before. (In fact, the percentage of women in the workforce 
decreased once more in the 1930s as a result of the Depression.) While only eight percent of 18-
22 year-olds attended college in 1920 (up from four percent in 1910), women among this number 
rose from forty percent in 1910 to close to half in 1920. Women also rose from six percent of 
PhDs in 1900 to eighteen percent of the total in 1930. The number of women working in 
“professional service,” where they comprised forty percent of the total workforce, rose from 8.2 
percent to 14.2 percent in 1930, much of it attributable to the women-dominated professional 
fields of teaching, nursing, and social work. Factoring in the third of all working women who 
worked as domestic help and the nineteen percent who held clerical and sales jobs, the total 
percentage of working women rose from 20.6% of all women in 1900 to 25.3% in 1930. In total 
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the number of women working outside the home rose by 27% over the decade, from 8.3 million 




One of the most pronounced transformations in this regard was the number of married 
women working outside the home, which rose from fifteen percent of the female labor force in 
1900 to 29 percent in 1930 – six times faster than the comparable rate for single women over the 
same period. While this still only amounted to ten percent of married women, the rise of the two-
income household accompanied other changes happening in the home. The 1920’s saw the ideal 
of “companionate marriage” become embraced by the culture at large, meaning that, instead of 
two persons who had simply come to a mutually satisfactory and beneficial social arrangement, 
husbands and wives were now meant to be true friends and lovers. They should take pleasure in 
each other’s company rather than just tolerating each other out of conjugal duty.1848  
 
“[M]arriage has now become the entrance into a fuller and richer life,” argued social 
scientist Phyllis Blanchard, “an opportunity for sharing joys and sorrows with a mate who will 
not merely be a protector or a provider but an all-around companion.” Now that women “are 
demanding positive values of marriage” and “setting higher ideals than ever before and will 
probably not be content unless they realize them,” she suggested, “[t]he modern union of man 
and women is visioned as a perfect consummation of both personalities that will involve every 
phase of mutual living.” “The nuptial relation must be kept romantic,” recommended birth 
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control advocate Margaret Sanger similarly. “Do not be afraid to take the brakes off your heart, 
to surrender yourself to love. Unclamp this emotion; let it have full, healthy exercise.”1849 
 
Writing in The Nation in 1924, Joseph Wood Krutch, not yet afflicted with the existential 
terrors of The Modern Temper, argued that this new ideal of marriage made life more interesting, 
but also created new expectations that must be satisfied. “As long as marriage is a matter of 
contract,” Krutch argued, “the importance of the inward harmony of personalities is of the 
slightest, for children may be begotten and reared whether the parents love or hate. As long as 
passion is generally conceded to be a shameful concession to unregenerate humanity, the average 
man is not likely to be concerned if he finds that the ideal of the poets is not realized in his own 
nuptial couch.” But now, Krutch concluded, the stakes were higher, for “when love is free and 
unashamed then it is made ten times more difficult, for lives are recognized as frank failures 
which once would have seemed useful and satisfactory.” Thus fiction was more important than 
ever – As “the record of individual souls in search of a successful way of life,” it now constituted 
“the best and perhaps only really important material for the study of that art of life which grows 
ever more complicated as we demand that it be more complete and beautiful.”1850 
 
“The distinguished feature of the modern family,” Ernest Groves and William Ogburn 
argued similarly in their 1928 book American Marriage and Family Relationships, “will be 
affection.  The new family will be more difficult, maintaining higher standards that test character 
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more severely, but it will offer richer fruit for the satisfying of human needs.” This new vision of 
family life extended not only to the relations between husband and wife but also to parent and 
child – instead of a household run by and catered to the whims of a domineering patriarch, now, 
social scientists, argued, the child should be the focus of the home. “It is the child’s right,” wrote 
J.F. Hayden in 1926’s The Art of Marriage, “to be wanted, and to have a chance to grow up 
under conditions assuring the proper mental, spiritual, and physical health.”1851 
 
For every child to be wanted, however, usually required some sort of planning on the part 
of families. Accompanying both the rise of this new ideal of family and the decreased cultural 
inhibitions on matters of sex was a growing debate over access to birth control. A 1922 study 
taken by the Bureau of Social Hygiene Committee found that three-fourths of the one thousand 
married women surveyed approved of “voluntary parenthood,” as it was called then, and almost 
all the middle-class respondents had taken advantage of contraception of some kind or another. 
Robert and Helen Merrill Lynd, in their study of Muncie, Indiana, found a class divide on the 
question: Middle-class couples took birth control “for granted” and working-class families, due 




Birth control, thought Charlotte Perkins Gilman, was “a free ticket for selfish and 
fruitless indulgence, and an aid in the lamentable behavior of our times, affecting both men and 
women.” But for renowned contraception advocate Margaret Sanger, access to birth control had 
very little to do with enjoyment of sex at all. Rather, in her 1920 book Woman and the New Race 
and the 1922 follow-up The Pivot of Civilization, Sanger argued instead that birth control was 
                                                          
1851
 Fass, 53. 
1852









“The most far-reaching social development of modern times is the revolt against sex 
servitude,” Sanger wrote in the first of these. “The most important force in the remaking of the 
world is a free motherhood.” An active Socialist (and one of eleven children) who had opened 
the first birth control clinic in America in 1916 and founded both the Birth Control Review and 
the American Birth Control League in 1921, Sanger declared that woman had “chained herself to 
her place in society and the family through the maternal functions of her nature” and become a 
“brood animal for the masculine civilizations of the world.” “Unenlightened, submissive 
maternity” had thus “perpetuated the tyrannies of the Earth,” by creating the overpopulation – 
“Battalions of unwanted babies” – which had spawned “war, famine, poverty, and oppression of 
the workers.” As such, “the most immoral practice of the day is breeding too many children.”1854 
 
But now, however, “woman is rising in fundamental revolt…Millions of women are 
asserting their right to voluntary motherhood. They are determined to decide for themselves 
whether they shall become mothers, under what conditions and when.” This, Sanger argued, was 
“for woman the key to the temple of liberty,” with which she could “pay the debt” caused by 
overpopulation and “consciously and intelligently undo that disaster and create a new and a 
better order.” In other words, almost all of the ills of the world, from poverty to militarism to the 
subjugation of workers and women, would continue until contraception was widely available.  
“We must, therefore, not permit an increase in population that we are not prepared to care for to 
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the best advantage—that we are not prepared to do justice to, educationally and economically. 
We must popularize birth control thinking. We must not leave it haphazardly to be the privilege 
of the already privileged. We must put this means of freedom and growth into the hands of the 
masses.”1855 
 
As long been charged against Sanger ever since, there is a touch of the eugenicist in her 
prescription. In her discussion of immigrants in the United States, Sanger is mostly quite 
complimentary of new arrivals – men and women who “bring in their hearts a desire for freedom 
from all the tyrannies that afflict the earth….They have the simple faith that in America they will 
find equality, liberty, and an opportunity for a decent livelihood. And they have something else. 
The cell plasms of these people are freighted with the potentialities of the best in Old World 
civilization. They come from lands rich in the traditions of courage, of art, music, letters, science 
and philosophy.” Americans, meanwhile, had hailed these new arrivals as “a lot of ignorant 
foreigners,’ we have shouted at, bustled and kicked them. Our industries have taken advantage of 
their ignorance of the country’s way to take their toil in mills and mines and factories at 
starvations wages…We have huddled them together like rabbits to multiply their numbers and 
their misery. Instead of saying that we Americanize them, we should confess that we animalize 
them.”1856 
 
Nonetheless, Sanger also spends a good bit of time delineating the ethnic composition of 
these new immigrants, and arguing that voluntary motherhood was the vehicle by which to 
enhance and ensure racial purity. “Motherhood, when free to choose the father, free to choose the 
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time and the number of children who shall result from the union, automatically works in 
wondrous ways. It refuses to bring forth weaklings; refuses to bring forth slaves…It withholds 
the unfit, brings forth the fit…Instinctively it avoids all those things which multiply racial 
handicaps.” Allow mothers to choose when to have a child, Sanger asserted, as “it will save the 
precious metals of racial culture, fused into an amalgam of physical perfection, mental strength 
and spiritual progress. Such an American race, containing the best of all racial elements, could 
give to the world a vision and a leadership beyond our present imagination.”1857  
 
Sanger would hit the eugenics note more stridently as the decade progressed. As historian 
Dorothy Brown points out, by 1922, in The Pivot of Civilization, Sanger was decrying “the lack 
of balance between the birthrate of the unfit and the fit” and by 1925 was writing that “those 
parents who are least fit to reproduce the race are having the largest number of children, while 
people of wealth, leisure, and education are having small families.” Not for nothing was Dr. 





It was on this eugenics argument for birth control that Catholic Church officials, such as 
Archbishop Patrick Joseph Hayes of New York, made their stance against the movement. “The 
Christ-Child did not stay His own entrance into this mortal life because His mother was poor, 
roofless, and without provision for the morrow,” Hayes told the faithful in December 1921. 
“Even though some little angels in the flesh, through the moral, mental, or physical deformity of 
parents, may appear to human eyes hideous, misshapen, a blot on civilized society, we must not 
lose sight…that under and within such visible malformation there lives an immortal soul to be 
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saved and glorified for all eternity among the blessed in Heaven.” In short, contraception was an 
interference with the laws of nature and the will of God. “To take life after its inception is a 
horrible crime,” he averred, “but to prevent human life that the Creator is about to bring into 
being is satanic.”1859 
 
That Christmas of 1921, the issue of birth control had a reason to be foremost on the 
Archbishop’s mind. Urged on by Hayes, who thought Sanger and her fellow birth control 
advocates were advocating “the degradation of the moral life of the entire social body,” New 
York police had broken up what was meant to America’s first conference on birth control at the 
Town Hall Theater in New York in November 1921, and arrested Sanger and another speaker. 
This attempt to silence Sanger backfired massively. “I consider my arrest in violation of every 
principle of liberty that America stands for,” an unbowed Sanger told the press, “and I shall take 
this case to the highest courts, if necessary, to preclude the possibility of it ever happening 
again.”1860 
 
The following day, a Judge dismissed the case against Sanger on the grounds that no 
crime was committed. Nonetheless, as the ACLU and other civil liberties advocates flocked to 
Sanger’s standard, the Town Hall incident sparked a considerable publicity wave for the cause. 
“The attempted denial of the open forum to birth control shows the fundamental weakness” of 
the Church’s position, editorialized TNR. “There would be no divorce laws in the United States, 
if the same opposition could have its way.” To help ease the sudden controversy, Hayes agreed 
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Sanger also took the opportunity of Hayes’ Christmas letter to respond once more. The 
Archbishop “knows no more about the fact of the immorality of the soul than the rest of us 
human beings,” she wrote, and “we who are trying to better humanity fundamentally believe that 
a healthy, happy human race is more in keeping with the laws of God than disease, misery and 
poverty perpetuating themselves generation after generation.” In her autobiography, Sanger 
noted the “columns and columns” of free ink birth control had gained as a result of “the 
blundering of the opposition.” Now, instead of her having to wrestle the ghost of Anthony 
Comstock and other moral reformers aghast at the idea of free love, “[i]t was now a battle of a 
republic against the machinations of the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church.”1862 
 
While Sanger’s pivot against the Catholic Church in 1921 served to amplify the 
movement (and brought it in accord with a number of other cultural happenings in the decade, 
few of them progressive), a later alliance worked less well. In 1925, she made common cause 
with the decidedly un-Socialist American Medical Association, securing their public 
endorsement of contraception in exchange for an ABCL proclamation that “instruction in Birth 
Control should be given by the medical profession…We do not favor the indiscriminate 
diffusion of unreliable and unsafe Birth Control advice.” She also offered, in the words of The 
Survey, “to place the direction of the medical activities of the American Birth Control League in 
the hands of a representative medical group.” In return, the medical community – whose eminent 
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scholars attended the 1925 birth control conference in droves – lauded “the splendid work of Ms. 
Margaret Sanger, the pioneer and leader of the birth control movement in America. Under 
difficulties and vicissitudes which would have completely disheartened a less courageous soul, 
she has kept up the fight and won a succession of victories which even a few years would have 
seemed impossible.” Even as the praise flowed both ways, this April 1925 conference had the 
mood of a handoff. As The Survey reported, “Now it is up to the doctors.” But while the medical 
establishment effectively pushed Sanger out of the forefront of her own cause, the AMA did very 




Unlike Sanger’s ABCL, Mary Ware Dennett’s Voluntary Parenthood League – a sister 
organization with which Sanger held an uneasy relationship – preferred an inside game. Until 
their dissolution in 1927, the League lobbied legislatures for the repeal of state and federal 
indecency laws that prevented open and frank discussion of birth control and abortion, usually by 
emphasizing women’s rights and the type of maternalist arguments that had worked so well to 
pass the Sheppard-Towner Act. Their letterhead argued that obscenity laws “besmirch…the 
question of intelligent parenthood by including it with penalized indecencies,” and that they 
should be repealed “so that the birth of children may occur with due regard to health…income, 
choice, environment, and the well-being of the community.”1864 
 
While the Voluntary Parenthood League aspired to less confrontational tactics than 
Sanger’s ABCL, they had an equally hard time moving Congress on the issue of birth control. 
One week after the inauguration of Warren Harding, Dennett wrote William Borah asking him to 
take up the subject of repealing obscenity laws. Soon thereafter, the Senator’s office was deluged 
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with postcards and letters on the subject. “The application of scientific knowledge in this field,” 
argued one, “is more important and far-reaching, I believe, than any other single issue now up 
for consideration.” “In view of the opinion of many deep students of sociology that the high birth 
rate among the poor classes must be checked” suggested another, “it seems deplorable that there 
are laws which brand as a felony the giving of information by means of which such restriction 
might be brought about.” One “Woman Physician” from Minnesota told Borah how she had 
“seen the need of intelligent Birth Control in a great many pathetic instances. Sponsoring this 
Bill would be a very real contribution to the progress of civilization, and towards the solution of 
some of our most heart rending national problems.”1865  
 
Several others appealed to Borah’s new status as America’s champion of disarmament 
and argued that repealing the obscenity laws would be “one more proof of the progressive open-
mindedness that has characterized your activities in the Senate.” “[Y]our proposal for a naval 
holiday make[s] it easy to believe that in you the women of the country have found a leader on 
whom they count to take this step in freeing them from an outworn code,” one writer suggested. 
“I hope that in you we have found that friend who will not be under the dominion of this tabu.” 
“This is bill is so in line with modern thought,” concluded another from Pittsburgh, “that you 
need for no reason hesitate to stand back of it. On the contrary you would be regarded with the 
highest esteem by those who have admired your courage for your stand on disarmament, 
economy of the inaugural, and other matters of importance.” The Idaho Senator was unmoved by 
these appeals – In fact, he didn’t even reply to Dennett personally. “Senator Borah directs me to 
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say that he is so crowded with other matters of importance that it is impossible for him to agree 
at this time to take any more work,” read the form response.1866 
 
This was not Dennett’s first rejection. In fact, she had been looking for a sponsor for the 
legislation since 1919, to no avail. Joseph France of Maryland, one of the only physicians in the 
Senate, seemed interested but also didn’t think he had the time. George Norris was a supporter of 
the bill, but thought the unpopularity of his other progressive stances on the Judiciary Committee 
made him a poor champion for the issue. France and Norris had sent Dennett ping-ponging back 
and forth to various potential sponsors – Thomas Sterling, William Dillingham, Morris 
Sheppard, Arthur Capper, William Kenyon – all of whom would deliberate for awhile than tell 
the League that, while they were in sympathy with the cause, they just did not have the time to 
take up this legislation. (“I’m mighty sorry,” said Senator Kenyon in a representative response, 
“but I am just loaded down with bills that are taking every moment of my time.”)1867 
 
Undeterred, Dennett and the VPL instead began to work on Will Hays, then still 
Harding’s Postmaster General, to enlist him in the cause of liberalizing mail codes. When Hays 
left Washington for Hollywood, however, Dennett turned her attention back to the Congress. 
Borah, in typically exasperating fashion, suggested to the League that he might be able to append 
the legislation to another bill, calling for stricter mail controls on race track betting materials, if it 
made it out of the Judiciary committee to the floor – but he then helped to kill the race track bill 
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in committee. Finally, after the 1922 midterms, she at last secured the sponsorship of Albert 
Cummins of Iowa and lame duck Representative John Kissel of New York, but the Cummins-
Kissel bill received no attention before the session ended, in part because a quorum on the 
Judiciary Committee had suddenly disappeared when Cummins said he was bringing the bill to a 
vote. (“They just faded away,” he told Dennett after the fact.)1868 
 
With new House sponsor William Vaile of Colorado, the Cummins-Vaile bill was 
reintroduced in January 1924, and once again, members of the Judiciary Committee received 
multitudes of letters pro- and con-. “When the universal trend of intelligent people is to get and 
make use of the contraceptive knowledge which the laws forbid,” the VPL asked in a twelve-day 
“daily dozen” series of talking points in favor of the bill, “— that is to become law-breakers – is 
it not high time to change the law?” Cummins-Vaile, they argued, would give “first class 
medical experts…a lawful and decent opportunity” to offer “dignified, reliable, scientific, 
hygienic information” instead being of “obliged to resort to the undignified process of boot-
legging their scientific teaching.”  In short, the VPL asserted, “[t]his country is founded upon 
faith in the people. Does Congress wish to maintain laws which repudiate that faith?”1869 
 
These appeals to science and sophistication were lost on the opposition. “I hope, my dear 
Sir, that you are not one of the ‘sophisticated’ Congressman,” Marguerite Stewart, head of the 
National Christian League for the Promotion of Purity, wrote Borah. Rather than being archaic 
nostrums, Stewart argued, the laws on the books had held back the “flood of the old world 
obscenities and immoralities” which had “made of the French nation the moral and physical 
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plague-spot of Christendom.” “For many years the French people have practiced birth control by 
contraceptive methods and have taught it to all comers. Today she is in the death-grip with 
venereal disease and a rapidly falling birth-rate which threatens national extinction.” “[T]he 
practices this literature is intended to teach,” another argued, “are in violation of the law of God 
as expressed in both religion and nature and cannot but be fraught with serious danger to the 
individual, the home and our country.” “Will you be treating us as your children,” the East St. 
Louis Woman’s Club asked the Senate, “when you place in our hands knowledge that would 
make us a nation of moral degenerates?”1870 
 
When hearings were held in April and May of 1924 on the Cummins-Vaile bill – the May 
date was added to appease irate Catholics – Marguerite Stewart was one of those who testified 
against the bill. She was joined by someone who carried more weight in progressive circles, 
Father John Ryan of the National Catholic Welfare Council. In 1916, Ryan had argued that 
“limitation of these families through these practices is injurious to the race” and “debasing to 
those who employ them, inasmuch as they lead inevitably to loss of reverence for the marital 
relation, loss of respect for the conjugal partner, and loss of faith in the sacredness of the nuptial 
bond.” The use of birth control, Ryan continued, “leads inevitably to an increase of softness, 
luxury, and materialism and to a decrease of mental and moral discipline, of endurance, and of 
the power of achievement.”1871  
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An old-school progressive argument reminiscent of Colonel Roosevelt, but one wonders 
if the committee was even listening. As one of Sanger’s aides reported back about the debate, the 
Cummins-Vaile bill had become “the laughing stock of the cloakroom.” Eventually, in January 
1925, Cummins – now the Chairman of the Judiciary – moved the bill though his committee 
without a report, whereupon it still languished on the floor, never came to a vote, and thus died at 
the end of the session in March.
1872
   
 
A dismayed Dennett folded up shop, ceding the issue to Sanger’s ABCL – either way, the 
birth control issue was stymied for the time being. “The way out of the ethical difficulty,” a 
writer in The Survey argued in 1923, “seems to lie in recognizing that the sex function serves as 
high a purpose, if associated with genuine affection and exercised in moderation, in making 
human happiness as in making human beings.” While conforming to the companionate ideal and 
the sensibilities of the younger generation, a number of progressives and politicians were not yet 




While the question of birth control separated old and new progressives, the animosity it 
engendered was relatively minute compared to one of the major clashes of the decade involving 
the emergence of the New Woman – the furor over the Equal Rights Amendment. Looking back 
at the decade, one WTUL organizer lamented how she and her fellow progressives “had to lay 
aside the work they were doing to improve conditions for women and spend their time 
combating the equal rights amendment.” No other issue so divided the former suffrage 
movement against itself in the 1920s.
1874
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The controversy over the Equal Right Amendment began not just in differing approaches 
to reform but lingering resentments from the suffrage battle. In 1914, 29-year-old suffragist 
Alice Paul had led a dissatisfied contingent out of the National American Woman Suffrage 
Organization (NAWSA) and formed the Congressional Union, soon renamed the National 
Women’s Party (NWP). As the more militant wing of the movement, Paul’s NWP adopted 
protest strategies from the British campaign for suffrage, such as hunger strikes and protests of 
the Wilson administration during wartime, which unnerved the often older and more staid 




Paul made further enemies through both her single-minded focus and her iron-fisted 
approach to the NWP.  Reporting on the 1921 Party convention, The Nation’s Freda Kirchwey, 
in an article entitled “Alice Paul Pulls the Strings,” deplored what she saw there – “[T]he leaders 
acted on the amiable contempt for their followers, the rank and file, either cynically or 
enthusiastically, watched the wishes of their leaders become the law of the convention:” 
 
The rank and file…do not know what their party will do; they only know that no action was taken 
in behalf of the Negro women, who have not yet got the vote in spite of the Nineteenth 
Amendment; that birth control and maternity endowment and most of the questions that stir the 
minds of modern women were ignored; that disarmament was ruled out; and that the program 
finally adopted – the majority report of the resolutions committee – declared vaguely against 
‘legal disabilities’ and for ‘equality’ leaving the future definitions of those terms and their 




Eventually, Kirchwey reported, both birth control advocates and a delegation of African-
American women got a chance to be heard on the control floor. But “they were simply an 
interruption, an obstacle to the smooth working of the machine…The attitude of Alice Paul and 
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her supporters toward these disturbers of the peace – Negro women and birth control advocates 
alike – was the attitude of all established authorities. ‘Why do these people harass us?’ asked 
Miss Paul. ‘Why do they want to spoil our convention?’ The answer that never occurred to her 
was this: ‘For the same reason that made you disturb the peace and harass the authorities in your 
peculiarly effective and irritating way: because they want to further the cause they believe 
in.”1877 
 
These tensions – simmering throughout 1921 and 1922 as the NWP publicly worked out 
its amendment strategy – boiled over in November 1923. Then, in a ceremony at Seneca Falls, 
New York to commemorate the seventy-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of 
Sentiments, the NWP unfurled its new “Lucretia Mott Amendment.” It read: “Men and women 
shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction.” 
This amendment, argued supporter Crystal Eastman, “would blot out of every law book in the 
land…sweep out of every dusty court-room…[and] erase from every judge’s mind that centuries-
old precedent as to women’s inferiority and dependence and need for protection; [and] substitute 
for it at one blow the simple new precedent of equality.” There was no path forward, Eastman 
argued, “so long as women are classed with children and minors in industrial legislation.”1878  
 
Older reformers and trade unions balked at this line of reasoning. In a debate for The 
Survey, New York reformer and Al Smith confidante Frances Perkins – who had been crucial in 
passing the 1911 Triangle Fire Reforms that augured a wave of protective laws across the nation 
– argued they had been “initiated because of observed and striking facts: namely, the overwork, 
exploitation, and unhealthful surroundings of the working women who crowded into factories in 








the latter part of the nineteenth century.” Everything from the “traditional and usual height of a 
workbench,” which was “based on the average male stature and is too high for the comfort of the 
average woman worker,” to the fact that women were often left out of unionization efforts, 
Perkins noted, argued in support of protective legislation. “[T]o compete fairly with men who 
have by habit and greater experience most of the advantages in any competitive struggle,” she 
concluded, protective legislation was a woman’s “only hope of a reasonably satisfactory life in 
industry…on the basis of the prevention of fatigue by short hours, good wages, and healthful 
conditions.”1879 
 
Florence Kelley, the head of the National Consumers’ League and a longtime advocate 
for protective legislation, was particularly livid at the NWP. “There is at this moment an insanity 
prevalent among women where we would least expect it,” she wrote to Roscoe Pound, Dean of 
Harvard Law School, about what she would later call the “miserable amendment.” “The insanity 
expresses itself in eager demands for identical treatment with that according to men.” Such 
“[b]lanket amendments to the U.S. Constitution,” Kelley declared at another venue, were 
“monstrosities” and “atrocities” that threatened all the decades of work her National Consumers’ 
League, the WTUL, and other progressive groups had put in to secure protective legislation for 
women in the workplace. “The Supreme Court definitions of ‘equal rights’ in the so-called 
‘Negro’ amendments,” she wrote Lavinia Dock in 1923, ‘have been consistently injurious, first, 
to the Negroes, and afterward to White women and children…I am in principle averse to giving 
the Court any fresh opportunities to interpret ambiguous terms.” In a list of “Twenty Questions” 
Kelley circulated to members of Congress in response, she asked Members to consider what 
effect their amendment would have on both protective legislation and a host of other areas. “Will 
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husbands need to continue to support their wives?” she asked. “Can deserting husbands be 
brought back and compelled to support wife and child?” “Will women be subject to 
conscription?” “What will become of the penalties (a) for seduction? (b) for violation of the 
Mann Act? (c) for rape?”1880 
 
To Kelley and her colleagues, the Mott Amendment and its adherents were also pouring 
salt on another painful wound. In April 1923, the Supreme Court overturned a minimum-wage 
law for women in the District of Columbia in the Adkins v. Children’s Hospital decision, penned 
by Harding appointee George Sutherland – later one of the nemeses of Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal. This 5-3 decision (with Brandeis abstaining and Chief Justice Taft and Holmes in 
opposition for different reasons) concluded, in the manner of the Lochner case, that this proposed 
minimum wage interfered with the liberty of contract purportedly upheld by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Court went so far as to call the law “a naked, 
arbitrary exercise of power” by the State – Rather than serve any social benefit, it was deemed 
“simply and exclusively a price-fixing law, confined to adult women…who are legally as 
capable of contracting for themselves as men.”1881 
 
That was the rub. In fact, Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, also suggested that it 
might be time to revisit the Court’s 1908 decision in Muller v. Oregon, which had upheld a law 
mandating that women could work no longer than ten hours a day. “The ancient inequality of the 
sexes, otherwise than physical…has continued ‘with diminishing intensity,” the Adkins decision 
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read. “In view of the great – not to say revolutionary – changes which have taken place since that 
utterance, in the contractual, political and civil status of women, culminating in the Nineteenth 
Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differences have now come almost, if not 
quite, to the vanishing point.” In fact, “the present day trend of legislation, as well as that of 
common thought and usage,” Sutherland declared, was towards women being “accorded 
emancipation from the old doctrine that she must be given special protection or be subjected to 
special restraint in her contractual and civil relationships.”1882 
 
Progressives were stunned by the verdict. “The minimum wage decision is the most 
severe blow which progressive American labor legislation has yet received at the hands of the 
Supreme Court,” wrote Henry Seeger in The Survey. “[I]t was not a new and untried experiment 
that was to be passed upon…The decision involved rather a reversal of what had come to be 
accepted as an established constitutional principle.” Louis Hart, the Governor of Washington, 
noted that the case “if it results in the wiping out of our minimum wage laws may be in its effect 
upon our economic and industrial life second only to the famous Dred Scott decision.” Samuel 
Gompers said the Court had “trampled” the law “underfoot, together with the great army of 
women wage-earners of our country.” “Every genuine lover of justice and every competent 
student of industry has been shocked by the decision,” wrote Father John A. Ryan, arguing the 
Court had stepped far outside its bounds. “The business of the judge is to interpret law,” Ryan 
thought, “not to determine legislative policy. “Adkins, lamented Frances Perkins, “is a most 
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surprising and shocking step backward in the history of social legislation in the United 
States.”1883 
 
In the years prior to the Adkins decision, Florence Kelley and the League had fought to 
see twenty-four states adopt minimum wage laws – twelve before the War, twelve after.  When 
the Adkins case came up, Kelly had put the full force of the League into fighting it, and, once he 
offered his services, had Felix Frankfurter “jumping high jumps twice daily” on its behalf. But, 
as Frankfurter told Kelley aide Mary Dewson after the verdict had been handed down, “Molly, 
you must learn that if the U.S. Supreme Court says a red rose is green, it is green. That’s final.”  
And the reformers had not only lost this case. They now saw the work of their lives in danger of 
being overturned by the Court – of nine men and no women, as Kelley noted – in the very near 
future. In fact, Adkins paved the way for similar state laws being overturned all across the 
country – By 1930, the number of states with minimum wage laws (excluding the District of 
Columbia) dwindled down to six. The National Woman’s Party, meanwhile, applauded the 
Adkins decision as a step forward for women and equality. “[O]ne can feel that at last the world 
is beginning to realize that women are adult human beings,” Alice Paul said of the verdict.  It 
was in this climate that, eight months later, the NWP  put forward the Mott amendment, which 




Especially in the face of Adkins, old-time reformers were enraged. “I could not help 
comparing you as you sat there, sheltered, safe, beautifully guarded against even the ugliness of 
life, with the women for whom you demand ‘freedom of contract,’” an irate Alice Hamilton, the 
                                                          
1883
 “The Minimum Wage – What Next?”, The Survey, May 15th, 1923, 215-222, 256-261. John A. Ryan, “Our Self-
Amending Constitution,” The Survey, August 1st, 1923, 480-481. 
1884
 Chambers, 68-70. Brown, 86. J. Stanley Lemons, The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973), 143-144. Alice Paul, “The Minimum Wage – What’s Next?” 
The Survey, May 15
th




former Hull House settlement worker who in 1919 had become the first woman on Harvard’s 
faculty, wrote to one ERA proponent. “[T]he great army of waitresses and hotel chambermaids, 
unorganized, utterly ignorant of ways of making their grievances known, working long hours and 
living wretchedly” would be the victims of the NWP’s line of thinking, she argued. Similarly, 
Mabel Leslie of the WTUL thought ERA’s backers were “merely theoretical ultra-feminists who 
[did] not have to work for a living,” while one AFL member suggested its supporters would view 




In fact, Paul – who herself had advocated for protective legislation at an earlier time – 
had originally urged Massachusetts members fighting for a state-level ERA in 1921 to “be very 
certain that none of the legislation which you introduce in any way disturbs any protective 
legislation that may have been passed in your state for the welfare of women”: 
 
I do not think we want to interfere in any way with the so called welfare legislation that has been 
passed at the instance of the Consumers League and other organizations for the purpose of 
protecting women from night work and from too long hours of labor…That is, it seems to me, 
when there is an inequality in which the position of women is better than that of me, we do not 
want to bring that standard for women down to that of men, but want, on the contrary, to bring 





But, in the final analysis, Paul and her allies found the principle of equality before the law 
too fundamental to hedge on behalf of earlier gains. “Would you regard it as ‘protection’,” NWP 
member Harriet Stanton Blatch asked Anne Martin, a woman running for Senate in 1918, “were 
you when elected to the Senate excluded from debates extending over eight hours, taking place 
Saturday afternoons or at night?” For similar reasons, Blatch thought, “in many highly paid 
trades women have been pushed into the lower grades of work, limited in earning capacity, if not 
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shut out of the trade entirely by these so-called protective laws.” By November 1921, Paul told a 
friend she no longer believed in “special protective labor legislation for women. It seems to me 
that protective labor legislation should be enacted for women and men alike in a trade or in a 
geographical district and not along sex lines. I think that enacting labor laws along sex lines is 
erecting another handicap for women in the economic struggle.”1887 
 
Clearly, there was more than a hint of sexism in the arguments put forward by some 
opponents of the amendment, even among ostensibly progressive ones. “Both the Catholic 
Church and the women trade union leaders,” Father John Ryan argued in a 1929 pamphlet on the 
subject, “approach this question from the side of experience and the facts of human nature.” 
Citing Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical on the Condition of Labor, Ryan argued that “wage earning 
women are a special class, having needs which are peculiar to that class. These should be taken 
care of by appropriate and special legislation. This is realism and common sense.” Protective 
legislation, he argued, “recognizes certain actual inequalities, weaknesses if you will, of 
physique and of capacity for organization.” As such, he argued the NWP’s position seemed to be 
borne of “a feeling of resentment against the male sex…Instead of striving to provide women 
with those conditions, economic, social, legislative, and other which will assure them reasonable 
opportunities for living their lives and performing their functions as women, the feminists would 
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have them become merely bad imitators of men…It would mean the destruction of the family 
and the race.”1888 
 
In any case, even more than the birth control issue, the fight over the ERA – and the 
appropriate path forward for women at issue – set former allies at odds. “The American woman’s 
movement,” Frances Kellor said in 1923,” and her interest in great moral and social questions, is 
splintered into a hundred fragments under as many warring leaders.” Congress, meanwhile, 
remained as aloof from the Equal Rights Amendment discussion as it had on voluntary 
parenthood. While introduced by Kansas Republicans Charles Curtis in the Senate and Daniel 
Anthony – Susan B. Anthony’s nephew – in the House in 1923, and subsequently introduced 




In the meantime, the culture of the Twenties continued to move away from the 
protectionism favored by old-line progressives and toward the perspective of the National 
Women’s Party. The New Woman, to borrow a phrase later used to describe Ginger Rogers, 
could do everything men could do, backwards and with high heels on. 1920 saw film star Mary 
Pickford join with Douglas Fairbanks, D.W. Griffith, and Charlie Chaplin as partners of United 
Artists, making her a cool millionaire. In 1926, American Gertrude Ederle made headlines 
around the world by becoming the first woman to swim the English Channel. Two years later, in 
1928, Amelia Earhart repeated Lindbergh’s solo flight across the Atlantic, while Margaret Mead 
became an instant sensation and one of the world’s most renowned anthropologists with the 
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publication of her book, Coming of Age in Samoa. In the pages of The New Yorker and at the 
lunch table of the Algonquin Hotel, writer and poet Dorothy Parker – who embodied the New 
Woman much more than ever did F. Scott’s Fitzgerald’s parade of vapid, alluring flappers – 
displayed a biting wit and caustic insight to rival Mencken’s. “If I abstain from fun and such / I’ll 
probably amount to much,” she wrote in her 1926 poetry debut, Enough Rope, summing up the 
spirit of the age, “But I shall stay the way I am / Because I do not give a damn.”1890 
 
To be sure, the social and political equality of the New Woman was in many ways still 
wishful thinking, and in fact the rhetoric of emancipation often imposed new strictures on 
women. Moving into the workplace usually meant women were now expected to bring home pay 
and maintain the vision of the domestic ideal, while, of course, remaining alluring for her 
husband. In fact, the sale of cosmetics and make-up increased dramatically in the Twenties, in a 
testament to changing traditions, the allure of the movies, and the same psychological tool kit 
advertisers had used to make Listerine mouthwash a standard in every bathroom. By 1929, 
according to sociologist Robert Lynd, the cosmetics industry was spending more on 
advertisements than either the food or car industries.
1891
    
 
Similarly, new household appliances that should have made life easier, like the oven and 
the vacuum cleaner, came hand-in-hand with higher expectations of cleanliness and domestic 
bliss. “When will women, patient creatures,” asked Anne Martin, the aforementioned Senate 
candidate of 1918, “see clearly enough to protest against…the pictures of themselves as wives 
and mothers appropriately arrayed in housewives’ uniforms, working oil, gas, and electric stoves, 
furnaces, carpet-sweepers, washing machines and clothes-wringers, or cooking and serving 
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various foods – all the wares of the advertisers – with sweet, seraphic smiles on their faces? As if 
they never had, or wanted another thought!”  If and when they did, it would not be thanks to 
advertisers, who – given the oft-cited statistic of the time that women made 80% of consumer 
decisions for the home – worked feverishly to merge the emerging ideals of the New Woman and 
companionate marriage with a need for their products. “Today’s woman gets what she wants,” 
one Chicago Tribune ad read, “The vote. Slim sheaths of silk to replace voluminous petticoats. 
Glassware in sapphire blue or glowing amber. The right to a career. Soap to match her 
bathroom’s color scheme.”1892 
 
Nonetheless, there was more to the New Woman than an advertiser’s marketing strategy, 
or a Fitzgerald novella. The grasping towards a new equality was very real, and, though many of 
the fundamentals of that new equality would take decades to reach fruition, if indeed they ever 
were, the aspirations toward them were hard-felt by the younger generation in the 1920’s – 
belying the intense cynicism that took hold of so many older progressives’ hearts during the New 
Era. 
 
A similar dynamic could be witnessed north of 96
th
 Street in Manhattan, where, in noted 
contrast to the despair and world-weary cynicism emanating from Paris, the Algonquin, and 
other bastions of white literary culture, a generation of African-American authors, poets, artists, 
and musicians were flourishing as never before. “Negro life is not only establishing new contacts 
and founding new centers, it is finding a new soul,” wrote Howard University professor of 
philosophy Alain Locke in the foreword to 1925’s The New Negro, a seminal anthology that 
offered all of America “the first fruits of the Negro Renaissance.” ‘There is a fresh spiritual and 
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cultural focusing. We have, as the heralding sign, an unusual outburst of creative expression.” In 




In many ways, Harlem was full of optimism for the same reasons so many white artists 
were crippled with despair. While many white writers and poets bemoaned what they viewed as 
the collapse of the old, neo-Victorian, Protestant civilization, African-American artists felt 
liberated at last from the yoke of its hypocrisies. They saw instead the crumbling of a broken, 
desiccated culture that had fought for democracy overseas while treating them like second-class 
citizens at home. Similarly, while whites had seen their hopes die in the World War and its 
aftermath, many African-Americans came out of the conflagration determined to stand up and be 
counted. To many in white America, Woodrow Wilson was the tragic “peace messiah,” who had 
promised so much and yet broken the heart of the world at Versailles. To African-Americans, he 
was the southern Democrat who had re-segregated the White House. If white America had 
decided to forsake the puritanical rectitude of a Wilson in exchange for the humble joviality of a 




Compounding this sense of new opportunity among African Americans was the Great 
Migration – A generation of black men and women was moving North into the cities, and 
escaping the very real repressions of the South. This was “a deliberate flight not only from 
countryside to city,” wrote Locke, “but from a medieval America to modern.” Even more 
inspiring, this cultural renaissance was all happening in what had fast become one of the most 
exciting and diverse places on the planet. African-American neighborhoods in cities were of 
course nothing new, but Harlem was something else altogether. “Here in Manhattan is not 
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merely the largest Negro community in the world,” Locke noted, “but the first concentration in 
history of so many diverse elements of Negro life. It has attracted the African, the West Indian, 
the Negro American; has brought together the Negro of the North and the Negro of the South; 
the man from the city and the man from the town and village; the peasant, the student, the 
business man, the professional man, artist, poet, musician, adventurer and worker, preacher and 
criminal, exploiter and social outcast.”1895 
 
In the great melting pot, Locke argued, the New Negro was taking control of his own 
destiny. “He resents being spoken of as a social ward or minor, even by his own, and to being 
regarded a chronic patient, for the sociological clinic, the sick man of American Democracy. For 
the same reasons, he himself is through with those social nostrums and panaceas, the so-called 
‘solutions’ of his ‘problem,’ with which he and the country have been so liberally dosed in the 
past.” Instead, Locke proclaimed, the way forward was through “belief in the efficacy of 
collective effort, in race co-operation. This deep feeling of race is at present in the mainspring of 
Negro life…As a world phenomenon this wider race consciousness is a different thing from the 
much asserted rising tide of color…Whether it actually brings into being new Armadas of 
conflict or argosies of cultural exchange and enlightenment can only be decided by the attitude 
of the dominant races in an era of critical change.” Regardless, Locke argued, “if in our lifetime 
the Negro should not be able to celebrate his full initiation into American democracy, he can at 
least, on the warrant of these things, celebrate the attainment of a significant and satisfying new 
phase of group development, and with it a spiritual Coming of Age.”1896 
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Alain Locke himself was not so much a product of the Harlem Renaissance as its 
designated chronicler. The year before The New Negro was published, Paul Kellogg approached 
Locke, a Washington DC native, to help put together a Harlem-themed issue of The Survey 
Graphic (The Survey’s more color- and image-intensive monthly issue.) It appeared on stands in 
March 1925, and eventually in longer form became the influential New Negro anthology. Locke 
seized this chance to act as the harbinger of goings-on in Harlem, recruiting, in the words of one 
historian, “a Who’s Who among black American artists, intellectuals, and scholars.” Along with 
poets like Langston Hughes, Claude McKay, and Countee Cullen, authors like Zora Neale 
Hurston and Jesse Toomer, and sympathetic whites like Kellogg and reclusive Philadelphia art 
collector Albert Barnes, Locke also turned to the staff of The Crisis, including James Weldon 
Johnson, art critic Jessie Fauset (whom Hughes deemed as integral to the Renaissance as Locke, 
and who, as the discoverer of so many Harlem talents, likely should have been the woman 
Kellogg turned to to assemble the Survey’s special issue), and the Dean himself, W.E.B. DuBois, 





In donating an essay for The New Negro (albeit one previously published in Foreign 
Affairs), DuBois bestowed his benediction on the nascent Harlem Renaissance – and yet he 
looked at the phenomenon with older and less optimistic eyes. In his contribution, Du Bois 
revisited his 1903 book and its central contention that “the problem of the twentieth century is 
the problem of the color line.” After surveying the European colonial systems that still held sway 
in Africa – the empires of Portugal, France, England, and Belgium – he concluded that this was 
still true, with one major caveat, in part because his generation had failed at Versailles. “To some 
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persons – to more human beings than ever before – at one time in the world’s history,” he wrote, 
“there came during the Great War, during those terrible years of 1917 and 1918, a vision of the 
Glory of Sacrifice, a dream of a world greater, sweeter, more beautiful and more honest than 
ever before; a world without war, without poverty and without hate. I am glad it came. Even 
though it was a mirage it was eternally true.” Until that dream was realized, Du Bois argued, 




More to the point, in a subtle rebuke to Locke’s evocation of race-consciousness and 
race-pride – which to DuBois carried troubling resonances of the philosophy of his nemesis, 
Marcus Garvey – he now argued that the color line was the problem of the world because it 
accorded with a more fundamental schism. “Most men would agree that our present problem of 
problems was not the Color Problem,” he now argued, “but what we call Labor, the problem of 
allocating work and income in the tremendous and increasingly intricate world-embracing 
industrial machine that our civilization has built.” In other words, it was the fight between labor 
and capital, rather than any Lothrop Stoddard-like clash of prideful races, that would guide the 
future. To take just one example, DuBois argued that the troubles in Liberia were “not because 
the republic is black, but because the world has failed in this same battle; because organized 
industry owns and rules England, France, Germany, America, and Heaven…unless the world 
escapes, the world as well as Liberia will die; and if Liberia lives it will be because the World is 
reborn as in that vision splendid of 1918.”1899 
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But DuBois, like reformers such as Florence Kelley and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, were 
of an older generation. “It was characteristic of the Jazz Age,” F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote, looking 
back on the decade from the vantage of 1931, “that it had no interest in politics at all.” For young 
men and women in Harlem, as in all of New York City – a city that doubled in population 
between 1910 and 1930 – the world was now, and the city was Modernity itself.  
 
With both the publishing and music industries flourishing as never before, and with the 
new technologies of radio and the movies broadcasting city culture to the rest of the world, New 
York in the 1920’s consolidated its position over Boston, Chicago, Baltimore, and other cities as 
the cultural center of America (and, by extension, the known universe.) “The whole world 
revolves around New York,” said Duke Ellington late in life, remembering his heydays as one of 
the early popularizers of jazz in the 1920’s. “Very little happens anywhere unless someone in 
New York presses a button.” There, under the tolerant eye of Mayor Jimmy Walker, a quick-
witted, sociable, and often sozzled bon vivant from Tammany Hall, men and women, whites and 
blacks, straight and gay people all gathered together to drink, dance, socialize, and forge a new 
culture from the ashes of the old.  America was “the most powerful nation” in the world, wrote 
Fitzgerald, “Who could tell us anymore what was fashionable and what was fun?” The world had 
been broken, but it could be remade. And in a decade that began with more Americans living in 
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To be sure, the breakdown of old barriers in New York can be vastly overstated. As 
historian Nathan Huggins noted in his seminal 1971 book on the Harlem Renaissance, there was 
a good bit of cultural tourism going on at the time, with white Americans venturing up to the 
metaphorical borderlands of Harlem in much the same way other whites still crossed literal 
borders into Indian land or Mexico. “Men who sensed they were slaves to moral codes,” Higgins 
argued, “that they were cramped, and confided by guilt-producing norms which threatened to 
make them emotional cripples, found Harlem a tonic and a release…” 
How convenient! It was merely a taxi trip to the exotic for most white New Yorkers. In cabarets 
decorated with tropical and jungle motifs – some of them replicas of southern plantations – they 
heard jazz, that almost forbidden music…The downtown spectator tried to encompass the 
looseness and freedom of dance…Into its vortex white ladies and gentlemen were pulled, to 
dance the jungle dance…It was a cheap trip. No safari! Daylight and a taxi ride rediscovered New 




“So viewed,” Huggins argued, “Harlem was a means of soft rebellion for those who 
rejected the Babbittry and sterility of their lives, yet could not find within their familiar culture 
the genius to redefine themselves in more human and vital terms. The Negro was their 
subversive agent – his music, manners, and speech…Negroes were that essential self one 
somehow lost on the way to civility, ghosts of one’s primal nature whose very nearness could 
spark electric race-memory of pure sensation untouched by self-consciousness and doubt.”1902   
 
Huggins point is well-taken. In The Survey, one author described jazz as “a joyous revolt 
from convention, custom, authority, boredom, even sorry – from everything that would confine 
the soul of man and hinder its riding free on the air. The Negroes who invented it…weren’t 
capable of satire or deception. Jazz was their explosive attempt to cast off the blues and be 
happy, carefree happy even in the midst of sordidness and sorrow.”  A decade later, Langston 
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Hughes would talk of “the tourist invasion of Harlem” that occurred “[d]uring the height of the 
New Negro era.” “Every night the limousines pulled up” between 130th and 140th Streets, 
remembered Harlem singer Bricktop, “and the rich whites would get out all dolled up in their 
furs and jewels.”1903  
 
And yet, just as with the emergence of the New Woman, something new was being 
forged in Manhattan and in other cities across the country. The avatars of this new culture may 
have spoken a language that seemed foreign to older progressives, and emphasized social and 
cultural liberation rather than political transformation, but the changes were real nonetheless. The 
likes of Walter Lippmann and Joseph Wood Krutch might be staring into an existential abyss, 
but for many younger Americans, there were still reasons for hope for the future. The youth 
culture may have been much less politically idealistic and concerned with matters of the world 
than its predecessor, but it still envisioned fundamental transformations happening in American 
life. And, however hedonistic at times, it was, perhaps, more honest, more tolerant, and more 
human.  
 
There was bound to be a reaction. 
The Empire and the Experiment 
 
If old-line progressives were perturbed by the riotous youth culture erupting beneath their 
feet, they also looked askance at the response of many defenders of tradition in embracing the 
Ku Klux Klan. In effect, the Klan – like many of the wartime and post-war ultrapatriotic 
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organizations with whom it shared a common vision and membership – was both a cracked 
funhouse mirror version of the old progressive movement and a cruel rebuke to the values they 
had long held dear. Hadn’t the progressive theory of change always rested on a great mass of 
ordinary Americans, mobilized by public opinion to take arms against a presumed social ill? 
Well, here they were, and with robes, masks, and funny names to boot. 
 
Although in many ways a reaction to the new culture of modernity, the Klan also had its 
own debts to modern life. For one, this iteration of the Klan arose out of a deliberate attempt to 
mobilize public opinion through the cinema. In 1915, D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation – based 
on Thomas Dixon’s novel The Clansman – heralded a new era in filmmaking. But it also 
presented to America a now-embarrassing whitewash of post-Civil War history in which the 
original, Reconstruction-era Klan fought to defend such virtues as honor and chastity from the 
rapine of marauding Yankees and bestial African-Americans. “The real purpose of my film was 
to revolutionize northern sentiment by presentation of history,” Dixon declared. “Every man who 
comes out of our theaters is a Southern partisan for life.”1904    
 
Well, not every man. “If history bore no relation to life, this motion picture could well be 
reviewed and applauded as a spectacle,” wrote Francis Hackett in The New Republic. But, as it 
is, the film “recklessly distorts negro crimes, gives them a disproportionate place in life, and 
colors them dishonestly to inflame the ignorant and the credulous.” In short, he argued, “this film 
is aggressively vicious and defamatory. It is spiritual assassination. It degrades the censors that 
passed it and the white race that endures it.” On the other hand, Woodrow Wilson, who knew 
Dixon from his days at John Hopkins, was among the credulous. “It’s like writing history with 
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lightning,” he proclaimed after a White House viewing. “My only regret is that it is all so terribly 
true.”1905    
 
Also a fan of the film was one William Joseph Simmons, who, just before the film’s 
Atlanta premiere, ascended nearby Stone Mountain – already earmarked to be the site of a 
confederate Civil War memorial. (It would not be completed until 1972.) There, with a burning 
cross and a bible open to Romans 12:1 (“I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of 
God that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your 
reasonable service”), he declared the Klan reborn.1906   
 
Its Atlanta roots notwithstanding, this Klan was not the southern-dominated movement its 
predecessor had been, nor was its primary focus on policing African-Americans to respect white 
authority.  At its height in 1923 and 1924 – before the 1925 conviction of a Klan higher-up on 
charges of rape and murder sent membership into a death spiral – the organization boasted three 
million members and perhaps considerably more – estimates range from 4.5 million to as many 
as eight million. By then, its reach extended throughout the Midwest to the Northwest and even 
into the heart of the enemy, New York City. The most potent Klan strongholds were Indiana and 
Ohio, with Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Oregon, and the inland empire of California 
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all under its sway as well. Many of these regions had very few African-Americans for local 




In fact, the Klan did not develop organically as a social protest movement. It was, in 
short, a pyramid scheme. Its founder, Simmons, was a member of the Woodsmen of the World 
(and a “Colonel” in that organization, and no other) who had always wanted to bring back his 
father’s “fraternal order.” So, in order to build membership for his revitalized Klan, Simmons 
outsourced his organization-building to the auspices of the Southern Publicity Association. 
Together, they came up with a scheme whereby joining the Klan cost a member ten dollars -- 
two of which went to Simmons, four of which went to the SPA, and four of which to whomever 




These recruiters – given the name “kleagles” – had every incentive to drum up new 
membership. This they did at first by farming existing networks of fraternal orders, such as the 
Masons and Elks, to enlist in the new cause, often setting up screenings of Birth of a Nation to 
help seal the deal. They also appealed to more recent violence, such as the 1915 lynching of 
Jewish businessman Leo Frank for the alleged rape of his employee, Mary Phagan, and the 
prospect of a race war after the 1921 Tulsa riots. Soon thereafter, men began flocking to the 
organization. In early 1920, the Klan went from a few thousand members to 100,000 in a matter 
of months. “In all my years of experience in organization work,” one SPA member told Colonel 
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Simmons, “I have never seen anything equal to the clamor throughout the nation for the 
Klan.”1909 
 
 It likely helped membership that, rather than being a terrorist organization that conducted 
raids on its prey at night, the Klan of the 1920s was mostly the type of humdrum fraternal order 
that George Babbitt would not have felt out of place in, and for all the venom the organization 
directed against Catholics, immigrants, and Wets, its members’ hoods were often more closely 
akin to a Shriner’s fez. Unlike its earlier and later incarnations, this Klan held family picnics, 
conducted parades, and did good works in the community, from collecting donations for the poor 
to policing their own membership for drunks and deserters. They even sponsored such offshoots 
as the Women of the Ku Klux Klan, the Junior Ku Klux Klan (for teenage boys), the Tri-K Girls 




In other words, the Klan was primarily a community organization – albeit one with a 
profound loathing for Catholics, immigrants, and drinkers – and its goal was ostensibly one of 
preserving the status quo from the forces of change. “Nordic Americans,” wrote Imperial Wizard 
Hiram Wesley Evans in 1926, “for the last generation have found themselves increasingly 
uncomfortable and finally deeply distressed.” They had experienced “first confusion in thought 
and opinion, a groping hesitancy about national affairs and private life alike,” followed by 
“futility in religion” and a “moral breakdown…One by one all our traditional moral standards 
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went by the boards, or were so disregarded that they ceased to be binding. The sacredness of our 
Sabbath, of our homes, of chastity, and finally even of our right to teach our children in our own 
schools fundamental facts and truths were torn away from us.”1911 
 
The Klan, Evans argued, merely wanted to restore the balance. “[T]he Nordic American today,” 
he continued, “is a stranger in large parts of the land his fathers gave him”: 
 
Our falling birth rate, the result of all this, is proof of our distress. We no longer feel that we can 
be fair to children we bring into the world, unless we can make sure from the start that they shall 
have capital or education or both, so that they never need compete with those who now fill the 
lower rungs of the ladder of success. We no longer dare risk letting our youth ‘make its own way’ 
in the conditions under which we live… 
 
‘We are a movement of the plain people, very weak in the matter of culture, intellectual support, 
and trained leadership. We are demanding…a return to power into the hands of the everyday, not 
highly cultured, not overly intellectualized, but entirely unspoiled and not de-Americanized, 
average citizen of the old stock. Our members and leaders are all of this class – the opposition of 






“This is undoubtedly a weakness,” Evans said, “It lays us open to the charge of being 
‘hicks’ and ‘rubes’ and ‘drivers of second hand Fords.’ We admit it…Every popular movement 
has suffered from just this handicap, yet the popular movements have been the mainsprings of 
progress, and have usually had to win against the ‘best people’ of their time.” One former 
WKKK member from Indiana interviewed by historian Kathleen Blee concurred with the 
contours of Evans’ argument. “All the better people” were in the Klan, she told Blee. “Store 
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owners, teachers, farmers…the good people all belonged to the Klan…They were going to clean 
up government, and they were going to improve the school books…loaded with Catholicism. 
The pope was dictating what was being taught to the children, and therefore they were being 
impressed with the wrong things.” While in many ways  a reaction to the candidacy of Al Smith, 
the Klan’s full-throated support of Wilson progressive William McAdoo in 1924, instead of, say, 
a more conservative candidate like Samuel Ralston of Indiana, suggests that the Klan didn’t 
think of themselves as reactionaries, but, as Evans said, one of the “mainsprings of progress.”1913 
 
It is for this reason that some progressives were wary of attacking the Klan’s fundamental 
purpose. Wasn’t this the type of reform movement many progressives had been calling for? 
While the editors of TNR argued in 1923 that the Klan was exceedingly dangerous because it 
operated in secret and was thus liable to move outside the law – “[t]here is no room for the secret 
political society in a civilized state” – they also conceded that “[t]he motives that lead men to 
attach themselves to the Klan are simple, and in the vast majority of cases, we believe 
honorable.” (In 1921, they had been less charitable of the group’s “Kludds, its Klokards, and its 
Kleagles,” but still deemed the organization “feeble-minded…rather than evil-minded.”) “It is 
easy to laugh at the absurdities of the Klan, its childish follies, its illiterate nomenclature, its 
fallacious conception of law and order,” wrote Edward Devine in The Survey in 1922. “But it is 
not easily laughed out of existence. Close at hand it is serious. It has a certain dignity of purpose. 
It is not sheer bigotry or stupidity or charlatanry or fraud.” Reporting on the organization a week 
later from a different Texas town, Devine, while harboring “no desire to whitewash its white 
robes,” found “more anti-Catholic sentiment…that appeared to be the case in the first community 
studied” but not much to suggest the “Ku Klux movement hereabouts is…conspicuously anti-
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Negro. The few Negroes with whom I have had an opportunity to talk are not greatly disturbed 
by it so far as the security of their own people is concerned.”1914 
 
Devine’s dispatches prompted a flurry of disbelieving letters to The Survey. The Klan’s 
constitution, noted the president of Atlanta University, Edward Ware, specifically called for the 
maintenance of white supremacy. “And yet Mr. Devine gains the impression that the Ku Klux 
movement ‘is not conspicuously anti-Negro.’ Probably the Klan is not against the Negro 
who…meekly submits to any limitation the dominant race chooses to impose. But how about the 
intelligent, progressive, self-respecting Negro of independent spirit, the man who has ambitions 
and aspirations for himself and for his people? I think we can safely say that there will not be 
much love wasted between that man and the Ku Klux Klan.” The Klan was “an institution of 
prejudice,” Ware concluded. “It glories the past and attempts to establish by ritual and ceremony 
and unquestioning devotion to the institutions and customs of the past.” Like the movement 
against evolution in the schools, it was “symptomatic of a deadening conservatism which is the 
worst enemy of progress.”1915 
 
Another writer – “A Texan” – was even less charitable about Devine’s “semi-apologetic 
articles.” “His conclusions are like the man who never saw France except when the steamer came 
close enough to the shore of Brittany where he saw red trousered men and women with uptucked 
skirts washing clothes. His description thereafter of France was that it was a country where all 
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men wore red pants and all the women tucked up their skirts.” On the ground, this writer argued, 
the Klan looked quite different.  “As a fomenter of private hatreds; as a feeder of the flames of 
religious prejudice, as a breeder of suspicion between friends and neighbors; as a creator of 
dangerous secret political corruption; as a destroyer of community solidarity; as a fomenter of 
strife and conflict at a time when our national life is at stake, the Ku Klux Klan is a menace so 
terrible that I cannot conceive how Mr. Devine should even damn it with faint praise.” It had 
“sowed dragon’s teeth – and monsters are already springing up where they sowed.” 1916 
 
Of course, there were many other progressives, many of whom had stood with Al Smith 
or Robert La Follette in the 1924 election, who stood vociferously against the Klan – Judge Ben 
Lindsey staged a lonely war against Klan control of Colorado and Harold Ickes even got himself 
into a fistfight at a Klan parade. Well before the organization began to grow exponentially in the 
Harding era, W.E.B. DuBois and the NAACP had sounded the tocsin that the Klan had risen 
again and urged the Justice Department to look into the organization. But, even in opposition, 
progressives had to contend with its strange and dismaying popularity. “To make a case against a 
birthplace, a religion, or a race is wickedly un-American and cowardly,” William Allen White 
wrote in 1921, deeming the Klan “a cheap screw outfit.” But he still saw the Klan sweep across 
his beloved Kansas with a gale force, and, when both major-party candidates for Governor in 
1924 received Klan backing, he decided to run himself on an anti-Klan protest ticket. Ultimately, 
White garnered 150,000 votes and placed third, and was reasonably satisfied with that result. 
“The way the Catholics and Jews and colored people were persecuted by the Klan in Kansas was 
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a dirty shame, and I couldn’t rest under it,” he told one friend after election day. “I put on my 
war paint and feathers and went out.”1917 
 
But as White told Oswald Villard when the votes were in, even among natural 
constituents of Robert La Follette, the Imperial Empire had exerted a greater pull on Kansas 
laborers than the progressive hero of Wisconsin. “If I had come out for La Follette, I would have 
lost half of my strength,” White wrote. “Here was a funny thing: labor in the Middle West is shot 
through with the Ku Klux Klan. It voted for Coolidge, a lot of it, because Coolidge was right on 
the Pope. I didn’t get much of it because I was wrong on the Pope. And LaFollette lost about 
forty per cent of his normal vote because of the Klan.” The Socialists, meanwhile, were coming 
to a similar dismal conclusion. In the Socialist World of December 1923, August Claessens, 
formerly one of the five New York state representatives expelled on account of his party, 
lamented the ascendance of the Klan even as parties of the left continually struggled through. All 
their life Socialists had been waiting for a popular reform movement to spring up organically 
from the people, and when it did, it came with white hoods and breathless conspiracies involving 
the insidious reach of Catholicism.1918 
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Even as progressives witnessed the Klan proliferate throughout the country, they also had 
to contend with the seeming collapse of what Calvin Coolidge called the “greatest social 
experiment of modern times”: Prohibition. “To hold the Progressives responsible for Prohibition 
would be to do them an injustice,” historian Richard Hofstadter wrote in an oft-cited passage of 
The Age of Reform, since “men of an urbane cast of mind, whether conservatives or Progressives 
in their politics, had been generally antagonistic, or at the very least suspicious of the pre-War 
drive toward Prohibition.” Passed along country roads by the “rural-evangelical virus,” 
Hofstadter wrote in a line that has stuck, “Prohibition, in the Twenties, was the skeleton at the 
feast, a grim reminder of the moral frenzy that so many wished to forget, a ludicrous caricature 
of the reforming impulse, of the Yankee-Protestant notion that it is both possible and desirable to 
moralize private life through public action.”1919 
 
This is a simplification – Prohibition numbered among its advocates plenty of urban 
social reformers and settlement house workers, while Senator Oscar Underwood was by no 
means the only Wet below the Mason-Dixon line – but there is considerable truth in it. As a 
speaker at the 1915 Anti-Saloon League convention put it in a telling remark, the “pure stream of 
country sentiment and township morals” that Prohibition embodied was needed to “flush out the 
cesspools of cities.” “The saloon will take the shirt from the back of a shivering man,” evangelist 
Billy Sunday had exhorted his followers.  “It will take the coffin from under the dead. It will take 
the milk from the breast of the poor mother who is the wife of a drinking man. It will take the 
crust of bread from the hand of the hungry child. It cares for nothing but itself – for its dirty 
                                                          
1919




profits. It will keep your boy out of college. It will make your daughter a prostitute. It will bury 
your wife in the potter’s field. It will send you to hell.”1920   
 
It is also true, however, as historian James Timberlake writes, that “prohibition was 
actually written into the Constitution as a progressive reform. As an integral part of the 
Progressive Movement, prohibition drew on the same moral idealism and sought to deal with the 
same basic problems” – namely to forge better citizens and eliminate the poverty, abuse, and 
despair that accompanied overdrinking. As Mark Lender and Edward Martin note in their 1982 
history of Drinking in America, “[u]rban Progressives viewed temperance as a means to alleviate 
poverty and to clean up the political corruption spread through insidious saloons,” where 
machines like Tammany Hall had often worked their magic.
1921
   
 
In any case, as noted in Chapter Three, when the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect 
in January 1920, there was a great rejoicing in many corners that, after a century and a half of 
wrangling with the beast, America had at last turned a corner. Prohibition, boasted the president 
of Washington and Lee University, was “the longest and most effective step forward in the uplift 
of the human race ever taken by any civilized nation.” But only a year and a half into what 
Herbert Hoover would later famously deem “the Noble Experiment,” huge cracks in the Drywall 
were showing. And even if it did manage to mitigate drinking in some sectors of society, 
Prohibition also taught its supporters, progressive and otherwise, a good many hard lessons about 
the laws of unintended consequences.1922 
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“On paper it was unbeatable,” Philadelphia lawyer T. Henry Walnut wrote in The Survey 
in 1922. “Every drop of the liquor in storage was under lock and key to be released only upon 
proper authority to proper persons. The manufacture and smuggling of liquor was suppressed and 
the sale for beverage purposes barred. The most ardent dry could ask no more. The only flaw in 
the thing was that it didn’t work.” In an argument that would be expanded on in a 1923 book, 
Prohibition and its Enforcement, Walnut argued that “within a year there was a general spirit of 
distrust and a demoralization of enforcement. It was a matter of bewilderment that a dry law 
could live in surroundings so universally wet…For a year and a half we had this melodrama of 
lawlessness. There seemed to be no popular support for prohibition.”1923 
 
The New Republic was inclined to agree. While declaring its support for “the cause 
known as the Temperance Movement,” the editors argued in October 1922 – less than three years 
into the Noble Experiment – that “the immediate question is what is possible, even remotely 
possible in this direction through prohibition by national law.” The ban on alcohol was flagrantly 
broken everywhere, they argued, and “the people of the United States are now paying the penalty 
in a vast and wide increase in law breaking and consequent diminution of respect for law.” As 
such, “the present law is a source of weakness and corruption which amount to a national 
scandal.” Touring the country debating the issue with Senator Smith Brookhart, Arthur Garfield 
Hays would make a similar point. “‘I had a drink before I came here,” he deadpanned to open his 
remarks. When this invariably got a laugh, Hays said “That’s the trouble with prohibition. As 
long as I admit that I help a seller break the law and you laugh at it, prohibition can’t be 
enforced.”1924 
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This absurdity was inescapable in much of the nation. “[T]he Prohibitionists; the Fathers 
of Bootlegging,” Dorothy Parker wrote in 1922 poem on “Social Reformers, “fixed things all up 
pretty for us; Now that they have dried up the country, You can hardly get a drink unless you go 
in and order one.” Even in the White House, it seemed, this double standard applied. It was well 
known that the man in charge of enforcing the Volstead Act, Secretary of the Treasury Andrew 
Mellon, had until very recently held considerable shares of the Overholt Distillery in 
Pennsylvania. (Mellon liquidated his stock upon taking office.) His colleague in the Justice 
Department, Harry Daugherty, was eventually found to be profiting through the sale of liquor 
permits at the Little Green House on K Street. And their boss? While officially Dry in public, 
Harding’s proclivities were also not the best kept secret. “I am not a prohibitionist,” candidate 
Harding had shrugged with his characteristic aw-shucks honesty, “and have never pretended to 
be. I do claim to be a temperance man. I do not approach this question from a moral viewpoint, 
because I am unable to see it as a great moral question.”1925 
 
This popular perception aside, several studies then and now seem to indicate that 
Prohibition was in fact somewhat successful in curbing drinking. “Death from alcoholism took a 
terrific tumble in 1920,” The Literary Digest averred after Prohibition’s first year. Martha 
Bruere’s 1927 study Does Prohibition Work? and Evangeline Booth’s 1928 Some Have Stopped 
Drinking – two admittedly anecdote-driven inquiries by members of the social work community 
– both suggested poverty and violence had gone down in the slums. “All through the American 
Belt,” Bruere’s study concluded, “wherever the Americans of the earlier immigrations are still in 
control, our reports show that prohibition works.” Similarly, economists Irving Fisher and Clark 
Warburton, in 1930’s The “Noble Experiment” and 1932’s The Economic Results of Prohibition, 
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argued that both alcoholism mortality rates and the amount of money spent on booze by urban 
workers decreased markedly after 1920. Later studies by historians of cirrhosis deaths and annual 
alcohol consumption rates seem to support these findings. “These data,” write historians Mark 
Lender and James Martin, “buttress the conclusion that Americans must have been drinking less 
than ever before during prohibition, probably just under a gallon of absolute alcohol per capita 
annually.”1926 
 
Perhaps one of the reasons this relative success went unnoticed is that Wet areas of the 
country stayed unapologetically Wet, not the least the culture-producing capital of New York 
City. In Terrible Honesty, her in-depth exploration of the writers, artists, and opinion-makers of 
1920s Manhattan, historian Ann Douglas discovered that “almost one-third of my protagonists 
were alcoholics or problem drinkers; the usual figure for the percentage of alcoholics to non-
alcoholics in America is 10 percent.” (As Robert Ripley, one of the writers in Douglas’ study, 
was wont to mention, the name of “Manhattan” was possibly derived from the Lenape word 
Manahachtanienk, meaning “Place of Drunkenness,” or where the Delaware Indians – just 
before being offered a lousy proposition – first encountered Dutch alcohol.)1927  
 
In fact, rather than preventing drinking in New York and other cities, Prohibition helped 
to fuel the cultural transformations that so unnerved the prohibitionists. By making criminals of 
virtually everyone, Prohibition in the neighborhood of Times Square, writes historian George 
Chauncey in his study Gay New York, “resulted instead in the expansion of the sexual 
underworld and undermined the ability of the police and anti-vice societies to control it”: 
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The economic pressures Prohibition put on the hotel industry by depriving it of liquor-related 
profits, for instance, led some of the second-class hotels in the West Forties to begin permitting 
prostitutes and speakeasies to operate out of their premises. Prohibition also drove many of the 
district’s elegant restaurants, cabarets, and roof gardens out of business, for such establishments 
had depended even more heavily on liquor sales for their profitability. They were replaced, on the 
one hand, by cheap cafeterias and restaurants whose profits depended on a high turnover rate 
rather than a high liquor-based profit margin, and, on the other hand, by nightclubs and 
speakeasies whose profitability depended wholly on illegal liquor sales.
1928
   
 
“Instead of purifying the nation by drawing a strict boundary between the acceptable and 
the unacceptable,” Chauncey concludes, “it threatened to blur those boundaries by encouraging 
more normally law-abiding citizens to break the law, to regard the police as their enemies, and to 
question the law’s moral authority.” The proliferation of speakeasies – by 1922, there were 5000 
in New York; by 1927, over 30,000 – only accelerated the pace of change.  Speakeasies, 
Chauncey writes, encouraged “middle-class men and women to interact even more casually and 
to experiment further with the norms governing acceptable public sociability…[They] eroded the 
boundaries between respectability and criminality, public and private…[and] encouraged 
behavior that flouted public morality.”1929 
 
One of the positive aspects of putting everyone on the wrong side of the law, Chauncey 
notes, was the increased tolerance towards – and even public fascination with – gays and 
lesbians. As with whites’ late-night taxis to Harlem, there was an element of the exotic here. “If 
whites were intrigued by the ‘primitivism’ of black culture,” Chauncey notes, “heterosexuals 
were equally intrigued by the ‘perversity of gay culture.’” And so the drag balls that had arisen in 
Greenwich Village a decade earlier now became hugely popular, drawing crowds of thousands. 
“[I]t was fashionable for the intelligentsia and the social leaders of both Harlem and the 
downtown area,” Langston Hughes recalled of one such Uptown ball, “to occupy boxes…and 
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look down from above at the queerly assorted throng on the dancing floor.” By the early 1930’s, 
drag balls had even moved into Madison Square Garden and the Astor Hotel. This is 




Nor did they intend the rise of organized crime that followed in the wake of the Noble 
Experiment. New York, for example, saw the likes of Frank Costello, Dutch Schultz, Lucky 
Luciano, Jack “Legs” Diamond, Meyer Lansky, and Arnold Rothstein profit mightily from the 
booming business of bootlegging. Cities in the East and Midwest experienced the growth of 
similar crime syndicates, from that of Enoch “Nucky” Johnson in Atlantic City to the Purple 
Gang of Detroit to George Remus in Cinncinnati.  On the West Coast, there was less in the way 




At the peak of his power, the most notorious gangster in America, Chicago’s Al Capone, 
employed close to a thousand men and brought in hundreds of millions of dollars a year through 
prostitution, racketeering, and, of course, the sale of liquor. In the years in which “Public Enemy 
Number One” consolidated his gangland empire over his rivals, Cook County saw between 350 
and 400 murders and around 100 bombings a year – over the course of the entire Noble 
Experiment, 800 gangsters were killed in Chicago in shootouts. Among the most notorious of 
these was the “St. Valentine’s Day Massacre” of 1929, in which seven associates of George 
“Bugs” Moran, the Irish-American who ran Chicago’s North Side, were brutally shot and killed 
by unknown assailants, some of whom were dressed up as police officers. Soon thereafter, 
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President-elect Hoover pledged to add 400 more Prohibition agents and ask Congress for $2.5 




Hoover’s investment eventually paid off, thanks to the hard work of Elliot Ness and the 
“Untouchables.” But it also reemphasized how expensive Prohibition turned out to be. The 
powerful head of the Anti-Saloon League, Wayne Wheeler, had prophesied that enforcement 
would cost no more than $5 million. In 1921, it in fact cost the federal government $6.35 million, 
increasing to $8.5 million in 1924, and over $16 million by 1932. As early as 1923, and even 
under the administration-wide mandate to keep government costs down, Secretary Mellon 
informed Congress that the Prohibition unit might need as much as $28 million. States, 
meanwhile – especially the Wet ones where crime was often centered – felt no inclination to take 
on any of this financial burden. Thirty of the 48 states allocated no money at all to enforcement, 
the other 18 a combined $550,000. To remedy this, author E.B. White suggested the government 
nationalize speakeasies. “In that manner, the citizenry would be assured liquor of a uniformly 
high quality, and the enormous cost of dry enforcement could be met by the profits from the sale 
of drinks.”1933 
 
As crime and costs rose, so too did the number of arrests – from 34,000 in 1921 to 68,000 
in 1924, to 74,000 in 1932 – and thus the judicial system increasingly found itself overburdened. 
Eventually, 90% of federal prohibition cases were expedited through a “bargain day” system, 
whereby violators could receive lower fines and jail terms if they pled guilty. In part because of 
the lucrative nature of bootlegging, Prohibition enforcement also became shot through with 
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corruption. While Prohibition agent Izzy Einstein – the “master hooch-hound” and “the man of a 
thousand disguises” – and his rotund partner Moe Smith became national celebrities due to their 
chameleonic tendencies and dedication to the job (“Would you like to sell a pint of whiskey to a 
deserving prohibition agent?” was one of Einstein’s pre-arrest catch phrases), more than a few 
agents decided instead to opt out of strict enforcement and go where the money was at. In the 
first six years of the Noble Experiment, 750 federal Prohibition agents were dismissed for 
delinquency or misconduct. Surveying the agents she was often forced to deal with, Assistant 
Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt deemed many of them “as devoid of honesty and 
integrity as the bootlegging fraternity” and “no more fit to be trusted with a commission to 
enforce the laws of the United States and to carry a gun than the notorious bandit Jesse James.” 
Congressman La Guardia, meanwhile, argued, not unpersuasively, that “the importation of liquor 
into this country is of such magnitude…that it could not carry on without the knowledge if not 
the connivance of the authorities entrusted with the enforcement of the law.”1934  
 
The low quality of federal agents helped to further diminish the Noble Experiment in 
Americans’ eyes, particularly after incidents such as the 1924 raid on the home of Portland 
businessman A.G. Labbe. Then, agents – some of them ex-cons – armed with a suspect warrant 
broke up a society party on slim pretenses and found little-to-no alcohol on the premises. In a 
decade newly attuned to the importance of civil liberties, this sort of harassment of otherwise 
upstanding citizens seemed particularly detestable. “Prohibition,” argued Clarence Darrow, “is 
an outrageous and senseless invasion of the personal liberty of millions of intelligent and 
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temperate persons who see nothing dangerous or immoral in the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages.”1935  
 
And there was the problem with the product itself. All too often, strains of bootleg 
alcohol hit the market during Prohibition that were much more of a health risk than the actual 
stuff. Among the adulterated booze in circulation during the time, notes historian William 
Leuchtenburg, were “Jamaica ginger, better known as ‘jake,’ which paralyzed thousands; Jackass 
Brandy, which caused internal bleeding; Soda Pop Moon from Philadelphia, containing 
poisonous isopropyl alcohol; Panther Whiskey, based on esters and fuel oil; [and] Yack Yack 
Bourbon from Chicago, which blended iodine and burnt sugar.” “Who drinks bootleg drinks with 
Death,” the New York Times warned in 1923, but drinkers didn’t care. By 1926, according to 
Mabel Walker Willebrandt, 660,000 gallons a month of these sorts of hooch were sold to thirsty 
American customers. The first of these above, Jamaica Ginger, had been an over-the-counter 
headache medicine and digestive aid that was 70% alcohol. After being tampered with by 
bootlegger chemists to bypass federal inspection, the substance afflicted over 35,000 Americans 
in 1930 with the “Jake Walk” -- a paralytic shuffle arising from the fact that sufferers of the 
“Jake Leg Blues” could no longer feel their extremities, occasionally resulting in permanent 
injury. In 1927, a Prohibition Bureau study found that fully 98 percent of 480,000 gallons of 
confiscated liquor in New York contained poisons, usually wood alcohol. By that same year, 
historian Edward Behr estimates, over 50,000 men and women had died from adulterated alcohol 
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As the Noble Experiment seemed to grow ever more ridiculous and pernicious as a public 
policy in the cities, the stridency of the issue in politics, on both sides of the divide, grew ever 
more pronounced.  “Not one American in a hundred is actively interested in the League of 
Nations,” wrote the irredeemable Wet Henry Mencken in 1924, “not one in a thousand is 
noticeably wrought up about the petty stealings of the friends of Dr. Daugherty; not one in ten 
thousand ever shows any excitement about States’ rights. But Prohibition is talked of 
everywhere, endlessly and with passion, and especially it is talked of in the big cities.” Even 
though urban centers grew to despise the law, many also agreed with Senator Morris Shepherd’s 
contention that “there is as much chance of repealing the Eighteenth Amendment as there is for a 
hummingbird to fly to the planet Mars with the Washington Monument tied to its tale.” Will 
Rogers explained this paradox thusly: “If you think this country ain’t dry, you just watch ‘em 
vote,” he noted, “and if you think this country ain’t wet, you just watch ‘em drink…You see, 
when they vote, it’s counted, but when they drink, it ain’t.” By 1928, the outgoing Mabel 
Willebrandt, in her book The Inside of Prohibition, called it with good justification “the only real 
political issue of the whole nation.”1937 
 
As discussed in Chapter Eight, this was another legacy of Prohibition -- its increasing 
potency as a divisive cultural issue in American politics. The seemingly unbridgeable chasm that 
had yawned before the Democratic Party in 1924 would, by 1928, engulf the general election. On 
one hand, urban politicians increasingly began to extol the virtues of drinking and deplore the 
vices of Puritanism. “The more advanced a country is, the higher its alcoholic content,” 
suggested Congressman George Tinkham of Massachusetts. “The government which stands 
against the founder of Christianity cannot survive,” Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts often 
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asserted in a clever turnaround. “If Christ came back and performed the Cana miracle again, he 
would be jailed and possibly crucified again.” If the Coolidge White House didn’t sound “a 
terrible blast against the potential danger of weakening law and order and good morals,” a 
nervous William Allen White wrote a friend in 1926, “Prohibition is pretty badly up against it in 
the East. We, in the West, are safe no matter what happens.”1938 
 
On the other hand, the nation’s rural Drys were in no mood to waver. “I often see it said, 
even by ministers, that the Prohibition Amendment does not represent general public opinion and 
for that reason is less entitled to support,” wrote social worker Frederic Almy to The Survey in 
1926. “It does not in cities, but in the country the approval is almost universal.” Prohibition, 
Walter Lippmann wrote in 1927, had “become much more than a mere question of regulating the 
liquor traffic. It involves a test of strength between social orders.” The Amendment, he argued, 
“is the rock on which the evangelical church militant is founded, and with it are involved a whole 
way of life with an ancient tradition. The overcoming of the Eighteenth Amendment would mean 
the emergence of the cities as the dominant force in America, dominant politically and socially 
as they are already dominant economically.” As such, Prohibition became the proxy war through 




As Prohibition moved to the center of the national discussion, some progressives became 
even more disgusted with the state of contemporary politics. In 1929, Hiram Johnson – “more or 
less tepidly” a Dry – told Ickes that “I personally have no use for liquor, and I abominate its use 
in others to excess. I do resent, however, that the sole test of character in this Republic, the sole 
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right to hold office, the only trait in public men, shall be a mad enthusiasm to disembowel one 
who may, either, occasionally or habitually, drink. There is another thing about it that is 
reprehensible, and that is the ecclesiastical government. We have it now, and have it to the full.” 
Ickes concurred.   “I have long been of the opinion that the prohibition amendment and the 
Volstead Act, from the general point of view of the country, are of the most vicious bits of 
legislation that have been passed in our time,” he responded. “Under cover of the highly ‘moral’ 
question of prohibition the thimble-riggers and the body-snatchers drive ahead without fear of 
check…And so far as I can see we are going to have this red herring…with us for years to 
come.”1940 
 
Johnson and Ickes held a particular disregard for the Anti-Saloon League, who, the latter 
wrote in 1926, “have become as corrupt as the old saloon politicians.” And they saw the shrill 
moral outrage now attending the Prohibition debate as yet another character flaw in their mutual 
frenemy, Raymond Robins. “Raymond…seems to be tilting his lance these days against all 
critics and opponents of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act,” an exasperated Ickes 
wrote his friend in 1926. “I was literally dragged by main force to hear him make a speech on the 
subject at the City Club last week.” Johnson was equally disgusted, arguing that, in the Wet-Dry 
political climate of 1928 and 1929, “[s]uch men as Borah and Robins, undoubtedly, are in their 
element. They can cunningly play any game, aye they can violate any principle or tenet, and 
have it entirely forgiven when they shout at the top of their lungs ‘dry.’”1941 
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As Senator Johnson’s screed attests, Robins thought Prohibition was a decisive victory  in 
the “age-long struggle of civilization against primitive appetite,” and that it was intimately bound 
up with the similar drive to Outlaw War. As for the Idaho Senator, he supported the Noble 
Experiment for the same reason he was for the Bill of Rights – they were in the Constitution. “So 
long as the Eighteenth Amendment stands as a part of the fundamental law of our country,” he 
wrote to a constituent the week before Prohibition went into effect, “it is the duty of every good 
citizen, in my judgment, to see that it is upheld and maintained in letter and in spirit. There is no 
other basis upon which we can build orderly society than that of obedience to the law.” Borah 
would sound this theme continually for the remainder of the decade. “So long as the Constitution 
remains as it is,” he told another correspondent in 1926, “there is only one thing for us to do, and 
that is, to uphold and enforce it.”1942  
 
Borah’s overriding allegiance to the founding document extended to Prohibition’s 
enforcement too, particularly with regard to the Fourth Amendment prohibiting the unlawful 
search and seizure of property. “It will never do,” he wrote one Dry minister in 1921, “for the 
prohibitionists of this country to take the position that in enforcing the 18
th
 Amendment we have 
got to disregard the other amendments to the constitution
”
 When Borah was deemed 
insufficiently Dry by some for this stance, he replied that he was “just as conscientiously in favor 
of enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment as you are. But I have taken an oath to support the entire 
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Constitution of the United States and it is just as impossible for me to violate that oath as I 
assume it would be for you to violate an oath which you had taken.”1943 
 
In any case, few doubted Borah’s commitment to the cause. In print, the Senator deplored 
“the pauperism, the insanity, the suicides, the broken families, the cries flowing in one constant 
steady stream from drink.” In April 1927, he took part in a notable debate against Columbia 
president Nicholas Murray Butler at Boston’s Symphony Hall on the question of whether the 
Republican Party should embrace repeal in its platform in 1928. While sounding the same 
argument that Prohibition must be upheld so long as it was in the Constitution, which Butler 
conceded, Borah also made the proactive case for Prohibition. “I believe the Republican Party 
should declare for the Amendment and for its enforcement,” he argued, “and make the same 
sublime and daring fight against this evil that it made against the evils of slavery, two evils 
which the immortal Lincoln associated together as the greatest evils of the human race.” Besides, 





Borah also thought that the Noble Experiment had, since its passage, been continually 
hamstrung by a lack of federal commitment. “If there is no real sentiment and conviction behind 
the effort of those who duty it is to enforce the law, of course, there will be no enforcement,” he 
wrote in 1926. “I do not think the Prohibition amendment has ever had behind it the official 
obligations of the government in the matter of enforcement.” As such, in early 1928, Borah 
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circulated a questionnaire to possible 1928 presidential candidates asking them to come forward 
and declare for a “vigorous and faithful enforcement” of Prohibition, and citing the state of New 
York as a particular problem area. Pressing Borah on the line of argument, an aggravated 
Fiorello La Guardia asked his colleague – who was notoriously against high government 
expenditures – why he did not recommend “$200,000,000 a year as a starter for prohibition 
enforcement?”: 
 
Considering the area and population of the country, prohibition cannot be enforced with less than 
100,000 Federal agents as a starter…Prohibition, like charity, should commence at home. You 
have forty-three Counties in your State and I am reliably informed by some of the boys who 
served in the Army with me during the World War, that liquor can be obtained in every county of 
the state…Idaho has an estimated present population of 534,000 and an area of 83,888 square 
miles. I am sure that you will agree that ten Federal prohibition agents for every thousand square 
miles is a ridiculously low figure. Bootleggers and law violators not working on any fixed hourly 
schedule require vigilance at all hours of the night and day. Therefore, ten men per thousand 
square miles working in two shifts instead of three, would require at least 1660 men for the State 
of Idaho. At the present time Idaho, Montana, and Utah compose one Prohibition District…This 





“[I]f the champions of prohibition are not willing to assume the burden of enforcing it as 
you desire, vigorously and faithfully,” La Guardia concluded, “then the thing to do is what some 
of us are advocating, to repeal the amendment and legislate accordingly.” Borah didn’t bite, 
except to say that “there is no reason why you should not address these questions to the 
respective candidates” in 1928.1946 
 
Borah, it seems clear, saw himself as one of those potential candidates for 1928, which is 
one reason he gravitated so strongly to the Prohibition issue in the later Twenties – he clearly 
seemed to think it was the issue on which he could mass a national campaign. In November 
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1927, he had his major speeches on the Noble Experiment circulated as a pamphlet. “Senator 
Borah, after having been a professional Liberal, is now a professional Prohibitionist,” spat H.L. 
Mencken in disgust. Borah’s new overriding Dryness also further exacerbated tensions in the 
flailing “Borah bloc” in the Senate, particularly as the two members from Wisconsin, John J. 
Blaine and Bob La Follette, Jr., leaned Wet. Prohibition is “not the only pebble on the beach,” 
George Norris argued to smooth things over among the cantankerous crew. It didn’t take. By 
December 1927, with Borah now on a dry crusade, the progressive bloc had fallen apart. That 
month, Bob La Follette rued the “determination on the part of each to stand by his own 
convictions no matter what the progressive bloc proposed.” The “Progressives Cannot Agree on 
Big Issues,” editorialized the New York Sun as the Senate bloc dissipated at last.1947 
 
When it came to the Noble Experiment, Borah also illustrated how malleable his much-
professed devotion to the Constitution could be. “No state can be dry while the Interstate 
Commerce clause of the Constitution remains,” the Senator intoned, “unless there is a 
prohibition which covers all states.” This was the sort of federal reasoning the Senator had long 
rejected on the issue of the Dyer anti-lynching bill, where Borah, noted Walter White, had 
“persistently and consistently used his oratory and reputation as an authority on constitutional 
law to oppose federal anti-lynching laws and other legislation of that character.” Worse, 
according to Raymond Robins, Borah seemed to indicate he had opposed the Dyer bill in order 




Whatever his reasons, Borah was not the only prominent progressive to keep the faith on 
Prohibition. Another was William Allen White, who thought that it was a necessary step to 
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accommodate life in the Machine Age. “It all comes down to the definition of liberty, doesn’t 
it?” he wrote one friend in 1927: 
I have tried to indicate my feeling that liberties are inexorably restricted as civilization becomes 
more complex. The liberty to drink what one wants to drink, and to buy it where one wants to buy 
it, is a perfectly defensible liberty in a simple civilization. But in a complex civilization, that 
liberty is not defensible because, although we will both admit that not more than ten persons 
drink to excess, the presence of ten persons in a hundred, a hundred persons in ten thousand, ten 
thousand persons in a million…this number endangers the lives, property, and security of too 
many people. Machinery requires a calm, steady nerve. Poisoned nerves at throttles, levers, and 
key places make a tremendous waste in a complicated civilization, hence it is the duty of the nine 
people who do not overdrink, as it seems to me, to give up their liberty so far as drink goes for the 
good not of the one man who abuses the privilege but for the ten thousands who are his potential 





Still, White suggested, it was possible that “with the many substitutes for boredom which 
civilization is presenting, that is the radio, the moving picture, the cheap automobile, and a 
diverting entertainment [that] man many…lose his vicious appetite for alcohol and use it wisely 
as they do around the Mediterranean where they have become immunized to alcohol.” Were that 
the case, then America could stand down on the issue. Until then, White was a Dry, but not one 
against looking the other way here or there. In the spirit of hospitality, he promised to “get police 
protection” for H.L. Mencken from the Governor should he visit Emporia, “so that you could 
bring in a bottle of life-sustaining hooch, and hang on to it as long as you wanted to, and as often 
as you pleased.”1950 
 
White’s argument that humankind must change its habits in the Machine Age were 
shared by other advocates of the Noble Experiment. One of the “Two Principal Reasons for 
Prohibition,” one Dry pamphlet argued, was that “18,000,000 automobiles beside trucks and 
other traffic, make the return of alcohol as a beverage under any name, impossible. People would 
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be afraid to use their autos or buy more. The loss in life, money and employment would be 
immense. OUR LARGEST labor employing industry WOULD FAIL.” Indeed it might, since, as 
Henry Ford told the Pictorial Review, “if booze ever comes back to the U.S., I am through with 
manufacturing. I would not be bothered with the problem of handling over 200,000 men and 
trying to pay them wages which the saloons would take away from them. I wouldn’t be 
interested in putting autos in the hands of a generation soggy with drink.” And as Jane Addams 
noted in 1930, “Automobile accidents are multiplied, not only by the man who is intoxicated but 
even more by the man whose few drinks have made him recklessly eager to take chances and 
have evoked within him a certain exhibitionism of daredevil courage. If it ever comes to a forced 
choice between automobiles and liquor, there would be little doubt, I imagine, as to which would 
be preferred.” For that reason among others, Addams argued, repeal of Prohibition was a non-
starter. “the increased speed and mechanization of life, not only in transportation but our daily 
living, requires the protection it affords.”1951 
 
Like many settlement house workers, Addams had an intimate knowledge of how 
drinking had impacted working-class families. “It is hard to exaggerate,” she wrote, “what 
excessive drinking did in the way of disturbing domestic relations and orderly family life.” It was 
important, Addams argued, not just for these families for the positive development of young men 
and women that drinking be stopped. “The imaginative powers, the sense that life possesses 
variety and color, are realized most easily in moments of pleasure and comradeship,” she argued. 
“All day long the young people work at factories…Only in moments of recreation does their 
sense of individuality expand; they are then able to reveal, as at no other time, that hidden self 
which is so important to each of us.” Before Prohibition, “happiness and release from reality 
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were associated with drinking…There is no doubt that more wholesome outlets are gradually 
being substituted in spite of the fact that many young men are very eager to demonstrate their 
superiority to law.” What of the youth culture? “We know indeed that a great many young 
people are drinking at the present moment solely from a sense of bravado. Each generation looks 
for a method with which it may defy the conventions and startle its elders.” But, Addams 
maintained, “this braggadocio movement is spending itself…Many flappers are afraid to drive 
with men who carry hip flasks.”1952 
 
Clearly, Addams conceded, much had gone wrong with Prohibition in its first ten years. 
“It is hard to tell just when we began to observe the social changes, due to lax enforcement or to 
the general conviction that it was possible to ‘get away with it,’” she wrote, but clearly the law 
lost the force of authority. Meanwhile, the “bootlegging situation came to resemble that in the 
early Pennsylvania oil fields not only in its economic structure but in its ruthlessness and 
widespread terrorism.” Similarly, the “development of political corruption” could not be ignored, 
nor could the corruption of law enforcement – “The most optimistic citizen…could scarcely be 




Nonetheless, America could not and should not turn back. “To give it up now, or to 
modify seriously the Eighteenth Amendment, would be to obtain not even a negative result, and 
would mean that we never could be clear as to the real effect of national prohibition.” The 
precedent for Prohibition, she argued, was Reconstruction – another time “in which the Federal 
government was obliged to administer a law in the midst of a population averse to enforcement.” 
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However unpopular the Reconstruction Amendments were at the time, “could anyone say 
that...[they were] not to the great advantage of the citizens of the United States, nor deny that 
after two generations of even pseudo freedom the negroes have had an enormous advantage over 
their forbears?” “Our experiment in the United States is being watched all over the world,” she 




In fact, W.E.B. DuBois supported the Noble Experiment because he thought it would 
help result in stricter federal enforcement of those Reconstruction Amendments. As noted in 
Chapter Six, DuBois and other leaders of the NAACP looked to the constitutional powers 
asserted to enforce Prohibition to be used to back a federal anti-lynching law. Prohibition was 
popular among other African-American leaders as well. “[T]he corruption of the Negro vote has 
been through the use of liquor plentifully served,” A. Phillip Randolph and Chandler Owen 
argued in their journal The Messenger before enactment. “Prohibition is a promise, a splendid 
promise to the masses of working people.”1955 
 
 By the end of the Twenties, that promise looks rather less bright. Instead, the Noble 
Experiment had come to seem to many a condescending imposition – one that had violated 
individual liberty, inflated criminality and corruption, swallowed up public resources and 
distorted American politics, exacerbated the rural-urban divide, and further soured Americans on 
reform and respect for the law. Jane Addams continued to support Prohibition despite its many 
flaws, but as she told students at Rockford College in 1931, “May I warn you against doing good 
to people, and trying to make others good by law? One does good, if at all, with people, not to 
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people.” By the end of 1933, four years after Pauline Sabin had organized the Women’s 
Organization for National Prohibition Reform – which become the largest organization for repeal 
and a group that by December 1931 had more members than the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union, the nation would concur – and end the Experiment for good.1956 
 
 For alcohol, that is. In 1922, the same year The New Republic and The Survey were 
voicing their doubts about the Prohibition regime, Congress passed the Jones-Miller Act, which, 
for the first time, criminalized illegal possession of cocaine and narcotics with a fine of $5000 
and up to ten years in prison. This legislation gave teeth to the 1914 Harrison Act, which had 
instead prescribed tax penalties to stop the illegal import, export, and manufacture of said drugs. 
(The illegal possession and use of opium had previously been banned in the 1909 Opium 
Exclusion Act.) This 1922 Act, exulted Joseph Chamberlain in The Survey, “strengthened very 
materially the arm of the executive department in the crusade against the narcotic evil…[and] the 
executive department itself is certain to make vigorous use of the new weapons at its disposal.” 
Chamberlain was correct: Eight years later, in 1930, the Department of the Treasury would 
create a separate Federal Bureau of Narcotics to enforce the Jones-Miller provisions, and a new 




While passage of the Jones-Miller bill in 1922 “shows a strong public sentiment against 
the traffic in narcotics,” Chamberlain cautioned readers of The Survey that “the fight against 
narcotics is not over.” Indeed, it never would be.1958  
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: NEW DEAL COMING 
PROGRESSIVES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW DEAL 
 
“Practically all the things we’ve done in the Federal Government are like things Al Smith did as 
Governor of New York.” – Franklin Roosevelt, 19361959 
 
“Almost every legal and political argument of the great court fight in 1937 was anticipated back 




Even in the unfavorable climate of the twenties, some progressives pushed forward 
against considerable headwinds in an effort to keep the fires of reform burning. 
Although expressed by progressives, many ideas that would become central to the later 
New Deal were ignored  by policymakers amid Harding Normalcy and Coolidge 
Prosperity. Nonetheless, in the Children’s Bureau, in Al Smith’s Albany, in the 
Tennessee Valley and in front of the Supreme Court, reformers sowed and nurtured 




A Taste of Things to Come 
 
 
The wheels were coming off. “Unemployment in many industries is at hand,” the Survey 
grimly reported in December. “Factories are working on part time. Some are closed…The 
working forces of many establishments are being demobilized or kept on part time.” By the 
following June, TNR declared matter-of-factly that the “nation is suffering from unemployment 
and depression” and urged the administration to do something, anything, to remedy the situation 
– That is, unless it wanted to prove that ‘the business theory of government’ is a delusion.” The 
Nation emphatically agreed. “It is high time for public action,” it argued that September. 
“Workers deprived of work have few resources; the more fortunate will pile up debt at 
neighborhood stores, the less fortunate will water the soup and mend old garments with still 
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older patches. In critical years, the children’s growth will be stunted; in the heart-breaking 
struggle not only their parents’ happiness but their self-respect will go. Some of the unemployed 
will become unemployable. And society will pay a price no expert accountant can ever 
reckon.”1961  
 
Nonetheless, the months that followed would be, in the president’s words, “the winter of 
the greatest unemployment in the history of our country.” “Distress prevailed in every city,” 
recalled Herbert Hoover, “soup lines had been formed.” The Crisis,” Secretary of the Treasury 
Andrew Mellon reminisced later, “was one of the most severe this country has ever 
experienced.”1962 
 
This depression, as Mellon deemed it, was the “Crisis of 1921.” 
 
As discussed in Chapter Nine, the eventual administration response to the severe 
depression of 1921-1922, in which somewhere between 3.5 and six million Americans found 
themselves out of work, was Herbert Hoover’s conference on unemployment. Here, the 
Secretary’s pattern of relying first and foremost on the power of voluntary and cooperative 
public-private association to solve national problems was established. Before the conference was 
held, Hoover told an aide that, more than just working to provide short-term relief, the 
conference would “tackle the fundamentals of unemployment.” But the low-impact, associational 
model of response sat fine with his boss. “It is fair to say to you that you are not asked to solve 
the long controverted problems of the social system,” Warren Harding had told the gathered at 
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the unemployment conference. “We have builded the America of today on the fundamentals of 
economic, industrial, and political life which made us what we are, and the temple requires no 
remaking now…I would have little enthusiasm for any proposed relief which seeks either 
palliation or tonic from the public treasury.”1963 
 
 But even as Harding limited the scope of the unemployment inquiry, there were other 
remedies being urged in the progressive press. “Unemployment is a risk of industry, as 
measurable and as recurrent as fire losses or work accidents,” argued William Chenery in The 
Survey of October 1921. “The most important device which society has developed for protection 
against risk is insurance. Hazards of the sea which used to be termed ‘acts of God’ are now 
covered by insurance. Promoters of sporting events assure their investments…Almost every 
human risk is provided for by means of insurance.” Why not take a page from England and other 
nations, Chenery asked, and have the conference set up a system of unemployment insurance for 
America?  Taking the idea off the table, he argued, “was like telling a group of citizens who had 
come together to devise means of dealing with fire losses that they must not consider 
insurance.”1964 
 
As Chenery’s invocation of Great Britain suggests, The Survey was not treading new 
ground here. Ten years earlier, Great Britain had established a system of national unemployment 
and health insurance with the National Insurance Act of 1911, which Italy and Norway had 
copied. Nations such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Denmark had unemployment insurance 
experiments dating to even earlier, while Germany’s ad hoc social insurance system had roots 
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dating back to Bismarck. The week before Chenery’s piece, noted Wisconsin economist and La 
Follette advisor John Commons had laid out the history and potential future of unemployment 
insurance in America for Survey readers. Explaining the features of the unemployment insurance 
bill recently introduced in Wisconsin, Commons advocated the creation of a “mutual insurance 
company…created, operated, and managed solely by the employers,” which they could pay into 
and pay out as they decided, as supervised by a state insurance board. “In other words,” 
Commons explained, “the system proposed is exactly like that of the workman’s accident 
compensation law of this state…It is a capitalistic scheme. It avoids the socialistic scheme, in 
that the state does not go into the insurance business…It induces the business man to make a 
profit or avoid a loss by efficient labor management. It places the compensation so low that the 
workman has no expectation of more than enough to pay his rent.”1965 
 
Commons’ emphasis on a private sector solution here was not just an anticipation of 
Hoover’s associationalism. Along with Louis Brandeis, eminent economists like Wisconsin’s 
Richard Ely, and one of his students, John B. Andrews – who eventually became the moving 
force behind the organization – Commons had founded the American Association of Labor 
Legislation in 1909 to bring economists’ insights to bear on the social problems of the day. In 
practice, this often meant taking up the social insurance standard gaining adherents overseas and 
applying it to the United States. In 1915, the AALL had proposed a compulsory health insurance 
system in 1915, not unlike Great Britain’s, that eventually went down to defeat in New York 
State in 1919 – a year in which comparisons to other nations’ good works were out of fashion. 
(The following year, the American Medical Association stated its public opposition to any form 
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of national or state-run health insurance system going forward.) Scarred but smarter, Commons – 
urged on by organizations like Margaret Dreier Robins’ Women’s Trade Union League and 
Florence Kelley’s National Consumer League – took up the unemployment question instead, 





Along with unemployment insurance, progressive observers also strongly endorsed the 
idea of public works spending to accelerate growth and put people back to work in 1921. “Cities 
and states and the nation itself,” Chenery argued, “ought to undertake with all possible 
expedition needed public improvements. No other measure for counteracting the effects of the 
economic depression is so inviting and none is more valid.” “I suggested sometime ago – and 
there seems to be some hope that it will be carried out,” Senator Borah wrote a constituent in 
November 1921, “that the government start work upon a number of our irrigation projects with a 
view of giving employment to the unemployed.” When pitching this plan to Hoover two months 
earlier, Borah underscored that “it gives work to large number of unemployed” while providing 
“acreage for the making of homes for increasing the production in this country.” In short, Borah 
argued,  it would be one “of the most practical and desirable things we could do.”1967 
 
In January 1922, The Survey published an article, “Public Works for the Unemployed,” in 
which – relying on conclusions drawn at the International Conference on Unemployment a 
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decade earlier – it further laid out its vision of how a sound public works program would be 
constructed. Relief works, it argued in typically progressive fashion, had to be useful and “of 
such nature as permanently to increase the wealth of the community” – such as drainage and 
irrigation, parks and forests, highways, reservoirs, and sanitation – or it would be “a source of 
degeneration to the workers.” (“It is not in human nature for a man to put forth his full strength 
in work which he knows has been artificially created.”) Public works should also be well-
planned – and not just a response to crisis – and workers should both be fairly compensated and 
well-chosen, preferably with the aid of local aid societies. (It would not do “to supply odd jobs to 
large numbers of casual laborers, many of whom may have drifted in from out of town, while at 
the same time, good steady workers with families are undergoing a forced process of 
degeneration into the casual class.”)1968 
 
Like unemployment insurance, however, the calls for a systematic federal public works 
program would diminish as the Crisis of 1921, and subsequent strike wave of 1922, faded into 
Coolidge Prosperity. The insurance bill Commons had advocated didn’t even manage to pass in 
the nation’s laboratory of Wisconsin until 1932. A bill to establish a Senate committee to look 
into the question of public works, meanwhile, was introduced by Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen 
of New Jersey and reported favorably out of committee in February 1923 – but that is as far as it 
went. The congressional term ended the following month, with no action taken. Another public 
works bill put forward by William Kenyon and Congressman F.N. Zihlman of Maryland, which 
The Nation argued, “at least promised a beginning of better things,” was also stillborn.1969  
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In 1926, with Coolidge prosperity in full flower, Isaac M. Rubinow – the theorist whose 
1913 book Social Insurance had helped bring the subject to progressive attention – argued it was 
perhaps time to raise the question again. Social insurance, Rubinow argued in The Survey, was  
“a system of insurance established by law, and with the assistance of governmental powers, to 
protect the working masses against the common vicissitudes of life which ordinarily lead to loss 
of income and consequent misery and distress.” The fact that the United States had not yet 
forged such a system, he conceded, was proof to  many “that America, of all countries, does not 
need it; that the phenomenal prosperity of this, the richest country in the world, has made 
unnecessary a type of legislation which impoverished Europe is forced to depend upon.” But this 
view, Rubinow argued, was naïve, and did not take into account the obvious income inequalities 
and disparities of wealth that persisted despite the general prosperity. “One cannot sweep away 
the ocean of human misery with a charitable broom,” he warned.1970  
 
What was needed, Rubinow argued, was “a Social Insurance Revival.” “If the somewhat 
naïve optimism of benevolent and continuous social progress which was so rampant a decade 
ago received its setback in 1917,” he argued, “it is just as unwise to assume…that as a result of 
the World War must come a complete breakdown of western civilization. It seems to me that in 
1926 we are again ready to plan on lines of social progress not very much different from those 
we believed in ten years ago.” In the twenties, at least, that revival for the most part did not 
occur. Organizations like the AALL, WTUL, and the National Conference of Social Work 
worked hard to draw attention to continued poverty in the midst of Coolidge prosperity, and The 
Survey’s Paul Kellogg argued in 1929 that “no nation is economically healthy and solvent which 
does not set a fair bottom level below which it shall not let the hazards and vicissitudes of 
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modern organized production press down on the individual and the family.” But, for the most 
part, these pleas fell on deaf ears. As one reformer put it, remembering the decade, “Utopia 
needed no social insurance.”1971  
 
While public works, social insurance and related ideas like old-age insurance languished, 
historian Clarke Chambers noted in his 1963 study of the New Deal’s roots, other avenues of 
reform instead moved to the fore. “Labor preferred restriction on immigration as a way to protect 
wage standards and reduce unemployment,” write Chambers, “business fancied higher tariffs, 
trade associational activity, and tax cuts to shake loose investment capital; agriculture turned to 
various schemes, most notably the proposals known as McNary-Haugenism, to uplift the farm 
segment of the economy.”1972 
 
And yet, not all the programs and reforms that would form Franklin Roosevelt’s New 
Deal in the decade to come were completely foreign to the 1920’s. (Indeed, as more than one 
later reformer noted, the New Deal owed a considerable debt to the La Follette-Wheeler platform 
of 1924, just as earlier Progressive Era reforms had echoed Governor La Follette’s achievements 
in Wisconsin.) Some of the later New Deal reforms lay quiescent, but on others reformers 
struggled mightily to gain ground,  unknowingly paving the way for future gains in a less 
prosperous era. One of the most important of these was the very notion of a federal welfare state 
itself.  
The General Welfare 
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Even as Warren Harding took office in March 1921 aiming to bring more business to 
government and less government to business, former suffragists, flush with victory after passage 
of the Nineteenth Amendment, entered  the decade with a very different vision of government in 
mind. With regard to foreign policy, as previously noted, the women’s movement embraced the 
call to disarmament and, eventually, the Outlawry of War. As for the domestic agenda, the newly 
formed League of Women Voters drew up the following list during the election of 1920: 
 
1. Sheppard-Towner (Maternity and Infancy Protection). 
2. Constitutional amendment to abolish child labor. 
3. Adequate funding for the Children’s Bureau. 
4. A federal Department of Education 
5. Federal aid to combat illiteracy and to raise basic teachers’ salaries. 
6. Compulsory civic education in the schools. 
7. Federal regulation of food marketing and distribution. 
8. Federal aid for home economics training. 
9. Women representatives on all federal commissions. 
10. A federal-state employment service with a women’s department (headed by a 
woman.) 
11. An end to discrimination against women in the Civil Service. 
12. Public funding for sex hygiene education. 
13. American citizenship for American-born women who married alien men and 




This was a very different vision of the federal government’s role than what Harding or 
even Herbert Hoover, with his network of voluntary associations, had in mind. And, in fact, 
women reformers had already established a beachhead in the federal government to make real 
some of these reforms with the Children’s Bureau, which had been created in 1912. Through the 
hard work of Wilson-era Bureau chief Julia Lathrop and others, the number of states with child 
hygiene or child welfare divisions leapt from eight in 1917 to thirty-five in 1920.  By 1921, when 
former settlement house worker and head of the Bureau’s child labor department Grace Abbott 
took the reins, the Children’s Bureau was an established force in the federal government, ready 
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to effect even more change at the national and state level on behalf of American’s youngest 
citizens.  As historian Robyn Muncy notes, “the use of federal power to build up public social 
services at the expense of private agencies clearly distinguished the goals of the Children’s 
Bureau from those at the Commerce Department. At precisely the time that Hoover and his men 
were using federal influence to empower private trade associations, women in the Children’s 
Bureau were swinging their resources into public institutions…Nowhere were the competing 
views of the state more obvious or more apparently gender-related.”1974  
 
With the passage of the Shepherd-Towner Act in November 1921 – which provided $1.5 
million in 1922 and $1.25 million a year thereafter  in federal grant money to support state-level 
child and maternal health programs – Grace Abbott and the Bureau had not only the mandate but 
the resources to build an infrastructure of support for child and maternal health programs across 
the country. “Once states opted into the Sheppard-Towner system of matching subsidies,” 
historian Theda Skocpol has noted – and by 1923 forty states had – “the 1921 act had the effect 
of reinforcing and spreading a nationwide system of ‘permanent administrative units that would 
promote child welfare reforms.’” Spurred by these federal investments – and the voluminous 
literature put out by the Bureau – states were thus encouraged to play a more formative role in 
the health and well-being of mothers and small children, including setting up a system of 
monitoring mortality rates and encouraging the provision of public health information and 
services. In effect, Abbott and the Bureau were helping to forge a new public health network 
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The Bureau Chief was quite explicit about her vision. “If we are to have…universal 
protection for all children,” Grace Abbott told the National Conference of Social Work in 1924, 
“public aid must be enlisted…If we set before us the ideal of reducing to the lowest possible 
level our present unnecessarily high infant mortality and of assuring real physical fitness for all 
children, public participation in the program becomes absolutely necessary.” “Our political 
philosophy is grounded in fear,” she argued of those who saw the overreach of government in the 
Bureau’s work. “We have been taught that the government is best which governs least and that 
that government is least dangerous which is nearest to us...[But w]e do not today hear people 
saying that the abandonment of the county insane asylum, the county jail, or the county 
poorhouse is a direct blow at the foundation principle of local responsibility in government. It 
was, however, exactly so denounced when Dorothea Dix began her agitation for state and 
national provision for the insane.”1976 
 
In short, just as the schooling of children had eventually come to be considered a public 
issue, so too with the health and wellbeing of they and their mothers. “We are not guided by the 
past in our social thinking,” Abbott concluded. “We cannot be guided by the past in the 
adaptation of political machinery to social needs not understood nor given recognition at the time 
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that machinery was set up. We shall have to do our own thinking and assume responsibility for 
what we do or fail to do for the children of the present.” This was a more progressive statement 




Over in the Commerce Department, Secretary Hoover did not disagree with Abbott’s 
goals. “Every child delinquent in body, education, or character,” he told the American Child 
Hygiene Association in 1920, “is a charge upon the community as a whole and a menace to the 
community itself.” As that meeting, he had offered his own “program for American children,” 
which, according to The Survey, emphasized “problems of birth, health, housing, food supply, 
education, labor, and legislation.” Some of its solutions – such as educating public opinion about 
good health and nutrition practices – seemed very akin to what the Children’s Bureau was trying 
to do. (“The investigations of the Food Administration during the war,” Hoover noted, “showed 
a woeful lack of appreciation of the need of milk for children, generally in the poorer section of 
the larger cities. Any study of the nutritional problem for children in the city quickly divides 
itself into malnutrition due to poverty, and that due to ignorance on the part of parents.”)1978  
 
But Hoover did take issue with the methodology of federal intervention – although, in the 
end, he liked even less that the Bureau was operating outside his own bureaucratic fiefdom. In 
1929, the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act was allowed to lapse, partly because the 
continued opposition of the American Medical Association, and partly because male politicians 
no longer held the same fear of a woman’s voting bloc. The following year, to the shock and 
dismay of women reformers, then-President Hoover transitioned much of the remaining powers 








of the Bureau to the male-dominated Public Health Service. The move, argued a wrathful 
Florence Kelley in The Nation, “served to reveal clearly at last President Hoover’s long ill-
concealed intention to dismember and destroy the federal Children’s Bureau.”1979 
 
While Hoover’s empire-building instincts may have overwhelmed his sense of political 
economy in the end, others thought the vision of government put forward by Abbott was 
disastrous to the republic no matter where such programs were housed. “Back of this 
unpretentious, simple looking bill today,” asserted Republican Congressman Frank Greene of 
Vermont during debate over Sheppard-Towner, “are the agencies that for a long time have been 
persistently and insidiously working to incorporate into our American system of public 
policy…Government supervision of mothers; Government care and maintenance of infants; 
Government control of education; Government control of training for vocations; Government 
regulation of employment, the hours, holidays, wages, accident insurance and all; Government 
insurance against unemployment; Government old-age pensions.”1980  
 
Similarly, a Massachusetts doctor, highlighted in anti-Sheppard-Towner pamphlets put 
out by the “Massachusetts Civic Alliance,” called the bill “the camel’s head in the tent, soon to 
the be followed by the rest of the camel.” “Maternity Benefits is paternalism, communism, 
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Sovietism, and all the other isms of the kind condensed into one,” he warned. “It is the entering 
wedge for all the various forms of compulsory insurance…It makes white man the equal of the 
Indian, a ward of the state.” Cornelia Gibbs, a “mother of four,” member of the DAR and the 
American Child Hygiene Association, and director of The Babies Milk Fund, deemed Shepherd-
Towner “a fraudulent pretense in the name of motherhood, that...provides nothing but offices, 
salaries, and traveling expenses for amateur investigators of motherhood and nothing of real 
benefit to mothers themselves. To put such power in the hands of those controlling Federal 
Bureaus, who will be intrenched behind red tape for all time to come, is to my mind a great 
menace to our institutions.” If the bill passed, she warned, “I cannot see anything ahead but 
caring for the individual from the cradle to the grave.”1981 
 
One Senator who concurred with these fears of big government and encroaching 
bureaucracy was William Borah – if he and the former suffragists were allies on disarmament, a 
great gulf existed between them on matters of domestic import. “For twenty-five years there has 
been a tremendous propaganda in this country, organized and unorganized, to convince the 
American people that the panacea for all evils is government regulation,” he told one constituent 
in 1921.“We have, as a result, built up a bureaucratic spirit throughout the country and a 
bureaucracy at Washington that has no equal in the world…if there was any form of government 
more burdensome, more sterilizing, as to the energies and capacity of the people, or more venal 
and corrupt than a bureaucratic form of government, God in His infinite mercy had not permitted 
it to curse the human family.” Before Sheppard-Towner, he grimaced, “we have been content 
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with taking charge of the child at its birth. We now propose to have the government anticipate 
matters and look after the possibilities prior to birth.”1982 
 
In Jeffersonian fashion, Borah – with one major and already-noted exception – continued 
to rail against this centralizing tendency throughout the decade. ““The truth is we are building up 
a bureaucracy here in Washington which reaches out and puts almost every mental and physical 
activity known to man in straight jackets,” Borah lamented in 1922 – clearly before finding 
renewed religion on the Prohibition question. “What the people back home get as a result is a 
few more salaried officers and less efficient government.” To an admirer from Selma, Alabama, 
Borah predicted that “[i]f we travel the course in the next fifty years that we have in the last fifty, 
we shall have practically wiped out State lines and established a bureaucracy in our Capitol.”1983  
 
In a April 1925 speech, Borah delivered one of his most robust and vehement attacks 
against this emerging vision of government. “Nowhere and in no way,” he proclaimed,  “is this 
vicious program of change for change’s sake, this fatuous stumbling in governmental affairs 
more pronounced than in the gradual but certain destruction of the States and the centering of all 
power, all government activities at Washington.”: 
 
No political party in Washington seems willing to stand against this subtle revolution, against this 
un-American, undemocratic program. As a result of well organized and venal propaganda on the 
one hand and sheer political expediency on the other, we are building up a bureaucratic form of 
government – the most expensive, the most burdensome, the most inefficient and the most 
arbitrary form of government which thus far has ever been permitted to torture the human family.  
 
Every conceivable thing relating to human activity is being given over to bureaus administered 
from Washington. This results in waste and inefficiency touching all local or state affairs which 
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in itself is burdensome and bad enough. But its capital offense is that of undermining the 
confidence and destroying the capacity of the citizen to assume and meet the duties and 
obligations of citizenship. The right, the authority, of the people to manage and control their own 
affairs of an immediate and local nature, affairs peculiar to the community or the State, is a right 
beyond all price. There is nothing for which the people can afford to exchange it. It is the only 
real democratic principle found in our entire structure of government. It means more to the 
happiness, to the dignity and power of those Lincoln lovingly styled the ‘common people’ than 
any other right or privilege they are permitted to enjoy. Destroy it and the average citizen 
becomes the victim of bureaucratic interference – tortured with its persistent leering upon the 
affairs of his daily life and burdened and exploited by its chronic inefficiency and habitual 
waste… 
 
The remorseless urge of centralization, the insatiable maw of bureaucracy, are depriving more 
and more the people of all voice, all rights touching home and hearthstone, of family and 
neighbors.  There is not a practice, custom, or habit but must soon be censored from Washington. 
There is not in all the relationship of parent and child, of family and home, anything sufficiently 
private or sacred to exempt it from the furtive eye of the special agent. I venture to say that 
coming generations when they awake to the deliberate robbery, to the unconscionable devastation 
of their heritage of local self-government, and begin to suffer the tortures and burdens of such a 
system as will follow, will denounce in the unmeasured terms of a defrauded people those who 





“Let it not be forgotten,” Borah concluded, “that local self-government is the citizen’s 
citadel of political power. Dislodged from this he becomes a political tramp, the helpless victim 
of arbitrary rule. Local self-government is the great political university where the average person 
is trained for the civic obligations which all sooner or later must assume if we are to continue a 
republic. Initiative, a sense of responsibility, political character, a feeling that they are a part of 
the government, and patriotism are all born of that daily contact with government which local 
self-government alone can furnish.” Put another way, the enthronement of federal government in 
daily affairs, Borah thought, would undermine the civic republican emphases on virtue, 




With his later position on Prohibition, Borah’s concerns are easy to lampoon as sheer 
hypocrisy. But he was not the only progressive to think thus. “I used to think that a ‘radical’ was 
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a person who…stood out valiantly – and even a bit wildly and frantically – against all avoidable 
encroachments upon individual life by that arch-foe of individuality and personality, that greatest 
of all necessary evils, the State,” William Hard told The Survey in 1926.  “I have lived to see my 
error”: 
The ‘radical’ of this moment – dominantly – is not so much interested in trying to weaken the 
power of the State to enslave the thinker and the worker as he is in vainly trying to strengthen  the 
power of the State to enslave the manager and the capitalist. 
 
I say ‘vainly.’ At Washington we see bureau after bureau, commission after commission, founded 
by the energies of ‘radicals’ and dominated now – and used against ‘radicals’ – by reactionaries. 
 
This is so; and it is bound to be so; for the plain simple reason that more ‘reactionaries’ than 
‘radicals’ can pay their railroad fare to Washington to see to it.1986  
 
 
“Those who take the sword will perish by the sword,” Hard warned, “and those who lay 
hold of government excessively to serve their purposes will ultimately perish excessively by 
government; for government in essence is nothing but coercion, nothing but the sword.” 
Disgusted that the red in radical was now a “red-tape-worm,” Hard argued that “[c]ontemporary 
‘radicalism’, trying governmentally to enslave its enemies, can end only be enslaving itself. It 
needs to transfer its emphasis from more commissions to more emancipations, from more 
bureaus of governmental inquiry to more equalities of governmental behavior, from more laws to 
more repeals of more laws.”1987  
 
With regards to Sheppard-Towner, the editors of The New Republic thought all of this 
was sheer hysteria, mostly put forward by irate physicians afraid of threats to their “medical 
liberty.” To the “certain Massachusetts physicians who argue that ‘this bill leads to control by the 
state, or socialism; socialism leads to bolshevism, and bolshevism leads to anarchy,” TNR 
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reminded them that “in the United States, which all of us loyally declare to be the most 
enlightened and the most humane country in the world, 25,000 die in childbirth every 
year…There would seem to be a good case for paternalism, when the milk of maternalism turns 
so sour.” (As for those who cited excessive government costs, the journal reminded readers that 
the entire Sheppard-Towner appropriation was “from one twentieth to one-tenth of the cost of a 
battleship.”)1988  
 
This was not bureaucratic legislation, they maintained – In stimulating cooperation 
between the federal government and states, “it is in fact one of the least bureaucratic measures 
ever put before Congress.” And while critics assailed the structure of the bill, “those who have 
the most powerful conceivable claim upon the interest of the nation are dying by the ten 
thousand, needlessly.” Grace Abbott argued similarly in 1924. To those who saw in Sheppard-
Towner the shadows of “socialized medicine, as the beginnings of state medicine, as a program 
supplied by Moscow,” she asked “the real question: ‘Can the general health of children be 
safeguarded by any other method?’ there is no answer.” Borah was having none of it. “Under the 
guise of serving the public in some laudable, or humanitarian, enterprise,” he wrote in 1924, “we 
are changing our whole structure of government.” “Of course, every sane man and wholesome 
woman is in favor of protecting children,” he argued, but it would avail the next generation very 
little “if the method we adopt…destroys the blessed old Republic whose blessings they are 
supposed to inherit.”1989 
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This same question of the appropriate role of the federal government reared again in the 
1920’s fight over Item No. 4 on the LWV’s national agenda, the creation of a Department of 
Education.  “[W]e wish to let you know what is wanted is a DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION,” the head of the Virginia LWV wrote to Senator Borah in December 1920. “We 
want an expert in education, in the new and larger sense, which makes it the chief medium for 
human welfare and national unity in the United States.” “To accomplish a great national purpose 
there must be a national center from which shall radiate national influence,” argued a pamphlet 
from the National Committee for a Department of Education. “The evidence is perfectly clear 
that states individually cannot furnish that equality of opportunity which is fundamental to our 
government.” The powerful General Federation of Women’s Clubs also “unanimously endorsed 
a Department of Education in the cabinet…we oppose the subordination of Education to other 
interests, for we feel that Education aside from its inherent value underwrites the material 
prosperity of the nation and deserves a separate department.”1990 
 
A bill creating a Department of Education  had been introduced by Senator Hoke Smith 
of Georgia and Republican Congressman Horace Mann Towner of Iowa (also the co-sponsor of 





respectively.  Along with establishing a federal Department of Education, it provided an 
appropriation of $100 million – “$7,500,000 for the removal of literacy; $7,500,000 for 
Americanization; $20,000,000 for physical education, including health education and sanitation, 
$15,000,000 for the preparation of public school teachers; $50,000,00 for equalizing educational 
opportunities in the states.” “The wealth of one state is $14,000 for each child of school age, 
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while that of another state is only $2000,” the National Committee noted of this last measure, 
and so “the greatest need for improvement in education is found where there is the least taxable 
wealth.”1991  
 
The Smith-Towner bill was crafted in such a way as to minimize the emphasis on 
centralization – the Senate sponsor was, after all, a Georgia Democrat – but critics railed against 
it regardless. This measure, one northern opponent argued, would “take money from those parts 
of the country which educate their children and spend it on those who do not.” Senator William 
King of Utah, meanwhile, thought the legislation would make “States…mere appendages to the 
Federal Government, not sovereignties possessing sovereign powers and charged with sovereign 
responsibilities.”1992 
 
With Hoke Smith replaced by Tom Watson in 1920 (who himself died in 1922, paving 
the way for the one-day appointment of 87-year-old suffragist and white supremacist Rebecca 
Felton, the first woman senator, however briefly, in American history), the Smith-Towner bill 
was reincarnated in 1921 as the Towner-Sterling bill, with Senator Thomas Sterling of South 
Dakota taking Smith’s place. When Horace Mann Towner accepted Harding’s offer of the 
Governorship of Puerto Rico in 1923, the bill subsequently became the Sterling-Reed bill in 
1924, with new House sponsor David Reed of New York. Finally, a slimmed down version of 
the bill, creating a federal Department of Education with only a $1.5 million appropriation, was 
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introduced in December 1925 by Reed and Senator Charles Curtis. But Curtis-Reed, like its 




This was in part because Borah, who took the gavel of the Senate’s Education and Labor 
Committee upon William Kenyon’s departure in 1922, hated the idea. “I am thoroughly in 
favor,” he wrote, “of the national government doing its part in the work of affording sufficient 
educational advantages and facilities for the American people.” “As a general proposition,” he 
told one constituent in 1922, “I am opposed to bureaucracy and bureaucratic control generally, 
and I think it is a very serious matter to consider putting our educational matters under such a 
system.” To others, he was more emphatic. A federal department of education, he argued, would 
“direct, guide, and control the whole educational system from the mother’s knee to the final 
departure from campus” and effectively make Washington “omnipotent in educational 
affairs…Why not confess at once that we have become a people utterly without initiative, self-
reliance, or self-help and fall down like savages of old before some bureaucratic head and ask for 
salvation?” To another correspondent, he averred that there “isn’t anything more serious in this 
country now than this centralization of all power and the domination of all human activities by 
the bureaucrats.” “I can not imagine anything more deadening to initiative, to responsible 
citizenship, and to the ultimate welfare of the common people,” he declared to yet another. If 
such a department were created, he said, borrowing an analogy offered to him during the 
Sheppard-Towner debate,  “I know the bureau, like the camel, once its nose is under the tent, is 
soon in the middle of the enclosure.” “Once you establish a Federal department of education, and 
in a startlingly brief time it will come to dominate completely and in detail your states in all 
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matters of education,” he argued in a 1926 speech on the subject. “That is the unbroken history 
of Federal bureaus.”1994 
 
In this fight, Borah had a powerful ally in the Catholic Church, who saw the Smith-
Towner bill and its subsequent incarnations as a dire threat to parochial schools. As such, the 
National Catholic Welfare Council were early and consistent opponents of the measure. “Any 
one with an ounce of common sense,” argued Father James Ryan in 1924, “knows that when the 
Federal Government divides $100,000,000 among the States for educational, or any other 
purpose,  it will insist upon a regulation of the manner in which the money is spent, and that 
would amount to a dictatorship.” “The philosophy behind this idea,” Ryan told one thousand 
Catholic women at the Hotel Astor, “is that the child does not belong to the parents, but to the 
State.” While Ryan conceded that education was of national import, “some of our well-meaning 
but rather poorly informed men in public life fail to detect the great difference between ‘national’ 
and ‘nationalization.’”1995  
 
With the Church engaged on this fight, it did not take long for the education question to 
become another proxy for the religious and culture wars engulfing the decade. “We look to your 
committee to report the bill out speedily,” one “One Hundred Per Cent American” wrote Borah 
in 1924, “and we are confident that it will pass and become law by a substantial majority, despite 
all the wire pulling, lobbying, threats, thuggery, and Jesuitical manipulation of the alien forces 
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opposed to our public schools, and to the Towner-Sterling bill in support of our public 
schools.”1996 
 
W.E.B. DuBois and the NAACP also opposed the Smith-Towner legislation, in this case 
because it hewed too closely to state’s rights. In allowing federal funds to be distributed “in like 
manner as the funds provided by State and local authorities for the same purpose,” The Crisis 
argued, the bill would help preserve an educational system in the South that “spends only the 
miserably inadequate sum of $10.32 a head on the education of white children and only $2.89 for 
each colored child.” Decrying the “vicious provisions of a great bill,” The Crisis thought it not a 
“proposal to decrease illiteracy” but a “bill to encourage lynching, peonage, and ignorance in the 
South by perpetuating the present educational discrimination against ignorant and helpless 
Negroes. Shame on the men, women, and national organizations which have loaned their names 
and influence to this travesty on educational justice.” Any bill that tried “to make ignorance 
among Negroes permanent while white children are educated from the proceeds of taxes paid by 
Negro citizens,” the journal declared, was “a disgrace so unspeakable that it deserves the 
denunciation of every decent American citizen.” “If this is National Education – God keep us in 
ignorance.”1997 
 
In a October 1923 op-ed for The Crisis, Florence Kelley also argued that the education 
bill, with its free handout of federal money without conditions, should be opposed in its current 
form. Breaking with the WJCC – “the ablest body  of women at work for legislation in this 
                                                          
1996
 “One Hundred Per Cent American” to Borah, undated. WJB Box 168: Sterling-Towner-Reed Bill. The Catholic 
Church and its “medieval, autocratic, political system, which is in form an absolute monarchy,” this correspondent 
argued, “cannot bear the light of reason, logic, or history.” Ibid. 
1997
 “Vicious Proposals of a Great Bill,” The Crisis, February, 1922 (Vol. 23, No. 4), 152-153. “The Sterling-Towner 
Bill,” The Crisis, April 1922 (Vol. 23, No. 6), 248.  “The Sterling Discrimination Bill,” The Crisis, March 1924 




country” – Kelley believed these same clauses forced “all enlightened citizens to opposed it as 
actively as they push the Anti-Lynching bill.” Schools in the South, Kelley wrote, had “been for 
a half century America’s one great monument to incompetence…Instead of requiring a State to 
modernize its Constitution first and get its federal money afterwards, it is to get the money 
anyhow. But why should this be? Why should such ultra laggard states be treated with ultra 
laxity?” Kelley underlined that she was very much for a national role in education – “Illiteracy 
must go and for this Federal aid is absolutely necessary. But this bill must be fundamentally 
rewritten, or it will do more harm than good, confirming ancient evils, while experimenting with 
reforms that, if properly safeguarded, might prove of great value.”1998 
 
One of the most important opponents of the Department of Education measure was the 
president, Warren Harding, if only because it did not accord with his own plan for consolidation 
and restructuring. In his April 1921 message to Congress, Harding – keeping faith on his 
election-year promise to progressives – called for one single Department of Welfare, comprising 
health, education, and labor, “where the whole field could be surveyed and where their 
interrelationships could be properly appraised.” This, the president argued, “would make for 
increased effectiveness, economy, and intelligence of direction.” “In creating a department, it 
should be made plain that there is no purpose to invade fields which the states have occupied,” 
assured Harding. “There need be no fear of undue centralization or of creating a federal 
bureaucracy to dominate affairs better left in state control.” In any event, Harding concluded, 
“we must ever resist the growing demand on the federal treasury for the performance of service 
for which the state is obligated to its citizenship.”1999 
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“All honor to the chief executive of the nation,” wrote Edward Devine in The Survey, 
“for insisting upon this and for striving to make the federal activities affecting the public welfare 
more effective.” In the meantime, Harding’s call for a broader reorganization of the Cabinet gave 
the National Catholic Welfare Council and others fundamentally opposed to a federal department 
of education a safe harbor – Groups could oppose Smith-Towner and its variations because they 
were supporting the president. In any case, Harding’s reorganization plan never materialized. 
Senator Kenyon introduced the plan in his committee in May 1921, but by October Harding 
seemed to be indicating that he had been moved against his original idea. At the 300
th
 
anniversary of the landing at Plymouth Rock, Harding bemoaned “the supreme centralization of 
power at home.” “The one outstanding danger today,” he told the assembled, “is the tendency to 
turn to Washington for the things which are the tasks or the duties of the forty-eight 
commonwealths.” The reorganization bill languished as other issues took the fore for the 
remainder of Harding’s presidency, and Coolidge never thought such a Department was a 




The Sidewalks of Albany 
 
Even as many reformers pushed to increase the federal domain over health, education, 
and welfare, other progressives were working to help fashion a new model of government in 
Albany, New York. There, Governor Al Smith and his top political lieutenants were attempting a 
fusion of the reform and Tammany approaches to politics that would echo well into the decade to 
come. “Practically all the things we’ve done in the Federal Government,” President Franklin 
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Roosevelt would later tell Frances Perkins in 1936, “are like things Al Smith did as Governor of 
New York.”2001  
 
In previous decades, urban progressives and ethnic political machines had almost 
invariably looked warily at one another. Smith, notes one of his biographers, Robert Slayton, 
“came from an era of polar choices: elite reformers who would handle the budget with integrity 
and honesty, but often ignored the needs of many of their constituents, or machine bosses, who 
approached the city’s coffers as a starving man would a Roman bacchanal, but assiduously made 
sure that the poor and working classes were cared for. Al Smith pursued a third vision, and 
eventually realized it. In this version, administrative reform became the servant of social justice, 
because it permitted more money to be spent on the poor and fostered support for a fair and 
effective government.” As Arthur Schlesinger Jr. put in The Crisis of the Old Order, “Smith 
stood for a social welfare liberalism, indifferent to the concentration of wealth, uninterested in 
basic change, but concerned with protecting the individual against the hazards of industrial 
society.”2002  
 
In the words of the Governor himself, as he put it to readers of The Survey in 1923, “[i]t 
has been my thought that within the limits of constitutional government there is much room for 
adaption to the daily, homely needs of those who are really the backbone of the state – its men 
women and children. I have expressed many times my conviction that the state is not its rivers or 
forests or railroads or properties, but that it is made up of living, breathing, thinking human 
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beings, and that it is the duty of the state to do everything in its power to make life more livable 
and conditions more equitable for them.”2003 
 
Of course, Al Smith was not the only urban progressive moving towards a new paradigm 
in government. In his 1913 book A Preface to Politics, Walter Lippmann had scandalized his 
progressive readers by arguing that “Tammany has a better perception of human need, and 
comes nearer to being what a government should be, than any scheme yet proposed by a group of 
‘uptown good government’ reformers.’” And Congressman Fiorello La Guardia, another urban 
progressive hailing from the Sidewalks of New York, also argued that the true worth of 
government was not based solely on efficiency, the moral uplift of citizens, or its ability to 
uphold abstract values by enlightening public opinion, but on how well that government actually 
responded to real human problems and fulfilled real human needs.
2004
   
 
At one point in the decade, La Guardia asked Coolidge Secretary of Agriculture (and 
Herbert Hoover protégé) William Jardine to look into the high cost of meat. When Jardine 
responded with information on how to conserve meat, La Guardia flew into a rage. “I asked for 
help and you send me a bulletin. The people of New York City cannot feed their children on 
Department bulletins.” This attempt to enlighten public opinion on meat usage, La Guardia 
remonstrated, “are of no use to the tenement dwellers of this great city. The housewives of New 
York have been trained by hard experience on the economical use of meat. What we want is the 
help of your department on the meat profiteers who are keeping the hard-working people of this 
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city from obtaining proper nourishment.” When appearing before a housing commission at 
which two Catholic priests testified about the horrors of the slums, La Guardia told the 
committee their testimony “stands outs in glaring contrast to the learned college professors, 
scientific experts, figure-jugglers, and truth-distorters who attempted to confuse the issues and 
make the Commission believe that there is no shortage in housing. You cannot feed babies on 
statistics, nor house families in blue prints, no better conditions on theories. The time has come 
when housing must be regulated as a public utility.” “The State is a living force,” Al Smith had 
argued similarly. “It must have the understanding to clothe itself with human understanding of 
the daily, living needs of those whom it is created to serve.”2005 
 
In any case, while this new urban liberalism was not embodied by any one person, 
Governor Al Smith was the right man at the right time to apply this philosophy statewide. His 
political education for that job had arguably begun in 1911, when, as Assembly Leader, he 
played a central role in orchestrating New York’s response to the readily preventable Triangle 
Shirtwaist Fire, which had claimed 146 lives mainly because of locked doors and a lack of fire 
safety. As noted in Chapter Eight, up to that point Smith had been considered by most to be just 
another machine politician. But working alongside his fellow urban progressive Robert Wagner 
(who became a Senator from New York in 1926, and is best remembered for the pro-labor 
Wagner Act of the New Deal), labor leader Samuel Gompers, and social reformer Frances 
Perkins on the state commission investigating the tragedy,  Smith showed that – if given leeway 
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– a Tammany man could also lead the vanguard of reform. Fifty-six labor laws were passed in 




The Triangle Commission was important in other regards as well. It brought Smith into 
contact with a host of prominent women reformers, among them Florence Kelley and Rose 
Schneiderman of New York’s WTUL. It made real – to Smith and everyone else involved – how 
directly and decisively government laws and regulations, or the lack thereof, could impact the 
lives of those in need. And it cemented Smith’s lifelong friendship and reliance upon Perkins, 
who had come to Albany in 1910 to advocate for protective legislation on behalf of the National 
Consumers League, and who ended up serving as Smith’s chief investigator during the Triangle 
proceedings. During those investigations, Perkins brought Smith to the factories at early morning 
so he could meet and talk with the women coming off the ten-hour night shift. Until his 
withdrawal from public life, Smith would seek out Perkins’s advice on countless issues involving 
labor and human welfare, and in 1920 he appointed her to New York’s Industrial Commission to 
serve as his go-between with New York’s labor community. When people asked the key to 
Smith’s success, wags would remark that “he knew Frances Perkins and she was a book.”2007 
 
Perkins knew other books too. It was she who, in 1918 – near the end of Smith’s first run 
for governor, against Republican Charles Whitman – introduced him to Belle Moskowitz, “an 
able, high-minded woman of energy and shrewdness”  that would become arguably the most 
influential of his inner circle of advisors.  (The only other person who came close, Judge Joseph 
Proskauer, thought Moskowitz “one of the most brilliant women I ever knew.”) One New York 
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political observer thought Moskowitz the “quintessential secretary,” but he had fallen for the ruse 
that Moskowitz liked to project. A former social worker who had been active in the progressive 
movement to reform New York’s dance halls, “Mrs. M,” as Smith called her, in fact served as 
the Governor’s unofficial brains trust, policy advisor, speechwriter, campaign manager, and 
publicist as needed. “What do you think, Mrs. M?” became a common refrain at any meeting 
with the governor. Indeed, when Moskowitz perished in January 1933 of an embolism at the 
relatively young age of 55 , Smith – by then a private citizen once more – was shattered, and 
emotionally withdrew from a possible campaign for the New York mayoralty. She, he told 
reporters, was “the greatest brain of anybody I  knew”)2008 
 
Smith’s Tammany background notwithstanding, it is likely not a coincidence that the 
American governor whose tenure most augured the shape of the later New Deal was also the one 
who had worked alongside women reformers for a decade before taking the State House, and 
who placed both his trust and the formation of his policy in the hands of Perkins and Moskowitz, 
both of whom shared close ties to larger networks of suffragists and social reformers. One of the 
largest was the Women’s Joint Legislative Conference (WJLC), a consortium of New York’s 
women’s groups organized in 1918 to promote social welfare legislation “as a remedy for the 
existing deplorable conditions under which one-half of the women are working.” Among the 
leading lights of the WJLC over the course of the Twenties were the WTUL’s Rose 
Schneiderman, Florence Kelley aide Molly Dewson, and Eleanor Roosevelt, all of whom would 
help to inform the governor’s policies.2009  
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Their influence is reflected in Governor Smith first-term agenda, which called for a 
minimum wage, maternity insurance, an inquiry into the high cost of milk, extended workmen’s 
compensation to cover occupational diseases, prison reform, improving access to health care 
professionals in rural areas, and the eight-hour day for women – Ultimately, with a strong push 
from the WJLC, the nine-hour day (and 54 hour week) passed in Smith’s first term. “Probably in 
no other state,” argues historian Clarke Chambers, “was there such a vigorous proponent  of 
protective labor legislation as Governor Alfred E. Smith.” “We must enact more stringent and 
more universal laws for the protection of the health, comfort, welfare, and efficiency of our 
people,” Governor Smith said, echoing the words of countless social reformers.2010 
 
In fact, one of Smith’s most notable achievements in his first term (1918-1920) arose 
from a meeting between Moskowitz and Perkins. Then, Moskowitz suggested that Smith put 
forward a comprehensive post-war reconstruction plan for the state of New  York. The 
Reconstruction Commission which resulted, chaired by Smith protégé Robert Moses and with 
Moskowitz as Executive Secretary (and architect), included such luminaries as Bernard Baruch, 
Felix Adler, the head of the Federal Reserve, and the head of General Electric. Among the issues 
it covered were health, education, labor, and – particularly important to former Assemblyman 
Smith – the reorganization of New York’s state government. (“Of all the men” in attendance, 
Elihu Root had said while presiding over New York’s 1915 constitutional convention, “Alfred E. 
Smith was the most informed on the business of the State.”) While very few of Smith 
recommendations would become law in that first term, the commission gave the Governor a 
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blueprint to follow over the rest of the twenties, and helped solidify his national reputation as a 




Re-elected in 1922 after the two-year Nathan Miller interregnum, Smith served as 
Governor of New York for the next six years. From $7 million in 1918-1919, his first year in 
office, Smith increased the state’s spending on education to $70 million in 1926-1927, a factor of 
ten. By 1928, it took up close to half the budget.  With education a state priority, both the 
average salary of New York teachers and the enrollment of high school students doubled, and 
rural areas saw their school infrastructure drastically improve. Governor Smith (and Moskowitz, 
who headed the public relations drive) also fought for and got passed a $50 million bond 
measure to improve the state’s hospitals and asylums and a $100 million bond to develop a 
public works program. With Frances Perkins’ aid, he hired the largest team of labor inspectors in 
America – more than Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania combined – and ensured that labor 
regulations were respected in New York’s workplaces and factories.2012   
 
Giving his ambitious aide Robert Moses loose rein, the Governor also established a State 
Council of Parks that worked to transform the landscape of the Empire State.  From virtually 
nothing, New York’s park system, by the end of the Smith’s term, included 70 parks numbering 
125,000 acres, among them 9700 acres of public beaches on Long Island. Smith also increased 
spending on highway infrastructure by a factor of five from his first term, leading to the creation 
of three thousand miles of roads across the state. After making the very savvy political choice of 
choosing former Governor Charles Evans Hughes to lead the commission, Smith also got his 
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state reorganization plan passed, which included a consolidation of agencies, a streamlined 
budget process, and the short ballot, meaning that only the top government spots – governor, 
lieutenant governor, comptroller and attorney general – ran for election. “As governor,” Norman 
Thomas later said of Smith’s eight years in the State House, “I thought him much better than 
Roosevelt.”2013 
 
There were limits to the Governor’s liberalism. Confronted with skyrocketing rents, mass 
evictions, and a clear housing shortage in New York City, Smith decided, in Hoover-voluntarist 
fashion, to work harder to “encourage capital to come back into the building field.” (“There is no 
legislation to make houses grow on empty lots,” he said, even if “home, everyone must have.”) 
Along with tax credits and a state housing bank offering low-interest loans to encourage new 
construction, Smith eventually opted to create an agency “to establish a permanent housing 
policy for the state. Such a policy does not necessarily mean the building of homes by the state, 
but it does mean the establishment of housing standards and of local development.” This 
particular strategy, however – which borrowed Secretary Hoover’s emphases on setting 
standards and encouraging private industry to fill the void – did little to ameliorate the state’s 
housing problem. A more direct intervention in the market was rent control, which passed in 
New York and many other states and cities after the War – including Washington DC, where it 
even enjoyed the support of Calvin Coolidge – as an “emergency” solution to the housing 
shortage. Most of these controls did not last the decade, however.
2014
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Nonetheless, Smith was not only transforming New York State during the Twenties. He 
was winning reelection by increasingly thumping margins, and showing that, at least at the state 
level, his mold of urban liberalism resonated with voters. “Al Smith had demonstrated while he 
was the standard bearer that social and humanitarian legislation would always bring popular 
support,” Frances Perkins wrote later in life. Little wonder that his eventual successor, Franklin 
Roosevelt, had been watching carefully. Roosevelt, Perkins wrote, “was to carry on those ideas. 
He believed in them. He wanted to do what Al had done, and perhaps do it better.”2015   
For the Child, Against the Court 
 
 
However much a silver lining in many regards, Al Smith’s New York is also the state 
where a decisive chapter in yet another progressive frustration of the decade took place: It was 
the turning-point in the battle for a Child Labor Amendment. That fight illustrated once again 
how reformers, with women leading the way, were envisioning a new federal commitment to 
ensuring the welfare of its citizens. And it also epitomized the same sort of frustrations with the 
Supreme Court that would push President Franklin Roosevelt to suggest his ill-fated “court-
packing” scheme a decade later. As Clarke Chambers notes: “Almost every legal and political 
argument of the great court fight in 1937 was anticipated back in 1923 and 1924.”2016 
 
The trouble began in May of 1922 with the Supreme Court’s 8-1 decision in the case of 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company, which overturned the 1919 Child Labor Tax Law putting a 
heavy tax on goods created through child labor. In 1916, Congress had passed the Keating-Owen 
Act, which, relying on powers granted through the Commerce Clause, forbade  the transportation 
of products created using child labor across state lines. The Supreme Court found Keating-Owen 
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unconstitutional in 1918, under their 5-4 decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, and so in 1919 a 




Taking up the case of a North Carolina furniture company who had been penalized for 
hiring a boy younger than fourteen and who subsequently brought suit, Chief Justice Taft and the 
Court declared that Drexel Furniture Company had the right of it: Congress could pass taxes for 
excise purposes, but not to be used as a specific penalty. In this case, Taft wrote for the Court, 
the tax “provides a heavy exaction for a departure from a detailed and specified course of 
conduct in business.” However laudable the desire to end child labor, “a court must be blind not 
to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits 
prescribed. Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable,” and thus, Taft argued, 
must be ruled unconstitutional. Not to do so “would be to break down all constitutional limitation 
of the powers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the States.”2018 
 
Progressives were dumbfounded. Writing in TNR, Edward S. Corwin argued that Taft 
was misapplying John Marshall’s famous dictum from McCulloch v. Maryland – that “the power 
to tax is the power to destroy” – in a way that undermined the “sovereignty of the national 
government within the field of its granted powers.” From now on, “any effort on the part of 
Congress to bring within its control matters heretofore falling to the states, raises the question of 
valid motive. The notion of the cooperation of the national government and the states in the 
furtherance of the general welfare…has apparently dropped out of view.” In The Nation, 
Raymond Buell argued the Court, by “imposing restraints on the power of Congress to levy 
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taxes,” was entering novel territory.  “In the light” of this decision, “it is not at all improbable 
that the court will nullify the Dyer anti-lynching bill, if enacted; and the Maternity and Smith-
Towner educational laws, on the grounds that they infringe on State’s rights.”2019 
 
Now cut off on the legislative front twice by the Court, the anti-child labor advocates 
who constituted the National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) – an organization founded in 1904 
by such progressive stalwarts as Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, and Lillian Wald – began 
looking towards a constitutional fix. After the Drexel verdict, NCLC General Secretary Owen 
Lovejoy asked the Board whether they wanted to pursue an amendment strategy. While some 
members, such as former Children’s Bureau Chief Julia Lathrop, thought that the current 
“popular distaste for governmental activity” would hamstring any attempt in that direction, the 




Incensed that the NCLC Board could be so divided – it was a “shadow of its former self” 
and had “defaulted all leadership in this crisis,” she told friends and former colleagues – Florence 
Kelley began looking for new allies to take on the fight for a child labor amendment. This 
included enlisting the WJCC and her own organization, the NCL – which rejected a potential 
amendment, 5-5.  Felix Frankfurter also harbored doubts about the strategy. Concerned about 
“the fashioning of responsible citizenship,” he told New Republic readers “[i]t is too easy to look 
to Washington and a centralized administration for the correction of all our national 
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shortcomings” and thought it better to engage public opinion against the practice. Over at the 
American Federation of Labor, meanwhile, Samuel Gompers was sympathetic to doing 
something, but thought an amendment would be a heavy lift and preferred instead Robert La 
Follette’s recent proposal for constraining the Court’s powers, a variation of which would prove 
so much trouble for the Wisconsin Senator in the 1924 election. Nonetheless, in June 1922 
Gompers formed, with Kelley and others, the “Permanent Conference for the Abolition of Child 
Labor” and insisted that, if Congress didn’t act, it would support an amendment. When Gompers 
and other members of the Conference testified to that effect before the House Judiciary 
Committee, the Congressmen on hand shrugged and argued their hands were tied. “It is amazing 
and astounding that it should be necessary to ask Congress to protect childhood,” Gompers told 
the press.  Now “we have a fight on our hands, strange and mid-Victorian as that may seem.”2021 
 
Florence Kelley, meanwhile, thought anything less than a constitutional amendment was 
a waste of time, and that the AFL was an “infelicitous banner bearer for children” regardless. 
(“We must certainly get disentangled from the leadership of Mr. Gompers,” she complained to a 
friend. “It is worse than anything I had imagined. Whether the futility is caused by incompetence 
or chicanery the net result is the same, and is intolerable.”) Compounding Kelley’s irritation was 
the fact that progressives could not agree on the wording of the proposed amendment. Owen 
Lovejoy and the NCLC desired language granting “concurrent” powers to both states and the 
federal government, in order to encourage states to pass their own laws and avoid the 
constitutional controversies that had ensnared other reforms, while Kelley and others did not 
want to see the amendment watered down in any way. While anti-child-labor advocates fought 
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amongst themselves, sometimes quite virulently, about these constitutional issues, 1923 faded to 
1924, further dulling the prospects for the quick ratification of any amendment. While forty-two 




In the meantime, everyone from Robert La Follette to Herbert Hoover to Henry Cabot 
Lodge had endorsed the measure. “Child labor and poverty are inevitably bound together,” 
Children’s Bureau Chief Grace Abbott had told wavering Congressmen, “and if you continue to 
use the labor of children as the treatment for the social disease of poverty, you will have both 
poverty and child labor to the end of time.” Even President Harding came out for a child labor 
amendment, telling Congress in December 1922 that, since “the decision of the Supreme Court 
has put this problem outside the proper domain of Federal regulation,” he recommended “the 
submission of such an amendment…We ought to amend to meet the demands of the people 
when sanctioned by deliberate public opinion.”2023  
 
So when an amendment – with Coolidge’s tepid endorsement – was at last introduced in 
Congress in April 1924, it passed within two months – 297-69 in the House, 61-23 in the Senate 
– particularly since it was an election year and the final burden of making it law would fall on 
the states. The final amendment consisted of two sections: First, that “Congress shall have power 
to limit, regulate and prohibit the labor of persons under 18 years of age” – a victory for Florence 
Kelley, who had pressed hard for the eighteen year cutoff rather than sixteen years. And second, 
that “[t]he power of the several states is unimpaired by this article” except as “to the extent 
necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by Congress,” a language to soothe constitutional 
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concerns and make it clear the amendment should be a floor, not a ceiling, for restrictions on 
child labor. (Strict constitutionalists were not appeased, with Borah once again in opposition to 
the bill’s centralizing tendencies.)2024 
 
With the amendment now being sent to the States, The Survey noted with a sigh, “the 
familiar bogeys…of states’ rights, the prohibition analogy, the grasping bureaucrats of 
Washington, the sacred right of the 17-year-old farmer boy to pick blueberries on the hill, and all 
the rest – will no doubt troop from state capital to state capital to do their worst.” And so it was. 
“They have taken our women away from us by constitutional amendment,” one opponent 
proclaimed. “They have taken our liquor away from us, and now they want to take our children.” 
The NCLC found itself fighting the argument, in Owen Lovejoy’s words, that “no girl under 
eighteen would be able to wash dishes and no boy could crank up the family Ford.” In The 
Survey, Felix Adler lamented “the Child Labor Panic” which seemingly took hold of the nation. 
“It is one of the terrible problems of democracy that great masses of the people are asked to 
decide questions on which they have not the facts,” he argued. “There is wild talk about Moscow 
giving orders to the National Child Labor Committee.”2025  
 
Organizations like the National Association of Manufacturers and the US Chamber of 
Commerce – as well as, to rural reformers’ dismay, the American Farm Bureau Federation and 
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the Grange – whipped up opposition to the amendment. So too did the nation’s many 
“professional patriots,” such as the Sentinels of the Republic. This amendment, “seeks to 
substitute national control, directed from Washington, for local and parental control, to bring 
about the nationalization of our children, and to make the child the ward of the Nation,” warned 
the Sentinels. “It is a highly socialistic measure – an assault against individual liberty,” and to 
pass it would be “to fasten upon ourselves the shackles of that kind of Bureaucratic Autocracy 
which ruined Germany.” The child labor question, another such group maintained, was “a Trojan 
horse concealing Bolshevists, Communists, Socialists, and all that traitorous and destructive 
brood.” Jane Addams was told by one New York employer that the amendment would make of 
America a “vast kindergarten.” In her memoirs of the decade, she later wrote of a talk in the 
course of that campaign to a group of professional men, most of them with a college 
background”: 
 
[They] asked me to state categorically the author of the Child Labor Amendment and the city in 
which it was written. To my reply that the bill had been drawn by a professor in the University of 
Pennsylvania, and that he had probably been in Philadelphia when he wrote it although he may 
have been in Washington in conference with the Child Labor Committee, they asked me whether 
I could make an affidavit to those statements, otherwise they would have to believe what they had 
been authoritatively told that the amendment had been written by Trotsky in Moscow. There was 
no discussion and the arguments of such a constitutional amendment could not be entered into, 





Another vociferous opponent of the amendment – despite the long-stated support of 
Father John A. Ryan for national anti-child labor measures – was the Catholic Church, who saw 
in it a stalking horse for the same federal encroachment that would result in a Department of 
Education.  Along with all the other forces arrayed against the bill, the Church’s opposition 
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helped to make Massachusetts, normally fertile terrain for progressive legislation, the first 
bloodbath for the amendment. Sent to an “advisory referendum” by squeamish state 
representatives, the child labor bill lost by almost three to one – 250,000 for, 700,000 against.2027 
 
After Massachusetts, the amendment ran up a string of defeats in Georgia, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, and Kansas, where William Allen White had argued 
“it was grotesque folly” to even attempt putting such a reform forward. “We are in a slough of 
reaction,” White warned. “It is the height of folly to push humanitarian measures at this time and 
give their opponents the prestige of defeat.” By the time the amendment reached the crucial state 
of New York in January 1925, it had passed in only three states – Arkansas, Arizona, and 
California – and lost in seven, and advocates for the legislation were tired and frustrated by the 
whirlwind of opposition, real and manufactured, they had encountered. “Is there any living 
Democrat in this state, beside the Governor and the State Department of Labor,” Florence Kelley 
complained to Frances Perkins, “who is right on the Children’s Amendment?” 2028  
 
As it happened, Governor Smith – a Catholic – was also wavering. While declaring his 
own support for the amendment, Smith recommended it too go to a referendum. Kelley fumed 
that Governor Smith had “gone over to the enemy,” but the damage was done. The State 
Assembly never even let it get as far as that, and without the reform bellwether of the Empire 
State behind the measure, the child labor amendment was effectively defeated. By the end of 
1925, forty-two state legislatures had met and only one additional state – the ever-reliable 
Wisconsin – had ratified. By 1930, only six states had passed the measure. The NCLC, 
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meanwhile, had effectively given up the fight in 1926, when Owen Lovejoy retired and was 
replaced by his more cautious assistant, Wiley Swift. “From now on,” said Swift in 1927, “the 
movement will be more gradual and necessarily less spectacular.” Florence Kelley was beside 





It was not lost on Kelley or any of the other child labor advocates that an amendment was 
only necessary because the Supreme Court had struck down the Child Labor Tax Law in Bailey 
v. Drexel and the Keating-Owen Act in Hammer v. Dagenhart. For much of the Progressive Era, 
as perhaps best represented by the 1905 Lochner case, reformers had seen the Court protect the 
rights of corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment, while consistently striking down any 
attempts to rein them in. The 5-4 decision in U.S. v. Newberry, scaling back campaign finance 
reforms in 1921, was yet another troubling example. “[I]t is high time,” Raymond Buell told 
Nation readers in 1922, “that the actual extent of its powers be reexamined.” The Court’s 
decision in Adkins vs. Children’s Hospital the following year, which Felix Frankfurter later 
described as the “death knell” of social legislation, only reconfirmed to many progressives that it 




“The Supreme Court of the United States is not a hereditary body,” wrote Buell. “It does 
not represent privilege. Nevertheless it exercises much the same power as the House of Lords, 
and it is just as likely to lose touch with public opinion because of the cloistered life in which it 
was sheltered, and because of the conservatism which constant contact with musty legal 
precedents inevitable gives.” Getting rid of judicial review entirely, however, “would remove a 
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desirable check on the domination of Congress by special interests, whether they be Agricultural 
blocs, American Legions, or Anti-Saloon Leagues” and “deprive the country of the services of 
the one branch of our Government where learning and intellect are conspicuous.” The popular 
election of judges was troubling too, since “such a reform would drag the court into politics more 
than ever,” as would subjecting judicial decisions to recall, as Theodore Roosevelt had once 
suggested. The most reasonable way forward, Buell concluded, “would be to require unanimity 
or at least a two-thirds majority before the court could set aside a law on the ground of 
unconstitutionality.” Since Congress already had the power to alter the size and scope of the 




Buell was not alone in calling for reform. The “general tendency of all the recent 
decisions of the superior and puissant Nine…toward shoving the man down and lifting the dollar 
up,” in H.L. Mencken’s words, was inescapable. In 1922, Samuel Gompers and the AFL 
officially endorsed a constitutional amendment – soon put forward by Congressman James Frear 
of Wisconsin and later to be included in the La Follette-Wheeler platform of 1924 – providing 
that a Supreme Court decision on constitutionality could be overridden by two-thirds of 
Congress. Father John A. Ryan, arguing that “a law shall not be nullified unless its 
unconstitutional character is beyond reasonable doubt,” supported the idea of a seven-judge 
supermajority required to determine a bill unconstitutional. “The time has come in the United 
States,” argued Governor George Hunt of Arkansas after the Adkins decision, “for the people of 
this country to take back from the Supreme Court the unwarranted authority  usurped by it in 
declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional.” William Sweet, the Governor of Colorado, said he 
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“would heartily approve an amendment to the constitution making it impossible for the Supreme 
Court to set aside an act of Congress.”2032  
 
Even Senator Borah, who agreed with the Court on the child labor decision and who was 
so finely attuned to any threats to the constitutional order, thought it time, for the Court’s own 
sake, to rein in the powers of the Judiciary. While he disagreed with the AFL-La Follette 
approach of a congressional veto, he thought requiring a seven-Judge supermajority was 
sufficiently within the bounds of the law and introduced legislation to that effect.. “Everyone 
must experience a feeling of deep regret,” he said in November 1923, “when the Supreme Court 
of the United States announces a decision involving some great constitutional question wherein 
five judges hold on view and four take the opposite view.” This bill “is not an attack upon the 
Supreme Court,” Borah insisted. “Anything which would relieve the Supreme Court of the 
embarrassment, of the odium, of a five to four decision would be distinctly to the ultimate 
advantage of that institution.” Borah’s bill was warmly welcomed by Florence Kelley and the 
National Consumers League, who had urged him to take up the cause. “No one else speaks with 
such authority as yourself,” Kelley wrote Borah, “on the need that seven Justices should concur 
in order to hold a law unconstitutional.” Fiorello La Guardia, agreeing to introduce the Borah bill 
in the House, called it “one of the first steps the progressive group intends to make.”2033  
 
The Borah bill never moved forward through Congress, and the decisive defeat of the La 
Follette-Wheeler ticket in 1924 closed the door on judicial reform for the time being. 
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Nonetheless, the urge to reform the Court still burned in the hearts of many progressives. 
Deeming Adkins “chapter three of the Dred Scott decision” (with chapter two being Dagenhart 
and Drexel), Kelley told Julia Lathrop  that she was “more than ever firmly convinced that we 
must have women in all federal courts; and Borah’s 7-2 requirement; and an effective restriction 
upon the due process clause which no one has hitherto succeeded in framing.” Kelley -- citing 
Roscoe Pound’s 1921 volume The Spirit of the Common Law – argued to another correspondent 
that the Court was too small, and that it “should be strengthened by the addition of several 
competent, learned women,” including Judge Florence Allen of Ohio. As it was, “monopoly of 
making and unmaking, teaching, interpreting, applying, administering, and enforcing the law by 
either sex has been hitherto eminently unsuccessful.” In The Survey, Kelley further developed 
this line of argument, telling its readers that the “monopoly of jurisprudence by men must, 
therefore, be replaced by just representation of women on the bench, at the bar, in the American 
Bar Association, and in the state associations, and by their admission to the law schools.”2034  
 
While Kelley and other reformers advocated expanding the Court to as many as eighteen 
Justices, legal-minded progressives urged caution. Roscoe Pound himself thought “legislative 
revision of judicial action” was a dangerous precedent. (He did concede, however, that the 
discussion of reforms might help to facilitate “a better judicial frame of mind.”) Felix Frankfurter 
also remained un-persuaded. “The 7 to 2 proposal will not come off,” he told Kelley, “and at the 
rate at which the Sutherlands and the Butlers are being appointed to the Court, it wouldn’t do any 
good if it did.” And Zechariah Chafee reminded his fellow progressives that the Court was 
ostensibly the last bastion of civil liberties as well. Weakening the Court’s ability to declare laws 
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unconstitutional could have unfortunate unintended consequences if bills violating personal 
rights and liberties made it through the legislatures.
2035
   
 
There the matter lay for the remainder of the decade. But the question would come up 
again. 




Even as the Court fight stalled in 1924, one of the most successful legislative harbingers 
of the New Deal reached a turning point. That same year, Senator George Norris – after a lonely 
fight against one of the most powerful and prestigious men of the era – turned back Henry Ford’s 
private bid for the Muscle-Shoals nitrate plant in Alabama. “I did not ask for the job of leading in 
the battle,” Norris later recalled in his memoirs. “I felt deeply I lacked the strength, the time, and 
the technical background to discharge that task creditably.” But just as Senator Thomas Walsh, 
despite his initial desires, took on the burden of prosecuting Teapot Dome and carried it through 
to wherever it led him, Norris led the way in first preventing private ownership of Muscle-
Shoals, and then encouraging public development of the plant to bring power to the entire 
Tennessee Valley. By the end of the decade, thanks to Norris and, in the House, Fiorello La 





The Muscle Shoals complex, resting at the navigation head of the Tennessee River, had 
originally been developed using federal funds during the World War. The National Defense Act 
of 1916 called for the creation of domestic nitrate plants in case America had to join the conflict, 
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and in September 1917, Woodrow Wilson chose Muscle Shoals as the site for such a factory, 
along with the necessary power plant to keep it running. (Nitrates are used in the production of 
both explosives and fertilizer. Previously, America had relied on Chile for these nitrates.) By the 
time of the Armistice, the government had invested $106 million into the site. Two nitrate plants 
had been built, and work had begun on what would later be known as the Wilson Dam, which 
when completed in1925 would be the largest concrete dam in the world. In 1921, however, new 
Secretary of War John Weeks announced that, with the war over and with President Harding 
desiring to reduce government expenditures as much as possible, the unfinished Muscle Shoals 




Henry Ford saw a golden opportunity. In July 1921, he made an offer for the Muscle 
Shoals complex -- $5 million for the two nitrate plants and a 100-year lease on the power plant – 
paying 4% interest on the $17 million the government had already sunk into it, plus $66,476 to 
amortize the cost of the plants after a century had passed. The deal also stipulated that the 
government would complete the dam and power plant fifteen miles upriver, and that Ford would 
produce 40,000 tons of nitrogen a year, which would be sold at an eight percent profit. “Let me 
have this and I will make it a wonderful development,” Ford said, “something that will open the 
eyes of the world.” 2038  
 
While other offers were also submitted, including a competing one by the Alabama 
Power Company, it was Ford’s that struck the national imagination. Local farmers, hoping to 
procure cheap fertilizer and, more importantly, to see Ford unleash the same magic in Alabama 
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he had brought to Detroit, looked forward to seeing the Great Man develop the project. “A river 
that is rolling its way to the sea without working is to Mr. Ford a river in disorder,” said Paul 
Kellogg in The Survey, quoting another writer, “and he longs to put it in order by making it 
work.” “Henry Ford, with Thomas A. Edison, will inaugurate – for the common folk of America 
– the Hydro-Electric-Chemical Age,” another writer gushed. “At Muscle Shoals we will witness 
the culmination of centuries of patient research into the mysteries of Nature.”2039 
 
Other observers weren’t so sure. While not necessarily averse to the offer at first, Gifford 
Pinchot saw through Ford’s gambit right away, noting that “for the water-power itself Mr. Ford 
would pay nothing” and that the offer  was “seven parts waterpower to one part fertilizer.” (He 
would later call it “one of the most outrageous pieces of piracy against the property of the 
people” he had seen in his career.) William Borah also had “not been impressed” by Ford’s offer 
since “there were no guarantees behind it…Ford doesn’t really agree to do anything. He seems to 
feel that his reputation for doing things is sufficient.” And granted oversight of the deal once it 
ended up before the Agriculture and Forestry Committee, George Norris – despite considerable 
pressure to just sign off on it – instead initiated several months of hearings into the question, 





“I came to the conclusion gradually,” he wrote after the fact, “that the possibilities were 
infinitely greater than had been first contemplated.” While nitrates were important for explosives 
in war and fertilizer in peace, “there were other goals much to be desired…I had come to the 
conclusion that many of the streams in the United States, flowing from the mountains through 
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the meadows to the sea, presented the opportunity to produce great amounts of electricity for the 
homes and factories of the nation…It has seemed always to me that the development and 
conservation of such resources ought to be under public control, public operation, and public 
ownership.”2041 
 
In April 1922, Norris’ committee rejected all private offers for the site except Ford’s 
unanimously and rejected Ford’s offer by a vote of 7-9. That same month, as a counter to Ford’s 
offer, Norris put forward a bill suggesting that a public corporation own and operate Muscle 
Shoals on behalf of the government, and not just for nitrates, but as a flood control site and 
source of power. At the time, Norris was introducing the bill mainly just to establish a baseline to 
better evaluate the Ford proposal. But by June 1922 – while not casting any aspersions toward 
the Great Man himself – the Senator had become quite convinced that the Ford deal was bunk. 
Even just considering the costs to date, Ford was offering to pay $5 million upfront for a site that 
taxpayers had already invested $106 million in, and “I am against any corporation or any man 
getting for a mere bagatelle what cost the taxpayers of the United States $106,000,000.” More to 
the point, the government was about to cede over 4600 acres of prime real estate to Ford for the 
sole intent of making fertilizer, when it was clear the site – as Ford well knew – could be better 
used as a source of hydroelectric power. The deal on the table even had the government paying 
the bulk of the costs of maintaining the dams for the century that Ford and his heirs grew even 
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Norris’s almost single-handed blocking of the deal enraged both Ford and many of the 
Alabama farmers who had wanted to see his Miracle City on the Tennessee River, as well as 
powerful lobbies like the American Farm Bureau Federation.  “I was burned in effigy in some 
communities because of my fight against his offer,” Norris recalled in his memoirs. “Threats 
against my life, to which I paid no attention, were quite common.” In February 1923, even the 
Nebraska State House turned against their Senator – It passed a resolution urging its members to 
support the offer and requesting Ford visit their state  for the purposes of hydroelectric 
development. (Norris’s angry response: “I am unwilling to give away the birthright of millions of 
unborn citizens for the enrichment of private corporations at the expense of the taxpayers of 
America.”) But by 1924, with the rapacity of the private interests involved in the Teapot Dome 
affair becoming ever clearer, Norris’ fight for public ownership of Muscle Shoals began to gain 
adherents among his Senate colleagues, members of the conservation community, and the 
League of Women Voters, who in 1922 almost passed a resolution supporting Ford’s offer, but 
by 1925 – thanks in good part to the hard work of reformer Mabel Costigan – had firmly swung 
into Norris’ camp. Newton Baker, the Secretary of War who had presided over the initial 
construction at Muscle Shoals, now declared that “no project to take that power out of the hands 
of the Government would interest me.”2043 
 
Henry Ford, meanwhile, likely took up his offer with Calvin Coolidge in a private White 
House meeting in late 1923. That December, after Ford had renounced a third party bid and 
openly endorsed Coolidge, the president called on Congress to close the deal on Muscle Shoals. 
In March, the House moved to action on Coolidge’s request, passing a bill out of the Military 
Affairs Committee that mirrored Henry Ford’s request exactly. “Ford wrote this bill,” Fiorello La 
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Guardia exclaimed in the five-day floor debate on Muscle Shoals, “and you cannot get away 
from that.” The Muscle Shoals property, he argued, could follow one of two precedents – that of 
Niagara Falls or that of the Panama Canal. “The Niagara power was grabbed by greedy, selfish 
corporations, assisted by favored legislation, and this gift of nature, this great water power is 
turned into dividends for these companies, and the people must pay excessive rates for power, 
current, and light. The Panama Canal, on the other hand, stands as a monument to government 
operation.”2044 
  
While Norris had mostly refrained from casting aspersions at Ford directly, La Guardia 
felt no such compunction. This was a man, he argued, who with “hatred in his heart…based on 
his ignorance of history, literature and religion,” continually conducted “a nefarious warfare 
against the Jews not only of America but of the whole world.” If the House passed this bill, it 
would be “bowing to money…and if you pass this bill you should replace that flag on the wall of 
this house with a great big dollar sign…Why, gentlemen, this proposition makes the Teapot 
Dome look like petty larceny.” Unperturbed, the House passed the Ford offer 227-142.2045 
 
But the bill still had to get through the Senate, and there George Norris bottled it up in the 
Agriculture and Forestry Committee, while continuing to drum up support against the deal. “The 
Senate of the United States,” reported TNR in April 1924, “is now considering a bill which many 
intelligent people believe will, if made a law, ultimately create a national scandal beside which 
the affair of the naval oil leases will seem a very teapot tempest indeed.” The month prior, The 
Survey ran a special issue on “Giant Power” which further drew progressive attention to the 
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importance of energy, the question of public versus private ownership, and case of Muscle 
Shoals. “The forces for good and evil latent in Giant Power,” wrote Robert Bruere, introducing 
the issue, “surpass those ushered in when Watts’ engine harnessed coal to the looms of 
England.” “From the power field perhaps more than any other quarter,” wrote Gifford Pinchot, 
“we can expect in the near future the most substantial aid in raising the standard of living, in 
eliminating the physical drudgery of life, and in winning the age-long struggle against poverty.” 
Al Smith, in his contribution, argued for “state development, under state ownership and state 
control” of public power, with – Niagara Falls being in New York – the emphasis on state, 
although “we will be far from selfish. In fact, we will be ready to link…up as a unit to any 
possible national power development; provided, of course, as it would be natural for us to seek 
that the interests of the state of New York and her people in the ownership of this water power be 
thoroughly safeguarded.”2046 
 
Meanwhile, by inquiring into a possible Coolidge-Ford quid pro quo and other matters, 
Norris and his committee (who now favored his position) were able to stall the deal through the 
1924 election season, although not before Oscar Underwood of Alabama got a resolution passed 
calling for solution as soon as the next Congress convened. Henry Ford was sick of waiting. 
Disgruntled by the treatment he and his offer received, Ford rescinded it in October 1924.  
Coolidge, for one, was embarrassed by the way the Great Man had been treated. “If anything 
were needed to demonstrate the almost utter incapacity of the national government to deal with 
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an industrial and commercial property,” he fumed in his 1925 State of the Union, “it has been 
provided by this experience.”2047 
 
While Ford had left the stage, the fate of Muscle Shoals was still very much up in the air. 
As soon as Congress returned after the election in December, Senator Underwood of Alabama 
put forward a new bill authorizing Coolidge to lease the nitrate plants to a private corporation – 
most likely the Alabama Power Company – for the sole purpose of creating nitrates, which 
would translate into cheap fertilizer for farmers. Norris’s plan of multi-purpose development and 
public ownership of Muscle Shoals, said Underwood, was “a good bill if what you want is only 
hydro-electric power” and woolly-headed bureaucrats running the operation into the ground. His 
plan, however, gave “all the property at Muscle Shoals to the national defense and to the 
production of fertilizer.” Norris emphatically disagreed. If the Underwood bill passed, he argued, 
“it will ultimately be recognized as a rape upon the Treasury of the United States, a gold brick to 
the American farmer, and the giving of a concession of untold value to some corporation…a 
concession so great that it will make Teapot Dome look like a pin head. Doheny and Sinclair will 
soon realize they were only pikers when they spent hundreds of thousands of dollars for the 
corrupting of private officials and the hiring of ex-public officials when a greater property is 
going to be conveyed to some private interest through the legislative channel without the 
expenditure of a dollar.”2048  
 
There was a better way forward, the Nebraska Senator averred. “We are not legislating 
for today, Senators; we are setting up a milepost in the history, not only of our country, but of 
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civilization. We are going to say by our action on this bill…whether it shall be a marker for 
human progress, more happiness, and greater democracy, or whether we are going to relegate 
ourselves and our prosperity to the control of combinations and trusts.” Echoing Norris on the 
House side, La Guardia declared in January 1925 that “the quicker we decide to take God’s gift 
to the people of America and operate it for the enjoyment of all the people instead of for the 
profit of private corporations, the better it will be for the people of this country.” “Muscle Shoals 
is a water-power project first, and incidentally a nitrogen plant,” La Guardia emphasized in 
March. “There is no use fooling ourselves, and there is no use continuing to fool the farmer.”2049 
 
 From January to March 1925, the end of the Congressional term, the fate of Muscle 
Shoals would depend on the outcome of a parliamentary chess match between Senators Norris 
and Underwood. First, the two combatants kept overwriting the pertinent legislation with their 
respective plans for Muscle Shoals via the amendment process. (Much of the Senate was 
agnostic as to the ultimate fate of Muscle Shoals, only that someone, somehow, develop the 
property and put the issue to rest.) After several back and forth substitutions, Underwood won 
this initial round, getting his revised amendment to Norris’s amendment approved by the Senate. 
When Underwood’s plan passed the Senate 50-30, Norris presumed he had been beaten. As per 
the norm, the bill then went to conference with the House of Representatives. Since Underwood 
was in the Democratic minority, he did not serve as a Senate conferee – and Norris, who had 
been chosen to head the Senate side delegation, provided he supported the Senate’s position – 
asked for a unanimous consent request not to serve, which was granted. (Underwood thought this 
was a gallant move on his opponent’s part.)2050 
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But then things hit a snag. On the House side, the only Muscle Shoals bill that had passed 
was the one from March 1923, supporting Henry Ford’s no longer extant offer. The Underwood 
bill, meanwhile, had never been approved by Norris’ committee – only by the entire Senate as an 
amendment. And so, when the conference report came back to the Senate in February, Norris 
noticed there were relatively insignificant issues in the bill – on the construction of navigation 
locks, for example – which had never been addressed in either the House or the Senate versions 
of the legislation and had been thus included in the conference. This, Norris argued, meant the 
conferees had not just conferred on the two standing bills, but actively legislated – which was 
against the rules of Congress. He complained this was out of order and Senate leadership, 
disliking the possible precedent involved and fearing Norris’s threat to derail anything the 
Coolidge administration put forward, agreed. After a 45-41 vote sustaining the Chair’s dismissal, 
the bill got sent back to conference. The conferees returned a new version of the report that 
solved the problem on February 26
th
, but a week later, the Senate adjourned without action on 
Muscle Shoals – thus killing the Underwood  measure in that Congress. By the hair of a whisker, 
and only through Norris’s strict reliance on Senate rules, the site remained in public hands.2051 
 
In March 1925, sick of the machinations attending the issue thus far, Calvin Coolidge 
authorized a board of inquiry to look into what to do with Muscle Shoals, thus preempting an 
attempt by Senator Underwood to try his bill again in the next session. When that board 
effectively punted – as one member summed up its findings to Herbert Hoover, “lease it if you 
can, and if you can’t lease, then run it” – Coolidge then urged Congress in January 1926 to create 
a joint committee to look into finding a lessee for the property, a plan that was shepherded 
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through the Senate by Senator Thomas Heflin of Alabama. This new joint committee entertained 
various offers for the complex, with senators on the committee supporting the bids of power 





All the while, Norris and La Guardia continued to rail in their respective Houses for 
public ownership of Muscle Shoals. “You cannot find any corporation in business for love, for 
philanthropy, or for patriotism,” La Guardia insisted. “The lessee will want to make money and 
they will make it on the farmers and the consumers.” Norris, meanwhile, had chemists testify 
before his committee that using cyanamide to make fertilizer, a process which required water 
power, was now outdated – Nitrates could be made from synthetic ammonia more cheaply and 
easily. Norris thus continued to urge that hydroelectric power, flood control and navigation be 
the determining factors in Muscle Shoals’ fate.2053 
 
And so the battle wended on until the spring of 1928, when another government 
ownership resolution put forward by Norris and La Guardia came to a vote. “The Government 
owns Muscle Shoals now,” Norris proclaimed, “it operates it now, and the question is, Shall we 
turn it over to private monopoly or shall we keep it for all the people?’” As before, many 
Senators cared less about how power was generated at the site and more that power was 
generated there at all, so by continually being a thorn in the side of any private concern 
attempting to take over the plant, Norris had made public ownership the most likely game in 
town. In March 1928, he and La Guardia’s resolution passed the Senate and House. Two months 
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later, after conference, the resolution passed by 43-37 and 211-147 respectively. Tiring of the 
whole  matter and desiring not to make an election year issue of Muscle Shoals, Coolidge chose 
to pocket-veto the resolution. But, thanks primarily to George Norris, a precedent had been set, 
even during the business-friendly Coolidge era, for public ownership and development of Muscle 





“I know you are sufficient unto yourself, and that you require from those who care for 
you neither expressions of unstinted admiration, nor protestations of affection,” Hiram Johnson 
wrote Norris after the dust had settled, “but, my dear George, I cannot tell you how your 
courageous and patriotic stand increased my respect and added to my love for you.” In fact, 
because Norris had waged his lonely fight for public development for so long, Hiram Johnson – 
with House co-sponsor and California colleague Philip Swing – were more easily able to gather 
support for their own legislation, calling for a dam on the Colorado River for flood control, 




Contemporaneously with Norris’s fight for Muscle-Shoals, Johnson and Swing, from 
1922 to 1928, pushed for a Boulder Dam which could rein in the Colorado and bring irrigated 
water and cheap power to the West. Their fellow Californian, Herbert Hoover, had helped pave 
the way in 1922 by acting as Chair of the Colorado River Commission. Then Hoover, combining 
his love of engineering with his fondness for voluntary associations, orchestrated an agreement 
among the seven states involved – California, Nevada, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico 
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and Arizona – although the latter state later balked at the deal. “Mr. Hoover talks like a man 
about interstate treaties,” William Hard told Survey readers in 1924. “He talks like a boy about 
making a dam in the Colorado River.” But Hoover’s fondness for the Boulder Dam project 
should not be construed as an endorsement of public power – in this case, the generated power 
would be sold to private companies. “[T]he distribution of the power by the government was 
pure Socialism,” Hoover argued. “Such exponents of these doctrines as Senator Norris, La 
Follette, and Borah, together with Gifford Pinchot and John Dewey,” he argued, “no doubt hoped 
for the growth of Socialism inch by inch.” When Norris’ Muscle Shoals bill passed Congress 
again in 1931, then-President Hoover vetoed it, declaring he was “firmly opposed to the 
Government entering into any business the major purpose of which is competition with our 
citizens.”2056 
 
In any case, after Johnson tweaked the Boulder Dam bill to give Arizona and Nevada 
more access to power and proceeds from power sales, the House and Senate passed Johnson’s 
legislation in December 1928, and Coolidge – who actually supported this particular project – 
signed it into law before the New Year. Speaking on the Boulder Dam in 1927, Fiorello La 
Guardia said it would be “a monument to the civilization of this era…the Boulder Dam project 
will demonstrate how cheaply power can be generated and once we demonstrate how nature may 
be harnessed and power generated at a low cost, it will break the control of the Power Trust and 
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it will bring relief to the entire country.” After passage, Norris called it “at once one of the most 
important, humane, and justifiable pieces of legislation that had been put on the statute books for 
many years.”2057 
 
Johnson’s push for the Boulder Dam had been stymied for years by two forces, the first 
being private power interests. “It is the opposition of Insull, and those similarly minded, that is 
most dangerous in the Boulder Dam Project,” Johnson wrote Ickes in the summer of 1927. “I 
fear it will be sufficient in the next session to prevent accomplishment. Of course, if  we had the 
wholehearted advocacy of the administration, we could whip this great power trust.” The other 
problem for Boulder Dam advocates for much of the decade were southern Democrats in 
Congress, who were unclear why they should sign off on expensive federal investments that 
availed their own region very little. But moods toward federal flood control efforts changed 





By April 1927, the Mississippi River would be moving three million cubic feet of water a 
second – three times more than the devastating flood of 1993 – and smashing through levees 
right and left. By the time the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 had run its course, 27,000 square 
miles had been submerged – an area equivalent to the size of New England – causing anywhere 
from 246 to over a 1000 deaths, up to a billion dollars in damages, and leaving close to a million 
people homeless. Such an unprecedented disaster merited an unprecedented response. In seven 
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states – Kansas, Tennessee, Missouri, Illinois, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana – the Red 
Cross ran as many as 154 tent cities, temporarily housing close to 326,000 people, and offering 






, 1927, Coolidge appointed Hoover the head of a special committee to 
oversee flood response efforts and then, having delegated the problem, fell back into his usual 
state of repose. Hoover, meanwhile, took on the cause with relish, seeing in the flood not only 
the type of grand relief and humanitarian effort he had been heading since the days of the War, 
but an amazing opportunity for both an engineer and a presidential candidate. For almost all of 
the next three months, Hoover – with his publicity bureau in tow – would guide the massive 
relief and reconstruction effort from the flood zone itself, drawing press reports that ranged from 
complementary to adoring. (“In the course of the next few weeks many representatives of 
magazines, newspapers, and feature syndicates will be in the flood area,” Hoover and Red Cross 
vice chairman James Fieser informed Red Cross personnel. “Give these writers every possible 
consideration.”)2060  
 
“I am speaking to you from the temporary headquarters which we have established for 
the national fight against the most dangerous flood our country has ever known,” Hoover told 
America at the end of April, in his first-ever national radio address. “Everything humanly 
possible is being done by men of magnificent courage and skill.” This fight, Hoover informed 
the nation, was a “great battle which the engineers are directing. They have already held 
important levees against the water enemy” – the implication being, of course, that the Great 
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Engineer was now the nation’s general in this fight. Most of the battles over the next few 
months, however, went to the water enemy, leaving Hoover more often than not directing 
evacuation efforts – which he did quite capably. In late May, he told the president that “[a]ll 
population that could be flooded is already covered.” Then came the June rise, which flooded 




Even when the water had its way, however, the press remained impressed by Hoover’s 
“organizing and directing genius,” in the words of the Boise Idaho Statesman. In the words of the 
Oakland Tribune, Hoover was “the ablest and most efficient American in public life…In 
personal fitness for the presidency, there is no other American, even remotely, in Mr. Hoover’s 
class.” From the field, the Commerce Secretary received summaries of this reporting two to three 
times a week from his staff, and saw it was good. If Coolidge chose not to run for office again, 
Hoover told an old Stanford friend, “I shall be the nominee, probably. It is nearly inevitable.”2062 
 
True to form, once the immediate crisis had passed, Hoover ran the flood relief and 
reconstruction efforts as another exercise in voluntary association, this time on almost a national 
scale. “I made ninety-one local committees to look after the Mississippi flood,” he later recalled. 
“You say, ‘A couple of thousand people are coming. They’ve got to have accommodations. Huts, 
watermains, sewers. Streets. Dining halls. Meals. Doctors. Everything’…So you go away and 
they simply go ahead and do it. Of all those ninety-one committee there was just one that fell 
down.” To help secure access to credit for all the many affected farmers, Hoover worked to 
establish “reconstruction corporations” – private non-profit organizations backed by credit from 
businesses and elites in each state. When some states, such as Arkansas and Mississippi failed to 
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reach their expected quota of donations, Hoover had Coolidge sign a letter requesting  “the 
business interests of America under the leadership of the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States…to secure to these loan corporations subscriptions of capital.” He also urged the nation’s 
civic organizations and fraternal orders to raise money as well.  As a result, ultimately Hoover 




But, as in instances prior – and in a few soon to come – these voluntary efforts fell short 
of addressing the real scale of the calamity. That $13 million Hoover raised translated to less 
than $20 per victim of the flood, and in Mississippi less than five percent of the amount of loans 
Hoover had predicted were ever made. “With due deference to Mr. Hoover,” said Franklin 
Roosevelt in New York, “I cannot believe that he really means that is adequate to meet more 
than the demands for the next few weeks.” Coolidge, meanwhile, refused to call Congress back 
into session to ask for a flood appropriation, incurring the wrath of several newspapers in flood-
drenched areas. Suddenly, Silent Cal’s laconic leadership approach and tight fist over the federal 
government’s purse strings were less appetizing attributes than they had been in years past. 
“Either [Coolidge] has the coldest heart in America or the dullest imagination,” complained the 
Paducah News-Democrat to its Kentucky readers, “and we are about ready to believe he has 
both.” Not among the naysayers was the New York Times, who respected Coolidge’s 
stubbornness in this matter: “Fortunately, there are still some things that can be done without the 
wisdom of Congress and the all-fathering Federal Government.”2064 
 
But there were some things that couldn’t. After the waters had passed through, it was 
clear to all that the previous Mississippi flood control system – or what remained of it after a 
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losing battle against the tides – had been insufficient to stop calamity. So in March 1928, after 
deliberating on the best way forward – President Coolidge and the Senate soon agreed it was the 
cheapest plan, put forward by Major-General Edgar Jadwin of the Army Corps of Engineers – 
Congress very quickly passed the Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928. Introduced by Senator 
Wesley Jones of Washington and Congressman Frank Reid of Illinois, this measure appropriated 
the unprecedented sum of $325 million over ten years in federal funds – “the greatest 
expenditure the government has undertaken except in the World War,” noted the New York 
Times – to construct a new flood control system for the river.2065  
 
Speaking as the Chair of the Committee on Flood Control, Congressman Reid argued that 
his committee thought “the construction of flood-control works dependent upon local 
contribution will result in the failure of the whole, and another disaster such as that which 
appalled the nation last year might happen.” The Senate agreed, and passed the bill unanimously. 
“There can be no doubt that the problem is here and that it is a national problem,” Borah had said 
while the flood waters raged, “and that the government should proceed in the most intelligent, 
effective, and speedy way possible to deal with it...The cost will be tremendous,” Borah 




When the Act came before Congress, Borah told constituents balking at the cost that “we 
should go about it something as we did in the building of the Panama Canal -- strip it of politics, 
dedicate it to public principles, and finish the job whatever it may cost.” “The national 
government itself must do this work and do it without faltering in the manner of expense,” Borah 
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told another, “that is, whatever is absolutely essential to be expended should be expended.” The 
American Bankers Association agreed. “It is the profound conviction” of that organization, 
“representing 20,000 American banks, that the control of the Mississippi River is a national 
problem, should be solved by the nation, and that, cost no matter what it may be, should be borne 
exclusively by the nation.” Coolidge was less resigned to the idea of such a massive 
appropriation – Indeed, he thought it “the most radical and dangerous bill that has had the 
countenance of the Congress since I have been president.” But, after pressure from all sides, he 






The Flood Control Act, said its House sponsor, “changes the policy of the federal 
government which has existed for 150 years…It is the greatest piece of legislation ever enacted 
by Congress.” Writing of the 1928 Act in Rising Tide, his history of the Great Flood, historian 
John Barry notes that “the law set a precedent of direct, comprehensive, and vastly expanded 
federal involvement in local affairs. In the broadest sense, this precedent reflected  a major shift 
in what Americans considered the proper role and obligation of the national government, a shift 
that both presaged and prepared the way for greater changes that would soon come.”2068 
 
If Coolidge, Borah, and the other longtime defenders of low government spending were 
dismayed by the massive outlays included in the Flood Control Act, they could have taken solace 
in a short book that came out the same year – The Road to Plenty, by William Trufant Foster and 
Waddill Catchings, two old Harvard friends who were now the president of Reed College and a 
financier for Goldman-Sachs respectively. While Congress had ventured onto the political path 
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that would dictate the coming decade, Foster and Catchings – although few noticed at the time – 




In a number of books throughout the 1920’s, including 1923’s Money, 1925’s Profits, and 
1927’s Business Without a Buyer, Foster and Catchings had delighted in being gadflies to the 
economics profession at large, poking holes in the conventional wisdom  and offering cash prizes 
to anyone who could prove their alternative theories were wrong. (“Once more,” began a review 
of Business Without a Buyer, “Messrs. Foster and Catchings are at their trick of placing a tack in 
the chair of that dignified old party, the Dismal Science, and are getting huge enjoyment out of 
the consternation thus caused to him and his followers.”) In The Road to Plenty, composed as a 
layperson-friendly Socratic dialogue among several plain-spoken strangers on a train, Foster and 
Catchings argued that traditional economists had worried too much about problems of production 
and too little about consumption and purchasing power, even though experience had shown that 
increasing the former did not necessarily have any effect in the latter. Believing that if you 
“[l]ook after production, and consumption will take care of itself,” Foster and Catchings wrote, 
economists had neglected the complicated “problem of getting products into consumers’ hands at 
the rate at which such products could be produced.”2070 
 
To remedy this problem of purchasing power, government’s primary economic 
responsibility was to “put more money into consumers’ hands when business is falling off, and 
less money when inflation is under way.” This was also in part because of a problem they 
deemed the “Paradox of Thrift.” When times were tight, individuals and businesses both worked 
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harder to save money -- but more money saved meant less money working in the economy and 
thus less economic activity. Saving – an individual good – became an detrimental to the overall 
functioning of the economy. Thus, “when business begins to look rotten,” Foster and Catchings 
prescribed “more public spending” through investments and public works. If that meant an 
increase to the national debt, so be it – “[I]t means scarcely more than that that people of the 
United States collectively owe themselves more money.” Meanwhile, the economy would grow, 
families would have money to spend, and “the greatest waste of all…the waste of idle plants and 
idle workers” would be bypassed.2071 
 
In the midst of Coolidge prosperity, Foster and Catching’s argument in The Road to 
Plenty attracted mostly just academic interest. “Too good to be true – You can’t get something 
for nothing,” Franklin Roosevelt wrote in the margins of his copy. Within a few years, however, 
like so many other of the reforms advocated or attempted by progressives in the Twenties, their 
prescient arguments about under-consumption, purchasing power, and counter-cyclical 












CHAPTER TWELVE: MY AMERICA AGAINST 
TAMMANY’S  
PROGRESSIVES AND THE ELECTION OF 1928 
 
 
“I did feel that the La Follette campaign served a definite purpose and had a great value in 
demonstrating again to both the old-line parties that there was a tremendous Progressive vote in 
the country which could not be safely disregarded. The effects of this lesson were certainly 
evident in the 1928 campaign when the choice of the voters was not between any ultra-
conservatives (such as Harding and Coolidge) but between men who might be designated: the 





The presidential contest between Herbert Hoover and Al Smith might have been a 
chance to debate two emerging visions of governance – the associative model favored 
by the Great Engineer and the emerging welfare state being created in New York. It was 
not to be. When Smith – always an underdog amid Coolidge prosperity – chose to 
minimize his policy differences with the Republican candidate, that left cultural rather 
than political distinctions the focus of the election. The same forces that had wreaked 
havoc on the Democratic Party in 1924 now spilled out into politics at large. The final 





The Republican Succession 
 
Given the general prosperity, there were very few surprises in the 1928 election cycle, 
particularly as compared to the two previous presidential elections. This followed a pattern set in 
the 1926 midterms. Unlike in 1922, which saw voters rebelling against labor unrest, agricultural 
depression, and a struggling economy and had given progressives hope of a reaction against 
Normalcy setting in, 1926 saw some normal churn, but not nearly the same broad dissatisfaction 
with the Coolidge administration that had lifted progressive hearts four years earlier.  
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In the House, Republicans lost nine seats but retained a majority of over forty. The 
Senate saw stronger Democratic gains, with the party out of power picking up six seats. 
Republicans still held a slim 48-47 majority, but had lost nominal control of the Senate on 
account of the progressive tendency to align with the opposition when opportunities warranted. 
Among the new faces in the Senate were Democrats Robert Wagner of New York (who defeated 
James Wadsworth), Hugo Black of Alabama (replacing the retiring Oscar Underwood), and 
Alben Barkley of Kentucky. On the Republican side, former Wisconsin Governor John J. Blaine 
replaced Irvine Lenroot to serve alongside young Bob La Follette – who had taken his late 
father’s seat in 1925. Gerald Nye of North Dakota was also a relative newcomer, replacing 
Edwin Ladd after his death that same year. And Republicans Frank Smith of Illinois and William 





Returning to the Senate in 1926 were Democratic David Walsh of Massachusetts, elected 
to fulfill the remainder of Henry Cabot Lodge’s term after losing in 1924, and Republican Smith 
W. Brookhart of Iowa, who had been forced out earlier in the year due to his support of La 
Follette – Republicans in a punitive mood had joined Democrats in the suit contesting his close 
1924 victory over Democrat Daniel Steck. Meanwhile, Wet referenda – either rolling back 
Prohibition enforcement or allowing for the sale of beer and wine – passed easily in New York, 
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The Nation and New Republic were heartened by many of these developments, as well as 
the unprecedented fourth term victory for the Governor of New York. “Al Smith's popularity is 
undiminished and is unique in the history of American politics,” noted TNR approvingly. But 
they relished most of all David Walsh’s victory over Coolidge ally William Morgan Butler in the 
president’s home state of Massachusetts. That election, argued The Nation, “which has removed 
from the Senate one of the most harmful of our reactionaries, should set men’s tongues free in 
other camps also.” TNR called Walsh’s victory “ a political fact of the first importance,” and 
noted it “had the appearance of a deliberate repudiation of the President by the Republican voters 
of his own state.” 2076  
 
But there was a touch of wishful thinking in much of this. While The Nation hoped “the 
strategic position of the Progressives” in the Senate would “promise a vigorous stirring in what 
would otherwise be an utterly arid political desert,” they also agreed they were “not so optimistic 
or inexperienced as to believe that we shall make great progress during the next two years.” 
TNR, in the end, noted the “country has gone somewhat wet and partly Democratic,” but 
otherwise the status quo had not much changed. “What has come to be a tradition of American 
politics has been fulfilled by the swing away from the party in power at the midterm voting.” 
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Despite some egg on the face of Coolidge for what had happened to Butler,  “[t]his does not 
necessarily or even probably indicate a Republican defeat in 1928.”2077 
 
While William Butler’s loss likely had very little to do with it, one of the only major 
bombshells of the 1928 cycle occurred ten months later, in the math classroom next to the 
president’s vacation-office at Rapid City High School, South Dakota on August 2nd, 1927 – four 
years to the day that Calvin Coolidge had ascended to the presidency. Given the anniversary, 
reporters asked Coolidge at a 9am press conference what he thought his biggest accomplishment 
was. “It is rather difficult for me to pick out one thing over another,” the president shrugged: 
 
The country has been in peace during that time. It hasn’t had any marked commercial or financial 
depression. Some parts of it naturally have been better off than other parts, some people better off 
than other people, but on the whole it has been a time of a fair degree of prosperity. Wages have 
been slightly increasing…There has been a very marked time of peace in the industrial 
world…There has been considerable legislation which you know about, and which I do not need 
to recount. There have been great accomplishments in the finances of the national government, a 




The president also requested that reporters come back at noon, at which point “I may 
have a further statement to make.” When they did – making it 3pm on the East Coast, after the 
stock market had closed – Coolidge closed the classroom door behind them and asked the pool of 
White House reporters to line up single-file. He then gave each of them a small slip of paper 
reading: “I do not choose to run for President in nineteen twenty-eight.” When the journalists in 
attendance asked if the president had any further comment, Coolidge replied “None.” When 
Senator Arthur Capper, in attendance, told the president his statement had caused quite a 













Immediately, political observers began speculating whether Coolidge, not unlike 
Woodrow Wilson in 1920, was hoping to be drafted by a grateful nation to a third term. “There is 
no doubt in my mind that Coolidge will be a candidate to succeed himself,” Hiram Johnson had 
said to Harold Ickes the year before. “[H]e will be re-nominated without difficulty, and then the 
split…will occur in the Democratic Party on the religious question, I feel very certain he will be 
re-elected.” Now that “the Sphinx has spoken,” Johnson thought “he spoke to leave the door ajar 
but that the American people have closed that door upon him.” Ickes concurred.  “I am firmly of 
the opinion,” he replied, “that he didn’t choose to be a candidate again for president in the same 
sense that a girl doesn’t choose to be kissed when she is just dying to have her boyfriend put his 
arms around her and do that same thing...[Coolidge] decided to give out the statement that he did 
in the hope of stampeding public sentiment. He doubtless thought that the country would stand 
appalled at the very suggestion that it was to be deprived of his unexceptional and extraordinary 
services as president.”2080 
 
From the contemporary vantage, however, signs suggest this was not the case. Asked the 
question in the 1930’s, Hoover argued that Coolidge definitely wanted out. “I know it from 
direct, positive, intimate, and complete discussion.” Edmund Starling thought the president was 
sick of the work involved and still heartsick over the death of his son. Grace Coolidge, who 
ostensibly knew the president better than anyone, gave two potentially apocryphal anecdotes in 
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the decade to come about her husband’s intentions at the time. In one, Coolidge told one of his 
Cabinet members, “[i]t is a pretty good idea to get out when they still want you.” In the other, 
written in 1935, Coolidge apparently said, “I know how to save money. All my training has been 
in that direction. The country is in a sound financial position. Perhaps the time has come when 
we ought to spend money. I do not feel that I am qualified to do it.” Coolidge had, according to 
Indiana Senator James Watson, said something similar to him: “I think I know myself very well. 
I fitted into the situation that existed right after the war, but I might not fit into the next 
one….From this time on, there must be something constructive applied to the affairs of 
government, and it will not be sufficient to say, ‘Let business take care of itself.’” Writing on 
“Why I Did Not Choose to Run,” for a Hearst publication in April 1929, Coolidge argued “it is 
difficult to conceive how one man can successfully serve the country for a term of more than 
eight years.” Or, as Thomas Edison more simply put it, “He is getting sick of the job.”2081  
 
Whatever motivated Coolidge to this decision, he was now officially out – opening the 
question of who in the Republican Party would succeed him. “It is generally understood that Mr. 
Hoover is the President’s own choice,” suggested The New Republic after Coolidge’s 
announcement, overstating the case quite a bit. (“That man has offered me unsolicited advice for 
six years, all of it bad!” Coolidge had exclaimed in May of “Wonder Boy.”) Otherwise, TNR 
thought, “Speaker Longworth seems to be making little headway. Mr. [Frank] Lowden has only 
the discontent of the Middle-Western farmers behind him,” which were not often a swing vote in 
a Republican primary. “Mr. [Charles Evans] Hughes has said he would not be a candidate; he is 
sixty-five years of age, and would be seventy-one on leaving office. A far more serious 
contender, undoubtedly, is General Dawes.” “In the back of my head is the notion that Dawes is 
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one of the strongest potential candidates in the country,” Ickes told Hiram Johnson. “I think I 
know that Dawes in his own heart believes that he is a man of destiny and will be president of 
the United States.”2082 
 
But Vice-President Dawes didn’t seem to have much of the Hell and Maria about him. “I 
have had friends who have been President and it killed them,” he told his brother Henry. “I have 
no desire to end my life that way.” While obviously the presidency was a great honor, Dawes 
thought “the man nominated will be either Hoover or Lowden. Essentially, I think as they do and 
there is nothing I can do that I could not do.” In September 1927, at an event honoring John J. 
Pershing, Dawes offered many splendid encomiums to “our great war president, Woodrow 
Wilson, and his able Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker” – which was aberrant behavior for a 
contending Republican presidential candidate. Two months later, Dawes stated unequivocally 
that “I am not a candidate for the presidency. I favor the nomination of Frank O. Lowden, 
assuming President Coolidge is not a candidate.”2083 
 
Dawes’ endorsement notwithstanding, Governor Lowden didn’t look to have much of a 
chance in 1928 either. If Lowden had been a candidate safely in the middle in 1920 – before his 
bid was inadvertently derailed by the Johnson-Borah campaign finance inquiry – in 1928 he had 
become the locus of agrarian discontent with the Coolidge administration, and the favorite 
candidate of McNary-Haugen supporters. But while Lowden quietly tested the waters in 1927 
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and 1928, he refused to put his name officially in contention, and believed – quite correctly – 
that Republicans would not insult the popular sitting president “by choosing the leading 
opponent of his farm policy.” When the Republican convention in Kansas City rejected a 
McNary-Haugen plank to the 1928 platform, Lowden – seeing the writing on the wall – asked 
that he not be considered as a candidate in the balloting. “Governor Frank Lowden was a man 
eminently fitted for the Presidency,” Hoover later wrote of him in his memoirs. “He should have 
been nominated in 1920 instead of Harding.” But, while calling Lowden “one of my most 
devoted friends,” the Great Engineer did not say the same of him in 1928.2084 
 
And then there was Borah. For much of 1927, as Borah increasingly forsook the rest of 
the Senate progressives to decry the lax enforcement of Prohibition, his colleagues and others 
presumed the Idaho Senator was gearing up for a presidential bid at last. While “Borah lost much 
prestige in this last session,” Johnson told Ickes in 1926, “[o]utside of the Senate, I think he 
gained enormously with the ‘drys’, and is their pet advocate, and possibly their presidential 
candidate.” As such, “[t]here is a consensus of opinion here that Borah is an avowed candidate 
now, and I think he really is, but knowing him as I do, I am perfectly certain he will never come 
to the scratch.” Johnson was basically on the money. The Idaho Senator’s strategy was not unlike 
the frustrating waiting game he had played with J.A.H. Hopkins and the third party movement in 
1924. While Raymond Robins worked to ascertain Borah’s level of support among progressive 
Republicans, Borah continued to send out mixed messages and play things close to the vest – 
“simply saw wood,” in his words – hoping for a deadlock at the convention that might redound 
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to his favor. “The present outlook,” he told one of his longtime backers in March 1928, “is that 
no man will go to Kansas City with sufficiency to nominate.”2085 
 
On account of this strategy, Borah’s behavior from the outside could seem erratic. In June 
of 1927 – two months before Coolidge officially bowed out – he emphatically and seemingly 
without reason endorsed the president. “I noticed that our friend from Idaho, just as he had a real 
opportunity…not only declared himself out, but announced his fealty to the president,” Ickes 
wrote to Johnson. “What a strange combination he is! I presume there will be nothing for our 
friend, Raymond, now but to seek another cruise upon the Mayflower and be reconverted.” 2086   
 
But as soon as Coolidge announced his retirement, Borah rushed to the telegraph to 
declare that the president’s choice “must be regarded as result of a profound conviction and a 
finality.” Now, he argued, “it would be a magnificent thing if the Republican party now in power 
would devote the next six months to legislation, to shaping and forming principles and polices 
instead of wrangling over individual candidates, in view of the pressing and important nature of 
the questions which now confront us” – those issues mainly being prohibition enforcement, flood 
control, and, to Borah, the return of the Continental Trading Company’s dirty money to the 




Three months later, Johnson reported that “the most intimate and confidential friend of 
Senator Borah” – Raymond Robins – had told former La Follette organizers “that Borah is a 
candidate for the presidency; [and] that he has the secret endorsement of certain progressive 
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elements in various Western states and of some of the former La Follette groups…at the 
appropriate time in the convention there may be a stampede for Borah.” Johnson thought this 
strategy was ridiculous, and said as much to Ickes the following June. Robins, Borah, and 
Outlawry advocate Salmon Levinson, he wrote, “have been snooping around for some months 
like the ‘Three Tailors of Tooley Street’ conspiring among themselves and keeping their plans 
for overturning the nation a deep, dark secret. They will all wind up, as usual, in the band wagon, 
and it does not make much difference what or whose band wagon it is.”2088  
 
It is true that Robins, as usual, was trying to play a complicated hand. “While Borah will 
never be the president of these United States,” he told his sister, “no man can now be elected 
next November on the Republican ticket without his endorsement. And this bitter truth is now 
known to all the ablest masters of the political game in our America. So far has the drive of a 
Sober America [proceeded]…and for the outlawing of the war institution among the nations of 
the earth.” But if Borah was fooling himself, so was Robins, as he hinted in October 1927 when 
he noted that Borah was “least friendly to Hoover – possibly because the Hoover boom is 
growing very substantially.” And indeed, Borah’s intricate dance to become a potential dark 
horse was far too subtle, and his voice by now too erratic, to stand in the way of the formidable 





From April 1927 until the end of the year, as he directed Red Cross camps, surveyed 
broken levees, and made time for sundry other flood-related photo opportunities – such as the 
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birth of triplets named Highwater, Flood, and Inundation in Opelousas, Louisiana – the Secretary 
of Commerce was a regular on the front-pages, radio broadcasts, and newsreels.   This added 
boon only enhanced the public prestige Hoover and his department had worked to cultivate in the 
years before the Great Flood, including securing the endorsement of the Scripps-Howard chain, 
formerly La Follette supporters. In December 1927, Oswald Villard complained that newspaper 
reporters “see nothing to the Presidential contest now except the nomination of Hoover and 
Smith, with Hoover winning in an easy canter.” But, in an otherwise unflattering portrait of 
Hoover two months later, even Villard conceded that “I cannot see how he can be kept out of 
[the presidency], or how anyone can doubt that, barring a miracle and the open and avowed 
opposition of Calvin Coolidge, he will be the first Californian to occupy the White House.” 2090   
 
“It looks to me as if Hoover is likely to be nominated,” wrote Hiram Johnson, who had 
always despised the man, that same month. “This is because he has practically no opponent. 
Hoover has the only organized force, and apparently is the only one lavishly expending money. 
There is no other candidate either with organization or with an appeal to the imagination of our 
people.” Ickes felt much the same. The thought of “the democratic-republican-non-partisan 
citizen of sunny, Southern California leave me even colder than the thought of Hughes,” he 
grimaced.  “I don’t like him and I never did,” But the signs of Hoover’s ascendance were clear.   
“I am willing to predict now that Raymond Robins will be found in a prominent seat on the 
Hoover bandwagon,” he told Johnson.2091   
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Robins wasn’t the only one contemplating swallowing that bitter pill. By the time 
primary season rolled around, and even though many Senate Republicans desired a different 
standard-bearer than “Sir Herbert,” Governor Lowden showed no strength outside of agrarian 
states and Hoover’s front-runner status was virtually unchallenged. The Great Engineer soon 
won handily in California, Oregon, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Maryland, while 
favorite sons like Senator Guy Goff and Senate Majority Leader Charles Curtis took West 




In order to stymie the growth of any potential rivals, the Hoover campaign decided to 
contest favorites sons in Ohio and Indiana, to mixed results. In Ohio, Hoover looked to be losing 
to Senator Frank Willis, the former Governor and committed Prohibitionist who had taken 
Warren Harding’s seat. “Personally, I have no fear of the results,” Willis averred, although he 
was rather irritated the Scripps-Howard papers in Ohio were backing Hoover’s candidacy. “In 
these times we hear much of chains – chain broadcasting, chain motion pictures, chain stores, 
chain newspapers, chains in international trade,” the Senator proclaimed “The fact is, under the 
chain system…the great middle class of our people face all the time greater difficulties in 
maintaining its independent existence...Since when has the Republican Party come to the place 
where its candidates are to be dictated by a chain of newspapers that have never supported the 
Republican ticket?” William Borah, no doubt desiring to slow down Hoover’s seemingly 
inexorable drive to the nomination and illustrate his kingmaker bona fides, indirectly backed 
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Willis by going on the radio to emphasize the vital importance of the Eighteenth Amendment – 
an issue on which the very Dry Willis had intimated the Dry-on-paper Hoover was wanting.
2093
   
 
 At a March 30
th
 campaign event, however, – as the Buckeye Glee Club unfortunately 
sang the “Farewell” refrain of a song called “The End of a Perfect Day” – Senator Frank Willis 
suddenly dropped dead backstage of a cerebral hemorrhage, clearing the path for a Ohio victory 
for Hoover.
 
 “Mr. Willis as school teacher, Governor, and Senator has given his life to honest, 
upright public service,” said Hoover in eulogy. “The passing of so conscientious a public servant 
is a matter of deep regret to every citizen.” Hiram Johson, who sat next to Willis on the Senate 
floor, grumbled “Damn the politics! That’s what killed him.”2094 
 
Two months later, Hoover entered the Indiana primary, where he faced the blustery 
Senator James Watson, who held the support of what remained of the Klan and who had publicly 
vowed to give Hoover a thumping. But, by then, the writing was on the wall. “If Herbert should 
by any chance carry the state,” wrote Bruce Bliven in The New Republic, his nomination would 
be so completely cinched that all fun would evaporate from the fight and the anti-Hoover 
alliance would literally crumble to pieces…Capturing Indiana would put Herbert’s nomination 
under the head of finished business, but he does not need the state.” In fact, Hoover lost the state, 
but, Bliven argued, “the fact that Hoover went into both Ohio and Indiana broke the rules of the 
game; but it also broke up the pretty plan to get enough states in hand, either in the favorite-son 
or the uninstructed class, to keep a majority against him in the convention.” Now, the Great 
Engineer’s nomination was virtually assured – a fact that was not lost on Borah. After the 
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passing of Willis, the Idaho Senator wheeled fiercely into Hoover’s camp, in order to maintain 
some sort of voice at the table moving forward. Hoover accepted the offer of Borah’s aid. From 
the White House, meanwhile, Coolidge told Edmund Starling “They’re going to elect that 




, when the Republicans gathered in Kansas City for their convention, Hoover 
was both a virtually unchallenged frontrunner for the nomination and a candidate that left many 
segments of the party, from the Old Guard to Wall Street to even some progressives, unenthused. 
“Dreariest and dullest of conventions,” reported Oswald Villard. “That is what we who 
journeyed here have witnessed.” The most outraged attendees were the western Republicans who 
had hoped Governor Lowden would mount more of a challenge – especially given the fact that 
Calvin Coolidge had vetoed the McNary-Haugen bill a second time only a few weeks before the 
convention. As Republicans arrived in Kansas City, they were greeted with a parade of 500 
farmers, in overalls and straw hats, yelling “We Don’t Want Hoover!” But even this seemed 
perfunctory to many observers. The Governor of Nebraska, Adam McMullen, had urged 100,000 
farmers to make their wrath known at the convention. “[T]he demonstration of the embattled 
farmers was an absolute fizzle,” said Villard. “Only a few hundred came – it was almost the 
worst time of year for farmers to leave home.”2096 
 
First, as always, came the Republican Party platform, many planks of which had been 
outsourced to William Borah to keep the Idaho Senator happy. As such, the platform endorsed 
the Kellogg-Briand pact “to renounce war as an instrument of national policy…as the first step in 
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outlawing war,” an idea that “has stirred the conscience of mankind.” It declared that the 
“improper use of money in governmental and political affairs is a great national evil” and that 
elections should be “clean, honest, and free from taint of any kind.” And it emphasized the 
importance of enforcing Prohibition in very Borahesque terms. Quoting both George Washington 
(“The Constitution which at any time exists until changed by the explicit and authentic act by the 
whole people is sacredly obligatory upon all”) and Abraham Lincoln (“We are by both duty and 
inclination bound to stick by that Constitution in all its letter and spirit from beginning to end”), 





 Citing the changes in the economy since 1921, especially the lower tax rates and reduced 
national debt, the Republican platform also endorsed “without qualification the record of the 
Coolidge administration...No better guaranty of prosperity and contentment among all our people 
at home, no more reliable warranty of protection and promotion of American interests abroad 
can be given than the pledge to maintain and continue the Coolidge policies.” It also approvingly 
cited the “energetic action by the Republican Administration” in responding to the Mississippi 
flood, as a result of which “a great loss of life was prevented and everything possible was done 
to rehabilitate the people in their homes and to relieve suffering and distress.” The platform 
called for a federal anti-lynching law, continued immigration restriction, federal investments in 
commercial aviation and administration over radio. Recognizing an “agricultural program… 
national in scope,” it endorsed “adequate tariff protection to such of our agricultural products as 
are affected by foreign competition,” “vigorous efforts” to open overseas markets, and “measures 
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which will place the agricultural interests of America on a basis of economic equality with other 
industries to insure its prosperity and success.”2098 
 
 This last plank turned out to be the most controversial, especially after young Bob La 
Follette took the convention floor and made the case for this year’s Wisconsin platform, which 
among other things endorsed the McNary-Haugen bill. “He spoke with such good temper and 
once with such real wit that he easily won his audience,” Villard said of La Follette, echoing his 
glowing review of the Wisconsin planks four years earlier. “There is a general belief that he will 
be a big factor in the party in the years to come.” To fight La Follette’s brushfire, the convention 
stalwarts unleashed Borah, who in a thirty minute harangue called McNary-Haugen 
unconstitutional and Coolidge’s veto of it “the greatest benefit and the greatest favor which has 
been rendered to the American farmer.” The minority platform subsequently lost 806-278, 




 The dust-up over McNary-Haugenism aside, the platform, as usual, inspired very little 
passion from either its adherents or its critics. “[W]hile no worse than usual,” The New Republic 
deemed it “a mass of evasions and hypocrisies which certainly will not attract independent-
minded unattached voters, and particularly if the Democrats have  the sense to strike out boldly 
on some of the same issues.” After the convention, George Norris told The Nation that both the 
platform and its standard-bearer “will be a sad disappointment to every progressive citizen... 
[A]ny Republican who believes in honest government [should view] the controlling features of 
the convention with shame and disgust.” William Borah’s contributions to the platform and 









water-carrying for Coolidge, meanwhile, further irritated his former progressive allies. The Idaho 
Senator “never once raised his voice…to have any plank included which would condemn the 
Power Trust, whose sins were smelling to high heaven,” rued Norris. TNR remarked that 
“instead of being the flaming mouthpiece of the minority,” Borah was this time “not only with 
the majority, but one of its directing heads.” 2100 
 
 In terms of picking a nominee, the convention needed only one ballot, after which 
Herbert Hoover had 837 of 1089 votes, Frank Lowden 74, and Charles Curtis of Kansas 64. The 
party chose a vice-president just as quickly. Eastern conservatives had been hoping to enlist 
Massachusetts Governor Alvin Fuller, until one Senator of note said, “We’ll not put the Sacco-
Vanzetti issue into this campaign.” (Wrote The Nation: “Though dead, yet shall they live.”) So, 
upon Hoover’s request and after he was nominated and pushed on the floor by Borah – who 
wanted a man of the West – the honor went instead to Curtis. As both Senate Majority Leader 
and an agrarian moderate who supported McNary-Haugen, but who had not voted to overturn 
Coolidge’s veto, Curtis could help placate some of the intraparty opposition roiling the 
convention. Only days before, Senator Curtis had made public statements ridiculing Hoover and 
encouraging the Republican party to look elsewhere – but he eventually accepted the vice-




 “It would be easy to exaggerate the seriousness of the dissention within the ranks of the 
Republicans,” argued the editors of The New Republic after the three day meeting had adjourned. 
But “the antagonism of the farmers, the passive dislike (at best) of some financial interests, the 
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active dislike of many politicians of his own party, are grave liabilities.” “No one who saw this 
convention meet and depart,” said Villard, “can pretend for an instant that the delegates are 
going back with their fighting clothes on. There was no cheering in the streets after the 
convention, no parading of joyous enthusiasts, no beaming delegates in the corridors of the 
hotels.”2102 
 
Even many progressives, some of whom used to count Hoover among their number, were 
left unenthused by the prospect of the Engineer-as-President. Whatever Hoover’s qualifications 
after the War, editorialized The Nation, “[w]e have seen him deteriorate since 1919 into the most 
ordinary of opinion-changing, favor-seeking, pussy-footing politician, jettisoning one after 
another all the views he held in 1919, as it seemed advantageous to do, and finally shutting up 
altogether. Now he has gratefully accepted the nomination from the reactionary wing of the 
Republicans with whom he said in 1920 he would have ‘nothing to do,’ upon a platform which 
does violence to every opinion he held” back then. Meanwhile, “[b]ehind Mr. Hoover stands the 
Republican Party and that fact alone ought to estop any liberal from voting for the Secretary of 
Commerce – even if he were everything that his greatest admirers assert that he is. It remains the 
party of privilege, of Big Business, of predatory wealth…It is still the party of Fall, of Harry 
Daughtery, of Denby, of Bill Vare, of Bascom Slemp, of Mellon...the Republican Party is merely 
the weapon and refuge of the masters of privilege.”2103 
 
The New Republic, much to the irritation of Hiram Johnson, had strongly backed Herbert 
Hoover’s dark horse bid eight years earlier, and in 1928 they were at first more sympathetic to 
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his candidacy than was The Nation. In nominating Hoover, TNR argued, “the Republicans have 
entrusted the responsibility of leadership to the member of their party who is best prepared for 
the work” and “the only vital ingredient in Republicanism which may serve as a positive leaven 
in the future conduct and policy of the party.” But the journal’s argument for Hoover was 
considerably more tempered than it was in 1920. Hoover, they conceded, was a Republican who 
believed that “the function of government in relation to business is to safeguard its essential 
interests, to respect its essential purposes, and even to encourage its essential activities” – in 
short, Hoover “believes in the subordination of government to business.”2104 
 
Business may be master, but unlike the Old Guard Republicans, TNR argued, Hoover at 
least believed that scientific-minded virtues like efficiency should guide the master’s hand. As 
Herbert Croly put it in a separate article, Hoover had won the nomination because “there was no 
alternative candidate upon whom the unplacated politicians, the suspicious big business men and 
the aggrieved agrarians could agree.” Nonetheless, “Mr. Hoover's nomination is really 
symptomatic of the triumph of business over traditional American politics. The predatory 
business which the progressives fought based its political calculations upon an alliance with the 
Old Guard, but the more successful business which Mr. Hoover represents,” said Croly, believed 





In sum, Croly concluded, “Mr. Hoover has introduced into politics engineering method.” 
This line of argument echoed one put forward by George Soule in the magazine in December 
1927. In a piece mostly sympathetic to Hoover, Soule argued that the Great Engineer was not 
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progressive but practical – “He seems more like the well-trained head of a great industrial 
corporation…He will waste no time on lost causes, or causes which cannot win until his day is 
over.” Any antipathy businessmen felt toward Hoover, Soule argued, was misplaced, because 
“Mr. Hoover is too much like them to think or act very differently about large issue. He will do 
much to help the present industrial order in the United States to live up to its better possibilities. 
He will do little to change it as its rulers do not want it changed.”2106  
 
A businessman he may be, but the progressive journals thought that Hoover’s affinity for  
“conferences and cooperation to legislative compulsion,” in Villard’s phrase, could still be tested 
and found wanting as president. “As Secretary of Commerce he has helped business to conduct 
their existing affairs more methodically and successfully…But he has assumed little or no 
responsibility for any improvement in business method which was not quickly and demonstrably 
profitable to individual business men.” As President, Hoover may have to make decisions 
“which do not interest business men as individual producers and which may involve 
expenditures and sacrifices on their part…If his attitude toward these questions is as evasive and 
complacent as that of President Coolidge, the progressive opinion of the country will size up his 
proposed application of scientific method to economic processes as merely a hypocritical attempt 
to rationalize Mellonism, and will cease to cherish any hopes or illusions about him.” In other 
words, the nation might soon learn the limits of voluntary association, unless Hoover showed 
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First, of course, the Great Engineer had to get elected, against an opponent who had also 
sailed to his party’s nomination despite much grumbling from many party regulars. “Hoover has 
gained his present position because he has had no opponent in reality, and he will be nominated 
for the same reason, unless Coolidge changes his mind.” Johnson noted to Ickes in June, just 
before the Republicans met in Kansas City. “Smith will be nominated by the Democrats and 
there will then be a merry fight, bitter, disagreeable, and nasty, as are all contests where religion 
is involved.” That’s exactly what many Democrats were afraid of. 2108 




Even more than the Republicans, the Democratic nominee of 1928 seemed almost 
foreordained – all the more so given that the general prosperity in many parts of the country 
meant the role was most likely one of sacrificial lamb. “Alfred E. Smith today,” his hometown 
paper of record had said in 1925, as the Governor embarked on his third term, “is the most 
powerful leader the Democratic Party has ever had in the greatest State of the Union.” After 
Smith won a similarly unprecedented fourth term in 1926, no other Democrat, to the 




Smith was also, to use historian Donn Neal’s apt phrase, “the Available Man.” Smith had 
been the good soldier, it seemed his turn to be the nominee, and not picking him would be an 
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implicit endorsement of intolerance and an unsightly repudiation of the Jacksonian spirit that had 
always informed the Democracy. And while Al Smith, in one contemporary’s words, was 
considered the candidate “of tenements, of municipal machines, invading foreigners, insolent 
wets, liberals, clubs, and New York – the forces deemed wicked and unholy,” those selfsame 
urban forces would leave the party in droves if Al Smith were not the candidate. “[S]o far as 
Smith is concerned,” said one Pittsburgh writer, “it looks very much to me as if the Democratic 
Party is in position of a man who ‘damned if he does and damned if he doesn’t.’” For the long-
term good of the party, many came to conclude, the Governor had to be given his shot. 
“Governor Smith,” argued one southern Democrat to writer Dixon Merritt, “is the greatest 
liability the Democratic Party has ever had”: 
 
If we nominate him, we shall lose some of the Southern States and we shall have a mean, hard 
fight in the others. If we don’t nominate him, we shall lose the bulk of the Democratic votes in 
the North. Well, I’m for nominating him. We can afford to lose a lot of votes in the South, and I 
think they would come back later on. We can’t afford to lose any votes in the North, and…they 
will be gone forever. Let’s let him have the nomination and get it out of his system – and ours.2110 
 
Even if party leaders concluded otherwise, there were few other options on the table. The 
natural choice for those Democrats opposed to Smith and all he represented had spent much of 
the past few years as he had the general election of 1924 – stewing and sulking in his tent. When 
William McAdoo did venture an opinion on the future of the Democratic party, it was usually in 
the direction of re-litigating 1924. “In my judgment,” he wrote to a friend in April 1927, “we are 
in one of those situations where the only way out to victory is to fight – not harmony, which 
means a colorless truce for the time being, with inevitable disaster at the end. Haven’t we had 
enough of that?” But as McAdoo had licked his wounds, his armies had scattered in search of 
                                                          
2110
 Donn C.  Neal, The World Beyond the Hudson: Alfred E. Smith and National Politics (Donn C. Neal, 1983, 
2011: http://www.donnneal.com/smithcontents.html), “The Available Man,” 9, 24-25. “The Contender,” 6-7. Dixon 




new leadership. Thus, in late 1927, McAdoo was forced to concede, “in the interests of party 
unity,” that he was not a candidate in 1928. Within the week, Democrats in eight Western states, 




If not McAdoo, then who? William Jennings Bryan, the other natural choice for another 
Dry crusade, had perished in 1925. John W. Davis, the party’s standard-bearer in 1924, had 
already declared himself as a Smith delegate. Some of the party’s more formidable statesman, 
such as Cordell Hull of Tennessee, Joseph Robinson of Arkansas, former Secretary of the Navy 
Josephus Daniels of North Carolina, and Carter Glass of Virginia, hailed from the solid 
Democratic South and thus brought nothing to the table in terms of a national election. Newton 
Baker still held his credentials as Wilson’s Secretary of War, but no Democrat felt like running 
on the League of Nations all over again. Bernard Baruch supported Smith (and was Jewish). 
Governor Albert Ritchie of Maryland declared his candidacy in late 1927, but, while as wet as 
Smith, he was too conservative to inspire much interest, and, besides, the Eastern seaboard was 
already considered Smith country. Senator Burton Wheeler had bolted the party four years 




That being said, Wheeler’s Montana colleague, Senator Thomas Walsh, did have a 
national reputation as the prosecutor of Teapot Dome and was anti-Smith besides: He disliked 
the Governor’s Wetness and feared a Smith bid would set back Catholics for “generations.” But, 
even though The Christian Century insisted that there was “a difference between a Montana 
Catholic and a Tammany Hall Catholic which the ordinary voter feels, even though it may elude 
                                                          
2111
 Neal, “The Contender,” 2. Murray, The 103rd Ballot, 271. 
2112
 Murray, The 103
rd




theological definition,” Walsh was Catholic nonetheless, and thus still carried much of the 
baggage Smith did to those whom religion mattered.
2113
   
 
Another option was Senator James Reed of Missouri, who, expecting another Smith-
McAdoo conflagration, had been actively campaigning for the nomination as a compromise 
choice since 1926. Except Reed had considerable baggage of his own. He had irritated 
Wilsonians by being an Irreconcilable, women by deriding Sheppard-Towner in highly sexist 
fashion, and McAdoo supporters by being the Senator who had encouraged oilman Edwin 
Doheny to announce his retainer of their man under oath. He was also a Wet, meaning that, like 
Walsh, he held much of Smith’s downside in certain regions of the country without having any 
of Smith’s upside in urban areas. In any case, Governor Smith made the Reed and Walsh 
candidacies moot by thumping them both in the California primary in May, garnering more votes 
in McAdoo’s home state than the two other candidates combined.2114 
 
There was one other potential candidate, although most everyone knew he was a Smith 
supporter, and his health was a concern regardless. In fact, Franklin Roosevelt had been pushed 
to run for Senator of New York in 1926, in lieu of Robert Wagner – but Roosevelt had demurred, 
since “if I devote another two years to them I shall be on my feet again without my braces.” 
(Besides, he said, “I like administrative or executive work, but do not want to have  my hands 
and feet tided and my wings clipped for six long years.”) When Carter Glass and Josephus 
Daniels reached out to FDR and his aide Louis Howe to see if there was any possibility Smith 
could be convinced to step aside for a Roosevelt run, Howe, in his words, “threw enough cold 
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water on the idea to extinguish the Woolworth building.” Roosevelt himself also urged his old 
boss to back Smith, although he too recognized the quandary the party faced. “Strictly between 
ourselves,” Roosevelt told Daniels, “I am very doubtful whether any Democrat can win in 
1928.”2115 
 
By the time the Democrats arrived in Houston in June for their 1928 convention – even 
the venue was an indicator of Smith’s overpowering strength, since he could afford to be 
magnanimous – Smith’s nomination was a given, and the only thing left for the Governor’s 
campaign to do was to ensure that nothing remotely approaching the disaster that had happened 
in New York City four years earlier occurred in Texas. “Remember the Garden” echoed as both 
the unofficial and official mantra of the convention, reverberating through Claude Bowers’ well-
received keynote speech – which The Nation predicted had been vetted by at least twenty 
different Democrats – and  helping to constrain any outward displays of negative sentiment from 
the anti-Smith contingents. “A national political convention today is primarily a great advertising 
stunt,” commented Nation correspondent Louis Gannett of the proceedings. “Nothing is decided 
on the floor that has not already been decided in the hotel rooms; and the formal work of the 
entire week could be done in two hours. But the prolonged big show advertises the party; it 
advertises the candidates…it forces into display on the front pages of three thousand newspapers 
speeches which ordinarily would not get two inches next to department store advertising.” 
However prescient a critique of the next 75 years of American political conventions, Gannett’s 
words were no doubt music to the ears to Democrats only four years removed from the  carnage 
of Madison Square Garden.
2116
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The platform also worked to sidestep any of the pitfalls of the past. Beginning with 
another encomium to Woodrow Wilson, rehabilitated some after eight years of Republican rule, 
it argued that “government must function not to centralize our wealth but to preserve equal 
opportunity so that all may share in our priceless resources; and not confine prosperity to a 
favored few.” As such, it deplored “bureaucracy and the multiplication of offices and 
officeholders” and, more centrally, the political corruption unearthed by the continuing Teapot 
Dome revelations. Offering a Democratic rallying cry from another time, it argued that “[a]s in 
the time of Samuel J. Tilden, from whom the presidency was stolen, the watchword of the day 
should be: ‘Turn the rascals out.’” “The Republican Party,” railed the document, “offers as its 
record agriculture prostrate, industry depressed, American shipping destroyed, workmen without 
employment; everywhere disgust and suspicion, and corruption unpunished and unafraid.”2117 
 
However bad the Republicans, the Democratic platform mirrored their opponents’ 
platform in important respects. It also called for campaign finance reform and government 
supervision of radio. It too endorsed the Outlawry of War and, in a turn of phrase that belied the 
earlier paean to Wilson, “freedom from entangling political alliances with foreign nations.” 
Echoing any number of speeches by Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, it called for “efficiency and 
economy in the administration of public affairs,” “business-like reorganization of all the 
departments of the government,” and “substitution of modern business-like methods for existing 
obsolete and antiquated conditions.” The announced tariff policy – which promised 
“maintenance of legitimate business and a high standard of wages for American labor” – 
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suggested both parties had finally reached agreement on this long-time bugaboo. (A disgruntled 
Newton Baker exclaimed that “McKinley could have run on the tariff plank and Lodge on the 
one on international relations.”) And, perhaps most importantly for this particular election, the 
plank on “law enforcement” – while attacking Republicans for “the remarkable spectacle of 
feeling compelled in its national platform to promise obedience to a provision of the federal 
Constitution, which it has flagrantly disregarded” – also promised “an honest effort to enforce 
the eighteenth amendment and all other provisions of the federal Constitution[.]” This was 
compromise language put forward by Carter Glass when, right out of the gate, Wet and Dry 
forces – the latter headed by host and young Texas governor Dan Moody, threatened to disturb 





Where the platform differed from that put forward in Kansas City – perhaps to appeal to 
the 17% who had voted La Follette in 1924 – was usually in the progressive direction. Because 
“under Republican rule, the anti-trust laws have been thwarted, ignored and violated” and thus 
“the country is rapidly becoming controlled by trusts and sinister monopolies formed for the 
purpose of wringing from the necessaries of life an unrighteous profit,” Democrats pledged 
“strict enforcement of the anti-trust laws and the enactment of other laws, if necessary, to control 
this great menace to trade and commerce.” Because “[u]nemployment is present, widespread, 
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and increasing,” it called for a plan whereby “during periods of unemployment appropriations 
shall be made available for the construction of necessary public works.”2119   
 
With regard to water power, “title and control must be preserved respectively in the state 
and federal governments, to the end that the people may be protected against exploitation of this 
great resource and that water powers may be expeditiously developed under such regulations as 
will insure to the people reasonable rates and equitable distribution.” It argued that “interference 
in the purely internal affairs of Latin-American countries must cease,” specifically citing Mexico 
and Nicaragua. And in a long attack on Coolidge agriculture policy, the platform called for 
McNary-Haugenism in all but name. Because “[p]roducers of crops whose total volume exceeds 
the needs of the domestic market must continue at a disadvantage until the government shall 
intervene as seriously and as effectively in behalf of the farmer as it has intervened in behalf of 
labor and industry,” it read, there “is a need of supplemental legislation for the control and 
orderly handling of agricultural surpluses, in order that the price of the surplus may not 
determine the price of the whole crop.” This part of the platform had been worked out with 
George Peek, the former Republican president of the Moline Plow company who had become a 
spokesman for disgruntled agrarian interests, and who had left the Kansas City convention 





This platform drew marginally better reviews than the Republican one from the 
progressive journals. “[D]espite various silences and inconsistencies, and the shameful 








compromise on the liquor issue,” The Nation found the platform “in the main in accord with 
Democratic tradition.” They were mostly alone on that front.  “[T]he two platforms contain no 
difference which would be called an issue,” wrote Water Lippmann. The only one he could find 
was that “the Republican [one] took longer to read.” TNR approved of the agriculture plank in 
particular, but also thought that “[i]f the denunciatory sections of the platform been omitted, and 
the customary genuflections to Jefferson and states' rights were cut out, anyone who did not 
know might easily mistake this for a document the Hoover forces had drafted for Republicans.”  
This was especially noticeable with regard to prohibition, where the Democratic desire to avoid 
another Wet-Dry implosion was particularly pronounced. Even Al Smith thought the wording 
was “not on the level. It doesn’t say anything. It only dodges and ducks.” George Brennan, the 
Democratic boss of Chicago, didn’t get all the fuss anyway. “No sensible Democrat ought to 
worry,” he argued. “Only one person in 25,000 thinks and only one in 50,000 reads the party 
platform. Do you?”2121 
 
The floor proceedings in Houston were as carefully orchestrated as the platform, with the 
biggest question for Smith’s team being how to ensure a state outside of Al Smith’s Northeast 
base put the Governor over the top. Since it was one of the only bright spots coming out of 1924, 
Franklin Roosevelt once again put Smith’s name into nomination – this time appearing in leg 
braces and a cane rather than the crutches of four years earlier, suggesting to many observers he 
was on the mend. It was time, Roosevelt beamed, to choose a candidate “who has the will to win 
– who not only deserves success but commands it. Victory is his habit – the happy warrior, 
Alfred E. Smith.” Once the balloting began,  Smith had 724 ⅔ votes – 8 ⅔ short of two-thirds – 
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to just under 72 for Cordell Hull, 52.5 for Senator Walter George of Georgia, and 48 for James 
Reed, at which point former Senator Atlee Pomerene of Ohio called for his state to switch into 
Smith’s column. So it was that, 102 ballots before a decision was made four years earlier, 
Governor Al Smith of New York became the nominee, the first time a non-incumbent had been 
chosen on one ballot since William Jennings Bryan in 1908. To avoid any trouble,  the usual call 
for unanimity was dispensed with. Smith ended up with 849 ½ votes, well over the two-thirds – 





Just as Hoover forces had looked to Charles Curtis, the Republican leader in the Senate, 
to help assuage continued grumbling over their nominee, Senate Minority Leader Joseph 
Robinson of Arkansas, a Protestant Prohibitionist, was chosen on his own first ballot as Vice-
President to offset Smith’s candidacy. As The Nation summed up the choice, Robinson was “a 
typical southern politician put on the ticket for the purpose of catching some guileless Drys.” 
“The naming of the Senator from Arkansas,” agreed TNR, “was clearly a sop thrown to the old 
South, forced to swallow such a bitter pill as Al Smith. It was not a necessary choice, and taking 
one of the Western progressive Democrats probably would have been better politics, but it was 
tactful.” All things considered, however, “[i]t was a hot, humid, but happy Houston,” reported 
TIME. “Discord waned. Celebrities furnished the atmosphere of a glorified picnic instead of a 
political dogfight.”2123 
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Only at the end of the convention proceedings did the semblance of goodwill break down 
in earnest.  After business had concluded on the third and final day, Senator Pat Harrison of 
Mississippi read a telegram from Smith to the convention, thanking them for their nomination 
and putting forward the basic themes of the coming campaign. In it, Smith declared he would 
enforce the law as the platform requested, but it was “well known that I believe there should be 
some fundamental changes…in national prohibition…I feel it to be the duty of the chosen leader 
of the people to point the way which, in my opinion, leads to a sane, sensible solution of a 
condition which…is entirely unsatisfactory to the great mass of our people.” 2124  
 
The Drys on the floor were aghast by this breach of the truce – “This man lost no time in 
writing, ‘I have not changed my views on the liquor question,’ rued delegate Alice David of 
Oklahoma – and many left newly recommitted to the notion of defeating their own candidate. 
McAdoo said the telegram “absolves every Democrat from any obligation to support” the 
candidate, and before the day was out, Bishop Cannon of the Methodist Church had announced 
with the Anti-Saloon League that they would soon be convening an anti-Smith convention in 
Asheville, North Carolina. Neither a “subject of the Pope” nor an emissary from “the foreign-
populated city called New York” would win in 1928, Bishop Cannon averred.2125  
 
The candidate likely knew the damage this inopportune telegram would cause, but while 
Roosevelt, among others, had urged him to “soft-pedal the booze question,” he thought the stand 
on principle was important. Smith told his advisors he’d just as soon “not be nominated as to 
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stand for something that I don’t believe in. Let them read the telegram before they call the roll, 
and if the convention nominates me after that, I have put them on notice as to what I am going to 
say in the campaign. On the other hand, if they don’t want to nominate me after reading the 
telegram, that’s all right with me.” But, upon receiving Smith’s missive, Senator Harrison 





If it speaks to Governor Smith’s sense of principle that he refused to run on such an 
obviously watered-down prohibition plank, it also suggests that the Governor and his closest 
advisors may have underestimated the vitriol many Democrats still harbored for Smith and what 
he stood for. In 1927, Smith, on the encouragement of advisors like Moskowitz and Roosevelt, 
had sent a letter to The Atlantic Monthly laying out his views of how his Catholicism intersected 
with his public service. This was in response to a polite but questioning article written in the 
Monthly by a Protestant New York City lawyer, Charles C. Marshall, and to address it, Smith 
relied on both Joseph Proskauer and Father Francis P. Duffy, an Irish-American pastor of some 
renown, to write the initial drafts. (Smith also ran the article first by Archbishop Hayes.) “I 
recognize no power in the institutions of my Church to interfere with the operations of the 
Constitution of the United States or the enforcement of the law of the land,” Smith’s response 
read. “I believe in absolute freedom of conscience for all men and in equality of all churches, all 
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sects, and all beliefs before the laws as a matter of right and not as a matter of favor. I believe in 
the absolute separation of Church and State and in the strict enforcement of the provisions of the 
Constitution that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”2127 
 
Smith’s response to Marshall received praise from across the spectrum as a statesmanlike 
answer to the quandary. One Democrat deemed it “the most remarkable state paper…since Mr. 
Wilson dropped his pen,” while another, Thomas Walsh, just thought it “good plain 
Americanism.’ Upon overhearing several positive responses to Smith’s letter on a train from 
New York City to the upstate, Senator Robert Wagner suggested that “the question is now 
beyond the stage of a serious issue…the Governor’s letter will forever remove religious rancor 
from political affairs.” More grist for this hopeful argument could be seen in Senate Democrats’ 
repudiation of Senator Thomas Heflin of Alabama. Heflin had been vocally opposed to Smith’s 
candidacy throughout the election cycle, arguing, among other things, that it “represented the 
crowning effort of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to gain control of the United States.” In January 
1928, however, Senator Robinson returned Heflin’s fire on the floor, drawing the support of the 
Senate Democratic Caucus. Watching all of this play out, Michael Williams, the editor of the 
Catholic magazine Commonweal, argued in April 1928 that this “battle is over and done 
with.”2128 
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As such, it is entirely possible Smith didn’t realize at the time how hard-set many 
southern and western Democrats remained to his coronation. Three weeks before the convention, 
Smith had even urged that Archbishop Hayes preside over the marriage of his daughter Catherine 
to a Republican lawyer. (“I hope the young couple won’t have to kiss the Cardinal’s toe as part 
of the ceremony,” Louis Howe deadpanned to Franklin Roosevelt.) All the while, a fever was 
building in some areas of the country. “I’d rather see a saloon on every corner than a Catholic in 
the White House,” remonstrated Dry Methodist evangelist Bob Jones to his congregation. “I’d 
rather see a nigger President than a Catholic in the White House,” Jones said at another time. 
Photographs of the currently-under-construction Lincoln Tunnel were passed along anti-Catholic 
channels, with an explanation that this was the secret tunnel that would ferry the Pope from 
Rome to his new throne in Washington. The Klan-affiliated journal Railsplitter, meanwhile, 
averred that “[w]e now face the darkest hour in American history. In a convention ruled by 
political Romanism anti-Christ has won.”2129 
 
In the genteel pages of the progressive journals, however, Smith’s Wet telegram – and his 
refusal to endorse, in Heywood Broun’s phrase, “a dry plank and a wink” –  was generally 
received not as a declaration of war but an act of statesmanship. “The candor of A1 Smith’s 
telegram of acceptance,” said Lewis Gannett in The Nation, “was a refreshing contrast to the 
mumbling of his supporters and of his political opponents at the convention. It was, to be sure, 
easy to be outspoken after the nomination, but at least Smith did not wait until after the election.” 
Harold Ickes, still deciding who to vote for but leaning Smith, told Hiram Johnson he “liked his 
frank statement on the liquor question and I think it made a good impression generally.” 
“Governor Smith has received warm praise in some quarters for his courage,” said TNR. “When 
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anyone in political life speaks out frankly on any controversial issue, it is something of an 
event.” That being said, everyone knew where Smith stood on the issue, so “[i]f he had kept 
silence, it could possibly have been interpreted as indicating any change of heart, and must 
therefore have been read as a mere cowardly equivocation. Governor Smith is not that sort of 
man.”2130 
 
And therein lied the potential strength of the Democratic campaign. As the Secretary of 
Commerce during a prosperous economy, Hoover clearly had the inside track – but many 
thought the Great Engineer a cold fish, too haughty to condescend to the practices of politics. 
And others believed, as The Nation had intimated, that Hoover had forsaken all of his laudable 
beliefs to win the nomination. Smith, on the other hand, was a known quantity. And – if one 
could bear his urban, Wet, Catholic proclivities, of course – the Governor was almost universally 
admired and respected as both a warm and competent fellow. Admittedly, Smith “as a good New 
Yorker, is as provincial as a Kansas farmer,” wrote H.L. Mencken, who, while agreeing with the 
Governor on matters of libation, nonetheless rarely gave out compliments freely. “His world 
begins at Coney Island and ends at Buffalo.” Nonetheless, the Sage of Baltimore argued, Smith 
“represents as a man almost everything that Maryland represents as a State. There is something 
singularly and refreshingly free, spacious, amiable, hearty, and decent about him…he will not 
lie, and he cannot be bought. Not much more could be said of any man.” Those who know 
Smith, concluded Mencken, “trust him at sight, and the better they know him the more they trust 
him. No man in American politics has ever had firmer friends among his enemies.”2131   
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But if Smith was “frank, amiable, tolerant, modest, and expansive,” Hoover was a model 
in contrast. “No one likes him in Washington,” wrote Mencken. “He is too cautious, suspicious, 
secretive, sensitive, evasive, disingenuous. He is another Coolidge, only worse.” On another 
occasion, Mencken called him “one of the most transparent and vulnerable frauds in American 
history. The man is Republican only by a prudent afterthought…He looks hollow and is hollow.” 
If Smith’s candor about Prohibition was a liability, Hoover’s caution to Mencken was vile 
indeed. “His whole life has been spent among men to whom Prohibition is as loathsome as 
cannibalism,” he wrote. “He came from London, the wettest town in the world, to sit in the 
Harding cabinet, the wettest since the days of Noah. No one ever heard him utter a whisper 
against the guzzling that surrounded him. He was as silent about it as he was about the stealing.” 
(During the election, Carter Glass offered $1000 to anyone who could find Hoover on the record 
as in support of Prohibition prior to the 1928 cycle. No one ever took it.) What Hoover excelled 
at, to Mencken, was publicity. “He knows how to work the newspapers…he is adept at the art of 
taking the center of the stage and posturing there profoundly…He went to the Mississippi in all 
the gaudy state of a movie queen, but came back with no plans to stop the floods there.”2132 
 
This presidential contest, therefore, was the Great Battle that Mencken had pined for in 
his Notes on Democracy.  “The essential struggle in America, during the next fifty years, will be 
between city men and yokels,” he had argued. “The yokels have ruled the Republic since its first 
days – often, it must be added, very wisely. But now they decay and are challenged, and in the 
long run they are bound to be overcome.” Here at last, the sides had lined up against each other. 
“In the long run,” Mencken declared in his election overview, “the cities of the United States will 
have to throw off the hegemony of the morons. They have run the country long enough, and 
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made it sufficiently ridiculous. Once we get rid of campmeeting rule we’ll get rid simultaneously 
of the Klan, the Anti-Saloon League, and the Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition, and 
Public Morals…And we’ll get rid, too, of those sorry betrayers of intelligence who, like Hoover 
and Borah, flatter the hookworm carriers in order to further their own fortunes.”2133 
 
“The coming Presidential campaign will be full of bitterness,” Mencken had predicted, 
“and...most of it will be caused by religion. I count Prohibition as a part of religion, for it has 
surely become so in the United States. The Prohibitionists, seeing all their other arguments 
destroyed by the logic of events, have fallen back upon the mystical doctrine that God is 
somehow on their side, and that opposing them thus takes on the character of blasphemy.” This 
undoubtedly made Smith’s road harder, but it was a fight, Mencken believed, he had to wage for 
the good of the nation. “Once the cities have liberated themselves from yokel rule, civilization 
will be free to develop in the United States. Today it is woefully hobbled by the ideas of 
peasants…No one wants to civilize the peasant against his will, but it is plainly against reason to 
let him go on riding his betters.”2134 
 
As was so often the case, Walter Lippmann agreed with Mencken’s diagnosis, if not 
necessarily the colorful prescription. “One cannot say that the new urban civilization which is 
pushing Al Smith forward into national affairs is better or worse than that older American 
civilization of town and country which dreads him and will resist him,” Lippmann had written in 
1925. “But one can say that they do not understand each other, and that neither has yet learned 
that to live it must let live.” In terms of the usual state of politics, there was not much reason for 
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the nation to be afraid of Smith, who was “really a perfectly conservative man about property, 
American political institutions, and American ideals. He believes in the soundness of the 
established order and in the honesty of its ideals.” “The brilliancy of Governor Smith’s 
administration,” Lippmann argued, “has not been due to its radicalism, but a kind of supremely 
good-humored intelligence and practical imagination about the ordinary run of affairs. He has 
made his Republican opponents at Albany look silly, not because he was so progressive and they 
were so reactionary, but because he knew what he was doing and they did not…He is what a 
conservative ought to be always if he knew his business.”2135 
 
Governor Smith’s “essential conservatism,” Lippmann thought, “makes it difficult to 
conceal the actual objection to him.” Smith had never advocated radicalism, or endorsed La 
Follette, or said much about peace. He  had “no designs on the institution of matrimony, he does 
not read free verse, he probably never heard of Freud, and, if you inquired closely you would 
find, I think, that he did not accept the revelation according to Darwin. He is against prohibition 
and for free speech, but so are Elihu Root and Nicholas Murray Butler.” The arguments against 
Smith, Lippmann wrote, were “inspired by the feeling that the clamorous life of the city should 
not be acknowledged as the American ideal…The Ku Kluxers may talk about the Pope to the 
lunatic fringe, but the main mass of the opposition is governed by an instinct that to accept Al 
Smith is to certify and sanctify a way of life that does not belong to the America they love. Here 
is no trivial conflict.”2136  
 
Continuing the argument two years later, Lippmann wrote that the “Pope, the devil, jazz, 
the bootleggers, are a mythology which expresses symbolically the impact of a vast and dreaded 
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social change. The change is real enough. The language in which it is discussed is preposterous 
only as all mythology is preposterous if you accept it literally.” These concerns about Smith and 
the city life he represented, Lippmann argued, were an “animistic and dramatized projection of 
the fears of a large section of our people who have yet to accommodate themselves to the strange 
new social order which has arisen among them.” That new social order was now embodied by 
the Democratic Party candidate.
2137
 
Hoover v. Smith 
 
 
The ethnic, religious, and cultural opposition to Smith’s candidacy was likely 
inescapable, and given the mood of national prosperity and the unrelenting antagonism of rural, 
Dry, and Protestant forces, Smith always faced an uphill battle in the general election regardless. 
But just as the Governor had aggravated the divide in Houston by taking an honorable course on 
Prohibition that nonetheless seemed to flaunt his disagreements with Drys, Smith and his 
campaign exacerbated these cultural tensions by giving the electorate little else with which to 
make a choice between the candidates.  
 
It didn’t help Smith’s cause that Herbert Hoover well knew he had the easier road. “It 
was obvious, from the beginning of the campaign,” he later wrote, “that I should win if we made 
no mistakes. General Prosperity was on my side.” Accepting his nomination in August at his 
alma mater of Stanford University, his words broadcast over a network of 108 radio stations, the 
largest ever to that point,  the Great Engineer reminded the nation of the unprecedented 
economic boom he had helped preside over.  “We in America today,” Hoover declared in words 
that would echo cruelly through much of his subsequent presidency, “are nearer to the final 
                                                          
2137




triumph over poverty than ever before in the history of any land…Given a chance to go forward 
with the policies of the last eight years, and we shall soon, with the help of God, be in sight of 
the day when poverty will be banished from the nation.”2138 
 
To accomplish that, Hoover argued that “the most urgent economic problem of our nation 
today…agriculture” must be addressed. His prescription avoided what he thought to be the 
intrusive price-fixing of McNary-Haugen – Instead, Hoover, true to form, advocated a 
‘wholesale reorganization of the farm marketing system upon sounder and more economical 
lines” and “the creation of a Federal farm board of representative farmers.” Otherwise, Hoover 
pledged to run an honest campaign and a presidency free of corruption. He endorsed federal 
water power projects, with the important presumption being they or the power they generated 
would eventually end up in private hands. He called for religious tolerance, noting his Quaker 
roots. And he called Prohibition “a great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and 
far-reaching in purpose” – thus coining the term “Noble Experiment” – that nonetheless had 
witnessed “grave abuses.” While “an organized searching investigation of fact and causes can 
alone determine the wise method of correcting them,” “Crime and disobedience to law cannot be 
permitted to break down the Constitution and laws of the United States,” and any attempt to 




To no one’s surprise, the address was applauded in Republican papers and derided in 
Democratic ones. The Portland Press Herald thought it “an American document…based upon 
American ideals…in harmony throughout with American conceptions of human relations and of 
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American theories of government.” (Shorter version: Hoover was a real American, wink wink.) 
“We can trust him for the future,” argued the Providence Journal, “because he has never failed 
us in the past. He has proved equal to every task imposed on him.” Meanwhile, the Arkansas 
Gazette thought Hoover just asked for Republicans to get “a chance to redeem its bad 
enforcement record” on Prohibition, while “Republican farmers looking for a Moses to lead them 
out of the wilderness of agricultural depression will have to keep on looking.” Drawing the most 
attention from both sides of the aisle was Hoover’s paean to the Noble Experiment. “There was 
no question,” reported the New York Times of Hoover’s address, “that in the opinion of the 
throng prohibition was the real point of cleavage in the campaign of 1928.” “Here and nowhere 
else,” argued the Springfield Republican, “is an issue of major importance to the country being 
openly and squarely developed.”2140 
 
The editors of TNR, so high on the Great Engineer eight years previously, thought 
Hoover’s speech “appears to endorse without any uneasiness of conscience all of the President’s 
most dreary Coolidgisms. It flourishes the same misleading claims. It overflows in the same 
equivocal and meaningless generalities.” The only difference between the two men, the journal 
declared, was that, while Coolidge seemed to think “America is a finished Utopia, which, like 
one of Mr. Ziegfeld’s show girls, requires only to be exposed in order to be glorified.” Hoover’s 
America was “a Utopia still in the making.” But there were two flaws in the Great Engineer’s 
mold. First, “the business men upon whom [Hoover] counts for the realization of his Utopia are 
the creatures of the economic system rather than its master. They cannot become its master 
without entering into a much more generous partnership with the wage-earner and with the 
expert than they are now willing to accept.” To “awaken American business to a livelier sense of 
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its public responsibilities…it requires less to be patted on the back and flattered than to be 
challenged and shocked into consciousness of  its anti-social dangerous courses.” And second, 
The New Republic – taking up an argument that the journal’s detractors had made in 1920 – was 
not convinced that the business culture Hoover lionized actually made for better citizens. “The 
American economic system is not operated by growing conscious individuals nor does it breed or 
need individuality. What it does breed and need are human atoms who dance to the tunes of the 
mob.” So much for efficiency as the reigning progressive virtue.2141 
 
In any case, having received the nomination, the Secretary of Commerce then adopted 
another Coolidgism that seemed to work rather well for the Republican ticket in 1924: For all 
intent and purposes, Hoover virtually retired from the field after Palo Alto, opting for the distant 
and above-the-fray statesmanship of a virtual incumbent. “I made only seven major addresses 
during the campaign,” Hoover admitted, and that included the acceptance address. “Have you 
ever seen quite such a campaign as Hoover is running?” an incredulous Harold Ickes asked 
Hiram Johnson in September. “Apparently he is betting on the simple proposition that the normal 
republican majority is so tremendous that he can sit still and still be elected in spite of all of the 
assaults of the enemy.” With thirty days to go until Election Day, TNR noted that “Hoover has 
made exactly one speech of importance since his acceptance of the nomination. He has not 
answered a single one of the challenges offered him by Governor Smith. He has not outlined a 
single issue more concretely than in his speech of acceptance – a document dealing largely in 
broad generalities…Why should anyone vote for Mr. Hoover?”2142  
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While the Great Engineer was silent, his surrogates and subordinates – as well as many 
disaffected Democrats – had an answer for that one. Hoover’s election meant a car in every 
home and “a chicken in every pot,” promised Republican posters and literature. “If you had these 
three men working for you,” one newspaper argued under a picture of Coolidge, Mellon, and 
Hoover, “would you fire them?”2143 
 
Governor Smith, accepting his own nomination eleven days later on a rainy day in 
Albany, hoped America might. There, he gave an eloquent summation of both his philosophy of 
government and the problems with the Republicans in power. “Government should be 
constructive, not destructive, progressive, not reactionary,” Smith argued over the airwaves of 
112 stations – breaking Hoover’s recent record by four. “I am entirely unwilling to accept the old 
order of things as the best unless and until I am convinced that it cannot be made better.” 
Coolidge and his ilk, Smith argued, believed “that an elect class should be the special object of 
the government’s concern” – their focus was “not people, but material things…I have fought this 
spirit in my own State…I shall know how to fight it in the nation.”2144  
 
Arguing that it was a “fallacy that there is inconsistency between progressive measures 
protecting the rights of the people, including the poor and the weak, and a just regard for the 
rights of legitimate business,” Smith promised to “continue my sympathetic interest in the 
advancement of progressive legislation for the protection and advancement of working men and 
women,” including the “[p]romotion of proper care of maternity, infancy and childhood.” The 
candidate also disparaged Latin American adventurism, endorsed a McNary-Haugen approach to 
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agricultural reform without naming the bill, and – hoping that a states’ rights approach might 
help bring Southerners back into the fold – called for a “fearless application of Jeffersonian 
principles” to the Prohibition question – in other words, let states choose whether or not they 
wanted to be Wet or Dry in their own borders. It was “the speech of an honest man with an 
honest mind and a human heart,” declared Senator Walter George of Georgia, fulfilling his 
obligations to the party. “Practical as he is to the core, the speech of Governor Smith breathes the 
fine spirit of progress and reform.”2145 
 
As the Democratic platform plank on unemployment indicates, there was an emerging 
pushback against the prosperity argument on the left side of the party. “Under the Coolidge 
administration the rich have declared war on the poor,” former New York party chairmen 
Herbert Claiborne Pell had said in January 1928. “Let them beware of the retaliation of those that 
they despise today.” But Governor Smith – animated by the inherent conservatism Lippmann had 
referenced and never one to question the foundations of the prevailing economic order – never 
endorsed that strategy any further than the guarded language of his nomination speech. Instead, 
Smith chose to minimize the economic differences between him and the Republican ticket, and 
attempt to illustrate to America that he would be as competent an administrator and steward of 




To that end, much to the consternation of his closest advisors, Smith chose as his 
campaign chairman John J. Raskob, the chief executive of DuPont and General Motors, and a 
well-known financier who had voted for Coolidge in 1924 – In 1929, he would pen an ill-timed 
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paean to prosperity entitled “Everybody Ought to be Rich.” Raskob certainly was. More to the 
point, as one journal put it, he was “very rich, very wet, and very Catholic, and besides that he is 
not a Democrat.” Nonetheless, Raskob had been a friend and major contributor of the 
Governor’s, and Smith, despite pleading from Moskowitz, Proskauer, and Roosevelt, chose to 
respect the loyalty. “It’s the only thing Raskob has ever asked of me,” Smith said in an echo of 
Warren Harding’s choice of Harry Daugherty years earlier, “and I’ve got to give it to him.” (In 





Here again, Roosevelt thought, Smith was making a choice from principle where political 
expediency should have reigned. Choosing Raskob, he believed, was a “grave mistake” that 
would “permanently drive away a host of people in the south and west and rural east who are not 
particularly favorable to Smith, but up to today have been seeping back into the Party.” FDR 
seemed to have the right of it. Carter Glass, among others, thought the pick reflected Smith’s 
“not only…distaste, but an actual contempt for the South.” Along with further alienating 
Democrats worried about Smith’s Other-ness, the choice of Raskob helped to close down any 
hard-hitting economic critique of the Coolidge years, dismaying progressives and agrarians and 




How could Al Smith possibly defeat Herbert Hoover and the Republicans, if the general 
national prosperity was conceded? Smith and his advisors had devised a three-part strategy. First, 
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by hewing close to the Republicans on economic matters and being more personable than 
Hoover otherwise, it was hoped Smith could break open the traditionally Republican Northeast, 
including his own state of New York. (This was why Smith insisted Raskob was a good choice to 
run the campaign – It soothed the financial masters of Wall Street and the Northeast corridor.) 
Second, it was assumed the Solid Democratic South would hold, and that disgruntled 
Prohibitionists still loathed the party of Lincoln and Reconstruction more than they did booze 
and the Pope. And third, agrarian discontent in the Midwest and West might work to pry away a 
few crucial states from the Republican column. On paper, it sounded like a workable strategy. Of 




To help buttress his fortunes in the Empire State, as well as to cement his four-term 
legacy of reform there, Smith, in one of the more lasting legacies of his 1928 bid, looked to find 
a strong candidate for the governor’s race in New York. So he turned to a man sympathetic to his 
worldview and a natural choice – Owen Young, the president of General Electric. Young, 
however, had no interest in the job, and so Smith turned to his second option. That would be 
financier Herbert Lehman, at which point New York Democrats reminded Smith that running on 
the same ticket as the man who would be the state’s first Jewish governor was not an association 
the candidate needed at this juncture. While considering other potential candidates, the name of 
Franklin Roosevelt came up – but Smith thought his health wasn’t up to it, and besides, as he 
told Francis Perkins, “the man hasn’t got any brains. He couldn’t possibly be Governor of New 
York.” Even if the two had mended fences politically over the years, Smith still saw in Roosevelt 
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the callow, condescending young Harvard man with the famous name who had first shown up in 




In fact, the New York Governorship was something Franklin Roosevelt had very much 
coveted over a decade earlier. After losing the 1914 Senate primary to Tammany’s candidate,  a 
younger and more openly ambitious FDR had even mended fences with Charles Francis Murphy 
in order to secure the 1918 gubernatorial nomination. But when the World War broke out in 
1917, Roosevelt could no longer leave his position as Assistant Secretary of the Navy without 
public opprobrium, and so Al Smith ascended to Albany instead. Even in 1928, Roosevelt – who 
was named head of the campaign’s business outreach – still chafed at his role in the Smith 
organization. “I was treated by Raskob and Mrs. Moskowitz all the time I was there,” Roosevelt 
said later in life, “as though I was one of those pieces of window dressing that had to be borne 
with because of a certain political value in non-New York areas.” “Frankly,” Roosevelt wrote a 
friend after the Raskob choice, “the campaign is working out in a way which, I, personally, 
should not have allowed and Smith has burned his bridges behind him.” He soon gave the 





Two months before Election Day, however, Smith conceded that, just as in 1924 after the 
death of Charles Francis Murphy, he now needed Roosevelt. FDR, who at the time was 
rehabilitating in Warm Springs, Georgia, was averse to the idea, as were his closest aides. (“If 
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they are looking for goat why don’t Wagner sacrifice himself?” Howe telegrammed Roosevelt at 
one point.) At first, Smith accepted Roosevelt’s demurral – “Okay, you’re the doctor,” he said. 
But, increasingly convinced that Roosevelt was the best and only option to put New York in the 
Democratic column, Smith called back with Herbert Lehman, the latter promising to help carry 
the load as Lieutenant Governor. (“Governor Trying to Reach You…Beware Greeks Bearing 
Gifts,” Howe had warned.) When Roosevelt still hesitated, Smith simply asked if he would 
refuse the job if offered. Roosevelt didn’t answer, and the next day, the New York State 
Convention chose him as their gubernatorial nominee. “Mess is No Name For It,” telegrammed 
Howe. “For Once I Have No Advice to Give.” Forsaking his fervent hope that Warm Springs 
could mend his condition, Franklin Roosevelt decided to play the good soldier. “The policies of 
the state as administered by Governor Smith are excellent now,” he said as the gubernatorial 
candidate, “I may not be able to improve on them.” To a friend years down the road, he said “I 
didn’t want it. I wanted, much more to get my right leg to move!...But the moral pressure was 





In the meantime, Al Smith had much bigger problems below the Mason-Dixon line. 
Raskob and Smith had based their election strategy on the Solid South, and it is true that, in 
many ways, the Democratic Party’s stranglehold on the region ran through deeper, darker soil 
than Smith’s candidacy could possibly uproot. “Don’t let Catholicism, don’t let Prohibition, 
don’t let propaganda of any kind blind you,” argued one Mississippi Democrat. “There is only 
one issue in Mississippi – white supremacy, and crushing a Mississippi white and black 
Republican party in the making.” As another put it, “I am going to vote for Al Smith because I 
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am a life long Democrat and because I am a Southern white man.” Party regulars emphasized the 
overriding importance of “Democratic supremacy” in the region and spread the tales that, 
Hoover had desegregated the Department of Commerce and, during his Mississippi relief efforts,  
both danced with a black woman in New Orleans and allowed blacks – “Hoover chocolates,” in 
the parlance of one South Carolina woman – to use white toilets. The Governor of North 
Carolina, Angus McLean, predicted – wrongly – that “the prominent Democrats of the South  
who are withholding their support from Governor Smith can be counted on the fingers of one 
hand.” 2153  
 
At the same time, the South also saw some of the most vociferous anti-Smith propaganda, 
and not just from Bishop Cannon’s conference of disaffected Democrats in Asheville. Former 
McAdoo supporter and Chattanooga News editor George Fort Milton organized an anti-Smith 
“National Constitutional Democratic Committee” that eventually spread to seventeen states. 
Among the leading Southern Democrats to openly renounce Smith were former Senator Robert 
Owen of Oklahoma, Senator Furnifold Simmons of North Carolina, and the wife of Clem Shaver 
of West Virginia, who was National Party Chairman from 1924 to 1928. (Asked about his 
spouse’s apostasy by a reporter, the pro-Smith Shaver simply said, “Are you married?”) “If you 
vote for Al Smith,” the pastor of Oklahoma City’s largest Baptist congregation told his flock, 
“you’re voting against Christ and you will all be damned.” “Will Dry Protestants of the South 
Put Their Worst Foe in the White House?” blared one anti-Smith pamphlet. Schoolchildren in 
Daytona Beach, Florida were sent home with notices to give the parents, declaring that “[w]e 
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must prevent the election of Alfred E. Smith to the presidency. If he is chosen President, you will 
not be allowed to have or read a bible.”2154  
 
Rumors also abounded throughout the region that Smith was an alcoholic himself, and 
that eyewitnesses had seen him falling down drunk at the Syracuse State Fair. One cartoon 
showed the candidate on a beer truck which read “Make America 100% Catholic, Drunk, and 
Illiterate.” This eventually prompted the bottom half of the ticket to respond. “The statement has 
been made that he is a drunkard,” said Joseph Robinson, drifting away from his prepared speech 
to a Labor Day crowd in Dallas, “There is not one word of  truth in it.” Needless to say, if you 





Other southerners were not shy about wielding the biggest possible artillery against 
Smith. It was argued by Bishop Cannon and others that the candidate secretly wanted to end the 
traditional southern ways and bring about full racial equality. Belle Moskowitz had in fact been 
urging Smith to make in-roads with African-American voters, and she set up a meeting with the 
Governor and the NAACP’s Walter White in early 1928, at which White encouraged Smith to 
take a stronger stand against segregation and lynching and for civil rights. Smith was 
sympathetic, and asked for a statement which would show “that the old Democratic Party, ruled 
entirely by the South is on its way out, and that we Northern Democrats have a totally different 
approach to the Negro.” White subsequently penned such a statement, but Governor Smith never 
used it or said anything more on the matter – a decision Moskowitz said he later regretted. The 
                                                          
2154






Chicago Defender still rallied to Smith’s standard, arguing that “it would be striking a severe 
blow at intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry if Negroes should help send this Catholic gentleman 
to the White House. Whatever sins may be charged against the Catholics, it cannot be said they 
have aligned themselves with the Negro baiters and lynchers.” That being said, in the election of 
1928 Smith did not actively align himself against them either. To charges that Smith was “that 
most dreadful of persons, a ‘nigger-lover,’” reported The Nation, “his managers have felt 
compelled to deny that he ever employed Negro stenographers or that he has appointed Negroes 
to any higher offices than the menial ones they fulfill in the South.”2156   
 
Because of all this, an exhausted Smith ultimately had to go on a Southern swing late in 
the campaign to try to shore up the shaky region, which even the ever-enthusiastic Raskob 
thought was “a terrible confession of weakness.” The trip was also seen as such an admission by 
the press, and did little to sway anyone regardless.  On the way to down to Oklahoma in mid-
September, the passage of Smith’s train had been lit by the fire of burning crosses. “Joe, how did 
they know you were on this train?” he allegedly joked to Proskauer, a Jew. Inside, however, 
Smith seethed at this ultimate rebuff, and, believing that the time had arrived to take on the 
religion question directly, he rewrote his remarks for Oklahoma City to address the slurs. People 
like Oklahoma Senator Robert Owen, who had come out for Hoover, talk of Tammany as the 
reason why they opposed his candidacy, Smith argued, but “I know what’s behind it. It’s nothing 
more or less than my religion:” 
 
Nothing could be so out of line with the spirit of America. Nothing could be so foreign to the 
teachings of Jefferson. Nothing could be so contradictory of our whole history.  Nothing could be 
so false to the teachings of our Divine Lord himself. The world knows no greater mockery than 
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the use of the blazing cross, the cross upon which Christ died, as a symbol to install into the 





Writing well after the campaign, Hoover said Al Smith “was a natural born gentleman… 
During the campaign he said no word and engaged in no action that did not comport with the 
highest levels.” That being said, he also argued that “Governor Smith unwittingly fanned the 
flame” of religion in his Oklahoma City speech. “[U]p to that moment,” Hoover – who was very 
conscious of being the first Quaker candidate for president – religion “had been an underground 
issue. The Governor thought that he would gain by bringing it out into the open.” Hoover was 
wrong on two counts. In fact, Smith was not so much eyeing the political outcome as making 
another stand on principle. “I felt deep in my heart,” he said years later, “that I would be a 
coward and probably unfit for the presidency if I were to permit [it] to go further unchallenged.” 
Second, religion was hardly an underground issue – it was arguably the foremost issue of the 
campaign. Hoover had already reprimanded one Republican committeewoman for trafficking in 
anti-Catholic arguments. “Whether this letter is authentic or a forgery, it does violence to every 
instinct I possess,” Hoover had said. “I resent it and repudiate it.” Resent it he might, but Hoover 
was also a savvy enough operator to know that Republicans didn’t need to fan flames that were 
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As the flare-up in Oklahoma indicates, the Old South had no monopoly on prejudice, and 
the Midwest and West were also perturbed by what they envisioned from an Al Smith 
presidency. No less an authority than the Sage of Emporia, William Allen White, admitted as 
much. “As a Kansas farmer said to me,” White told a banquet audience in 1927, “‘No man will 
ever tell his beads in the White House.’” When pressed by a local Monsignor on this position, 
White apologized “[i]f the remark gave offense to my hearers of the Catholic faith…in the future 
I shall be happy to change the phrasing of it. The remark that the man made, however, represents 
in its rustic phrasing a political fact…I shall be more than happy to see the day come when an 
honest and intelligent Catholic will have an equal chance as a candidate…Among intelligent 
thinking men religion has no place in politics. When I made the remark I was simply calling 
attention to the fact that unfortunately there are enough bigoted and unintelligent men to prevent 
an honest Catholic from being elected.” 2159 
 
As someone who ran against the Klan for governor to express his contempt for their 
brand of intolerance, White’s pluralistic bona fides are in good standing. “I am, as you know, a 
Republican,” White wrote Franklin Roosevelt in February 1928, “but I admire Smith greatly. I 
think his is one of the important brains now functioning in American politics.” Nonetheless, 
when election season came around, White used equally apocalyptic language to deride the 
Democratic candidate. Specifically, White went on record arguing that “the whole Puritan 
civilization which has built a sturdy, orderly nation is threatened by Smith.” To White, Smith 
was an “urbanite with an an urbanity unrestrained…city born, city bred, ‘city broke’, city 
minded, and city hearted.” As an Assemblyman, White argued to one correspondent, “Smith 
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voted not only with Tammany on the liquor question but on questions controlling gambling and 
prostitution. This does not mean Smith is a low fellow. On the contrary, I have the highest 
respect for his integrity, his courage, and his intelligence. But he is thoroughly Tammanized in 
spirit and in a moral point of view. And his courage, wisdom, and honesty will not prevent him 
for making such a record in the White House as Tammany would desire.” As such, White 
thought, “Smith is a menace to the country, for all his high qualities and in spite of them.”2160 
 
“William Allen White stubbed his toe badly,” argued The Nation of this outburst. “We 
are sorry to have to criticize so old and valued a friend, but Mr. White’s utterances can only have 
shocked all who read them.” Harold Ickes agreed. “I am afraid that our old friend…didn’t come 
out in his controversy with Al Smith with flying colors,” he told Hiram Johnson. Walter 
Lippmann urged White to recant this tirade, at which point White dropped the mention of 
prostitution and gambling and stood by the rest. When it was pointed out to White that the 
Harding administration had a more recent record of rampant corruption than Tammany did, the 
Sage of Emporia brazened his way out of the box. ““When corruption was exposed in the 
administration,” he fumed, “Coolidge immediately set the wheels going to punish the 
corruptionists. It was no business of Hoover to leave the Cabinet because Coolidge was 
prosecuting the corruptionists. Everyone must admit that Smith had no more hand personally in 
the corruption of Tammany than Hoover had in the corruption of the Harding administration. But 
the corruption of Tammany is a system.” Explaining the method to his madness, White told a 
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friend, “I hate the religious fight being made on Smith. I have denounced it time and again. He 
seems now doomed to defeat. I shall regret that part of his defeat, though not all, nor indeed not 
much is due to bigotry. But I hoped he would be defeated on the wet issue with Tammany 
symbolizing it.”2161 
 
Another notable critic of Smith in the Midwest was less nuanced about her conflation of 
the wet and religious issues. “To your pulpits!” former Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker 
Willebrandt told a conference of Methodist leaders in Ohio. “There are 2000 pastors here. You 
have in your churches more than 600,000 members of the Methodist Church in Ohio alone. That 
is enough to swing the election. The 600,000 friends have friends in other States. Write to them. 
Every day and every ounce of your energy are needed to rouse the friends of prohibition to 
register and vote.” In fact, Willebrandt would later to convert to Catholicism, but given the 
environment her remarks very easily seemed like a deliberate rousing of Protestant wrath against 
a Catholic candidate. Other Republican party officials were even less circumspect. In Alabama – 
belying Hoover’s argument that religion was a strictly underground phenomenon – Republican 
committeeman Oliver Street sent out over 200,000 pamphlets across the South condemning 
Smith’s religion.2162 
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Even in the Northeast, where the Governor enjoyed his strongest base of support, Smith 
faced the same set of interlocking cultural obstacles to his candidacy. One would be hard-pressed 
to find a more Catholic major city in America in 1928 than Boston, Massachusetts. Nonetheless, 
there reformer Elizabeth Tilton, who in her time had lobbied for Sheppard-Towner, the child 
labor amendment, protective legislation for women, and disarmament, thought the election a 
fight to the death “between two levels of civilization – the Evangelical, middle-class America 
and the big city Tammany masses…It is the old American, Puritan–based ideals against the new 
Latin ideals…It is the old stock agin the loose, fluctuating masses of the Big Cities. It is dry agin 
wet. It is Protestant against Catholic.” The night before the election, Tilton was moved to 
hysterics in her journal by the possibilities of a Smith victory. “My America against 
Tammany’s!” she cried. “Prairie, Plantation, and Everlasting Hills against the side-walks of New 
York! Women meeting on the street clasping my hand to cry, ‘We can not live if Hoover is not 
elected!...Women say, ‘We feel like night before our wedding!’ – Life held in terrifying 
suspension!”2163 
 
Ms. Tilton was not alone. “Everywhere one goes in the North,” The Nation reported at 
the end of October, “it is prejudice which seems to be electing Herbert Hoover – prejudice 
against the Pope; prejudice against Tammany Hall; prejudice against the man who waxes 
ungrammatical as he waxes eloquent; prejudice against his wife because she has not enjoyed the 
opportunities for leisure and culture that have been the good fortune of some Presidents’ wives; 
prejudice because Al Smith represents the immigrant part of our population.” Surveying the 
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country as a whole, the magazine thought “[o]ne must go far back in our history before one 
comes across a similar era of Know-Nothingism, of rank, passionate prejudice.”2164 
 
Give the intensity of the reaction against him, even among citizens who agreed with the 
vast majority of his policies, Smith’s presidential bid was almost inevitably going to founder. But 
even without these cultural rifts drastically complicating matters, Smith and Raskob’s strategy 
for victory had serious problems. The plan to peel off Midwestern farmers from the Republican 
party, for example, was not proceeding as envisioned. For one, everyone well knew Smith hailed 
from the Sidewalks of New York, where not much farming tended to take place. When he was 
queried by reporters about “the needs of the states west of the Mississippi,” Smith joked, “What 
are the states west of the Mississippi?” For another, Smith’s strategy to toe the Coolidge-Hoover 
line on most economic matters made his feints toward McNary-Haugenism seem like the 
transparent political opportunism they mostly were. “If Al Smith starts out with the idea that he 
wants to do something for the farmers,” noted TNR, “but will not do anything which 
conservative business men might  disapprove, he will land on the farm issue exactly where 
Herbert Hoover stands.”2165 
 
For yet another, Hoover had an additional ace-in-the-hole to blunt any forays made by 
Smith on the farm issue – the vocal endorsement of noted progressive straight-shooter William 
Borah. After Al Smith delivered a well-received speech on McNary-Haugen to farmers in 
Omaha, Borah, on a swing through the Midwest and West, took the lead on covering his 
candidate’s flank on agricultural matters, and witheringly exposed Smith’s previous nonchalance 
on the topic. “On the 27th day of January, 1927, after the McNary-Haugen bill had been up for 
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discussion for almost three years,” Borah told a Minneapolis crowd at one of these stops, “the 
governor had another idea at that time”: 
 
I will read it to you…he says, ‘A chain of farms might help the situation.’ That is just what some 
of the farmers have been trying to get rid of, a chain of farms. Now, I do not claim that the idea 
came from Tammany. I think it was original. Then he goes on to say profoundly, ‘At least the 
business methods embodied in the situation would bring the only relief that I can possibly think 
of.’ The McNary-Haugen bill had not yet passed across his intellectual horizon. Again, he says, 
‘When the farmer stops sitting on top of the world and begins thinking and keeping the rules of 
economics and business, he will begin to help himself.’…Again, he says, ‘I can’t think of any 
other way to help the farmer. The fact is they are the only ones who can save themselves.’ A 





Noting also that Smith had admitted “I don’t know a great deal about any of these plans” 
and, in the end, had called for the traditional political cop-out of a commission to study the 
problem, Borah declared “there is not a man living who can tell what Governor Smith’s position 
is upon the farm problem.” By contrast, Borah argued, “I doubt if there is a farmer within the 
sound of my voice tonight either here or elsewhere who would doubt the ability of Mr. Hoover to 
solve this problem…[B]ear in mind that Herbert Hoover has never set himself to the solution of 
any kind of an economic problem that he has not made good.”2167 
 
Other than George Peek and Democratic agrarians like Joseph Robinson, who explicitly 
endorsed McNary-Haugen by name at his campaign stops, there was one other spokesman of 
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note who thought Smith was the better option for farmers – Republican George Norris. After 
both conventions were complete, Norris had originally taken a pox-on-both-your-houses 
approach to the election. “Have the people any avenue by which they can bring about the defeat 
of the great polltlcal machines that always control our national conventions?” he complained in a 
letter to The Nation. “The ordinary suggestion is to organize a third party or run an independent 
candidate for President. This is a beautiful theory, but, for practical purposes, it is a will o’ the 
wisp”:  
 
We are confronted with the antiquated and worse-than-useless electoral-college system of 
electing a President. The two old parties have complete organizations from the township to the 
White House. The great mass of people outside these organizations have nothing to do but choose 
between two evils. 
 
I have tried several times to interest forward-thinking people in a campaign to abolish, by an 
amendment to the Constitution, this antiquated electoral-college system and to provide for a 
direct vote, but people do not seem to see the importance of it, and the machines of our great 
parties do all they can to conceal the true conditions. As it is, machines control both dominant 
parties, keep up a sham fight, arouse partisan feeling when they are only pulling monopoly 




 To Norris, the real question of the campaign was not McNary-Haugenism or prohibition, 
although both were important, but this: “Shall the great trusts, particularly the water-power trust, 
control the destiny of our republic? When this trust is in control it will take care of all subsidiary 
questions, like prohibition and farm relief” so that “none of these subsidiary questions will be 
solved for the benefit of the common folks.” When Smith continued to advocate for more of a 
federal, state, and municipal role in water power than Hoover, Norris jumped ship – something 
he did not even do for his old friend La Follette in 1924. “I had followed with intense interest his 
position on the development of water power in New York State while he was governor,” Norris 
later wrote. “I had been attracted to him by his liberal and farsighted position on that issue. I 
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knew where Mr. Hoover stood…He had demonstrated to my satisfaction that, whatever other 
claims he might have to a liberal outlook[,] on the question of conservation of American 
resources, he was most backward and reactionary.”2169 
 
This prominent defection clearly rankled Hoover, who even mentioned it in his memoirs 
years later. In his “effort to secure unity in action,”  he wrote, “I had only a single failure, that 
being Senator Norris of Nebraska.” (In fact, Norris was not the only Republican to bolt – While 
Bob La Follette and, in the House, Fiorello La Guardia remained studiously neutral, Senator 
John J. Blaine of Wisconsin also endorsed Smith.) “As I disliked to see any break in our rank, I 
related the situation to his friend Senator Borah, who was actively supporting me. To my 
surprise, Borah broke loose in a tirade against Norris, admonishing me to pay no more attention 
to him. Norris was, in fact, a devoted socialist; certain left-wing women furnished funds for his 
elections and for the maintenance of a publicity bureau in Washington which constantly 
eulogized him.” At the time, Norris’s emphasis on water power so irritated the Great Engineer 
that he ventured down from his Herculean remove a fortnight before Election Day and – in 
exactly the type of break the Smith campaign had been hoping for all along – lost his temper.2170   
 
“There has been revived in this campaign,” Hoover told a crowd at Madison Square 
Garden on October 22
nd, “a series of proposals which, if adopted, would be a long step toward 
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the abandonment of our American system and a surrender to the destructive operation of 
governmental conduct of commercial business”: 
 
You cannot extend the mastery of the government over the daily working life of a people without 
at the same time making it the master of the people’s souls and thoughts…It is a false liberalism 
that interprets itself into the government operation of commercial business. Every step of 
bureaucratizing the business of our country poisons the very roots of liberalism – that is, political 
equality, free speech, free assembly, free press, and equality of opportunity. It is the road not to 





“I have witnessed not only at home but abroad the many failures of government in 
business,” Hoover told the assembled.  “I have seen its tyrannies, its injustices, its destructions of 
self-government, its undermining of the very instincts which carry our people forward to 
progress.” While reaffirming that regulation was necessary and laissez-faire was not an answer, 
Hoover declared that Smith’s policies with regard to water power, the farmer, and a host of other 
issues “would destroy political equality. It would increase rather than decrease abuse and 
corruption. It would stifle initiative and invention. It would undermine the development of 
leadership. It would cramp and cripple the mental and spiritual energies of our people. It would 
extinguish equality of opportunity. It  would dry up the spirit of liberty and progress.”2172 
 
“The United States already was being infected from the revolutionary caldrons of 
Europe,” Hoover wrote in his memoirs to justify this address. “[T]he growing left-wing 
movement, embracing many of the ‘intelligentsia,’ flocked to Governor Smith’s support. I was 
determined that the Republican Party should draw the issue of the American system, as opposed 
to all forms of collectivism.” In this speech, Hoover actually coined the term “rugged 
individualism,” but although the words were not in Hoover’s prepared remarks, the takeaway in 
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many corners was that Hoover had accused Smith of engaging in “State socialism,” particularly 
after Smith used that phrase to characterize the address. “The cry of Socialism,” Smith responded 
in Boston, “has been patented by the powerful interests that desire to put a damper on 
progressive legislation… To refer to the remedies for all these evils as State Socialism is not 
constructive statesmanship, it is not leadership, and leadership is what this country is hungry for 
today.”2173  
 
In an editorial entitled “Herbert Hoover – Conservative,” TNR called the Madison Square 
Speech “the first in his campaign which is, in, any degree worthy of the man’s reputation.” 
Instead of consisting “chiefly of evasive and non-contentious generalities,” Hoover had offered a 
“reasoned” and “deeply felt defense of the candidate’s conservatism in regard to the relation 
between government and business. If the Republican campaign had been conducted on this level 
from the beginning, we might have a really significant debate which would have distracted 
attention from the religious and social prejudices which have marred it.” 2174  
   
Nonetheless, the MSG speech, the journal thought, also exposed Hoover not as some 
hard-headed engineer willing to tackle problems, but as a woolly-headed idealist who trafficked 
in vague generalities. (If TNR had ventured to notice, this had been clear since at least the 
publication of American Individualism in 1922.) “Mr. Hoover is just stupid enough not to see 
that his idealism is, in practice…[the] best shield and weapon” of “big-business interests,” the 
editors argued. “The balm of the words he uses makes him believe that they are, in some magic 
way, responsible for all the glories of our civilization. It renders him hesitant to admit the full 
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importance of the failures among our economic institutions. And it leads him to resort, when he 
is forced to mention these failures, to an easy optimism that everything will be improved if left to 
private initiative[.]”2175   
 
As such, it now seemed Al Smith was the engineer in the race, because his overriding 
desire was to solve problems. “His mind is not obfuscated with antique formulations of principle 
which are ill-suited to the necessities of twentieth-century civilization. If we are to have 
socialism by the Smith route, we shall have it by the logic of necessity, not by the argument of 
dogma.” What the speech exposed most of all, TNR argued, was that Hoover was no true friend 
to progressives. “[I]f progressive voters do not appreciate the immense superiority of Smith to 
Hoover on hydroelectric power,” they argued, “there is little hope for progressivism in the 
United States.” And “progressives who share any of the New Republic’s understanding of the 
word, ought to be finally convinced by the New York speech that Mr. Hoover is one of their 
worst, because one of their noblest, enemies.”2176  
 
To Smith advocates, Hoover’s “State Socialism” address seemed like it could be the 
opening the campaign desperately needed: At long last, the 1928 campaign seemed to be moving 
towards policy differences that didn’t involve drinking. “I think you will see a tremendous 
change in sentiment,” said John Raskob after Smith’s response in Boston.  “If his program for the 
reduction of hours for women and children is Socialist,” said gubernatorial candidate Franklin 
Roosevelt, “we are all Socialists.” “Anybody in public life who goes ahead and advocates 
improvements is called a radical,” FDR noted, but Democrats had continued to win in New 
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York, and “will keep on winning as long as it goes ahead with a program of progress.” A hopeful 
Amos Pinchot thought this back-and-forth might be “the opening gun of a bitter fight between 
democracy and plutocracy.”  “On the one hand,” Mencken pointed out, Hoover “denounces 
every effort to hobble the water-power hogs as socialistic and tyrannical; on the other hand, he 
swallows calmly the intolerable contempt for private right that is Prohibition. On which side 
does he actually stand?” George Norris was also shocked by Hoover’s mask falling away. “How 
can any progressive in the United States support him now, after his Madison Square Garden 
address, in which he slapped every progressive minded man and woman in America in the face?” 
he asked. “My God, I cannot conceive it.” Former Children’s Bureau Chief Julia Lathrop, upon 
hearing of Hoover’s address, immediately refused to speak any further on behalf of the 





Borah and Norris weren’t the only two erstwhile allies who found themselves on 
opposing sides in the election of 1928. The progressive community in many ways split against 
itself that year. In the social work community, one Mary Van Kleeck formed a pro-Smith 
committee that quickly drew the support of, among others, Lillian Wald. Although a Dry, Wald 
thought Hoover had surrounded himself at the Republican convention with men who, four years 
earlier, he had claimed “made him vomit.” She and her colleague John L. Elliot signed their 
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names to a pamphlet circulating among social workers that praised Smith as “a vital 
humanitarian” who would lead the way on labor and public health matters and end “hypocrisy 
and evasion” with regard to the Noble Experiment. “He is a realist, and a hard worker,” Wald 
and Elliot’s circular declared. “He has a genius for comprehending what social work is and he 
sees straight through unhindered by abstraction and academic proposals.”2178  
 
Of the 66 lengthy responses Wald and Elliot received, 17 were pro-Smith (including 
missives from Paul Kellogg and Edward T. Devine) and 45 were pro-Hoover, most notably the 
brief response from Jane Addams. (“Voting for Hoover but send good wishes for the Smith 
campaign.”) Others were less gentle. “I have the same contempt for social workers dabbling in 
politics that I do for ministers who do the same,” replied one South Carolina respondent. 
Besides, “wherever the Catholic Church rules, there is darkness, superstition, and deterioration.” 
Others lamented that Wald would “prostitute” herself for such an “arch” and “rather cheap 
politician,” particularly when there was a “constructive statesman” and “efficient, cultured, 
competent, experienced, tolerant Quaker” on the ballot. “By broadcasting your views in this 
unsolicited fashion you have alienated many of us who feel it is rather cheap to trade on your 
otherwise fine regard,” another read.2179 
 
Since Charles Curtis had introduced the Mott Amendment in the Senate, the National 
Woman’s Party – then under the chairmanship of Jane Norman Smith – moved to endorse the 
Hoover-Curtis ticket, setting off a similar round of infighting and recrimination among its 
membership. Emma Johnson, who had been active in the NWP since its founding, was among 
those who resigned, arguing that the Party had “grossly betrayed women.” “I could no more cast 
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a vote for the Republican Party,” explained socialist member Lavinia Dock, “than I could 
swallow a large, smooth, green caterpillar.”2180 
 
So it went along the line. A poll put together by TNR in October found that, along with 
traditional Democrats like Louis Brandeis and Walter Lippmann, Frederic Howe, Heywood 
Broun, and Charles Merz all supported Smith. So too did Clarence Darrow, who emphasized the 
prohibition issue, and Felix Frankfurter, who thought a Smith presidency would be a victory over 
religious zealotry and sectarianism. Besides, Frankfurter wrote, Smith’s “imagination, his 
generosity, his patient and pacific temperament, his humor, his charm, his flair for reality, his 
effectiveness in negotiation, are far better guarantees for a wise and tolerant dealing with other 
peoples than impatience and temper and a dogmatic belief in pre-war economic theories of 
national self-interest.”2181   
 
While politically more aligned with Norman Thomas, John Dewey argued he was voting 
Democratic because a Smith presidency would have an important “humanizing social effect,” 
and help to introduce “some degree of frankness and of humane sympathy” in national life. As 
for Hoover, Dewey argued, “if he has any human insight, dictated by the consciousness of social 
needs, into the policies called for by the day-to-day life of his fellow human beings…I have 
never seen the signs of it. His whole creed of complacent capitalistic individualism and of the 
right and duty of economic success commits him to the continuation of that hypocritical religion 
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of ‘prosperity’ which is, in my judgment, the greatest force that exists at present in maintaining 
the unrealities of our social tone and temper.”2182  
 
On the other hand, UMW president John L. Lewis elsewhere argued that Hoover was 
“the foremost industrial statesman of modern times” and needed to win so that “the 
unprecedented industrial and business prosperity which he inaugurated may be properly 
developed and stabilized.” The Lone Eagle, Charles Lindbergh, was a Herbert Hoover man, 




For his part, Harold Ickes decided that, for the third time in a row, he would have to buck 
the party of Roosevelt. “I wish I could turn the clock back ten or fifteen years,” he told Hiram 
Johnson in August. “If I could I would tell the Republican Party, politely but firmly, to go to Hell 
and I would join up with Al Smith.” While hoping to remain silent through this year’s campaign, 
Ickes found himself increasingly drawn into the battle as passions flared. “The more I 
contemplate the bigotry and unfairness of the attacks on Smith the more difficult it is for me to 
keep from uplifting my voice in violent protest,” he wrote in September. Smith, Ickes thought, 
“made the impression on me of a keen, alert city man perfectly capable of taking care of himself. 
There was nothing of the conventional politician or statesman about him. He is a hard hitter who 
marshals his facts and lets them fly where they will do the most good.”2184    
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When Ickes saw that his fellow Chicago Jane Addams had come out for Hoover, he wrote 
her a polite letter pressing her on the endorsement. “I know something must be the matter with 
me because for the first time in my life I cannot follow the reasoning in a statement by you,” 
Ickes told her. “There seem to me to be so many reasons why Smith should be the preference of 
progressive and socially minded people and yet the preeminently progressive and socially 
minded person in all the world has declared for Hoover…Smith seems to me to be a really great 
man who has risen far superior to his environment while Hoover, with a better start and greater 
advantages, has receded somewhat. But the decisive thing with me is that so many bigots and all 
the snobs are against Smith.” To this, Addams responded in an equally friendly manner. “I may 
have been much influenced by my personal acquaintance with Mr. Hoover during my various 
visit in Europe immediately after the War,” she conceded. “It is always easy to rationalize a 
position one wishes to take…I will confess that I was very much disturbed by Hoover’s New 
York address, although when I saw him the other day in Washington I felt immensely reassured 
to his basic principles and intentions.”2185 
 
Ickes’ usual correspondent, Hiram Johnson, stayed regular as usual – although not 
without much grumbling. “[I]t is a difficult thing for me to campaign for our candidate,” he 
confessed to Ickes. “Many of the things which are of deepest interest to me and which I believe 
to be of gravest concern he apparently either doesn’t care for is in opposition to my views. I am 
compelled, therefore, when I speak for him, as I do whenever I make a political speech, to use 
just one thing, the tariff.” Gifford Pinchot also felt caught between two unappealing choices, and 
he also stuck with Hoover. “I am thoroughly on record publicly as to my opinion of Hoover,” he 
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told Ickes. and it happens to be my true opinion. I also have an equally definite opinion of 
Tammany Hall, and of the wetness of Al Smith. It is a hard time for a dry independent, and no 
mistake.”2186 
 
Disheartened by his own need to toe the party line, Johnson’s reaction to other 
progressive endorsements of Hoover ran from dismay to outright fury. Reading a pro-Hoover 
statement by Margaret Dreier Robins, Johnson told Ickes he “felt an infinite sorrow that one I 
had respected so much could indulge in such stuff.” But as usual, nobody drove Hiram Johnson 
so much to distraction as the Senator from Idaho. “Borah is a ‘good dog,’” he vented to Ickes, 
“and doing exactly what he is told to do – preaching prohibition where it was thought that may 
be effective, and refraining from mentioning prohibition where it is thought the mention of the 
matter might do harm – and never in any way saying aught in relation to corruption or the 
infamies of the power trust that can offend the most delicate sensibilities.” Alas, he groaned, “I 
am too old to be a Borah now, even though I might win the plaudits of every lousy newspaper in 
the country.” Ickes, per the norm, commiserated. “I have never liked Borah because I have never 
trusted him,” he told the Senator in early October. “But my feeling of contempt for him grows 
measurably every day.” By the end of the month, Ickes thought that “Borah has completely 
discredited himself in this campaign with liberal opinion everywhere. Of course, I never have 
believed in the man myself and it has irked me considerably to have had him held up during the 
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past few years as the supreme liberal by journals and individuals who should have known 
better.”2187 
 
It is true that Borah’s standing in the progressive community had taken a considerable hit. 
The Nation, who had pushed him for president in 1924, now called him the “sorriest figure” in 
the whole campaign. “Whatever influence Senator Borah had heretofore among the liberals of 
the country” wrote an enraged Oswald Villard “there is none left today.” For a man who had 
roundly attacked Hoover and the Old Guard in the past to “turn around now and go to the other 
extreme of adulating Mr. Hoover, and declaring that he is the one man above all others to lead 
the country, is just a trifle too nauseating. A man must have some convictions, some principles, 
some standards of consistency, or else there is no use whatsoever of anyone’s applying 
measuring sticks of character, of public honesty, yes, of plain intellectual decency.”2188 
 
Borah was surprised at the progressive reaction to his working for Hoover, since he 
legitimately thought the Great Engineer was the way forward. “He wants Smith beaten and 
beaten decisively,” Robins said of the Senator. “He really has the spirit for this fight apparently. 
He wants me to get in and drill.” In fact, after working the West on behalf of Hoover’s farm 
policy, Borah took it upon himself to continue the fight into the South, where he deplored 
Smith’s views on Prohibition and contrasted “the great party of Lincoln” with the sordidness of 
saloon-soaked Tammany Hall. Tammany, Borah reminded voters, had been opposed to 
immigration restriction, and would have let “the poorly paid races of Southwestern Europe to 
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enter this country. I can’t conceive of anything more detrimental.” Looking back on his Southern 
swing, Borah later deemed it “one of the finest campaign experiences in my whole life.” “[T]hey 
are a wonderful people and they have a wonderful country,” he effused.2189 
 
In the end, none of the major progressive journals came out for Hoover. For all the 
reasons earlier noted and in order “to seize upon promising progressive seedlings in the 
Democratic Party and try to fertilize them,” TNR endorsed Smith. To those who would bring up 
the magazine’s emphatic calls for a third party four years earlier, the editors simply said: “We 
can see no sign of such an upheaval in the near future.”  The Nation still adhered to the notion 
that both major parties “were corrupt and contemptible” and hoped its readers would stand for “a 
new and clean peoples’ party” when the time came. In 1928, with the editors deadlocked on 
endorsing Al Smith or Socialist Norman Thomas, the journal praised them both, at the expense 
of the Great Engineer: “[T]o our readers we can again only appeal not to cast their ballots for 
Herbert Hoover.” Paul Kellogg of The Survey similarly endorsed Thomas.2190   
 
And The Crisis held a symposium entitled “How Shall We Vote?” which carried essays 
supporting all three candidates. Hoover, argued John Hawkins of the Republican Colored Voters 
Division, had displayed his “willingness to administer any high office without discrimination and 
with even-handed justice.” A President Smith, said New York City Commissioner Ferdinand 
Morton, “would be a fine victory for the cause of tolerance and fair play in America.” As for 
W.E.B. DuBois, he suggested his readers vote for Thomas. “[W]hen I read the platform of the 
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Socialist Party and compare it with the Republican and Democratic platforms, there is absolutely 
no doubt in my mind but that this is the only platform before American people that has common 
sense or justice, reason or hope, written to it. It dares to mention Negro disfranchisement as a 
prime cause of reaction, fraud, and privilege, and it is right.” More than ever before in American 
history, the African-American vote was now un-tethered from the Republican Party.
2191
   
 
If progressives had chosen the president, Al Smith would have been in a considerably 
better position on November 6th. According a poll of Nation subscribers, Al Smith outpolled 
Norman Thomas two-to-one, with Hoover coming in third.  (“The vote now stands Smith 6804; 
Thomas 2780; Hoover, 2761; [William Z.] Foster 428; Will Rogers 26.” California and New 
York were Smith country, while the Midwest showed “little indication of a farmer revolt.”) The 
“object of the poll,” the journal argued, “was to bring out the political choice of the progressive-
minded intelligent voters whose influence largely transcends their political strength…The only 
surprise for us has been the strength of the Hoover vote.” A Literary Digest poll – the same 
outlet that had eventually predicted the Coolidge landslide in 1924 – showed Hoover doing much 




Particularly after Hoover’s “state socialism” speech, much of the Smith camp seemed 
outwardly optimistic about the direction things were going. John J. Raskob, who had long been 
predicting an over-300 vote electoral victory for Smith, now revised that upward to a 402-vote 
landslide. “You’re absolutely wrong, Frances,” Belle Moskowitz admonished Frances Perkins 
when the latter confessed her doubts. “You’re absolutely wrong! It’s all right. We have intimate 
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reports that we’re all right. The Governor feels absolutely sure!” Smith himself had said to 
Perkins that the intensity of his crowds seemed auspicious. “I know politics and I know political 
crowds,” Smith told her. “I know political loyalties. I have never seen anything like this. This 
must mean something.”2193  
 
It is hard to say how much of this was wishful thinking and how much was just attempts 
to maintain esprit de corps.  Later Moskowitz, Proskauer, and Herbert Lehman all said that they 
knew their cause would end in defeat. In 1935, Smith wrote that he had really expected to win in 
November, but he was no political novice and, despite the intensity of crowds in the Northeast, 
part of him knew the score. Later in life he suggested that “we partly knew at the time” that 
Election Day was not going to pan out as Democrats hoped. And in The Happy Warrior, her 
affectionate remembrance of her father, Emily Smith Warner revealed in 1956 that Smith had 




But even Al Smith never predicted how badly it would turn out. 
 




“We are saved!” exulted Boston reformer Elizabeth Tilton, she of the “My America 
against Tammany” talk, when the returns came in on Election night. “I feel this great Country, its 
presence, lying out there in the vast darkness, like a soft thing enveloped in sweet, misty night, 
immense but one in purpose for the Clean Man, the Free Man.” The mood was less bright in Al 
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Smith’s campaign offices at the General Motors Building in New York, where Emily Smith 
Warner was trying to confirm the returns with World editor Herbert Swope. “It it possible that 
these reports we are getting from down South are right?” she asked. “That’s what is happening,” 
apologized Swope. “But there is something else that bothers me even more…New York State. 
Your father is going to lose that too.”2195 
 
John J. Raskob had been half-right. There had been a 400-vote electoral landslide, only 
not in Smith’s direction. In fact, Herbert Hoover won 444 electoral votes, the most ever, and 40 
states, as well as 21.4 million popular votes – six million more than Coolidge – constituting 58% 
of the vote. Smith, meanwhile, ended up with 87 electoral votes, eight states, 15 million votes, 
and 41% of the vote. The Governor had won 6.7 million more votes than John W. Davis in 1924 
and carried the nation’s thirteen largest cities, both firsts for a Democrat – but that seemed little 
consolation given all else. While the West had stayed Republican, Hoover had carved away 
Virginia, North Carolina, Florida, and Texas from the Solid South. In the Northeast, on the other 
hand, Smith won only Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Republicans also picked up seven seats 
in the Senate and thirty seats in the House, giving President-Elect Hoover a sizable governing 
majority on both ends of Congress. And in the cruelest blow of all, even as Franklin Roosevelt 




“Losing his own state,” thought Smith friend and ally Walter Lippmann, “was more than 
he could stand.” The day after the election, Al Smith announced he was retiring from American 
politics. “I will never lose my interest in public affairs, that is a sure thing. But as far as running 
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for office again is concerned – that’s finished.” When asked by the World why he had been 
beaten so decisively, Smith emphasized first the Coolidge prosperity, followed by 
contentiousness over Prohibition and his religion. To Frances Perkins, he was more forthright. 
“Well, I’ll tell you,” Smith said, “I don’t think we can allege the reason anywhere, or put the 
reason at any of these things. To tell you the truth, Commissioner, the time hasn’t come when a 
man can say his beads in the White House.” A thorough statistical analysis of the election results 
in 1979 by historian Allan Lichtman came to the same conclusion – Catholicism, more than 
anything else including Prohibition, had been the issue of the campaign. Thomas Walsh’s worst 
fear had come true. “The ‘Catholic’ question has been settled for good,’ one correspondent wrote 
the Senator. “No party will again risk that chance.”2197 
 
The Nation and The New Republic were mortified about what all the prejudice revealed 
about the American people. “We must confess to both disappointment and shame,” the editors of 
The Nation, wrote just before the election. “Disappointment that a campaign like this could not 
have been kept on a decent level, and shame that our nakedness is thus exposed to the world. We 
cannot but hang our heads when we think of the effect that all this will have upon foreign 
observers. They will once more say that we are a land of barbarians, and that, whenever we 
desist from the chase of the almighty dollar, we reveal an attitude of mind no whit different from 
that which led to the killing of the witches in Salem.” This, averred TNR, had been “the bitterest 
political fight in at least a generation…[A]n unprecedented number of voters will cast their 
ballots, not for a candidate but against one.” A decade that had begun amidst a wave of abnormal 
panic over the “Red Menace” approached its end with an outpouring of national revulsion 
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towards the possibility of a Catholic president – It did not speak well for the possibility of 




“Regret and conceal it as we may, religion had more to do with the overwhelming defeat 
of Governor Smith than any other one thing,” agreed George Norris soon after the election. “The 
madness of religious prejudice and hatred” – “the most abhorrent thing” in American life – had 
worked to “frighten misinformed people in regard to the dangers of a Catholic domination.” 
Worse, the anti-Catholicism of 1928, Norris argued, “has sown the seeds of hatred, prejudice and 
jealousy, and they will grow and bear fruit long after the present generation has passed away.” 
And all the while, Norris thought, “the greatest monopoly that ever existed,” the power trust, had 
laughed. Still, having broken from the Republicans in 1928, Norris “never felt so independent in 
my life. I am not sorry for what I did. I am proud of it, and I have been made so, to some extent 
at least, by the enemies who have jumped on me and the friends who have deserted me; but the 
main reason for my feeling of satisfaction, or one that really counts, is that I have an absolutely 
clear conscience on the subject.” Whatever had happened in 1928, Norris still believed “a great 
majority of our people are truly progressive and at heart believe in the fundamental principles for 
which the progressive group have fought.” Norris would continue the fight.2199 
 
Another progressive satisfied with his defection despite the final results was Harold 
Ickes. “It was a landslide for Hoover,” he said to Johnson, “although as one who voted for Smith, 
and has no regrets for so doing, I am able to derive some consolation from the size of Smith’s 
popular vote.” Like Johnson, who had said as early as September that Hoover would be elected 
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“due principally to the religious issue,” Ickes said there was no “doubt in my mind that the 
religious issue was the one that cut deepest.” As for the president-elect, Ickes didn’t “like Hoover 
any better than I ever did. I would like him better if he expressed a little pardonable human 
pleasure in the result, but his woodenlike expression indicates one or two things to me, either that 
he is immune to all human ordinary emotions or that he thinks he is a vice-regent of God 
divinely appointed to favor our country with the infallible administration that he doubtless 
proposes to give us.”2200  
 
As for Johnson, he was disgusted and at the end of his rope with the one-issue politics of 
the time. “It is generally accepted that the big thing in our country is prohibition,” he told Ickes 
in March 1929, “and that any human being may be tattooed with every indecency and leprous 
with immorality, but will be cleansed of all his sins if he shouts loudly enough for the eighteenth 
amendment and the Volstead Act…No question of supremacy of a power trust; no evil of the 
orgy of stock gambling; no encroachment by special privilege upon the peoples’ rights to a 
country gone mad over liquor laws, and no domestic wrong will receive either attention or 
publicity.”2201 
 
Ickes shared Johnson’s frustrations with both Hoover and the ascendance of Prohibition. 
“I remarked to a friend of mind this morning,” he replied soon after inauguration day, “that it 
would be an irony of fate if this superintellect, this great engineer and administrator would have 
to face during his administration a business and financial depression after little Calvin Coolidge, 
possessed of no ability at all, was able to leave office with a record of abundant national 
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prosperity to his supposed credit. And yet I wouldn’t be surprised if just this thing would 
happen.” Ickes was also “particularly delighted that Franklin Roosevelt should have won for 
governor in New York.” Other than the sheer schadenfreude of seeing a Roosevelt other than 
Teddy Jr. take the Empire State first, Ickes thought that FDR, if he maintained “a successful 
administration, may offer a leadership against Hoover four years from now that won’t have to 
struggle against religious prejudice and social snobbery, although, personally, I wish it were in 
the cards for Al Smith to sweep the country in 1932. There would be a bit of poetic justice about 
that that would be very gratifying to me.”2202 
 
Ickes wasn’t the only one whose hopes now turned to Franklin Roosevelt. “The one 
bright spot on this extremely dark horizon is the fact that you have been elected Governor of 
New York,” former diplomat Sumner Welles wrote FDR.  The Governor of Virginia, Harry 
Byrd, told Roosevelt he was “the hope of the Democratic party.” He was also the hope of Al 
Smith, who thought he might be able to continue on in politics as the eminence grise of the 
Roosevelt administration. “I told him I’d come up every week if he wanted me to,” Smith told 
Frances Perkins. “I could be there Monday and Tuesday. Those are the big legislative days. I 
could see people for him. I could deal with them. I could talk with the Republicans and 
Democrats. I could help him with a lot of things.” He also suggested Roosevelt install Belle 
Moskowitz “right there in his own office. She can see people. She can arrange things. She can 
keep in touch with me, tell me what’s going on. I can tell her what ought to be done.” Roosevelt 
remained courteous to his former mentor – though he also complained to Perkins that Smith was 
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calling every day offering unsolicited advice – but he was also determined to be his own man. It 




While many Democrats lapsed into despair after Smith’s landslide loss, H.L. Mencken 
thought the candidate had done the Democracy a good deed, even in defeat. “Hoover could have 
beaten Thomas Jefferson quite as decisively as he beat Al,” Mencken averred. “His judgment of 
the American people was cynical but sound…He let Al bombard them with ideas, confident that 
ideas would only affright and anger them. Meanwhile he did business behind the door with all 
the professional boob-squeezers, clerical and lay.” The Hoover rout “did credit to his gifts as a 
politician,” Mencken conceded. “But Al hogged all the glory as a statesman and a man.” Now, 
he argued, the “future of the Democracy lies in following the furrow plowed by Al. As a feeble 
imitator of the Republican party it has no chance. But as a party of progress and enlightenment, 
dedicated to common sense, common rights, and common decency – as a  refuge for all men and 
women who tire of government by frauds and fanatics, exploiters and hypocrites, theologians 
and corruptionists, clowns and knaves – as the complete anti-Hoover party it faces opportunities. 
Can it win? Maybe. But, win or lose, it can at least carry on a brave and uncompromising war 
against the rabble of Babbitts and Gantrys which now afflict the country.”2204 
 
As for Hoover’s main progressive champion, William Borah was now in the catbird seat, 
even if The Nation now despised him. William Kenyon wrote the Senator after the election and 
deemed him “the conquerer of Texas…You reversed a great historical miracle and made water 
Republicans out of wine Democrats.” Will Hays – master of Hollywood and servant of the 
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Continental Trading Company – told Borah “his speeches probably exerted a greater influence 
upon the electorate than was ever before exercised by a human voice in a political campaign.”2205  
 
Borah accepted all these compliments, but his eye was fixed on the future. Affirming 
Hoover’s victory as “a blessing to the country,” he argued that “we have an opportunity to put 
the Republican party in a position where it can remain in power without much trouble for the 
next twenty years” – hopefully one that would listen to him more often. But when Hoover 
extended the offer of Attorney General or possibly even Secretary of State to the Idaho Senator, 
it was “grudgingly tendered and gleefully declined,” in the words of one reporter. Borah instead 
desired to remain in the Senate. “I have had a lot of fun out of dry champion Borah’s refusal an 
opportunity to track the demon rum into its lair and slay it with its naked hands,” Ickes mused to 
Hiram Johnson. “I wonder just why Hoover offered to appoint him Attorney General. This 
appointment and its declination only served to make Borah look ridiculous.” In any case, very 
soon into the Hoover administration, Borah – never happier than when playing the quixotic, 
principled insurgent of the Senate – was up to his old tricks again.2206 
 
One of the Republicans who showered effusive praise on Borah for his campaigning was 
the Sage of Emporia. “What a brave old lion you are!” Will White exclaimed to the Senator. 
“How splendidly you waged the battle. You knew what the issue was when no one else did.”  To 
White, that issue was definitively the Noble Experiment. “Mr. Hoover carried the South on 
prohibition,” he said to one correspondent. “It wasn’t religion. I was down there and I know.” To 
Louis Brandeis, White offered a longer and more forthright answer. “I think thousands of 
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western progressives balked at Smith,” he wrote, “first because he was going too fast; second 
because he zigzagged on the wrong side of traffic on prohibition; and third because he 
represented a strange, unfamiliar, and to many narrow minds, an abhorrent tendency in our 
national life. Partly it was religion that symbolized the distrust. But I think it was chiefly an 
instinctive feeling for the old rural order and the old rural ways…the old order holds fast in spite 
of our urban and industrial development.” When Brandeis asked him, “Shall we soon have 
another ‘great rebellion?’” White thought: “Probably not, I should say. We shall probably have a 
slow evolutionary adjustment of the blessings of prosperity…I hope will all my heart that the 
Hoover administration will mean just this, for I see no other immediate hope.”2207 
 
White was not alone. “We were in a mood for magic,” recalled journalist Anne O’Hare 
McCormick. “We summoned a great engineer to solve our problems for us; now we sat back 
comfortably and confidently to watch the problems being solved.” By all accounts, the machine 
had been well-prepared for Hoover. “No Congress of the United States ever assembled on 
serving the state of the union,” Calvin Coolidge said in December 1928, in his last address to that 
body,  “has met with a more pleasing prospect than that which appears at the present time.” The 
outgoing president pointed out that “[f]our times we have made a drastic revision of internal 
revenue system, abolishing many taxes and substantially reducing all others…One-third of the 
national debt has been paid, while much of the other two-thirds has been refunded at lower rates, 
and these savings of interest and constant economies have enabled us to repeat the satisfying 
process of more tax reductions.” Lower and lower tax rates, a budget brought to balance, little to 
no government intervention in business – “That is constructive economy in the highest degree,” 
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President Coolidge averred. “It is the cornerstone of prosperity. It should not fail to be 
continued.” And with the economy humming along to these fiscal principles, it was now time for 




“It was the bitter experience of all public men from George Washington down,” Hoover 
wrote in his memoirs about his entering politics in 1919, “that democracies are at least 
contemporarily fickle and heartless.” In January 1929, as he prepared to embark on his 
presidency, he confessed similar doubt to the editor of the Christian Science Monitor in words 
that very much echoed Woodrow Wilson’s remark to George Creel on the way to Paris a decade 
earlier. “I have no dread of the ordinary work of the presidency,” Hoover said. “What I do fear is 
the result of the exaggerated idea the people have conceived of me. They have a conviction that I 
am some sort of superman, that no problem is beyond my capacity…If some unprecedented 
calamity should come upon the nation…I would be sacrificed to the unreasoning disappointment 
of a people who expected too much.”2209 
 
But that is another story.  
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CONCLUSION: TIRED RADICALS 
 
“It seems strange in the light of later experiences that we so whole-heartedly believed in those 
days, that if we could only get our position properly before the public, we would find an 
overwhelming response.” – Jane Addams, 19302210 
 
“The old reformer has become the Tired Radical and his sons and daughters drink at the fountain 
of the American Mercury. They have no illusions but one. And that is they can live like Babbitt 
and think like Mencken.” – Norman Thomas, 1926.2211 
 
“I have only lost my faith in man, not my pity for him. That is stronger than ever.” – Fremont 
Older, 19262212 
  
“I tell you, it’s damned discouraging to be a reformer in the wealthiest land in the world.” – 
Fiorello La Guardia, 19282213 
 
Guns aren’t lawful / Nooses give / Gas smells awful / You might as well live. – Dorothy Parker, 
19262214   
 
The Strange Case of Reynolds Rogers 
 
 
 On September 8
th
, 1932 – nearly three years after the October 1929 crash of the stock 
market that seemingly inaugurated Hard Times, and with the election campaign between 
embattled President Herbert Hoover and Governor Franklin Roosevelt of New York in full swing 
– the White House had some very strange news to report. Four days earlier, the President’s close 
friend and confidant, Colonel Raymond Robins, was supposed to meet with Hoover to discuss 
the urgent need for stronger enforcement of Prohibition, a case Robins had been making over the 
past nine months on a 286-city tour. But Robins never showed up. On September 3
rd
, he met a 
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friend for lunch at the City Club in New York, and was set to board the train to Washington DC. 
Robins had even left the forwarding address of his usual hotel, the Dodge, with the Club. But 




“Friends of ours in Washington and New York are helping us with the search for him,” 
Margaret Dreier Robins, obviously beside herself, told the press, “but I feel sure that bootleggers 
have at last carried out their frequent threats.” Mrs. Robins had seriously begun to worry when 
Raymond never contacted her on her birthday. In the meantime, federal agents began searching 
for leads. Robins’ luggage was still sitting in his room at the City Club in New York. A few 
acquaintances of Robins said they were sure they had seen him on the street back home in 
Chicago after the date he went missing but before it went public. “I was walking north and he 
was going south in State Street,” said one man who had known Robins for two decades. “I 
recognized him and said ‘Hello, Mr. Robins.’ He answered me and walked on.” Dry advocate 
Daniel Poling, with whom Robins had lunched in New York, thought this was impossible. 
“Colonel Robins has received many threats, but I think it is more probable that he is suffering 
from a temporary illness – amnesia.” Another close friend, a Dr. Fred Smith of White Plains, 
thought he might be on a “secret mission” of some kind. “The Colonel is a lone wolf,” Smith 
said. “He is accustomed to work alone when he wants some special bit of information.”2216 
  
The Secret Service followed up on the Chicago leads, but the trail was cold. A month 
later, Margaret Dreier Robins briefed Hoover herself on the search for Raymond. She remained 
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sure bootleggers were involved, and told the press of threats Robins had received near their 
winter home in Florida. “I have such faith in his resourcefulness and persuasiveness that unless 
they have killed him without giving him a chance I feel he will come out of this in some way,” 
she said. “Since we were married, twenty-seven years ago, he has never left me for a day without 
letting me know where he was.” By the end of October, Robins’ friend from the Outlawry 
campaign, Salmon Levinson, said there was “little hope.” “President Hoover and Senator Borah 
of Idaho, his good friends, are aghast that such a thing could happen to a man of his 
prominence,” said Levinson, adding that Robins “had prepared a statement in favor of the re-
election of President Hoover to be released within a few days after the date of his 
disappearance.” Otherwise, the man had simply fallen off the face of the earth.2217 
 
Even as the election of 1932 wended its way to  its inevitable conclusion – Roosevelt 
demolished Hoover, winning 472 electoral votes, 42 states, and 58% of the vote – Colonel 
Robins’ bizarre disappearance remained a national news story. On November 11th, flipping 
through an issue of the rural newspaper Grit, thirteen-year-old Carl Byrd Fisher of Whittier, 
North Carolina showed the picture of the missing Robins to his father. “Dad, have you seen this 
man?,” Carl asked. Carl’s father, a local shopkeeper in that small mountain town, did a double-
take. “I surely have. That’s Mr. Rogers.”2218 
 
J.O. Fisher contacted Levinson, who contacted the authorities. A week later, two local 
Prohibition agents confronted Reynolds H. Rogers, a Kentucky mining engineer who had come 
to town two months earlier and settled in at the boarding house. Rogers was well-liked in the 
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small mountain community, despite seeming a bit of a strange bird. Other than giving speeches 
on behalf of world peace, Theodore Roosevelt’s birthday, and the re-election of Herbert Hoover, 
the man spent most of his time hiking, prospecting, and sitting in a lookout he had constructed in 
an old oak tree. “How do you do, Colonel?” the federal agents asked Rogers, when they caught 
up with him. “Good morning,” Rogers replied. “Why the Colonel?” The agents took a 
handwriting sample, which matched what they had from Robins. The next day, Robins’ nephew, 




Reynolds Rogers, nee Raymond Robins, was taken to a hospital in nearby Asheville, 
sixty miles east. In the pockets of his overalls were found several crumpled newspaper clippings 
about his disappearance. An overjoyed Margaret soon arrived with more Prohibition agents from 
Spartanburg, South Carolina, where she had been continuing the search. “I don’t know this 
woman,” said Raymond. “She must be mistaken.” Robins was then transferred to a private 
mental hospital, where Margaret told the press she had “had a pleasant, friendly chat” with her 
husband, “but he did not recognize me as his wife.” Otherwise, “he was well and healthy in 
every way.” When the doctors asked Robins where his home was, he told them he had none. “I 
feel that I’m surrounded by four high walls,” Robins said, “so impossibly high that I cannot get 
out.” After two more days, with Mrs. Robins returning each day, Raymond at last had a 
breakthrough. “Margaret!” he cried, as she held his hand.2220  
 
“I have come through a terrible experience,” Robins said in a statement from he and 
Margaret’s Florida winter home a month later, his memory and sanity restored. “Those who are 
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wise in matters of this sort assure me that the darkness that overtook me in the midst of  my 
day’s work was a provision of nature to save me from a serious collapse. Those who meet me in 
the future will be able to judge of my mental clarity. Those who have known my life in the past 
will not believe that I have been a quitter…In so far has there has been untrue and unfair 
comment, I forgive its authors and accept it as the cost of a life spent in battle for causes I hold 
dear.”2221 
 
As far as anyone can tell, Robins’ break with reality and amnesia were not faked. The 
Colonel’s mother had suffered from schizophrenia, and he himself had epilepsy as a child, was 
prone to bouts of both mania and depression, and had suffered previous nervous breakdowns in 
1914 and 1921. And along with Robins’ rigorous schedule of trying to prop up the failing 
support for Prohibition, he was also serving as Chairman of the Board of the First National Bank 
of Brooksville, Florida, in which both his family assets and those of many close friends were 
invested. The Hoover years were not good years for banks, and Brooksville was no exception. In 
fact, Robins came very close to losing his and Margaret’s home, Chinsegut Hill, until he worked 




And then there was the matter of Hoover. Within a year of the Great Engineer’s election, 
Robins saw a devastating loss to come in 1932. “Hoover has lost more of dominion and prestige 
in one short year – than I have before known to overtake any leader in American politics.” As the 
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Depression darkened, Robins was in a full rage about what he saw from the Great Engineer. 
“Hoover is a complete wash out as a political leader,” he told a friend. “[H]e has failed utterly as 
the Big Wisdom in the worst economic crisis I think I have ever known this country to suffer, he 
has been a lap or six behind on all relief and done nothing vital or creative after his first efforts to 
prevent cuts in wages and unemployment…He has alienated Labor, the Negroes, Women, all the 
Social Justice folks, and the most effective hard-boiled organization leaders along with 
Borah…and many others of liberal minds.” Quoting the words of a major Hoover fundraiser, 
Robins declared the president “a dead mackerel on the political shore shining and stinking in the 
pale moonlight that precedes his complete eclipse, leaving simply the memory of a bad smell.” 
Nonetheless, Robins was committed to the president, and so, before his episode, pledged “to 
walk and speak and write and work for the election of Herbert Hoover – to the hidden music of a 
dead march to an open political grave.”2223 
The Progressive Revival 
 
The music may be hidden, but the failure of Herbert Hoover’s presidency was there for 
all to see. “That the Hoover administration has come to a cropper seems to be the general feeling 
from end to end of the Republic,” Mencken wrote in May 1930. By the following year, Oswald 
Villard – who never much liked the man – thought “Mr. Hoover’s position is nothing less than 
tragic. If he is the sensitive, proud, and high-minded man that his intimate friends have certified 
him to be, it must seem to him that in his case the road to glory has led but to despair. For years 
he planned and worked and schemed and stooped to achieve the greatest gift the American 
people can bestow. It has turned to ashes in his hands. Not in my thirty-four years of journalistic 
experience has any President so failed to impress or to win the public.” “He is a tragic figure, one 
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to be pitied,” Villard concluded, “and his own unhappiness appears mirrored in every counterfeit 
presentment which reaches an entirely unresponsive public”2224 
 
Now the fate of America – indeed, the entire world – rested in the hands of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt who, other than promising that Happy Days Are Here Again, had run a 
campaign as carefully modulated as Al Smith’s had been occasionally intemperate. Writing of 
the Democratic candidate two months before Election Day, the editors of The New Republic 
detected a “philosophical opportunism at the base of the candidate’s thought. He has not made up 
his mind whether we are headed toward collectivism or away from it. To him it is sufficient to 
suggest particular programs for particular situations, regardless of the general goal. If one of 
these programs pleases the radicals and another the conservatives, so much the better for his 
chances of election.”2225   
 
Indeed, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal would be remembered, in the words of Richard 
Hofstadter, as “a chaos of experimentation,” as the president applied all the many different 
schools of reform available to him – from the associationalism of Hoover and the central 
planning of the War  to the regional planning of George Norris and the social welfare legislation 
of Al Smith and Frances Perkins – to try to jumpstart the economy and alleviate the suffering of 
American families. There was often a sense of flying without a map or compass which some 
progressives found intensely aggravating. “We seemed doomed to try out everything,” William 
Borah complained to a constituent in 1934. But after Republicans were decisively beaten – again 
– in the midterms that same year, Borah conceded the New Deal was the only game in town. 
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“[W]hat were the people offered?” he told TIME. “People can’t eat the Constitution.” George 
Norris, a much more vigorous proponent of the New Deal than his Idaho colleague, had led the 
formation of a National Progressive League for Roosevelt in 1932, which included among its 
ranks former Republicans like Fiorello La Guardia, Julia Lathrop, Grace Abbott, and John L. 
Lewis. He was more sanguine about the experimentalism at the heart of the New Deal, and saw 
no other possible way forward. Asked in 1936 how Abraham Lincoln would respond to the 
Depression, Norris said, “Lincoln would be just like me. He wouldn’t know what the hell to 
do.”2226  
 
Even if he wasn’t wedded to any one school of reform, Roosevelt considered himself an 
heir of the progressive tradition, surrounded himself with like-minded individuals, and often tied 
his work back to the fights of the 1920s. “A comparative study of the Progressive platform of 
1924 and the policies enacted into law by Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal,” historian 
Kenneth Mackay wrote in 1947, “would indicate that, perhaps unintentionally, much of the latter 
was plagiarized. The Progressives get no credit line for the TVA, the ‘rapidly progressive’ 
income (and inheritance) tax schedules, the Wagner Labor Relations Act, the various New Deal 
aids to agriculture, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the abolition of child labor.” Yet, 
he notes, all of these were part of the 1924 La Follette-Wheeler platform. In fact, the plagiarism 
was quite intentional. “If Franklin had not been a Roosevelt,” Rexford Tugwell said of his boss, 
“I am quite certain he would have liked to be a La Follette.”2227 
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Similarly, to staff his administration and serve as advisors, Roosevelt turned to the 
progressives he knew and admired from the La Follette and Smith candidacies and other fights of 
the 1920s, most notably Frances Perkins as Secretary of Labor (and, on the advice of Hiram 
Johnson, who turned it down)  Harold Ickes as Secretary of the Interior, but also Donald 
Richberg, John Commons, Felix Frankfurter, Basil Manley, Mary Dewson, Paul Kellogg, Grace 
Abbott, John A. Ryan, and countless other rank-and-file reformers who had worked to keep the 
flame alive. “[M]any of the very men who are now engaged in aiding President Roosvelt,” wrote 
Congressman J.E. Watson of Indiana during the New Deal, “were in Wisconsin at that time [in 
1924] helping La Follette.”2228 
 
Perhaps no other progressive supporters were as enthused by the New Deal as the 
reformers, many of them women, who had fought for so long to see a stronger federal role in 
ensuring social welfare. Although Florence Kelley and Julia Lathrop both perished in 1932 
before these efforts reached culmination, as did Jane Addams in 1935, Lillian Wald was there to 
bear witness for her long-struggling friends and colleagues. “I…see many things developing,” 
she said as Social Security wended its way through Congress, “that I feared we would live a long 
time to see throughout this country.” “What was the New Deal anyhow?” Frances Perkins later 
said, “Was it a political plot? Was it just a name for a period in history? Was it a revolution? To 
all these questions I answer ‘No.’ It was something quite different…It was, I think, basically, an 
attitude. An attitude that found voice in expressions like ‘the people are what matter to 
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government,’ and ‘a government should aim to give all the people under its jurisdiction the best 
possible life.’”2229  
 
This conception of government, born in the settlement houses and the social work 
conferences, and nurtured through the adverse climate of the 1920s, became central to the New 
Deal and to liberalism thereafter. “Perhaps you may ask, ‘Does the road lead uphill all the way?’ 
a triumphant Grace Abbott told a graduating class of women in 1934 of the reformer’s life, “And 
I must answer, ‘Yes, to the very end,’ But if I offer you a long, hard struggle, I can also promise 
you great rewards.” Grace Abbott, Wald, Norris – these progressives got to enjoy those rewards. 




But  many did not. And even for those who did, the struggle changed them and their 
philosophy for good. 
 
Confessions of the Reformers 
 
While Raymond Robins’ flight into the persona of Reynolds Rogers was a particularly 
pronounced reaction to the pressures of the time, Robins was far from the only reformer to battle 
a seemingly merciless onslaught of despair. “Few indeed are the progressives of my generation,” 
wrote Donald Richberg in 1929, “who have survived the bludgeoning of these years.” Reading 
through their letters and writings during this period, the pervasive sadness is inescapable. “We 
are in the midst of a season of pessimism, verging at times on despair,” Borah wrote in 1922. 
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Two years later, as the Teapot Dome revelations unfurled, Borah told a friend the situation in 
Washington “is very deplorable and very demoralizing. I have felt for the last few weeks more 
keenly and more firmly than every that I would like to get out. I can’t see anything much ahead 
in the matter except dreary, hard work and not much in the way of results…The whole thing 
seems rotten to the core.” “There is no short road to Justice and Mercy in this Republic,” 
lamented Florence Kelley similarly after the Adkins decision in 1922. By 1927, as the nation 
seemed in full retrenchment, she told John Commons that “keeping the light on is probably the 
best contribution that we can make where there is now Stygian darkness.”2231  
 
In 1921, Hiram Johnson confessed his own depression to Harold Ickes, and how the 
“constant defeats with dwindling support in each, are utterly destroying what standing I have. I 
cannot help it though…I have got to go ahead in just the same fashion in which I am acting.” 
Four years later, Ickes argued  “progressives…don’t exist anymore except in a few states like 
Wisconsin. I don’t see any immediate prospect of a resurrection of the progressive party. We are 
still suffering from the moral reaction that hit us after the war and there doesn’t seem to be any 
leader in sight to rally us or any issues on which such a leader, if he existed, could rally us.” As it 
was, Ickes thought, “the reactionaries are in full control…[U]ntil the people generally think there 
is something more worthwhile in life than making money politically we will go along the path 
we are now following. It seems to me the only thing to do is to wait for the pendulum to reach 
the limit of its swing in the reactionary direction and wait for it to begin to come down again. 
That it will do is inevitable, but when it will do so no one can foretell.”2232 
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 Later that year, Ickes felt even worse. “I am doing nothing politically because I don’t 
know what to do or where to turn,” he told Johnson, to whom he confided because “[o]f all the 
old progressive crowd you are the only one to whom I can express myself with the utmost 
frankness…I am not cheerful over the present situation or future prospects as I can envision 
them.” Johnson understood completely. “Gifford likes you and me now,” he replied. “He sees us 
(pardon me for saying this of you; I mean it rather of myself) as dead himself politically and he 
has no way to turn in his political sepulcher except to those who are moldering with him.” Two 
years later, Johnson reiterated to Ickes that “the political world has passed us by and…our 
political philosophy has become…quaint and bizarre.”2233 
 
“God, how I would like to get out and raise hell for righteousness!” William Allen White 
swore in 1926, “instead of which I sit in my office and write unimportant editorials and go to my 
house and write unimportant books, with the gorge kicking like a mule all the time.” The 
following year, he told Gifford Pinchot that “[w]e have got to sink lower before we rise higher. 
Prosperity must break. We must get out of our timidity complex. Lord! Heaven! How scared we 
are of change for the better. Stability is our God and until we change our Gods we won’t change 
our attitude toward living. I’m pretty hopeless.” George Norris – who thought heavily about just 
up and resigning from the Senate – informed The Nation in 1927 that “I am on the downhill side 
– sometimes, I think, traveling rapidly. The end cannot be very many years in advance. I think I 
have, to a great extent, run my race.” “It is pretty poor pickings for a man who doesn’t believe in 
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having the big fellows control everything,” Gifford Pinchot shrugged in 1928. “[T]imes change 
and the wheel will eventually revolve. In the meantime we have got to grin and bear it.”2234 
 
The two bestsellers of 1929, Walter Lippmann’s A Preface to Morals and Joseph Wood 
Krutch’s A Modern Temper, also attest to this crisis of the progressive spirit. Some who could 
not stand to look into that existential abyss turned instead to the comfort of religion. “The sum of 
the whole matter is this,” wrote Woodrow Wilson in 1923’s The Road Away from Revolution, his 
last published work. “[O]ur civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed 
spiritually. It can be saved only by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ and being made 
free and happy by the practices which spring out of that spirit.” New Republic editor and founder 
Herbert Croly, searching for the wellspring of virtue in a materialistic age, also retreated into 
mysticism and spiritualism during the decade. Assessing these late-period writings after Croly’s 
death in 1930, Edmund Wilson thought Croly was, not very successfully, attempting “to explain 
to his own rational intelligence this mysterious spring of spiritual power.” He was trying to 
“make it possible for us to maintain that faith in human life which, in the America of our day, the 
comfortable, the brutalized, the timed, the hopeless and pleasure-drugged, the fatigued and 
machinery-driven, seem pressing on every hand, and within ourselves, to destroy.”2235 
 
Faith in humanity is exactly the quality that the experience of the decade took away from 
the progressives. Before the War, the foundations of  progressivism as a civic philosophy were 
that Man can – and should – be improved, that politicians should act to uphold the public 
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interest, and that the great mass of people, if public opinion were duly educated and accurate 
information provided, would come to embrace progressive principles by sheer force of reason. 
By the end of the decade, all those beliefs had attenuated to a vast degree. In short, the very 
foundations of the progressive worldview had crumbled. 
 
One of the definitive statements of this disillusionment with what had been the basic 
tenets of progressivism is Frederic Howe’s 1925 book Confessions of a Reformer. “Facts were of 
little value,” Howe wrote, citing Wilson’s experience at Versailles in 1919. “Paris had all the 
facts in the world. Van-loads of facts. Tons of expert reports – an army of experts. Men did not 
believe in the truth. They lied quite frankly…[T]hinking things through I began to see 
similarities, parallels, universal conditions. The scholar had failed at home as he had failed 
abroad. Facts were of little value; morality did not guide men.” This was eye-opening for Howe. 
“The one thing I had clung to all these years was a belief in my class convinced by facts”: 
 
It was mind that would save the world, the mind of my class aroused from indifference, from 
money-making, from party loyalty and coming out into the clear light of reason. I now began to 
see that men were not concerned over the truth. It did not interest them when economic interests 
were at stake. The mind was as closed to facts as a safety-deposit vault. There was a sign outside: 
‘Do not enter here.’2236  
 
 
“The world had not been saved by morality,” Howe concluded. “Apparently it had little 
to hope for from the human mind.” Having pronounced the death of reason and educated public 
opinion, Howe also determined, with regret, that the public interest was a ridiculous abstraction. 
“Bankers thought as bankers, railway-owners as railway-owners, railway employees thought as 
railway employees…Men did not think disinterestedly in politics; they followed their economic 
interests. They were moved by elemental motives. Like the amoeba going out for food, man went 
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out for the things he wanted; sought to satisfy his wants by a minimum of effort. That was 
universal in nature. Moral professions were weaker than instinctive desires.”2237  
 
Instead of fighting for a public interest, Howe argued, progressives should in the future 
align themselves with the working man and woman. “Labor could not serve privilege…as 
privilege could only be enjoyed by the few. By necessity labor would serve freedom, democracy, 
equal opportunity for all…The place for the liberal was in labor’s ranks.” The death of the public 
interest was not an easy moment for Howe. “The new truth that a free world would only come 
through labor was forced on me. I did not seek it; did not welcome it. But it crowded into mind 
and demanded tenancy as the old occupants gave notice to leave.”2238 
 
Howe was far from the only progressives to come to these conclusions. When it came to 
the demise of public opinion, even the charitable Jane Addams noted in 1930 that “it seems 
strange in the light of later experiences that we so whole-heartedly believed in those days, that if 
we could only get our position properly before the public, we would find an overwhelming 
response.” The decade just had not borne this belief out. “It is a striking commentary of our 
times, wrote Samuel McCune Lindsey on the 25
th
 anniversary of the National Child Labor 
Committee in 1929, “that at first the committee was not incorporated, for the reformers of the 
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new century believed its task would soon be accomplished once the American public was 
informed of the facts. The public has been informed – and child labor persists.”2239 
 
In a February 1926 symposium held by The Survey on Frederic Howe’s Confessions – 
entitled “Where are the Pre-War Radicals?” – many other reformers were less politic and more 
emphatic about the lessons that had been forced on them. “A large part of pre-war radicalism,” 
argued labor reformer George Alder, “dealt with political machinery intended to make the mass 
power of the uninformed common man apply to problems which he was incompetent to decide. 
This program is no longer appealing.” “One must always remember that human beings do not 
reason,” admonished Clarence Darrow. “They live from their emotions and so far as they do 
reason, this is controlled by their emotions. They are patriotic when they are getting plenty to eat 
and begin to grumble when times are hard.” As Will White put what he had come to believe 
more bluntly elsewhere, the “majority of Americans are morons.”2240 
 
Even getting plenty to eat was no assurance of a progressive mindset.  “I thought all that 
was necessary to bring about a mild millennium was to raise wages,” sighed municipal reformer 
Fremont Older. “Improved living conditions would give the poor a chance to express these fine 
qualities that I felt they possessed, and there would be no further difficulty in quickly making the 
world a finer place to live. The high wages came…and what happened? The workers became 
more conservative. They bought automobiles, lived in better houses, dressed better, and acquired 
the habits of the well-to-do.” It was “a bad time for those who believe the people have any rights 
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in their Government,” Hiram Johnson lamented in 1925. “The psychology of ‘economy’ has 
twisted and distorted idealism and altruism.” Thanks to “the fat materialism of a corrupt age,” 
John Haynes Holmes argued similarly in 1927, “[o]ur people are fat, corrupt, contented.”2241 
 
The ACLU’s Roger Baldwin had also once believed “the old American faith that 
privileged classes could be controlled by the ‘Public.’” But “[m]ost of us have since been as 
disillusioned as Howe. There is no ‘Public’; ‘the ‘People’ as a political party are unorganizable.” 
It was time, he argued, to stop believing in “a phantom public” and realize that “the only power 
that works is class power.” This, of course, is what the Socialist contributors to The Survey’s 
symposium had been arguing all along. Howe “discovered in Paris what was perfectly patent in 
New York,” scoffed Morris Hillquit, ‘that the world was ruled by an exploiting class’..,and that 
there was but one class of people who could change that order.” Where Hillquit was caustic, an 
aging Eugene Debs, in the last year of his life, remained defiant. “We refuse to become 
discouraged over a temporary set-back in our own country,” Debs wrote in his contribution. “We 
are where we always were – just as radical, just as confident, just as determined…In three years 
we will present the American people with an American Socialist Party greater, stronger, more 
militant and more aggressive than we have had before.”2242 
 
Even some of the non-Socialists thought all the progressive pearl-clutching was 
overwrought. “Has the movement become a class struggle?” replied Burton Wheeler. “It has 
always been a class struggle. Every economic struggle is a class struggle. It does not matter 
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whether it has for its base the divinity of kings or the divinity of dollars.” Arthur Garfield Hays, 
reflecting on the depression afflicting his fellow reformers later in life, argued that “[m]any 
liberals, succumbing to an easy cynicism, moved over into the sneering section” during the 
Twenties. The problem, thought Hays, was that progressives were so invested in their theory of 
change they missed the positive transformations occurring in American life underneath their nose 
– People were happier, freer. As for himself, “I have no belief in any system as a system, 
whether it is called Capitalism, Socialism, Communism, or anything else. The liberal takes the 
world as he finds it; he will take any means to ameliorate bad conditions and improve 
society.”2243  
 
 In 1919, years before The Survey’s symposium and soon before his untimely death, 
Walter Weyl had written an essay entitled “Tired Radicals” which anticipated at least some of 
the disillusion of his generation in the decade to come. “[E]ven in good times, age deals harshly 
with radicals,” Weyl reminded his readers – “long before a man’s arteries begin to harden, he 
sees things more as his father and grandfather saw them.” Eventually, these Tired Radicals 
“become sensible, glacially sensible. They become expert in the science of Impossibles; they 
know better than anyone else why every thing is Impossible because have they not failed in 
every thing?” This was not a new problem. This was all part of the natural order of things. 
“There is no use crying over those who are graduated out of Radicalism,” said Weyl. “for the 
young trees grow where the old trees die.”2244 
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 The progressives who seemed most content in the Survey’s symposium were the ones 
who held in mind Weyl’s wisdom. “There is no use crying because our particular medicine is not 
needed forever,” said Norman Hapgood. “Other jobs approach, and they will be seen by other 
men.” “The flowers of last spring have withered and passed away, and the radicals of ten years 
ago have for the most part gone to seed,” wrote Basil Manly in similar fashion. “But fear not. 
Since the dawn of creation each spring has brought new crops of wild flowers – and weeds. So 
likewise the years will in due course bring forth anew, as from the dawn of History, new men 
and women in ever increasing numbers who will lift up their eyes to the light and devote at least 
the spring time of their lives to making this a happier and more beautiful world.” The founder of 
the muckraking journal McClure’s, John S. Phillips even had a vague notion of what form the 
new liberalism might take. “Out of the present materialism, penetrating and impregnating all 
classes in these days of widespread luxuries and indulgences, will arise other liberals,” he wrote. 
“I have an idea that this will be born of spiritual hunger rather than material deprivation. Man 
cannot live by automobiles and bathrooms alone.”2245 
 
Of course there would be more generations of reformers – indeed, only six years after the 
Survey’s litany of despair, many of the same progressives would take central roles in the “encore 
for reform” that was the New Deal. But the decade of War, Harding Normalcy, and Coolidge 
Prosperity had exacted a heavy toll on progressivism as both a movement and a public 
philosophy. The abiding Emersonian faith in the cleansing powers of democracy, the belief that 
public opinion on its own could and would effect positive change – these yielded to an embrace 
of government-by-experts and a more robust appreciation for civil liberties. The perhaps naïve 
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idea of a public interest, which could be articulated and then heeded by the people’s 
representatives, was – after the obvious ascendance of the business class during the Coolidge 
years – subsumed by the notion of a broker state that instead mitigated among competing 
interests. The critical progressive emphases on citizenship and developing and retaining each 
individual’s capacity of self-government faded, while the importance of providing welfare and 
justice to all, and entitling each citizen to his or her pursuit of happiness, all moved to the fore.  
 
For better or worse, when progressivism lost these abiding central faiths, it also lost much 
of its ambitions. “It wasn’t that today was any finer in 1919 than in 1932,” said John Dos Passos. 
“It was that in 1919 the tomorrows seemed vaster.” That same year, Franklin Roosevelt re-read 
the writings of Wilson and was surprised at the breadth of their scope. “It is interesting, now, to 
read his speeches,” he noted. “What is called ‘radical’ today, and I have reason to know whereof 
I speak, is mild compared to the campaign of Mr. Wilson.” Through the power of Ideals, 
progressives of that generation had tried to change the world, and, inevitably, a materialistic, 
fallen world changed them instead. “I do not now expect my plans for the world will ever be 
realized,” said Howe in 1926. “That is too much to ask. Every other man and woman wants a 
different world from that which I want. And they may have an equal right to have it.” 2246  
 
Instead of working to end war forever, or to mold better citizens, providing that equal 
right to pursue one’s own path, wherever it may lead, would become the democratic project in 
the decades to come. As progressivism became New Deal liberalism, reformers that worried less 
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about the potential of Humankind and more about the needs of actual men and women was in 
many ways a welcome change. But the diminished scope of the tempered progressive project 
carried over into other realms as well. Progressives, who once thought they could “subdue the 
power and arrogance of organized capitalism and remold it to the democratic patterns of the 
rights of man,” wrote John Haynes Holmes in 1927, now “have no confidence anymore – no 
confidence that we were ever justified in having confidence!” As historian Alan Brinkley shows 
in The End of Reform, the New Dealers would make one more go at this project. But, after 
attempting many different strategies to rein in capitalism between 1933 and 1937, or at least to 
bend it to the service of a sounder political economy – they would lose confidence as well, 
settling instead on an acknowledgment of the established order, in the hopes that, under 




To be sure, every generation faces their own bout with disillusionment, from the Radical 
Republicans who saw Reconstruction fail and Jim Crow rise to the liberals and radicals of the 
Sixties who watched the Great Society tear itself apart in Chicago, Memphis, Watts, and 
Vietnam. In 1953, almost thirty years after his father wondered if democracy would ever work 
and seven years after he lost the Wisconsin Republican primary to Joe McCarthy, Bob La 
Follette Jr. ended his life with a pistol his father had given him, bringing a sad conclusion to the 
tale of the Fighting La Follettes. In any decade of American life, fighting for progressive change 
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At the same time, the disenchantment of these progressives represents a truly unique 
moment in the American story. A generation of reformers who had grown up in the Victorian era 
were forced to confront not just the collapse of their beliefs and idealism after the War, but the 
sudden emergence of a twentieth century world of cars, communication, consumerism, popular 
culture, and advertising that arguably looks more like our own world today, almost a century 
later, than the world of their youth. The world that created them would never return. 
 
 In fact, while history invariably tends to rhyme and analogies can be drawn from any 
period, the 1920s – with the notable exception of the national drive for disarmament –  arguably 
speak more to life in the contemporary United States than any other decade in the first half of the 
last century. Then as now, we live in an America driven by popular, youth, and consumer 
culture, being transformed by new technologies, and emphasizing the pursuit of happiness. Once 
again, we are grappling with issues such as fears of terrorism and unrestricted immigration, the 
corporate corruption of government, and the appropriate role of civil liberties in American life. 
Once again, the popular and advertising-reinforced sense of general prosperity masks the 
economic troubles being faced by millions of Americans. 
 
Having forsaken the welfare state affirming path of Eisenhower, Nixon, and even 
Reagan, today’s Republican Party proudly embraces as the pathway to prosperity the Harding-
Coolidge-Mellon philosophy of low taxes, balanced budgets, limited government, and minimal 
interference with the prerogatives of business. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party, strangely 
reluctant to embrace its success in the New Deal and the Great Society, now veers back and forth 




securing the general welfare, and its ascendant Hoover wing, which calls for business-friendly 
public-private partnerships and a slightly more progressive version of the low-tax, no-deficit 
Republican philosophy. Not unlike 1928, one of the presidential candidates in 2012 was viewed 
by half the nation as a welcome avatar of a new, multicultural America coming into being, and 
by a significant minority as a dangerous, possibly even un-American harbinger of foreign values. 
Once again, from the near-collapse of Wall Street in 2008 to the undeniable signs of a warming 
planet in 2013, there are sizable hints that the current state of affairs is dancing on a precipice, 
and another Great Crash beckons. And once again progressives, having recently hoped they had 
arrived at a moment of profound change in American life, now find themselves embattled and 
embittered, trying to conserve former gains and searching for a way forward.  
 
So turns the wheel of history. One can imagine the Sage of Baltimore having a grand 
laugh about it all. Mencken, naturally, was not invited to the Survey’s symposium on 
Confessions of a Reformer, but he had his own answer for disillusioned progressives of his 
generation nonetheless. “Life may not be exactly pleasant,” he wrote in April 1928, “but it is at 
least not dull. Heave yourself into Hell today, and you may miss, tomorrow or next day, another 
Scopes trial, or another War to End War, or perchance a rich and buxom widow with all of her first 
husband’s clothes. There are always more Hardings hatching. I advocate hanging on as long as 
possible.” If Mencken’s caustic enjoyment of the world’s ironies isn’t enough to sustain in dark 
times, there is always the consciousness that previous generations – in the 1920s, before, and after – 
carried the torch of progressivism and persevered, and that, for their legacy and our world, there is 
much work left to be done. 2249  
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“[O]ur kind of reformers will not reappear because the conditions that made up what we were 
have gone,” Frederic Howe replied to his fellow progressives at the end of the 1926 symposium. 
“The reformer of tomorrow will fight with a different background.” He or she “will, I think, fight for 
substantially the same thing, for the things we fought for relate to the right to live. And the people 
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